Welfare and Values in Europe

Transitions related to Religion,
Minorities and Gender

National Overviews and Case Study Reports

Volume 2

Continental Europe:
Germany, France, Italy, Greece

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Coordinator
This research project was funded by the European Commission 6th Framework Programme. The project was also supported by the Foundation Samariterhemmet, the Faculty of Theology at Uppsala University, and the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation.

Information regarding the project is available at http://www.crs.uu.se/ or http://cordis.europa.eu/fp6/projects.htm

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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Welfare and Values in Europe

This book is the second in a series of three from the research project *Welfare and Values in Europe: Transitions Related to Religion, Minorities and Gender*, WaVE for short. The WaVE-project responded to a call by the European Commission’s 6th Framework Programme for research on ‘values and religions in Europe’. The call invited studies aiming ‘to better understand the significance and impact of values and religions in societies across Europe and their roles in relation to changes in society and to the emergence of European identities’. The Commission sought an exploration of how religion is used as a factor in solidarity or discrimination, tolerance or intolerance and inclusiveness or xenophobia. It was looking for insight on ways to ensure the peaceful coexistence of different value systems through a comparison of various policies and practices employed in European countries, and through a consideration of their relative degrees of success. It was the positive response by the European Commission to our proposal in 2005 that enabled the European research group to carry out this project successfully. The project ended formally in March 2009 with an international conference at Uppsala University; the work on these volumes has been completed since then.

The background to the study

The WaVE-project should be seen as part of a wider development of research in religion and society at Uppsala University. It started in the 1990s with a project on church and state in which, amongst other areas, the social/diaconal function of the Church of Sweden was investigated. The separation of church and state in Sweden in the year 2000 was analysed as part of the increasing separation between religion and society, but the study also included investigations into the deregulation of the welfare state and the

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1 The project was part of a broader initiative by the Swedish Research Council under the title ‘The State and the Individual: Swedish Society in the Process of Change’. The title of the project is: *From State Church to Free Folk Church. A Sociology of Religion, Service Theoretical and Theological Analysis in the face of Disestablishment between the Church of Sweden and the State in the year 2000*. The results are summarized in the final report: Bäckström, Anders and Ninna Edgardh Beckman and Per Pettersson (2004). *Religious Change in Northern Europe. The Case of Sweden*. Stockholm: Verbum.
increase of poverty resulting from the financial crises in Europe at the beginning of the 1990s. This development sparked a new interest in the organizations and associations of civil society, of which churches and religious organizations are part. After its separation from the state the Church of Sweden became the largest organization within the civil society in Sweden. The study formed the background for the inauguration of a Centre for the Study of Religion and Society at Uppsala University, an enterprise developed in conjunction with the Foundation Samariterhemmet.2

As part of the work on the church-state project an international reference group was formed. This group became the core of a new network with a clearer focus on the place of religion in the different welfare regimes of Europe. In 2003 the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation accepted a second project entitled Welfare and Religion in a European Perspective. A Comparative Study of the Role of the Churches as Agents of Welfare within the Social Economy (2003-2009) – it is known as WREP. The aim of the project was to analyse the function of majority churches as agents of welfare in a comparative European perspective. Its motivation lay in an awareness of common developments observed around Europe, such as an aging population, growing migration and an ever greater strain on the economy.

The WREP-project included four different welfare models together with four different majority church traditions with theologies that are 'incarnated' in the respective locality. That is a) the social democratic model of the European north which has developed within the context of Lutheran state churches (Sweden, Finland and Norway), b) the liberal model typical of Anglo-Saxon countries (England with its established Anglican Church), c) the conservative or Christian Democratic model found mainly in continental Europe, where the Catholic Church is dominant (France, Italy and to some extent Germany with its special history and bi-confessional status) and finally d) the countries of southern Europe where the state plays a weaker role compared with that of the family (Orthodox Greece but also Italy, at least to some extent). In total eight countries were covered by the project. In order to make the project feasible and at the same time collect reliable and comparable data, the study focused on one middle-sized town, in which different kinds of data were collected including printed material of various kinds and interviews with representatives of the local government, the churches and the wider population.

The project brought together different areas of society (a new idea at the time), namely the fields of religion, welfare, gender and social economy. The project revealed the interconnectedness between different welfare regimes of

2 An agreement between the Foundation Samariterhemmet and Uppsala University to develop research within the social/diaconal sphere of society was signed in 1999. The Centre has now changed its name to the Uppsala Religion and Society Research Centre and has moved to new premises at Uppsala University, see www.crs.uu.se for more information.
Europe and their background in both social/political and religious circumstances. The study also shows that care within religious organizations, as within the welfare organization of the state, is normally carried out by women. Our data reveal that the representatives of the local majority churches, of local governmental social organizations and of the population as a whole expect churches and voluntary organizations to function as complementary organizations to the state. At the same time a critical voice is asked for. The fact that the churches themselves are contracting at the same time as growing demands are made upon them is an increasing dilemma. Two edited volumes from this project were published in 2010 and 2011.3

The Welfare and Religion in a European Perspective project has been introduced at some length as it constitutes the background to the Welfare and Values in Europe project reported in this volume. WREP did not, however, cover the religious and social conditions as they appear in the eastern part of Europe – i.e. in the post-communist countries where the welfare situation is quite different, and is continuing to evolve. In this part of Europe, the majority churches have often moved from being oppressed by the state to having a central role in national identity after the fall of communism. The WREP-project also revealed the need to include religious minorities in the study as a whole, as their presence to a high degree shapes the discussion on the presence of religion in the public sphere of society. Thus the WaVE-project has the advantage of resting on experiences of WREP. At the same time the project has an agenda of its own, which will be developed in the following section.

The Welfare and Values in Europe project (WaVE)

In the WaVE-project, the focus has shifted from the function of and interaction between majority churches and welfare regimes to the study of welfare as the ‘prism’ through which core values are perceived – for example those of inclusion and exclusion. The methodological issues and the comparative nature of the project are also extended in the sense that the religious minorities found all over Europe are included and are seen in relation to the values of the majority cultures. The number of researchers has grown accordingly from 24 to 34.

The aim
The WaVE-project was formed against the background of major transitions in the welfare state and the growth in religious activities in the domain of welfare. By shedding light on the degree to which religion, on the one hand, and welfare, on the other, are viewed as private and public matters, WaVE entails a comprehensive re-examination of theories of secularization and counter-secularization in the European context. WaVE is predicated on the assumption that the intangible concept of ‘values’ is understood best through the ways in which they are expressed and developed in practice. The provision of basic needs, and the related notion of citizenship and belonging, comprises the most fundamental level at which coexistence between different cultures, values and religions can be examined.

The objectives of the project may be summarized as follows:
First, the project sets out to assess the impact of religion in societies in different parts of Europe as a bearer of values of solidarity and social cohesion, or as source of tension and exclusion. WaVE pursues this aim through an in-depth examination of the values expressed by majority religions in their interaction with minority communities in the domain of social welfare needs and provision.

Second, the project studies the values expressed by minority groups (religious minorities in particular), both in their use of welfare services, and their search for alternatives (tracing trends in the establishment by minority groups of their own welfare networks). WaVE offers insights into the extent to which minorities are perceived to challenge the values, cultural identities etc. of the local majorities.

Third, WaVE seeks to bring to light the gender-related values underpinning conceptions of welfare and practices in welfare provision in the localities under examination, focussing on whether there are particular elements of tension or cohesion embedded in values relating to gender, and to the rights and needs associated with women and men. The relationship between religious values, minorities, and gender is a critical and relatively under-explored field of research. The effects of and the transitions in this relationship in terms of social welfare, social cohesion, and conceptions of citizenship and belonging, form a key dimension of the WaVE-project.

At the same time the study raises important questions concerning the secular state’s idea of a clear separation between the religious and the secular. There is an uncertainty in the state’s expectations of the religious organizations of civil society which is clearer in the north-west than in the south-east of Europe. This concerns the consequences of an increased social involvement of religious organizations for the role and identity of the secular state. The project therefore explains an important factor behind an increasing observance of religion in the public sphere of society, a tendency which is
contradictory to the general understanding of Europe as a place where religion becomes ever more private. A full explanation of the theoretical background and aim of the study is found in Chapter 2 in the first volume of this series of three reports.⁴

**Methodological considerations**

WaVE is an empirical study concerned with the relationship between majority cultures and minority religions across Europe and their relationship to welfare and values as they appear in a local context. It was from the start a comparative project as it was looking for similarities and dissimilarities following north-south and east-west dimensions of Europe. It covers considerable geographic breadth as well as religious and social complexity.

The complexity of the religious and social developments taking place in Europe and the substantial differences concerning both welfare organization and religious majority/minority relations in each country, urged us at an early stage in the project planning to use qualitative rather than quantitative data. Quantitative data is useful in order to frame values across countries and religious communities in Europe and in order to study changes over time. It also gives a comprehensive understanding of the religious and social situation in each country. These kind of data were however already available through the World Values Survey (WVS) and through the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) covering most of the countries involved in the WaVE-project.⁵

Instead of collecting statistical data on a national level, we decided to follow the model established in WREP and to dig deep into one medium-sized town in each country, using a range of qualitative methods.⁶ The great advantage of working in this way has been a much more profound understanding of the complex relationships in the locality between majority and minority relations. It has also been possible to observe at first-hand the contributions of women both as givers and receivers of welfare. Conversely it has been much more difficult to foresee what would happen in the course of our research. In what way would the provision of welfare services function as a prism through which values of conflict or cohesion would become visible?

An important choice concerned the towns in which in-depth observations could be carried out. These towns should be middle-sized relative to the population of the respective country. They should exhibit values connected

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⁴ The State of the Art-report is drafted by Effie Fokas.
⁵ www.issp.org/; www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
to post-industrial circumstances with growing employment within the service society. Most important of all was that the towns in question were able to exhibit a majority religious tradition alongside minority communities either as autochthonous ethnic/religious groups or as religious minorities growing as a result of migration into Europe. Equally important, however, were practical issues such as accessibility and appropriate contacts with the locality in question. The selected towns are listed below – those marked with an asterisk were also included in the WREP study.

- Sweden: Gävle (population circa 90,000 located north of Stockholm)*
- Norway: Drammen (population circa 57,000, located close to Oslo)*
- Finland: Lahti (population circa 98,000, located north of Helsinki)*
- Latvia: Ogre (population circa 29,000, located east of Riga)
- England: Darlington (population circa 98,000, located south of Newcastle)*
- Germany 1: Reutlingen (population circa 110,000, located south of Stuttgart)*
- Germany 2: Schweinfurt (population circa 55,000, located in Northern Bavaria)
- France: Evreux (population circa 54,000, located north-west of Paris)*
- Poland: Przemysł (population circa 68,000, located in the south-east of Poland, near the Ukrainian border)
- Croatia: Sisak (population circa 53,000, located in central Croatia)
- Italy: Padua (population circa 200,000, located 40 km from Venice)*
- Romania: Medgidia (population circa 44,000, located near the Black Sea)
- Greece: Thiva (and Livadeia) (combined population circa 43,000, located north of Athens)*

More information about each of these places can be obtained in the project description, and for the eight countries that were part of WREP, in the working papers published by the Uppsala Religion and Society Research Centre. The precise location of each town can be seen in Figure 1.1

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7 For a discussion and definition of minority groups see chapter 2 in Volume 1, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studies in religion and society, no 4., Uppsala 2012.
8 The population of Reutlingen is predominantly Protestant; the population of Schweinfurt is predominantly Catholic.
9 Italy was included in the WREP project; the town in question however has changed from Vicenza to Padua.
10 Greece was included in the WREP project where both towns were studied; in the WaVE project, the study has focused on Thiva only.
11 For further information, see the following: Presentation of the Research Project Welfare and Values in Europe. Transitions Related to Religion, Minorities and Gender (2006). Research Project funded by the European Commission Sixth Framework Programme (FP6). Uppsala: Uppsala University; Edgardh Beckman, Ninna (ed). (2004). Welfare, Church and
The data collection was carried out during the autumn 2006 and the year 2007 and has been divided into two stages.

*The first stage* was a mapping process which included fieldwork in the thirteen European towns (twelve countries) covering the north-south and east-west axis of Europe. This fieldwork included information on the welfare regime in question, an introduction to the majority religious tradition of the

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country, and an overview of the minority situation in the town studied. The researchers were asked to map as broadly as possible ensuring that the following information would be covered: a) the groups present in the locality with a description of ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ communities, b) whether or not these groups provide welfare services, either internally to the group or externally for others as well and c) how these various groups interact? The researchers were encouraged to find this information by approaching a) local authorities – asking for statistical information, b) central offices for majority churches – to ask about welfare-related activities, c) a selection of representatives of minority groups and d) the local media. Online material was also gathered together with material produced by churches, religious communities and voluntary organizations. This included quantitative data and national statistics. The results from previous interviews within the WREP-study were also available in eight of the case studies. In order to give the four new countries an opportunity to catch up with this kind of information, they were given an extra year of funding.

The first mapping process was a research enterprise in itself, resulting in an overview of religious minorities in different regions of Europe, showing its breadth and complex history. The overview shows that minorities can be indigenous as the Sami people in the north of Europe and Turkish-Tatars in the east of Europe. They can also be a result of changed borders as in Poland and of changed history as in Latvia (the Russian speaking ‘minority’). They can also derive from immigration within Europe (most often from east to west) or from other continents, most often from Africa or Asia. The reason for migration can be work opportunities in the west or the result of oppression and conflict (ethnic, social, political or religious). These groups can be of different Christian origin as in England or representing other religions, most often Muslims as in many West European societies. The interrelationship between ethnic and religious affiliations is strong but they do not overlap completely.

The mapping process was used finally as a means for a strategic selection of interviews with a) individuals representing religious minorities, b) individuals representing local authorities working with religious minorities and c) individuals representing majority churches with a special relation to minority communities.

The second stage was the in-depth interviews with the individuals selected as described above. The focus was on the minority groups present in the given localities. The interviewers were asked to include a broad range of questions following the practice in WREP. These interviews were complemented by participant observation in the communities studied with notes taken. Shorter interviews largely for clarification were also carried out. The ‘principle of saturation’ has been used in order to decide when to stop the collection of material. All in all about 30 interviews were conducted in every town, in some cases fewer and in some cases more. All interviews have been
transcribed and have become an important source of information. In the WaVE-project approximately 400 individuals that have been interviewed across the north-south and east-west divide of Europe. Together with the WREP-material, more than 800 interviews have been performed, transcribed and analysed.

The enquiry included the study of the values of minority (religious) groups and the extent to which these values are perceived as different to, or in conflict with, those of the majority. Attention was also paid to the tendency to establish independent networks for the provision of welfare-related needs. The expression of minority group values, their search for alternative means of social care, the extent to which their welfare-related values are perceived as different to or in conflict with those of the majority, and the extent to which values are particularly gendered, are embedded in the analysis of the interview research.

Throughout the observations and interviews indicated above, researchers have gleaned insight into the gendered nature of the rights and needs of men and women, in both majority and minority communities. By means of observation, note has been taken of the relative participation of women and men in both the provision and receipt of welfare assistance. By means of the interviews, information has been gathered about the extent to which these patterns are religiously motivated, and whether this leads to greater social cohesion or social exclusion.

Our methodology has resulted in a broad overview of examples grounded in the historical tradition of each country. In order to make the most of the fieldwork, and to extract as many examples as possible of local cooperation between religious communities and local authorities, the research team in each country was asked to focus on examples of tension or cohesion in the respective locality. The advantage of this method is the breadth of examples that resulted from that analysis. This is certainly reflected in all three reports from the WaVE-project.

That said, there is an obvious tension between comparability and contex-
tuality embedded in a project like this. The project is clearly comparative in the sense that similarities and dissimilarities between majority-minority relations have been studied throughout Europe. At the same time the comparative nature of the project is based on contextual situations mirroring the complexity of reality on the ground. This has been a demanding part of the project but at the same time a very enriching enterprise as it has offered insight into the very complexities that surround the European situation. Generalizations of current religious and social developments in Europe are clearly dependent on this kind of knowledge.
Project coordination

The WaVE-project has been based at the Religion and Society Research Centre at the Faculty of Theology, at Uppsala University. The work of a project such as WaVE would not have been possible, however, without an extended group of people with an interest in the area of welfare and values amongst majority and minority religions across Europe. All in all 34 junior researchers across Europe have been involved in collecting data together with senior colleagues who have contributed to the analysis of the material in the respective country. A complete list of partners and researchers attached to the WaVE-project can be found in Appendix 1.

A project of this size can only come to a successful conclusion if the organization is well developed, with regular meetings to discuss progress. The Researchers’ Handbook, which displays the design and structure of a European Commission sponsored project, acted as a guide in this respect. Such a project is divided into work packages and deliverables following a time schedule from the start to the end of the project.

WaVE contained eight work packages (WP1 to WP8) and sixteen deliverables. WP1 was the State of the Art-report (deliverable 1) and is included in the first volume as Chapter 2. WP1 also includes an overview of the national situation (deliverable 2), which will appear as the first report from each country in this volume. WP2 constitutes the Development of Methodology (deliverables 3, 4 and 5) which includes the guidelines for the mapping process and the interview sessions. The Work Package is attached to this volume as Appendix 2. WP3 concerns the Fieldwork (deliverables 6 and 7); these were interim reports on the case studies for internal use only. WP4 is the Analysis of the Local Data (deliverables 8, 9 and 10) and constitutes the final case study report (D9) – this is the second report from each country in this volume.

WP5 is the Comparative Cross-country Analysis (deliverables 11 and 12) which includes a preliminary and a final draft of the comparative analysis – for internal use only. WP6 is the Dissemination of Results at Local and National Level (deliverables 13 – the local conferences and 14 – the national conferences). WP7 is the Generation of EU Policy Recommendations (deliverable 15), which will appear in the final volume (volume 3), together with WP8, the Final Report (deliverable 16).

Each partner has had certain responsibilities linked to a particular work package. Further, to keep the research group together, and to adhere to a strict time table, the consortium had to meet on a regular basis. Accordingly the whole group of researchers has met once a year and the junior researchers, with direct responsibility for data collection, twice a year. The meetings have taken place in different countries, making these occasions a source of information in themselves. These meetings have included not only a high standard of conversation connected to the aim of the project, but also relaxed
gatherings in the evenings in order to encourage the social side of the work. This combination of hard work and relaxed interaction has been very fruitful.

We are pleased that we are able - after some delay - to publish these reports in hard copy. They will also be placed on the following website: www.crs.uu.se. We hope that they will be read by a wide variety of researchers and stakeholders, as well as by the European Commission itself. The reports vary a little in their style and presentation but we trust that they convey accurately the scope of the WaVE project and the richness of our data.

Acknowledgements

It is important first to acknowledge the core group of coordinators, those who conceived the idea in the first place, who found the resources and dealt with both the intellectual organization and day-to-day management of the project. They are Anders Bäckström, Grace Davie, Effie Fokas, Ninna Edgardh and Per Pettersson. The team represents a range of disciplines and each individual contributed differently to the project. The support staff of the Religion and Society Research Centre should also be acknowledged, namely Barbro Borg and Maria Essunger. Lina Molokotos-Liederman has been responsible for checking the reports emerging from the project. All of these people deserve our warmest thanks; they have played a vital role in the success of the whole undertaking.

I would also like to thank the institutions that have contributed financially to the project, most of all the European Commission with its substantial grant, with Andreas Obermaier as our latest contact person. I must also include the Foundation Samariterhemmet and the Faculty of Theology at Uppsala University, both of which have provided premises and covered extra costs attached to the project. Finally the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation has made the production of this report possible. Anna Row has been responsible for the editorial work of this publication.

We are pleased to note in conclusion that the WREP and WaVE projects have borne fruit in the form of a major research programme known as The Impact of Religion: Challenges for Society, Law and Democracy. This is an Uppsala University programme running from 2008-2018, and is funded by the Swedish Research Council. The focus is on the visibility of religion studied through six different themes.12 This multidisciplinary research programme would not have been possible without the experience drawn from the WREP and WaVE projects. For further information see www.impactofreligion uu.se.

12 The themes are 1) Religious and social change, 2) Integration, democracy and political culture, 3) Families, law and society, 4) Well-being and health, 5) Welfare models-organization and values, 6) Science and religion.
As the coordinator of the WaVE-project it is my privilege to extend my especial thanks to Grace Davie and Effie Fokas. Without the expertise of Grace and her extraordinary talent in managing large and complex meetings, the project would not have been completed. Effie started as a doctoral student within the WREP-project, but very quickly became a key contributor; it was Effie who authored both the proposal and the final summary of the results.

In this respect Effie exemplifies one of the great advantages of this kind of project. That is to give space to young researchers in order to develop their interests and to grow as researchers. Indeed one of the most pleasing aspects of the whole venture is the emergence of a new generation of scholars that have one by one obtained their doctoral degrees and launched their careers. Their enthusiasm and growing skills have contributed enormously to the whole project; it has been a pleasure to work with them.

This is the second volume of three, and covers Germany, France, Italy and Greece, i.e. the bi-confessional German case, two countries from Catholic Europe and Orthodox Greece. Their welfare states vary from moderately strong to relatively weak. The first volume covered the Protestant north of Europe (Sweden, Finland, Norway and England). The third volume will present the results from further east (Latvia, Poland, Croatia and Romania). As already explained, each volume contains two reports from each country, first a report on the national situation covering the characteristics of the welfare system and the religious composition of the country, and second a case study covering the mapping process and the analysis of the results from the interviews. The results from the whole project will be compared and analysed in the third volume.

Finally, as the coordinator of the project Welfare and Values in Europe: Transitions related to Religion, Minorities and Gender, I would like to thank all those who have contributed to the project and have helped to bring it to a successful conclusion. The consortium as a whole will be listed in Appendix 1, and the contributors to this volume are introduced at the beginning of this volume.

Uppsala, February 2012
Anders Bäckström
Coordinator
Chapter 2 Germany

2:1 OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL SITUATION

Ilona Biendarra, Annette Leis-Peters

Introduction
The German Constitution gives emphasis to the social character of the state, but the term 'welfare state', which is used in the international debate, has a negative connotation in Germany. It is linked to a powerful state, which provides for its citizens from birth to death. After the experiences of the national socialist regime and the socialist regime in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) a strong state with comprehensive knowledge of its citizens is considered to be dangerous for democracy and citizenship rights (Alber and Schöllkopf 1998). During the second half of the 20th century the German social state was formed, expanded and differentiated. Its growing effectiveness and comprehensiveness contributed to re-establish and deepen the confidence of the citizens in the state, especially in the periods after the political dictatorships. Because of this, the current need to adapt the system to changes in society is perceived as a crisis of the German welfare system both by the media and by the citizens.

Characteristics of the German situation
The two big folk churches, the Roman-Catholic Church and the Protestant Church, and the welfare organizations related to them play an important role in the welfare sector. They provide many of the welfare services and are critical markers of the German system, especially with regard to political and social matters. In the field of welfare in particular, values are still influenced by the majority religion that is by the two folk churches.

Another specificity is German post-war history, which implies the existence of two separate German states, the Western Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the socialist German Democratic Republic (GDR). Even though the two states have been socially reunited for 17 years now, the so-
cial conditions shaped by the different political systems still influence the situation of gender, minorities and religion. The West German welfare system has become the dominating model in the country as a whole. However, it is still more common and natural for women in the former GDR to combine work and family. For economic and historic reasons the number of residents without German passport is lower in the Eastern federal states, while the unemployment is still higher. East Germany is one of the most secularized parts of Europe, where only between 35% and 20% of the population is a member of the two folk churches. At the same time it is important to stress that due to economic and structural developments there are considerable regional differences not only between Eastern and Western regions, but also between the Northern and the Southern part of the country.

Different definitions can be found for the term ‘minority’ in the German context. There are many minority groups present in the country, e.g. ‘national minorities’, ‘ethnic minorities’ and ‘religious minorities’. Many of the minority groups have their own values, which they express in their practices. The different values and practices of the majority and the minorities are experienced as a source of tension in the German society. German policy tries to direct the interaction between majority and minorities towards more cohesion and solidarity. At the same time it becomes more and more obvious that minority groups influence and challenge majority values. This is for example illustrated by different perspectives on welfare provision and gender issues.

Changes in society and welfare mirrored by research literature

There is a multitude of publications, empirical studies and research on welfare, values, gender, religion and minorities in Germany. In this report we can only select important examples of some of the research areas: the works by Allmendinger and Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2000, Schmidt 2005b or by Butterwegge 2005 provide a general review of the current challenges and developments of the German welfare system. As the social changes also imply changes for religious agents and their position within the welfare system they have become of increasing interest to researchers since the 1990s. Areas of interest include the organization of church-related welfare organizations and their interaction with the churches (Boeßenecker 2005, Schmidt 2005a, Falterbaum 2000, Broll 1999), the identity and motivation of Christian welfare workers and welfare services (Haas 2004, Degen 2003, Ziebertz 1993), the links between church-related welfare organizations and the state and its legitimacy (Frerk 2005) or studies questioning current church social work in the light of growing poverty (Flessa 2003).

Another field of interest is European comparative studies on welfare issues in general and church social work in particular. Hantrais (1995) compares social policy in the European Union, Rieger and Leibfried (2001) compare the effects of globalization on different welfare systems, Schmid

There are several publications discussing the relationship of the majority state, the majority population or majority religion to minority groups: Markefkas (1995) offers a sociological introduction into how prejudices emerge and how to work against them, Mintzel (1997) compares different concepts of multicultural societies in Europe and Northern America, Tibi (2000) discusses the crisis of multicultural societies in a European perspective, Rommelspacher (2004) describes the problems and achievements of multicultural society in Germany applying amongst others a gender approach, and Meier-Braun and Weber (2005) argue from the perspective of a prosperous federal state that Germany has become a country of immigration. Starting from the majority religion Heimbach-Steins and Eid (1999) try to define the task of majority churches in a multicultural society. The anthology of Barth and Elsas (2005) gives topical perspectives on religious minorities and Baumann and Behloul (2005) explore the existing religious pluralism in Germany and Switzerland. A useful source is the registered association REMID e.V., a media and information service for the study of religion (http://www.remid.de).

A growing number of welfare studies pay attention to gender issues: the anthology of Pfau-Effinger and Geissler (2005) examines European societies from a care regime perspective, Abrahamson, Boje and Greve (2005) map the changes in the field of welfare and family, Daly and Rake (2003) analyse the relationship between the welfare system and gender by examining the areas of care, work and welfare, Hammer and Lutz (2002) explore the question of why women are socially disadvantaged both on a theoretical and empirical level and Fix (2001) shows the connections between family policy and majority religion in four European countries.

Presently there is a strong research focus on minorities, emigrants and immigrants in Germany, on Muslims and Jews in particular. Numbers and data on migration are provided by the European Commission (Eurostat) 2004, by the Federal Department for Migration and Refugees 2004 or by the Representative of the Federal Government for Migration, Refugees and Integration 2004. The Federation of German Trade Unions has created a website on migration issues (http://www.migration-online.de). Oltmer and Schubert have compiled a bibliography of historical research on migration. Van Deth (2004) links the issues of migration and minorities to European social and
values studies, Allmendinger and Ludwig-Mayerhofer (2000) and Treichler (2002) study migration and minorities in the context of the changing welfare system. In addition to these more general approaches there are many studies on individual minority groups within German society, e.g. on migrants with German origins coming from the former USSR (Peitzmeier and Kaiser 2005, Bade and Oltmer 2003) or about migrants from Turkey (Pütz 2004, Sökefeld 2004). Other studies explore the intercultural communication in welfare institutions such as hospitals (Dreißig 2005) or the specific connections and problems of migration and sickness (Marschalck and Wiedl 2001). Both minority and gender-related research indicate difficult situations, tensions and conflicts within the German welfare system and German society in general.

Another research area is the image of migrants and minorities in the media and the public debate. Beck-Gernsheim (2004) reviews how migrants and minorities are perceived by the media and the public, while Geißler and Pöttker (2005) study the role of the mass media in integrating ethnic minorities.

Furthermore, there are a variety of research projects and research institutes dealing with the respective issues. Again, we only can mention a few selected examples. The faculty of educational science at Hamburg University currently hosts the project ‘Religion in Education. A contribution to Dialogue or a factor of Conflict in transforming societies of European Countries (REDCo)’. At Osnabrück University there is an interdisciplinary Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (http://www.imis.uni-osnabrueck.de). Oldenburg University has founded an Interdisciplinary Centre for Formation and Communication in Processes of Migration (http://www.uni-oldenburg.de/ibkm/).

The examples above illustrate that there is a lot of research on welfare, values, gender, religion and minorities, but at the same time the review points to a research gap. Neither existing studies, nor on-going research projects, bring together all of the above mentioned issues. In this respect the WaVE project is an important contribution to new knowledge on German society within a European context.

Characteristics of the German welfare system

With reference to Esping-Andersen, the German welfare system is often described as conservative and corporatist (Esping-Andersen 1990; cf. e.g. Schmid 2002; Poole 2001). Having its origins in the Bismarck social insurance laws of the 1880s, today it combines various independent schemes of
social insurance\textsuperscript{13} and state responsibility for welfare. In a European comparison the social state gives German residents a comprehensive social protection. This is for example indicated by high expenditures on social protection (30.2\% of GDP in 2003) or the risk of poverty rate after social transfers (16\% in 2004), which is below the average of the poverty rate after social transfers of the EU 15 (17\% in 2004) (www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat\slash). As the different schemes of social insurance were and are (partly) still organized according to different occupational groups the welfare system tends to maintain or exacerbate economic-social differences and be open to pressure groups (Esping-Andersen 1990, 60f.; Baumert and Schümer 2001). Another feature of the welfare system is that it is employment-centred. Being employed is a precondition to becoming an independent member of the insurance system (Bussemaker and Van Kersbergen 1999; Strohm 2000). Furthermore, the welfare system is shaped by a strong family orientation. It takes for granted that families, namely women, do (unpaid) welfare work, educate young children and care of the elderly in particular. Accordingly, the system is not aimed at the individual, but at the individual within her or his family context. Many social laws and regulations presuppose a male breadwinner who provides for the wife and children (Poole 2001). Therefore, Germany has been labelled as a male breadwinner regime (Sainsbury 1999, Silius 2002). However, the social reforms of the past years have started to change these characteristics. The reformed laws on funding and support of disabled persons are one example of this trend. They focus on the individual person and aim at giving as many individual choices as possible (Jerg 2005, Schädler 2003).

Cooperation of public and independent providers in the field of welfare

Another specificity of the German welfare system is the cooperation of public and independent providers in the field of welfare (Olk 2001). As in the different schemes of social insurance, this cooperation has historical roots in the 19th century and the first democratic state in Germany, the Weimar republic (Kaiser 1998, Leis 2004). After the experience of the totalitarian National Socialist regime, policy makers wanted to avoid any form of centralization and streamlining of society. The churches, which were almost the only intact organizations left, and the welfare organizations related to them, became important partners in the emerging German social state. During the 1950s and the 1960s, the legislation and social reforms dominated by the ruling conservative Christian Democratic Party gave independent welfare

\textsuperscript{13} The German discussion tends to emphasise the advantages of independent schemes of social insurance in comparison with uniform system of social insurance, such as para-fiscality or self-administration (cf. for example Neumann and Schaper 1998, 143 et seqq.).
organizations in general and church related organizations in particular a privileged position, often in the face of opposition from the Social Democrats. The principle of subsidiarity, with origins in Catholic social teaching, became a guiding principle for German social policy. This meant in practice that the legislation gave non-commercial independent welfare providers precedence over public providers whenever a welfare service was to be established or to be run. Public providers should only run services if no independent provider was interested. This does not mean that the state, the federal states and the municipalities have handed over their responsibility and obligation of social warranty. Rather they delegate their social tasks to independent welfare organizations and reimburse them the costs of providing these legally guaranteed services (Neumann and Schaper 1998, 244f.). This tendency in legislation and practice is called the ‘privilege of associations’ (Verbändeprivileg) or ‘relative priority’ (bedingter Vorrang) of independent welfare organizations (Campenhausen 1982) and was applied until the middle of the 1990s in the area of welfare provision.

During the 1990s social policy started to integrate commercial welfare providers and to gradually introduce a social market. By establishing a controlled competition between commercial and non-commercial independent welfare providers the public authorities hoped to reduce welfare costs. The adoption of the law on care insurance in 1994 is considered to mark the change (Lange 2001).

Due to state-church-legislation in Germany, independent welfare organizations related to the churches have a special position. Legally, they are regarded as belonging to church bodies. But organizationally and financially, they are autonomous. The German Constitution guarantees religious freedom not only to the individual, but also to associations and organizations and applies the positive right to exercise religion to organizations such as independent church related welfare organizations. This means that social work conducted by these organizations is approved by law as a way of exercising religion (article 4 and 140 GG). Through being members of the regional umbrella organization of Caritas and Diakonie (private-law), church-related welfare organizations can be legally recognized as a part of the Roman-Catholic or Protestant church. This status gives them special rights and freedoms: the right of the state to interfere in their internal affairs is limited, which has for example noticeable effects in the field of labour legislation. (Campenhausen 1996).

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14 On the independent welfare organizations see Characteristics of the two German folk churches, below.
Current changes in German society and social system

German society is going through considerable changes at the moment. Quite apart from internal causes, this development is affected by international trends such as globalization, European integration, ageing societies and a general change of values. The German social state is in principle based on full employment (at least of the male citizens). Because of this, the rate of unemployment, which has been between 8% and 10% for almost 20 years (in some regions up to 25-30%), is experienced as major social problem. The financial situation of the various schemes of social insurance is worrying as their construction and, as a consequence, their financing is called into question by unemployment, the costs of German reunification and the ageing of the population. The demographic developments challenge both pension and health insurance in particular as they rely on a contract between generations. Growing life expectancy along with low birth rates from the 1970s onwards result in overextending future working generations (Landsberg 2003). In 2004 the average life expectancy in Germany was 75.7 years for men and 81.4 years for women. This is below the average life expectancy of the EU 15, which is 76.0 years for men 81.7 years for women (in 2003) and above the average of EU 25, which is 75.1 years for men and 81.2 years for women (in 2003) (www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/). There are also ideological changes. Solidarity, as an inherent value of the welfare system, becomes less important due to growing individualisation. The motivation to contribute to the welfare system declines because its sustainability is increasingly questioned (Deufel and Wolf 2003, Keupp 2000). At the same time there is a vivid public discussion on labour costs weakening the competitive position of German companies on the European and global markets. It is often argued that fundamental cuts in the welfare system increase competitiveness.\footnote{As an example for this discussion see Hans-Werner Sinn, ‘Arbeit für alle’, in Die Welt, 1 March 2006, 9.}

The welfare system has to adapt to these changing conditions. The most debated current reform is legislation, which changes the system of unemployment benefits and aims at reducing unemployment (Hartz IV). In 2005 social assistance and benefits for long term unemployed people were combined. Now, unemployment benefits fall much faster to the level of social assistance. The reform affects the middle-class, as it has become more difficult to maintain social status under longer periods of unemployment. Some researchers expect a visible growth of poverty within society and an increasing number of families and children living on social assistance (Butterwege, Klundt and Zeng 2005).

Hartz IV implies a fusion of the social welfare offices and labour exchanges, which means centralization. At the same time initiatives are made to decentralize the public administration on all levels. This includes the de-
centralization of welfare services. There is an intense debate among professionals about this decentralization: will it make the provision and quality of the welfare services more unbalanced as they will be affected by the financial situation of the respective local and regional entity (Grözinger and Haas 2004)? Other currently debated issues are political initiatives to support women combining professional work and family (see below) and reforms to reduce costs in the healthcare system. On the one hand, public opinion seems to agree on the need of reforms in the welfare sector. On the other hand, experts question whether the German welfare system in principle is capable of reform because of its federal and corporatist character and the strong influence of interest groups (Opielka 2003; Metzler 2003).

Women and men in German society and welfare system

The roles of women and men within the welfare sector indicate that traditional gender roles still exist in Germany. While men manage the welfare sector within the public sector, churches and other independent welfare organizations, the actual welfare work is conducted by women. This is for example illustrated by figures on employees within the healthcare sector. Altogether approximately 75% of all healthcare employees are women. But two thirds of all occupations with higher incomes and managerial responsibilities (such as physicians), are held by men. The distribution of women and men among voluntary welfare workers is similar. About 75% of all welfare work is done by female volunteers, while male volunteers often direct and manage these activities (Kirchenamt der EKD 2006, 21, Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend 1999). If the welfare work conducted within the family is taken into consideration as well, then the prevalence of women in welfare work becomes even more obvious (Stark and Regnér 2001). It is more difficult to provide a consistent picture of men and women as welfare users. There are for example more women who are using care services or family counselling, but more boys than girls engage youth care services.

The changing life concepts of women are less and less in line with the traditional division of work. Because of this, many current reforms attempt to ‘soften’ the existing male-breadwinner system. The introduction of a new model of parental benefits and parental leave in January 2007 was vividly debated. The model is inspired by the Swedish system, which includes the feature that the state pays two extra months if the father takes parental leave as well.


Another important discussion is the increasing social exclusion in society. Certain groups have a much higher risk of reaching a marginal position. In addition to migrants, young people and single parents should be mentioned. Approximately 10% of all children and young people – and their parents – have only limited access to all the opportunities society has to offer, among them an important percentage of children of single mothers. Against the backdrop of their particular family situation it is very difficult for single mothers to find regular employment with an income above the poverty line. Poverty thus becomes young and female. This does not only affect the individual lives of the persons concerned but also the future of society (Butterwegge, Klundt and Zeng 2005).

Statistics show that many young people from migrant backgrounds have low educational levels or do not graduate from school at all. As a consequence, the risk that they become unemployed increases. In comparison, young migrant men fare worse than young migrant women. This is viewed as a failure of the German educational system (Beauftragter der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration 2004, Baumert and Schümer 2001).

A complex issue of public debate is the care of elderly people at home. Women are highly affected by this as the majority of caretakers as well as the majority of caregivers are female. Care insurance (1995) has made it possible to be reimbursed for home-care within the family. If certain family members are unemployed a growing number of families use this possibility to earn extra money by caring for family members. But the women involved in the care work find themselves in an isolated situation, which can result in personal crisis and family conflicts. At the same time, professional home care services lose clients and have to dismiss employees who are also almost exclusively women. Families who want professional home care, but cannot afford professional services, employ women from Eastern Europe to care for their elderly both legally and illegally. The women live in the family for some months caring for the elderly person all day. Because of the wage differences and their working hours this is cheaper for the family than a professional German home care service. In this respect the EU is directly influencing the home care situation in Germany. Public opinion is split. On the one hand, this makes life much easier for many families who have to take care of an elderly relative. On the other hand, there is a fear of losing regular jobs and declining wages in the comparatively badly paid field of home care. In addition the consequences for the living conditions of women from Eastern Europe and their families are debated (Caritasverband der Diözese Rottenburg-Stuttgart & Diakonisches Werk Württemberg, 2005).18

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Other controversial issues include domestic and public violence against women (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend 2004). There is also the issue of violence against young immigrant women in the form of ‘honour killings’, especially after the case of a young woman in Berlin, who was murdered by her brother in 2005 (http://www.migrationinfo.de/migration_und_bevoelkerung/artikel/050903.htm), and trafficking and prostitution, especially in the context of the 2006 Football World Championship in Germany (http://www.ekd.de/efd/index_559.php3; www.kok-potsdam.de), which received a great deal of attention by the mass media.

School is an important source of conflict and debate related to welfare provision since all people who live in Germany are obliged to send their children to school. Well-known cases are the ‘crucifix case’ and the ‘veil case’. In the ‘crucifix case’ parents sued the federal state of Bavaria, which – according to its own school law – puts up crucifixes in every schoolroom. The parents considered the crucifix to influence their children in terms of the Christianity and to violate their personal beliefs (Bundesverfassungsgericht 1997). In the ‘veil case’, a Muslim teacher sued the federal state of Baden-Württemberg for not employing her as teacher and civil servant because she was wearing a veil while teaching in school (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2003). Other conflicts related to religion, minorities and gender concern the instruction itself, such as co-educational physical education.

Religious composition in Germany

There is no majority church in Germany, but two large folk churches, which have almost the same size. The following table presents the numbers of churches and religious groups in the beginning of the 21st century:
The most exact numbers are those of the Roman-Catholic and the Protestant Christians (EKD). Their member statistics are directly connected to the church taxes that are collected together with public taxes.

The evolution of folk churches has been characterized by a decline of members, while the Muslim minority is growing. Among them 732,000 hold a German passport. Altogether 64.9% of German inhabitants are members of a Christian church. The smaller Catholic and Protestant denominations, a large number of smaller Christian Free Churches or special communities and the exact numbers for the different Orthodox Churches are not included in the table. There are more Hindus than Buddhists in Germany. Regarding the Jewish community it should be mentioned that about 80,000 Jews live outside of parishes and 5,000 Jews belong to a union with a liberal Jewish orientation. The number of Jews is growing since the 1990s as many Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union come to Germany. Among the
religious communities, which are not officially registered as a church, the New Apostolic Church (about 388,000 members) and Jehovah’s Witnesses (about 164,000 members) have the most members. Current studies presume that about 800,000 persons in Germany have close contacts to or belong to smaller independent religious communities, philosophical communities or new religious movements. Legally, the two folk churches and Jewish parishes have privileged positions. Compared to them, there is a risk that the other religious communities consider themselves in a disadvantaged situation, the numerically strong Muslim communities in particular.

The distribution of Roman-Catholics and Protestants among the population differs considerably among different regions depending on the church history of the area (http://www.brockhausenzyklopaedie.de/be21_article.php?document_id=0x17f0e1a7@be; Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, Statistik, Kirchenmitgliederzahlen am 31.12.2004, 7). Historically, Roman-Catholics, Protestants and Jews lived together in the same territories at least after the Napoleonic Wars. The Jewish population has almost been annihilated by the National Socialists. The fact that the Jewish community is currently growing is warmly welcomed and considered a sign of hope in the German society. After reunification, the German population can be divided into three major religious groups: about 26 million are Roman-Catholic and Protestant respectively and about 23 million inhabitants do not have ‘any confession’ (konfessionslos), that is, they are not officially registered as members of any religious organization. Most of the church members live in the Western part. Only about 1 million Roman-Catholics and 3.53 million Protestants live in the Eastern federal states. The third group represents both the multi-religious character and the secularization of society as it embraces, other Christian denominations, other religions (such as Islam) and the sizable group of atheists, agnostics and unaffiliated. Though the peaceful revolution of 1989 emerged mainly from church related circles (Lindner 1998, 15-24, 63-83), it is still normal in the Eastern federal state not to be affiliated to any of the churches or religious organizations. Unlike most of the other post-communist countries, the majority of the population in the Eastern part of Germany is indifferent towards the churches (Gabriel 2003). There is a growing number of studies on this issue (for example Schneider-Flume 2006, Domsgen 2005, Roßner 2004).

Characteristics of the two German folk churches

The formal relationship between the folk churches and the state is based on state church law as found in German Constitution, the constitutions of the German federal states and the contract law (Protestant Church contracts and Catholic concordats). The Catholic Church and the Protestant Churches, syndicated in the Evangelische Kirche Deutschlands (EKD) are corporations
under public law to ensure the institutional independence of both church and state. An important interface is the area of religious education (schools and universities) and the area of welfare (see Characteristics of the German welfare system, above).

The first democratic constitution in Germany, the Weimar Constitution (1919), separated state and churches, established state neutrality in the field of religion and world views, and guaranteed the citizens freedom of religion. Accordingly, the traditional government of the Protestant Churches by a secular sovereign came to a sudden end. The Roman-Catholic Church and the Protestant Churches remained corporations under public law, but became autonomous in relation to the state (Campenhausen, 1996, 29ff.). After World War II the folk churches were integrated in the reconstruction of the destroyed country. The preamble of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany refers explicitly to God. This was a consequence of the experiences of the totalitarian National Socialist regime. On the one hand, the constitution maintained the separation of church and state, introduced by the Weimar constitution, but at the same time it confirmed the churches as corporations under public law and defined them as an integral part of the democratic society (Winter, 2001, 51f.). The strong social position of the churches is also exemplified by the fact that religion as a compulsory subject in public schools is taught in accordance to the principles of the folk churches in most of the federal states (Campenhausen, 1996, 238-248).

The development of the churches in the Eastern part of Germany was different. Church employees and church members experienced ideological pressure, personal threats, spying or arbitrary arrests from the 1950s onwards. The youth organization of the Protestant Church was an early target of the oppressive socialist church policy (Greschat 1997, 273ff.). As a consequence of this type of pressure, people left the churches and stopped baptizing their children. At the same time, the churches became meeting places for critics of the socialist regime and followers of alternative ideologies. The civil rights movement grew strongly within the churches during the 1980s. Since the reunification, the numbers of church members in the Eastern federal states have not increased and the numbers are still in decline (Schneider-Flume 2006). This is a disappointment for many church members.

Religious practice, organization and finances
Baptism is required to become a member of the Roman-Catholic Church and the Protestant Churches. Baptism as a sacrament and religious burials are still important rituals for all Christians in Germany. In 2004, 200,635 people were baptized and 256,678 people were buried in the Roman-Catholic Church. The same year, 227,189 people were baptized and 309,179 people were buried in the Protestant Church. Only a few years before, in 1998 the
number of baptisms and funerals was clearly higher both in the Roman-Catholic Church (248,014 baptisms and 275,721 funerals) and in the Protestant Church. Church marriages are less important to the church members and their number is decreasing fast: in 1998 there were 69,102 church marriages in the Roman-Catholic Church and 73,763 in the Protestant Church. In 2004, the number dropped to 49,178 in the Roman-Catholic Church and 54,910 in the Protestant Church. (Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz 1998 + 2006/ Kirchenamt der EKD 2003 + 2006; http://dbk.de/daten/in_daten-05.html). As shown above it is still more natural for Roman-Catholic and Protestant Church members to have baptisms and funerals than to have church marriages. This is illustrated by the following percentages. In 2004, 73.7% of all children with at least one Roman-Catholic parent and 77.9% of all children with at least one Protestant parent were baptized within respective church. The percentages for funerals are even higher. The percentage of Roman-Catholic funerals among Roman-Catholic deceased was 91.9% and the percentage of Protestant funerals among all Protestant deceased was 86.2% in 2004 (Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz 2006/ Kirchenamt der EKD 2006). Nevertheless, both the Roman-Catholic Church and the Protestant Church experience a development of decrease, which has consequences for structure, finances and for the position they have in society. Statistics on baptisms, confirmations, church weddings, funerals and church activities indicate that both German folk churches, the Protestant Church in particular, face the problem of becoming an aging organization (http://dbk.de/daten/in_daten-05.html, Kirchenamt der EKD 2006).

The basic organizational structure of the Roman-Catholic Church on the national, regional (for example, Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria) and local level (for example, Reutlingen and Schweinfurt) can be described as territorial as far as the parishes and the umbrella organizations for the independent organizations (for example, the welfare organizations) are concerned. The Roman-Catholic Church is hierarchically structured with the Pope as the head, bishops, priests and lay persons. In Germany the conference of bishops is an institution, which has a considerable influence on the Roman-Catholic Church at national level, making decisions for the local dioceses and coordinating the pastoral and church-related social work of the dioceses. The Roman-Catholic Church is territorially structured according to provinces, (arch-) dioceses and parishes.
There is no Protestant national church in Germany, but 23 regional churches, which are independent in their organization and decision-making:

19 For the numbers see EKD 2004, (http://www.remid.de/remid_info_zahlen.htm), http://www.brockhausencyclopaedie.de/be21_article.php?document_id=0x03239657@be#24)
The Protestant regional churches reflect the historical territories (dukedoms and kingdoms), which shaped Germany for centuries. They are organized in provinces and parishes. (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland 2004). Denominationally, the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) can be called a mixed cooperation. It is a union representing Lutheran Churches, so-called ‘United Churches’ (combining Lutheran and Reformed traditions), and the Reformed Church. The EKD is a voluntary union and can be compared to an umbrella organization working for all Protestant Churches in Germany. Its tasks are public relations, lobbying and public statements on a national level, guidance of the regional churches and administration of the common international activities of the Protestant Churches. Apart from very limited areas the EKD has no legislative responsibility. Church legislation is the responsibility of the regional churches. They can decide to delegate certain limited areas of church legislation to the EKD. This means that the Protestant Church is characterized by regional rather than central power (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland 2004, articles 6-20; Broll 1999, 194-209).
The general financial situation of the Roman-Catholic Church and the Protestant Churches is linked to church taxes. Almost 70% of their income comes from the church tax. In addition, they receive money from public contributions, as reimbursements for teaching religion in public schools, and from investments and real estate property. The church tax is linked to the public income tax and amounts about 8 to 9% of the total income tax payments (Campenhausen 1996, 262f.). Church taxes are mainly used to pay the salaries of the ministers and other church personnel in parishes and organizations and to support services provided by the church (for example, welfare services). Since the middle of the 1990s the income from the church taxes has been declining. As almost 80% of the expenditure is made up of direct and indirect expenses for personnel (often with long-term contracts like the ministers) it is difficult for the church to make short-term savings. If the number of members belonging to the Roman-Catholic Church and the Protestant Churches continues to decline, the church tax will decline as well. Therefore it is necessary for both folk churches to downsize staff and reduce services. In addition they are in direct need of additional donations to maintain their current activities, e.g. by foundations or fund raising.

The role of the folk churches in the area of welfare

The Roman-Catholic Church, the Protestant Churches and church-related welfare organizations are important partners of the German social state (see Characteristics of the German welfare system, above). They take care of pastoral and social issues, including pastoral care for people speaking other languages, integration work in the parishes, migrant services, youth, family work and work with elderly, healthcare services, work with people with disabilities and educational and social institutions. These different services are syndicated in umbrella organizations. The Roman-Catholic umbrella organization is Caritas and the Protestant one Diakonie. Caritas and Diakonie cooperate closely with the umbrella organizations of the other independent welfare services, 'workers' movements' (Arbeiterwohlfahrt) the German Red Cross, the Deutscher Paritätischer Wohlfahrtsverband (DPWV, German equality welfare organization), which is the umbrella organization for all ideologically independent welfare organizations and the Jewish welfare organization (Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland e.V.). As independent welfare organizations Caritas and Diakonie play the most important role. In some areas, for example in the field of care for elderly or disabled persons, Caritas and Diakonie run between 50% and 60% of all social services and institutions (Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Freien Wohlfahrtspflege 2002).

Often the work of Caritas and Diakonie is equated with the umbrella organizations or with larger independent welfare institutions, which resemble
companies that offer social services. But the involvement of the folk churches in the field of welfare is more heterogeneous. It varies from the welfare work of parishes, self-help groups and grass root initiatives, to the work of church districts, church provinces, dioceses and religious orders, to the work of large independent institutions, which are related to the church (Schmidt 2005a).

In 2005 there were 24,989 institutions and services run by Caritas (Deutscher Caritasverband 2005). In 2002, Diakonie ran 27,301 institutions and services (Schmitt/Kellermann 2003). With regard to welfare provision for minority groups, Caritas and Diakonie provide the following services for asylum seekers, immigrants, emigrants and foreigners:

- social counselling in residential accommodations for asylum seekers and refugees,
- social counselling in accommodations for immigrants of German origin,
- social services for young migrants,
- cultural and leisure centres for migrants,
- social services for migrants,
- psychological counselling for migrants,
- legal counselling for migrants,
- social and pedagogic services for children, young people and parents from immigrant backgrounds,
- special schools for children of immigrants with German origins.

There are also special services for migrant women:

- social counselling for women from non-European countries,
- social counselling for women who are victims of trafficking.

On the grass root level Roman-Catholic and Protestant parishes host a variety of voluntary groups aiming to meet and support immigrants and refugees. With regard to the welfare services offered, there is a common understanding in the folk churches that they are responsible for the well-being of everyone because of their Christian spirit and religious motivation. Schavan (1999) explains that faith and church have to be more than just ‘welfare’ and ‘therapy’.

The Christian churches are linked to society through its problems and conflicts and work together with the state and the citizens to find appropriate solutions. The official theological and ethical statements of the Roman-Catholic Church concerning issues related to welfare, minority religions or gender policy are connected to Christian social teaching (Christliche Soziallehre) (Hilpert 2004). These statements are part of the documents of the Second Vatican Council and the Synod of Wuerzburg.

One of the last instructions of Pope John Paul II, entitled Erga migrantes Caritas Christi (2004), refers to the situation of migrants and the Roman-
Catholic responsibility for their problems. The first Encyclical *Deus caritas est* by Pope Benedict XVI (2005) explains and summarizes the programme of the Roman-Catholic Church: Roman-Catholic Christians have to be open towards all people that need hope and help. Human rights and love must lead religious dialogue and interactions in future. The Roman-Catholic Church, Christian lay persons and organizations have responsibilities with regards to economic, social, legal and institutional support for every person's well-being (40f.).

There are also documents by German bishops. The bishops write for example about ‘Social Values and Human Happiness’ (*Gesellschaftliche Grundwerte und menschliches Glück*) (1976). There are two related documents: a pastoral letter with the title ‘Values need Positions’ (*Grundwerte verlangen Grundhaltungen*) (1977) and another statement refer to the ‘Christian Responsibility in a Changed World’ (*Christliche Verantwortung in veränderter Welt*) (1990). Bishops give emphasis to a Christian value structure including the acceptance of other cultures and religions and the integration of other perspectives. There are also statements by German bishops with regard to the relationship between the majority church and religious minority groups, church welfare provision and services especially for minorities, for example ‘The Position of Church Organizations’ (1990), ‘One Mission – Many Services’ (2000) and ‘Supporting Integration for Living together’ (2004) (http://dbk.de).

There are various statements on social welfare published by all levels of the Protestant Churches and of church related welfare organizations within the *Diakonie* as well. In addition to the regional umbrella organizations, there are statements by the national *Diakonisches Werk der EKD*. An example is the statement on the reform of healthcare services, ‘Demands for a sustainable and socially balanced healthcare reform from a diaconal perspective’ (2006) (www.diakonie.de). In 2006 the EKD council made a statement on ‘Fair Participation – Empowerment for Individual Responsibility and Solidarity’) (http://www.ekd.de). The Advisory Commission for Social Order of the EKD deals with matters of welfare and regularly publishes statements on urgent social questions, for example on the future of welfare in Europe: ‘Responsibility for a social Europe’ (1991), on the healthcare system: ‘Responsibility and Solidarity’ (1994) and ‘Solidarity and Competition. For more Responsibility, Self-Determination and Efficiency in the Healthcare Sector’ (2002), or on the future of welfare services: ‘Social Services as a Chance’ (2002) (http://www.ekd.de). Even regional churches make statements on issues of social welfare.

These numerous statements make it difficult to obtain a general view and to grasp the essence of the Protestant Churches’ point of view. Common statements of two or more churches or welfare organizations receive the most attention by public opinion, for example the common reports of *Dia-

Both the Roman-Catholic Church and the Protestant Church have relations with religious minority groups, which have been present in Germany for a long time, for example Jews. German Roman-Catholic and Protestant Christians are engaged in an ecumenical and inter-religious dialogue with Orthodox Christians, Jews and Muslims. Many towns have intercultural and interreligious working groups or forums working together to solve religious, cultural and social problems and tensions between different groups. This cooperation exists with all minority religions, but not with all groups among them. Some groups in every denomination and religion are not interested in cooperation.

**Folk churches and gender**

In the past the Christian religion and the majority churches, especially the Roman-Catholic Church, influenced the role of women and men in society. The Roman-Catholic Church has a strict position on gender issues. Still today only men are admitted to the priesthood in the Roman-Catholic Church. With regard to women and their position in the church, comments can be found in the texts of the Second Vatican Council and the Synod of Wuerzburg. On the one hand, emphasis is given to women’s dignity, but on the other hand they maintain traditional religious and social rules in terms of gender. In the Encyclical *Mulieris dignitatem* Pope John Paul XIV (1988) describes the vocation of women by comparing it to ‘Mary’ as the ideal Christian woman. According to conservative Roman-Catholic theology it was the duty of the wife to support her husband, to be responsible for the home and to raise the children.

The traditional family model is deeply rooted in the Protestant Churches. This is partly due to the prominent role that the pastor and his family used to play in the Protestant parish. Trying to resemble the model of Martin Luther
and Katharina von Bora the pastors and their wives aimed to become model families – and were expected to do so by the parish. According to this model the man was working in the public sphere, while the woman was organizing the household (Schmidt 1998). There are still many Protestants who consider this to be the ideal family. Although women can become ministers in all member churches of the EKD and although the Protestant Churches have three female bishops at the moment, opinions on this issue diverge. They vary from those advocating more equal treatment of women and men (for example, the Evangelische Frauenarbeit in Deutschland, http://www.ekd.de/efd/index.php3) to those who prefer the traditional family model (for example, the Christliches Infoportal Idea 2006, http://www.idea.de/startseite/nachrichten/sv-ss-rubriknews/article/43846/128/).

Violence against women, the difficulties to combine work and family obligations and the small number of women in management positions are currently important topics of publications on gender issues within the Protestant Churches. In 2000 a report on violence against women was published by the EKD (‘Violence against Women as an Issue of the Church’). In 2005 a document was published, which discussed the general conditions and the challenges of living with children in a flexible working environment (Frauenstudien- und –bildungszentrum der EKD/Männerarbeit der EKD 2005). All 23 regional churches and church related organizations (such as the Diakonie) employ representatives for equal treatment and equal opportunities, who publish smaller discussion papers. To activate young women to aim at management positions in church, the EKD and eight regional churches started mentoring a project for women in 2002 (Frauenreferat der EKD und Burckhardthaus e.V. 2002).

Welfare, religion and gender

In Germany, the right for everyone to vote and the eligibility to stand for election were introduced in 1918. The German constitution gives men and women equal rights (Article 3, 2 GG), but experience shows that there are still gender differences and discrimination. Diane Sainsbury describes the relationship between men and women in German society as a male breadwinner regime (Sainsbury 1999) (see also Characteristics of the German welfare system, above). According to this model labour is divided between women and men. Men are expected to act in the public sphere providing for their wives and children, while women are expected to take the responsibility for the household and the children (Fix 2001). To do the housework and to be responsible for the household was a legal obligation for women until the reform of the family law in 1977. This is still indicated in the labour market, in taxation and in the welfare system. Women’s work is paid less
and the representation of women in managerial and leading positions in society is low in all areas of society (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend 2002). With 65.4% in 2005 the female employment rate is higher in Germany than the average of the EU 15 (65.1%) and the EU 25 (63.8%) (www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/). But a high percentage of these employments are part-time. Unlike in other European countries, part-time work in Germany is considered to improve the position of women in the labour market. Because of this a bill on part time work was passed in 2001 in order to guarantee the right of employees to work part time, including employees owning managerial positions.

Statistics show that it is still more likely and self-evident for women in the Eastern federal states to combine a full-time employment and family. In 2004, 49.3% of women with one child and 48.3% of women with two children had full-time jobs in the Eastern part of the country; in contrast, only 24.6% of women with one child and 16.4% of women with two children in the Western federal states had full-time jobs (Statistisches Bundesamt 2005, 33). At the same time, the female unemployment rate is still much higher in the Eastern federal states (19.3% in 2004) than in the Western federal states (8.9% in 2004) (Statistisches Bundesamt 2005, 71). The female unemployment rate for the country as a whole is 10.3% (in 2005), which is higher than the average of the EU 15 (8.9%) or the EU 25 (9.8%) (www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/).

The taxation system mirrors the male breadwinner model as well. The incomes of the spouses are combined for taxation. According to the Ehegattensplitting (splitting of the spouses) the partner who is earning more is granted a reduction, while the partner who is earning less pays comparably high taxes. This means that it is less attractive for the partner who earns less to have a job and, as a general rule, these are women. At the same time this taxation system plays an important part in the public benefits to families, which are economically much more important than child allowances (Stark and Regnér 2001). Being influenced by the principle of subsidiarity social entitlements of the welfare system do not aim at the individual, but at the individual within the traditional family, presupposing that there are women who are taking care of the family. Correspondingly, the provision of day care for children is only fragmentary, especially in the federal states in the Western part of Germany. In 2002 nurseries were for example available for 3% of all the children between 0-3 years in the Western part and for 37% in the Eastern part (Statistisches Bundesamt 2004, 5f.).

Susanne Schunter-Kleemann has compared modern European welfare states by studying the following dimensions: women’s labour market positions, their position within the family and different social insurance schemes, family policy, the culture of the welfare system, the progress of women’s emancipation and democratization in relation to national and international policy (EU). She demonstrates that all welfare systems are based on a type
of patriarchalism marginalizing women and the reproductive work they do. Germany – along with Austria, the Netherlands and Switzerland – is characterized as an example of ‘marriage-related patriarchalism’ (Schunter-Klee- mann 1992). This is confirmed by newer studies, which point to the fact that women who are not married are in a clearly weaker position within the German welfare system, e.g. single mothers, divorced women and young people in general (Poole 2001, Butterwegge, Klundt, Zeng 2005).

The traditional male breadwinner model in Germany is challenged by equality policies and regulations abroad. Germany had and has difficulties in implementing EU guidelines for the equal treatment of women and men into national laws and regulations. Widely shared ‘collective understandings of differently gendered identities’ seem to be hard to overcome (Kodré and Müller 2003, 83). This is illustrated by the fact that the law on equality of rights was passed as late as 1957 and a paragraph about the promotion of equal rights for women was not inserted in the German Constitution until 1994. These traditional understandings are not only questioned by EU policy, but also by other international conventions, such as the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination of the United Nations. The fifth report for this network compiled by the Federal Ministry indicates fifteen areas of anti-discrimination policy. They vary from the elimination of role stereotypes and the elimination of trafficking to equal treatment in the labour market, in the healthcare sector or in marriage and family matters (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend 2002). The report states that there is still lot of work to be done even though there has been some progress. In 2001 a new federal law on equal treatment was introduced. Parental leave, as well as parental money and the provision of daycare for children will be reformed in order to improve the preconditions for women to combine family and work (see also Characteristics of the German welfare system, above). But these reforms can be explained by the low birth rates in Germany. In the field of healthcare the first ‘Report on the Health Situation of Women in Germany’ was not published in until 2001. In March 2006 a law against prostitution was introduced. Its purpose is to strengthen the position of the – mainly female – prostitutes in relation to their clients and to provide them with certain social security benefits. Altogether, the number of more recent initiatives and bills indicates that the issue of gender seems to be high on the political agenda.

Overview of the minority presence in Germany

The term ‘minority’ can be defined in terms of ‘ethnic minority’ or ‘religious minority’. ‘Minority’ can be: (1) a group with a small number of members,

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20 See http://www.bmfsfj.de/Kategorien/gesetze,did=72948.html.
(2) a less powerful group with a small number of members, or (3) a power-
less group with many members (Polm 1995 in: Schmalz-Jacobsen and Han-
sen, 340). Scherr (1998) refers to ‘minorities’ as groups that are a part of
society, for example poor people, the unemployed, the homeless, illegal im-
migrants, drug abusers, alcoholics or the mentally ill (Schäfers and Zapf,
525). Markefka (1995, 25f.) conceives of ‘minority’ as a social and institu-
tional reality, distinguishing between ‘social minorities’ in terms of the
body, intelligence, mind, rights, sexual orientation, economic or social mat-
ters, and ‘ethnic minorities’ in terms of race, nationality, religion and culture.

A ‘national minority’ is defined by the German state as a group within the
nation, having the same rights in the state as its citizens. German ‘national
minorities’ are the Danish, the Sorb, the Roma, the Sinti and the ‘Friesen’
(Second report of the Federal Republic of Germany according to 26 article
25 para. 2 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National mi-
norities, 2004). The social sciences often think of national minority groups in
a broader way and opt for the term ‘ethnic minorities’. An ‘ethnic minority’
can be described as a group of people from another country with – from the
majority perspective – different cultural and religious practices and not the
same national rights as the citizens belonging to the majority population
(Polm 1995 in: Schmalz-Jacobsen and Hansen, 341). In this report we are
interested in both ethnic and religious minorities.

Germany as a country of immigration

In 1995 Schmalz-Jacobsen and Hansen gave an overview of ethnic minori-
ties in Germany over the last decade. The ethnic minority groups with the
highest number of members for the year 1993 come from Turkey
(1,918,395), former Yugoslavia (929,647), Italy (563,009), Greece (351,976)
and Poland (260,514) (Statistisches Bundesamt 2004 in Polm 1994 and ibid,
556f.). In the process of European unification the German state started to
control immigration through European legal measures. As a consequence the
number of immigrants declined since the end of the 1990s. To give an ex-
ample: the number of asylum seekers allowed to stay in Germany is con-
trolled by the Dublin procedure. This measure allows the authorities to check
if an asylum seeker coming to Germany has asked for an asylum application
in another EU country at the same time. Since only one EU state can be
asked for asylum at once and since it has become more difficult to get to
Germany directly, less people are seeking asylum in Germany today than in
the beginning of the 1990s.

As of December 31, 2004 the foreign population according to the German
Federal Office of Migration and Refugees is as follows:
Table 2:1:2 German foreign population by nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,764,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>548,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia/Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>507,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>315,989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>292,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>229,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other states</td>
<td>3,060,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,717,115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2004, 75.

Another group to consider are immigrants with German passports from Eastern Europe and mainly from the former USSR. Since the end of the Cold War thousands of people of German origin have come to Germany. They have German passports and therefore are not included in the statistics on citizens with a foreign passport. At the same time, many of them face similar problems concerning language and integration as other immigrants. More data on foreigners, migrants and other groups of the German population in comparison to other EU states are provided by the European Commission (2004).

In 1955 the first application for the recruitment of guest workers (Gastarbeiter) was made by the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Italy. The German labour shortage was the reason for recruiting unskilled guest workers. Their number rose when labourers from other countries followed, for example the first immigrants from Greece and Spain arrived in 1960. In 1961 the first Turkish labourers began to work in Germany. Between 1965 and 1967 the German Democratic Republic (GDR) also recruited workers from Poland and Hungary. The intention was that guest workers should stay for the time they were needed and then return to their own countries. However, employers continued the contracts with semi-skilled workers who then brought their families to Germany. The government introduced a family reunification programme in order to make it possible for guest workers to live together with their families in Germany. By 1973 when 4,1 million working migrants were living in Germany recruitment of guest workers was stopped. Today the second generation born in Germany have grown up and have children of their own. They do not want to return to the countries their
parents came from but rather to transform their own cultural and religious traditions and identity. (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2004; Beck-Gernsheim 2004; Dälken 2005; http://www.migrationonline.de).

Many migrants live together in specific sections of large German cities, for example in Berlin, Frankfurt or Munich. Different religious minority groups can be identified, including Jews and Muslims. The Jewish communities in large cities account for nearly half of the Jewish population in Germany (Kugelmann 1995 in: Schmalz-Jacobsen and Hansen, 259); the same situation applies to various Muslim groups. For example, in Frankfurt every third citizen has a personal migration experience. Many migrants have lived for years in these cities, but socially they are not well integrated (Straßburger 2001). Different traditions and practices can be a source of tension between the German population and the migrants and minority groups, not only in Frankfurt (Römhild 2003; Beck-Gernsheim 2004). The percentages of residents without German passport is highest in the city states Hamburg (14.1% in 2004), Berlin (13.4% in 2004) and Bremen (12.8% in 2004) and lowest in the Eastern federal states, for example 2.0% in 2004 in Thüringen and 1.9% in 2004 in Sachsen-Anhalt (http://www.statistik.baden-wuerttemberg.de/Indikatoren/01_002.asp). At the same time these federal states and other regions with economic problems are still experiencing emigration. Young, well-educated people move to prosperous regions Western part of Germany to find work (cf. for example http://www.menschen-fuer-ostdeutschland.de).

Immigration in policy, research and media

German integration policy offers social possibilities and welfare provision to different groups of migrants, including immigrants, emigrants, asylum seekers and fugitives. But their social rights and their formal access in public welfare differ depending on their status of residence. The report of the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2004) gives an overview of the different groups and the provision and possibilities available to them. The folk churches have established social services for different groups of migrant as well (cf. Characteristics of the two German folk churches, above). However, it is not always easy receiving support. Often immigrants and asylum seekers have to explain the reasons for coming to Germany in a lengthy administrative process. Immigrants who are new in Germany often look for help within their own minority group since they neither speak German, nor understand German laws.

German minority research is focused on questions of migration, asylum and ethnic identity. There are a lot of open questions and problems especially with regard to political and social integration (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung 1997; Allmendinger and Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2000; Treichler 2002; van Deth 2004; Pfau-Effinger and Geissler 2005). In a
multicultural perspective Mintzel (1997) thinks of 'majority, minority and minority security' as key terms, which are connected to integration or discrimination (ibid., 208). With regard to all minorities living in Germany 'minority security' is motivated by human rights, but only the 'national minorities' are protected by the constitutional law of the state. Multiculturalism is a concept often mentioned in politics and social sciences, for example in presenting special problems or conflicts (ibid., 455). The German state and its federal states are working together to find solutions with regard to cultural pluralism and actual integration politics (Meier-Braun and Weber 2005).

In the German media immigration and integration are key issues in public debate. The media report for example on special asylum cases giving emphasis on the tension between state regulation and individual needs. Often, social, cultural and religious conflicts between the majority population and (religious) minority groups, especially Muslims are highlighted by the media. Differences in cultural and religious values of Islam and the Arabic world became major issue during the last decade, especially after September 11, 2001, the war in Iraq or the conflict over the Muhammad cartoons in early 2006. These debates are going on and the media tend to reproduce the view of the majority on the tensions (Geißler and Pöttker 2005), rather than focus on the perspectives of the minorities. For example the media debate of double citizenship was following the majority perspective not asking what it means for adolescent immigrants born in Germany to choose between the German identity and the original ethnic identity of their parents. Another example is the media debate on the culture and language test, which was introduced by the government of Baden-Württemberg in 2006. This test has to be passed by immigrants who want to have a German citizenship (http://www.landtagswahl-badenwuerttemberg.de/themen/einbuerger.php3).

Over the last years the number of media with international background has risen considerably in Germany. There are a range of international newspapers, for example Turkish newspapers like Hürriyet, Türkiye, Milliyet or Sabah; Russian newspapers like Russkaja Germaniya and Serbian newspapers like Vesti, but also Greek newspapers like Makedonia, Italian newspapers like Corriere d’Italia, US newspaper like Stars and Stripes and European editions of international newspapers such as International Herald Tribune, Wall Street Journal, The Times and Le Monde. These media offer immigrants information and communication platforms in their native languages.
Religious minority-majority relations

This report uses the term ‘religious minority’ to designate a religious organized group, which is not connected to the majority religion in the country, or a Christian denominational group with only a small number of members in comparison to the folk churches. Religious studies and theology also refer to religious minorities in terms of religious groups that have for example an anthroposophist, astrologic or esoteric background (Barth and Elsas 2004). Schmalz-Jacobsen and Hansen (1995) gives an overview of the religious minority groups in the encyclopaedia of ethnical minorities in Germany.

With regard to the world religions represented in Germany, Muslims and the Jews are the largest religious minority groups (Markefka 1995; Rommel-spacher 2002; Braun and Weber 2005). Roman-Catholics and Protestants are the main Christian denominations. There is also a number of Orthodox Christian living in Germany.

Christian minorities

Religious minority communities are organized in denominations, associations or other forms. Only a few Catholic minorities can be found in Germany: the Old Catholics (25,000 members in 2000), the New Charismatics (11,000 in 2001) and the Free Catholics (412 in 2005) (http://www.remid.de). With regard to the German Protestants the free Christian churches, for example the Methodists, Baptists, Pietists, and the Pentecostal and Christian assemblies, can be characterized as denominational minority groups. They have their own ecclesiastical structures and differ in their teachings and in ritual practices.

There is a variety of Orthodox Churches in Germany, including the Orthodox Churches belonging to the Patriarchate of Constantinople, Antioch or Kiev: the Serbian-Orthodox, the Romanian-Orthodox, the Syrian-Orthodox, the Russian-Orthodox, the Armenian-Orthodox and Ethiopian-Orthodox Church.

The Arbeitsgemeinschaft christlicher Kirchen in Deutschland e.V. (ACK; Working Group of Christian Churches in Germany) is an organization promoting ecumenical work. It was founded in 1948 by the Protestant Church, the Old-Catholic Church, the Baptists, the Methodists and some other Protestant Free Churches. In 1974 other churches became members as well, including the Roman-Catholic Church and the Orthodox Churches in Germany (www.oekumene-ack.de).

The Orthodox Churches are not very visible in the public discussions on welfare, religion, gender and minorities in Germany. Their members are well integrated into the German society. There are only a few international humanitarian organizations to mention, e.g. the International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC) founded by the American Orthodox bishops in 1992.
and the Finish Ortaid relief organization. In 2000 the Russian Orthodox Church passed a social document called *Foundations of the social conception of the Russian Orthodox Church* (Grundlagen der Sozialkonzeption der Russischen Orthodoxen Kirche) (cf. Oeldemann 2006, 176-182).

**Non-Christian minorities**

There are about 78 Jewish communities in Germany organized in regional associations. They are placed under the *Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland* (Central Council of Jews in Germany). This Jewish umbrella organization supports Jewish religious and cultural life in Germany as well as Jewish political interests in German society (Kugelmann 1995 in: Schmalz-Jacobsen and Hansen, 257-259; Bundesministerium des Innern 2006). Today 105,000 Jews belong to a synagogue and 80,000 Jewish persons live in Germany without being members of any synagogue (http://www.remid.de).

The following Muslim groups are present in Germany: Sunni Muslims (2,200,000 in 2001), Alevits (340,000 in 2000), Iranian and Turkish Shiites (170,000 in 2000), the Ahmadiyya (50,000 in 2003), the Ismailis (12,000 in 2000) and the Sufi (10,000 in 1997). In Germany Islam is not organized as a public corporation. This means that Muslim congregations are not structured like German churches, but had to choose other forms. The Muslim umbrella organizations are the *Zentralrat der Muslime* (Central Council of the Muslims) and the *Islamrat* (Islam Advice Council) and the *Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion* (DITIB; Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institute for Religion). All of them are engaged in a dialogue with representatives of both German society and the churches, e.g. members of parliament, local politicians, church leaders and priests. At the same time they are also connected to the countries of their origin. The DITIB (110,000 in 2000) is also a very important mosque association. Other organized mosque groups are the *Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş* (Islamic Community Milli Görüş) (26,500 in 2003), the *Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren* (Federation of the Islamic Cultural Centres) (20,000 in 2000), the *Turkish-Islamic Union (ATIB)* (11,000 in 2000), the Islamische *Gemeinschaft Jamaʿt un-Nur* (Islamic Community Jamaʿt un-Nur) (5,000-6,000 in 2000), the *Muslimbruderschaft* (MB; Muslim brotherhood) (1,300 in 2003) and the *Kalifatsstaat* (Kalifat State) (800 in 2003) (http://www.remid.de). The last named organization is often linked to terrorism.

The Hindus are divided into the Tamil Hindus from Sri Lanka (45,000 in 2003), the Indian Hindus (35,000-40,000 in 2003), the Hindus of Western origin (7,500 in 2003) and the Afghan Hindus (5000 in 2003). Some Hindus are organized in associations, for example the *Indischer Kulturverein Bharat Samiti e.V.* (Indian Culture Association Bharat Samiti e.V.) in Köln, *Bengalische Vereinigungen* (Bengali Associations) and the *Kamadchi Ampal Tem-
pel e.V. (Kamadchi Ampal Temple). There are also several ‘new religious movements’ and groups with different Neo-Hinduist backgrounds in Germany, e.g. Integraler Yoga (Integral Yoga), Sri Chinmoy and Hare Krishna (http://www.remid.de).

There are Buddhists with different backgrounds in Germany: Buddhists from Vietnam (60,000 in 2003), from Thailand (25,000 in 2003) and from other Asian countries (20,000-30,000 in 2003) and Buddhists with German background. The Buddhists belong to different groups, to Theravada, Mahayana, Zen, Japanese or Tibetan Buddhism. They are organized in the Deutsche Buddhistische Union (DBU; German Buddhist Union) (for the data and the numbers cf. http://www.remid.de).

Many European and German public debates about religion focus on Islam. Current debates ask for instance if and how the Islamic sharia laws can be linked to human rights and civil laws in general and with women’s rights in particular. Family and role models represented by immigrants living in Germany are criticized from a gender perspective. Women with Muslim backgrounds who wear headscarves are regarded as symbolic of female oppression. Consequently, prohibiting headscarves in certain public contexts is considered by some groups to be an act of women’s liberation (Barth and Elsas 2004). At the same time there are associations of Muslim women working with gender questions such as the Huda – Netzwerk für muslimische Frauen e.V. (Huda - Network for Muslim Women), the Muslima aktiv (Muslima Active) and the local associated group Muslimat – Islamische Frauenbewegung Dresden e.V. (Muslimat - Islamic Women’s Movement Dresden). These associations offer information and social services as well as education and special support for women in particular.

Both orthodox and liberal Jewish women are organized in groups, including the Bet Debora e.V. in Berlin, an organization that promotes democracy and women’s rights, the Jüdischer Frauenbund in Deutschland (JFB; Jewish Woman Federation in Germany), founded in 1904, a charter member of the Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland e.V., the Rosch Chodesch Gruppen (Rosch Chodesch groups), ritual groups, and the Women’s International Zionist Organization (WIZO). These organizations are mainly offering social services and educational support (e.g. nursery schools, schools, special institutions for women).

Religious minorities and welfare provision

Religious minority groups have established own institutions engaged in welfare matters. There are both explicitly welfare providing institutions and other organizations dealing with welfare needs. The Jewish welfare institutions are organized very similar to the Christian organizations in the social sector. Their umbrella organization is the Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland e.V. (Central Welfare Office of the Jews in Germany), an
independent (non-profit) welfare organization, which offers social services in different areas of welfare provision (Boeßenecker 2005; Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Freien Wohlfahrtspflege 2002). Other organizations are the Gesher (Gesher), responsible for Jewish culture and tradition, the Keren Hayesod – Vereinigte Israel Aktion (Keren Hayesod - Associated Israel Action) supporting Jews in Israel and the WIZO, a women’s organization described above. Some other Jewish organizations offer social support, too. The Jewish communities in large cities also serve as community centres where all generations can meet. They take care of old people and organize kindergartens and primary schools for Jewish education. (Kugelmann 1995 in: Schmalz-Jacobsen and Hansen, 266f.).

Muslim social support and services of religious minority groups exist, but few people in the German population know about them. A mapping of Muslim welfare-providing institutions and social organizations dealing with welfare indicates that their networks are differently organized and focused, e.g. regarding support for immigrants arriving in Germany. It is a Muslim task to give money as Zakât (Armensteuer/Tax for the poor) to poor people. These activities are often linked to mosque communities, which are offering social support and education (Beinhauer-Köhler 2005). On regional and national level the Muslim umbrella organizations play an important role for networking in the field of welfare. There are also some Muslim organizations on the national level with a specific social purpose, e.g. the Muslimischer Sozialbund e.V. - Cenanze Vafki (Muslim Social Federation - Cenanze Vafki) or Kauf und hilf (Purchase and Help), an institution of the international organization Muslime helfen e.V. (Muslims Help).

German Muslims have about 2,200 houses or places of worship (including 70 mosques). Over 320,000 Muslims are members of mosques or other Islamic organizations. Jewish synagogues have about 102,500 members. In Berlin there are over 11,100, in Munich about 8,900 members, in Düsseldorf about 7,200 members and in Frankfurt about 7,000. Buddhists have 200 centres and groups. Approximately 25% belong to the umbrella organization called Deutsche Buddhistische Union – Buddhistische Religionsgemeinschaft (DBU; German Buddhist Union - Buddhist Religious Community). The German Tamils in Hamm built a Hindu Temple in 2002, which is considered to be the largest temple in continental Europe.

The reactions in German society towards the building of non-Christian places of worship differ both from local community to local community and between the religions. Mostly, initiatives to build new Jewish synagogues are warmly welcomed by German society. They are considered to be a sign of hope after the shoah. The new synagogues in Dresden (2001) and Munich (2006) have become important cultural centres and tourist attractions. For Muslim communities it has been more difficult to build places of worship. Quite a few conflicts over the building of mosques have taken place over the
last few years (Beck-Gernsheim 2004). Plans to build a mosque in the city centre of Cologne (2002) resulted in a protest movement obtaining a lot of media attention. In Schüchtern (2002) a citizens’ decision was needed before the construction work of the mosque could be started. The Muslim congregation in Berlin-Kreuzberg had to meet many stipulations before it could start the construction of its mosque. Similar conflicts have emerged in Darmstadt, Frankfurt, Hannover, and Bad Salzuflen. But they are also positive examples obtain much less attention in media (cf. for instance the Reutlingen case study below).

Conclusions

Germany is a society undergoing change. It has to adapt to internal developments and international trends. In some respects German society and the welfare system have been shaped by post-war conceptions, which do not correspond to the current situation. After a long period of continuity in the Western part of the country, citizens, pressure groups and politics are preparing for fundamental changes both in the field of welfare and in society in general. The Eastern part of the country experienced a paradigmatic shift seventeen years ago. In both parts of the country the forthcoming changes evoke strong feelings. This is illustrated by the vivid public discussions on welfare reforms, family models and migration policy.

The challenges are diverse and we have selected four aspects. First, German society in general and the welfare system in particular have to adapt to a variety of factors including a globalized economy and the European market, a workforce and citizens with international working careers and profiles, an ageing population and a growing individualization and diverse forms of family configurations. Second, fewer and fewer women in Germany adopt traditional roles. The new role and family models need more and new types of welfare services. Third, statistics show that German society is shaped by immigration. Against this background, current concepts of integration have to be analysed in order to examine whether and how they relate to the social reality and to the minorities present in the country. Fourth, social exclusion and poverty are both rising. Neither the mechanics of exclusion, nor the strategies of counteracting poverty, have been explored sufficiently. But it is obvious that complementary actors and initiatives are needed as the state and the municipalities are beginning to limit their welfare engagement.

Even though the membership numbers of the folk churches are declining, Germany is still a religious country. Almost two thirds of the population are Christians and almost three quarters belong to one of the world religions. These numbers illustrate that the churches and other religious communities remain important actors in society and in the welfare system. Nevertheless, the exclusive position of the folk church no longer mirrors the reality of the
country as the religious situation has become more complex and pluralistic. The prisms of welfare and gender reveal many unanswered questions about the values and the religious practice of minorities in Germany. How do minority religion communities and churches relate to German society? How do they perceive and use the welfare system? How do they evaluate the changes in traditional roles and family models? How do they define and deal with poverty and social exclusion? Which values do they feel connected to? Which values do they resist? This is of specific interest with regard to Muslims living in Germany as they represent the most numerous religious minority community. As society is in constant change it is also in search of a new consensus. Not at least for the sake of an inclusive public discourse and a social consensus it is important to fill in the many gaps at the intersections between minorities, values and religion.

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2:3 REUTLINGEN CASE STUDY REPORT

Annette Leis-Peters, Anika Albert

Abstract

The welfare focus chosen through the case study of Reutlingen in south-western Germany is care for elderly people. About 15% of the city’s residents do not have a German passport. As an industrial city, Reutlingen has become an international city on the basis of working migration during the 1960s and 1970s. Among the many minority groups living in the city today the Turkish and the Greek community as well as German immigrants from the former USSR are the most numerous ones; they consequently play the most prominent role within the framework of the case study. The prism of the study does not only look at the welfare needs and expectations of elderly people, but also those of younger generations and intergenerational issues. Working migration influenced the city and lives of migrants strongly. Neither the migrants themselves, nor German society and the welfare system seemed to be prepared for the (social) effects of migration that they are experiencing today. Key concepts in the case study are age, family, family cohesion, inter-generational relationships and the transfer and maintenance of traditions. The material shows that it is not mainly the conceptions (or the values), that differ between different groups in society, but rather the way how these conceptions or values are related to actions or practices.

The city of Reutlingen

General information

Reutlingen is a city of approximately 112,000 inhabitants in the relatively prosperous federal state of Baden-Württemberg. The town is situated between the region of Mittlerer Neckar, one of the economic motors of Germany, and an agricultural highland region called Schwäbische Alb. Several large firms (such as the Daimler Corporation, the Porsche Corporation or Robert Bosch GmbH) as well as many middle size firms supplying them are based in the Mittlerer Neckar. Reutlingen is an attractive place of residence for many commuters who work in this industrial region and in the capital of the federal state, Stuttgart, which is a 50 km journey away.

With origins in the 11th century the town became a centre for the south western German Reformation movement during the 16th century. In 1524 the citizens of Reutlingen forced their government to officially introduce and maintain the new teachings of the Reformation (Brecht 1995). In 1530 Reutlingen was one of the two German towns, which signed the Confessio Au-
gustana. A strong notion of being a Protestant city can still be found in Reutlingen though the figures tell a different story. After World War II the city became increasingly denominationally mixed. Many refugees from former German areas in Eastern Europe and many working migrants who moved to Reutlingen were Roman-Catholics. In 1950, 83.5% and in 1970 66.5% of all residents were Protestants. Today, Protestants are still the most numerous religious group. But with 43.8% of citizens belonging to the Evangelical-Lutheran church this is no overwhelming majority. Up to 23.9% of all residents are Roman-Catholics. Over and above these two groups, public statistics only include another third group, the so-called others (33.3%). This group comprises other Christians such as Orthodox Christians or members of the Christian Free churches¹, Muslims, Jews, Buddhist and Hindus, but also people who do not belong to any religion at all. The latter are the most numerous among ‘others’. This is illustrated by a noticeable growth of this group after the fall of the wall, when many East Germans moved to the Western part of the country to find a job. In 1990 the group of ‘others’ constituted 21.1% of the residents, in 1995 it was 26.5% and in 2004 33.3% (Stadt Reutlingen 2005d, 58). With regard to the non-Christian religions, approximately 4,000 Muslims (most of them of Turkish origins) and about 120 Jews (most came recently from the former USSR) live in Reutlingen.

Reutlingen has been and still is an industrial city. From the middle of the 19th century Reutlingen underwent an early industrialization. Today, Reutlingen is not as beautiful a historic city as its early past might suggest. Destruction of the war and an early economic upswing in the 1950s and 1960s, which saw the replacement of many remaining old buildings with modern buildings, has left traces in the townscape. It is the structure of the city with its pedestrian precinct and its huge market place in the city centre, which is most reminiscent of the long historic tradition of the town.

Politically, Reutlingen was as an industrial city, a stronghold of the Social-Democrats within the traditional Conservative federal state of Baden-Württemberg. Today, the town has an independent female mayor with a city council that is dominated by Conservative and Liberal parties. The political balance of power has led to a quite open and positive policy when it comes to involvement of church-related actors in the field of welfare (Leis-Peters 2006). At the same time integration policy toward migrant residents may be

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¹ There is a Pentecostal parish in Reutlingen called the ‘Christian Centre Reutlingen’. According to the external view it offers, its website (www.czr.de) and material from the WREP study in Reutlingen it is a quite established parish in the town. In some of the interviews of the WREP study, it was mentioned that there is an interest in new charismatic parishes among young Christian people in Reutlingen. But mostly, these young people go to Stuttgart where some charismatic youth churches have started to establish on larger scale.
characterized as quite modest and cautious compared to other German cities of the same size (ii 1, f).2

Minority presence in Reutlingen
About 16,541 (or 15.2%) of Reutlingen inhabitants do not have a German passport. They come from 125 different countries all over the world. The largest groups among these residents are of Turkish (more than 3,000 people or 2.7%) and Greek nationality (almost 3,000 or 2.65%) (Stadt Reutlingen 2005d, 55f). In general most of the residents with a foreign passport in Reutlingen have European origins. About 2,000 residents are Italians, 1,600 are Croatians and 1,100 come from Serbia and Herzegovina. The largest non-European group in Reutlingen are the Iraqis (300) followed by the Pakistanis (170). All other non-European residents (2,500) are included in the group ‘other foreign residents’. This group consists of more than 100 different minority communities, which all have a share of less than 1% of the total foreign population in Reutlingen (Stadt Reutlingen 2005d, 50f.).3

Concerning migrants in Reutlingen one has to also mention the community of immigrants from Eastern Europe and the former USSR with German origins. Most come from Asian parts of the former USSR as many of the ethnic Germans were deported to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan during the Stalin area. Since the end of the Cold War many thousands have moved to Germany. According to the German citizenship legislation they have German passports and therefore they are hidden in the statistics. The statistical agency in Baden-Württemberg points to the dilemma that the statistics on foreign residents cannot mirror the existing migration process within German society. Citizenship statistics indicate that 12% of all residents in Baden-Württemberg do not have a German passport. But the statistics related to

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2 The study is mainly based on interviews. There are two categories of interviews: individual interviews (ii) and group interviews (gi). Within these categories the interviews are numbered in a chronological order. For individual interviews, (f) indicates a woman and (m) a man.
3 Public statistics do not include figures for the Roma and the Sinti. The Sinti are a subgroup of the Roma who are until today the most numerous group of Roma living in Germany. Their name refers to their language and it is a name they chose for themselves. In the German context statistics refer to both the Sinti and the Roma, not to either the Sinti, or the Roma. Not including Sinti and Roma in public statistics is due to historic reasons as Sinti and Roma were one of the persecuted groups during the Nazi-regime. Representatives of the statistical bureau make it quite clear that public statistics in Germany should never make it possible again to define Sinti and Roma (in order to prevent risk of persecution). Because of this the statistical officer in Reutlingen guesses that there must be some Sinti and Roma in Reutlingen, maybe among the residents coming from Eastern Europe. According to the German Association of Sinti and Roma in Baden-Württemberg about 10,000 Sinti and Roma are living in Baden-Württemberg today. The task of this association is to coordinate education work, culture, public relations and welfare work for Sinti and Roma. The association points to the fact that many Sinti and Roma still suffer from persecution during the Nazi regime, ongoing discrimination when reparations were paid and insufficient social, cultural, economic and political reintegration (http://www.sinti-roma-bawue.de).
the PISA study in 2000 reveal that 29% of all 15 year old pupils have at least one parent, who was born in another country and for 20% of these pupils both parents were born in another country (Jäger/Leschhorn/Stutzer, 2004, 40f.). Citizenship issues affect not least access to the welfare services. Compared to other immigrants the Germans from the former USSR have been treated generously, for example when it comes to language courses or entitlements to the pension system (Deutsche Rentenversicherung, 2007, 4ff.) At the same time they make up a community that has come to the city most recently facing similar problems concerning language and integration as other immigrants.

The rate of residents holding a foreign passport or with an immigrant background differs a lot from city district to city district. In the city centre and in the northern parts of Reutlingen 38% of the residents do not have a German passport. In the districts, where the more affluent residents live and in the villages that were incorporated into the city of Reutlingen after World War II, only 3% to 7% of residents have a foreign passport (Stadt Reutlingen 2005d, 55f.). In one of the districts where there are very high numbers of residents from a migrant background (Tübinger Vorstadt) a co-operation project has been developed. The international associations present in the district (there is a Turkish, a Greek, a Serbian and a Croatian association) have formed a so called ‘Colourful Table’. They meet regularly and plan common cultural and social events. Both the Protestant parish and a Muslim organization are involved in the cooperation as well. The project is financed by the municipality, the Federal Ministry of family, elderly people, women and youth and the European Social Fund. It is also part of the European LOS (Local Capital for Social purposes) programme.

**Brief presentation of the local welfare system**

Public responsibility for welfare provision on the communal level is mainly divided between the local government (municipality of Reutlingen) and the regional level (district of Reutlingen). Together with the social insurances (pension insurance, accident insurance, health insurance, unemployment insurance and compulsory long term care insurance), the municipalities and the district are the most important funding sources of welfare benefits and services in Germany, supported and complemented by federal and national payments.

The public responsibility for welfare provision does not only imply the funding, but also the control and the governing of the welfare services delegated to public and non-public providers. As German history during the 20th century was formed by two totalitarian political systems German citizens are still sceptical of a strong state with comprehensive welfare services. One strategy to guarantee democracy and citizen’s rights in the welfare sector is to include different independent welfare actors and providers in the welfare
system. When it comes to welfare provision the social authorities on the communal level tend to delegate the social services to independent non-profit and for-profit organizations. Due to historical reasons, the two big folk churches (Roman-Catholic and Protestant) and church-related welfare organizations (Caritas and Diakonie) play an important and self-evident role in this context, in the western part of the country in particular.

Even for insiders it is very hard to figure out which area of welfare the municipality is in charge of and which one is covered by the district. To draw some general lines: the districts are responsible for the health care system, help for handicapped people, for homeless people and for stationary services for children and young people; the municipalities are responsible for help for elderly people, home care and nursery services, general social assistance, day-care services for children and young people and general-education schools. In our study we will concentrate on the interaction of majority and minority communities on the level of the municipality, not least because our focus (care for elderly people) suggests this perspective.

Reutlingen is a typical west-German case as the churches and one church-related welfare organization in particular have a strong position in the local welfare system. The BruderhausDiakonie, a diaconal institution founded in the 19th century is based in the city (www.bruderhausdiakonie.de). Through the development of the German welfare system after World War II it has become a major provider of social services in the region with about 3,500 employees (Leis-Peters 2006, 74f.).

To illustrate how complicated the mix of welfare providers can look like we will sketch the local distribution of welfare services among different actors within two areas: services for immigrants and refugees and services for elderly people (the focus of our study). When it comes to immigrants the local Caritas organization (http://www.caritas-fils-neckarlab.de/20698.html) and the local Red Cross (http://www.drk-reutlingen.de/) offer counselling for migrants and German resettlers from Eastern Europe and the former USSR, while the diaconal centre of the church district of the local Protestant church is responsible for counselling refugees and asylum seekers (http://www.kirchenbezirk.reutlingen.elkwue.de/cms/startseite/werke-und-einrichtungen/diakonieverband/diakonisches-werk-rt/). In addition Caritas coordinates an international women’s group (http://www.caritas-fils-neckarlab.de/24445.html). The BruderhausDiakonie runs several integration services for young immigrants (http://www.bruderhausdiakonie.de/hilfbereich/jugendhilfe/Jugendmigrationsdienste/index.php?h=4&s1=23&t1=1206), among them integration and language courses. For the integration and

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4 These Germans coming to Germany have never lived in Germany before. Their families have been living in Russia and the USSR for generations.
When it comes to care for elderly people, the division of work gives another picture. In the area of home care and nursery services it becomes more visible that the German welfare system has been opening up to for-profit providers since the mid-1990s. The municipality is no longer a service provider itself. Its home care service has become part of a new non-profit company offering services for elderly people (RAH, Gemeinnützige Altenhilfe mbH Reutlingen). In addition to these home care services, there are four other non-profit providers in the field: the home care services of the local Catholic and the Protestant church, the home care service of the BruderhausDiakonie and the home care service of the German Red Cross. These five non-profit providers formed a working group to cooperate instead of competing. One of the results of the cooperation is that they divided Reutlingen into five geographical parts of about 20,000 residents. Each of the non-profit home care services is in charge for one of the parts, while the others don’t compete in this specific area (Leis-Peters 2006). However, as there are six private for-profit home care services they find themselves in a situation of competition anyhow (Stadt Reutlingen 2007, 66f.). Another aspect is the fact that a growing number of families employ women from Eastern Europe (mostly Poland) to care for their elderly family member 24 hours a day. This kind of home care is organized privately, without public coordination or control, often on the basis of an illegal working contract (without taxes and social contributions). Everybody knows about this, but this grey area is not regulated publicly (Leis-Peters 2006).

As regards to nursing homes for elderly people the picture is less diverse. Altogether four non-profit providers run ten nursing homes for elderly people: the RAH (2), the BruderhausDiakonie (6), the German Red Cross (1) and a foundation related to the Catholic Caritas (1), which also runs the local hospice (Stadt Reutlingen 2007, 70f.).

The examples of the two welfare areas above illustrate that the two folk churches and the diaconal institution in particular are strongly engaged in the local welfare provision. Both for welfare users and the local population it is often impossible to distinguish between the different church and church related actors. In Reutlingen, the perception of church related welfare work is strongly formed by the BruderhausDiakonie which is - in contrast to actual circumstances - seen as a part of the Protestant church (Leis-Peters, 2006, 99ff.).

The role of minority associations in the local welfare system is not easy to grasp as it is not comparable to the role of the folk churches and the other traditional non-profit welfare organizations. Nevertheless, there are numer-

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5 We chose not to pay close attention to this area within our case study as it did not seem to be as relevant to the minority groups we were focusing on.
ous local associations related to national minority communities or religious communities. Among them are religious associations, such as Free churches, religious communities linked to Christian traditions (like the Jehovah Witnesses or the New Apostle Community), Muslim associations, a Jewish community and a Buddhist Centre. In addition, a great variety of national minority associations (such as Turkish or Greek associations) are present in Reutlingen. Some of them target explicitly women, like the Greek women’s group. The national minority communities are also organized in political groups competing for the city council of immigrants (Council for Residents with Foreign passport) (http://www.reutlingen.de/ceasy/modules/cms/main.php5?cPageId=799).

There are national minority associations focusing on culture (such as the Federazione Italiana Reutlingen, Griechischer Tanzverein ‘Orphas’ Reutlingen e.V. or Türkischer Kultur und Anadolu Sportverein e.V.) and notably religious organizations (such as the Ahmadiyya Muslim Gemeinde, Muslim-Gemeinde Reutlingen e.V. or Kroatische Katholische Gemeinde ‘Sveta Obitelj’). But the field studies showed that the activities of many of the associations cover cultural, social and religious activities (as for example in the case the Griechische Frauengruppe or the Türkische Gemeinschaft Organisation im Raum e.V.).

Nevertheless, there is only one international association that has become a regular provider of welfare services: the Ridaf (Reutlinger Initiative für deutsche und ausländische Familien/Reutlingen Initiative for German and Foreign Families). The association was founded in 1981 to further meetings between native families and immigrant families. Its most important aim was and still is to improve the situation of migrants and disadvantaged Germans. Most of the welfare services the association runs today relate to this aim: social work for young people, truants and street children, language and integration courses and activities to help disadvantaged residents find an occupation. The fourth and the fifth fields of activity, a catering service and home help services for elderly people, are the result of efforts to help disadvantaged migrants and Germans into the working life (http://www.ridaf.org). Becoming a welfare provider also meant for the Ridaf developing into a professional and specialized organization. Organizing and experiencing meetings between Germans and foreigners, which was the original aim of Ridaf, no longer belongs to the major activities of the association, explains a representative in a telephone interview (ii 2, f).

National minority associations and religious associations contribute to the local welfare. This is strongly expressed by all the interviewees. In addition to the very obvious function as meeting places, where experiences can be exchanged, members can also reinforce their traditions and religious values and the associations contribute to cultural and moral education of the young generation. The last named is perceived as another major task among Mus-
lim and Turkish associations in particular, but also among some of the Germans coming from the former USSR. These associations thus focus on educating children and young people. They want the young generation to know their culture, their religion and their traditions. The traditions passed on through this education are viewed as helping young people to get on with life, to complete school successfully and to find a job. Some representatives state directly that they consider their work as prevention of delinquency and drug abuse (gi 2).

The national minority associations in particular are becoming more self-confident in being important actors within the field of local welfare. They are about to establish welfare services on their own instead of being ‘only’ the clients of other welfare providers. The most prominent examples in Reutlingen are services aimed to help pupils with school difficulties with their homework. As pupils from migration background often face this kind of problem parent organizations of national minority associations want to take responsibility for these services. Their arguments are that they know the need of their children best and that they can assess most competently if the service works successfully (ii 1, f, gi 2).

Context and Timeframe

The timeframe of the field study in Reutlingen was August 2006 to July 2007. The mapping was conducted between August and September 2006. During October and November 2006 first contacts with possible informants were made. In November 2006 the series of interviews started. Intensive periods of fieldwork took place in November and December 2006 and in January, March, June and July 2007.

In the following paragraphs we point out developments, events and public discussions on the national and the local level that occurred and/or started during our field work period and that are reflected in the material.

National level

- Unemployment has been and still is perceived as the major problem both for German society in general and for the welfare system in particular. Reutlingen is situated in an economically prosperous region of Germany and has a comparably low rate of unemployment. According to the Statistical Bureau of Baden-Württemberg, the unemployment rate in Reutlingen was only 5.3% in 2005 (http://www.statistik.badenwuerttemberg.de/SRDB/Tabelle.asp?99025020GE415061, 10.01.2008) compared to 7.0% for the federal state of Baden-Württemberg (http://www.statistik.badenwuerttemberg.de/ArbeitsmErwerb/Landesdaten/AL_JD.asp, 10.01.2008) and approximately 12% for Germany as a whole in the beginning of 2006
Since then both the national federal state and local unemployment rates have dropped slightly. Nevertheless, unemployment was mentioned in almost all the interviews.

- In October 2006, a school in Hamburg and in Berlin decided to introduce a requirement for pupils to speak German, not only in the class room, but also in the school yard (http://www.spiegel.de/schulspiegel/0,1518,397429,00.html). This was very controversial, as it was viewed both as a prohibition of foreign mother tongues in school and as an important step towards better integration. Several of our interviewees mentioned this debate, especially representatives of the Turkish community.

- The membership of Turkey in the European Union is another political issue that representatives of the Turkish associations were very engaged in. In the media the issue was discussed intensely and in controversial terms during autumn 2006 (for example: http://www.euractiv.com/de/erweiterung/verheugen-befurwortet-eu-mitgliedschaftturkei/article-158587).

Local level
During the recent years the municipality of Reutlingen conducted two exhibitions related to the focus of care for elderly people and intergenerational relationships in families from migration backgrounds. Both exhibitions are part of larger projects focusing on people from migration backgrounds and were organized by the migration officer of the city. Several of our interviewees referred to these exhibitions. This indicates that the exhibitions had some influence on the local perception of immigrant issues.

The perspective of elderly people
The title of the first exhibition was ‘In the foreign parts: HOME. HOME: in the foreign parts’. It is based on interviews and photographs of people, who came in the 1960s as guest workers from countries, like Turkey, Greece, Italy or Portugal to Reutlingen. The exhibition tells in the form of portraits 14 different life stories of first generation migrants who came to Reutlingen and who are now growing old, but still have plans for the future in Reutlingen – even if their plans look very different in comparison to their original objectives. What do they think about growing old in a foreign country, which at the same time somehow has become their home? What does their situation look like? What are their problems and concerns? (http://www.reutlingen.de/ceasy/modules/cms/main.php5?cPageId=797).
The perspective of young people
The second exhibition with the title ‘Whom I admire’ has its focus on seven young people in the age of 14 from a migration background. They all live in Reutlingen and go to different schools. In interviews and photographs they show their favourite places and first work experiences in Reutlingen, talk about plans for their future and present their role models, who are often members of their own families. The exhibition asks: What questions are these young people preoccupied with? How do they perceive themselves? How is their relationship to the older generations? What gives them their orientation? What future plans do they have? (http://www.reutlingen.de/ceasy/modules/cms/main.php5?cPageId=798).

Methods, sources and focus
The following research methods and sources were used:
• Collection of statistical material published by the municipality, the statistical bureau of Baden-Württemberg and the national statistical bureau;
• Collection of documents, such as guidelines and information material, published by the municipality and different local associations;
• Observation of regional newspapers and other regional media;
• Participant observation (both by taking part in group meetings and informal gatherings of different minority communities and by reflecting on our communication and interaction with different actors and communities);
• Individual interviews and group interviews (seven individual and eight group interviews were conducted).

The individual interviews were conducted with:
• Two representative of an international association providing welfare activities (both of them are female, one is an employee and in working age, the other a member of the board and a pensioner);
• One representative of the municipality (female, working age);
• One representative of the local Protestant church (female, working age);
• One representative of an association of Germans from the former USSR (female, working age);
• One representative of a Turkish association and local mosque (male, working age);
• One representative of a Greek association (female, pensioner).

The group interviews were conducted with:
• A men’s group of a Turkish association (14 interviewees, male, working age);
• A women’s group of the same Turkish association (4 interviewees, female, working age, all mothers of school children);
• A group of men from a Mosque association (7 interviewees, male, of working age and pensioners);
• A mixed group from another Mosque association (mixed male and female, all of working age);
• A group of elderly women from an association of Greek women (about 30 interviewees, all female, all pensioners);
• A Russian language and culture association running a Russian school on Saturdays (2 interviewees, female, of working age);
• An association for the integration of immigrant citizens and development aid founded by immigrants from the former USSR (7 interviewees, mixed male and female, most of working age and one pensioner);
• A group of female employees within the municipal office for care for elderly people (3 interviewees, female, all of working age).

As the group interviews mostly took place in the localities of the international associations they were open and public to the visitors of the association. Because of this they often had the character of an open discussion, in which a new discussion member came and others left. Because of this it was difficult to relate certain statements to a specific individual. Therefore, we chose to refer to the group interview in general.

The case study focused on the following three national minority communities:
• Turkish
• Greek
• Germans from the former USSR

These communities cover the following religious groups:
• Muslims
• Orthodox Christians
• Protestant and Catholic Christians (among the Germans from the former USSR)
• Jews (among the Germans from the former USSR)
• Non-religious people (mostly among the Germans from the former USSR).

Focusing on the Turkish and Greek minority community was almost self-evident because they represent the two largest minority communities in Reutlingen. Many Turkish and Greek men and women came to Germany in the 1960s and the 1970s in order to earn money and to go back to their home countries after a few years. Many of them are still living in Reutlingen. They
brought their families with them and are growing old now. Today, third or even fourth generations of people with Turkish or Greek background are living in Reutlingen.

The Germans from the former USSR are specific to the German case and because of this of special interest for the study: on the one hand they are German passport holders; on the other hand, they share many problems with other immigrants, for example concerning language and integration. They often live in two worlds, more so than other migrants because in the countries where they lived before they were ‘Germans’. But in Germany they often feel like strangers and are perceived as ‘Russians’. They are Germans both on a formal (having a German passport; being part of the statistics) and on an emotional level, but in everyday life they are often perceived and treated very differently from other Germans, i.e. the majority population. In addition, they are the group of immigrants who arrived most recently in Reutlingen.

Focus of the case study: care for elderly people and intergenerational relationships

As mentioned before the Reutlingen case study focuses on care for elderly and relationships between the generations. When starting the case study we compiled a long list of arguments for selecting this focus. After having conducted the case study the following argument or starting points proved to be most relevant:

- Ageing is a very pluralistic and at the same time unifying phenomenon, concerning the majority, as well as, minority groups.
- The ageing of society is a major (welfare) problem in many European countries, which will even increase in the coming decades.
- There may be different expectations of elderly German people and of people from a migration background that are growing old.
- Ageing involves the whole family. There may be different pictures of what a family is or should be like.
- The need to care for elderly people may reveal conflict and cohesion between the generations, both in the majority population and in the minority communities.
- Care for elderly people is a highly gendered issue.
- Intercultural care has in fact become a practical problem.
- Care for the elderly is an area where the churches as religious actors are very much involved.
Findings

Background information: old people in Reutlingen

More than 19,000 people who are over 65 live in Reutlingen. Of those 1,000 do not have a German passport (Stadt Reutlingen 2005d, 26) and there are some more people from migration backgrounds among them, who meanwhile have obtained a German passport. Most of the old people living in Reutlingen are, despite of their age, able to live an independent life. Others need help in different situations of life; some have to rely completely on the help offered by other people or professional services. There are a variety of social services and networks for elderly people in Reutlingen run by different public and private suppliers (see 2.3). An overview of all useful contacts for old people and their relatives is provided in a booklet published by the city council of Reutlingen (Stadt Reutlingen 2005c).

Municipal services for elderly people

The social administration of Reutlingen has a special ‘Department for Elderly people’ with seven offices in different districts of the city. They are places for information, contact and mediation. Their function is to support the development of diverse services, groups and networks for elderly people in the city. The ‘Department for the Elderly’ provides information and counselling to all institutions supporting elderly people and tries to coordinate the different suppliers. Furthermore, it tries to strengthen volunteers working with elderly people and contacts between volunteers and elderly people, for example by putting rooms at their disposal. An interesting project initiated by the ‘Department for the Elderly’ is a project called ‘Every Day Companion’, in which volunteers spend a few hours a week together with an elderly person doing activities like going for a walk or visiting concerts.

For its work the ‘Department for the Elderly’ has established some principles in a mission statement (Stadt Reutlingen 2005b). In this paper the philosophy of work and the understanding of ‘age’ are explained. The paper puts emphasis on perceiving ‘age’ from the perspective of abilities and resources rather than from a perspective of deficiency, infirmity, neediness and poverty. Age is understood as a stage of life, providing a great variety of individual situations and personal positive or negative experiences, including an independent lifestyle or community with others. Against this background a vision is developed: Reutlingen is to become a city in which people of all ages have good chances to participate in the social, economic, cultural and political life according to their special situation. The ‘Department for the Elderly’ tries to reach this aim by including the special interests and needs of elderly people into a plan for developing community work in the city: ‘our work helps to shape and to preserve the social cohesion, the community of
generations and the cooperation in our city’ (Stadt Reutlingen 2005a). Fel!

Hittar inte referenskälla.

In addition to the ‘Department for the Elderly’ there is a ‘District Council’ for elderly people, which represents the interests of elderly people on the level of the district. This forum tries to collect and coordinate the services for elderly people as well (http://www.ksr.reutlingen.de/cms/index.php). Another important actor is a foundation for ‘Services for Elderly People’ (http://www.ksk-reutlingen.de/7c06d9f9b1b2dcc4/index.htm) funded by the district bank of Reutlingen. The foundation rewards people being engaged in activities for elderly people every year.

Examples of cooperation and/or cohesion between and within groups

Cohesion within the family

In the general public discussion in Germany the issue of care for elderly people is without doubt related to conflicts and power struggles. Both the practical and the economic provision of care for elderly are considered to be major tasks of German society that are challenging the existing welfare system and overburdening the younger (and smaller) generations. Books, such as the ‘The Struggle of Generations’ by the theologian and sociologist Reimer Gronemeyer, stimulate the discussion (Gronemeyer 2004). Within the national and religious minority associations the issue of care for elderly people was perceived in very different ways. The subject seemed to be not at all conflictual or of any major interest. Instead, unemployment (or the difficulty to find a proper job), integration of the young generation into German society or reforms of the German health system were subjects of interest. But when it comes to care for elderly family members there was not much to discuss. Most interviewees stated that this can be taken care of by the family. It may be important to note that this is not only an inside perspective. The local officials who work with elderly confirm this self-perception. Families from migration backgrounds are clearly under-represented among those who contact the municipality, asking for help to care for their elderly relative in need (gi 6).

In other words, it seems to be easier (and more natural) for families from a migration background to organize the care of elderly members within the family and without professional help. But how do they manage to do this given the fact that both the majority population and minority communities live within the same framework, this means in an increasingly individualized society demanding more and more flexibility in the field of occupational work? When asking these questions in minority community interviews we met a certain lack of understanding. What do they mean? At the same we felt that we as researchers did not really understand how family care works in
families from a migrant background. We were for example often told that women in a working age (who are often still perceived as the natural caregivers) actually were working or were really eager to work.

All interviewees from the minority communities stress that family is an important factor in their lives. Family stands for cohesion and mutual support. According to many interviewees it is mostly their families who create cohesion in often fragmented lives. This was described in several ways:

The main reason for old people from a migration background to stay in Germany is the fact that their social network has become more solid in Germany than in their home countries. This means that the children and other family members live close by. Many of the elderly migrants we met had mainly one argument explaining why they live in Germany: ‘My children are here, so I will stay as well’. (http://www.reutlingen.de/ceasy/modules/cms/main.php5?cPageId=797).

This corresponds to the results of the exhibition on migrants growing old in Reutlingen.

The exhibition ‘Whom I Admire’ about young people from migration backgrounds shows that the family bonds are still very strong in the young generation as well. It is very interesting that four of the seven young people who were interviewed presented their fathers as their role model, one boy his grandmother, one girl her aunt and another girl a friend of the family. Although this is not a representative survey, a careful conclusion can be drawn that the role models of young people from migration backgrounds are closely connected to their understanding of the family. In this context the role models can be male or female, but particularly often the father is a decisive figure, for sons, as well as, for daughters. The people we interviewed appreciate what their parents and grandparents have done for the family. Family and the care of family members seem to be important ideals even in the younger generations. Family traditions are kept up. Many young people try to maintain the connection to the home country of the parents, some can even imagine going back there, even if they are born and well integrated in Germany. Being asked about their visions for the future, many respondents answer that they want to finish school, to find a good job and their own way of life, while also keeping the close family bonds. At the same time, they see both the advantages and the disadvantages of living between two cultures. This can be exemplified with two quotations:

It is hard to live in a foreign country, because in the beginning you feel like a stranger and all the friends and relatives live far away in the home country. (http://www.reutlingen.de/ceasy/modules/cms/main.php5?cPageId=798)

6 The German quotations are translated by the authors.
It is a great chance to live in a different country as your home country. You can choose to live in both countries and you can get to know both cultures. (http://www.reutlingen.de/ceasy/modules/cms/main.php5?cPageId=798).

We met the same ambiguity about moving to and living in another country in many of the interviews.

Both the Germans from the former USSR and the Greek women emphasize the decisive role of women for the strong cohesion of families. The power and the importance of the family, which many interviewees are proud of, presuppose extensive women’s work and involvement, something which some female interviewees in particular were critical about. Some of the elderly Greek women think that the women of the younger generation are not willing or not able to take over the same responsibility within the family as they themselves did. Many younger women from migration backgrounds have started successful careers and demanding jobs. In this respect, a different agenda in family matters may become a source of conflict within the minority communities as it is within the majority community.

**Cohesion within the minority network**

Some of the male representatives of the Muslim and the Turkish communities experience that the strong family bonds are threatened by an adaptation to the surrounding German society. Not all the families within their minority community want to or are able to put the same emphasis on passing on the (family) traditions. According to their perception, these families— and young people in particular— get lost between the cultures. They consider this situation as a genuine challenge that mosques and international associations must respond to. Actually, several of the interviewees underline that this is the most important task of their communities and associations, namely to transmit the traditions to the next (third and fourth) generations. Among these traditions family cohesion plays a key role. The importance of family has to be explained and transferred both in terms of culture and religion (gi 1, gi 2, gi 7). Representatives who are of working age emphasize that the older (first) generation is expecting them to have family cohesion function like it was in their home countries. As they realize that the members of the third or the fourth generation do not always support (or even know) these traditional family values, they think that the mosques and minority community associations should strengthen their educational activities. To guarantee future (family) cohesion the minority community associations have to focus on cohesion and cooperation within their network (gi 2).

**Cooperation with the majority population**

The need and willingness to cooperate with the majority society is expressed primarily in areas that are experienced as problematic. For example there are visible problems of some young people from migration backgrounds to inte-
grate into German society and to find a job. The growing juvenile delinquency and the emergence of youth gangs are alarming to many of our interviewees in different minority communities. Several representatives of Muslim communities were happy that the local police have contacted them to discuss the situation of young people in Reutlingen and they are happy to cooperate in this matter (gi 1, gi2). According to them the educational activities and the open meeting places that the minority communities offer can be a contribution to prevent juvenile delinquency among young people from migration backgrounds. Because of this they want to intensify these activities and hope that the support of the majority society will be able to do so.

This is also an area of concern among the Germans from the former USSR. During their own youth they were integrated in a system of leisure activities organized by the Soviet state. In Germany it is the responsibility of the parents and the young people themselves to organize leisure activities in the afternoons as many schools still finish in the early afternoon. Many young people coming from the former USSR end up doing nothing at all in the afternoon. As one of the interviewees describes it:

In our neighbourhood I see many of the boys just hanging around [...] because they are bored. [...] some parents send their children somewhere, but 60-70% of them hang just around, as I can see it. 10 to 12 to 40 people just stand together at one place in the street. From doing nothing, nothing good can emerge. [...] In this area something more has to be done. (ii3, f)

In this matter minority communities express the wish to get support by the majority society.

Another area in which the minority communities express a strong wish to cooperate are services for pupils from migration backgrounds who have difficulties in school. Many surveys and studies make quite clear that pupils from migration backgrounds do much worse academically in German schools than majority population pupils. Because of this, the representatives of the minority communities are eager to change this situation and to get the best possible support from the majority population. The international parents’ organizations which are often a part of the minority community associations are particularly involved in this matter. Their growing involvement also leads to more self-confidence: some of them are thinking of running some services themselves (gi 2, ii 1, f).

Another field of cooperation is religion. Several minority communities said that they have quite good and vivid relationships with the local parishes. Within the districts contacts and mutual visits are taking place on a regular basis. Some think that the parish representatives have a better understanding of the situation of the minority community than the officials of the municipality (ii 3, f). They respect their religious celebrations and traditions and they show up when invited to some events (gi 2).
One of the representatives of the Muslim community told us about building a mosque in Reutlingen when we asked for examples of cooperation. Being part of the Muslim steering committee for the building plan he was quite enthusiastic about the course of the project. There were no problems, neither with the administration, nor with the population of Reutlingen. When we visited the mosques ourselves the imam showing us around told us about all the local firms that were involved in the building project. Building a mosque in Reutlingen obviously contributed to coherence in the city (ii 6, m).

The Greek women describe their relation to German society in terms of giving and taking. They are explicit that they have contributed to the development of Reutlingen, by doing their share of the work, by paying taxes and by bringing Greek culture and hospitality to Reutlingen. But they also think that they have learned from the Germans. Some examples that they give include the ability to save, to keep everything tidy and clean, and to appreciate punctuality (gi 4, ii 7,f).

Examples of tensions/problem between and within groups

**Inner conflicts**

Some of the interviewees were quite outspoken about inner conflicts, as being a migrant and growing old in Germany implies a feeling of living between two different cultures. In each of the countries they somehow feel at home and like strangers at the same time. They still long for their home countries and often go there on holidays, but – as one woman expresses: ‘when I am for quite a long time in my home country I feel homesick of Reutlingen’ (ii 4). On the one hand, they try to keep their native cultural identity, on the other hand, they have to deal with the German way of life and be integrated in society. Most of the interviewed people solve this problem in the following way: ‘I accept people the way they are, but I won’t forget my own culture’ (gi 4). In practice this can mean that they somehow mix the cultures, for example by celebrating Ramadan and Christmas, by organizing themselves in cultural associations that are connected to their home countries in order to strengthen their native traditions (ii 6, m; gi 2). Taking into consideration the broad range of international organizations in Reutlingen, some of the interviewees had the feeling that contacts between Germans and migrants could be intensified in some ways (ii 4, f; ii 6, m).

The most outspoken about their ‘inner’ conflicts were the elderly women from Greece. They gave examples of questions they are struggling with: ‘where is my home, in Germany or in Greece?’, ‘Where are my roots?’ (….).
The answer is mostly provided by the children. Home is where the children live and find work. The lives of the elderly Greek women in Germany have been and are still formed by this difficulty to decide. One woman describes it in the following way: ‘we swing to and from like a wall clock’ (gi 4). They live in Greece for some months (during the long summer holidays) and the rest of the year they live in Germany. Airplanes make distances shorter today than some years ago. Still, they are living in two worlds; feeling Greek in Germany and German in Greece. At the same time, this way of life is only possible as long as they are healthy. Some elderly Greek women believe that they will live only in Germany when they become older and less healthy because the provision of medical care is better in Germany (ii 4, f; ii 7 f). The difficulties to decide even made them take the wrong decisions. Many of them have built a house in Greece, but live in small rented apartments in Germany though they live most of the time in Germany. According to some of the women it is too late for them to change the situation though they are not satisfied with it. Today they think that they should have made a decision earlier in their lives on where to stay and they should have built houses in Germany in order to feel at home there (gi 4).

Conflicts with the majority society

Many of the interviewees are concerned about their future in Germany. But among the elderly interviewees unease about who will take care of them when they become older and more dependent is not their primary concern. Instead they are more afraid that for example they will lose the contacts with their (German) colleagues after they are retired. Working life seems to be an important part of feeling integrated into German society and they feel scared of the idea that their abilities will not be needed any more in society. Without contact with work they sometimes even have the feeling of forgetting the German language (ii 4, f).

A rarely discussed issue is the economic situation of retired people from migration backgrounds, women and men who were working in Germany for more than 35 years. Although they were working all their lives they often received very low pensions. Guest workers had very low salaries compared to native workers, thus leading to low pensions. This becomes especially difficult when they have to pay for medical care, as additional payments in the German health care system have become more usual for some treatments (as in the area of dental care) (gi 4). Many retired guest workers feel that they are treated in an unfair way. What is most frustrating to them is the fact that no one in among German general public seems to be interested in this question or even perceive this problem (gi 2, gi4, ii 4, f). A precarious financial situation seems to be a problem of elderly women from migration backgrounds in particular. In comparison to men, their wages have been and are even lower (gi 4).
Even though working life seems to be an important factor for integrating into German society, it also can be a factor of exclusion and conflict. This is especially true for all interviewees who have difficulties entering the labour market themselves or have relatives and friends in this situation (gi 2, gi 7). These problems may be related to the fact that some of the migrants have arrived quite recently (like the Germans from the former USSR). Others experience that German employers are more hesitant about employing persons with their particular cultural background. This was mostly mentioned by the Turkish and Muslim interviewees (gi 1, gi 2, gi 7).

Sometimes different cultural characteristics can be a hindrance for succeeding in the German labour market. One of the German women from the former USSR told us about an interesting observation she made when it comes to men that have been shaped by the Russian culture. She told us that in the Russian culture men are – as a sign of authority – not used to speak and communicate very much. The more silent a man behaves the more authority he has. This is true in family life, as well as, in working life. In working life men define themselves by the work they are actually doing, not by presenting their work in nice words. Therefore it is a real problem for many men with Russian backgrounds to find a job in Germany because self-presentation is a natural part of the application process for a German employer, something contradictory to the Russian idea of being a valuable man (gi 8).

The cultural patterns for women from the former USSR are different, including more communication. This is one reason why it may be easier for women from the former USSR to find a job, to make contact with other people and to integrate in the German society. This often leads to conflicts within the families, as the men still feel as outsiders, while the women already have started to integrate (gi 8).

Related to these issues are conflicts on the German education system and schools. As mentioned above most interviewees were most concerned about the future perspectives of the young generation and their worse chances when entering the German labour market. Some interviewees were quite critical of German schools and their abilities to prepare young people from migration backgrounds for working life. They have a feeling that their children are disadvantaged in comparison to children with German parents (gi 2, gi 7) or that the education and school system does not encourage and challenge children and young people as much as it could. According to their viewpoint young children can perform a lot more and should be encouraged to do so (gi 3, gi 8). Representatives of the Germans from the former USSR in particular express the opinion that the teaching style and the methods are too liberal and permissive. As one mother of school children put it:

[…] When it comes to school, too little is done. The school system just wears on […]. In kindergarten children are not expected to perform anything. They
only participate if they are in the mood of doing so. If not they [the personnel] just let them go. It should not be like that. (ii 3, f)

When it comes to social contacts German society is described as cold by all of the interviewees. In several interviews it was pointed that Germans lack hospitality, which is an important part of their own culture and tradition (gi 7). According to the interviewees it is most easy for children and most difficult for elderly people to overcome this lack of social contact. Among the Germans from the former USSR and among the Turkish people it was mentioned that it was most difficult for the old (first) generation to get used to the German society. Representatives of the working age generation in particular think that the elderly people still live very strongly in their traditional home culture without connecting to German society. It is the task of the younger ones, the second generation, to build bridges between the cultures (gi 2; ii 3, f). The working age interviewees from the former USSR illustrate the difficulties: the elderly Germans from the former USSR in particular were expecting another society when coming to Germany. They thought that they were coming home, but now they are shocked about what German society looks like. They don’t feel welcome in Germany and miss the social contacts with neighbours that were quite natural for them in the former USSR (ii 3, f; gi 8).

Another issue of dissatisfaction are the poor facilities and finances of most of the religious and national minority associations. In comparison to other local associations and the churches many of the representatives feel in a very disadvantaged position, for example concerning the (financial) support by the municipality. This is true for all national minority communities that we are focussing on. A strong need for bigger and better localities is expressed in several interviews (gi 1, gi 2). These localities are needed to meet and to sustain home cultures. But without public support the minority communities are not able to realize their plans. In this respect, they feel abandoned by the German public authorities since the municipality gives very little support. At the same time, they feel unsure about strategies and routines on how to push their own interests in the local community. Several times, we, as researchers and interviewers, were asked to put pressure defending their interests (gi 2, gi 4, gi 7).

The Muslim associations in particular were quite upset about the picture the media draws of Islam. In this respect they mostly referred to the national media, not to the local media. They stated that attitudes in society towards Muslims have changed for the worse since the September 11th attacks. They feel that people are more distanced since then and they think that this may partly be due to the way German media cover Muslim issues. The unbalanced and sometimes offending reporting of the media is a recurrent subject in the interviews with most Muslim representatives making them feeling angry and defenceless. In general, media debates were very present in some
of the interviews. Examples were the debate about a prohibition of foreign languages on school yards or the controversial debate about Turkey becoming a member of the European Union (gi 1, gi 2).

Conflicts within and among minority communities
When it comes to care for elderly people a future conflict can be sensed in some of the – sometimes contradictory statements during the interviews. As the family bonds in minority communities are still very strong, expectations to care for elderly relatives are quite outspoken. Many interviewees emphasize that the traditions are quite clear and stable in this area. As one of the interviewees said:

> When the children are young, the parents care for them; when the parents are old, the children care for the parents. The more children are in one family, the better is the providing when people are old. (gi 2)

An interviewee in the exhibition put it like this: ‘old people’s homes are just for Germans. My children will care for me, when I am old’ (http://www.reutlingen.de/ceasy/modules/cms/main.php5?cPageId=797).

Against this background the question of how to take care of elderly people in need of care seems to be a great challenge for the members of the different generations: whereas many old people expect their children and grandchildren to care for them, this is often quite difficult to for the young generation. On the one hand, they are expected to integrate into the German labour market, and, on the other hand, they are expected to take care of the family. These two tasks become harder to combine taking into consideration the demands of the labour market. In addition, some interviewees hint that not all migrant families are willing or able to put the same emphasis on transmitting cultural and religious traditions. Still, German homes for elderly are not considered to be an alternative (gi 2, gi 7). At the same time institutions for elderly people often do not know very much about the special needs of elderly people from migration backgrounds as they do not have very much experience in this field (gi 6). It is hard to make any predictions. The situation seems to be quite open: ‘the large number of elderly migrants will be new chapter in German history’ (gi 6).

It also has to be mentioned that there seem to be some conflicts between the minority communities as well. Some representatives of the minority communities distance themselves from other minority communities accusing them of being less willing to integrate. Some of them mention also that they do not feel accepted by other minority communities (ii 3, f; gi 1; gi 4; ii 7, f; gi 7).
The ‘grey areas’ – situations in flux

The ambiguity of personal situations is illustrated very well by the biographical reflections of some of the elderly interviewees. Many of them realize that they themselves are growing old and their surroundings have completely changed: again the Greek women are most outspoken about this. They do not work anymore, they get quite low pensions, they miss the contacts with their colleagues and they have given up their dreams to go home to their country. One of them formulates it like this: ‘we have come with a suitcase full of dreams and are now travelling with a suitcase full of medicine’ (gi 4). Almost all the elderly Greek women in the interview group agree that the transition from working life to retirement has been very hard for them: in financial terms, but also in terms of social contacts with colleagues. Looking back, they realize that work has been an important factor for them and their self-definition during many years (gi 4; ii 4, f; ii 7, f). The break off is even harder when their life partner has died.

At the same time they acknowledge that the working situation in Germany has changed fundamentally and that their children have to struggle with this. One woman puts it like this: ‘some years ago work came to us – now the situation has changed and it is hard to find any work’ (gi 4). A few decades ago young people were invited to work in Germany. They were able to support financially their families (especially the parents) in Greece. Now parents have to support their adult children because it is very hard to find good jobs (gi 4; ii 7, f).

Some women point also to the fact that the relationships to native tradition decrease from generation to generation. Some of their children are married to Germans. Their grandchildren often do not speak their own language very well. Some are sorry for this development. Others stress that their feeling of being European is stronger than being German or Greek (gi 4).

One of the Turkish respondents describes a similar development. He points to the fact that the third generation has become more self-confident. An example for this is that young Turkish people do not organize ethnic sport clubs any longer, but are involved in the local associations (ii 6, m). Another interviewee indicates that Turkish minority communities are more eager to organize their own welfare services instead of accepting welfare services that are offered by others (like the municipality or the churches) (ii 1, f). However, this development is not clear as other Muslim representatives think that the third and fourth generation has more difficulties to integrate socially. They refer to problems in the school and to problems in entering the labour market and to the growing juvenile delinquency (gi 2).

Another important field of ambiguous encounters between the majority population and the minority communities is the neighbourhood. German neighbours get both positive and negative evaluations by the representatives of the minority communities. On the one hand they are often perceived as
not very friendly, warm or hospitable. At the same time, many German neighbours are pitied for their social situation and loneliness (elderly Germans in particular). Partly, this can be explained by the low cost housing areas where many members of the minority communities live. It is possible that many of the German neighbours they meet really live in precarious social situations (gi 7, ii 7, f). On the other hand, there are also interviewees who refer to their neighbours as friends and important sources in strengthening contacts with the majority population (ii 4, f; gi 4).

A very special perspective of Germans from the former USSR was provided in an interview with two young women who organize a parents’ initiative on Saturdays to teach children Russian language and culture in a playful way. Their goal is to support integration in German society by making children self-confident because of their special German and Russian identity and giving them the feeling that they do not have to hide their roots. Their intention is to give their children the best they can: this is – especially because of their Jewish background – a form of education in a very broad sense, containing skills beyond language, such as culture (mainly music), sports and religion. According to their perception the German school system does not promote all the talents that children have in a satisfactory way. Therefore, they organize activities in their leisure time in order to compensate for this deficiency. Here they adapted to the German structure of voluntary organizations, a system which was very strange to them when they came to Germany. In Russia any kind of education was offered by the state. In this context it was quite astonishing for us how uninhibited they feel when dealing with the ambivalence of the Soviet system by stressing the positive aspects and leaving the negative sides behind. Doing this is a conscious choice; ‘the world has become so complex, that we have to make decisions all the time – why should we choose the negative side?’ (gi 8). They understand their task in transmitting the best of their own experiences onto their children: ‘the rest is history and you have to keep it in distance; you just should know about it without emotion’ (gi 8). Here it can be seen that the situation is in flux indeed: the young generation seems to be very self-confident and able to use the positive aspects of both cultures in a productive manner. This becomes evident in the way the children see themselves: as ‘Jewish children, born in Germany by parents who speak the Russian language at home’ (gi 8).

Analysis: Emergent values and conceptions

Within the German debate ‘value’ is a dazzling term which is frequently used. One would not have any problem finding literature on the values keeping German society together and on the on-going value changes. Though resonant throughout Germany, the term is rarely defined. Only few of those dedicating themselves to the broad field of value discussion actually focus
their attention on defining their key term. This is not at all a new phenom-
non. Already in 1969 the German sociologist Rüdiger Lautmann tried to
construct a more precise sociological definition of the terms ‘Norm’ (norm)
and ‘Wert’ (value) by analysing their use in existing sociological literature.
As a result of his inquiry he stated that there is an inconsistency in the usage
of these two terms and a certain indifference among sociologists towards
using them in a more precise and reflected way (Lautman, 110f.).

The usage of the term ‘value’ is even more complex because it is not only
used in social sciences, but also in other disciplines, such as ethics and phi-
losophy. The German equivalent to value ‘Wert’ has its origins in economy,
economic science and mathematics and is still used within this context.
German philosophy and social sciences did not adopt the term until the 19th
century. In philosophy it became a key term during the first third of the 20th
century. An updated handbook on ethics defines ‘Wert’ (value) in the fol-
lowing way:

… values can be identified as conscious or unconscious orientation directives
for human achieving. The human being as a subject is marked by this relation
to values. They are directives for the creation of herself/himself and of her/his
world. …In relation to the subject the value is a kind of being supposed to,
something, that the human being is subjecting herself/himself to and is identi-
fying herself/himself in accordance with; …In that the value gives the human
existence meaning and direction; …’ (Krijnen 2006, 528f.).

Against this background it seems adventur ous to use just the term ‘value’ to
classify, interpret or analyse statements, opinions, positions or narratives of
our interviewees, even though the term is sometimes explicitly used by
themselves. At the same time it would be a much too ambitious project to
give a scientifically subtle definition within the framework of this case
study. To ignore the problem by replacing the term ‘value’ by a more neutral
term like ‘conception’ is not satisfactory either. This would dilute the bonds
to the other case studies in the project. A compromise could be to relate to
the term ‘value’, but not to use it in a way that contradicts the results of our
analysis.

The analysis of the material of the case study suggests that the usage of
the term ‘value’ can at least be as disguising and as illuminating. We will try
to illustrate this by means of two key conceptions in our case study: ‘family’
or ‘family cohesion’ and ‘age’ and/or ‘respect for elderly people’.

Family and family cohesion
Within the framework of the above named discussion it would be easy to
introduce the conceptions of ‘family’ and ‘family cohesion’ as values. Even
more, it would be easy to place them as core values offering a common
ground for society. There is evidence for doing so. Within the framework of
our case study it would be impossible to find any representative not supporting the statement that it is good, important and meaningful to have ‘family’ and ‘family cohesion’. In this respect there are no differences between the majority population and minority communities. This leads to the question: why not define family as a core value of society since all groups in society can share it? To draw a conclusion like this would be stating a quite outward consensus. Furthermore, it would ignore that it is obvious (not least in the material of our case study) that not all forms and expressions of ‘family’ and ‘family cohesion’ are as valuable as others within all groups in society. Actually, the evaluation of forms of ‘family’ and ‘family cohesion’ differs considerably between different groups. In this respect the case study material is full of examples:

Minority community representatives are often proud that their families stay together well, probably better than the families of the majority population. Some of them are quite explicit in distancing themselves from German majority society and culture when it comes to family matters. One aspect that our interviewees were very critical about is that majority population families do not care for their elderly people themselves, but hire professionals to do that (gi 1, gi 2, gi 7). Another criticism was that the younger generation within the majority population lacks respect for the parents and for the older generation in general (gi 3, ii 3, f). There is no such thing as a common concept of family among the representatives of the different minority communities included in the study. Even though elderly people within German families from the USSR are still often taken care of by their families, professional care services are becoming more and more accepted among them. Nevertheless, all minority community representatives agreed that they do not want to adapt to the forms and expressions of ‘family and ‘family cohesion’ that they perceive as those of the majority population.

Does this mean that the minority communities feel more obliged to the core values of ‘family’ and ‘family cohesion’ or do they succeed better in realizing them in their daily life (not at least in the areas of welfare and care)? There is surely some evidence to support this hypothesis. Again, to stop the research process here would mean to give simple and very obvious answers, even though there may still be important reasons to take the questioning process even further. Possible questions could be: why do majority population representatives refer to ‘family’ and ‘family cohesion’, but do not live these conceptions in the same way like minority communities tend to? Have ‘family’ and ‘family cohesion’ become abstract ideals with little reference to everyday life in the majority population context? Or are there some crucial misunderstandings between the majority population and minority communities when it comes to ‘family’ and family cohesion’?

All three questions (and many more that are not stated above) would be interesting to investigate closer. The material of our case study has offered some reflections on the last question. For us as researchers (who represent
the majority population perspective) it became increasingly difficult to understand what is implied when the interviewees told us that the family takes care of an elderly relative. Sometimes it was quite clear from the narrative that, neither sons or daughters, nor the sons or daughters-in-law, were actually doing the daily work as all of them had fulltime jobs. But as family they were fulfilling of their duties by using a (possibly quite distant) family relative who provided this type of care work. An arrangement like this seemed to perfectly fit into the ‘family’ conception of some minority communities, while majority population representatives, who unconsciously equate family with close family, would not necessarily think in this direction. From this perspective it is quite natural to consider having children as a direct retirement provision. Muslim interviewees in particular were very explicit about their concept of family-building and their moral and religious education aims at being cared for when becoming old (gi 2, gi 7). That the importance of children for elderly care provision is not taken into consideration may be as hard to understand for many minority community representatives as it has become unfamiliar to many majority community representatives to link children to a lifelong obligation that they cannot choose for themselves.

The intention of these reflections is not an evaluation of different models, ideas, narratives and practices related to the conception of ‘family’ and ‘family cohesion’. It is rather an argument for being cautious when defining values (or even core values) as there is a risk of missing the subtext (read: models, ideas, narratives and practices) behind the term. To improve the cooperation between minority communities and the majority population a deeper understanding of the content of values is needed, not an outward agreement on common values.

This approach seems to be even more relevant as the case study also shows that there are some fundamental changes going on. It is obvious that the plurality of family structures and life styles is growing. This may be related to the integration of women in the labour market or to the changing conditions of a globalized economy. The same developments question both the welfare system in general and those institutions that the welfare system is offering for elderly care provision in particular. Certainly, these changes affect both the minority communities and majority population. As it is more difficult to find a job some of the minority community interviewees expressed a growing willingness to compromise family obligations. But at the same time the same interviewees emphasize that ‘family and ‘family cohesion’ is a substantial part of their religious and cultural identity. Religious and cultural traditions and religious and cultural education seem to be even more important in a situation where these obligations are at risk or threatened. Among the threats for the majority population there are the shrinking resources of the welfare system which may possibly (in the long run) lead to a rediscovery of family obligations (gi 6).
Age
Another interesting aspect of the case study is the concept of age. In general, it is obvious that the perception of age is changing in society. Many official papers and public statements claim that existing conceptions of age should be reconsidered. Elderly people should be seen as active and independent members of society. They have been discovered as financially strong customers by the industry and the service sectors. To be sick, needy and dependent on others is only one (very limited) aspect of being old. Approaches like this can be found in the case study material as well, in particular among the elderly people themselves and in the statements of the municipality.

The sociologist Irmhild Saake is quite critical to approaches like this. She has studied German research about age since the 1960s. Her conclusion is that all generalizing theories about age and aging are not applicable as they do not take into consideration the contextuality of each aging experience (Saake 2006, 255f.). This is an interesting starting point to analyse the value of ‘respect for elderly people’ arising from the case study material.

When distinguishing between elderly people and very old people, the majority population connect the latter group in a more outspoken way to more need of help. As mentioned above, public documents and majority population interviewees focus on the abilities and resources of different age groups during the ageing process. They draw a picture of old age as an active and independent period of life. But when it comes to public statements, there may be a hidden agenda behind this focus during a time of shrinking welfare resources. When stressing independence and ability such statements are bound to miss some important aspects of the individual and contextual situation of age. At the same time, minority community representatives may have generalizing ideas about the elderly as well, not taking different contexts and experiences into consideration. According to most of the working age interviewees the maintenance of traditions and traditional role models is most important for the elderly, while second and third generation representatives said that the representatives of the third or fourth generation are not as dependent on these traditions. In other words they expect the elderly to be traditional. Moreover, the same interviewees mostly focused on their obligations towards and their support of the elderly as their task within the generational contract. Unintentionally they make the plurality and contextuality of age invisible by only focusing on the need for care. Relating elderly people to traditions and to family obligations they do not leave any room for individual and contextual experiences of and attitudes towards age.

Again, this is not about evaluating conceptions and perceptions. Both the majority population and the minority community representatives may have their reasons for focusing on certain aspects. One of the motivations may be their own fears related to age as a future phase of life, regardless whether they express these or not. In this case undifferentiated references to ‘values’
or ‘concepts’ related to age are not helpful. To strengthen mutual understanding and to build cooperation and cohesion between and among the minority communities and the majority population it would be better to understand each other’s very personal and contextual models, ideas, narratives and practices related to age. This would not only do more justice to the individual situation of age, but it would also further awareness of the effects of wide-ranging international trends (such as internationalization, changes in working life, transformed gender roles and migration) on the ageing process as part of life. Based on such a dialogue, new flexible welfare solutions for elderly people, adapted to a range of individual and contextual situations, could be developed.

References


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**Websites**

- www.bruderhausdiakonie.de (12.12.2007)
- http://www.destatis.de (10.01.2008)
- http://www.reutlingen.de (10.01.2008)
- http://www.ridaf.org (10.01.2008)
- http://www.spiegel.de (10.01.2008)
Abstract
The study of values in Europe, observable through the prism of welfare, consists of an examination of the values of various groups in the domain of welfare, e.g. in the expression and provision of ‘basic’ individual and group needs. The different values and practices of the majority and the minorities are a source of tension in the German society. German policy tries to direct the interaction between majority and minorities towards more cohesion and solidarity. At the same time it becomes more obvious that minority groups influence and challenge majority values. In the case of Schweinfurt, a medium-sized town with Roman Catholic and Protestant churches, as well as, with several minorities, we examine the majority and minority presence in the welfare sector and their social attitudes and practices. Focusing on values within the local society, the aim of the research is to gain insight into the value orientations and structures which lead to conflict and/or cohesion between and within groups. The case study focuses on three local minorities: the Protestant Free Churches, Muslims and ethnic Germans from the former USSR. Illustrating the different perspectives and views on welfare provision as well as conducting in-depth interview research both help enlighten the concept of human identity as a ‘core value’.

Presentation of the town

Introduction
One of the two German case studies in the WAVE project is conducted in Schweinfurt, a medium-sized town in lower Franconia (North-Bavaria). As an old industrial town it is a political and commercial centre for the Eastern part of this region. Schweinfurt has traditionally been Protestant, but in the context of a Roman Catholic Bavaria. The religious traditions, social structure and traditional economic structure have undergone crucial changes. In recent years, the town has seen fundamental demographical changes and has become multireligious and multicultural. Today, unemployment, changes in the economic situation and the consequences of migration are the major challenges of the town. The town has an established social welfare sector. In Schweinfurt the main welfare actors are the town, the Churches and the welfare organizations. Both of the majority Churches play an active role in the public welfare of Schweinfurt. To illustrate the local situation in Schweinfurt the case study research follows two questions:
1. Which values can be seen in examples of cohesion and/or conflict in the domain of welfare?
2. How are these values related to religion, majority-minority relations and/or gender, as well as, linked to a ‘core value’?

Presentation of the majority and the minority presence

Schweinfurt has 53,646 (as of 31.12.2006) inhabitants and 6,459 (as of 31.12.2006) foreigners. There are 7,286 ethnic Germans from the former USSR and approximate 2,500 immigrants from a Turkish background living in the town. Schweinfurt also accommodates a US military base with 11,000 – 12,000 soldiers and their family members.

According to the town clerk of integration counselling there are about 6,000 foreigners from 142 countries in Schweinfurt. Statistical data on ethnic (and national) minorities from 104 countries often include only small numbers. There are some large ethnic minority groups, the most important being from Turkey. There are also immigrants from Italy, Greece and Poland in Schweinfurt, as well as, refugees, ethnic Germans from the former USSR and American citizens.

Table 2:3:1 Ethnic groups with the highest percentage in Schweinfurt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries of origin</th>
<th>Proportional percentage of foreigners (6,000 = 100%) among the population (54,222)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>38,48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>11,18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3,65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2,75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia/Montenegro</td>
<td>7,12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>2,37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2,37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1,69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1,63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia/Herzegovina</td>
<td>1,45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Germans from the former USSR:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (Russische Föderation)</td>
<td>4,89%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kazakhstan 3.06%
Ukraine 1.97%
American citizens:
USA 3.12%


As a comparison, in December 31, 2004 the foreign population in Germany according to the German Federal Office of Migration and Refugees was as follows:

**Table 2:3:2 German foreign population by nationality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries of origin</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,764,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>548,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia/Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>507,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>315,989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>292,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>229,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other States</td>
<td>3,060,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All:</td>
<td>6,717,115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2004, 75

Another group to consider are immigrants with German passports from Eastern Europe, mainly from the former USSR. Since the end of the Cold War thousands of people of German origin have come to Germany. They have German passports and, therefore, are not included in the statistics on citizens with a foreign passport (cf. Biendarra/Leis 2008, 26f.).

The first waves of immigration towards Schweinfurt started in 1957 in accordance with the national migrant movements to Germany. Foreign workers were recruited for the expanding German industry until the closing down of factories in the 1990s which entailed problems, e. g. unemployment, social poverty and xenophobia. Work-related immigration lasted until 23 November 1973 (when Germany stopped its recruitment of foreign workers). The number of immigrants increased in the years after 1973, when family
members of immigrants moved to Germany, as part of family reunification, while the immigrant’s relatives came later on.

According to the German understanding of citizenship, the Germans who lived for centuries and generations in Eastern Germany are legally Germans who can choose to migrate to Germany at any time. This was regulated by West German laws after the Second World War which tried to provide for the German minority communities behind the Iron Curtain. In the former USSR in particular these communities were discriminated as a consequence of the war. In Germany the ‘Russian’ emigration factored relatively little into public discussion, until the breakdown of the USSR in 1989. After 1988 and the collapse of the Soviet Union a high number of ethnic Germans from the former USSR arrived in Germany.

Different denominational, religious, ethnic (and a few national) minorities can be found in Schweinfurt: not having their own parish in Schweinfurt, a few Old Catholic Christians live in Schweinfurt. Two of the Christian minority groups presented in the town are the Orthodox Christian Churches: the Greek Orthodox Christian Church based in one of the Roman-Catholic parishes in Schweinfurt, St. Anton and the Russian Orthodox Christian Church, whose new parish officially opened in November 2007. Furthermore there are six Protestant Free Churches (Freikirchen) in Schweinfurt: the Evangelisch-Freikirchliche Gemeinde (EFG) or Brüdergemeinschaft; the Evangelisch-Methodistische Gemeinde (EMK) or ‘Methodists’ with a more liberal orientation; the Christliches Glaubenszentrum, coming from the Biblische Gemeinde Schweinfurt e.V., both charismatic Churches emerging from the Protestant Auferstehungskirche; the Christliche Gemeinde am Obertor or Freie Gemeinde, an evangelical Church; and the Freikirchliche Gemeinde Christen in Aktion (CIA), also an evangelical Church with mostly American members. Some of them can be characterized as charismatic and evangelical movements, but there is no Pentecostal presence in the town.

Regarding other religious minorities in Schweinfurt, the Muslim minorities are the most important. There are four main mosque communities in Schweinfurt. Three of them have their own mosque in Schweinfurt. The umbrella association Milli Görüs (‘The National Vision’) [IGMG] is represented in the city through the mosque Fatih Cami. The most important German-Turkish cultural society in Germany, the Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren (‘Association of Islamic Cultural Centres’) [VIKZ] affiliated with Sunni Islam, is nowadays called Islamischer Bildungs- und Integrationsverein (‘Islamic Education and Integration Association’) to indicate its education and integration orientation in Schweinfurt. A Turkish DITIB mosque called Merkez-Cami is also present in the city. The Turkish State has an influence on the DITIB mosques. The DITIB organization is the largest national Turkish Muslim organization in Schweinfurt (approx. 450-500 members, approximately 20% of the Turkish population in Schweinfurt) and in Germany (approximately 80-90% of the Turkish population in Germany).
The progressive Alevits community has its own cultural association called *Alevetisches Kulturzentrum e.V.* (‘Alevits Cultural Centre’) [cf. Project report ‘gerne daheim in Schweinfurt’, 2007].

There is also a Jewish minority in Schweinfurt. Finally, a small Buddhist minority group can also be found in the town. Other religious communities include a Jehovah’s Witnesses’ assembly, a Seven days Adventists’ parish, as well as, other small new religious movements represented in Schweinfurt.

**Presentation of the local welfare system**

**Role of local government**

*Town welfare support, services and projects*

The welfare sector of Schweinfurt can be characterized by the local German social organization structure. The town’s websites provide overviews of different local and social town hall departments, as well as, links to different social support groups, institutions, services and projects (cf. http://www.schweinfurt.de).

The town hall has different departments, some of which are responsible for social matters and integration tasks. A range of town hall departments, e.g. the departments for social affairs, government office for youth welfare, as well as, the adult education centre and the local agenda, offer various welfare support services. In addition a social project called *gerne daheim in Schweinfurt* (‘Happy at Home in Schweinfurt’) is financed by the town (cf. Project report ‘gerne daheim in Schweinfurt’, 2007).

With regard to minorities the State offers special social provisions and support services to immigrants, emigrants, asylum seekers and refugees who have to apply in the town where they live. Among these groups there is a lack of language competence for them to be able to identify these services and unemployment is still an unresolved problem (cf. Biendarra/Leis-Peters 2008, 8). In addition to the above mentioned welfare support services of the State a social project called ‘gerne daheim in Schweinfurt’ is run by the town and attends to matters of integration, especially mutual solidarity and tolerance. It finances a range of integration services, for example, education and language courses, youth and social support, as well as, a counselling service for integration, where a Turkish woman is employed. The social project is a forum for common intercultural learning and integration. As a department of the town hall the adult education centre gives also emphasis on interreligious dialogue, integration matters and women’s support. Furthermore the local agenda in Schweinfurt is run by an urban head office staffed by volunteers. It is also responsible for other groups concerning their common future (see above). In the working groups the goals of sustainable development are connected to ecology, economics and social topics, e.g. intercultural and interre-
igious dialogue. The ‘social service of Catholic women’ (Sozialdienst katholischer Frauen) and the Protestant Evangelischer Frauenbund are also involved in the support of minorities, e.g. ethnic Germans from the former USSR.

Role of Majority Church

Church-related welfare
The Roman Catholic Church (44.14% as of 31.12.2006) and the Protestant Church (29.23% as of 31.12.2006) are the main churches in Schweinfurt; they both offer diverse social services through welfare organizations and local parishes. There are nine Roman Catholic and eight Protestant parishes in the town with various social interests and involvements. Up to 26.63% (as of 31.12.2006) of the German population in Schweinfurt do not belong to the Roman Catholic or Protestant Churches.

Church-related and independent welfare agents
There are five welfare organizations in Schweinfurt that are independent or run by the Church. The local welfare organizations are all connected to their national umbrella organizations and work together in a local working group called Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Freien Wohlfahrtsverbände.

There are five welfare organizations in Schweinfurt: the Arbeiterwohlfahrt (AWO) affiliated with social democrats, the Paritätischer Wohlfahrtsverband (DPW), the Bayerisches Rotes Kreuz (BRK) (‘Red Cross’) and the Caritasverband (CV) affiliated to the Roman Catholic Church and the Diakonisches Werk (DW) affiliated to the Protestant Churches.

Role of minority associations/networks

Denominational, religious and ethnic minority alternative networks
Approximately 100 cultural associations and choir groups can be found in the town. With regard to denominational minority networks in Schweinfurt there is no information available on the welfare activities of the Greek Orthodox and Russian Orthodox Christians. The Protestant Free Churches do not offer social services to everyone, but support their own members or have special institutions, e.g. the Evangelisch-Methodistische Gemeinde (EMK). An association called Levi e.V. located at Gut Kaltenhof in the area of Schweinfurt is a local social support institution of the Protestant and Free Churches (two houses for alcoholics and people with mental health problems). There is no visible social engagement of the new charismatic and evangelical movement in the town.

With regard to other religious minorities the mosque communities and other intercultural associations in the town have social networks and/or are involved in social areas; however no official information can be found.
There is a broad range of social activities offered by the mosques for groups and individuals. For example, the Islamischer Bildungs- und Integrationsverein e.V. concentrates on the creation of a school and education centre in Schweinfurt. Furthermore there are the Eltern-Union parents engaged in children’s support, the Turkish social service association run by Graue Wölfe (‘grey wolves’) and the Horizont Bildungszentrum e.V. (Horizont education centre) giving emphasis on language support and the Türkisch-Deutscher Kulturverein e.V. (Turkish-German cultural association) linked to the DITIB mosque and offering social and cultural activities. In addition the Albanisch-Deutscher Kulturverein Illira (Albanian-German cultural association Illira) and the Bati-Trakya e.V. of Greek Muslims is present in the town, but not involved in social matters. A literature club, Zaman, is newly established in Schweinfurt (cf. Project report ‘gerne daheim in Schweinfurt’, 2007).

The Jews living in Schweinfurt are mainly involved in spiritual practices and in welfare issues at the synagogue in Würzburg where the regional office of the Jewish welfare organization, Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Jüdischen Gemeinde, is located. The structure and tasks offering social support to Jews are similar to the German welfare organizations.

The small Buddhist minority group in Schweinfurt only meets for spiritual practices and is not engaged in welfare issues (cf. http://www.buddhismus-schweinfurt.de).

There is no observable social involvement of the new religious movements in Schweinfurt.

In addition to the public welfare services and the welfare services of the traditional welfare organizations, the ethnic Germans from the former USSR have their own cultural and social association, Russische Landsmannschaft, as well as, a self-organized project called Freundschaft (‘Friendship’) emphasizing integration.

Context and timeframe

Regarding the national social context during the fieldwork, we have to note the violence as well as the rioting and small-scale terrorist acts that took place in Germany, especially by Muslim minorities. For example, in September 2007 the German security authorities arrested three terrorist suspects in the Sauerland region. They were accused of planning to carry out several bomb attacks (cf. http://www.bmi.bund.de/cmn_012/mm_662928/Internet/Content/Nachrichten/Pressemitteilungen/2008/05/Verfassungsschutzbericht.html). In recent years, international Islamist terrorism has been perceived as a major threat to Germany’s internal security (cf. Brettfeld, Wetzels 2007).
The debate of Turkey’s entrance into the European Union is still ongoing, which has an impact on the relationship between the German population and the Turkish minority in the country.

Furthermore, the access and quality of education are publicly discussed in Germany. In comparison with other European countries, as the PISA studies have shown, the German results show that there are connections between educational levels, social class and migration background (cf. Hopmann 2007).

With regard to the health sector, in January 2007 the German State introduced new welfare legislation and in March 2007 the health reform that had been prepared over the last few years finally came into effect. Because of the German economic situation, social and health services have been reduced and new regulation structures for different social sectors in order to improve efficiency have been introduced.

In the summer of 2007 two events influenced the political and social climate in Germany: The Muslim umbrella associations did not wish to participate in the national integration meeting in Berlin, criticising recent German migration policies. During the G8 Summit in Heiligendamm there was a great deal of disagreement on issues such as globalization and poverty, the large gaps between north and south or between west and east, as well as the climate problems around the world.

These events and developments have affected the overall social, political and economic climate both in Germany and in the local town. Questions of religious and social integration of the Muslim population in Germany as well as the necessity of a long-term process of acceptance and communication between the German State and representatives of the Muslim population in Germany have been discussed more openly and frequently.

Methods and sources

Research focus and questions

Based on the assumption that the intangible concept of ‘values’ is understood best through the ways in which they are expressed and developed in practice, the case study research focuses according to the principles of the theoretical sampling (cf. Lamnek 1988/1995, 22) on the interaction of individuals as ideal types of minority associations/groups and their diverse value systems in different areas of welfare.

The case study is mainly based on individual informal conversations and on individual interviews structured by questions, namely focus and in-depth interviews that examine a range of both majority and minority ‘inside’ views of interviewees and ‘outside’ perspectives in the public area. The material
presentation (Findings) and analysis (Analysis: emergent values) address two research questions:
1. Which values can be seen in examples of cohesion and/or conflict in the domain of welfare?
2. How are these values related to religion, majority-minority relations and/or gender, as well as, linked to a ‘core value’?

Methods and materials
The case study aims to bring light to the relationships between different factors in order to detect and examine typical situations and to get insight on the case as a whole. A qualitative case study follows three steps: first, the theoretical sampling, the choice of ideal types/figures and ways of action; second, the data collection, the triangulation of different qualitative methods to examine individual persons and social groups/parts using communicative techniques regarding real situations; and third, the material analysis, the development and formulation of theoretical concepts by describing ideal types and categories (cf. Lamnek 1988/1995, 4ff.).

In order to collect information from a diverse range of individuals, groups and settings in Schweinfurt a variety of methods were used in the case study. The research material was collected using document analysis, direct observation, informal conversations, and focus and in-depth interviews during the fieldwork (September 2006 – June 2007). In this way the risks that conclusions may reflect only the systematic biases or limitations of a specific method are reduced. This allows a better assessment of the validity and generality of the explanations which are to be developed.

The detailed methods for collecting and analysing the material are as follows:
1. Document analysis (documents, statistics, newsletters, etc.) to examine world views, attitudes and practices (especially religious, minority and gender related) of institutions, individuals, groups, and networks with regard to welfare and social support.
2. Direct observation, through visits in the municipality, the welfare institutions, the parishes and mosques, visits of events and services organized by them, visits of meetings with individuals and groups.
3. Focus interviews with representatives of the municipality, the Churches and the welfare organizations, as well as, with leaders of minority social networks. During the interviews we asked respondents their specific experiences, perspectives and critical comments with special regard to majority or minority groups and their interactions.
4. In-depth interviews with official representatives of particular associations asking them for information on public, independent and church related welfare services, e.g. offered by the welfare organizations and by
the parishes. Interviews with representatives of minority social networks are about the minority groups under study, their views and values, including their interactions with the majority welfare sector.

5. Qualitative network analysis, an approach of social sciences, referring to the social theory of James Samuel Coleman (1988; 1990), in order to examine the relationships and interactions between the social actors under study.

6. Qualitative content analysis in order to summarize the interviews and to categorize their main themes (cf. Mayring 1988; 1997; 2000; Biendarra 2005).

7. Intersectional theory approach to show if/how majority and/or minority cohesion and/or conflict oriented attitudes, practices and values are related to religion, majority/minority relations and/or gender, which are interactive factors and sometimes reinforcing each other (cf. McCall 2005).

**Research sample**

To examine the structure of the local welfare system and the majority churches’ social engagement with special regard to migrant and minority provision and services in Schweinfurt, we have focused on official representatives from the municipality, the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches and the local welfare organizations (focus interviews).

We interviewed individuals engaged in the welfare sector from the following (religious) minority associations and groups:

1. The *Evangelisch-Methodistische Gemeinde* (EMK), a Protestant Free Church.
2. *Levi e.V.*, an association of the Protestant Church and the different connected to Protestant Free Churches.
3. Three of the four main Muslim groups present in Schweinfurt: DITIB, Milli Görüs and the *Alevitischer Kulturverein e.V.*
4. *Russische Landsmannschaft e.V.*, the association of ethnic Germans from the former USSR.

The EMK and *Levi e.V.* have been selected because of their social engagement in the town, e. g. one of the two associations’ social support house is called ‘Kaltenhof’.

We interviewed Muslim women representatives, volunteers and other individuals from three of the four main Muslim associations – DITIB, *Milli Görüs* and *Alevitischer Kulturverein e.V.*

Ethnic Germans from the former USSR have been examined mainly for two reasons: their migrant status and the fact that many of them came to Schweinfurt relatively recently and they are one of the large minority communities in the town.
In addition, it is interesting to study how the larger minority communities of Muslim immigrants and Germans from the former USSR actually use the existing welfare and counselling services for migrants.

Conversations and focus/in-depth interviews

The following table provides an overview of the conversation, focus and in-depth interview participants:

Table 2:3:3 Conversations and focus / in-depth interview participants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Representative/volunteer individuals</th>
<th>Other individuals</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Representative of the town social project (M)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Representative (M) and volunteer (M) of the ‘Agenda 21’</td>
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<tr>
<td>Welfare Organizations</td>
<td>- Representative of the DPW (F)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Mobile social workers (DW) (M8/1, M8/2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Majority Christian Churches</td>
<td>- Roman Catholic dean (M1)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Retired Protestant pastor (M)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denominational Minority Churches (Protestant Free Churches)</td>
<td>- Pastor of the EMK (M3)</td>
<td>- EMK parish member (F19)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Representative of Levi e.V. (M6)</td>
<td>- 3 Kaltenhof clients (M20, M21, F22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic Germans from the former USSR</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Representative (M11/2)</td>
<td>- Association president (M10/1) and</td>
<td>- 3 ethnic German women from the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>executive committee member</td>
<td>social advisor (M10/2) of the Russische</td>
<td>former USSR (F)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(M11/1) of DI-TIB</td>
<td>Landsmannschaft e.V.</td>
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<td>- Executive committee</td>
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<td>member of the Fatih Cami</td>
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<tr>
<td>mosque (M)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- German-Turkish association</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deutsch-türkischer</td>
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<td>Unternehmerverein e.V.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(DTU) (M15)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Member of the Turkish</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advisory Council on</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreigners (M9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Muslim representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>woman for integration</td>
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<td>(F5)</td>
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<td>- Muslim volunteer woman</td>
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<td>from the executive</td>
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<td>committee of the intercultural</td>
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<tr>
<td>women association (Interkulturelles Begegnungszentrum für Frauen / IBF) (no interview) (F)</td>
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<td>- Muslim volunteer woman</td>
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<td>association (Alevitischer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kulturverein e.V.) (F)</td>
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<td>- 3 ethnic German women</td>
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<td>from the former USSR (F)</td>
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The social actors in Schweinfurt have been mapped with the help of qualitative network analysis. The main themes of the interviews are summarized and categorized in the content analysis. Intersectionality is used to show how factors interact and sometimes reinforce each other.

Findings

The interviews in the case of Schweinfurt are summarized in the qualitative content analysis which is mainly focused on manifest content, namely, what the interviewees consciously and explicitly say. Further a classification of the data following certain empirical, as well as, theoretical points permit a structured description of the collected material offering representative interview examples and excerpts.

With regard to the research questions (Methods and sources, above) the interviews deal with cohesion and/or conflict related to different minority interviewees’ values in five welfare areas: family, education, health, social care and employment. According to the analysis social mechanisms and communication factors are not directed to cohesion, nor to conflict, but to something in between. The different orientations of belief and action are presented in interview examples, which are connected to five welfare areas, and illustrated by concrete interview excerpts.

The material analysis (Analysis: emergent values, below) examines values which influence cohesion and/or conflict (between majority and minority and/or within minorities) in the interview examples, and asks if/how they are intersectionally related to religion, majority-minority relations and gender, as well as, linked to a ‘core value’.

Social cohesion is understood in two ways: reducing social inequalities and social exclusion, as well as, strengthening social relations (cf. Berger-Schmitt 2000, 4). Accordingly, social conflict refers to social inequalities, exclusion and misunderstandings in social relations.
Communication, mutual understanding and social cohesion

This chapter is mostly about the lack of communication, mutual understanding and social cohesion regarding and focusing the social care area, e. g. social provision and involvement, social support and services.

In a first interview example a Turkish member of the town Advisory Council on Foreigners (M9) emphasizes cultural/religious diversity and the development of Muslim self-esteem in family, as well as, in society. Regarding conflict and tension between the majority population and his minority group he refers to misunderstandings in the communication and interaction between town representatives and migrant clients because of their different cultural backgrounds:

Mostly there are misunderstandings, for example, let us take the Turkish society here, they may have been misunderstood because of the cultural diversity by local bureaucrats and then we go in to help to try to correct this with our German friends. (M9)

By ‘our German friends’ the interviewee refers to the German majority bureaucracy and its representatives in the town hall. He gives the following example to illustrate what he means:

For instance, someone has to pass on some information, usually in written form, and he thought it is customary with Turkish people to call rather than to write like we do in Germany with signature and such. And someone calls someone else and asks for him to take some notes and this person writes something down that is incorrect and when this writing is being taken to the Government office then it can happen that the text is being misunderstood again. So it is simply the way of misunderstanding that can threaten a person to be thrown out of the country. (M9)

With regard to the mentioned communication problems the interviewee refers to the tasks of the Advisory Council on Foreigners – helping reduce social inequalities and social exclusion, as well as, strengthening social relations – and its importance for the development of social cohesion in the town:

And why is there an office that helps foreigners? We are a bridge between migrants, who live in Schweinfurt and the various city offices. We try to solve the problems that perhaps the city cannot solve and we try in a humane way to search for individual solutions. (M9)

In the interviewee’s eyes the town project called ‘gerne daheim in Schweinfurt’ has had no success, having adopted only a short-term point of view and not being really connected to the migrants:
There is only vague information to explain where German-Russians and Turks can get together, but this is not enough. It is not a long term project, but sporadic and then nothing again. I feel this is not the right way. I observe that the process of integration does not work in this way, not like we imagine it anyhow and perhaps this is so with the city people. They are doing what they can on their side but for the moment it is not the right solution and a good way has not been found yet. And it is not enough to have support for a project. (M9)

In his eyes the town hall department has to take into account everyone’s culture regarding social equality and social inclusion. He emphasized support for developing the migrants’ self-esteem by taking into consideration and accepting their attitudes, practices and values:

How these problems can be solved over time: the city offices have to become more sensitive with regard to each person’s culture. That is one thing and the other being that we called a feeling of self-esteem. How can this be done? I do not know, but it has something to do with education, with being able to accomplish something, maybe playing theatre. With other activities the self-worth of children has to be raised, for the next generation. With other generations another approach may have to be found, perhaps by interaction between the local offices and the families. Thus, children can identify themselves with the city and this feeling of self-worth has to come from the children. When there are problems with garbage collection, with the climate of political debates, where they are able to vote, they should not refrain from doing so. Also education is very important. The more education one has received the more a person is self-assured, the more one would venture to say one’s opinion, even in places where there are 100-150 people present. This is again connected with confidence in one’s abilities and self-esteem. (M9)

He underlines that a change of value orientation in the direction of cohesion will take time: for the first and second generation of Turkish migrants it is impossible, for the third difficult, but for the fourth there is a chance. The situation of this fourth generation is different because they are born and have grown up in Germany. For example, one interviewee (F14) points out that she feels at home in the country.

Describing several examples of cohesion and conflict in the interview he mentions self-esteem and confidence in society as two dimensions of values. Two solutions for supporting cohesion and cooperation from a migrants’ perspective may be:
1. the sensitization of the town hall departments to the migrants’ different cultural backgrounds
2. the development of the migrants’ self-esteem through education and professional development, as well as, their integration in the German society
Emphasis is also placed on cultural, especially religious freedom as a source of cohesion in the society: ‘What I think is important also in a religious sense, is to each his own in faith’ (M9).

Religion is a main dimension of cultural life, especially for the Muslim community. Because of religious freedom a coexistence of different religions is possible. In the religious area of Schweinfurt problems and tensions are often consequences of different understandings and prejudices. The role of religion in social cohesion is mentioned in the interview research. Both majority and minority groups are involved in social provision. But because of their different religious and cultural identity they do not have the same attitudes and experiences, which are often seen as a source of conflict and tension. The following interview example allows us to gain insight into the problematic points and indicates practices leading to cohesion.

Religion influences the whole of Muslim life and defines value orientations (‘professed values’ as well as ‘values in action’). Two representatives of the Muslim DITIB mosque give answers on the mosque’s (social) attitudes and practices.

One interviewee (M11/1) mentions the associations’ work as important for the Turkish Muslim community. With regard to his role in the DITIB mosque the other representative (M11/2) underlines his responsibility for the Turkish people in Schweinfurt. There are often visitors in the mosque and he is interested in a dialogue with the town, the Christian Churches and other town organizations. The interviewee mentions that there are few contacts between different mosques in the town. The described social services of the mosque include prayers, religious education, especially for children, and cultural activities. For children the mosque has a sports organization and offers Koran lessons to them so they can learn Arabic prayers. The representative describes the mosque’s tasks as putting emphasis on religious education, as well as, on the development of solidarity, cohesion and respect:

The first and foremost goal of this mosque is to be of service to Moslems. They can offer their prayers here. They can sit down and read. Young people can watch TV, and talk with each other which many find very helpful. On weekends children can come and we teach them about our religion. Besides we have events for school students, where they can come and visit our mosque. We give them an overview of our religion. Thus, we have common dialogues and contacts. Another important service is this, that when any major disaster strikes anywhere in the world we collect money and material gifts from people, no matter if the disaster has taken place in a Moslem country or in a Christian one. In the name of the State we send them this kind of aid and help. And outside of the mosque we conduct cultural activities, we visit the elderly and sick and all this belongs to our service and tasks. The more one gets to know each other the more respect is being generated. (M11/2)

The same representative says that Muslim women are creating their own Muslim organization. The mosque women cooperate with the town’s inter-
cultural association, *Interkulturelles Begegnungszentrum für Frauen* (IBF). With regard to values, freedom, friendship, love, openness and dialogue are key words for him. In terms of financial support he mentions that the mosques only try to help in cases where the German State is unable to do so. He points out the good working relationship with representatives and institutions in the town, but also the prejudices of the Germans and the generalizations of the public media:

In order to have more success, in order to meet one another with more charity and friendship, the more preconceived ideas have to be done away with. And this as far as the State is concerned, but also the general population. It makes me sad when I see in the media that Moslems and the Koran are being judged when a Moslem has done something wrong. This is a great mistake on the part of the media. And people with whom we want to have a dialogue also are being influenced by such stories. The doors are being shut. The media are the fourth most powerful might on earth. I wish this power would be enlisted for the power of charity and friendship. (M11/2)

It took us several attempts to obtain the presented interview with the Muslim representative. There were different understandings of what a *social network* is. On the Muslim side of the term ‘social’ means to meet each other and to spend time together as it was illustrated in the interview example. In a German perspective the concept of ‘social’ is more structured, institutional and defined in official terms. With regard to the term ‘network’ the interviewee first thought of terrorism networks. In his eyes the mosque is not a social network, but a place to come and pray together. The described misunderstanding illustrates that understandings of cultural and religious identity, as well as, attitudes and practices are influenced by different value orientations. Communication factors are additional sources of conflict and tension. They also reflect the importance of cohesion and cooperation within the society.

In the examples mentioned above there is emphasis on communication, mutual understanding and social cohesion because of different cultural and religious backgrounds. Several conflicts in social life are mentioned because of different understandings of social action and interaction between the majority and minority, as well as, within minorities themselves. Therefore, various social support services are needed to develop social cohesion through ‘the power of charity and friendship’ (see M11/2).

**Different definitions of family and women’s roles**

Majority and minority interviewees mention the importance of the family in everyday life, also for generating values among the examined minority groups. The ideals of family and community can come into conflict with routines and tasks in German society.
The family orientation and structure of the Protestant minority Churches is illustrated by the example of a middle-aged woman from the Evangelisch-Methodistische Kirche (EMK) [F19] more involved in pastoral matters than in social support. She states that the parish is the place for her in-depth experiences with God and intensive personal contacts with parish members and other people. Spending time to meet people and to listen to them is important for her and encourages cohesion inside and outside her parish. The interviewee refers to the familiar character of the parish as a religious and social network. Further the pastor of the EMK in Schweinfurt (M3) emphasizes gender equality: in this ‘Free Christian Church’, as well as, in his parish, women and men are viewed with the same dignity and rights as full-time and lay persons.

Regarding the Muslim culture and religion the family is the place of education, being the task of the woman. In the view of a representative of the Turkish minority community the importance of opening family life in order to develop the self-esteem and sense of responsibility among minorities is increasingly important:

This representative points out the importance of the family and women in generating basic as well as cohesion oriented values in the Muslim community and underlines a different view on gender equality to reduce conflict and tension:

Furthermore, an interviewed Muslim woman (F14) mentions that in both majority and minority perspectives welfare is related to quality of life, but that there are also different views and values becoming more visible, with also many gaps in the social care area. A Muslim German woman, born in
Schweinfurt and having Turkish immigrant parents, studies engineering. She is married and has two young children. She works for a school pupils’ homework service to earn money. She characterizes her family, lifestyle and education as German. She puts emphasis on her Muslim faith for everyday life. In her eyes the family is responsible for the religious education of her children. With regard to welfare and social support by the German State she only uses support for living (Wohngeld: financial support from the German State for living costs depending on income) and education (Bafög: financial support from the German State for German students depending on several factors, e.g. parents income). She is not involved in any social volunteering. She describes her way of children’s education, based more on feelings and love, than on rules and strength. She also feels responsible for the further education of her children preferring the Montessori system. She wants her children to speak German and Turkish mentioning this as an important qualification. Therefore, she is sad that most of the Muslim pupils are generally seen as weak in German schools. She and her husband both pray and give money to the poor to fulfil their religious responsibility. In the interview she regrets that many Germans have prejudices towards the Muslim faith and life, especially after the 11th September 2001 attacks: Muslims are often seen as dangerous and fanatic by the majority. She mentions cooperation, as well as, conflict between the majority population, e.g. the town representatives, the churches, and the different national and religious minority groups. She describes several activities and initiatives in the social care area, e.g. the interreligious dialogue movement and intercultural events. She also gives some examples of discrimination and provocation, e.g. with regard to wearing a veil and having her own way of dressing as a Muslim woman being a symbol of her human identity:

Yes, this is what is hurting. I feel here like home, I just feel this way. I love this country. Therefore, I tell you as any German would do, I love Germany. No question. And I could not live anywhere else. But then people question why I wear a headscarf. They say I want to bring Islam to Germany. No, I want this country the way it is. There are mistakes being made in politics. But where are there no mistakes being made? There are mistakes in the system, but where are they not to be found? But generally speaking I love this country. (F14)

She describes herself as well integrated but believes that integration is not enough: in her opinion a new consciousness of cultural difference and living together is needed:

As far as Turkish people are concerned we feel differently from Europeans. When the glass is half full we say so. We always see the positive in things. Germans say, the glass is half empty. It is the same glass and the same
amount. But it is viewed from another angle. That really is so. It is the German mentality. (F14)

To show that one biography is not like another one more individual life plan example of a Turkish Muslim woman (F5) employed by the town and being responsible for integration support, especially with regard to Turkish and Muslim immigrants, is to add: In the interview she emphasizes that she does not wear a headscarf to show her progressive perspective. Employed by and responsible for the integration project of the town she offers comments of her experience with regard to migrant work and explains the institutional background of her employment: working for a lawyer at first she was involved in migrant support as a volunteer. She then became the manager of the ‘Ausländerbeirat’ in the town hall before being hired to coordinate the town’s integration project. She describes her main personal and official interests with the word ‘support’ and offers some examples of her involvement: children’s education projects, journeys with migrants, especially Muslim women, and integration language courses. She says that recognition, understanding and emotional commitment are very important for her work, which she calls ‘social work in practice’. In her view ‘welfare’ means ‘good life’ and has different dimensions: financial support, administrative and personal counselling, education possibilities etc. With regard to her integration work she underscores the importance of cooperation between the representatives of the town, individuals in social and other welfare areas, institutions or organizations. In her eyes these relationships support the cohesion in the town. She emphasizes conflicts between and within the Muslim communities, especially with regard to women. Furthermore, she mentions the Muslim men’s problematic focus and interpretation of ‘honour’.

In comparison the first life plan example offers more insight into Muslim private life, while the second illustrates many institutional aspects of a Muslim woman’s employment.

The Roman-Catholic dean (M1) who is the priest of a local parish, where the Germans from the former USSR are the majority, has the impression that the family is also important for this minority group according to its cultural tradition and lifestyle in Germany. The family also encourages cohesion from generation to generation.

In conclusion, there are differences in the definition of family and women’s roles according to different minority perspectives, individual life experiences and cultural traditions. Prejudices in attitudes influence practices and can cause conflicts. Furthermore, the family and a woman’s role are defined in different ways between the majority and the minorities, but in both cases they are seen as an important factor for social cohesion.
Education and language support, but for whom?

The opportunity of education is mentioned both by the majority and the selected minorities. The importance of language and equal access to education is emphasized regarding social cohesion. Town officials, welfare organizations, as well as, minority associations try to encourage public education institutions to develop integration and language training programmes. Many language courses and other education opportunities are offered in Schweinfurt, but there is little demand from minority groups. According to the interview research, they do not see the need for these and they do not have the motivation to learn German. On the minority side the Muslim main education institutions are the mosque and in this type of welfare area the family is important for both the Muslim community and the Germans from the former USSR as mentioned above.

The ethnic Germans from the former USSR put emphasis on language competence as a basis for self-confidence and quality of life in Germany, as well as, for integration, which are mentioned by the interviewees as main value reference points. In a project called ‘Friendship’ (Freundschaft) one woman from this minority group (F2) works with other Germans from the former USSR and majority Germans, as well as, with the town hall and other networks in the part of the town where herself and many other Germans from the former USSR live (Deutschhof); it is an example of social cooperation in the town. She speaks of the importance of integration through different social support services, e.g. education opportunities:

Yes, we in the ‘Friendship’ project are still active. Many measures are still valid. We are active in various ways. We have a language course which is running over one year already and we are a good group of people there. We have found very good teachers for the German language for little remuneration, it runs by itself. Only recently we started a very original language course with an action program, be it walking tours, excursions, simple German conversation at the table. This was our idea, it came also from Mr. …. He is the leader of our project here in Schweinfurt. I find it simply super. The men among the refugees also need support, because many are at home, without work and without adequate knowledge of the German language they cannot advance in any way. So we thought we would make a roundtable discussion at the elementary school where we would also correct homework. We now have two groups with emphasis on German as a support and we have four teachers. This can also be a task and furthermore we have organized two concerts here at the ‘Deutschhof’. (F2)

But she mentions the problem that often there is no motivation from the Germans from the former USSR to use these services and to become independent:

All our efforts we have divided in five sections in Schweinfurt. First, language courses and then also some in events, Lutheran or Catholic events....
And I must admit the motivation on the side of the participants is not overwhelming. There are arguments with which I cannot agree at all. (F2)

For example, they ask why they have to learn the German language if they have no chance to find work in the country. Furthermore, it is not necessary to speak German because there are many Germans from the former USSR living in Schweinfurt who speak Russian.

She described herself as an idealistic person feeling responsible for society and everyone’s ‘positive feeling’:

Yes, I tell you frankly this is idealism, something that one simply has. Social responsibility is what I say. That is where everyone carries his own part, even if perhaps not everyone can attend. Many do not have all good feelings, I feel. The positive feelings here in Schweinfurt help to bring out other feelings as well. When we are being asked why do these people come to Germany, we cannot explain this to all, that we have to accept. But there are also many people who can understand the plight of others and they can change their opinion. I still hope. (F2)

In her eyes welfare means, not only public social support, but also giving human beings a feeling of a better life, which is possible through other means:

This word [welfare] means to me welfare in social support. However, to me this means to help bring to people a positive feeling that things can get better. All these organizations are trying to convey these positive feelings. (F2)

Interviews with other representatives of the Germans from the former USSR also refer to the mentioned gap between social provision and minority demand. The association ‘Friendship’ (Freundschaft) aims to support social cohesion and cooperation in the town, but problematic points appear, e.g. language support is offered, but there are very few takers. In addition, a gap between supply and demand is also evident with regard to other educational matters. Furthermore, there is the question of social responsibility that is understood in different ways.

With regard to the education sector an interview with the two mobile social workers (M8/1, M8/2) based at ‘Haus Marienthal’, a social support house of the Protestant ‘Diakonie’, describes their involvement in youth work. They work in two parts of the town: one with a high number of Russian emigrants called ‘Deutschhof’ and one with German and Turkish populations, called ‘Gartenstadt’. Before one of the mobile social workers began to work, the young people often came together at several town places in high numbers. These meetings often caused conflicts between the minorities groups and the majority population. During the first months of the mobile social workers’ employment they needed time to become familiar with the Russian, Muslim and German youth present in the different town parts. The
mobile social workers mention that most of their clients are male, but sometimes they succeed in supporting young Russian women to have some ‘free space’ at home and to do what they want. With regard to Muslim young women they point out that they are not present in the streets. Most of them have to stay at home so offering personal or social support is not possible.

In the eyes of mobile social workers the Russian and Muslim families are the initial social networks and educational references; for the Muslims there are also the mosques and for the Russians their cultural associations. The mobile social workers emphasize the protection of their different young clients’ interests, especially with regard to administrative matters. The underlying values of their work are ‘solidarity, respect, cohesion and openness’. The mobile social workers pointed out that it is very important to go to the (young) people they work for. In conclusion they emphasize their added role in school education.

Individual and alternative health care

Regarding the health care sector the interviews indicate that there is a gap between the ideal picture and the real situation. On the one hand, emphasis is placed on belonging; on the other hand, the lack of health care possibilities is mentioned.

In the area of health, the support of the Haus Kaltenhof, one of two social support houses of the Protestant social association ‘Levi e.V.’, is an example of a minority support initiative, which is related to factors such as, e.g. faith, community and work. The house is an initiative of different ‘Free Christian Churches’ supported by the Protestant Church and the independent welfare organization Paritätischer Wohlfahrtsverband (DPW).

An interviewed representative from the Haus Kaltenhof (M6) mentions the everyday life of both the mentally ill clients and the employees and volunteers working there together and looking after the clients’ individual development. He points out that they exist and live from donations and money they earn from their own work, which has also a therapeutic dimension. He mentions religion as a basic and observable value expressed in the association’s aims and practice, e.g. everyday prayers or employment only for Christians:

The religious aspect is more of a background. We have informative meetings, we have a brochure with information where it says that this is a Christian institution. We have devotions, table prayers, etc. and it is understood that we talk about God here and when one goes along with that it is ok. Even if a man entertains Buddhist thoughts, that is his choice, but he has agreed to go along. (M6)

It is important on the side of co-workers that they are practicing Christians. (M6)
In the representative’s eyes religion is fundamental for the social work because it helps people to focus on their value as human beings:

Our clients come mostly from psychiatric clinics where people have experienced a crisis and had to go into a clinic. And the social workers first ask the question of how did a person get there and why? (M6)

Furthermore, he mentions everyday conflicts between clients, employers and volunteers, but he also puts emphasis on contacts with the Protestant parishes. The religious dimension of health care is also mentioned in three interviews with clients of the support house and it is connected to their real life situations. Two of the three clients of the Haus Kaltenhof tell their individual life stories, as well as, their different ways of coming to this Protestant social support institution:

One client (F22) is a single woman born in 1957. She says that she found God in her illness. Her religious conversion has completely changed her life. In her eyes God has led her to this religious house and has given her the strength to become healthy. In the future she will go to France where her family lives.

Another client (M21), a single man of fifty-four years, was a construction worker before he became psychologically ill. The Haus Kaltenhof gave him new faith and opened life perspectives. Living together in the Haus Kaltenhof, he will no longer live alone, not knowing how to make things work:

It is good that one is among people and has a firm daily structure. And as we have said it is not a lonely situation like the one in which I have lived before. And for all practical purposes I cannot be alone. (F21)

A third client of the Haus Kaltenhof (M20), a farmer born in 1953, has a family of two adult children. He repeats the short sentence 'it will not become better'. These words show his physical condition and his broken family social situation. In the interview he does not see a way to become healthy again after a year staying at Haus Kaltenhof. But he also mentions that religion still matters to him and his life.

In the interviews the clients mention faith, community and work as factors of health and values in their life. With regard to the religious and individual support and value orientation of the Haus Kaltenhof they give positive feedback. But they also mention some inner tension in daily life. As one client mentions the majority can learn from this health practice run by a minority community.

Yes, I feel there should be more institutions like this and better funded by the State. I mean there are many people who are lonesome as the situation is, there is depression and many do not know where to turn to. Now we can say that there are not enough facilities of this kind and they need better support. It
is my opinion that there should be better funding and more support given by the State. This is my opinion. I am here now one year. I have not been to a clinic since I am here, whereas before I went to clinics more often. And if there were more facilities more people could be helped. And in doing so the State would not have to help so much. Hospital and clinic stays are very expensive. (M21)

The interview excerpts emphasize the need for individual support in the health sector. The presented institution is an example of alternative health care based on the cooperation between different Protestant denominational minority groups. Regarding access to health care there are ‘the questions on how did a person get there and why’ (see M6) and on ‘facilities of this kind [of alternative health care]’ (see M21). The recent conflicts on health care quality and costs in the German society, as well as, on the value of alternative institutions and cooperation are evident here. This institution is filling a gap among socially vulnerable people, which the official/public German health care system does not cover: generally, when checked out from the clinic, people with mental diseases are expected to keep going, living on their own (with some help by the counselling services). But of course they do not always manage to do so. In this respect this institution - which is the initiative of a minority group - fills the gap.

Employment as a basis for identity and integration

The president of an a German-Turkish association and a social advisor of the Russische Landsmannschaft both emphasize the importance of employment because work is a basic factor of identity related to individual life and social community. With regard to quality of life the financial aspect of employment is also mentioned, as well as, the high number of unemployed migrants in Germany.

In 2006 there were 2,843 unemployed persons (2,110 German inhabitants, 733 foreigners) (cf. http://www.schweinfurt.de). The German State supported unemployed migrants for example by arranging language and education courses, as well as, social and financial support (cf. Project report ‘gerne daheim in Schweinfurt’, 2007).

With regard to employment and work there are differences in the minorities’ life stories and value orientations.

The president of the German-Turkish association Deutsch-türkischer Unternehmerverein e.V (‘German-Turkish Company Association’) [M15] mentions that he feels financially and socially responsible in the German society. Regarding integration he emphasizes respect, solidarity and tolerance between different cultural and religious attitudes, practices and values and mentions openness as a basis for cooperation and cohesion. Furthermore, he sees a relation between one’s own acts and the reactions of others.
He is against the use of force and looks for a ‘middle way’. With regard to welfare he wants a ‘good life for all’.

The president (M10/1) and the social advisor of the Russische Landsmannschaft (M10/2) were asked for both their personal view of themselves as Germans from the former USSR in Germany and their involvement as volunteers in their cultural association. The social advisor, a former teacher in Kyrgyzstan who came to Germany in 1993, distinguished between two groups of Germans from the former USSR: ‘academics’ and ‘workers’. The ‘academics’ are not really able to integrate well because they do not find any employment in their field. He pointed out what is indirectly mentioned in other interviews. The ‘workers’ are mostly satisfied today because they have been employed for a long time, thus, having a higher quality of life than in their countries of origin. The first generation of Germans from the former USSR had a higher education and motivation to integrate and learn German when they came to Germany, than the second generation for whom the German social situation has changed in the last years in ways that they do not agree with. This impression is evident in several interviews. The interviewees put emphasis on the cultural and social support of the Russische Landsmannschaft which aims to provide a ‘feeling at home as the Germans from the former USSR in Germany’. For ethnic Germans from the former USSR the question of ‘identity’ causes a lot of inner conflicts. In the interview this is seen as a reason for tension in the public sphere. The association offers mainly help in dealing with the social bureaucracy of the German welfare structure and the cultural opportunities of traditional ‘Russian’ life.

The association president we interviewed was born in 1950 and came to Germany in 1975; he emphasizes work, diligence and order as ‘Russian’ values. Furthermore, he mentions traditional gender rules in the interview, e.g. the separate traditional work roles of women and men, but also puts emphasis on individual attitudes and practices, for example his wife has a job.

With regard to German welfare the German woman from the former USSR (F2) working in the ‘Friendship’ project thinks that it is a mistake for the German State to give money to people who do not work: in her eyes this is a source of encouraging laziness among the Germans, as well as, foreign populations. In summary, she emphasizes civil norms and values, as well as, individual freedom of religion because of living in Germany.

In summary, the interviews show the importance of employment for both financial security and quality of life. The interviewees point out that a job is not only needed to earn money, but also to provide satisfaction with life. Employment is seen as the basis of social integration, inclusion and equality.
The local situation in flux: an on-going integration process

Cohesion and conflict based on different definitions of welfare and social practices on both the majority and minority side, as well as, within minorities themselves, are evident in the in-depth interview research.

In the presented interview examples many factors are important, e.g. time, especially with regard to integration and status, language competence, space for individual development and cultural life, as well as, money for financial achievement and quality of life.

Regarding the local situation overall it is important to note:

With regard to the public welfare support and services, as well as, the social project of the town, the welfare organizations and other socially engaged associations contribute to an on-going integration process in Schweinfurt, but the majority perspective and values are leading factors. For example, many public language and education activities are offered, but there is very little demand on the minority side. Furthermore, according to some interviews there are misunderstandings regarding bureaucracy or communication.

The Roman Catholic parishes want to become increasingly a ‘town church’ (Stadtkirche) of nine parishes, thus, changing their pastoral structures, defining new and important tasks and developing their religious and social involvement with regard to different demands of individuals and groups. A similar development of networking can be seen in the Protestant Churches in town. In these networking processes the local parishes focus on neighbourhoods and support towards social cohesion.

The Muslim mosque communities in Schweinfurt started to recognize the importance of cooperation and dialogue. In addition, intercultural meetings and festivals between the majority population and ethnic Germans from the former USSR aim to support the social cohesion in the town. The minority associations of Muslims, as well as, of Germans from the former USSR have an integrating function, especially in terms of social and cultural life and regarding the role of other religions, the integration of Germans from the former USSR in the Catholic and Protestant parishes or the example of the role of the Free churches when it comes to mentally ill people are noteworthy.

The local welfare system is sufficient to cover the majority population’s needs, but with regard to minorities there are still insufficiencies. As mentioned above different religious and cultural attitudes, practices and value orientations (e.g. regarding leadership positions or gender roles) as well as, communication problems are barriers. Furthermore, there is often no interest and motivation on the side of the minorities to use the available social support and services (cf. Project report ‘gerne daheim in Schweinfurt’, 2007).
Analysis: emergent values

In the previous section the ‘inside’ views of representatives, volunteers and other individuals have emerged through informal conversation and interview examples in five welfare areas, adding ‘outside’ perspectives. They show a range of attitudes, practices and values related to different aspects: cohesion and conflict, religious, majority-minority relations, religion and gender dimensions, as well as, ‘core value’ connections.

In this case study report it is not possible to provide an overview of all the interview findings and a complete value analysis. Therefore, the presented examples that we have selected are the main basis for the following analysis with the help of other interview excerpts illustrating the following analysis results.

The value analysis follows the two research questions (from Research focus and questions, above):
1. Which values can be seen in examples of cohesion and/or conflict in the domain of welfare?
2. How are these values related to religion, majority-minority relations and/or gender, as well as, linked to a ‘core value’?

Values ‘are seen as conceptions of the desirable which are not directly observable, but are evident in moral discourse and relevant to the formulation of attitudes. For heuristic purposes, these conceptions are to understand as hypothetical constructs which constrain attitudes. The claim for the empirical relevance of values is to demonstrate by evidence of patterning among attitudes. These meaningful patterns can be called value orientations’ (Van Deth/Scarborough 1995, 46).

Welfare areas and values

The values and views of the examined majority and minority interviewees shown above, emerged in different areas of welfare and appeared as values in and of themselves: family, education, health, social care and employment. In the analysis, emphasis is placed on emergent values appearing in the presented interview material.

Communication, mutual understanding and social cohesion

The lack of communication, mutual understanding and social cohesion is a main theme that is repeatedly referred to in the interviews. Both majority and minority groups are involved in social provision, but they have different attitudes and practices. This is seen as a problematic point and a source of conflicts, e. g. with regard to German bureaucracy and different cultural ways of communication.
Public social support services are characterized as structured and limited, while on the minority side, supply and demand are dependent on family, community relations and networks. According to both the majority and minority perspectives welfare is related to quality of life, but welfare definitions differ among the interviews, for example, different views among Germans from the former USSR regarding language courses (see F2, M11/2, M10/2). There are also differences in views and values (see M11/2, F14) as well as problems in the social care area, e.g. with regard to education and work (see F14, M10/2).

*Family and gender equality are valued*

Majority and minority interviewees refer to the family orientation of the minority groups. The denominational Protestant minority churches’ family and cohesion orientation is pointed out by the female member of the EMK, thus underlining the importance of intensive personal contacts in her parish (see F19).

With regard to the Muslim culture and religion the family is a place of education, which is the task of women. The interviewed Turkish member of the Advisory Council of Foreigners emphasizes the role of Muslim women in supporting the cohesion of their own minority group, but also the differences of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ views as a source of conflict. Furthermore, the importance of education in developing self-esteem and social responsibility among minorities is mentioned as a support mechanism for social equality and social inclusion (see M9). This male perspective is complemented by two female views (see F5, F14). For example, an interviewed Muslim woman (see F14), on the one hand mentions the positive development of the integration of women in the town, but on the other hand she presents personal experiences of provocation and discrimination because of differences in gender definitions and practices.

For the Germans from the former USSR, family and women are important to the ‘Russian’ cultural identity and tradition, as well as, for everyday life in Germany, particularly for strengthening social relations in their own minority group (see M10/1, M10/2).

*The value of education and language competence*

Both the majority and minority interviewees emphasize the necessity of education. Language and equal access to education are important for social cohesion (see M9). The majority tries to develop integration and language competence through public education institutions as mentioned in interviews in which ‘outside’ perspectives appear. Many language courses are offered in Schweinfurt, but there is little demand, as indicated by an ethnic German woman from the former USSR, who is involved in the self-organized project ‘Friendship’, which she sees as a problematic point (see F2).
Regarding value patterns on the minority side, the family (see M9) and the mosque community, are the main Muslim education institutions, as pointed out by the representative of the DITIB mosque (see M11/2). There are several attempts by Muslim organizations and groups to develop their own schools, especially with regard to the religious education of Muslim children. In Schweinfurt the Islamischer Bildungs und Integrationsverein is still trying to open its own Qur’an school. The interviews do not relate directly to the public schools in Germany (see M8/1, M8/2).

The Germans from the former USSR regardless of their generation have put emphasis on language competence as a basis for self-confidence, quality of life and integration in Germany. Not only language, but also responsibility are valued as part of the development of the individual and his/her social identity and well-being (see F2, M9; M10/1).

Health and humanity as basic values
The health care offered by the Haus Kaltenhof, one of the two social support houses of the Protestant social association Levi e.V., is an example of a minority effort related to more observable values, e.g. faith (see M6, F22), community (see M21) and work (see M6). The interviewees do not only refer to ‘conceptions of the desirable which are not directly observable’ but also ‘meaningful patterns (which) can be called value orientations’ (Van Deth/Scarbrough 1995, 46) describing values seen in practice.

This minority health practice is an example for the majority: the German health sector is very structured with high standards, many institutions and high costs. Alternative health care support services to migrants are mainly dependent on volunteering and networking: both are value motivated, especially by love and humanity. In the interview examples concepts of values depend on identity and value orientations appear in ‘professed values’ as well as in ‘values in action’ (see M6). In order to build a future with less inequality and exclusion and more social interaction, it is necessary to motivate and transmit to the State the fact that volunteers and networks have to work together in the health care area (see M21).

The value of employment in identity and integration
To reduce social inequality and social exclusion the president of a German-Turkish association and the social advisor of the Russische Landsmannschaft noted the importance of employment (see M15, M10/2). With regard to quality of life, the financial aspect, as well as the high number of unemployed people in Germany, are important factors. Work is mentioned as a basic component of identity related to personal and social life; the president of the Russische Landsmannschaft emphasizes ‘Russian’ values strengthening social relations, especially within their own minority group (see M10/1). The interviews shed light on the different relations between (un-)employment and identity, as well as, on the consequences for self-esteem and social cohe-
sion. For example, the ‘academics’, among ethnic Germans from the former USSR, are not able to integrate themselves because they cannot find any employment in their field (see M10/2). Employment is especially valued by the Germans from the former USSR.

Summary

After illustrating the five welfare areas through the interview examples the following points can be made:

- Communication, mutual understanding and social provision correlate with different religious/cultural motivations and orientations, which are also viewed as a source of cohesion as well as of conflict.
- There are different religious/cultural definitions of the family and women’s roles and different male and female perspectives on gender.
- There are many education and language support opportunities in Schweinfurt, but the question is for whom? There is an apparent gap between supply and demand.
- In Germany health care support is structured and limited, but the interviewees emphasize that the German State is no longer able to offer individual and alternative health care. Thus, alternative health care possibilities are necessary.
- Employment is a basis for integration and integration is also necessary for employment, both relating to definitions and questions of identity.
- Both cohesion and conflict are based on different definitions of welfare and social practices both on the majority and minority side, as well as, within minorities themselves.

Classification of values: values related to religion, minorities or gender

Regarding the interviews overall several examples of conflict and/or cooperation were provided above, e.g. examples of conflict and/or cohesion between and/or within majority and minority groups. While the religious dimension plays a role in a number of interviews, emphasis is mainly placed on majority-minority relations. The gender dimension plays a role only in some examples.

Values related to religion:

In all of the interviews love emerges as the main religiously motivated and oriented value among the majority representatives and Churches. The Protestant Churches and the Roman Catholic Church are critical voices in the society with regard to social matters.

The interviewees of the selected minority groups mostly mentioned freedom, humanity and hospitality as their values related to religion, faith and
worship. The charismatic and evangelical potential of religion is conflict oriented and mentioned with regard to the Protestant Free Churches. *Individuality, humanity, solidarity, community and hospitality* are described as their basic values.

Muslim and ‘Russian’ values show similar orientations: the Muslim interviewees emphasize *love, friendship and freedom (of religion)*, while the interviewed Germans from the former USSR mention *freedom (of worship), humanity, quality of life and hospitality*.

In the interviews religious values support *cohesion*. If not, then the above mentioned values are mostly ‘professed values’ (see M9.6, M6.2) and not ‘values in action’ (see M6.1).

*Values related to majority-minority relations:*

On the majority side emphasis is placed on quality of life, solidarity, security, integration, openness, respect, cohesion and equality.

Close to the majority Churches are interviewees from the Protestant Free Churches who mention the importance of a ‘lived attention and allowance to the socially vulnerable’ (M3).

On the minority side, Muslim interviewees point out the importance of community, openness, dialogue, understanding, (civil) norms and values, family, (self) esteem/confidence, humanity and identity. Some Muslim interviewees wish for more (social) responsibility, support and education, characterized as ‘social work in practice’ (F5). They also would like a new consciousness of cultural and religious diversity in living together. ‘Good life’ (M10/2) requires financial security and support, administrative and personal counselling and education opportunities (for example, comprehensive language courses).

The ‘Russian’ interviewees emphasize quality of life, solidarity, community, hospitality, success, work, diligence, order, and integration through different (social) support services, (social) involvement, participation, familiarity and education.

Most of the mentioned values refer to majority-minority relations: belonging to a group is essential for one’s individual and social identity (see M10/2).

*Values related to gender:*

An interviewee from the Protestant Free Churches emphasizes the importance of equal *human dignity and rights* to men and women.

In some interviews with Muslims there are differing views on *(gender) equality* and *different views on cultural and religious education* (see M9). Emphasis is placed on women’s support, women’s association membership and the opportunities of various experiences for women (see F5).
Among the majority interviews there is a lack of reference to gender-related values; also ‘Russian’ interviewees do not often refer to gender (see M10/1).

*Intersections between the three domains:*
The values of different social actors and their relations to religion, majority-minority relations and gender have been described above. The interview material shows that value orientations and motivations in attitudes and practice are interdependent. The following intersections can be found:

On the majority side, values are mainly related to majority-minority relations (town representatives/volunteers and welfare organizations) and to religion (majority Churches). The gender dimension is only prevalent in some attitudes and with regard to practices. In Germany gender equality is valued in society: men and women have equal rights. But in some interviews there are views acknowledging that there may not be equality between men and women in practice.

For the Protestant Free Churches values are mainly religiously motivated and more related to majority-minority relations than to gender patterns. We have to note that they are in a minority position with regard to the majority Christian Churches in Germany. With regard to gender the interviews reveal that men and women have the same dignity and rights but are in different positions.

Muslim values are mainly related to religion intersecting with majority-minority relations and gender. In the interviews Islam is viewed as a religion that influences the whole life of a Muslim. The Koran influences everyday life through religiously motivated individual and social norms, e.g. how men and women have to behave within the family and society or how Muslims should interact with others.

Most values of the Germans from the former USSR are linked to majority-minority relations, but few intersections with religion and gender can be found in attitudes and social practices. They are German citizens, but in the eyes of the majority population they are still recognized as Germans from the former USSR.

**Analysis and conclusions**
Summarizing the results, most social values refer to majority-minority relations. This finding indicates that values are based and influenced by the majority and/or minority culture. Therefore, the values of the German majority population and of Germans from the former USSR are driven first by majority-minority relations, with religious and gender factors being secondary. But among Muslim and Protestant Free Church representatives values are primarily religiously motivated. These results reveal that values are based on
the individual and collective definition of human identity (cultural and/or religious) and connected to real situations and practices.

With regard to the first research question, the interviewed individuals from the selected minority groups show similar belonging and support in the social area as the majority population. But their support services run according to different religious, cultural and gender orientations influenced by their own values. The interviewees mention inner cohesion and tension between the majority and minorities, as well as, solidarity and conflict between different individuals and groups.

With regard to the second research question it has been shown in an intersectional perspective that conflict and cohesion are motivated and influenced by religion, majority/minority relations and gender.

In conclusion the interviews show different value motivations and orientations linked to the concept of human identity, thus forming the ‘core value’ of the research. ‘Identity’ is a basis of values or perspectives to which an individual most strongly relates. The factor of community plays an important role in the consideration of individual and collective values within the majority population and in the relations between the majority population and minority groups: What value do individuals attach to their identity as members of a community? How important are collective values to personal identity?

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3:1 OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL SITUATION

Corinne Valasik

Introduction

According to recent research led by Ro sanvallon (2004), French society is based on the notion of citizenship, which is principally a legal, abstract notion, enabling equality between different individuals. Indeed, French political culture defines a citizen as an individual free from any particular affiliations. This is the only accepted way for citizens to build a universal and equitable nation. All forms of particularism or communitarianism, i.e. religious, ethnic or local affiliation, are questioned. Likewise, intermediary structures (unions, associations, etc.) are strongly rejected, since they are also likely to prevent the bond between citizens and their Nation. Particular characteristics (regional, ethnic, religious, gender, etc.) are part of private life. Citizenship transcends all specificities. Any claim taking into account a particular characteristic is thus viewed as a communitarian tendency questioning the very foundations of democracy, namely universal citizenship. This particular conception has many consequences for the WaVE project.

According to Liogier, France is one of the EU-members that intervenes the most in religious matters. ‘Laïcité is a particular way of religious intervention implying the denial of the “religious” nature of the intervention’ (Liogier 2006, 26). The role of religion in France in the social sphere has barely been studied. It is possible to find studies on charitable religious groups, but not a general analysis of their place in society. Without suggesting that charitable religious groups are absent, their role seems minor.

Ethnic affiliation is viewed as suspicious from a Republican point of view. Given that it is linked to possible communitarianism, ethnic affiliation

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1 Danièle Hervieu-Léger was the senior researcher for the French case.
2 The exclusive attachment or loyalty to one’s own community interests.
3 The idea that community is more important than individuals, who have to comply with the community’s rules.
is conceived as a threat to the unity of the Nation. Thus, France has only just started to address these types of issues and mainly from an integration (anti-discrimination) perspective. This delayed interest is evident in scientific studies on these questions. In France it is prohibited by law to conduct statistics in terms of the ethnicity or race of an individual, which limits the possibility to know the different types of populations living in France. The only possibility is thus to conduct polls on the identity that individuals give to themselves (white, black, etc.) (Brouard and Tiberj, 2005). Furthermore, the French sociological tradition analyses mainly social inequalities with the help of social class categories. It was through the actions of associations against racism, namely though testing, that it was proven that ethnic discrimination was a social reality. From now on, this notion is taken into account in scientific studies as a social phenomenon (Weil, 2005; Amadieu, 2006; Lagrange, 2006; Ribert, 2006).

Similarly, there are no official statistics on religious affiliation, so it is difficult to know the percentage of each religious minority in France. Furthermore, even though France is a multi-religious country, this reality is not taken into account in scientific studies that abandoned the religious dimension long ago. Beyond the tradition of laïcité, the belief that France became secularized can explain this delay. What we called the ‘return of religion’ gave rise to a new interest in new forms of religiosity. Therefore, there is extensive research on religious minorities, particularly on sects and new religious movements, certain Protestant groups and Buddhism. However, there is very little research on other religions. When it comes to research on immigration, the religious factor is usually underestimated – particularly as far as Islam is concerned.

The concept of religion as a vector of social networking has emerged very recently with a few studies on the local relationships between religious groups (Frégosi and Willaime 2001, Lamine 2004). For reasons explained earlier, there is very little research on the link between the Catholic Church and minority groups. There are only references in chapters of books on local case studies (Lamine, 2004).

To explicitly admit an inequality between men and women, or even just talking about gender, has been perceived as adopting a pro-communitarian logic, as it implies differentiation between citizens. This generalizing perspective has held back the development of gender studies, which were seen as being too particularistic. Likewise, most university studies on welfare do not mention the existence of unequal relationships between men and women. It was only in the 90s that the question of male/female inequality and its consequences for society arose in France. This also explains why the theoretical conclusions of French feminists (Hélène Cixous, Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray) were, for a long time, more renowned in other countries than in France. Now gender studies have been included in more research fields, particularly the issue of women in suburban areas (Guénif Souleimans, 2000),
in politics (Mossuz-Lavau, 2004; Sineau, 2001), in the education field (Duru-Bellat, 2004), etc. The question of equality between men and women in France has never been so present in public discourse as today. Recent research on gender equality is particularly focused on gender-based employment inequality. Even though girls are more successful at school than boys, women seem to work in lower level positions and are paid 20% less than men for the same position. There are three different explanations for this. The first one takes into account the ‘internalization’ of gender stereotypes: children receive a different education according to their gender, which determine girls’ professional future. The second one uses the rational choice theory: girls look for jobs that make it easier for them to balance their professional and personal lives (Duru-Bellat 2004). Finally, the third one reverses the previous analysis by underlining that boys make more traditional choices and that girls put their career first (Ferrand 2004)

Therefore, the links between welfare, religion and gender have not been adequately studied in France. This is where the WaVE project can make an important contribution to existing knowledge on values relating to religion, gender, welfare and minorities in France.

Characteristics of the national welfare system

According to an updated version of Esping-Andersen’s typology, France is a corporatist welfare state (1990). The main characteristics of the French model include: social security benefits and labour laws which reinforce status distinctions. Many social funds are specifically granted to certain professional categories. Finally, state representatives, unions and managers jointly negotiate wages, social security benefits, etc. There is no formal (state endorsed) role for the involvement of the majority church in the national welfare system.

At the time of the French Revolution, solidarity among all citizens became one of the central references for French society. The family was the main place for the protection of individuals. Businesses were at the origin of family benefits and protection against work accidents, sickness and old age. It is not after the Second World War that social protection expanded to the whole of the French people and not only to salaried employees. The state was thus progressively endowed with legislation and structures that allowed it to insure citizens against various risks (work accidents, health, job loss, housing, etc.). Female employment grew rapidly, with implications for the role of the family in society. Businesses became individually disengaged from social protection in order to create inter-professional mechanisms linked to the state.
Welfare and the family

According to Pedersen (1993), French family policy is focused on children and not on the family as such. The French welfare state was, thus, conceived in order to divide the cost of children on all of the citizens. Taking responsibility for children falls on everyone. In this perspective, women are viewed as workers. This point of view was strongly supported by French employers. By financing family allowances not in terms of the distinction worker/non worker but by distinguishing between those who have children and those who do not. Currently there are approximately 40 family allowance programmes for a total of 40 billion euros. With the changes in the family structure (divorce, single parent families, etc.), the family is playing less of a protective role against the risks of life, for which the state becomes responsible.

Therefore, the state has become the main provider of social protection. Faced with the extent of growing needs, cooperation has taken place between the state and associative sectors, which is more flexible and delocalized, that is between private and public actors.

The role of associations

Initiatives in the welfare system originate mainly from the associative sector. As demonstrated by Laville and Sainsaulieu (1997), this domain is very active in France, although paradoxically it is rarely studied. France is a very centralized country and the republican ideal is based on a distrust of intermediary structure or organization. This is why there is typically very little interest in ‘intermediary structures’ (corps intermédiaires), particularly as far as welfare is concerned. It is the welfare state that is supposed to deal with social or welfare matters.

Up until the early 20th century, the state refused to legislate on the freedom of association, fearing it would benefit the Catholic Church. The law of July 1st, 1901 stipulates the freedom to create an association in France; one of its objectives was to decrease the influence of Roman Catholic congregations. No formalities are required to set up an association, apart from a declaration at the Préfecture. This authority has no right to give an opinion on the proposed objectives of the association (unless they seem illegal). It is the members that define the objectives and the articles, as well as the internal rules and regulations of the association. Only those associations recognized as offering a public service (which can be associated to a religious denomination) and, therefore, recognized by the state, can receive state funding. They are subject to a financial and legal audit by the state. Although this law is generally viewed as relatively liberal, it forces associations to submit to state control when they need funding. In the first part of the 20th century, many powerful associations were set up: religious and secular associations,
which were strongly encouraged by the state. Alongside traditional activities, such as charities, new areas are being developed, particularly in culture and leisure activities.

After the Second World War, the French state became a welfare state and tried to combine economic development and social protection. Progressively some associations that were recognized for offering a public service became organizations working in cooperation with state institutions. More flexible in their way of functioning and in their structure, these associations were asked by the state to carry out certain missions: offer additional aid to underprivileged people or assist them in administrative issues (for example how to put together a file or request for social assistance), etc. Progressively entire aspects of welfare management came under the direction of an associative sector controlled by the state. This collaboration was encouraged by a flourishing economy that allowed the state to provide regular funding to these organizations.

The laws of 1982 on decentralization brought an end to state support of these associations. Monopolies of services offered by associations, such as home help and child minding, were now questioned. These services were considered potential sources of employment and the state authorized private companies to enter this sector. For example, parents can benefit from state aid (in the form of a reduction in income tax) if they employ a child minder and associations no longer receive subsidies. ‘Associations and companies are, thus, forced to compete in job creation’ (Laville and Sainsaulieu 1997, 366).

At the same time, given the high unemployment rate and increasing exclusion, the state requests from the associations to help in professional and social placement. National professional placement policy and solidarity-employment contracts (contrats emploisolidarité) allow people to work for an association as long as their job does not compete with existing professional activities. These jobs are short term and are more appropriate for people in difficult financial and social circumstances. In exchange, the associations benefit from lower taxation and are exempted from paying social taxes (charges sociales). But the state no longer has the same financial means as in the past and now state subsidies depend on the final results of these associations. Therefore, religious associations can benefit from state funding if their objectives are recognized as offering a public service and under the condition that they are not involved in proselytism. Thus, associations that work with welfare benefit from state recognition, but at the same time they are under tight control if their existence and work depend on subsidies.

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4 In 2002, 64% of French citizens over the age of 15 donated various types of household and personal items (toys, food, clothing, etc). Three quarters of these donations were organized by charities or humanitarian organizations.
With the persistent economic crisis since the beginning of the 80s, the French state has had to deal with increased needs (in unemployment benefits, pensions and housing, etc.) but with fewer resources. In this situation, women and immigrant populations are the most vulnerable: it is them that have the most precarious jobs (short term contracts, part-time jobs, etc.).

Main challenges of the French welfare system

The main challenges to the French welfare system in the near future include:

- Develop equal opportunities for immigrants, young people, disabled people and women.
- Increase social housing.
- Reconsider social diversity.
- Strengthen social mobility.

The re-organization of welfare is a priority too. French political milieux have been considering solutions to financial and social welfare security for a long time (pensions, unemployment, healthcare, etc.) without any success. Therefore, since ten years ago, approximately 30% of GDP is dedicated totally to social expenditure, which is more than the EU average of 27% (Eurostat). The main stake is unemployment. In fact, the unemployment rate in 2006 was 9% compared to the 7.9% EU 25 average. Following an increase in jobs of 0.1 in 2003 and 0.0 in 2004, France is reaching towards the European average of 0.4 in 2005 (Eurostat). The result of this situation is the constant number of poor workers, approximately 10% to 15% of the population, who find themselves increasingly in financial precariousness.

The re-distribution of social expenses is regularly criticized. In fact, they are allocated less to the underprivileged and more to those who are well off. In 2000, there were 60 billion inhabitants in France, of which 4.5 billion were at the poverty line and 5 billion were living above the poverty line. According to the Eurostat data, 13% of the French population is below the poverty line (after social transfers) against the 16% EU-25 average. At the same time, social welfare expenses rose to 54% of GDP (Observatoire national de la pauvreté et de l’exclusion sociale 2002).

The question of retirement is equally important since in 2005, 16.4% of the population was over 65 years old with life expectancy rates of 76.7 years. Retirement age in France is one of the lowest in the EU at approximately 60 years old.

Religious composition in the country

Until recently, religion aroused suspicion in France; they were viewed as restricting the social integration of citizens. The law of 1905 completes the
process of ‘laicisation’ that had originally started during the French Revolution. However, the notion of laïcité is not defined as such in the legal text, as only its principles are stipulated: ‘The Republic does not recognize finance or subsidize any faith’ (Article 2). It must protect the religious freedom of each individual. Churches are no longer the responsibility of the state; therefore, the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) no longer has the right to intervene in politics. Laïcité applies to all public institutions. Referring to the law of 1905, the 5th Constitution of 1946 declares that France is a République laïque.

According to Liogier (2006), by passing the law of 1905, the French Republic somehow artificially divided what was part of religious practise from other ‘social’ aspects of religion. Under these circumstances, religion is not really viewed as an agent or actor of social welfare in France. This is why there is not much research on this subject. However, political authorities tend to seek consultations with local religious organizations (clergy, religious associations, etc.) on various occasions and social issues.

As a consequence of the French laïcité model, there are no official statistics or sociological data on religious affiliation. However, we can observe the presence of these religions in France: Catholicism, Islam, Protestantism, Judaism, Buddhism, others and atheism. The only available data can be obtained by polls (Source: CSA survey, 2003).

**Table 3:1:1 Religious groups present in France**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Group</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants (Calvinists and Lutherans)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Out of the 65% of the French Catholic population surveyed in 2003, only 12.8% practise regularly (they go to church at least once a month) and 7.5% weekly. Among Muslims 66% say they practise but only 10 to 15% seem to

<sup>5</sup> Including between 50,000 and 500,000 Buddhists.
actually attend a mosque. Most of these affiliations are transmitted from
generation to generation, as there are very few religious conversions.

Characteristics of the majority Church
In accordance to the law of 1905 separating religion and state, there is no
formal relationship between the majority Church and the state. The term *laïc*
has two meanings in French. The first designates state authorities free from
church intervention (secular state, secular schools: *Etat laïc, écoles laïques*).
The second is specific to the Catholic Church and differentiates between
believers (men and women) and members of the institution of the Church
(priests, monks, nuns). The term ‘lay people with responsibilities’ refers to
people involved in implementing pastoral policies and activities; they are
selected and appointed by the bishop for a renewable period of 3 years.
There are also lay people who work for the Church as paid employees but do
not have a pastoral mission. They are paid by the Church, for example, to
work as a secretary, treasurer, etc. Those who are not lay people are, there-
fore, the bishop and the priests, monks and nuns, who are all unmarried.

Only one child out of two is baptized in France, whereas four out of five
babies were baptized in the late 1960s. Lambert has predicted that only one
third of children will be baptized by 2020 (Lambert 2003). Eighty-two per-
cent (82%) of burials are Catholic, a figure that has remained stable (Survey
on funeral industry carried out in 1995).

The organizational structure of the Catholic Church

**National level:** *La conférence des évêques de France* (Conference of French
Catholic Bishops) is a place of discussion and common decision-making.
The Conference does not exert any power on bishops but allows them to
meet and act in concert on current issues.

**Regional level:**
- 15 *ecclesiastical provinces* that enable bishops from nearby dio-
  ceses to work together.
- 96 *dioceses corresponding to a département* (a French system of
geographical subdivision of regions.) The size of a diocese is equiva-
  lent to that of a département; there are 93 dioceses located in France
  and 9 in the overseas French territories. A diocese carries the name
  of the town where the main cathedral is located. The diocese is di-
  vided into sectors and parishes. The bishop manages the diocese and
  all its parishes. He defines the general activities of the diocese and
  provides the main guidelines for its general pastoral action and more
  specific pastoral activities.
Local level: parishes make up a diocese. One parish priest or reverend is in charge of one or several parishes. The activities of parish priests must therefore follow the global pastoral vision defined by the bishop. Religious congregations and lay associations are present at all levels.

These three levels (national, regional and local) work together in the same perspective. This organization allows more flexibility and versatility in the daily management of affairs.

The French Roman Catholic Church is known for its constant decrease in the number of active priests. This situation is of a permanent concern for church leaders at a national level as it is a threat to the French Roman Catholic model, based on hierarchy and strong presence at a local level. In 2002 there were 23,542 priests in France compared to 32,267 in 1990 and most of them are now elderly (Annuaire Statistique de l’Eglise, 2002). To compensate for this problem, the role of deacons (whose activities were previously unclear and thus unknown) has now been strengthened. Deacons can marry and have children as well as having a professional position within the church. They are nominated by the bishop and can also become ministers. They assist both priests and lay people in their work. They work primarily in three areas: Charity, Liturgy and the Word (reading and teaching the word of Christ). In 2003 there were 1,850 permanent deacons with a ministry in France, compared to only 571 in 1990. The number of ordinations of deacons is constantly growing: from 70 in 1990 to 97 in 2003 (Comité national du diaconat, 2004).

The situation is similar for sisters, nuns, brothers and monks. The total number of nuns has decreased from 52,507 in 1998 to 42,648 in 2004, including 4,911 nuns leading a contemplative life. There were 9,409 monks and brothers in 2004 compared to 10,652 in 1998 (Conférence des Supérieures majeures et Service des moniales, 2004).

Financial situation
In addition to the lack of priests, the Roman Catholic Church in France is confronted with financial challenges. Since the law of 1905, the RCC receives no money from the state or from the Vatican. Therefore, it was decided to make each hierarchical level financially independent. Diocesan accounts are managed and controlled by the Diocese Financial Council, which can be audited by state authorities. Parishes also have independent finances and there is solidarity between them. Associations, religious congregations, communities of monks and nuns and charity associations … are all recognized by the state but manage their own finances. Some receive subsidies from the diocese. Since 1996, donors can benefit from an income tax reduction up to 60% against their donation, if this does not exceed 10% of their
taxable income. The Church can also inherit property and funds under certain conditions.

These resources allow the payment of salaries to priests, as well as the employment of lay people (about 60% of expenses): the average salary for priests, bishops (they receive free housing) and employed lay people is approximately 1,000 euros per month. In 2003 there were 22,912 priests present in France compared to 32,267 in 1990 and most of them are now elderly (Annuaire Statistique de l’Église, 2003).

The Church’s resources are currently increasing. In 2004, the total funds of the French dioceses were estimated at 451,16 million euros (compared to 438,290,382 euros in 2002) (Conférence des évêques de France, 2006). Financial resources for each diocese originate from the following types of donations: 43% church offerings given to parish priests (previously called the denier du culte), 29.5% group donations, 14.4% individual donations, 12.8% church offerings.

In line with the principle of laïcité, there is no official cooperation in France between the RCC and public authorities. For many centuries, the RCC undertook social welfare work in France through its associations. Besides, the Church now has few financial means, a fact that restricts its capacity to implement actions. However, its social responsibility role is still present nowadays and more obvious in the associative sector. As a result, the Church is developing a number of partnerships with the following organizations:

- Church movements and services, such as Caritas (Secours Catholique France – French Catholic Aid), the Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement (CCFD-Catholic Committee Against Hunger and for Development), the Saint Vincent de Paul conferences, etc. These are lay, independent associations, movements or communities of local, national or international size and influence that are recognized by the Roman Catholic Church. They have their own objectives and pedagogical structures and develop a specific mission for the Church.
- Spaces within parishes, where lay people can listen and have dialogue and discussions with specific groups: alcoholics, single mothers and disabled people. These places allow such groups of people to get together and have discussions, but rarely produce any concrete actions.
- Non-Catholic associations whose missions are compatible with those of the Roman Catholic Church. This collaboration takes place mainly by exchanging information and organizing meetings (for example, for illegal immigrants with no official documents) in a public space.
Even though the social discourse of the Church of France is barely heard within the French society, the positions of certain Catholic figures can provoke strong enthusiasm. For example, the death of Abbé Pierre (1912-2007) took proportions of a national event. His struggle for homeless people, through the creation of the Emmaus communities, made him very popular to the point that for many years he was one of the personalities most admired by French people. However, the homage that was paid to him after his death emphasized particularly his human qualities without link to his faith by playing down the fact that he was Catholic. Therefore, French public opinion can publicly approve or even admire a Catholic figure but under the condition that his or her religious attachment is ‘erased’.

Welfare, religion and gender

The modernization of tradition was at the core of the state’s programme of action. The law on parity between men and women in French political life marked a turning point. On June 28th 1999, the French Parliament passed a constitutional reform that grants equal access to electoral mandates and elective functions to both women and men. The application of this law has been the topic of a great deal of research, which showed that France was far from achieving gender equality in politics. However, the concept of gender parity is seen as a tool to justify the presence of women in French politics. Gender is presented as a permanent anthropological factor in accordance with the universalism of citizens and not as a specificity. It is only after this issue entered the general public debate that the concept of gender was used in universities and also gradually in the media.

Questions on equality between men and women have never been so present in public discourse in France: both leftist and rightist milieux, employees and employers, say they are concerned with this issue. Gender equality in the workplace was the theme chosen for debate by Medef (an employers’ trade union) in 2003. Measures taken are recent and are the result of a real political motivation. But despite this willingness, we observe that when laws are not enforced they are rarely applied. To deal with these inequalities, political measures have been taken:

The Roudy law of 1983 requires companies to make an annual comparative report between men and women. A report on the application of this law, upon the request of the socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin in 1998, shows a lack of respect of these decisions. The Génisson law from 2001 (law 2001-397, May 9th 2001) reinforces social debate on equality in businesses. They are not asked to solve the problem of inequality, but at least to take it into account and to aim at getting closer to parity. The issue of gender equality in the workplace is from now on negotiated every year between employers and
trade unions. However, very few companies address this problem. This law is complemented by another one against discrimination (2001-1066, November 16th 2001). The employee must still bring evidence showing that he or she was subject to discrimination, but it is now the task of the employer to prove that a company’s decision was founded on objective, non-discriminating criteria.6

In February 2000, a convention was signed in order to ‘implement an overall policy of equal opportunities between girls and boys, men and women in the educational system’. It is a matter of ‘improving the academic and professional orientation of girls and boys’, ‘to promote an education based on the respect of the two genders’, and to ‘strengthen the tools for promoting the equality and training of actors’ (Convention interministérielle du 25 février ‘pour la promotion de l’égalité des chances entre les filles et garçons, les femmes et les hommes dans le système éducatif’, p.1-3).

Gender and welfare

For thirty years, from 1945 to 1975, welfare, viewed as the Etat-Providence and the quest for well-being, have contributed in structurally modifying French society. The domestic family structure changed completely: dwellings rose in terms of size and number. The democratization of access to household goods (washing machines, etc.) as a consequence of lower prices freed women from a certain number of domestic tasks. Additionally, the state took charge of young children (through the development of day care centres) and elderly people (through the development of old people’s homes), which were obligations that traditionally belonged to women. In this way the schedule of women’s housework became lighter, which allowed them to get involved in activities outside the home. During this period of economic growth the state offered these women jobs in the public sector, jobs that were close to their capabilities (in assisting others). This is how women, supported by the state, were able to access the labour market. Thus the number of women employed was doubled between 1945 and 1980. Ferrand (2004b) demonstrated that thanks to welfare, women have gained autonomy relative to their spouses and to the institution of marriage, while gaining protection against any possible risks (such as divorce, death, sickness, etc.). Not only do women benefit from welfare, but they work mainly in that sector, which enables them to reconcile their personal and professional life: 50% of women working in the social and medical sectors work less than 35 hours per week (compared to 12% in other sectors or in private companies) (Insee emplois 2004).

This dependence has made women more vulnerable in periods of economic crisis; they are more affected by budget restrictions and are progres-

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6 A free phone service is available since 2001.
sively excluded from the workplace, just like immigrants. Individualizing social rights is a recent concern in France. The social security system implemented after the Second World War was adapted to the traditional family model, where the male head of the family met the needs of his wife and children. As women did not work they had no social rights. Since the 1970s this model has been debated. Nowadays, social security is adapted to two types of families: the family with dependents and the single parent family based on the notion of isolation (Théry 1998).

Health insurance is related to professional activity (including unemployment) or to being part of a family/couple. The implementation of universal health insurance coverage now gives a minimum individual insurance to people living outside this framework. Pension is calculated according to the previous revenue of the person. Some adjusting factors are taken into account for women (maternity, etc.). When one of the spouses dies, the other receives a bereavement pension. As life expectancy is longer among women, they benefit from pensions.

A family allowance/child benefit is accorded to the person who acts as the permanent guardian of the child: a couple, a single parent or a legal guardian (other than a parent).

The objective of minimum social allowances for individuals is to fight against all forms of exclusion: the minimum insertion revenue (revenu minimum d’insertion/RMI) provides each person aged over 25 a minimum income; 52% of those receiving this type of allowance are women. Other financial assistance benefits include a specific solidarity allowance, an insertion allowance, a widow’s allowance and a disabled adult allowance. The single parent allowance is allocated at 98.9% of the cases to young women with a child under the age of three; it provides them with a minimum income.

There are as many men as women living below the poverty line, but among those over 75 years old, the proportion of women to men is four to one, since women live approximately seven years longer than men. Two-thirds of those benefiting from the old age minimum income are women.

The Parental Educational Allowance encourages young women, often with a poorly paid job, to leave the work place in order to look after their child. Set up in 1985, it provides an allowance to the parent in charge of the child so it is a form of unemployment benefit. This type of support to family responsibility often leads to discouraging people to work so specific measures have been implemented to help women looking for jobs. Thus, the National Plan of Action for Employment sets quantified objectives involving women: it helps them mainly through employment solidarity contracts and consolidated employment contracts. Women continue to benefit very little from measures in the overall job market. Only 28% of young women benefit

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7 Younger if there are dependent children.
from assistance contracts to poorly qualified young people in companies that were set up in the summer of 2002 (Insee emplois, 2004). According to Ferrand: ‘We can confront a ‘welfare state’ that favours giving autonomy to women within a ‘macho state’, which allows inequalities between genders to develop elsewhere’ (Ferrand 2004b, 320). This is why addressing gender-based employment discrimination is still at the heart of French government action.

Religion and gender

The RCC had a historic influence on the formation of gender roles for both women and men in French society. For a very long period religious and political power in France shared a common vision of women’s roles in society. Women are considered as naturally passive: they submit to their father and then to their husband and are totally devoted to domestic tasks. The family is the basic unit of society and the Church so women must play their part in each so that they can both run smoothly. ‘The central role of their religious life and their social being must be their status as wives and mothers’ (Maitre 2004, 200). After the French Revolution (1789), the political field became independent from religion, which however, did not involve any modification in the status of women. Male politicians monopolized the new power and kept women in their minority roles, whereas the Church pushed them towards a social activity, in the hope of reinforcing the power of Catholicism in French society. When the state decided to professionalize the education, health and welfare sectors, the Church refused to give this type of work to women, even though women entering these sectors were influenced – unconsciously – by Catholic values (Knibiehler 1980). Public education trained future wives and mothers, or ‘modelled them to be more likely to commit themselves to feminine professions where they serve others’ (Lagrave 2004, 590). Male politicians developed a family-based policy where the role of women is hardly different from that proposed by the Church, apart from sexuality. Since the middle of the 20th century – a period when the Roman Catholic religion lost its grip on French society – the Catholic Church has wanted women to gradually play different roles from those they hold in French society. But there are disagreements mainly on the question of sexuality. Catholic women have progressively distanced themselves from the Church and those who are observant churchgoers feel free not to follow papal orders on this issue. Thus, the Catholic conception of women, men and society has very strongly influenced French society. But at present, in a society undergoing many changes and with the emancipation of women, the hold of the Church has become weak.

The Church of France admits its message on women is out of date and doesn't reflect the work they do and the roles they play in French society. Some French bishops aim at strengthening this movement and giving it a
public voice, thus fighting against Catholic conservatism in these areas. The Social Commission of the Bishops of France firmly supported the law on the parity of men/women in politics, viewing it as a chance for democracy. Since January 2004, Marie-Caroline de Marliave is head of communication at the Bishops of France Conference. She has been selected to build a bridge between the institution and the outside world and to show that the Church plays an active role in the social debate. In France, women are still the primary caretakers for those in need: children and the elderly. This need for assistance will strongly increase in the years to come. Being aware that women are rarely paid for this type of service that they provide, the Church considers that solutions must be found in order to avoid women being monopolized and have them receive the recognition they deserve. In the same way, women with children should receive more assistance (child care). It is not about distributing allowances but about having an income, in other words considering maternity as an activity just like any other.

Thus, the Catholic Church of France adopts the Vatican point of view on the place of women in society while offering them concretely new responsibilities. But, as Liliane Voyé rightly wonders, does ‘this correspond to a real institutional opening or is it a solution due to the lack of priests? … Is it an answer to a void or a true wish?’ (Voyé 1996, 26).

An overview of the minority presence in the country

The demographic category of ‘immigrants’ was taken into account in French public statistics only after 1995. Many questions were raised over the usage of this term. Any person born abroad but living in France is now considered an ‘immigrant,’ regardless of his/her nationality. A ‘child of an immigrant’ is any person born in France to at least one immigrant parent, regardless of his/her nationality. These studies have revealed the real existence of ethnic discrimination, connected with the unwillingness of French society to integrate its minorities. The ‘ethnic’ notion is rarely used because it suggests social involvements relating for example to religion, ways of life, culture, etc. The French state prefers to use the term ‘race’, which is unclear, but prevents the government from being ‘involved in the official recognition of collective identity issues’ (Lorcerie 2003, 14).

The main immigration waves that came to France in the 1950s and 1970s included Muslim unqualified workers and also former colonial subjects. ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islam’ are the terms most often used to talk about North-African immigrants, which avoids any reference to ethnic origin, thus, considered to be above any suggestion of racism or post-colonialism. Islam has progressively become an inherent category used in a prejudiced way by a French identity that was redefining itself, particularly during the construction
of the European Union. Immigrants are also known as Muslims, which indicates their belonging to an affiliation group and not necessarily a religious practice (Davie 1996). In fact, even if expressing one’s religious difference in public is still a sensitive issue in France, religious identity is in fact preferable to an ethnic one. Thus, the expression of Muslim identity can also be a claim for the recognition of culture. This phenomenon also exists amongst other religions like Judaism: we hear more of a Jewish religion, but very seldom of a French Jewish identity.

Any French citizen benefits from the same rights, regardless of his/her ethnic or religious affiliation. In France, citizenship is connected to naturalization. There are four ways to obtain French nationality:

- through ‘blood right’ (all children born to at least one French parent are French);
- through ‘right of the land’ (anyone born on the French territory is French; when parents are foreigners, French nationality is obtained when the child turns 18);
- through naturalization (applicant must be over 18 years old, have lived legally in France for at least five years, and go through a personal interview);
- after two years of marriage to a French citizen.

Illegal immigrants do not benefit from the same political rights as French citizens, except European citizens who have the right to vote for particular elections; it is also impossible for them to become civil servants. However, illegal immigrants benefit from the same social rights. If they work, they are covered by the national health system (health insurance, parental leave, work accident insurance, pension benefits, etc.). If they do not work, they are granted the couverture maladie universelle (universal free health insurance) and a minimum pension benefit (559.50 euros for a single person). They can receive social housing and single women are also granted financial assistance. School is free and obligatory for all children. Illegal immigrants benefit from social welfare assistance, especially in the area of health.

The following figures were released after the latest French population census conducted in 1999 (Insee 2005). The number of immigrants has doubled between 1946 and 1975, but their percentage in the French population as a whole has remained stable. In 1999 they represented 7.4% of the whole population living in French metropolitan areas. The percentage of immigrants from Europe has decreased sharply from 78.7% of total immigration in 1962 to 44.9% in 1999. Over the same period, the percentage of immigrants from Africa has risen strongly from 14.9% to 39.3%. There are also more immigrants from Asia: in 1962 they represented 2.4% of total immigration against 12.8% in 1999.
Table 3:1:2 Country of origin of immigrants in 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Europe</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African countries</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian countries</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America and Oceania</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Two thirds of immigrants live today in large cities (more than 100,000 inhabitants). Most of them live in Ile-de-France (region around Paris): 35% against 15% of non-immigrants and in areas of Eastern and Southern France. Their apartments are generally smaller than those of non-immigrants (75 m² against 91 m²) even if the person-per-flat ratio is higher (2.9 against 2.3) (Insee 2005).

Brief historical overview

France has been a land of immigration since the 1880s. Until World War I, immigrants came mainly from neighbouring countries: Belgium, Italy, Spain, Germany and Switzerland. This provided France with workers for its manufacturing industry. After 1918, immigration increased, especially from Italy, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Apart from this economic immigration, foreigners settled in France also for political reasons. In 1886, 3% of the
population was foreign in France, reaching 6.58% in 1931 (Weil 2005, 14). Since 1945, only foreigners with a job contract can come to France.

Since the period of French decolonization, three major periods are distinguished, (Lorcerie 2003) each of them corresponding to different immigration motives.

**End of the 1950s –mid 1970s: unorganized and labour immigration**

France developed a cooperation policy with its former colonies, which attracted workers from mainly North Africa in an unorganized way. They were mostly illiterate and in rural and had low-qualified jobs, which prevented them from being socially privileged. After the end of the Algerian War of Independence, one million *pied-noirs* (Algerian-born French people) were brought back to France, as well as, 10,000 *harkis* (Algerian soldiers loyal to France).

In the name of solidarity and in an effort to offer ‘a traditional relief to former colonies’ France took more seriously than before the financial consequences of its colonial policy. Emergency welfare grants were allocated to immigrants, who were constantly and strongly watched over by police. The notion of integration was not really used at that time; public services mainly talked about ‘welcoming’ immigrants.

**From 1974 to 1997: family reunification, asylum seekers and political crisis**

In 1974 France did not authorize any new immigration of workers but allowed family reunification (*regroupement familial*). Immigrant workers were able to stay, as well as, to bring their family in France. This caused an unexpected and unwanted phenomenon: the births of French citizens to immigrant families (because of the naturalization ‘right of the land’). The young people born in immigrant families are discriminated as a minority, since although they have been born in France they are still called ‘immigrants’. The integration of ‘immigrants’ has become a major political issue. The *Front National* (extreme right-wing party) receives more and more votes, especially because of its anti-immigration stance.

French politicians were divided. On the one hand, the law obliged France to support family reunification, to limit the rush of immigrants to the French borders and to guarantee citizenship to children born in France. On the other hand, social attitudes seemed to not accept immigrants and their children born in France as part of the whole of the population, viewing the issue in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Among the whole French political class in 1984 the ‘rule of the game’ concerning immigration was that immigrants who lived in France legally were asked to integrate themselves by making a concerted effort. Those who were living in France illegally had to leave. The creation of a single residence and work permit recognized the long-term stay of immigrants and separated the right of residency from the requirement of em-
ployment. Following these measures, the High Council for Integration was created in 1989.

**1998: France begins to acknowledge discrimination**

Due to the economic crisis, France decided to limit the access of non-European workers to employment, which caused a rise in illegal and clandestine immigration. Immigration for family reunification increased by four times than work immigration. There was now a two-fold political stake: integration and illegal immigration.

When it comes to immigration, the French government admits that immigrants suffer from discrimination, which makes their integration problematic thus causing anger. Such an acknowledgement is the result of the action and work of associations taking into account new statistical surveys. Meanwhile, the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 includes in the priorities of the European Union ‘the fight against discrimination’. Facing various pressures, in 1998 the French government put the struggle ‘against [racial or ethnic] discrimination’ at the heart of its integration policy.

This is an acknowledgment that there is a problem in the French political conception of ‘living together’. Immigrants and their children should no longer be considered as ‘foreigners’ but as true members of French society. This change has led to a new understanding of the relationships between France and its former colonies. For the first time, the Algerian War of Independence was acknowledged as such and legal and historical research on this issue has been encouraged since 1999.

As far as illegal immigration is concerned, regular police controls and sending back people to their original country are now very frequent. The presence of Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the French extreme right-wing party, in the presidential election of 2002 shows that immigration remains a core issue in French society. In September 2005 and until June 2006 an experimental measure was put in place for the voluntary return of foreigners having an irregular status. It was implemented and tested only in certain areas, under the authority of the local prefect, and provided material and financial aid. The results of this measure have not yet been published.

A new bill proposed by the French Ministry of the Interior in 2006 advocates a strong tightening of immigration policy. French Christian churches are firmly opposed to this project, in the name of respect to humankind.

**Current issues**

Before the Second World War, employers had to provide immigrant workers with housing. This law has now been abolished without having being replaced by any other type of public policy on this issue. In the late 1950s housing was built for single Algerian workers. Since there were very few
beds, workers had to live in unhygienic buildings in urban centres, before they were evicted by real estate developers. This forced them to settle in ‘ghettos’ around cities: there were 19 shantytowns in 1966 (Weil 2005, 51). The state has now built low-income/social housing in an effort to close down these unhygienic buildings. The aim of these premises, located near cities, is to enable immigrants to get used to the mainstream way of life. Instead of grouping people according to the same ethnic origin, quotas were put into practice. The idea was to assign and rent social housing to immigrants. In the 1980s, the middle-class started moving out from these suburbs in order to buy their own house elsewhere. They were replaced by very poor and/or immigrant families. This trend of class division (distinction and exclusion) has spread to the whole of society: upper classes stay away from middle-classes that avoid popular neighbourhoods, thus, separating themselves in immigrant and non-immigrant populations. France suffers from an urban segregation problem with an increasing concentration of ‘wealthy ghettos’. However, ‘the rate of urban exclusion of immigrants has not risen in 20 years’ (Maurin 2004, 18).

In November 2005, there were youth riots in many French disadvantaged neighbourhoods. On October 27 2005, in Clichy-Sous-Bois three young men entered an EDF electric power plant and one of them was electrocuted. The reason they fled into this power plant is not known but for the young people who lived in this neighbourhood there is a clear explanation: they were fleeing the police that was after them for no reason. The Ministry of the Interior has provided an explanation related to delinquency. What followed this incident was an uprising in the area of Clichy before more suburbs followed all over France. This is the first time that France witnessed uprisings of such extent. In fact, 280 communities reported such incidents and up to 11,500 policemen were mobilized each day during the peak of the crisis. On November 8, a state of emergency and cease-fire was declared on the whole of French territory. There were no deaths during these incidents. However, the material damage was heavy: according to the Ministry of the Interior 10,000 cars and 30,000 disposal containers were burnt. Hundreds of public buildings (especially schools, sports centres, city halls and police stations) were damaged and burnt. About 140 buses, as well as, police and fire-brigade vehicles and ambulances were completely destroyed. Approximately twenty places of worship (churches, synagogues and mosques) were damaged. In total, the police arrested 5,200 people.

For over 20 years, immigration has been a core issue in French politics. Right-wing parties wish to set up stronger limits and controls, whereas left wing parties are split between humanitarian ideas and a call for social consciousness by their activists. In the 1990s, a specific idea prevailed in French media, regardless of political influence: the self-proclaimed ‘Republican’

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8 This measure had been used only once before since 1955.
discourse. Initiated by right-wing parties, it was progressively adopted by the left wing. Even if the two versions are different, they do share some common ideas. They all refer to a ‘French model’, a ‘Republican French tradition’ that is viewed as a universal and equitable model as opposed to English or American communitarianism. According to this view, immigrants are more prone to assimilate and integrate themselves, especially Muslims. By the end of the 1990s, a new trend emerged: the self-proclaimed ‘nationalist and Republican’ discourse. The idea is that French society is multicultural and has to adapt and behave as such. France should not acknowledge its minority cultures as such, but rather give them a proper place in French history, in order to facilitate the acceptance of the current pluralism of French society (Lorcerie 2003).

On 24 July 2006 a proposal for a law concerning a ‘selective immigration’ policy was voted. Only qualified immigrants and students would be accepted from now on. Restrictions would limit the conditions for family reunification (regroupement familial). This would betray the French tradition of welcoming immigrants that are in trouble in their native country. For almost a year, another debate has divided French politics, even within the French government: positive discrimination policy (quotas) for immigrants. It is a proposal by the Ministry of the Interior inspired by affirmative action in the USA. It is about putting into place preferential quotas in various professional categories (for example, setting a minimum number of black lawyers or teachers from the Maghreb and so on.)

Religious minority-majority relations

Religious minority groups: the role of the state

The French Council of State determines what worship is supposed to involve (the French term culte, meaning worship, is preferred to religion; it also determines the legal status of culte to a religious denomination, which can create a cultural association or a congregation and thus obtain both legitimacy and tax benefits (see the law of 1905). Thus, Buddhism was able to receive official acknowledgement from the French authorities faster than Islam, even though the Buddhist population is smaller and more recent (1970s) than the Muslim communities in France.

Religions have to organize themselves and select an officially recognized authority to represent them and help negotiate with the state. Once they are authorized, religious denominations can set up an association of religious worship. Religious organizations in France include the following: the Catholic Church, the French Protestant Federation, the Representative Council of Jewish institutions in France, the Orthodox Inter-Episcopal Committee in
France, the French Buddhist Union, and the French Council for the Muslim denomination. Following an initiative of the Interior Ministry, the French Muslim Council was set up in 2003 so that the Muslim community in France can have its own representatives and delegates to engage in dialogue with the state. Apart from these organizations, there are some minority religions that are not included because usually only large religious denominations tend to negotiate with the government. Religious representatives are also members of the National Ethics Committee or the National Advisory Commission for Human Rights, which are regularly consulted by the French government. Religious groups that are not acknowledged by the state are organized in non-cultural associations. In 1996, an interdepartmental observatory of sects was created and a law was passed in 2001 in order to ‘strengthen the prevention and repression of sectarian movements’. French authorities try to control ‘high-risk’ groups through tax audits and administrative controls.

Relations between religious minority-majority groups

Catholicism has been historically rooted in France longer than any other denominations; this is why the relations seem to be unequal, especially concerning places of worship. Officials representing religious denominations in France (recognized by the state) have regular relations with each other. Official relations have been established between the Episcopal Conference and the established religions in France. There is a Council for Christian Unity and Jewish-Christian relations, which is supported by the actions of national Catholic services, such as the Secretary for Christian Unity, for Jewish-Christian and Islamic-Christian relations. These three services work at a national and local level. Bishops also meet at the Pastoral Council of Sects and New Beliefs in order to discuss new forms of faith.

Religious minority groups can offer charity through social-oriented associations that can sometimes be financially supported by the state. It is not an institutionalized system but rather networks of local initiatives. Charities related to the Catholic Church, Islam, and the Protestant and Jewish communities provide welfare services to the whole population. These are social religious associations (Muslim, Catholic, etc.) that exist not only for their own community. For example, Catholic associations offer assistance to non-Catholics and so on. It is only religious services that are addressed specifically to their own religious communities. Because of its low financial resources, the majority Church is not able to lead relevant and concrete actions in the social sector. Its role is visible through Catholic associations such as Caritas (voluntary, etc.). On the other hand, the Catholic point of view on society issues (i.e. immigration or housing), that is widespread through institutions or charismatic figures, is considered important in public debates, even though it is not always considered as legitimate. The French model, based on universalism and against communitarianism, and the fact that Islam
has not been organized as a community both indicate an integration process where religion stays in the private sphere. Therefore, Muslim communities do not have their own welfare-providing networks.

Facing the current French economic crisis, established religions in France have suggested reconsidering the methods of income distribution that seem to penalize the disadvantaged classes in order to give everyone the opportunity of having a decent job. The aim is to consider finance and economics as a means to support the general well-being of citizens. In this area, relations between religious minority groups exist at the local level, for example in the care for migrant populations: arranging occasional meetings that include local associations, representatives of state agencies, etc. Sometimes religious denominations come together to protest against a state decision.

They support the consolidation of counter-powers within society, in order to fight against any law that is considered as humanly unfair. Religious denominations were opposed to the adoption of the PACS (pacte civil de solidarité), which allows civil unions between same-sex partners. They also protested, against the 2001 law on sects, which increases legal sanctions against movements defined as sectarian, viewing it as potentially dangerous. Same applies to the centenary of the law of 1905: religious denominations fear that religious freedom is being slowly reduced in France and that certain groups, such as Catholic religious congregations can also be labelled as suspicious. Lately, they also fight against the policy of ‘selective immigration’, advocating for the regularization of illegal migrants (sans-papiers), whose children are registered in a French school. These actions are regular and depend on current affairs, especially religious and ethnic issues. Otherwise, representatives of religious denominations are members in public national commissions (such as the Ethics Commission), which are frequently consulted by the state for matters, such as bioethics (for example the question of embryos that are not used during in-vitro fertilizations).

Currently most issues concerning women and religious minorities relate to Islam. The main issue has to do with a potential conflict between Muslim culture and the Western conception of women (Guénif Soulamas and Macé 2004; Debray 2004). The recent debates over young Muslim girls wearing their headscarf or hijab in secondary schools and lycées are indicative examples. These debates led to the law of March 15, 2004 prohibiting all pupils and adults from wearing ostentatious religious symbols or clothing in all state schools. In 2004, there were 639 violations of the law, leading to 47 student expulsions. By autumn 2005 the number of violations had dropped to only 12 cases. This interpretation of laïcité aims to strengthen integration and grant equality to all citizens.
Places of worship

In accordance to the law of 1905, Christianity and Judaism can use places of worship built before 1906. Buildings constructed up until 1905 are the property of the state or the locality, which maintains them. Each religious denomination is responsible for the payment of all operating costs. Since Islam was not widespread in France by 1905, it did not benefit from any place of worship. Any buildings constructed after 1905 are the responsibility of each religious denomination and are financed by its members. Mayors are responsible for issuing building permits. Muslims can be prevented from building mosques, depending on the mayor and town or city. However, French authorities try to reach a balance between religious denominations through interest free loans granted by local governments to any religious denominations. A municipal lot can be sold for one symbolic euro to build a place of worship. Generally speaking, these constructions are criticized by secular associations. In the meantime, the French population supports the renovation of old churches that is now considered more as part of France’s historical heritage than a simple religious symbol.

In 1905, the Roman Catholic Church owned 36,668 places of worship in France (cathedrals, churches, etc.) There are still 36,000 left today. Protestants: 1,100 places of worship in 1905, 2,300 in 2005. Jews: 60 synagogues in 1905, 430 in 2005. Muslims: 0 in 1905, 1700 mosques and prayer rooms in 2005.

The restrictive immigration policy by the French state concerns indirectly Muslims living in France. Islam has a more recent presence in France and is directly linked to immigration, especially from North Africa after the Second World War. The current debate is about whether the assimilation of Islam in France is possible; it is an issue of compatibility of values. Activist Muslim movements around the world are worrying many French people who fear the development of an ‘unmanaged’ Islam. French authorities are currently trying to control the speeches of imams. France has also been strongly involved in the creation of a training institute for ‘French’ imams, in order to limit the influence from foreign preachers (as Islam does not have any ‘certified’ clergy), who are considered too conservative. However, very few people decide to become an imam (only 30 per year). As a result, another policy has been approved: introducing foreign preachers to the French culture and language (but one third of them do not speak French).

Another debated issue is foreign financial support to mosques, mostly from Saudi Arabia. Given that French authorities do not finance any religion, Islam does not benefit from existing places of worship and Islamic believers have generally low incomes; therefore, foreign financial support is essential. However, foreign supporters often have the right to control the content of what is preached in mosques. To face this problem, France created in April
2005 a state foundation that will control financial support to Islam in France. Obviously these issues have created a very tense atmosphere in France.

Conclusions
This presentation explained why it has been difficult to find research on the relationship between welfare, religion, minorities and gender in France. French democratic values are founded on the notion of equality of rights for all citizens. To be a French citizen is to be part of the Nation, without any notion of individual specificity in terms of ethnic or gender characteristics. Belonging to a church, as well as ethnic or linguistic differences, etc. are considered part of one’s private life thus not part of public life. The same difficulties are to be found in the debates on equality between men and women. The recognition of social inequalities related to gender has been both a long and recent process in France.

It is only recently and progressively and under the pressure of social activist movements that social inequalities are now being taken into account and addressed. The implementation of the welfare state (*Etat-providence*) had the objective of bringing welfare to the neediest in order for everyone to have equal access to opportunities and, thus, be able to become a citizen with full rights. The present challenge, as indicated by the recent urban riots, is to acknowledge that in France there are also inequalities related to ethnic and cultural minorities.

The WaVE program will thus fill these gaps and help better understand the French situation in relation to the other European nations.

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Corinne Valasik

Abstract

This report presents the findings of the WAVE case study carried out in Evreux, a medium sized town in northern France, not too far from the Paris metropolitan area. Evreux illustrates both the changes and challenges affecting a town that has been marked by increased levels of immigration. As a case study, Evreux also represents some of the key challenges in the coexistence of the majority with minorities as a result of the increased presence of immigrants. The research focuses on the interactions between the Catholic majority population and the Protestant and Muslim minorities in the town. The research entails extensive fieldwork including participant observation, semi-structured interviews and analysis of a range of relevant documents, including official publications and the local press. Some of the most prevalent issues raised in this report relate to the challenges of integration, including cultural differences (in terms of language, values, lifestyles and communication), negative and mixed attitudes towards immigration and Islam, disillusionment with the social work and action of associations but also with state policies (including immigration laws), and discrimination. Values relating to family, parenting, gender roles, education, solidarity and different forms of belonging and affiliation (ethnic, religious, etc.) also come into play.

Presentation of the town

Introduction

Evreux is the capital town of the department of Eure, located in Haute Normandie (Upper Normandy) in northern France, approximately 100 kilometres northwest of Paris. With a population of 54,076, the town offers a good quality of life while remaining in close proximity to the key decision making centres in and around Paris. The layout of the town offers plenty of green spaces, including 550 hectares of woods, 70 hectares of leisure spaces (parks, golf course and a race track). The river Iton flows through the town centre and the local economy has developed along its banks. The Roman Catholic Cathedral of Notre-Dame d’Evreux, dating from 1076, is located in the town centre and is listed as a national monument in France.

The town is laid out according to three main areas: the town centre is located in a valley between two separate plateaux. To the north lies Saint-
Michel (a residential area) and to the south is the Madeleine-Nétreville area. More than half (54%) of the housing in Evreux is the social housing in Madeleine-Nétreville, where most of the immigrant populations live. Most of the housing in these areas is old and in sub-standard condition and due for refurbishment which has resulted in a severe shortage of homes. Most social and welfare problems in Evreux are to be found in these areas.

Evreux offered a number of advantages that helped attract national and international companies in the ’60s. As a result, one of the key features of Evreux is its dense industrial area. There are 2,300 companies located in Evreux employing approximately 32,719 people. However, Evreux has been greatly affected by the on-going financial crisis and since 1990 the economic slowdown in the whole of France has had a noticeable impact on the town. Manufacturing, which represents 21% of jobs in Evreux, has been the most severely affected area (-21%). At the same time, the third sector has grown significantly (+20%) and counselling, social assistance, healthcare and administration now represent 58% of jobs. The manufacturing of intermediate goods remains important despite a 10% job loss in sectors, such as, electrical appliances and electronics; chemicals, metals and pharmaceuticals. Finally, administration accounts for 16% of jobs.

The majority and minority presence in Evreux

Ethnic minorities

‘Immigrants’, as a separate demographic group, were taken into account in French official statistics only after 1995 and after many questions and objections over the definition and use of this term. Regardless of nationality, any person born abroad but living in France is now considered an ‘immigrant’. A ‘child of an immigrant’ is defined as any person born in France to at least one immigrant parent regardless of nationality (Lorcerie 2003, 14). Although many immigrants living in France have obtained French citizenship they are still considered immigrants. Any person without French citizenship living in France is considered a ‘foreigner’. Most of the foreigners residing in France tend to have the same geographical origin as immigrant populations living in the country. This is also the case in Evreux, where both foreigners and immigrants are concentrated in Madeleine.

The number of foreigners living in Upper Normandy represents 2.7% of the population in this area, while immigrants represent 3.7% of the population. I. Approximately 50% of the immigrant population in Evreux originates from Africa, including 30% from North Africa (Maghreb), particularly Morocco. While only 25% of immigrants originate from Europe most come from Portugal. The Turkish population in Evreux is currently decreasing.

Most of the immigrant populations came to France in the ‘70s in order to find work. The men who came to find work in France were progressively
joined by their families that have now settled in France. As a result, the im-
migrant population in Evreux is not only ageing but also becoming increas-
ingly female with the arrival of women and children.

**Table 3.2.1 Place of birth according to nationality in Evreux (in absolute figures):**

**Nationality : French - by birthplace**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Place of birth</th>
<th>In EU</th>
<th>Outside EU</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
<td>67</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td></td>
<td>76</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>143</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>978</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nationality : French - acquired**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Place of birth</th>
<th>In EU</th>
<th>Outside EU</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td></td>
<td>124</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>197</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nationality : Foreign**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Place of birth</th>
<th>In EU</th>
<th>Outside EU</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
<td>152</td>
<td>1,384</td>
<td>1,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td></td>
<td>132</td>
<td>1,141</td>
<td>1,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>284</td>
<td>2,525</td>
<td>2,809</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nationality: Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Place of birth</th>
<th>In EU</th>
<th>Outside EU</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>2,175</td>
<td>2,467</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>1,968</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>4,143</td>
<td>4,767</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Recensement de la population 1999 - Exploitation principale et complémentaire - Copyright INSEE

Religious minorities

Because there are no official statistics on religious affiliation in France it is not possible to know the exact size of the religious minority groups living in the country. The reality that France is now a multi-religious country has not been taken into account or analysed by scientific studies. This is partly due to the tradition of laïcité: the principle of religious neutrality applying to all affairs of the state and the school system in France. The absence of any statistical data on the religious affiliation of the population can also be attributed to the general belief that France has now become a secular society.

The only data on religious affiliation that is available has been obtained through polls (for example, the 2003 CSA survey) but no information is available specifically for Evreux. This means that, the only data available on Evreux is the information collected during the research and interviews conducted for this case study report. The majority faith in Evreux is Catholicism, probably representing 60% of the local population, which is analogous to the national average in France. Protestantism is also present in the town, mainly through the Reformed Church of France (Église Réformée de France) and the Evangelical movement, both of which represent about 2% of the population in France. There are also Muslims (6%), Jews (1%), Jehovah’s witnesses and some Buddhists.
The local welfare system

Public service provision and organization

In the ‘80s the French state implemented a policy of decentralization of action areas (*compétences*)\(^1\) in order to strengthen democracy at a regional and local level and make local authorities more dynamic. The highest degree of decentralization has been implemented in the social welfare sector. However, there is still a great deal of overlapping of social services between the different levels (local, regional and national). Setting up social partnerships in France has, therefore become a complex process.

Social services offered at regional and departmental levels include the following:
- Social cohesion: fighting social exclusion
- Assistance to the elderly and disabled
- Professionalization of the social service sector
- Social protection
- Child welfare
- *Revenu Minimum d’Insertion* (RMI): minimum income allowance (the minimum income of an unemployed person)
- Medical care

Social services offered at a local level

Social welfare in Evreux has been centralized since 1986 under the authority of the CCAS (*Conseil Communal d’Action Sociale* – Communal Council for Social Action). Although legally independent, the CCAS is supported financially by the town hall and managed by a board of administration including elected representatives who are appointed by the mayor and representatives of associations. The CCAS is in charge of analysing social welfare problems, managing childcare institutions, kindergartens and retirement homes, as well as, responding to requests for social assistance. Two other important projects have been planned and are in the process of implementation: a health centre combining in one building a broad range of health services (administration, social assistance and medical care), and a social grocery store.

The role of voluntary associations

Social welfare initiatives in Evreux originate mainly from the voluntary sector and a broad based community network. As demonstrated by Laville and Sainsaulieu (1997), this sector is very active in France although, paradoxically it is rarely studied. The law of July 1st, 1901 stipulates the freedom to form a non-profit association but only organizations offering a public service

\(^1\) *A compétence* is a field of aptitude defined by law, covering a range of social action areas which are overseen by a particular authority that is in charge of policy setting and implementation.
(regardless whether they are associated with a religious denomination) can be recognized by the state and receive state funding. These associations are subject to regular financial and legal audits by the state.

After the Second World War, France became a welfare state trying to combine economic development and social protection. Certain associations that were recognized for offering a public service became organizations that started working in cooperation with state institutions. However, the laws of 1982 on decentralization brought an end to state support of these associations. With the persistent economic crisis since the beginning of the ‘80s, the French state has been faced with an increase in demands for unemployment benefits, pensions and social housing, while having fewer resources to be able to offer these services. As a result and because many associations are dependent on state funds, their future survival is now at risk. The WREP research project (2003-2006) indicated that given the bleak economic situation, a considerable number of welfare and social problems are now being addressed by the voluntary sector and a community network of both faith-based and secular associations.

The role of the majority church

The law of 1905 by the French Republic contributed in artificially separating what was once part of religious practise from other, more ‘social’, aspects of religion (Liogier 2006). Therefore, religion in France is not considered a factor in social welfare, which helps explain why there is so little research on this issue. For many centuries, the Catholic Church undertook social welfare work in France through its associations. However, in line with the principle of laïcité, there is no official cooperation in France between the Catholic Church and state authorities. Furthermore, the Church now has very limited financial resources, something which restricts even more its capacity to implement social action programmes. The Church’s social responsibility role is still present nowadays but it is more visible in the voluntary sector. Therefore, the Church has developed a number of partnerships with several faith-based and secular voluntary organizations.

The role of minority associations

A similar situation can be observed in the case of minority associations, which have a limited presence in Evreux. These consist mainly of meeting places offering the opportunity to their members to speak the same language and talk about their respective homelands. For this reason, the associations selected for this case study are broadly defined as associations that deal with various minority groups.

Given the low number of Protestants in Evreux there are very few social action initiatives organized by Protestant communities. The Assalam Centre in the town is an Islamic centre offering education, training and social assis-
tance. For example, volunteers work as mediators in conflict situations and offer support to newly released prisoners; they also offer help to people who have difficulties filling out government administrative forms. The Centre also offers aid locally to underprivileged people, as well as international humanitarian assistance to African countries, including Algeria (for example, sending crates of 18 tons in 2006). Although the services of the Centre are intended to both Muslims and non-Muslims, in practice Muslims are the main beneficiaries of social assistance.

Context and timeframe

A note on the social uprisings in 2005

In November 2005 a series of youth riots erupted in several disadvantaged areas around France. It seems that the trigger for these events was a specific incident that took place on 27 October 2005 in Clichy-Sous-Bois: three young men entered an EDF electric power plant and one of them was electrocuted. It is not known why the youths fled to the power plant but according to the young people who lived in this neighbourhood there was a clear explanation: they were fleeing the police that was after them for no obvious reason. The Ministry of the Interior provided its own explanation of this incident: delinquency. What followed after this incident was a series of uprisings in the area of Clichy and all over France.

This is the first time that France witnessed uprisings of such magnitude. Up to 280 communities reported such incidents and 11,500 policemen were mobilized each day during the peak of the crisis. On November 8, 2005 a state of emergency and cease-fire were declared on the whole of France, the first time since 1955. Although there were no deaths during these incidents, there was extensive material damage. According to the Ministry of the Interior, 10,000 cars and 30,000 waste disposal containers were destroyed from the fire. Hundreds of public buildings (especially schools, sports centres, city halls and police stations) were damaged and burned. About 140 buses, as well as, police and fire-brigade vehicles and ambulances were completely destroyed. Approximately 20 places of worship (churches, synagogues and mosques) were also damaged. The police arrested a total of 5,200 people.

The urban violence that broke out in France in 2005 also took place in the Madeleine area of Evreux, where the most serious incidents in the Eure region occurred. The material damage was extensive: approximately 30 cars, three shops, a police station and many telephone booths were burned and destroyed by the protesters. The fighting that broke out between the police and about 100 young people (armed with baseball bats, pétanque balls, stones and metal bars) damaged a school and a town hall building and sev-
eral people were wounded (Paris-Normandie, Nov. 7th, 2005). The curfew that was imposed on Madeleine was the strictest in the whole of France. The young people that were involved in these incidents were primarily French citizens of second or third generation immigrant families.

The French Presidential elections and minority issues

The issue of discrimination was a key feature of the French presidential elections in 2002 or 2007. Minorities in France remain an inconspicuous issue due to the principle of universalism and its determining role in French political thinking. According to Rosanvallon (2004), French society is based on citizenship as a legal and abstract notion, enabling equality between different individuals. Citizenship is viewed as universal, thus transcending all specificities. According to French political culture, a citizen is an individual free from any particular affiliations (ethnic, racial, religious, etc.). This is the only accepted way for citizens to create a universal and equitable nation. All forms of particularism or communitarianism based on religious, ethnic or local affiliations are mistrusted because they are viewed as challenging the universal character of French citizenship. For this reason, regional, ethnic, religious, gender, characteristics are to be confined to private life. As a result, intermediary structures, such as unions and associations, are often viewed with suspicion because they are considered disruptive to the existing bonds between citizens and the nation. Taking into account or claiming a particular characteristic is viewed as a communitarianist tendency that questions the principles of democracy and universal citizenship.

In this context, it is not surprising that until the end of the 20th century, neither the press, nor politicians, explicitly acknowledged the existence of religious or ethnic minorities in France, with the exception of associations against racism. In 2001 a new law was passed according to which victims of discrimination no longer need to show evidence of the discrimination they had suffered. This development was a significant change: prior to the new legislation victims had to prove the discrimination they had suffered because they were suspected of using discrimination as a convenient excuse for the problems affecting their lives. This change in legislation has greatly simplified and increased discrimination court cases in France. In 2004 the creation of the HALDE (Haute Autorité de Lutte Contre les Discriminations et pour l’Egalité - High Authority for the Fight against Discrimination and for Equality) expanded the notion of discrimination, based on a range of factors, such as race, gender, disability, etc. As a result, numerous studies at the request of the government have revealed the existence of discrimination in France, mainly towards young people of North African/Maghrebi origin.

Given the above-mentioned developments, the mere mention of discrimination in public has increased awareness of the presence of minorities living
in France to the point of considering minorities primarily as victims and no longer only as a potential threat. During the urban youth uprisings in 2005 the President of the French Republic, Jacques Chirac, insisted that these incidents were the result of discrimination. Since the election of Nicolas Sarkozy in May 2007, fighting against discrimination has become a national priority and is now at the core of French political debate.

This opening of public debate on issues of discrimination has greatly facilitated this study since the recent political discussions on these questions have greatly facilitated this study. Interview respondents discussed minority issues more freely, something that was previously considered a taboo subject.

Two new mayors in Evreux

In 2001 Jean-Louis Debré, a political figure of national importance and a member of the conservative UMP party became mayor of Evreux. In 2002 he was elected President of the National Assembly and in 2007 named by the President as President of the Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional Council). He was, therefore replaced by a new mayor, M. Nicolas (UMP). However, during the municipal elections of March 2008, Michel Champredon, a member of the Socialist Party (PS) was elected as the new mayor of Evreux.

Methods and sources

Methods

Research and fieldwork carried out during the course of this study included the gathering of qualitative data, namely interviews and participant observation, as well as research and analysis of various documents (statistics, official government reports, etc.) and the local print media.

Participant observation of selected groups consisted of informal and non-recorded conversations with local shopkeepers and people in cafes in Madeleine. This method offered the opportunity to better understand the general atmosphere in the town.

A total of 24 semi-structured interviews were conducted, each one lasting between 45 minutes and 2 hours. These interviews took place in private homes or places of work and were recorded and transcribed. When interviews are cited throughout the text, a number indicates the interview number, followed by an indication of the interviewee’s gender (F or M).

Some data was collected through official publications by the Regional Council and County, the Health and Social Action Ministry, the DDAS (County Direction of Health and Social Affairs), the DRASS (Les Directions
Régionales des Affaires Sanitaires et Sociales - Regional Direction of Health and Social Affairs) and the municipality of Evreux. The CCAS (Conseil Communal d’Action Sociale – Communal Council for Social Action) provided extensive data on the current welfare needs in Evreux; this material also provided some interesting insights on how the ethnic and gender dimensions were taken into consideration.

Information on the role of the Catholic Church in Evreux was collected through the Pastorale des Migrants (Migrant Pastoral), a service of the Diocese of Evreux offering social work to the local foreign populations. In addition to its social work, the Pastorale plays increasingly a mediating role in the Madeleine area. Some of the staff of the Pastorale had been already interviewed for the WREP project and were, therefore eager to speak more freely on the current situation of minorities in Evreux.

Finally, local newspapers, including Paris-Normandie (Evreux edition), La Dépêche d'Evreux, le Courrier de l'Eure, Eure-Info, were also examined and proved to be very useful sources for understanding the local situation before conducting the actual survey.

Targeted minority groups in Evreux

The fieldwork was focused on the following three minority groups:

*The Muslim community in Madeleine*

The research was targeted mainly on the Assalam Centre, a very dynamic and active organization, involved in different types of social work that also deals with issues of culture and religion. Focusing on this organization provided an excellent opportunity to meet and interview Muslims of all age groups and from different backgrounds. Looking at the work of this organization was also useful in helping determine whether a Muslim minority organization in Evreux is in the making. Interviews with members of the Jeunes Musulmans de France (JMF - Young Muslims of France) were also carried out in order to obtain a different image of Islam, other than the one promoted by the Assalam Centre.

*The Protestant community*

Rather than observing the limited social work of the Reformed Church of France, it was preferable to carry out interviews with specific Protestant figures, particularly with the pastor of the Church. Although this is a religious minority that has been present in France for centuries, the small number of Protestants in Evreux means that members of this community end up being mere bystanders or observers of the religious conflicts opposing Catholics, who are still in the majority, and Muslims, representing the second largest faith in France.
Although Catholic and Protestant associations were easily identifiable, Muslim organizations tend to keep a low profile since most of them are not listed in the local directory of associations. Furthermore, there is often a great deal of confusion between the cultural role of prayer halls and the social role of Islamic centres. Although one of the goals of the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* (CFCM – French Council of the Muslim Faith) at a national level is to register all organized Muslim activities in France, in reality the organization has a very limited data. It was only after walking around Madeleine and talking with the locals on a ‘word of mouth’ basis that Muslim associations were progressively identified for the study.

*Ethnic minorities with no particular religious affiliation*

Since there are a few ethnic minority associations in Evreux, the associations working in Madeleine that were originally identified for the WREP project were used once again for this case study. Revisiting the work of these ethnic minority associations offered an advantage because it provided the opportunity to better understand the long-term evolution of the organizations across time, especially in terms of social welfare work. In addition, some associations aiming to encourage different communities to communicate with each other were also included in the study, thus providing a better understanding of the complexities of using the term ‘minority’ in France.

**Findings**

**Examples of cooperation and/or cohesion between and within groups**

The idea of cooperation and cohesion is very noticeable in the interviews. However, all interview respondents struggle to actually be more specific on what these terms mean.

Cooperation, we are for it … but … it is difficult to put in place, it’s complicated. (1, M)

In order to cooperate, it is necessary to have a clear goal. For the moment it is important to note that this is not the case. It is simpler to cooperate with the other when he/she is far away, in another country. But to do it here, in the city, then, that changes everything. (6, M)

And again:

What is needed is work. This is the work of the state. While waiting for this, what do you want us to do? That we cooperate for what? We are not going
spend our time discussing the ideal world…. It has to be concrete, here and now!! (9, M)

**Cooperation between religious groups**

The examples of cooperation that were observed were mainly between different religious actors. The *Pastorale des Migrants* has established strong relationships with some Muslim residents in Madeleine. The Catholic priest, assisted by a deacon and a few volunteers, try to make the local immigrant population feel welcome. Their objectives are primarily to promote inter-faith dialogue through meetings and exchanges between Muslims and non-Muslims in Madeleine. The *Pastorale* also tries to make local Catholic communities more aware of the populations in Evreux that are foreign or French but of foreign origin. Special emphasis is given on administrative issues but also on more general concerns relevant to immigrants, refugees and people with no identity papers, such as racism, integration, language, etc. The organization also tries to accommodate Catholic communities coming from overseas (Africa and India), for example by conducting services in a language other than French.

There is a real dialogue between the two communities. Meetings give Catholics and Muslim residents an opportunity to talk about daily life, even though religion is rarely mentioned or discussed. The main objective is to make people aware of the rights and duties of each person, while also trying to form a social network. Some Muslim respondents mentioned that they were pleased to meet the Catholic priest in town and that they greeted each other, thus suggesting form of recognition that could contribute in changing their image of the Catholic Church. New immigrants in Evreux seemed pleased to have the opportunity to go to places where they are made to feel welcome. However, relations with state administrative authorities remain difficult since immigrants struggle to take the right steps or follow the correct procedures, especially when they find themselves outside their immediate neighbourhood.

**The environment and nature**

Ecology and the respect for nature and the environment is a common theme that both Catholic and Protestant respondents seem to refer to when trying to cultivate public awareness. This is the result of a more global awareness of protecting the environment, but it also seems to have a local specificity. Evreux is surrounded by villages where agriculture is still important. The agricultural roots of Evreux’s rural life can be observed in a number of ways: the on-going fight against European quotas that limit agricultural production and research into other types of agriculture (debates on GMOs, organic agriculture and farming, etc.). The residents of Evreux are, therefore directly concerned by environmental issues. However, it seems that the Muslim residents living in Evreux, who mainly immigrated in the ‘70s to work in indus-
try, do not have a particular interest in these local matters; instead they seem to be more concerned with issues that are closer to their own countries, such as the problem of water in the Middle East.

**Homosexuality**

Both Catholic and Muslim respondents initially refused to discuss their opinions on homosexuality. After some prompting they recognized the need to respect homosexuals and give them support as part of a general understanding of their choice. However, respondents do not really accept homosexuals and they are still viewed as deviants who need help.

It is interesting to note that Protestant respondents seem to have a different point of view. They think that female homosexuality should also be discussed. They also believe that homosexuality may be a sin but everyone is prone to commit a sin, so homosexuality should not be judged more severely than any other sin. The Protestant pastor even mentioned that he would consider marrying homosexual couples.

**Cooperation between ethnic groups**

Other examples of cooperation can also be found between associations that create opportunities for people (especially women) of various ethnic origins to talk to each other, for example during workshops or literacy classes. During these exchanges people share advice on bringing up children or express their views on various issues, such as TV programmes and politics. Women of non-French origin are often involved in other activities, such as sewing and cooking:

> It allows women to go out a bit from their place. Because, well, staying all day with an unemployed husband who watches television and with children that want more pocket money is not easy. There, at least, they laugh, they talk about stuff… It’s nice, it’s friendly. And then one learns a lot of things. One discovers oneself. (14, F)

During these encounters women gradually start talking about the problems they face; they also seek advice from the association volunteers on learning how to read and write, and ask for support on how to help their children with school and guidance on vital issues, such as alcoholism, financial difficulties, etc.

This type of community work is about developing relationships between individuals and creating a social network among people who live in the same neighbourhood. The activities offered have a long-term focus and seem to have positive outcomes with no real differences between faith-based and secular associations. Faith-based associations welcome everyone and do not organize prayer sessions or a religious service. This allows them to collaborate more easily with secular associations.
Although this extensive community work seems to work well among adults, especially women, the situation is different for young people. They are not interested in participating in the various community activities or attending the meetings and multicultural or inter-faith events organized by the associations. Young people do not seem to share a feeling of community involvement with the associations, but they do not have a hostile attitude towards such initiatives.

**Additional examples of cooperation**

Another example of cooperation, transcending religion and ethnic or religious affiliation, relates to illegal immigration and politics. Some associations, but also individual people, shocked by the way police handled arrests of illegal immigrants, want to help protect their families. For example, they collect children after school and find a place for them to live. These activities are well known in the neighbourhood and seem to have a calming effect on some of the conflicts going on in Madeleine.

More generally speaking, all respondents view and present themselves as guardians of freedom against political extremes. To this effect they encourage citizens to vote and get involved in social causes. During the presidential elections, religious representatives of the three main faith groups (Catholicism, Protestantism and Islam) condemned policies that constitute a threat to individual freedom and supported policies offering support to everyone. Although no one from the three faith groups took a stand in favour of any candidate, they all condemned the extremism of the far right, which did very well in the French presidential elections of 2002. Finally, they also expressed their support to the separation between religion and politics.

**Examples of tensions/problem points between and within groups**

**‘Good’ and ‘bad’ immigrants**

The most significant conflict that was observed between groups relates to the opposition of negative and positive views of immigrants (‘good’ and ‘bad’ immigrants). Since the 2005 youth uprisings and the subsequent immigration control policies that have been implemented, it is assumed that the violence was instigated by young French people of foreign origin who seem to reject the French integration model. This view emerged during the interviews with persons who were in charge of associations and the CCAS. According to the head of the CCAS, there is a significant difference in people’s behaviour according to their ethnic origin. Men and women of Spanish or Portuguese origin are not a problem: they know how the welfare system works and are not aggressive; they are respectful of other people, they wait their turn, listen to advice and come back with the necessary documents.
Men and women from the Maghreb are also apparently respectful but problems arise when women wear a headscarf. The person heading the CCAS, a woman, views the wearing of the headscarf as a symptom of male domination. She, therefore sometimes tries to get veiled women to talk about their family life in order to find out if all is well at home. Some of the women seem to get upset and react strongly to these questions, which they see as irrelevant. A tense situation apparently arose when a veiled woman came with her husband who spoke for her so it was difficult to hear the woman’s own point of view.

Young people from the Maghreb (North Africa) and of African origin are viewed as disrespectful. They want the process to move quickly without having to present the documents needed to prove what they are claiming. When asked to present the required documents they get angry, saying that they act in good faith and accusing the CCAS staff of being racist. They also say that France exploited their parents and that they will not allow this to happen to them. Most often other people who are present try to appease the situation by explaining to them why the documents are necessary. Although this generally helps appease the tense situation, it shows that there is great deal of tension between this segment of the population and the administrative staff.

Finally, a different situation seems to arise with recently arrived African migrant women: they do not speak French well and go to the offices carrying young children. Anticipating potential conflicts, the CCAS representative says that she adopts a different attitude according to the ethnic background of the people that she has to deal with. This type of behaviour is apparently common among other heads of associations. These examples illustrate the tensions between the majority (represented in this case by the CCAS) and the minorities, and type of image that the former have of the latter. It is worth noting that religion, in this case Islam, becomes an issue only in cases of veiled women. Apart from these instances, cultural differences constitute the main problems and sources of conflict, thus indicating the difficulties that some people have in adapting to French culture.

**Tensions in the voluntary sector**

A new French policy of contracting is currently underway. It consists of financially subsidizing only associations that achieve results on concrete and practical projects. This political re-orientation of contracting has caused numerous conflicts in the associative sector since some organizations have refused any form of assessment or evaluation by the state. The association heads that were interviewed seem to question the criteria used by the state to determine whether to grant them financial support. According to some association representatives, by granting more power to local authorities, the laws on decentralization have indirectly created a new type of clientelism because only associations corresponding to the model proposed by the municipality
receive funds, while other projects differing from this standard are barely considered. Locally elected council members partly confirmed this situation and indicated that they usually refuse to take the risk of supporting a programme whose impact they cannot measure. Therefore, as association heads often mentioned, there is a decrease in the funding of faith-based associations or organizations that do not work in the Madeleine area of Evreux. Sewing and cooking workshops for women may, therefore be suspended, whereas community associations bringing together people of similar origins continue to receive subsidies because their work is expected to be able to promote social peace within the community.

The issue of space
The residents of Evreux often hesitate going to Madeleine without a special reason. This means, for example, that in the local Judo Club there are only children from the neighbourhood. A few years ago children came from all many parts of Evreux but now parents prefer children to change sport rather than go to Madeleine. Similarly, Madeleine residents do not often go to the centre of Evreux because they often feel stared upon when they do so. Two veiled women said that they no longer visit the furniture stores in the centre of Evreux because they felt uncomfortable after a shop-keeper apparently asked them why they were there since they could not afford to buy any furniture. They interpreted this question as a racist remark and have not been back, although they miss going out to this part of town. Young people from Madeleine also mentioned that they had the same feeling when they go to the centre of Evreux: they feel watched by the locals as though they are going to steal or vandalize the shops. This applies to most places, except for the municipal library, where the atmosphere is less tense, and the cinema complex, which is isolated from the town centre and surrounded by parking lots. Surveillance cameras placed inside the buses going to and from Madeleine amplify this feeling of exclusion since people from Madeleine feel they are considered guilty no matter what they do.

In addition to the sense of division between areas and neighbourhoods, there is also a division within Madeleine itself. Some adolescents seem to have taken over some of the public areas, where they spend time from the middle of the afternoon until late at night. They talk about passers-by, play music very loudly and become aggressive if adults ask them to be quiet. The youngest children (8-10 year olds) spend time in a parking lot where they ride their bicycles and play football, which makes car-owners anxious because they often find their cars scratched. The mothers or older brothers, but rarely the fathers, end up going to these areas to collect get their children. In such cases, spending extended periods of time or taking over a place seems to act as an identity marker for these young children who are mainly boys.
The ‘grey areas’ in between

A crisis of confidence

Associations aiming to improve the integration of minorities were founded on the basis of condemning discrimination against immigrants. The figure of the foreigner was, therefore central in their mission. Nevertheless, they faced a variety of problems and situations some of which help explain the limited success of these organizations. These associations, founded on the basis of an integrationist project, were influenced by the institutional framework of state integration policies. In order to be able to obtain financial support and operate, many associations committed themselves to actions that did not actually correspond to their founding mission: they focused on the ethnic dimension without really defining what it means. The same situation applies to Islamic associations, which did not actually properly define their mission.

According the association heads that were interviewed, these organizations were initially able to have an impact on some North African immigrants who found themselves excluded from the usual places of the French integration process. These immigrant groups were given the opportunity to take a glimpse at the possibility of constructing a unique French identity. During participant observations, it was noted that associations brought together older persons, at least 50 years old, who met in order to speak Arabic, share cooked dishes, etc. They therefore recreated a place to socialize in a way that was similar to what they were used to in their country of origin.

Since the 1990s and after the emergence of the violent youth uprisings that were involved in the riots in many urban centres throughout France, the state asked associations to set as their main goal helping to build social peace. Even Muslim heads of associations were enlisted in this endeavour. However, both secular and religious leaders failed in their mission: they were unable to fulfil their role because they did not have a clear and long-term mission and lacked the necessary social influence over the local population. Furthermore, the persistence of the economic crisis, which affected more severely this segment of the local population, encouraged social withdrawal from initiatives that were linked to the notion of citizenship, since such activities seemed quite removed from other more pressing preoccupations. The associations therefore ended up progressively focusing on more short-term actions, such as literacy and cultural events, without developing a vision of integration for the long-term and without proposing any solutions to the on-going financial difficulties of the groups they intended to support.

There were two subsequent developments. The first relates to association heads who came from an immigration background. They had a leadership role which allowed them to obtain a job that was socially valuable and become representatives of state authorities. Having benefitted from a certain level of integration and social promotion, one could say that they constituted
a transitional form of elite that some call the ‘bourgeoisie’ (Wihtol of Wenden and Leveau 2007). However, in response to institutional demands, they progressively cut themselves off from the expectations of the members of their associations. The association heads seemed to spend less and less time in the neighbourhood and were, thus not very present in daily life. However, it is important to note that female association heads dealing most often with issues and problems that are more specific to women, managed to remain closer to the population. This means that they were able to break away from their original traditional milieu, where women are not typically expected to be involved in public life outside of the home.

The second development concerns the low impact that these associations have had on French immigrant youth. The key challenge here is that policy makers do not seem to pay attention to issues that relate to immigrant youth. What differentiates these young people is that, although they are French citizens, not foreigners, they know very little about the country of origin of their parents, but at the same time they also do not feel totally French. A key issue is to encourage the involvement of people who can relate to these issues and listen to the problems that young immigrants face in order to communicate their needs to the relevant types of people and organizations that can do something about it. Some of the young people that were interviewed think that the association heads ‘sold out’, that they let their personal interest of social promotion supersede any concern for the common good. Therefore, there seems to be a crisis of confidence among immigrant youth.

It is also important to distinguish between ethnic associations and faith-based associations. The former have had a rather short-lived experience in France. The latter, Muslim associations for example, benefit from better organizational expertise because they are part of an international network of associations addressing social issues. Furthermore, the term ‘Muslim’ is simpler to use and more easily defined than ‘immigrant’ or any other term referring to an ethnic affiliation.

*Financial considerations*

Lack of financial resources is a recurrent problem that affects both the individuals and organizations that were included in this case study. At a personal level, this situation creates tensions within the family and results in a differentiated division of roles within the couple. When women take a job to replace or to add to the salary of the spouse, they also start contributing and having a say in the finances of the household. However, being in this position makes them feel torn between their duties as mothers, spouses and workers. In fact, they have to find a compromise between their own traditional values, according to which the woman must take care of things in the

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2 The term ‘beurgoisie’ is a play on words. The term ‘beur’ in French refers to second-generation North Africans living in France.
private domain (the home), and the values of French society that promote the financial empowerment of women. The use of money is, therefore mentioned frequently as a source of tension in the couple. Choosing between sending money to the family in the country of origin, saving some money for retirement (without knowing if they will retire in France or in the country of origin), helping children in their schooling (for example, paying for private classes to improve their school results) or even buying things for the house or the family, such as a new television or a car, are only some of the usual points of tension.

Language proficiency

Lack of language proficiency in French is usually an obstacle but it is necessary to make some distinctions. New immigrants, notably women, tend to have problems expressing themselves in French. They need to turn to associations that can put them in touch with people who speak their language that can help them understand the labyrinth of the French administrative system.

Another group is people who can speak well but have difficulties writing. They are often at a disadvantage when entering the job market as skilled workers; they also need the support of associations to follow different administrative procedures. Social organizations tend to encourage them to follow literacy classes in exchange for services. However, the persons offering these classes are most often volunteers with limited professional skills in this field and the groups tend to be very heterogeneous which complicates the process of learning. Mothers indicated that they have difficulties and often feel behind in comparison to their children so they have trouble helping them read, checking their homework, and writing to their teachers. Some have developed basic coping strategies: if they see many red marks on the homework sheets of their children, then they know that the grade is not good so they ask from them to work harder.

Finally, another group includes people that have been fluent in French for a long time. They most often have pursued extensive studies and have worked in various higher-level jobs in their country of origin (as professors, doctors, nurses…). The main difficulty they face is to have their diplomas and experience abroad recognized in France. This takes a certain amount of time and while waiting for this process they resort to working in low level jobs compared to their abilities and level of expertise.

Different conceptions of time

When women start working they usually need to have access to child-care, which entails more expenses. For example, women who work as housekeepers begin their work early in the morning and must, either find a place to leave their children (but there are very few such places in Evreux), or leave them with the eldest siblings or with close family members or neighbours. Furthermore, they must juggle multiple tasks in order to have sufficient time
for work, children and the family. This means that they have very little time for themselves and for any personal endeavours. Older siblings are, therefore often asked to take care of the younger children. Regardless whether older siblings take the time to oversee homework or help younger siblings get ready, the type of supervision they are able to provide is inadequate. Time is, therefore a particular challenge for families and it gets even more complicated when work schedules between spouses shift or clash, if the husband works at night or when the woman does not have a traditional or regular work schedule.

Time is also linked with the future and with making plans. For example, a long-term plan to return to the country of origin can often make the sometimes difficult situation of living in France more bearable. However, the idea of a return to the country of origin tends to destabilize young people who are torn between two types of commitments and are forced to find a compromise between their daily reality and their parents’ plans. Young people who have difficulties in school or work can waver between these two types of plans and, thus have to find a coping mechanism. They have to come up with and develop a particular concept of time, often focusing more on the present and the short-term. Some parents end up staying in France in order to remain close to their children, so they make frequent trips between France and their country of origin. This makes it particularly difficult when they have to announce to family members in the country of origin that they have decided to stay in France permanently.

Faith-based or secular associations seem to have different conceptions of time: some associations adapt to the requests of young people and state authorities opting for more short-term results, while others set projects that are focused more on the long-term, helping a person become an actor of social change. The latter type of associations, aiming to support their members for the long-term, receives less financial assistance by state authorities so they have to resort to funds originating from other sources, usually religious.

\textit{Dress codes}

Muslim women often have to choose whether to wear the Islamic headscarf. If they decide to do so, there is a shop in Madeleine where they can buy headscarves. However, girls are not allowed to cover their head with a headscarf inside state schools. Some cover their hair with scarves that they decorate with hair-pins or other accessories in order to neutralize the religious affiliation of their headscarf. They can, therefore wear the headscarf in public areas. Adult women wear different types of headscarves, ranging from one that resembles the Iranian \textit{burkha} to a light veil that can easily be blown away to the slightest wind. During the interviews female respondents explained that their reasoning for wearing or not wearing the headscarf is based on both family and social factors. Some girls want to wear the headscarf

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even though their mothers may not or may even be opposed to it. During participant observations in Madeleine, it was noted (this would have to be verified through a more in-depth study) that young men in the neighbourhood tend to speak to veiled girls differently compared to unveiled girls: they made fun more easily of unveiled girls, which some viewed as ‘not being serious’ girls. They also indicated that they understood why someone would not wear a headscarf: because they are French.

Intersections between gender, welfare and minorities

A crisis of male identity is evident mainly among unemployed working class men. These men are still driven by a patriarchal model according to which the idea of the man as the bread-winner in the family is still dominant. This means that unemployed men are not only confronted with unemployment, but also with the realization that their skills are no longer of any value or needed. Therefore, they find themselves in a situation of inactivity that makes their male identity even more fragile. In contrast to women, they do not get involved in family activities and on the contrary tend to withdraw socially:

Men, we can see it clearly, they are ashamed to be unemployed. So they don’t go out anymore. Their friends were their colleagues, they are working, they’re busy or else they are unemployed like them and they avoid seeing each other. The women tell me about it, their men stay in front of the TV and that’s all. They don’t help them as much as they used to. (16, F)

Given this situation, social workers are unsure about what solutions they can offer because they are faced with a problem that is beyond their competence or control.

This problem is more prevalent among young working class men: with no diploma or qualifications they are unable to find work and still subscribe to a traditional male role model. Feeling disconnected from the world of work, they become overpowering towards women and intimidating to those who do not act in the same way, thus trying to assert their masculinity in the neighbourhood. Community associations try to provide places where these men can feel welcome and comfortable in such spaces. Young girls and women are rarely present.

It seems that people who work in associations have different attitudes depending on their own gender identity. In fact, this brief analysis has revealed that women are more frequently viewed as victims, while men, especially young men, are considered responsible for their own situation. It would be interesting to examine if belonging to a faith changes these views and representations.
Finally, the notion of gender cannot be fully understood unless relationships between men and women and the interactions between masculine and feminine identities are studied further. Without over-estimating the role of immigrant women in the workplace, the increased presence of immigrant women in posts where they have a greater degree of responsibility suggests a small opening in the usually fixed symbolic representations of men and women.

Analysis: emergent values

Values relating to family, education, employment, health and social care

Family and parenting
Recent government policies have focused on the family. Above all, they attempt to discourage family reunification in France by imposing strict checks of marriages between French and non-French persons (especially persons without official identity papers). Furthermore, family benefits are often suspended if children have a record of multiple convictions. Therefore, a progressive distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ parents is being made in French society. The latter are considered responsible for the illegal activities of their children and are subsequently penalized through specific social policy measures. These parents are required to follow parent education classes, which are offered by social workers in associations that have a social mission.

A few remarks have to be made at this point. The first concerns immigrant families that are in precarious financial situations and severe distress. They think that both the school and social workers are suspicious of them not being good parents even though they try to pass on the value of respect that was transmitted by their own parents. They also feel that they have to compete with French society and they frequently accuse the media in transmitting the illusion of easy success, centred on individualism. One of the difficulties of the parents is asking their children to work hard in school when they themselves have financially failed.

The second remark relates to the division of roles between men and women. For certain families, the gap between the traditional role models from the Maghreb and the more progressive French role models seems insurmountable. As a result, some families often end up adopting a view that is fixated on a rigid and extreme role model.

A final remark concerns the idea of respect towards the elders. This is an issue that relates to the idea of parental authority. Parents want their children
to show respect, especially towards the elderly and/or vulnerable people. As parents become more vulnerable they consider charity and solidarity as even more critical values. They also refer to the idea of pride and seem to prefer receiving assistance from close family members than from social institutions. Immigrants consider that they are more ‘French than the French’ when it comes to the observance of the value of equality and fraternity: they financially take care of their family that has remained in the country of origin, therefore feeling very attached to the principle of solidarity. They find that native-born French people no longer have real respect towards their elders and have become too individualistic. In this respect, they say that they feel closer to the values of Islam, and even Catholicism. This is probably why they emphasize the social support offered by the faith-based associations to people in need.

**Education and employment**

Paid employment is considered an outlet against the social and economic marginalization of immigrants because it can offer security and solidarity. However, difficulties in finding work and the risk of unstable employment can become sources of social marginalization putting individuals in precarious situations.

Immigrating to France primarily for financial reasons, parents assign a great deal of importance to the value of work, even if they themselves are currently unemployed or in a precarious situation. The centrality of work in the words of association heads is evident since they view work as the best way to integrate into French society.

Young people also value the idea of work but for them it has a different meaning. Some view the work of their parents as an anti-model: for example, when a father still works at an age when he should retire while also suffering from severe physical pain due to his job. Mothers, who often stay at home, also embody an anti-model to the eyes of their daughters wishing to become emancipated.

Work can also mean selling illegal substances, thus offering the opportunity to make a substantial amount of money very quickly. For some young people, the wish for material wealth and success makes them want to have a big car and brand name clothes or to help their parents. In this respect, drug dealers represent a real alternative model since the possibility of going to prison is viewed as an experience that can reinforce the integrity of men. Association heads feel quite powerless dealing with this problem and so children have started drug dealing. In fact, since children cannot be arrested by the police, they are often sent to deal drugs under the supervision of adult drug dealers. They are, thus selected and trained before they are even 10 years old to earn money from drug dealing.
Health and social care

According to association heads, the question of health and eating habits, as well as the relation between money and food consumption is critical. An increase in the prices of fruits and vegetables in France is now a significant social issue because it amplifies inequalities among households since the more disadvantaged households have to resort to food products that are not fresh (cereals, bread, crisps and other pre-packaged foods).

Eating habits can tell a lot about someone’s value of health, dignity and respect. The opportunity and ability to stay healthy seems a privilege for some people. Immigrant workers often suffer from illnesses or work accidents and their life expectancy is among the lowest in France. This is more relevant to men who often work in physically strenuous jobs since manual labour is often associated with physical pain, sometimes with irreversible consequences. At the same time, work is essential for financial autonomy, self-respect and respect by others, but it has a health and a social cost. When one is afraid of losing his/her job it becomes more and more difficult to stop work due to illness.

The human body and good health are key values when trying to integrate into society. However, the definition of ‘good health’ varies according to situations. Former manual workers who do not suffer too much from back pain see this as a sign of good health and typically refuse to follow any treatment of physical therapy, either for financial reasons (since this type of treatment is not always covered by the social security system), or because of fatalism (that this is part of life). Therefore, there is no tradition or habit of taking care of oneself, of one’s body. This partly explains why the free services offered by hairdressers, beauticians and make-up artists in associations have not been successful. One of the objectives of social workers is to enable people to take care of themselves, to value themselves and to take pleasure in doing so. Yet this approach to social care can be directly opposed to the ways some people take care of their bodies. Association representatives believe that these types of questions have to be considered more seriously.

Values related to religion, minorities and gender

Ethnic vs. religious belonging

The powerful links between immigrants and Islam are evident throughout this study. The most significant waves of immigrants that arrived in France in the 1950s and 1970s included unskilled Muslim workers who came from former colonies. North-African immigrants are most commonly qualified in France as ‘Muslims’, thus avoiding the question of ethnic origin, race and racism, and post-colonialism. However, Islam has progressively become a category that is being used with a certain degree of prejudice in the context of a changing French identity that has been redefining itself. Immigrants are
usually referred to as ‘Muslims’, which indicates their belonging to a group affiliation and not necessarily a religious practice (Davie 1996). Although expressing one’s religious affiliation in public is still a sensitive issue in France, religious identity is in fact more acceptable than an ethnic one. Therefore, the expression of Muslim identity can also be interpreted as an attempt to claim a distinct ethnicity. This trend is evident among other religious groups, including Judaism: Jewish religious identity is used more commonly than an ethnic Jewish identity. This intermingling between religion and ethnicity can also be observed in Evreux, where there are more religious minority associations, than ethnic minority associations.

The notion of territory should also be noted. From an urban planning perspective, immigrants in France have been clustered together in specific neighbourhoods, as is the case in the Madeleine area of Evreux. Therefore, there is a certain connection between Muslims, immigrants and other residents in Madeleine. Most of these groups are financially disadvantaged, so the following equation has developed: Muslim immigrants = living in Madeleine = underprivileged. These interrelated issues (Islam, immigration, the Madeleine area and deprivation) seem to carry a range of challenges which became evident during the fieldwork for this case study: the persons that were interviewed are simultaneously affected by all four of these factors and dimensions, regardless, whether they come from a minority or majority group. Immigrants to France consider themselves, either in the minority in terms of their ethnic origin, or in the majority, since they are French citizens relative to more recent immigrants. In the same way, some Muslims consider themselves in the majority since they are very visible in Madeleine, but at the same time they remain a minority in Evreux.

**The individual as a whole person**

Catholic, Protestant and Muslim respondents view the individual as a whole being whose multiple personality facets should be supported. They refuse to consider a person only according to his/her status: unemployed, disabled, etc. Therefore, they believe that welfare services should address the multiple aspects of a person’s life. The primary goals most frequently mentioned in the interviews are well-being, self-confidence, long-term objectives and recreating the social fabric. Only by achieving these goals will people be able to fully participate in society.

Having a job is not considered as a universal solution to all of a person’s problems. Solidarity and religious belonging also play an important role. Therefore, many respondents are critical towards the project of the President of the Republic to ‘work more to earn more’ because they think that there is more to life than work. They also believe that religion can help making the importance of money more relative because earning a lot of money should not be a goal in itself, especially for young people.
Catholic, Protestant and Muslim respondents believe that the state tends to sometimes intervene in religious matters, which is contrary to the principle of *laïcité*. The most usual example cited is of the banning of the wearing of the headscarf in state schools and fighting against religious sects. They are also disappointed that they are not viewed as legitimate representatives by the various political authorities and regret that their in-depth knowledge of the local population is not taken into account. Therefore, they argue that if the municipality had listened to them and action had been taken in advance, the social uprisings in November 2005 in Evreux could have been prevented or limited. The Catholic Church in France has frequently voiced its disagreement with the government’s position against immigration. The Protestant Federation of France and representatives of Islam in France have also followed suit. In Evreux, the Catholic priest and Protestant pastor confirmed this view. The director of the Assalam Centre also protested against anti-immigration laws but this has apparently not been covered very much in the local media.

Interview respondents seem to have assimilated the principle of *laïcité*, even if they cannot offer a definition of the concept. They believe that religious institutions must not intervene in the public sphere because if they express an opinion publicly it enters the public arena, thus, making them political players. However, respondents also say that they would willingly listen to members of Catholic, Muslim, Protestant associations talk about their experiences, both as actors and observers of social issues.

Representatives of all three religions regret the lack of adequate spaces and structures that can help address young people’s needs. They believe that this problem is partly the cause for the climate of tension among young people, who form violent gangs, and the older members of the population, that are afraid of violence. In response to this situation, all religious representatives have set up meeting places for young people in the aim of providing young people with an opportunity to have informal exchanges and trying to promote the values of tolerance, respect. Another objective is to help young people set specific goals for themselves, such as find training courses, get involved in humanitarian causes, address drug problems, etc. Finally, they try to bring together young people and students from Madeleine and the centre of Evreux.

A key question behind these initiatives is the issue of transmission: what should be transmitted to young people? Which experiences can they relate to? For Muslim youth there is an additional issue that has to be considered and addressed in the right way: their ethnic origin.
To conclude, several key issues have emerged throughout the course of this case study. These have been formulated as questions that can hopefully be addressed by subsequent research work in this domain. Given the failed integration state policies, is it up to local associations to offer and implement social initiatives that could help improve integration? Is there a risk of conflicting projects in similar places addressing the same types of people? According to which criteria can the idea of integration be defined, explained and transmitted to young people? Given that integration is one of the foundations of French society, how can the tension between the local and the universal be reconciled? Is it possible to develop a common minimum standard of integration that is accepted by everyone or should integration be turned into a broader national project? Are associations equipped with the necessary financial means undertake such initiatives and can they benefit from a take these steps and can they have a certain level of autonomy in order to help in the development of an alternative civic model in France?

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4:1 OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL SITUATION

Adriano Cancellieri, Valentina Longo

Introduction

Italian society is facing new and old challenges with regard to important social and demographical changes: an aging population (19.2% of people over 65, compared to 16.5% of the EU 25 average in 2004, Eurostat) connected to increasing life expectancy (in 2003 female life expectancy in Italy was 82.5 years, compared to 81.2 in EU; male life expectancy was 76.8 years, compared to 75.1 in the EU), a decrease in birth-rates (resulting in a reduction in the average size of the family and a growing shortage of daughters and daughters-in-law as caregivers), a growing presence of foreign citizens, an increased presence of women in the labour market (often in precarious positions), an increased marital instability and de-institutionalization of the family (new family-forms, including single mothers) and limited male involvement in family care-work. Moreover the precariousness of the Italian labour market has increased risks, especially for the younger generations. Generally speaking, the employment rate in Italy is significantly lower (57.6% in 2005, Eurostat) than the EU average (63.8%, EU 25). Female employment (45.3% in 2005), even if it is increasing, is still far from the EU 25 average (56.3%). The unemployment rate in Italy was 7.7% in 2005 compared to the 8.7% in the EU 25; on the other hand, female unemployment rate was 10.1%, while in the EU 25 it was 9.8% (Eurostat).

The Italian welfare system seems unable to face these challenges since it is based on the family as the first agent of welfare provision. The family model implies a rigid gender division, with the husband being the main

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1 Adriano Cancellieri wrote the sections on religious composition in the country, characteristics of the majority church and the overview of the minority presence, while Valentina Longo wrote the sections on characteristics of the national welfare system, welfare, religion and gender, and religious minority-majority relations. The introduction and conclusions are the result of a collective work. The authors would like to extend their thanks to Chantal Saint Blancat and Annalisa Frisina for sharing their knowledge and support.
breadwinner and the wife providing all the care-work. The strong Catholic tradition has historically legitimized and supported this family model.

The Catholic Church has not only had an inspirational role in shaping many social policies in Italy, but it has also always had an active part in the implementation of social services. This is expressed by the principle of subsidiarity, which gives a central role to intermediate bodies in the implementation of social policies and considers state intervention only as a last resort.

The Italian field of study on the role of religious agents in the national welfare system is not particularly well developed. To be precise, there is ample literature, which stresses the important role of Catholic organizations in the welfare system, but this role is often taken for granted and not viewed in a critical perspective. This type of work, moreover, is practically exclusively produced by organizations directly or indirectly related to Catholicism. The most important studies on religion and welfare are developed by Caritas and by the ISMU (Initiatives and Studies on Multi-Ethnicity) foundation. The former is an organization dependent on the dioceses, the latter is an organization related to Milan’s Catholic university. Another important work is that by Sarpellon (2002), which stresses the Church-related non-profit organizations’ capability of working in all social sectors. One of the first and most recent research projects exploring the social and welfare-related role of the religious agent in Italy is the WREP project (Welfare and Religion in a European Perspective).

Over the last few years, the role of the Church in the Italian welfare state has grown progressively stronger (Ascoli and Pasquinelli 1993) due to two concomitant factors: on the one hand, the growing importance of intermediate bodies in the implementation of social policies, and, on the other hand, cuts in fund-transfers from the centralized state to local bodies. Local territorial organizations of the Catholic Church, with their historically solid and widespread structures, do not in fact suffer as much from this situation, since the financial autonomy of the Church is more developed than that of less structured lay associations or cooperatives. Catholic organizations are core agents in the implementation of social services towards immigrants. At the same time, we can find many informal or organized networks of mutual assistance among foreign citizens; nevertheless, this field of study is not very well developed. In this respect, the WaVE project can highlight some features of these networks providing welfare services.

In recent years, research has been mainly focused on the regional or local context of the main immigrant groups that have settled in Italy. Moreover, many research projects are conducted by local NGO’s and only circulate informally. This leads to difficulties in providing an exhaustive overview of existing research.

Generally speaking, research focuses on some main aspects: statistical data on the presence of immigrants on the national territory, insertion in the
labour market, ‘integration’ process in the host society and push-pull factors in migration decisions. Melchionda (2003) has produced one of the most detailed studies available on Albanians, the second largest immigrant group in Italy. The joint work by Farina, Cologna, Lanzani and Breveglieri (1997) makes particular reference to the Chinese community. An important work on migration from Morocco and Senegal has been written by Barile, Dal Lago, Marchetti, and Galeazzo (1994). The volume by Schmidt di Friedberg (1994) remains an essential work on the Senegalese community in Italy. Other important works on migration in Italy are the volumes Foreigners in Italy (Stranieri in Italia 2002; 2003; 2005; 2006) promoted by the authoritative research institute Istituto Cattaneo which analyse different aspects of the migrant presence in our country.

Studies on the values regulating relationships between minorities, religion and welfare, usually deal with themes related to the concept of identity and culture. However, they pay no particular attention to the so-called ‘embodied values’, i.e. the practices of everyday life giving form and substance to values. These practices will be the object of our field study.

Even when social policies are discussed in terms of integration, the focus is still on identity (De Vita, Berti and Nasi 2004). The ‘culturalist’ paradigm overshadows certain traits and highlights others. In our field study we intend to investigate values as the set of material and symbolic practices that constitute the basis of embodied values.

There is no relevant research on gender equality related to religion, nor any study on the interconnection between religion, welfare and minorities.

The WaVE project can highlight the intertwining of different factors, such as gender, minorities and religions in the construction of social policies, as a new kind of citizenship. The welfare system can be the mirror of how a society thinks of itself, particularly when practices are taken into consideration.

Characteristics of the national welfare system

The Italian welfare regime is commonly described as a conservative/corporatist or social/capitalist system (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; Sainsbury 1999) and is categorized as belonging to the Mediterranean typology (Ferrera 1998). Welfare in Italy has mixed traits: it is universalistic in terms of healthcare and education, but it becomes occupational as a social insurance system. Participation in the labour market becomes therefore of paramount importance for the entitlement to services and the allocation of funds. It must be stressed that general services are not provided directly, but take instead the form of an allocation of monetary resources (note how the expenditures for old-age pensions in Italy are higher than in other European countries with more advanced welfare systems) and these resources are usually intended more for families than for individuals.
Historically, the birth and development of the Italian welfare system rests upon a rigid gender division of work within the family: paid work, with the social rights it entails, for men and unpaid care-work, with related social rights, for women. The characteristics of the current Italian welfare system can be traced back to the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th (Ascoli 1999). By the end of the 19th century, the state introduced the mandatory insurance for industrial workers: it was the beginning of the particularistic and paternalistic welfare, in which the services and allowances are based on the work status of the citizen. After the Second World War some attempts were made to build a universal welfare system: the school reform in 1962, when attendance became compulsory for all residents up to 14 years old and the establishment of the National Health Service in 1978. Despite the cited measures, the welfare remained highly differentiated according to various geographic regions throughout Italy and dependent on private organizations (third sector organizations, such as non-profit NGOs). The welfare system has been historically based on the male breadwinner model: for example, the first law on equal salary for the same job for men and women was introduced in 1975, while the law on affirmative actions aimed to remove obstacles to equal opportunities dates back to 1991. Equal opportunities legislation has been implemented over the last few decades through European directives. Nevertheless, the legislative changes have not been so effective: the pay gap between men and women is still very high (between 15% and 20%, Addis 2006) and the female presence in top leadership positions (‘glass ceiling’ effect), both in the political and in the economic field, is still weaker than in other European countries. Female Members of Parliament in Italy amount to 9.8%, while in Sweden they reach up to 45.3% (Sabbadini 2006).

The central role of the family, as the basis of Italian society, is sanctioned by the Italian Constitution: the ‘family’, founded on marriage, assumes the husband as the main breadwinner and the wife as the main provider of care-work. Italian welfare can therefore be defined as ‘familist’, since one of its foundations lies in networks, above all family networks, which have been able to compensate for the lack of state social policies. The current employment of immigrant women in the field of personal care is indeed due to the scarcity of state intervention, as well as, to the permanence of the female component in the labour market, particularly when marriage or children come into play. Generally speaking, women, both immigrant and autochthonous, have a two-fold role: they are recipients of the policies, as mothers and members of a family, and providers of services, as key elements of informal networks and as social workers.

Recently, many scholars in the field have stressed the crisis of the Italian welfare system. The changes that have taken place in Italian society render the old and outdated welfare-regime obsolete (De Leonardis 1998).
(2002) sees the crisis of the Italian welfare state beginning with the inability of the system to respond to new risks, i.e. the precariousness of work, the transformation of the family, the crisis of the family unit, the aging population and unemployment. Such risks cannot be dealt with by means of policies based on monetary distributions, and require a total rethinking of the welfare system. Moreover, the public welfare structure is hampered also by the lack of funds and by bureaucratic obstacles that make it ineffective.

Ranci (ibid.) identifies other negative elements. The pension-system is generous only with a section of citizens that is declining, such as workers with a long-term contract. On the other hand, the welfare system provides a limited minimum wage, insufficient unemployment programmes and almost no guarantees for precarious workers. Other problems quoted by Ranci are: a relative generosity in safeguarding motherhood only for mothers with regular work and a tax system which rewards the sustaining of a spouse more than the support of children.

Finally, interventions lack mostly coordination. Social and family policies, for example, are often carried out independently: social policies have been aimed at offering an alternative to using the family unit as service provider, while family policies have supported motherhood without considering how the children would afterwards be taken care of.

The interdependence between the welfare model and the gender relationships model (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; Lewis 1992) becomes evident when considering services offered by local bodies. The growing role played by local institutions (regions, provinces and communes) in providing social services (as, for example, nursery schools) has led some researchers to talk about ‘conflicting models of welfare’ (Bimbi and Pristinger 1985; Donati 1990). Generally speaking, in regions or municipalities marked by a leftist socio-political tradition (such as Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany), interventions are aimed at promoting the continuity of women in the labour market and keeping care-work as a public or collective responsibility. In areas marked by a Christian-democrat or conservative tradition (such as Veneto and Sicily), motherhood and the care of family members are considered a private issue to be dealt with within the family with a rigid gender-based separation of roles.

These territorial differences are moreover linked to the growing presence of third sector organizations in the implementation of welfare policies at the local level. The so-called non-profit sector is not specifically an Italian phenomenon and during the last two decades it has been visible in all of the most industrialized countries. This transformation of the social system has sanctioned the rise of voluntary-work associations and cooperatives that offer services as important partners of the public sector (Ascoli 1999, 17). Growth in the third sector takes place indeed in a complementary manner to welfare policies. The third sector has become a part of the mechanism of
public funding by responding to old and new needs and by turning its response into projects, thus becoming the main actor in welfare policies.

Within the non-profit sector, Catholic organizations play an important role. The Catholic Church itself is not officially endorsed by the state to provide social welfare services, but it has developed its own charitable organizations (providing social assistance, healthcare, education, or helping the poor) for centuries. At the end of 1800s the social doctrine of the Church introduced the concept of subsidiarity, which is nowadays again in fashion (see the modifications to title V of the second part of the Constitution, permanently approved on 8th March 2001).

Religious composition in the country

According to the latest Eurispes report (2006), 87.8% of Italians declare themselves Catholic; this large majority is, however, internally heterogeneous. In Italy ‘since the very foundation of the unitary state, there have been many cultural, religious and political currents within Catholicism, often denoted by sharp divergences (from intransigent to liberal Catholics, from extremist papists to modernists). These divisions have followed the lines of social and territoriality fractures’ (Garelli, Guizzardi, Pace 2003, 297). Moreover, Italians in particular define themselves as more ‘Catholic’ than ‘religious’ since ‘the traits determining affiliation to Catholicism are more of a cultural than a spiritual nature, and behavioural praxis is shaped after the principles of Catholic morals only to a limited extent’ (Garelli 1991, 44-45).

According to the latest Eurispes report (2006), up to 65.6% of Italian Catholics defend the law on divorce and 77.8% are against refusal of the Eucharist to those divorced. Even regarding abortion, Catholics diverge from the official view of the ecclesiastic hierarchy and 83.2% declare themselves in favour of the interruption of pregnancy if the life of the mother is endangered.

The appearing monolithic character of Italian Catholicism is due mainly to the historical necessity of forming a common front against an enemy (Communism during the cold war, Islam nowadays). The unity of Italian Catholics can be understood as a social construction coming from a double hegemony of the Catholic political party and the Catholic Church itself (1948-1972) (Pace 2005).

Regarding people who have a non-Catholic religious identity in Italy, statistics are definitely difficult to produce. According to the latest estimates (CESNUR 2006a), Italian non-Catholic citizens amount to 1,124,300 people (1.9% of the total population, see Table 4:1:1), while non-Catholic foreign legal immigrants (non-citizens) are more numerous, amounting to 2,156,627 people (77.4% of the total migrant population, see Table 4:1:2). The total non-Catholic population in Italy, including both Italian citizens and foreign
immigrants are estimated up to 3,280,927 people (5.6% of the population, Caritas 2006). Since there are no official data on the religious affiliation of foreign citizens, the CESNUR estimate presented here is a re-elaboration of data provided by the Migrantes Foundation and Caritas as part of the latest statistical survey on immigration (Caritas 2005). It is obvious that similar data cannot take into account the processes of secularization and individualization of belief among individual immigrants. We can generally note on the one hand, a relevant increase in the number of Eastern Orthodox Christians, and, on the other hand, the centrality of Islam as the second most widespread religion on the territory after Catholicism.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Minority</th>
<th>Nº</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jehovah’s Witnesses</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>363,000</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Pentecostals</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ‘Historical’2 Protest.</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Adventists</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Human potential movements’3</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhists</td>
<td>93,000</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other groups of Christian origin</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Fringe’ and dissident Catholics</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Orthodox</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

2 Waldenses, Lutherans, Reformed, Calvinists, Baptists and Methodists.
3 Mostly affiliated to the Church of Scientology and to the Paris Energy Method.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organized New Age and Next Age movements</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu and neo-Hindu</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esoteric and ‘ancient wisdom’</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osho and related groups</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha’i and other groups of Islamic origin</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Japanese religions</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh, Radhasoami and related groups</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other groups of eastern origin</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,124,300</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.Cesnur.org/religioni_italia/introduzione_01.htm
Table 4:1:2 Main religious groups among legal immigrants (non-citizens) in Italy (estimates according to Caritas) 2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Groups</th>
<th>Nº</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non Catholic</td>
<td>2,156,627</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>919,492</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Orthodox</td>
<td>565,627</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>183,898</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>66,872</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhists</td>
<td>52,940</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other rel. of African origin</td>
<td>33,436</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>8,359</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>326,003</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>629,713</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,786,340</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.Cesnur.org/religioni_italia/introduzione_01.htm

Characteristics of the majority Church

Church and State

From a historical point of view, the Catholic Church has always had a privileged relationship with the Italian state throughout different phases. The Roman issue began when the troops of the Kingdom of Italy invaded Rome and the papal territory (1870). This event marked the loss of the Church’s temporal power and led the Holy See to refuse acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the new unitary state and to produce the famous non expedit measure, which forbade Catholics to participate actively in the political and parliamentary life of the nation. A solution to this conflict was found in 1929 thanks to the Lateran Treaty: this gave birth to the state of the Vatican City and moreover granted the Church various privileges, also from a legal point
of view. The Catholic religion was the only official worship in Italy and the religious education was a monopoly of the Catholic Church in every type of school. The agreements made in the treaty were then incorporated also in the later Constitutional Chart, which ended up in evident contradictions with the principles of freedom of conscience and freedom of teaching and with the exclusive attribution to the state of juridical functions, all elements sanctioned in the Italian Constitution itself. In 1984 the treaty was reviewed by both sides in the Villa Madama Agreement: state and Catholic Church both declared themselves independent and sovereign in their own right. The principle of ‘the Catholic religion as the sole religion of the Italian state,’ was considered as ‘no longer valid’. The 1984 treaty is a sort of ‘framework of agreement’ on basic principles and it was followed by a series of accords regarding specific issues; of particular relevance are those regarding: the reform of ecclesiastic bodies and properties, the system of sustenance of the clergy, the appointment of key figures with ecclesiastical functions, the official civil acknowledgment of religious holidays, and the teaching of the Catholic religion in schools (CESNUR 2006b).

The problematic issues raised by these agreements are particularly evident in the teaching of Catholicism in public schools. The teachers are indisputably chosen by the bishop and in order to keep their job, they need to ask for the approval of the diocesan authorities every twelve months. This means that the state employs and pays staff that it has not selected and over whom it has minimal control (in 2001, the approximately 25,000 Catholic religion teachers in the country cost the state more than 620 million euros).

Moreover in March 2000 the Parliament approved law n. 62, allowing private schools (of which the vast majority in Italy are Catholic schools) to enjoy privileged taxation and ad hoc funding by the government: further funding has been planned for needy students in any type of school. The law resulted in funding for almost 130 million euros in 2000 and 155 million euros in 2001.

Recently the Italian Catholic Church has particularly stressed its argument on the importance and plausibility of a public role for the Christian religion (Garelli 2005) as a moral guide even in the legislative field. The Church has been involved in campaigns ranging from the issue of crucifixes in public schools, to the necessity of including ‘common Christian roots’ in the European Constitution, to the referendum on assisted procreation (see chap. 5) and the fierce defence of the ‘family’ against any form of institutionalization of any possible alternative.

If the Catholic Church is trying to keep its role in shaping public and private behaviours, many Italians are changing their attitudes toward the traditional norms: in 1966 civil marriages in Italy amounted to 1.2%, reaching 14.2% in 1986 and 32.4% in 2005 (ISTAT 2006). Moreover church attendance is decreasing: in 1993 people who took part in a mass at least once a week was 39.2%, while in 2003 it decreased to 33.9% (ISTAT 2006). We do
not have any available data on baptisms and burial ceremonies probably because the large majority of Italian citizens celebrate such rituals within the Catholic liturgies and this has always been taken for granted.

The organizational structure and financial situation of the Catholic Church in Italy

As in many other countries, Italy is marked by imbalances and discrepancies in the structure and organization of the Church. The Catholic Church is subdivided in 224 dioceses whose borders often coincide with those of civil local territorial subdivisions (communes, provinces and regions), since they both reflect previous historical periods (Garelli 1991, 128-131). This system results in a very different and scattered distribution of dioceses on the national territory (ibid. 136). The average northern diocese is usually larger (both in both in terms of territory and population) than its central or southern counterparts (usually approximately twice as large – ibid. 132). Dioceses are in turn subdivided in more than 25,000 parishes, on average one for every 2,200 inhabitants and every 11,8 square kilometres approximately (ibid. 141). This situation results in a network of basic religious structures that are rather wide-spread and concentrated on the territory (primarily in northern and middle Italy– ibid. 143).

The second Vatican Council required more autonomy for parishes, thus partially weakening the ‘controlling and pyramidal’ organization of the Church (Garelli 1991). This tendency, however, is not very coherent; much of this autonomy depends on the kind of relationship the parishes have developed with dioceses and the Curia (Sarpellon 2002, 39). Not only the positions and practices of the different parishes encompass a wide range of points of view, but also the sectors of intervention of Catholic organizations are very different. As stressed by Frisina (2006), in the case of Vicenza (a medium-sized town in the north-eastern part of the country), despite the powerful Caritas Diaconia, the Church ‘includes a multiple community of believers who commit themselves to social work without needing to publicize their actions under the banner of institutional Catholicism’ (Frisina 2006). One cannot, therefore, speak of ‘one role’ played by the Catholic Church in the Italian welfare system, but must rather speak of the ‘multiple roles’ it plays, thereby stressing the plurality, or internal fragmentation, of Italian Catholicism.

As revealed in a recent report by an economic magazine (Panorama Economy, January 2004), the financial specificity of the Catholic Church is closely related to the fact that the Pope holds an independent and sovereign state in the Vatican City. Its economy is based on monetary and real estate investments, on existing assets, and on incomes from dioceses all over the world.
One of the main sources of income for the Catholic Church in Italy is, however, the so-called *otto per mille* (0.8%). It is a mechanism created by the ‘new’ agreement of Church and state in 1984, according to which every tax-paying citizen can choose to allocate 0.8% of his/her income tax to one of seven bodies: the state, the Catholic Church, or one of the other 5 Churches who have a special agreement (at this time: the Union of Christian 7th Day Adventist Churches, God’s Assemblies in Italy, the Union of Methodist and Waldense Churches, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Italy, and the Union of Italian Jewish Communities).

In reality, nobody gets to really choose who will actually receive his/her own 0.8% contribution: it works more like a highly complicated survey, at the end of which the figures obtained by each of the seven bodies are calculated in terms of percentages, according to which all the funds are subsequently allocated. This happens because the number of people who do not express a preference are not taken into account, ‘and in this case the sum will be shared out proportionally according to the preferences that have been expressed’ (art. 46 of the Villa Madama agreement). Indeed in 2000 the total amount was approximately 1 billion euros, out of which only 400 million euros were explicitly destined to the religious organizations by the citizens. On the other hand, some of the religious groups, as for example the Waldenses and God’s Assemblies in Italy, accept only funds that are explicitly destined to them.

In 2003, the Catholic Church received more than 1 billion euros (Adista 2003), but only 32.4% was employed to financially support the clergy, and only 18.2% was used for charitable interventions. Other Churches, as for example the Waldenses and Methodists, have agreed that the funds they receive must not be used to support the clergy or to finance cultural religious activities; instead they must be entirely used for projects of social and cultural assistance and 30% is exclusively allocated to projects in developing countries.

**Church based welfare provision**

Catholic Church related organizations are very active in providing welfare services in Italy. The services vary a lot in typology: they can be first aid services, such as distribution food and urgent medical care for illegal migrants, or long term services, such as housing programmes for foreign minors. The organization and implementation of these types of services also vary a great deal from a territorial point of view. They depend on the local parish and on the good will and time availability of volunteers. These services are more common in northern Italy than in the rest of the country and this of course means that they are not offered where they are most needed (in southern Italy).
Regarding minorities, the Catholic Church historically paid attention to the presence of migrants in Italian society, thus, defining minorities most of all as a foreign population. This sensitivity is observable both from the point of view of the services implemented by Catholic organizations (see *Caritas* activities) and from the official statements. Recently the Pope underlined the importance of recognizing the labour and social rights for migrants, while also focusing on the value of the family: ‘The International Convention for the protection of the rights of all migrant workers and members of their families, which was enforced on July 1st, 2003, intends to defend men and women migrant workers and the members of their respective families. This means that the value of the family is recognized, also in the sphere of emigration, which is now a structural phenomenon of our societies’ (Message of the Pope Benedict XVI for the 93rd world day of migrants and refugees, 2006).

**Welfare, religion and gender**

A ‘double presence’ (Balbo 1978) still characterizes the Italian role of women in society: women are active both in the public sphere through paid work and privately through bearing and raising children and housework, while men have the main responsibility in the public sphere. The legislative changes over the last few decades have tried to restore the balance between private and public responsibilities (see *Characteristics of the national welfare system*, above) the gaps are still far from being filled.

Political life in the country has been marked by a strong Catholic tradition, which implies ‘appropriate roles’ for husband and wife, that is to say the male breadwinner and the female ‘angel of the hearth’. The position of the Catholic Church on the role of women and gender policies is well illustrated by the apostolic letter *Mulieris Dignitatem* by John Paul II (1988), a recent letter to the bishops by the prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith at the time, and by the current Pope, cardinal Ratzinger (*Letter to the Catholic Church Bishops on the cooperation between Man and Woman in the Church and in the World*, 31st May 2004). These documents explicitly take a stand against the so-called ‘new tendencies in facing the female issue’: a first tendency causing ‘an attitude of contestation’ and leading to ‘a rivalry among the sexes’, which is dangerous for the structure of the family; and a second tendency, leading to ‘erasing differences, considered as a simple effect of socio-cultural conditioning’ and which has actually questioned the idea of family and equated homosexuality to heterosexuality.

One of the themes where the Catholic Church has benefited from a strong visibility is the recent referendum on assisted procreation. The referendum asked citizens to decide on certain articles of the new law no. 40/2004. These
articles prohibit, among other things, cloning for therapeutic purposes and clinical research on embryos, and attributed equal rights to embryos and born individuals. The official position of the Church is contained in the encyclical *Evangelium Vitae* and in the *Donum Vitae* document by the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith. These documents state that embryos obtained in test tubes are ‘human beings and have rights’ and that it is, therefore, ‘forbidden to jeopardize the life of human beings’. For these reasons the Pope’s vicar and president of the Italian Bishops’ Conference, Camillo Ruini, has declared himself in favour of the existing law and has invited Catholics not to vote. Since 50% plus one of the voters is needed for the referendum to be valid, the Church openly intended to render the referendum ineffective, which actually happened later. Quite remarkably, almost all other Christian Churches in Italy (Evangelical Lutherans, Reformed Protestants, Waldenses, Methodists and Baptists) were in favour of the referendum.

Public debates and discussions on gender and religion make often reference to Islam. In general, the question is centred on whether or not Islam is compatible with women’s rights. Categories, such as subordination, used to analyse the condition of Muslim women are not applied to discuss the status of Italian women. On the other hand, the similarities between Italian and Muslim women, such as labour segregation, the weight of care-work or domestic violence, are not discussed often (Campani 2002). Islam is seen as a compact and uniform religion in which women are perpetually placed in a minority position. Issues emerging in the public sphere concern the application of religious rules on the female body and the presence of women in the public sphere: this usually means debates on genital mutilation or on the wearing of the veil.

A recent book by Santanchè (a female deputy for Alleanza Nazionale, the former Fascist party) is paradigmatic of the existing discourse on Muslim women, as ‘denied women’ (Santanchè 2006). It reproduces all the current prejudices on the Muslim world, as if it were homogeneous and immutable. She constructs a gap between the ‘emancipated western women’ and ‘Islamic women in their obsolete condition’: the former being self-conscious and autonomous, the latter always subordinated.

From an academic point of view, gender equality within the Muslim minority is taken into consideration by Saint-Blancat (1999, 2000). She stresses the tendency to ‘attribute to religious doctrine social conducts that derive instead from anthropological and cultural dimensions’ and ‘to turn into universal principles customs and habits bound to a precise historical and social context’ (ibid. 1999, 142-143). Saint-Blancat’s reflections on the different meanings and ways of living Islam chosen by Muslim women are in a similar perspective. An example is the use of the *hijab*: we find a ‘variety of female strategies regarding the use of the *hijab*, reflecting the capability of women to be autonomous, as well as, the pragmatic character of their choices’, to the extent that one can talk of a ‘polysemic usage of the *hijab*’.
(ibid. 187). Saint-Blancat moreover stresses how, nowadays, the processes of transformation related to migration from another country are no longer seen as ‘a rupture and uprooting, but rather as the logical continuation of a process of transformation already on-going in the society of origin’ (ibid. 144).

Overview of the minority presence in the country

Providing a clear picture of the presence of minorities in Italy is no simple task. What can be considered as a minority group? This issue has once again been in fashion in recent years both in public debate and among academics. Answering this question means defining a controversial concept, as well as, the kind of society one is envisioning, that is to say also the kind of society one intends to construct. This issue involves the ever-growing presence of foreigners on the Italian territory, which brought a certain degree of ‘visible’ diversity in Italy, leading to the decrease of the importance in the internal differences (for example between north and south). When talking about minorities in Italy we refer especially to migrants.

Nevertheless, we have also some internal minority groups that have been recently taken into consideration by the Italian politicians. From a legislative point of view, since 1999, law 482 in Italy acknowledges the presence of certain autochthonous minorities in the country with the aim of linguistically safeguarding groups whose presence is rooted in history (see statistical annex). This recognition had no influence on the perception of a homogeneous national identity by the Italian population also because there are no large financial gains involved and it is not a matter of economic interest.

The situation is different in the case of autonomous regions with special statutes: they enjoy ample resources, which they distribute to their citizens in various forms. The case of Alto Adige is paradigmatic: it is a place where the coexistence of different language groups (Italian and German) has turned into a separation. In Alto Adige, citizenship is constructed in a different way depending on one’s ‘ethnicity’. Citizens are required to declare which group they belong to in order to apply for education or public positions. Language is the primary selection criterion, since each group is entitled to a certain quota. Public life is, thus, shaped on the basis of linguistic separation, creating in two actual completely separated groups.

At the same time we have to take into account the emergence of small local ‘homelands’, such as for example ‘Padania’, created by Lega Nord (a far populist regional anti-migrant political party) and loaded with political and social consequences. Lega-related parties ask for recognition of northern territories in various degrees, ranging from total autonomy (see the process of secession initially advocated by Lega Nord) to the softer and more up-to-date version of fiscal federalism and autonomy in certain political areas. But
this process isn’t so coherent and the different strategies are used from time to time.

But outside the cited local specificities, when talking about ‘minority’ we mean the growing presence of foreign citizens in Italy and we have to point out that during the last 30 years Italy has gradually become a country of immigration. In 1970 immigrants in Italy amounted to 144,000 people, fewer than the Italians who left the country (152,000) that same year. Thirty-five years later – in 2005 – foreigners regularly residing in Italy were approximately 2,800,000. In the European Union, Italy, together with Spain, is the EU member-state with the most important increase in immigration. The average rate is 4.8 immigrants for every 100 inhabitants (Caritas 2005).

The presence of immigrants in Italy is characterized by a high level of heterogeneity when it comes to their countries of origin. Among the five nationalities with the largest presence in 2004, only one was included in an analogous list in 1990 (see table 4:1:3). In 1980, Iranians were the largest immigrant group, followed by Yugoslavs. Ten years later, however, the southern Mediterranean dominated the Italian immigration scene (especially Morocco and Tunisia). In 2004, an equally significant change began with a marked increase of foreigners from Eastern Europe and the Balkans (in particular from Romania and Albania.).
Table 4:1:3 Some general trends in the major waves of immigration to Italy: classification of the first ten countries of origin for number of residence permits granted (1980-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980</th>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>8,399</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>63,809</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>6,472</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>31,881</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>4,107</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>26,166</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>4,048</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>22,335</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3,139</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>21,073</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2,535</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>14,183</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2,411</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>12,998</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Ver.</td>
<td>2,168</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>10,933</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2,080</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>9,364</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2,018</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>8,747</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>198,483</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>548,193</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 4:1:3, continued:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>155,864</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>133,018</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>67,386</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>61,212</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>56,660</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>46,773</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>41,234</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>40,890</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>34,042</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>31,991</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,340,655</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Colombo e Sciortino (2004a) and Caritas 2005.

Immigration, being a phenomenon related to a dynamic labour market in Italy, indicates a higher concentration in Northern Italy (59% of the migratory presence), a decrease in the middle regions (27%) and an even sharper decline in the South (14%). Moreover, the structure of immigration is influenced by geographic factors (such as proximity to national borders), as well as, by the possibility to enter the labour market and the existing policies (Colombo e Sciortino 2004a; 61).

In Italy a large part of the migrant population are not Italian citizens because of restrictive legislation. Thus, foreigners enjoy a limited form of citizenship: this does not mean exclusion from rights, but a weaker status than that of clear entitlement to citizens’ benefits (Ambrosini 2000). The regularization of the legal status of immigrants in Italy illustrates a wider conception of foreigners as temporary persons, constantly on the verge of becoming clandestine: they gain an ‘emergency legal status’, at the mercy of labour market forces and are subject to the fluctuating contractual needs of employ-
ers. The primary way of regularization of foreign citizens in Italy takes place by means of emergency measures and exemptions.

The application process for a residence permit, denominated as a ‘residence contract’ according to law 189/2002 (the so-called Bossi-Fini law, two leaders of centre-right coalition), is initiated not by the workers but by the employers: in other words, regular residence of foreign citizens on the Italian territory depends on the will and needs of employers to utilize a registered workforce. In a country such as Italy, where it is estimated that 25% of the workforce is employed illegally, it is evident that many foreigners are illegal residents because this condition lowers labours costs and makes it easier for employers to manage.

However, in Italy the status of registered immigrants allows theoretically foreign citizens to enjoy the majority of services. Emergency healthcare (first aid) and compulsory education are guaranteed to all residents, both legal and illegal. Foreign citizens with an official residence permit are equal to Italians in terms of civil and social rights such as: participation in employment lists, healthcare, social and public housing and even pensions. In reality there is a lack of a national framework of duties and rights since most of the policies towards migrants are implemented at the local level. The absence of official policies has favoured voluntary work and the transfer of policies to private-social associations, religious institutions, trade union services and other forms of organized mobilization of civil society. The use of voluntary resources produces fragmentation and uncertainty in social interventions (Barrucci and Liberti 2004). Policies intended for migrants are often aimed at situations of extreme poverty, such as provision of food, but they are not designed to give structure to a permanent presence in the country. Regarding family reunification the recent legislative framework is more restrictive than before. The prevailing tendency is to consider the migrants only as a workforce, but not viewing them holistically as individuals with a variety of needs and desires.

For many years migration was understood as a temporary phenomenon: the cultural dimension has been hidden while some aspects, such as participation in the labour market, security and public order, have been highlighted. Particularly since the second half of the ‘90s there has been a progressive intertwining of immigration, national security, deviance and criminality. However, the growing number of immigrants in Italy cannot put aside the relevance of the cultural dimension. The general context of emerging of international debates on ‘Islamic issues’ highlights this aspect; therefore, the question has been focused on whether Muslim migrants can be integrated or they are too different from the existing Italian society. The debate on migrant cultural diversity in Italy has been characterized by ideological juxtapositions. Leftist milieux are divided between a universalistic position based on an individualistic conception of equality and a multicultural position that
supports (indiscriminately) differences. Right-wing milieux are also divided between two different positions: the first one is represented by the *Lega Nord* party and by the so-called ‘neoconservatives’ (some well-known intellectuals such as Oriana Fallaci, some politicians, such as the former President of the Senate Marcello Pera and some religious actors) that envision an enduring ‘Islamic invasion’ in Christian countries. A second position is expressed by one part of right-wing Catholics, such as the former Ministry of Interior Pisanu, who first established a council for Italian Islam. This can be considered a first attempt to publicly recognize the existence of an Italian Islam, even for controlling purposes.

The CENSIS report (2002) on immigrants and the media clearly stresses how the role of immigrants in the news is always in a negative context, at least in 78% of the cases. The image of immigrants in broadcasts TV ranges from the ‘poor immigrant’, victim of multiple damaging circumstances, such as crime, discrimination, legal oversights, delays or a malfunctioning bureaucracy, to images of a ‘violent or criminal’ foreigner, as perpetrator of an unlawful activity. In this sense, immigrants seem to become an ‘instrumental icon’, one may say ‘a narrative function’: They are characters that are used as a convenient and reliable means to spice up and dramatize the news. The media, therefore, provide a highly stereotyped interpretation, and only in few rare cases do the news elaborate on the cultural identity of immigrants and their public and social life (CENSIS 2002).

Moreover, in recent years the media have strongly contributed to constructing a so-called ‘Islamophobia’. Siebert (2006) defines Islamophobia as a new form of racism, characterized by an ideology that brings discrimination, hate and exclusion. According to the author this kind of racism emerged rapidly after September 11th after a silent development since the ‘80s. Islam is often represented using stereotypes: Islam as a religious code, in opposition to the ‘democratic, secular and plural’ Western world (Said 1977). The voice of Muslims in Italy’s public debate is certainly peripheral and the media do not seek to cover and report the extent of existing debates among Muslims. Rather, they prefer to ‘breed’ interlocutors according to stereotypical expectations, thus, creating the ‘fundamentalist interlocutor’ (Saint-Blancat and Perocco 2005, 101).

Muslim immigrants are usually defined in religious terms, as opposed to, for example, the Eastern Orthodox; while immigrants from northern Africa and the Middle East are always viewed as Muslims, women from the Ukraine, for example, are viewed first as personal assistants for the elderly, second as women, third as Ukrainians, and so on. Therefore, among non-Muslims, religion does not seem to play a central role in their definition.
Religious minority-majority relations

According to Article 8 of the Italian Constitution, all religions are equally free before the law and have the right to organize themselves accordingly as long as they do not infringe Italian law; their relationships with the state must be regulated by law on the basis of formal accords with their representatives.

There are currently 6 religious organizations that have signed an agreement with the Italian state: the Waldenses, God’s assemblies in Italy, the Union of Christian 7th Day Adventist Churches, the Union of Jewish communities, the Christian Evangelical Baptist Union and the Evangelical Lutheran Church. Along with these, agreements were also signed in 2002 with the Christian Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and with the Buddhist Union, even though they have not yet been converted into law. Muslims have not yet entered into an agreement with the state but in 2005 the Ministry of the Interior Pisanu constituted a council for Italian Islam (see part 6).

Regarding religious practices, we can find dissimilar attitudes depending on the different religions. Non-Muslim groups do not face many difficulties in establishing places of worship. In particular, the Catholic Church helped Orthodox groups by giving them churches that were not in use.

The situation is different for Muslim places of worship: the local bodies involved show the prevalence of a pragmatic attitude. ‘When a request is made for a prayer room to be opened, however discreet the projected room may be, local institutions have fallen into the habit of dealing with this potential source of conflict with a series of compromises, with a ‘laissez-faire’ attitude, and with decisions reached after many bureaucratic wrangles. The will (or lack thereof) of town councillors, the (often coordinated) involvement of both secular and religious volunteer associations, as well as, the patience and determination of Muslim populations also play a key role’ (Saint-Blancat and Schmidt di Friedberg 2005, 1085). At the end of 1900s, a ‘mini-war’ on mosques broke out in Italy, initiated in most cases by members of Lega Nord or by people with close ties to this movement. Such were the cases in Varese, Curno and Costa Magnano in Lombardy, in Alessandria, Piemonte, or in Farra di Soligo in the Veneto (ibid.); meanwhile the media placed these local events within a wider national context of the problematic case of Muslims in Italian society.

These conflicts ‘are structured according to pre-existing tensions and ambiguities that exist in Italian society: e.g. the complex relationship between local and national politics, the Catholic Church’s monopoly on cultural values vs. the premises of secular society, and the issue of regional and European identities’ (Saint-Blancat and Schmidt di Friedberg 2005, 1101). Mosque construction means visibility within the public space (Eade 1996; 223) and transmits the message that the new community is ‘here to stay’ (Saint-Blancat and Schmidt di Friedberg 2005, 1101).
Regarding the relationships between the Catholic Church and religious minorities, the Church has the main power to determine with whom it forms relationships and how. The post-council Catholic Church has explicitly selected an ecumenical path of strong openness to other religious dimensions. Two fundamental official documents, which sanctioned this phase, are the Decree on Ecumenism *Unitatis redintegratio* from Vatican Council II (21st November 1964) and the council statement *Nostra Aetate* (28th October 1965). Inter-religious dialogue has, however, almost solely addressed theological controversies, almost completely neglecting ethical issues; and it is probably no coincidence that, in recent times, conflicting positions on both sides have been raised precisely on various ethical issues (divorce, abortion, contraception, relations with the state, role of the Church in society): Catholics and Protestants are still apart on this issue. Similarly the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Waldense Churches are rather complex: there are some agreements (i.e. a joint translation of the Bible), but there are still some disagreements on theological and social issues. At the same time, the Catholic hierarchy has also reaffirmed an alliance with the Jewish community.

The relations between the Catholic Church and Islam, Italy’s second religion, are even more complex and difficult. Catholic policies regarding Italian Islam, resulting from specific social situations and crises, have been actually based on the actions of organizations, such as *Caritas* and *Migrantes*, which see immigrants more as needy ‘brothers in Christ’ than as followers of a different faith (Guolo 2003, 81). Guolo (ibid) revealed the recent transition of the Church from taking an ecumenical position of strong openness to adopting its current attitude, more and more critical, more and more attached to its own ‘identity’. Certain high ranking Catholic representatives have openly expressed positions against Islam (such as Bishop Biffi who suggested Italian government to encourage Christian migrant in opposition to the Muslim ones), thus, violating one of the golden rules of mutual understanding between public religions in secular societies (Casanova 2000).

A symptom of this new trend is surely to be observed in the new Pope’s attitude towards the so-called *Assisi spirit*. The former Pope proclaimed a worldwide day of prayer for peace in Assisi together with leaders of all world religions (27th October 1986). Since then, Assisi has become a place of meeting with other religions in the name of dialogue and peace. The new Pope, a few months after his election, immediately accused the Assisi friars of ‘religious syncretism and irenic pacifism’ (Lerner 2005). Thus, the Pope acted to restrict their autonomy, subordinating their actions to the ‘jurisdiction’ of their diocese’s bishop.

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4 In 2000, the current Pope, who at the time was Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, by means of the declaration *Dominus Jesus*, became a representative of this current.
In Italy there are many Islamic organizations that are struggling to enter the public scene: the main one is UCOII (Union of the Italian Islamic Communities), which represents the large majority of Muslim places of worship in Italy. It is a neo-traditionalist Islamic movement connected to the Muslim Brothers. Another Islamic organization is the Islamic Cultural Centre (ICC) in Italy, known as the ‘Rome Mosque’, supported by certain governments, such as Morocco, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia.

There is no data on the capability of minority associations, including Islamic associations, to establish their own welfare provision institutions or services. The lack of data is due to the fragmented presence of minority associations in Italy. The WaVE project will be useful in analysing the role of some of these organizations.

Conclusions

We have highlighted here the main characteristics of the Italian welfare system, the religious composition and the minority presence in the country, trying to connect these different aspects while also paying attention to the gender dimension.

A variety of factors, including a globalized economy, an immigrant workforce and population, an ageing population, low birth-rates, diverse forms of family configurations, including gender relations and working women/mothers, provide the general context for the diverse challenges of the Italian welfare system and society.

The Italian debate on welfare is mainly focused on family as the core unit of solidarity. Families are always considered central factors for the mutual support among family members and in the coordination of working and family life. Proposed interventions in Italy are still always of a *una tantum* type (such as the 1,000 euro check for the first born child as stated by law no. 326/2003, which was moreover denied to immigrant women). The discussions are very ideological: various milieux tend to support the family as the prevalent source of solidarity and social policy. This vision is supported mainly by Catholic politicians (both in the centre right and centre left parties) and by right wing parties. The responsibilities given to families seem often in stark contradiction with the rights of equal opportunities, not only for women, but also for the younger generations; this is one of the reasons why Italy is one of the countries with the lowest birth-rates, with the lowest levels of participation of women in the labour market and with an extremely strong intergenerational reproduction of disparities.

Related to the key role of families in Italy is the question of gender roles and relations, and the status of women. Women have become the object of political debate in Italy, as for example in the campaign during the recent
elections. They are used, as a symbolic group (particularly by centre-left parties) or as a group to be protected because of its central function within the family (particularly by centre-right parties), but women are almost never considered as full citizens participating in the public life of the country. In the current government, for example, we can find six female ministers out of 25. In the business world, in medium enterprises female managers represent only for 5.6% of the total number of managers and they earn 20% less than their male colleagues: the glass ceiling is far from being broken (Federmanager 2007).

From a legislative point of view, the juridical framework ensures equal opportunities for men and women in all fields of social and political life. Nevertheless, the laws are often not so effective: for example, the Ministry for equal opportunities is without portfolio, indicating that the general official will of equal opportunities cannot be supported by more concrete initiatives.

Gender relations have been historically influenced by the Catholic Church, which had the power to define appropriate male and female roles; it still addresses regularly gender and family issues, such as regarding the ‘Dico’, a recent law proposal aimed to regulate the cohabitation between two persons of the same or opposite sex. The Catholic bishops declared that the law is against the ‘legitimate heterosexual family based on marriage’ that is still the ‘exclusive model’ of family. The power of the Church is strengthened not only by the fact that most of the Italian population is Catholic, but also by its privileged relationship with the Italian State.

Nevertheless the ways of being Catholic and the activities of the Catholic organizations vary a lot. Generally speaking the Catholic Church plays an important role in the implementation of social policies with its non-profit organizations. The WaVE project can highlight the different ways of being Catholic, embodied by a variety of welfare activities and also the values underpinning such activities.

The extensive social services provided by the Catholic Church, devoted mainly to situations of extreme poverty or need, give the Church also the power to define the categories of those who will benefit from the services. In this perspective, it is interesting to note that among the categories used to define the recipients of the social services offered by Catholic organizations, ‘migrants’ were the only ones defined without a specific reference to their problems, as it was the case of other recipients, such as drug-addicts or alcoholics (Sarpellon 2002, 20). This is symptomatic of the general public perception of the migrant population as a problem in itself, as a population that – despite its internal differentiation in terms of position in the labour market, existence of social network, etc. – is a priori considered poor and needing help, and not as a group of individuals with rights, as the modern concept of citizenship would claim (Mezzadra 2001).
Moreover, in recent public debates the ‘migrant issue’ has become the ‘Islam issue’. The media have strongly contributed to construct a so-called Islamophobia: they have strengthened the perception of Islam as an alien body and an all-encompassing and monolithic socio-political bloc. Despite the internal differentiations of Islam, the way in which Muslims are represented by the majority, leads to a perception of an insurmountable gap between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Muslims, ‘through a mirroring mechanism, [...] end up feeling and acting as such’ (Saint-Blancat and Schmidt di Friedberg 2002, 91-92). In this stigmatization process, Muslim women suffer a double discrimination: on the one hand, European distrust towards alien religious symbols – such as the hijab; on the other hand, general discrimination towards women, regardless of their religious affiliation (Campani 2002).

In the current historical phase, which is characterized by the reduction of welfare benefits, numerous issues are being publicly debated but there is not enough research that approaches thematically the tensions related to the provision of welfare services. These are aspects that will be investigated in the WaVE research. Through this case study we will try to investigate the values underpinning the practices, paying attention to the power, held by the majority, of defining who the minorities are. But we should probably not put aside that minorities themselves may possibly also have an influence on how they are viewed by the majority. Minority and majority groups cannot be defined as static and uniform groups; on the contrary they have to be questioned and viewed as diverse, fluid, and part of an on-going process. In this sense it will be of particular importance to investigate perceptions of minority religious groups, also from their very own points of view.

The way women from minority groups (especially foreign women) report their experiences in the national health services, indicating issues of poor communication or contrasting values, highlights the ambiguities of a system that has not completely developed a self-reflexivity on its own contradictions and that tends to take for granted implicit values.

In that perspective majority-minority social interactions could be indeed an effective contribution for improving Italian social policies in the next future.

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4:2 PADUA CASE STUDY REPORT

Annalisa Frisina, Adriano Cancellieri

Abstract

The report presents the results of a qualitative research study carried out in Padua, a medium-size town which mirrors the contradictory values of the Italian society. The research investigates access to local welfare services and their availability to immigrants by focusing on a central issue (reproductive health) and on two immigrant groups (Romanians and Nigerians). Using participant observation and in-depth interviews we were able to compare discourse and practices of immigrants and welfare workers. We identified three axes of values crucial in welfare practices: universalism vs. differentialism/particularism; gender equality vs. traditional gender roles; secularism vs. religious values in the field of reproductive health. Our research showed some failures of universalism, the conservatism of the Italian welfare in practice and the difficult secularism in the field of reproductive health. Moreover, it emerged clearly that mechanisms and practices of cohesion/conflict are often transversal to immigrant groups and Italian people. Lastly, our study underlined how values and interests are tightly intertwined.

Presentation of the town

Introduction of the town

Padua is one of the major cities of the Veneto region (210,301 inhabitants – ISTAT 31st December 2006, www.istat.it). It is situated in the North-Eastern part of Italy that is a prosperous Italian area characterized by a proliferation of small firms and very low rates of unemployment. Until the half of the last century it was one of the poorest parts of Italy, characterized by high rates of emigration towards other countries. In the last thirty years, the North-East has become an industrial area of economic specialization, experiencing strong economic growth and a high capacity to attract workers (especially un-qualified).

Padua is characterized by a Christian-democratic political or conservative sub-culture, stressing family related and individualistic interests and a relative mistrust towards national institutions and national parties. In recent

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1 Adriano Cancellieri wrote the abstract and presentation of the town, while Annalisa Frisina wrote the sections on context and timeframe, method and sources, and findings. This report is the result of a collective work in which Valentina Longo also took part.
years a centre-left and centre-right coalition alternate in the administration of the city.

Majority and minority presence
Padua, like the Italian society as a whole, is facing important social and demographic changes:

- an aging population connected to increasing life expectancy and decreasing birth rates (32.2% of families are composed by only one person and 29.1% by only two – Census Data 2001);
- a growing presence of foreign citizens;
- an increased presence of women in the labour market;
- an increased marital instability and de-institutionalization of the family.

In addition, the precariousness of the Italian labour market poses increased risks, especially for the younger generations. The local society is also marked by strong solidarity networks usually acting through their work in non-profit organizations. Indeed Padua and the North-East have one of the highest national rates of voluntary work. Regarding this issue, we have to highlight the strong and diversified role played by Catholic organizations. We could speak of multiple ‘roles’ played in every aspect of social life, thereby highlighting the plurality, or internal fragmentation, of Catholicism in Italy: parishes, independent social associations linked to the parishes, self-help groups, the church district and independent church-related welfare organizations. Therefore, the research allows us to see a strong majority church ‘at work’ in the implementation of welfare services, especially towards ‘minorities’.

When talking about ‘minorities’, both in Italy and in Padua, we refer especially to the ever-growing presence of migrants. The Veneto region has one of the highest proportions of migrant people: 7.3% (ISTAT 31st December 2006) compared to a national average of 5%. Furthermore, Padua has experienced even higher rates (9.3%). This is due to the fact that immigration is a phenomenon strongly related to the dynamism of the labour market (see 2.1): therefore, we note a higher concentration of migrant workers in the richer Northern and Centre Italy (90% of the migratory presence according Dossier Caritas 2007).

The uniqueness of Padua’s immigrant population is the large presence of people from Central and Eastern Europe, with a high percentage of women playing an important role in the local labour market, above all in ‘3C jobs’ (Cleaning, Cooking and Caring - Andall 2000).

The largest migrant group living in the city are Romanians (4,221 or 21.5%, see Table 1), followed by Moldavians (2,372 or 12.1%) and Albanians (1,646 or 8.4%). Another distinctive aspect of this city, compared to the
rest of the country, is the relative high presence of a Nigerian minority. This is the largest non-European group in Padua (1,386 or 7.0%).

In addition, it is important to highlight the fact that in Italy many migrants are not Italian citizens because of restrictive legislation based mainly on *ius sanguinis* (transmission of citizenship through parents).

**Table 4:2:1 Country of origin of migrants* in Padua, in Veneto and in Italy.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Padova</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Veneto</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>4,221</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>48,207</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>375,947</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>2,372</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>46,781</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>343,228</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1,646</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>35,654</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>342,200</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1,386</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>Serbia/Mont.</td>
<td>22,415</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>144,885</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,381</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>19,112</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>120,070</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>15,610</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>101,337</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>15,560</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>89,932</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>12,340</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>74,162</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other coun.**</td>
<td>5,089</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>Other coun.</td>
<td>134,536</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>Other coun.</td>
<td>1,348,161</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>19,661</td>
<td>100</td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>350,215</td>
<td>100</td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,938,922</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* The available statistics on foreign residents only refer to legal migrants.

** Migration in Italy is characterized by a strong heterogeneity of country of origin.

**Local welfare system**

Padua is characterized by a mixed welfare system (a particular blend of state, market and third sector) and by a massive presence of non-profit organizations rooted in Catholicism and volunteering.

Public responsibility for welfare provision is divided between three territorial organizations with statutory, organizational and administrative autonomy:

- the Municipality of Padua;
- the Padua Province;
- the Veneto Region.

As in every Italian region, Veneto has the overall responsibility of legislation, while the Padua Municipality has to carry out the local programmes and the operation management of the services. But the distribution of services varies from one welfare area to another.

Generally, the Municipality manages the social secretariat for information and advice, interventions for social emergency situations and assistance for handicapped persons and for the elderly. For example, the Padua Municipality managed some of the services towards migrants, such as CISI (a public...
counselling service to aid migrants to renew their residence contracts and to face other bureaucratic problems). In addition, it partially funds some emergency services implemented by non-profit organizations. In contrast, health services are under regional responsibility and are managed by Local Social Health Unities (USSL).

Church-related welfare organizations play an important role in the implementation of social services as well. There are separate religious actors managing important services, distributing food and urgent medical care for illegal migrants. There are also large organizations, such as Caritas, which devote their activities in emergency situations and in providing counselling and informal mediation (for ex. between Italian families and immigrant caregivers). In recent years the local Caritas directly ran several services especially devoted to migrant women, such as relief for victims of human trafficking. In the last few years, the Catholic Church has tried to coordinate a part of these services under the supervision of a new organization, called ‘Pastorale Migranti’.

Through laws n. 142/1990 and n. 328/2000 there have been attempts to coordinate and harmonize social policies, giving a growing role to Provinces and Municipalities and promoting the concept of an ‘integrated system’ in order to avoid the superimposition of competencies and the inefficient distribution of resources and knowledge. Moreover, since the local welfare system is often focused on dealing with emergency situations, recently there have been many projects attempting to structure new services and solutions. For example, a desk directly aimed at foreign women was recently opened (called ‘Desk for Women of the World’). But the current historical phase is characterized by the reduction of welfare resources and benefits; therefore, it is more and more difficult to build long-term projects. A paradoxical aspect is that in several cases these projects are less integrated, are supported by often temporary workers and are only financed for a limited time, often as an experimental project. So we can say that the local, as well as, the Italian welfare system are still experiencing an overlapping of competencies and a lack of coordination.

Finally, it is important to mention that over the last few years there have been increasing numbers of migrant associations: the leadership and the representation capacity of these groups in the local government seem very weak and in several cases the associations are very small and strongly divided among them. The role played by these groups in the welfare system is largely informal and it varies greatly. Generally speaking we can say that many of these groups seem to be only nominal and ineffective. But at the same time there are associations and informal networks that function properly to help people find a job, to provide relational and psychological support, and to inform on rights.
To what extent the local situation is in flux

The city of Padua seems to be a paradigmatic microcosm of the national debate on religion, minorities and gender. First of all, it is important to mention ‘the Via Anelli case’. ‘Via Anelli’ is a large apartment building zone near the city of Padua that has been progressively abandoned by Italians and by local institutions, becoming an ideal zone for illegal activities (drugs and sex). In August 2006 local administrators decided to construct a barrier to separate these buildings from the surrounding area. In a few days, in both national and international debates, this physical barrier became ‘the wall of the new battle of civilizations’ (Vianello 2006). In July 2007 resident families were moved to other parts of the city and now the area has been entirely emptied. In December 2006 Padua also became the first Italian city in which heterosexual or homosexual couples who live together, can be legally recognized in the registry office as a ‘family’ based on affective ties. This fact is particularly relevant considering that in Italy a recent national law proposal aimed to regulate the cohabitation between two persons of the same or opposite sex, encountered strong political and religious opposition.

Another recent paradigmatic episode shows us some local conflicts: in November 2006 a bishop was prevented from having a service in a small school near Padua in order to respect freedom of religion. Local mass media and local centre-right politicians exploited this situation to construct a campaign to support ‘our values’. Northern League, a populist regional anti-migrant political party, plays a prominent role in this battle.

With respect to WaVE issues we can say that Padua is a city full of contrasts, characterized by a complexity of opposing social dynamics, mirroring the contradictory values of Italian society.

Context and timeframe

During the period of the research the national political situation became more unstable. The centre-left wing coalition ruled by Mr. Romano Prodi won the elections (2006) with a very small margin of votes. The government disappointed many Italians because of its ‘immobilism’ (i.e. the electoral promise to change the immigration ‘Bossi Fini’ law and the citizenship law of 1992, which are today still valid) and because of some ‘likeness’ with policies typical of the right-wing parties.

Moreover, the public debate on the growing number of immigrants in Italy was characterized by the dominance of the ‘security framework’. The immigrant issue became the ‘Islamic issue’ and fear was mainly linked to the international threat of terrorism or to the supposed aggressive traditionalism of Muslims, especially towards women.
In 2006 a new social representation of ‘enemies’ was created: the Romanian citizens. The Italian public debate often confused Romanian citizens and the Roma people. The latter are strongly stigmatized and they are seen always as strangers, even if their presence in Italy dates back to the 15th century and many of them have Italian citizenship. The entrance of Romania in the European Union did not guarantee the public legitimacy of Romanians immigrants in Italy: when there was an episode of violence by a Romanian man, the Italian mass-media used discriminatory language, generating the fear of an ‘invasion of criminals’ (www.cestim.it/argomenti/15politiche/Italia/15politiche_rumeni_espulsione.htm).

A further important trend is the growing normative role of the Catholic Church in the Italian public sphere. Catholic hierarchies tried to oppose every attempt to promote the legitimization of new forms of families and responsible procreation choices (contraception in order to prevent abortion – ). It often received broad consensus from several political parties. Moreover, the Catholic ‘Pro-Life Movement’, thanks to the cooperation of local parishes, has collected signatures in churches in support of Regional Law no. 3 in Veneto, which encourages the presence of activists of this organization in Family Advice Bureaus and in hospitals with the aim of convincing women, who have decided to have an abortion, to change their minds.

The Italian feminist movement has reacted by defending the Law no. 194/1978 (on the safeguard of maternity and abortion regulation): legislators aimed at eliminating clandestine abortions by means of transmitting information on responsible procreation, intending to avoid abortion being used as a birth control system. According to data from the Health Ministry in areas that were better equipped with Family Advice Bureaus abortion rates between 1982 and 2004 fell by 43.2% (Tormene and Frascella, 2005). Italian feminists stood for the professionalism of Family Advice Bureau workers (who are in charge of promoting responsible procreation choices in a secular approach). The renewed activism of the Italian feminist movement has focused also on fighting gender based violence (primarily domestic violence). A large women’s demonstration in Rome (24/11/07) protested against the association of violence with (Romanian) immigration, framing the security issue through a gender perspective and asking for a change in Italian culture and in law in order to prevent and deal with violence against women in a more effective way.

Methods and sources

We decided to investigate access to local welfare services and their availability to immigrants by focusing on reproductive health, the state of psychological, physical and social well-being regarding practices in the following areas: 1) sex and relationship education; 2) birth control; 3) preg-
nancy and child birth; 4) child care in early infancy. Reproductive health is the main motivation for migrants in Italy to use welfare services and this explains why immigrant women use health services more than men (Lombardi 2005; Tognetti Bordogna 2004). We investigated also social practices related to the voluntary interruption of pregnancy because it reveals the ‘moral crisis’ experienced by many Italian welfare providers, both at a local and national level. In fact, while, on the one hand, we see the persistent defending of Law no. 194 against conservative Catholicism, on the other hand, we have an emergent phenomenon, which still finds welfare providers unprepared: immigrant women, especially younger, are those who nowadays have the most abortions, often doing this as a substitute for contraception. According to data from the main hospital of Padua (see Table 5:2:2), migrant women were those who had the majority of the total number of abortions in 2006 (437 out of 812 or 53.8%). Moreover, in Veneto 80.5% of the doctors express a conscientious objection and refuse to perform the procedure (Tormene e Frascella 2005; Spinelli, Forcella, Di Rollo, Grandolfo 2006).

Table 4:2:2 Migrant abortions in Padua: main national groups (Source: statistical data of Padua main Hospital)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main national groups in Padua</th>
<th>No. of abortions</th>
<th>% on total migrants abortion (2006)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>437</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The research was carried out in various contexts, which we selected as highly relevant in observing how local welfare is changing:
- Services which target exclusively illegal immigrants and adopt a differentialist strategy, such as Spazio Ascolto (Listening Window) and Ambulatorio Multietnico (Multi-Ethnic Health Centre). These services are built as exceptional spaces, both in their administrative status and in the way they work. The ‘Spazio Ascolto’ is an experimental project that is run by one director, a secretary and a few trainees. It is located in an office where all these people work together and to which the recipients turn to, mainly in order to obtain the STP (Stranieri Temporaneamente Presenti - Temporary Foreigners) card in order to have access to basic health services. Regarding women’s reproductive health, illegal immigrant women must turn to the Ambulatorio Multietnico, but because of their precarious situation, they ask doctors and nurses many types of questions and, thus, it has become a more general counselling centre.

- Services running on a universal basis: they are local services catering to autochthonous families and legal immigrants. These Consultori Familiari (Family Advice Bureaus) are the main institutional outposts for the promotion of reproductive health; they were intended by legislators (according to Law no. 405/1975) to be characterized by a specific social model of health, a gender perspective, and a horizontal, multidisciplinary and active approach. In actuality we find, on a national level, a picture filled with gaps due both to the number of advice bureaus (generally insufficient) and to the quality of the work they carry out (due to lack of funding, multidisciplinary staff often suffer severe cuts and the focus is moved from prevention to cure).

- In order to investigate the aspect of advice bureaus that offers an active approach we decided to also include a high school, where one of the bureaus conducted a course in sex and relationship education. Despite a lack of legislation in this matter, many Italian schools include programmes on health, sex and relationship education, carried out by teachers, doctors and psychologists.

- We moreover carried out our research in contexts where immigrants get together (parties and public events, associations, churches, ‘ethnic’ shops...) in order to meet both key informants and ordinary people, who are the potential welfare system users.

- Finally, we attended conventions and public demonstrations on a local and national level, in order to gain a broader perspective and to be able to contextualize our case study within the trend of on-going transformations in the Italian welfare system.

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2 http://www.ministerosalute.it/assistenza/approfondimento/sezApprofondimento.jsp?id=30&label=sito
Concerning the immigrant groups, in the first phase of the research we made no distinction of nationalities of the people that we met in our fieldwork (mainly in the family advisory bureaus), while in the second phase we decided to focus on the **Nigerian and Romanian population**. This decision was due, not only to the importance of these groups in numeric terms, but also to their relevance regarding the issue we are taking into consideration (i.e. see Table 5:2:2, on the abortion rates among those groups). The Nigerian group in Padua is both very active and very visible. There are many associations in town, both secular and religious (i.e. several Pentecostal groups), and many African shops, especially in the area around the railway station. Moreover, Nigerian migrants are highly stigmatized because they are black and because they are perceived as underdogs: women are ‘prostitutes’ and men are ‘drug dealers’. The Romanian population is the most substantial immigrant group in Padua and in Italy. This group is interesting because of its transnational links and high level of mobility, especially now that Romania is part of the E.U. Considering this group also allows us to reflect on some of the challenges that the welfare systems is facing: on the one hand, they are care providers, especially for the Italian elderly; on the other hand, they use the Italian welfare system in a way which is considered ‘opportunistc’ by some of the interviewed doctors, as we will see.

In our research we used the following techniques:

**Participant observation**: it has been the primary tool in the investigation, as it is indispensable in observing the practices of welfare operators, as they interact with immigrant users. Entering the field was very difficult in the case of services towards illegal immigrants, while access to universal services was generally easy. Regarding participant observation in the Family Advice Bureau, we selected those activities with a significant part of immigrant users (Consultori of distretto 1, 2 and 3).

**Interviews**: in order to record the discourse on the reproductive health of immigrants and compare it with the practices observed, we carried out 25 interviews, both with welfare operators and immigrant users. We interviewed association leaders, cultural mediators, religious leaders and ordinary people.

**Data collection**: to supplement our results we contacted various bodies (Padua Hospitals, Municipality services, Family Advice Bureaus of the districts 1-2-3, Caritas, and third sector services for migrants) in order to attempt to reconstruct a more general picture of the issues we examined.

We followed Gubrium and Holstein (2000) in our interpretative analysis of data and we selected examples of cooperation and conflict, which concerned many of the people and contexts that we met in our fieldwork.
Findings

Introduction: the ‘grey areas’
Many of our examples may be defined as ‘grey areas’ since the same situation can be read as an example of cohesion or conflict. A perfect example of this type is the case of cooperation during a social conflict (see ex. 3).

In the examples of cohesion presented we tried to specify at the end of each case the solidarity limits. Among the examples of conflict too, there is ambivalence (a ‘cohesion aspect’) when the conflict illustrated is managed peacefully by some social actors met in our research.

Examples of social cohesion

The basis of social cohesion. According to Berger-Schmitt (2000) we studied social cohesion by focusing on: 1) reduction of social inequalities and social exclusion and 2) strengthening of social relations. We have moreover included as another basis for social cohesion a further important characteristic: the social construction of common, and more or less explicit, frameworks of values.

Example 1: Universalism in practice
In our fieldwork we observed a migration of foreign women towards Family Advice Bureaus considered as ‘good’; this is the information they receive from their informal ‘ethnic’ networks. For instance, a user from Moldova, not belonging to the appropriate district of the Family Advice Bureau that she went to (therefore, according to the rules, she would have to go to the advice bureau in the area where she resided), wanted to make an appointment with a specific gynaecologist because a friend had informed her that the doctor was ‘immigrant-friendly’. The woman was quite shocked because she had had an examination in a gynaecological clinic within a prevention programme which offers women in menopause free ‘pap-tests’. According to the woman, the result of the examination was alarming, ‘a problem with no cure’, but she was not able to understand what the doctors had meant. During the dialogue between the welfare worker (a woman) and the immigrant user, we observed a clear universalistic intention. The welfare worker said that it was her right to come back and ask for explanations from the doctor who failed to inform her correctly and, thus, wanted to educate the immigrant woman to her social right in order to let her feel (and act as) ‘equal’ to other citizens. On the other side, concerning the difficult situation of that woman, the welfare worker did not opt for a ‘normative approach’, but was capable of acting with some flexibility: she accepted to make an appointment for the immigrant woman for ‘just this time’, understanding that her socio-economic
situation made it very difficult for her to manage her time (she assists an old man by living in his house). The welfare worker’s practice showed a pragmatic universalism, without intransigence, capable of adapting to new users with specific needs.

Sometimes the positive attitude shown by the doctors turns out to have negative effects on their workload. For example, one woman from Somalia who moved to another town 200 km away from Padua, still goes to the same Family Advice Bureau she was used to in Padua. In a generally negative context for migrants, feeling welcome is considered by migrant women as something exceptional, something precious to hold on to, but this creates conflicts within the working groups, since the distribution of users should follow territorial criteria and not personal preferences.

Moreover, we observed the presence of solidarity networks between Italians and immigrants who live nearby, which can be useful in the interface with social services. For instance, in one Family Advice Bureau a foreign user was accompanied by a neighbour who helped her with the Italian and with the general understanding of what was going on. This kind of informal mediation together with the active listening of social workers (for instance, they always ask ‘is there anything you would like to ask?’, thus, allowing the users to express doubts and fears) may explain why in this Family Advice Bureau nobody has ever applied for professional cultural-linguistic mediation. However, in another Family Advice Bureau the situation we observed was quite different. In that case the lack of active listening brought misunderstandings and resulted in slow procedures. A woman from Saudi Arabia, for example, had to call her husband on the phone because she could not understand the questions the nurse was asking her. The questions were asked very quickly, without giving the person the time to understand them and answer accordingly.

Example 2: Gender equality in practice
In one Family Advice Bureau we observed the doctor (a woman) addresses her interlocutors by emphasizing what they share as women, thus promoting mutual mirroring and gender solidarity, rather than discursively creating ‘us vs. them’ on the basis of the country of origin. This discursive strategy seems to interrupt, or maybe mitigate, the power asymmetry existing between doctors and patients, between Italians and immigrants, contributing in creating a relaxed atmosphere in which immigrant women can express themselves more easily. For instance, this is the case of the first visit of the woman from Moldova (see ex. 1). The woman was very worried about suffering from a sexually transmitted disease. The woman was reassured by the doctor not only from a medical point of view, but also from a human point view, implicitly acknowledging the immigrant woman’s ‘morality’. The interaction observed was relaxed and emotional, the immigrant woman told the doctor
about her private life and the doctor encouraged female solidarity. At the end of the conversation the doctor asked if the immigrant woman could work for her as a care-giver. The conclusion of the interaction allows us to think about some of the structural limits of female solidarity, even if in this case the doctor is a self-reflexive social actor engaged in the feminist movement. Generally speaking, the emancipation of Italian women requires the work of foreign women: thus, the value of autonomy is experienced by Italian women at the expense of foreign women, who often are residing in Italy illegally. Since there are no public or collective solutions to care needs, the answer remains on a private level and contributes to the development of global care chains (Ehrenreich, Hochschild 2004). Care work remains a female task and the division is no longer between men and women within the families, but between Italian and migrant women.

Another example of gender solidarity is the case of a Somali woman who, thanks to her good relationship with her doctor (a woman, in another Family Advice Bureau), decided to be deinfibulated, choosing a more self-aware sexuality. However, the autonomy promoted is often the one imagined and experienced by Italian women and the boundaries between ‘us’ (‘emancipated and modern’ women) and ‘them’ (‘subaltern and traditionalist’) can come back in the welfare worker’s discourse.

Example 3: Reproductive health - secularism (and traditional religious values) in practice

One example of cohesion was observed during a social conflict, the 2006 demonstration in defence of Law 194 and Family Advice Bureaus (Venice, 7th October 2006). The leaflet of the Regional Assembly of women in defence of Law 194 condemned the proposal of a Regional Law as one that ‘represents a violent attack against the self-determination of women and a heavy form of intimidation above all for younger and immigrant women’. The most cheered speech from the stage during the demonstration was the one held by a social worker of Nigerian origin. In her speech she said: ‘We don’t want the help of bigoted and moralist people who will attack the weakest and most defenceless women, such as the immigrants, but we want more professional social workers, more psychologists, more gynaecologists, secular and free! Let’s help immigrant women to do prevention, do not threaten them when they have to make dramatic decisions by themselves and they have no alternative other than voluntary interruption of the pregnancy: this means fighting for civil rights and for freedom. This is the fight of all women, Italian and immigrant!’ On the one side, there is the women’s alliance in defence of secularism related to reproductive choices, on the other side, there is a solidarity between immigrants and Italians based on conservative religious values in this field, for instance concerning the ‘moral way’ to family planning. ‘There are also Italians who come to us (to the Nigerian Catholic Church), they run groups, hold courses in family planning, teach
which methods of contraception are natural and morally acceptable according to the Church’ (Nigerian man, 39 years old).

Examples of tension and conflict

**The basis of conflict.** The idea of *conflict* that we use considers *material and symbolic aspects*. Regarding material aspects, conflict can be seen as a crisis situation related to the increase in social inequalities and social exclusion. Regarding symbolic aspects, emphasis is instead placed on the lack of a common ‘framework of values’, and, hence, the presence of conflicting expectations and priorities among different social actors. Moreover, a further feature related to conflict is the weakening of social ties. Finally, conflict can be open and declared, that is to say rendered explicit in the discourse of involved social actors; or it can be latent, that is to say present in the practices of those involved without any clear sign of reflexivity in social actors.

**Example 1: The failures of universalism**

*Consequences of juridical and socio-economic precariousness of immigrants in Italy:*

The right to health care even for illegal immigrants exists in theory, but the extreme condition of legal uncertainty suffered by immigrants prevents them from having concrete access to welfare services, first and foremost because of the *fear of being expelled* from the country. According to a welfare worker from a service that targets illegal migrants, the main problem is lack of *knowledge of the law, of existing rights*: STP immigrants must first overcome fear then find out about the correct bureaucratic procedures and finally have the patience to follow them. There is in fact a portion of immigrants who choose not to exploit welfare services because of how often and badly red tape slows down the system (e.g. the necessity of booking appointments and entering long waiting lists); this slowness is seen as incompatible with their *hard and precarious working conditions*. This is particularly evident among those (mostly women) who care for the elderly. A doctor working at a service devoted to illegal migrants related many cases of eastern European women who do not manage to come to appointments (or arrive too late) because of how difficult it is for them to leave, even for just a few hours, from their ‘more than full-time’ night-and-day job. We observed other organizational conflicts regarding foreign women. Often nurses complain about users forgetting the results of recent medical examinations and they are unhappy about the presence of *different priorities*: while the personnel are mainly preoccupied with the physical health situation of the recipients, foreign women link broader significance to their health. General psychological and -social well-being is connected to the precariousness of their living conditions. In fact, ample research shows that the problems of immigrants in Italy
in the following order of priority: fear of having the status of an illegal immigrant, a status that is difficult to overcome and easy to fall back into (becoming illegal again, due, for example, to the strictness of the Bossi-Fini law and to the malfunctioning bureaucratic system for the dispensation and renewal of residence permits); extreme difficulty in finding decent housing (almost total absence of social housing, housing prices that have dramatically increased during the last 15 years, and strong discrimination against immigrants when looking for housing); difficulty in finding a regular job that can sufficiently cover housing and food expenses. Thus, for many migrants, health is not the primary problem they have to deal with, but they know that they can try to use health services in a strategic way. For example, for illegal immigrant women pregnancy is not just waiting for a baby to be born, it is also a chance to get a temporary permit to stay in Italy since minors enjoy legal protection and women derive some rights from it (for instance the possibility to improve their living conditions in the name of the baby's health). These conflicts related to ‘extended’ expectations from the assistance that immigrants can receive from a certain service can be managed peacefully. Some doctors in fact choose to face pragmatically the needs of immigrants, for example, by asking before the examination: ‘Are you here for the permit? Do you need the letter [the one that states that you are pregnant]?’ (One doctor working in a service that targets illegal migrants).

Discrimination of ‘black people’ and possible conflicts within minorities:

It is common among immigrants to feel discriminated against, for instance in the value given to the previous education that they received in the countries of origin, or in the ‘ethnicized’ work niches accessible to them. Among immigrants, however, discrimination seems to be stronger against Nigerians, and this is related to the colour of their skin.

Once I went to the commune’s offices to apply for a grant (...) And I hear someone tell ‘Let the poor little nigger go, let him go make some more children!’ They thought I could not hear them. I suddenly got very angry, I left and returned after a short while with a friend of mine who works as a journalist (...). The guy got a bit scared and asked me: ‘Why this? Who are you?’ ‘I am James, a poor little nigger like any other!’…The real wall is not the one in via Anelli, it is invisible … (Nigerian man, 39 years old)

Such experiences of discrimination can lead someone to give up after facing the first difficulties in obtaining welfare services and to demonize ‘the white man’s system’ by interpreting even communication and language issues in a racist perspective.

Regarding intersectionality (Verloo 2006), it is clear that apart from being immigrants and being black, gender is another relevant factor in causing

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3 Regarding Via Anelli, see To what extent the local situation is in flux, above.
inequalities. The Nigerian women we have studied have had even harder experiences and for them even access to care work (which as we have seen is characterized by hard and precarious working conditions) is an impossible ambition.

I wish I were a domestic worker but nobody wants to hire me because I’m black. Nobody wants a black woman at home. Italians want a tall blond woman with blue eyes, such as the ones from Eastern Europe. (Nigerian woman, 29 years old)

According to the Nigerian Women for Cultural Promotion Association, employment agencies also have a responsibility for this situation, since, despite existing regulations, instead of fighting skin colour discrimination, they follow what the market demands and favour white workers from Eastern Europe according to what employers request.

This situation can generate conflicts within ‘minorities’.

And then, I mean, for us it is always more difficult, white migrants are always preferred…people look at the colour of your skin… And then prostitutes get everything, they give them houses, they find them jobs…how do these people think? They favour prostitution instead of favouring families with children… (Nigerian woman, 30 years old)

**Differentialism in the welfare system (legal and illegal migrants):**

In public discourse legal migrants are more or less welcome, while illegal migrants have to be expelled as public enemies. In such context, devoting some health services to illegal migrants is a challenge. Compared to other family advisory centres we observed, where the staff includes a doctor, a nurse, an obstetrician, a social worker and a psychologist, the health centre devoted to illegal immigrants only has a nurse and two doctors. This service, with its exceptional status, assumes similar characteristics of many third sector organizations working with illegal migrants that do not operate like a service organized for human beings with rights, but rather like doing a favour to destitute people. In practice, a line is drawn between illegal immigrants, who experience difficulty in accessing a ‘weakened’ service (i.e., very few opening hours), and legal immigrants/autochthonous citizens, who can access regular Family Advice Bureaus, which despite economic hardship, manage to offer services with higher quality standards.

**Particularism in the welfare system:**

The lack of proper networking, i.e. coordination among the various actors, in the Italian welfare mix is generalized to many types of services, included those running on universalistic basis.
Based on what I experience, services are riddled with holes, there is no system for social and health services for people, be they Italians or immigrants (...). It has become a DIY thing... all we do is work on emergencies when they arise. And on the level of national policies it works just the same way (Italian female doctor working at Padua’s city hospital, 48 years old)

These gaps in the Italian welfare system are particularly evident in the case of one service for illegal immigrants that we have examined. The ‘network’, supposed to be a central part of the work of this service, turns out to be more of a declaration of intention, rather than an organizational principle. The way in which this service is framed does not allow the building of a real network: the practice turns out to be more of an exchange of favours, thus being arbitrary and based on specific circumstances. It depends on the person met by the immigrant and on the person’s own network, competences and power. Service users reach this service mostly by ‘word-of-mouth’, as the organization does not even have a sign on the outside; the main space is the director’s office, which is often occupied for meetings. One welfare worker of this service related that for this reason she has often been forced to receive users ‘in the hall’. Moreover, this service is not really structured and just depends on ‘good will’.

Each case is different. For example, there was an illegal man who had big orthopaedic problems and he was given a corset. He was sent to a certain hospital because the doctor knew someone there... There are no consolidated standard procedures, everything is ‘ad personam’. (Welfare worker in a service that targets only illegal migrants).

Another example of particularism in Italian welfare is the problem of Romanian immigrants. Since January 2007 they are in a ‘paradoxical’ situation: they no longer have health care rights as these are not granted to non-EU citizens (by means of the STP for those who were irregular), but since most of them are guilty of evasion of their own country’s health care taxes (7% of monthly income), they do not have a European health care card, which allows card holders to access health care services in any other European country. Therefore, the Ministry of Health was forced to prolong the validity of STP cards by one year for those who had one as of December 31, 2006. The issue remains nevertheless unresolved: something that should be a right may or may not be granted depending on the person in power.

Now they have entered the EU and should have their own country’s health care insurance card, the situation for Romanians has become even harder... Now all they need is their own card, but nobody has it...as long as they need something I can do, I do it. But if I have to refer them to another doctor, will he accept them? (Male doctor working in a third sector health centre devoted to illegal immigrants, 56 years old)
Immigrant ‘opportunism’:
This type of conflict can be seen in the account of an employee of one Family Advice Bureaus. She complained about an Albanian woman:

We had to deal with her case for one year. Just by chance I came to know that she was not the person on the National Health Service Card she was using… we did not report this to the police, but just to our director.’ (Female welfare worker, 48 years old).

This strategy of ‘changing identity’ grants Albanian women necessary health care, but it leads the staff to stigmatize not only a single user, but the whole Albanian population: ‘after that case, I think that all Albanians are cheating’ (female welfare worker, 48 years old).

Some of the welfare actors interviewed in our research see as opportunistic also the mobility of Romanian citizens when it comes to their health needs. For example, some Romanian women living in Romania and having relatives in Italy come to give birth to their child in an Italian hospital since the assistance is considered to be better. But there are some Romanians living and working in Italy who go back to Romania to have abortions performed after the Italian legal deadline (third month of pregnancy).

Lack of welfare resources and ethnicization of conflict:
In many public welfare services we have repeatedly heard the same complaint: over the last few years human and material resources are getting scarcer and scarcer. This situation obviously highlights the shortcomings of a system which is increasingly less able to keep the universalistic promises made by regulations. Nowadays, among users, the foreign component is increasing, but instead of increasing the resources for these new demands, social expenses are decreasing. One welfare worker expressed fear of the ethnicization of a conflict on welfare:

The Italian user could say that she paid taxes for so many years and she could feel she has priority over newcomers…She could think that foreign people are stealing her rights. (Female doctor in one family advisory centre, 49 years old)

Moreover, instead of finding an alliance to improve the ‘welfare of everybody’, there is the risk of looking for scapegoats (first of all immigrants) to account for the shortcomings of the welfare system. This doctor feels just overwhelmed by work and she is afraid of having to face an impossible dilemma: what kind of priority and for whom? She knows that any decision she will make is arguable.
Example 2: The conservatism of Italian welfare in practice

How to reconcile work and family life?

Our research registered frustration among many immigrant women who feel trapped in traditional care-giving roles and who are facing daily the lack of public support to women’s paid work.

This place is going to drive me insane! (…). Always stuck at home, watching TV, bound and fettered to the sofa… There are no jobs for me here. I worked for an oil company in Nigeria. I have a certificate, and if I go to London or New York I can get a job in a big company just like I did in Nigeria (...). And then, if I ask for help they tell me that if I can’t manage to raise my children here I can go back to my country or at least send them there! (Nigerian woman, 30 years old)

In the commune’s offices they told me: if you have no job that gives you the possibility to look after your children! (…). I tried to get my mother here…it costs 3,000 Euros and it can take up to 3 years (...). And even women who have children who are at school until 4 pm, how can they manage? There are no jobs where you finish at 4. (Nigerian woman, 28 years old)

These impressions are confirmed also by our interviews with welfare operators, in particular those working in information bureaus for immigrant women:

Many ask only for part time jobs from 9h to 13h, to be able to take their children to school at 8 and be home at 14h. This leads to ‘unemployability’ in the case of individuals with no specific skills or training. (Italian female social worker, 35 years old)

Thus, immigrant and Italian mothers without family networks are facing similar problems.

How far can shared childcare work be promoted within the family?

European research shows that Italian fathers are among the least involved in care giving work. This is due both to low female participation in the labour market and to cultural and ideological reasons (Di Giulio e Carrozza 2003). Nevertheless, very recent studies show that the amount of time spent by fathers with children is increasing, thus, reducing the asymmetry within the couple (Zajczyk, Ruspini, Crosta, Fiore 2007). Family Advice Bureaus play a role in this socio-cultural change by promoting ‘active paternity’ and more equality within the couple. During the fieldwork we found the commitment to the value of gender equality especially in one of the advice bureaus. Here women often arrive alone at the centre, but in very few cases they arrived with their partners and then we observed the openly visible intention of doctors/nurses to make the fathers feel responsible by redistributing home duties...
in order to promote gender equality. Men’s reactions seemed to vary from amazement to annoyance.

While interviewing a doctor in another advice bureau we understood that according to certain welfare operators the promotion of responsibility among fathers should be limited.

At times Italian fathers feel even too responsible. They actually sometimes even become invasive and they make their role overlap with that of the mother. (Italian female welfare worker, 45 years old)

What this doctor fears is a total redefinition of fatherly and motherly roles, which would lead to sexual identity problems in children. In her opinion, active paternity should be promoted, but only within certain specific boundaries, so as not to damage gender identity. Moreover, based on her experience working at the Family Advice Bureau, this welfare worker expressed her views on the differences between different groups of immigrants regarding gender equality.

Immigrant families are a completely different story. Immigrant women often go through the pregnancy alone (...). Some husbands come here and show interest in the pregnancy, but some, like the ones from Bangladesh for example, do it only to check how things are going and what their wives are doing (...). Moroccan fathers are instead very involved and this has to do with their culture (...). In Morocco maternity regards only women, but not in Italy: in Morocco there are extended families and female networks of women helping women; here in Italy they have a nuclear family and hence husbands participate a lot (...). Romanian husbands work a lot and they are never there for their wives. (Italian female doctor, 45 years old)

Although the doctor is making generalizations on the basis of ethnic groups, it is possible to observe on-going transformations in what she describes: what she tells about Moroccans helps us in fact to deconstruct the common stereotyped image of Muslims as eternal prisoners of tradition and as incompatible with modern European values.

Among the local welfare operators there are different ideas, not only regarding the gender roles of different groups of immigrants, but especially on how to promote gender equality: each prenatal course, for example, has its own way of interpreting and promoting shared childcare within the couple, as we have observed.

*Family conflicts linked to the change in gender roles:*
The transformations in gender roles within the families are accompanied by conflicts, which can or cannot be managed peacefully, and can have different outcomes. According to the information we collected in interviews, there is
increasing separation/divorce among some immigrant groups, i.e. Romanians.

Among the youths I am assisting in schools, 80% has divorced parents… this is the most negative side of immigration (…). Romanian women fit in the stereotype of the submissive homebound wife (…). And so when these women manage to conquer some freedom, freedom of choice…they don’t know what to do (…) They realize they could have another identity, a new and different one…they enter a state of crisis in order to grow and develop in a different manner. (Romanian cultural mediator)

The wishes of emancipation by many immigrant women can clash with the frustrations of men who can feel dispossessed of their traditional role. In our interviews, some Romanian and Nigerian women told us about episodes of domestic violence by husbands, i.e. under the influence of alcohol.

Violence against women is an historically unresolved problem for all of Italian society, as it has emerged clearly from the recent research promoted by Ministry of Equal rights and Opportunity (‘La violenza e i maltrattamenti contro le donne fuori e dentro la famiglia’ published by ISTAT, 21/2/07).

Example 3: The difficult secularism in the field of reproductive health

What about prevention?
In Italy, working on prevention is particularly difficult in the field of reproductive health: conflicts based on interests (lack of money) intersect with those based on values (conservative religious vs. secular values). This is evident in the case of sex and relationship education. Since there is no national law on sex education not every Family Advisory Centre can teach prevention of abortion and sexual diseases among young people. Observing one sex education course (organized by one Family Advice Bureau in collaboration with Contatto Giovani, a youth advisory bureau) allowed us to note that the educators’ practices were clearly formed to promote secular values in the field of reproductive health (first and foremost by encouraging self-determination in girls) and that this was often conflicting (at times openly, but more often implicitly) with traditional Catholic doctrine. During the course at a technology and business oriented high school, the gynaecologist chose to clearly distinguish between effective contraceptive methods and ‘pseudo-methods’, among the latter she mentioned the ‘natural methods’ prescribed by institutional Catholicism. Employing statistical data she helped the audience understand that responsible procreation choices can only and solely be made using medical means and she stressed that the only possible

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4 One example of the historical patriarchal structure of Italian society is the fact that until 1981 Italian legislation recognised that a man who killed his wife, daughter or sister to defend his or family honour could have the penalty reduced by 1/3.
defence against STDs (Sexually Transmitted Diseases) are condoms (indirectly criticizing the official position of the Church which, still nowadays, promotes sexual abstinence as a solution). The clash of secular and religious values became even more explicit when discussing the ‘morning-after pill’: is it an abortive ‘drug’? No, ‘it is an emergency contraceptive’, stated the gynaecologist stressing the statement issued by the World Health Organization (www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs244/en/). But there are other doctors who would have answered yes, following what the Catholic Church dictates. So, depending on which kind of doctor they meet, youths may or may not be granted access to the morning-after pill\(^5\).

Moreover, in our local fieldwork we find a lack of promotion of contraceptives among immigrants.

There is nothing to turn immigrants towards prevention, we receive meagre funding and we are short of personnel unfortunately and so cuts in services begin right there. (Female welfare worker of a Family Advice Bureau, 47 years old)

But prevention is necessary to fight not only the increasing rate of abortions, but also the spreading of STDs, two emerging phenomena today among immigrants in Italy.

Abortion:

Family Advice Bureaus should ‘guide the service recipient towards autonomy (…), they should offer the person the instruments needed to operate choices in full awareness of all options’ (female welfare worker, 48 years old).

Providing responsible choices for abortion becomes particularly difficult: sometimes the employee’s own values override the autonomous decisions of women, other times voluntary workers linked to institutional Catholicism can find themselves in conflict with the secular approach of the public welfare system.

Today many social workers have a problematic relationship with the task of helping women in self-determination because they think that for some immigrant women abortion is an easy solution.

For Central and Eastern European women abortion is a contraceptive procedure, it is not their fault if they grew up like this, in a context where abortion was a legitimate state policy, when not even a promoted practice. It was much cheaper for the state to interrupt pregnancies and get rid of the children, cheaper than running campaigns on the birth control pill. (Italian female doctor, 45 years old)

\(^5\) While in other countries, like France or the U.K., morning-after pills are readily available at pharmacies, being sold over the counter, in Italy they require prescription by a doctor, who has the power to refuse prescription and use to the ‘conscientious objection’ argument.
This gynaecologist working at district 2 told us that, also in the case of screening tests (with 90% accuracy), while Italian women further investigate with amniocentesis in order to be completely assured whether the foetus is malformed before they decide what to do, ‘many immigrant women can’t bear to wait and decide to get rid of the baby directly’ (Italian female doctor, 45 years old).

On the one hand, the emphasis on welfare workers’ discourses is often on ‘cultural factors’.

Eastern European women have lots of abortions, Nigerian women too (...). No contraceptives, above all no condoms: they come from cultural contexts where men demand to have sex without protection… it is a matter of virility, of male chauvinism, a way of affirming one’s sexual potency. (Female welfare worker, 36 years old)

On the other hand, interviews with the immigrants themselves, Romanians and Nigerians, clearly show the importance of material (and not only cultural) factors in opting for abortion.

If I get pregnant nobody will hire me and I’ll be unemployed… (36 year old Romanian woman)

Moreover, the active role of institutional Catholicism through some conservative private social organizations (mainly the Pro-Life Movement, which made the proposal for regional Law no. 3) has created new conflicts within the local welfare system (see Context and timeframe, above).

We need nursery schools, paid leaves, and those who choose not to work should receive grants at least up until the child is 2-3 years old. (...). The proposal for regional Law no. 3, in my opinion, is very ideological and little or not at all concrete. (Italian female doctor, 45 years old)

Those voluntary workers (from the Pro-Life Movement) intercept in hospitals the women who want to have an abortion and they insist and repeat: ‘Keep the child, we will be there for you’, but they help them only for 2, 3, at best 4 months and then they leave them on their own. At that point women no longer know what to do and they are forced to give up the child for adoption... Thanks to them it all becomes traumatic. (Female welfare worker in one Family Advice Bureau, 40 years old)

But we listened also to the opposite opinion.

We had lots of problems with Family Advice Bureaus in the beginning, in the feminist period up until a few years ago (...). The proposal for a regional law… they took it badly and thought we wanted to have a role in hospitals which would damage the doctors. Padua is the proof that we have to get where we have to get in a very quiet manner (...). [Regarding abortion] the
main problems are always of an economic nature (...). Nowadays 80% of those who turn to our service are immigrants...lots of Nigerians, especially here in Padua (...). We realized that more unsophisticated and simple people more easily accept our help, out of fear... while those with a higher cultural level at times are the most difficult to reach. (President of the Centro Aiuto alla Vita)

Indeed the cultural conflict related to abortion is transversal: it is not a simple question of secular people vs. religious people, or Italians vs. immigrants. The welfare workers in the Family Advisory Centres are Catholics too. Sometimes the conflict is between progressive Catholics vs. conservative Catholics in the field of reproductive health: the former think that it is a matter of being ‘pro-legal abortions’ or ‘pro-clandestine-abortions’ and that ‘defending life’ means more social rights; the latter refuse any option for abortion and interpret the defence of life by trying to persuade women to keep the child in any condition. Other times, cultural value conflicts related to abortion occurs within ‘minority groups’, as it emerges from the discourse of a Romanian Orthodox priest.

Romanian women see it [abortion] as an instrument of women’s emancipation... they are quite late compared to western society where this was the case in the 70s with feminism (...). The (Romanian) government also has not done enough...and now they want to make up for it by doing something even worse, by introducing sexual education in schools (...). I know that in Romania the church has reacted to this... (Orthodox priest, Romanian, 40 years old)

Analysis: emergent values

Health and Social Care: universalism vs. particularism / differentialism (Related concepts: Equality, Identity, Culture).

*Universalism*: social rights must be granted to all, without distinction.

*Particularism*: social rights must be granted first of all and primarily to certain groups.

*Differentialism*: social rights must be granted in a differentiated manner to different social groups.

The discrepancy between, on the one hand, the universalistic discourse in international\(^6\) and national\(^7\) rules and regulations in matters of health, and, on

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\(^6\) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the main challenge to any and all forms of particularism/ differentialism, even those based on the idea of nationality-based citizenship. This implies that only national-citizens have certain rights, while others, even if they contribute to the cultural and material development of the country in which they reside, are solely ‘second class’ citizens.
the other hand, the *particularist/differentialist* practices, common in the welfare systems of Italy and Padua is a cause of much *conflict*. Conflict is found, on one level, between the majority population and minorities: autochthonous citizens seem often unwilling to grant immigrants, and especially illegal immigrants, rights that are equal to their own; immigrants often feel they are being discriminated against in several manners and fields, including access and fulfilment of welfare services. On another level, a similar kind of conflict is found also within the majority population itself: an increasing number of Italians show signs of not wanting to accept an equality based on redistribution of wealth by means of taxation, as the gap between the northern and southern regions of the country grows even wider and deeper.

This framework of values is bipolar (universalism - particularism/differentialism), but is not to be interpreted rigidly. There are social actors responsible for new strategies of *social cohesion* that seek *substantial equality* by means of an *extended universalism* (Kilani 1997), capable of including differences (not only cultural, but also religious, gender and sexually oriented, as well as, generational differences) and characterized by a pragmatic kind of solidarity which is at times reflexive.

**Family, Social Care and Employment: gender equality vs. traditional gender roles** (Related concepts: Equality, Identity, Culture).

*Gender equality*: men and women have equal opportunities, i.e. they enjoy equal rights and share equal responsibilities.

*Traditional gender roles*: men and women have different opportunities, rights and responsibilities, depending on their traditional gender roles.

In this case, the rift between *equalitarian discourse* and *traditionalist practices* likewise generates *conflict*. Expectations of equality for many Italian and foreign women are thwarted by a welfare system, which is incapable of supporting them adequately. This difficult situation can lead to new forms of *social cohesion* based on an alliance of sorts between women; there are, however, also often latent conflicts between Italian women and foreign women, who substitute them in the traditional care-giving roles, which they were not able/could not change together with Italian men.

This framework of values (gender equality vs. traditional gender roles) can be further subdivided in another dimension:

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7 Art. 32 of the Italian Constitution states that, ‘The Republic safeguards health as a fundamental right of the individual and in the interest of the community; it grants free healthcare to the needy’. This article does not refer solely to (national) citizens, as the other articles do, as it employs the term ‘individual’: social rights as human rights, and hence to be granted to all, illegal immigrants included. This universalistic principle was explicitly acknowledged in 1998, when the provision of healthcare for illegal immigrants was introduced in the ‘testo unico dell’immigrazione’ (see art. 34, 35, 36; 42, 43, 44).
Care giving work is everybody’s responsibility vs. care giving work is a women’s responsibility:

Care giving work is everybody’s responsibility: taking care of non-self-sufficient individuals (first and foremost children and the elderly) is a duty of society as a whole, men included.

Care giving work is a women’s responsibility: taking care of non-self-sufficient individuals (first and foremost children and the elderly) is a women’s task and duty.

Health, Education and Family: secular values vs. religious values in the field of reproductive health

(Related Concepts: Freedom, Identity, Culture).

Secular values in the field of reproductive health: scientifically based secularized morals of international organizations, like the W. H. O., should determine choices in matters of reproductive health (sexual education, birth control, pregnancy and childbirth ...).

Religious values in the field of reproductive health: religious morals, based on the prescriptions of the Church and of religious leaders and movements, should determine choices in matters of reproductive health (sexual education, birth control, pregnancy and childbirth ...).

The Italian welfare system is formally secular, but it includes practices explicitly determined by religious principles deriving from Catholic morals, which are openly in conflict with the reproductive health needs of women (Italian women and, increasingly, foreign-born women). In particular, the clash of values emerges in matters regarding contraception and abortion. This framework of values (secular values vs. religious values in the field of reproductive health) can in its turn also be broken down into a subset:

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8 ‘Within the framework of the World Health Organization’s definition of health as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being (…), reproductive health implies that people are able to have a responsible, satisfying and safe sex life and that they have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so. Implicit in this are the rights of men and women to be informed of and to have access to, safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of fertility regulation of their choice and the right to access to appropriate healthcare services that will enable women to go safely through pregnancy and childbirth and provide couples with the best chance of having a healthy infant’ (www.who.int/reproductive_health/en/index.html).

9 Regarding the Catholic standpoint, see for example the position of the Accademia Pontificia Pro Vita, which openly clashes with the W.H.O. regarding reproductive health (www.academiavita.org).
Self-determination of women vs. hetero-determination of women:

Self-determination of women: a woman’s body belongs to her and her alone, and no external entity (family, Church, state) can force her to make choices against her will.

Hetero-determination of women: women’s bodies as generators of life are a public good and it is hence legitimate (for the state, the Church …) to limit, influence and condition women’s choices.

The polarization of this situation is to be perceived in the various forms it takes. Nowadays there are, for example, many women who, by stressing the idea of a ‘parental project’, feel that their choices as inevitably conditioned by the role of the biological father, who may or may not decide to accept commitment (Boltanski 2007). In other words, these women feel nonetheless the weight of the social context (at least on an immediate level) and they relativize the militant idea of female self-determination as an absolute.

Religion, minorities and gender
(Related Concepts: Identity, Freedom, Justice).

Universalism vs. particularism/differentialism:

Religion. Catholicism, the majority religion, is clearly involved and committed on the basis of a kind of universalism that intends to include migrants. Basic associative movements and Catholic voluntary work are in the frontline when it comes to assisting illegal immigrants, above all when it comes to their reception upon arrival. It should also be mentioned that a portion of Catholics have also been advocating in political campaigns to favour the granting of social rights to illegal immigrants10. But particularistic practices can be found among religious actors (both in the majority and minority groups), which for example prioritize helping people who are part of the same faith, or which only are able to reach certain people in certain specific areas.

Minorities. ‘Particularism/differentialism in practice’ concerns first of all immigrants who are excluded from welfare services despite being theoretically entitled to them. Our results are in agreement with the observations of the Italian Society of Migration Medicine: the main reasons for this exclu-

10 The case of Caritas Roma (led by Don Di Liegro) deserves a special mention: in 1995 (when there still were no regulations guaranteeing rights to healthcare for illegal immigrant) they acted to ‘awaken consciences’ by means of the ‘Immigrazione e salute: una politica dell’oblio’ convention, thus contributing (together with secular associations) to the creation of the public debate which led to 1998 change in legislation.
sion are the lack of application of the law, the lack of knowledge of the law, the lack of coordination between different sectors and different institutional and non-institutional actors, the lack of communication between the services offered and the potential users.

Gender. Universalism has met opposition from the feminist movement: feminists hold that the alleged neutrality of social and political citizenship is in fact biased in favour of male citizens. The Family Advice Bureaus, which were crucial in our research, were born out of these feminist political struggles during the 70s: innovative and gender-conscious services were created and planned above all for women. Nowadays, the focus on substantial, rather than on formal, equality and the need for awareness of differences are crucial to uncover and stress the exclusion of many immigrant women from the Italian welfare system (first and foremost illegal immigrant women employed in care giving work for the elderly).

Criticism against universalism as a hegemonic principle has also led to increasing consideration of cultural differences. Geraci (2007) holds in fact that the current crucial issue for the Italian welfare system is the availability of services, i.e. the cultural ability of services to adjust and respond adequately to the needs of new migrant users. Ideological universalism born out of assimilationist policies (i.e. adopting standardized welfare strategies) is clearly rejected, but it is less clear what the plan is and how it is meant to proceed to guarantee equality and respect of mutual differences. Two options arise (Giménez 2006, 159-161): multiculturalism and interculturality. While the former tends to essentialize cultures and often result in differentialist policies, the latter aims towards working on differences to constantly reconstruct that which is common, from a standpoint which we have labelled as ‘extended universalism’. In the first case we find ‘dedicated services’ for specific social groups (e.g. illegal immigrants). In the second case, priority is instead given to actions ‘targeted’ to certain social groups, but always within a framework of universal services.

Gender equality vs. traditional gender roles:

Religion and gender. As part of our research we met with local autochthonous social actors that expressed their affiliation to the majority church (both within private and public welfare services) that promotes ‘traditional gender roles’. Their practices clearly revealed their belief that care giving work is mainly and primarily a duty of women. Interviews with religious leaders of migrant groups also prevalently show a conservative traditional view of gender roles.
Minorities and gender. Many immigrant women migrate not only for economic reasons, but also to satisfy a desire for social and political emancipation and above all for freeing themselves from subordination to male authority. The reality they are faced with once in Italy is, however, far from meeting their expectations as they find it hard to enter the labour market and in most cases this is possible solely in the sector of care-giving work to the elderly and children. The way the Italian welfare system is organized harms these women, not only by segregating them within this traditionally female labour niche (regardless of their previous education or working experience, or of their current aspirations), but also, on a more general level, by not adequately supporting them in reconciling paid work and family life; this is also the case for Italian women (but they can count on support from parental networks). The end result is that migrant women are forced to play a traditional gender role, which they thought they had left behind.

Secular values vs. religious values in the field of reproductive health: Religion. The secularization process in Italian society is definitely contradictory and, depending on which social actors and areas we observe, we find different realities but in a more or less dependent relationship to Church hierarchies. Nowadays the influence of religion on sexuality and family morals seems relevant only for a small minority of young Italian Catholics (Garelli 2006, p. 98). The most strongly disregarded norm of Catholic morality is in fact that which ‘demands that partners in a relationship practice their sexuality solely within the boundaries of wedlock’: it is by now common, even among committed young Catholics, that ‘mutual understanding and harmony in a couple should be tested and verified also on the level of sexuality’ (Ibid, p. 101). This too is a form of the individualization of faith: young Catholics ‘select’ what to deem valid within their religious tradition. In fact, during a participant observation in one high school, statements, such as ‘a Catholic boy and girl wait for years before making love’ or ‘virginity is important for a Catholic girl’, were classified as ‘outdated ideas’ according to the unanimous reaction by the pupils in the classrooms.

Faced with sexual and reproductive practices among Italians, which are increasingly removed from Catholic morality, church hierarchies have become more active in the public sphere trying to regain the ground they have lost. The focal point of this cultural and political struggle is the issue of women’s reproductive health. Since the ‘90s, the core of Italian debates concerns the recognition of subjective rights to the embryo, thus going in the direction of making abortion a crime as if it was comparable to homicide11.

11 In 1995 the Pope was in the frontline issuing the encyclical letter Evangelium Vitae, comparing abortion and genocide, http://www.ewtn.com/library/encyc/jp2evang.htm. The same concept of recognising subjective rights to the embryo is used against assisted reproduction methods.
Minorities. As far as migrant populations are concerned, we found a certain gap between the normative discourse of religious leaders and the secularized practices of women in matters of reproductive health. It is not possible to link, for example, the limited use of contraceptive methods solely to religious prescription; there seem to be other intervening factors (i.e. socioeconomic factors) which hinder the possibility of any responsible family planning (that could avert resorting to abortion).

Gender. As far as religion is concerned, the exclusive focus on the embryo makes women disappear, as if they were simply ‘a womb’. The effects of these struggles on the bodies of women are severe, considering not only the on-going ‘revival’ of abortions (and clandestine abortions) in Italy among immigrant women, but also the increase in sexually transmitted diseases among immigrants and youths in general (due to inadequate sexual education). Regarding the hetero-determination of women, it is important to stress that it can be used on the basis of secular values. Several former Communist states, like Romania for example, through the years have de-penalized and re-penalized abortion depending on demographic planning needs. On the other hand, neoliberalism does not seem to favour health practices in reproduction: the bodies of immigrants are seen more as useful goods to be exploited for labour, rather than as human beings to whom social rights should be granted.

Notes on intersections
There are intersections between these three domains, in the following ways.

Religion and gender. Considering the discourse of the social actors involved and the practices of those who act inspired by religious values, our case-study evidently showed that institutional Catholicism plays a predominant role in the local welfare and that the Italian welfare regime is a conservative one (Esping-Andersen 1999; see Examples of social cohesion, ex. 2 and 3, above). Whereas the WREP project (Frisina, forthcoming) had clearly shown that within Catholicism there are those who challenge traditional gender patterns, in our study carried out in Padua the traditionalist side of Italian Catholicism seems to prevail. Maybe this is because our study focused on reproductive health and in Italy (as is the case in the U.S.A., Lakoff 2006, pp. 170-201) where there is a political and cultural inability among progressive groups to validly counter the arguments of conservatives regarding crucial moral themes, such as the ‘preservation of life’. This situation generates frustration among all those women (Italian and immigrant) who no longer feel they belong in this traditional model of society and family.
Gender and minorities. Studies on global care-giving networks are focused on the migration of women from some of the poorest countries of the world who move, often on a temporary basis, in order to look after the children, the elderly and the homes of affluent women in the North (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2004). In this analysis, the position of countries in the global capitalist hierarchy, being in the core or in the periphery, socio-economic class, ethnicity and gender, are all factors that can collectively result in the exploitation of the specifically feminized labour of caregiving work. Here class is understood as part of a global system of capitalism, whose effects are traced back to commodity chains. It is seen as gendered not only because those who sell their labour are women, but also in the nature of the tasks they perform, namely of care-giving work (Walby 2002). In the Padua case study we found that skin colour is a further factor of subdivision. Multiple inequalities seem in fact to burden Nigerian women much more than Romanian, since being black in Italy today is a basis for discrimination (Andall 2003; Sorgoni 2002).

Religion and minorities. Considering the social exclusion that many immigrants suffer, churches are doubtlessly an important resource of primary basic welfare services. They are first and foremost a place for getting together, a place where information is exchanged, a safe haven where it is possible to socialize within a general context that is perceived as hostile (especially in the case of Nigerian immigrants). For example, by attending Sunday services at a Nigerian Pentecostal mass, it was evident how the ceremony played an important empowerment role for people living in very precarious social, economic and legal conditions. However, in many cases religious communities are formed on the basis of nationality or ethnicity, favouring social relationships between people who are ‘alike’; hence, in practice the universalism of many religious messages is often put aside.

All the cases of conflict or cohesion that we looked at seem to be based on aspects which are both symbolic (values) and material (interests). In other words, values and interests are tightly intertwined. In particular, cuts in social spending seem to inevitably lead towards the polarities of particularism, traditional gender roles and the predominance of certain religious values in the Italian welfare system (the values of institutional Catholicism).

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Chapter 5 Greece

5:1 OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL SITUATION

Nikos Kokosalakis, Effie Fokas

Introduction
The aims and objectives of the WaVE project are very pertinent in the case of Greece. One of the most conspicuous changes in Greek society in the last decades is the mass influx of immigrants, particularly in the last ten years. This development challenged a homogeneity, which has been considered – especially since the population exchanges with Turkey in the 1920’s – characteristic of Greece. Intimately related to this is the loss of a religious homogeneity in Greece, as the percentages of members of the Orthodox Church of Greece have always been cited as quite high (in the upper 90’s). Greece, like most other cases in the WaVE project, reveals social tensions that arise with increasing ethnic and religious diversity in society, as observed through the prism of welfare: in other words, the competition of increasingly scarce welfare resources leads to similar practical problems in Greece as in other cases. In the Greek case, though, we also see a very strong identity dimension to the problems, as Greek society struggles to come to terms with a situation in which it must share its welfare resources with ‘others’ who are often perceived as a threat to Greek national and religious identity (given not least the strong connection between national and religious identity in the Greek case).

This identity dimension significantly influences the realm of politics. Specifically, there are two sets of relationships which serve to bring identity issues to the forefront of public social and political discussions: these are the relationship between religion and national identity (historically a powerful force in Greek society and symbolically embedded in narratives of the establishment of Greek national independence), and, based on the foundations of the latter, the relationship between church and state. These two sets of relationships profoundly influence the Greek political sphere and, by extension, policies towards minorities in Greece.
There is a great deal of attention, both in the Greek political sphere and in the mass media, to relations between the majority and minorities in Greece. This has also been the subject of a great deal of research, both qualitative and quantitative (namely, the European Values Survey and the European Social Survey). However, the examination of majority-minority relations – and the values embedded in these – through the prism of welfare is quite new to Greek research. Likewise, although there have been studies of the welfare of minorities in Greece (including a number of FP5 and FP6 research projects), of the relationship between religion and welfare (the WREP study), and of gender and welfare (mainly national level research but also comparative European research), the intersections between these three dimensions – minorities, religion and gender – have not, to our knowledge, been examined in the Greek context. It is precisely the intersections which we expect to yield fruitful research, as in the Greek context these three dimensions intersect in very interesting ways, and we expect to learn a great deal about transitions in welfare and values in Greece through this approach.

Characteristics of the Greek welfare system

Historical background

The Greek welfare system is often described as late in developing. Its background is in welfare conceptions that can be traced to the establishment of the modern Greek state in the 19th century, when conservative ideas of social control prevailed and were strongly embedded in a philanthropic ideology: “‘rehabilitation’ of the poor entailed aligning them with the values of a work ethic and the family’ (Arapoglou 2004, 108). The Church represented the model of philanthropy and, together with the family, formed the social network, which tended to welfare needs. Within this context, the history of church state relations have had a significant influence on how welfare is shaped in Greece and, historically, there has been a mutual influence between welfare provided by the Church and that provided by the state. The strong links remain today and, consequently, there is substantial interaction in welfare provision between Church and state.

In terms of the establishment of formal state welfare structures, the first of these was IKA (Institute for Social Security) in 1934, followed by OGA (Agricultural Insurance Organization) in 1961. The welfare state was formally embedded in the 1975 constitution. Beyond this, the Greek welfare system as it stands today began to take its shape in the early 1980s, with the PASOK government. Social spending increased significant in the early 80s (and again during the 1994-2003 period of PASOK rule). The perhaps most
conspicuous accomplishment of this government in the welfare domain was the establishment of a unified national health service (ESY).

Greek historical political culture has had strong effects on the Greek welfare system, especially the strongly bipolar nature of the party system and the conflicntual character of party politics: like education system reform, progress is often stunted by change in the administration, and welfare is one of the most intense battlefields for Greek party politics. The system of social protection is highly unequal, and those who benefit most play a large role in objecting to and blocking change and progress. As a result, the system can be described as marked by relative continuity since the early 1980’s (Sotiropoulos 2004, 269). For the past 25 years, welfare state reforms in Greece have been a result of interplay between domestic politics and EU influence (Sotiropoulos 2004, 267). The EU has left its mark mainly in the domains of employment policies, vocational training, regional development and, to a certain extent, social assistance. But other welfare reforms have remained mainly on paper, including especially pension reform.

Contemporary characteristics

Greece falls under the ‘southern European’ model (i.e., in Esping-Andersen’s terms an ‘underdeveloped version of the conservative regime’): specifically, Greece belongs to the conservative-corporatist tradition, with the southern-European specificity of ‘particularist-clientelist’ tendencies. It is relatively restricted in its breadth and also relatively new (most of the current welfare structures were developed after 1981, with the PASOK government). Today, it is characterized by fragmentation and clientelism in the funding and delivery of social protection, resulting in large-scale inequities; cash benefits predominate over other kinds of transfers of services; and pensions form the largest part of cash transfers. Social spending in 2004 stood at approximately 22% of the GDP, while the EU average is 28%. Compared with EU averages, Greece has a higher unemployment rate; a particularly high youth unemployment rate; ineffectiveness of social transfers in terms of success in fighting poverty; a more unequal income distribution; and a lower female participation in the labour force (Sotiropoulos 2004, 269-271; Matsaganis 2005, 237-8). In terms of comparison with European Union averages in 2005 (based on EU25), Greece had an unemployment rate of 9.8% compared to the 8.7% EU average, and female unemployment of 15.3% compared to the EU average of 9.8%. In the same year, the long-term unemployment rate in Greece was 5.1% compared to the EU average of 3.9%; for females, this rate was 8.9%, compared to the average of 4.5%. In 2004, 20% of the Greek population was at risk of poverty after social transfers (compared with the EU25 average of 16%), and 21% of the female population were at risk of poverty (compared with the EU25 average of 17%). Mean-
while, the total expenditure on social protection in Greece, in 2003, is 26.3%, as compared with the EU25 average of 28.0%.

The relationship between the role of the public sector, private companies, NGO’s and the family varies significantly across the spectrum of welfare services. In very general terms we can say that the Greek system is based on a public-private mix, relying heavily on the family in nearly all aspects of welfare provision, with a public medical system, which yields increasingly to private care schemes, and a fairly weak social capital structure (little volunteer activity, with the exception of the Church context). Certainly the Greek family structure has played an enormous role in informal protection, acting as a ‘social shock absorber’ in many areas of social need (Matsaganis et al, 2003).

Current challenges and debates

A poignant problem facing the welfare system today, and which is expected to continue in the near future, has to do with insufficient pensions and with the factors which are intimately related to this: an aging population; low birth rates and hence fewer contributions to the funds by the working population; increased activity of women in the work force; and, therefore, a new gap in care for the elderly. Social security as a whole is considered a central challenge facing Greek society. In general (and certainly this applies beyond the Greek case), there is a great deal of connectivity between challenges to the welfare system. For example: increasing immigration to Greece raises the potential contributions to pension schemes, but also raises the problem of extending benefits to third-country nationals; meanwhile, increased female employment also raises contributions to pension schemes, but leaves gaps in care for the elderly who are currently insufficiently covered by their pension schemes, and who are increasingly cared for by immigrant women (many of whom are third-country nationals). We see here, then, the ‘intersections’ between the various dimensions addressed by the WaVE project.

Certainly pension reform has been one of the most potent areas of welfare debate in recent years, and the problem of insufficient pensions continues to be at the top of the agenda. Difficulties in introducing and implementing pension reforms are indicative of the stalemate often characterizing general welfare reform efforts. Beyond this, poor quality care in public hospitals (overcrowding especially) is a much-discussed welfare dilemma; and the widening gap between the rich and the poor is increasingly a focal point of media attention (in February 2006 plans to cut public spending led to waves of strikes and protest in Athens).

In the extent to which education is considered a welfare issue, education reform – at almost all levels of education – has been central to political debate, culminating in a series of long-term strikes and of protests throughout Greece in the autumn of 2006. Although this spate of debates began over the
issue of remuneration of the teaching staff, it spread to include a number of related problems (including racism in schools, discussions of the failures of the system of universal tertiary education, etc.).

There are other important welfare issues which are not so widely debated and which deserve mention in order to highlight the underlying power structures, which influence whether or not an issue reaches the public agenda in a compelling manner. For example, homelessness of refugees and immigrants (as well as of Greek citizens) stands as a pertinent problem in Greece in its own right, exacerbated by the lack of official data (and, linked to this, an official definition) and, more importantly, by the administrative and political views which underlie the problem of weak data. A result is a stumbling block in the documenting of the rise of both visible and hidden homelessness in Greece (Arapoglou 2004).

Likewise, there are a number of gender-related welfare issues which are not particularly high on the agenda of public debate, but which are especially important and challenging policy issues. Four such issues are still low rates in female employment; trafficking/prostitution of migrant women; violence against women; and poor personal security for migrant women working in domestic care.

There are so many inherent contradictions in the system that reform in one general direction is neither possible nor constructive. Meanwhile, the system suffers from gridlock in reforms as these are always heavily contended in the public debate, due not least to the many incompatible claims of various groups. Given the urgency for reform in the system as a whole as it pertains to the majority community, within this context policies towards gender equality fall behind on the priority list. This is much more the case for immigrant groups (in fact, Greece is considered one of the worst destinations in Europe specifically for refugees). In other words, if the needs of the average Greek citizen are not met by the welfare system, the problem is exaggerated for immigrants to Greece. (It is important to emphasize that minorities’ experience of the welfare system varies significantly from one minority group to another, and certainly those with citizenship fare relatively well as compared with undocumented immigrants.)

Religious composition of Greece

Historical overview and current situation

For the contemporary religious situation in Greece the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) was a historical landmark. Following the defeat of Greece in Asia Minor and the burning of Smyrna (a Greek-populated town in contemporary Turkey, in August 1922) over one million Greek Orthodox refugees fled to
Greece. The treaty ratified the exchange of populations in the Balkans and more than half a million Muslim Turks moved from Greece to Turkey. This turned Greece into the most homogenous national state in the Balkans, from 43% Greek Orthodox in 1912 to 89% in 1924 (Pentzopoulos, 1962: 125-140).

Official statistics for the religious groups in the country today are not available because the Statistical Service of Greece has not been including the declaration of religious affiliation in the census since 1951. There are, however, estimates but these are also constantly changing because of migration flows into the country over the last twenty years. From 1950 to 1990 the nominally Orthodox in Greece were estimated at over 95% of the total population. Although between 1950 and 1974 more than a million Greeks emigrated abroad, most of them Orthodox, many of them returned after 1980 and from 1985 many Greeks came from the countries of the Soviet Union, mainly from the area of ‘Pontos’ (the Black Sea).

With the collapse of the socialist bloc a sudden and massive wave of immigration started mainly from Albania but also from Bulgaria, Romania and Poland. This influx of immigration affected the religious composition of the country as most of the immigrants were non-Orthodox. In addition to the immigrants from ex-socialist countries there have been Muslim inflows from the Middle East and from North Africa.

Muslims constitute by far the largest non-Orthodox religious group in the country but of these only around 100,000 (those who live in the Western Thrace), are recognized officially as a religious minority. Their rights have been clearly established by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), and they are all Greek citizens. Ethnically 50% of them are of Turkish origin, 35% are Pomaks (Slavic speaking) and 15% are Roma (http://www.mfa.gr/foreign/musminen.htm). The rest of the Muslims (over 500,000) came recently as immigrants from Albania, the Middle East, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Africa. These are not Greek citizens and many of them are not regularized as they have not acquired yet a residence and work permit. The majority of them live in Attica and other big cities and some live in the rural areas. Most of them are practicing but they do not have mosques.

The second major non-Orthodox group in the country is the Catholic minority. Again about 50,000 are ethnic Greeks and Greek citizens and live mainly in Athens and in the islands of Syros and Tinos. To these must be added about 5,000 Catholics of the Eastern right (Uniates). In additions there are of 100,000 Catholics, immigrants who came from the Philippines, Poland and other countries.

The third religious minority in Greece are the Jehovah’s Witnesses. They are ethnic Greeks and Greek citizens and recognized as minority. The fourth group is the Protestant Churches consisting of various denominations amounting to around 30,000 members. The fifth group is the Jews, around 5000, also Greek citizens. Finally there is an assortment of small groups
such as: the Baha’i Faith, the Adventists; the Unification Church, Scientology, Followers of the Greek Pantheon, etc. None of these groups exceeds 1,000 members and they are Greek citizens.

A major Orthodox group (over 500,000), which is not considered a minority, is that of the Old Calendarists. These have separated from the Church of Greece from 1923 when the country and the Church adopted the new Gregorian calendar.

Legal provisions for religious minorities

The official organization and recognition of all religions in Greece falls within two major categories: Legal Persons of Public Law and Legal Persons of Private Law. In the first category belong: the Orthodox Church of Greece; the Jewish community, and the Muslim Community of Thrace. In the second category belong all the other groups mentioned above as long as they have an officially recognized place of worship by the Ministry of Education and Religions. Another categorization is ‘known religions’ (Greek Constitution, Article 13, 2) and ‘other religions’. ‘Known religions’ are: the Orthodox Church, the Old Calendarists, the Catholic Church, Islam, Judaism, the Protestant Churches, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the Adventists. ‘Other religions’ applies to any other religion. For ‘other religions’ to become known they must be granted a license for a place of worship by the Ministry of Education and Religions after consultation with the local bishop of the Orthodox Church in whose diocese the official place of worship is going to operate.

In the above framework most religious minorities mentioned above are organized in denominations and have various associations. The Muslims of Thrace have numerous mosques, are entitled to the welfare provisions of the state and have their own schools. The Muslim immigrants lack Mosques and gather for worship in various houses and have established various national associations (for immigrants generally available on line: http://www.migrantsingreece.org/who.asp). The Catholics have their own places of worship and partake in the welfare services as Greek citizens and have established some schools. Catholic immigrants from the Philippines, Poland and elsewhere use the Catholic Churches and have their own associations. Most Protestant Churches have their official places of worship and the minor ones and the various sects have their own informal places for meeting and worship. The Jehovah’s Witnesses have places of Worship in cities and towns and a major centre in Athens. The small Jewish community is organized in Athens and Thessaloniki.

As indicated above, old established religious minorities in Greece, both Muslim and Christian, partake in state welfare but they also have their own services. The quantity and quality of such services is unknown and is a matter for research. Immigrant minorities also have their own associations,
which may fulfil welfare functions but the number and the functions of such associations is also a matter for research. The situation in this area is certainly fluid as the embodiment, let alone integration, of immigrants in Greek society is an open and yet uncertain process.

Characteristics of the Orthodox Church of Greece

Historical developments

The Orthodox Church of Greece was officially established as an autocephalous church in 1833, shortly following the establishment of the modern Greek state with independence won from the Ottoman Empire. The decision of the Greek state to establish an autocephalous church was very much motivated by political, rather than theological, concerns and meant a close link of religious and national identity as well as of church and state.

The formal relationship between church and state today is set out in article 3 of the Greek Constitution, which states that ‘The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ’. Under the Greek legislature the Orthodox Church is a Legal Person of Public Law. This fact leads to a number of practical implications. The Orthodox Church has served until recently (1982) almost as department of the state performing civil functions as registrar of births, and marriages. Law 1250/1982 recognized the option of civil marriage, which was, until then, non-existent in Greece. The close connection of Church and state meant in fact the subjugation of the first to the latter, which the Hierarchy accepted for various ideological, ethnic and economic reasons. As a consequence the Church suffered from and was always involved in the political upheavals of the state. Thus, up to 1975 the change of government often meant changes in the Synod and almost invariably a change of the Archbishop.

Over the last thirty years Greece’s membership in the EU and the efforts of governments to modernize the state and Greek society have brought new tensions in the relationship of the two institutions (Manitakis, A. 2001; Dimitropoulos, P. 2001). Such tensions are enhanced by the fact that Greek society is becoming increasingly pluralistic whereas the Church seems to insist in maintaining its ethnocentric role (Prodromou, E. 2004). Tensions in Church and state relations, however, tend to reflect tensions within Greek society. The policy of the Simitis government to remove the mention of religious affiliation from new civil identity cards since the year 2000 was vehe-

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1Interestingly, another point in Article 3 states that text of the Bible ‘shall be maintained unaltered. Official translation of the text into any other form of language, without prior sanction of the Autocephalous Church of Greece and the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople, is prohibited.’ This has significant implications for Protestant minorities in Greece.
mently fought by the Church hierarchy which seemed to have strong ground support with Orthodox believers (Makrides, V. 2005). Such tensions have brought again the issue of the separation of Church and state into public debate by the media and the Press, but the government does not intend to include this issue in the proposed revision of the Constitution. It could, of course, be proposed for inclusion by any of the opposition parties.

The power of the Church derives from its influence on Greek society. Apart from the fact that Orthodoxy remains an important component for ethnic identity, popular religiosity, at personal and collective levels, seems to be deeply rooted in Greek society. Indicative for this is the high participation of the public in festivals, holy Week, Easter, and the cult of the Saints and Virgin Mary. Also, Greece is perhaps unique in Europe in the universal practice of the rights of passage within the Orthodox Church. It is inconceivable that parents would leave their children un-baptized even if they have only tentative, nominal connection with the Church. The collective ethos is such that even those Greeks who are indifferent to religion, or claim to be agnostics or atheists, do nevertheless participate in the rites of passage, i.e., baptisms, funerals and weddings. Since legislation for civil marriage came to effect only around 4% (on average) of the marriages conducted avail themselves to that option and many of these do have a church ceremony later. Only recently was a bill passed by parliament allowing cremation in Greece; the Church has strongly opposed this development for years. However, as a compromise with the Church, the bill only applies to the non-Orthodox.

Current leadership and activities

Church and the state in Greece are also deeply interconnected at the symbolic level of civil religion as well as at the organizational and economic levels. At national holidays as well as at formal political occasions such as the swearing of the President or of a new or reshuffled government the Church is formally officiating. Conversely at major religious services and festivals representatives of the state and in some cases the Prime Minister do have to formally participate. The current Archbishop (Christodoulos, in position since 1998) has had a particularly conspicuous presence on the political scene (not least due to the aforementioned ‘identity card crisis’ and its aftermath, in terms of its effects on individual politicians).

The organization of the Church is nationwide. According to the Constitution, it is administered by the Holy Synod of the Hierarchy of all Bishops, which meets once a year or in cases of emergency, and the Permanent Synod, consisting of twelve bishops for the on-going administration of the Church. Both Synods are presided by the Archbishop of Athens and all Greece who is a prominent public figure. The Church of Greece consists of eighty dioceses, each administered by a bishop, corresponding to the eighty
prefectures of the country except Crete, the Dodecanese and Mount Athos, which have their own ecclesiastical regimes. Each bishop is autonomous and has all the parishes and the monasteries within his diocese under his jurisdiction. The bishops are elected by the Synod of the Hierarchy and their appointment is formally confirmed by the state, which pays their salaries. The parish priests are ordained by a bishop but they are also formally appointed by the state, which pays their salaries. There are around 10,000 priests paid by the state. Meanwhile, all Greeks baptized in the Orthodox Church are members automatically and their parish is that which is near their residence, to which they may or may not have any formal contact.

The Church has its own financial board, which administers its considerable immovable and fluid assets, but no public knowledge exists as to what exactly they are. Dioceses and monasteries have their own properties and the income from the parishes goes to the dioceses, with around 16%, which goes to the state for the pension fund of the clergy. As mentioned above the bishops and the parish priests are paid by the state but periodically in the past substantial property was transferred from the Church to the state. The whole problem of ecclesiastical finances and property is an opaque controversial issue with periodic tensions between Church and state and in many respects involves also the provision of welfare by the Church.

The Church’s welfare activities

The Church has a de facto significant place in the national welfare system, which some trace to the indeed strong role played by the Orthodox Church in welfare and philanthropy during the Byzantine era. In practice, this role developed especially in the post-war reality of relatively wealthy/well-endowed Church operating in a climate of extreme destitution.

Church welfare activity is decentralized (based in the individual dioceses) and, in many cases, it is developed in partnership with local public services. Such partnership however is based on informal (and usually interpersonal) links. Due to its decentralized character, the role of the Church in welfare provision, and in its relation to the state structures, varies considerably across dioceses.

It should be noted that civil society and, by extension, volunteerism, are relatively weak in Greece (following a southern European pattern); accordingly, within this context the organized activity within the framework of the Church philanthropic and charity work is more conspicuous than it would be

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2 It should also be noted that a number of dioceses remain formally under the canonical supervision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, thus requiring the approval by the Ecumenical Patriarch of new appointments of bishops; in 2003 a conflict arose between the Church of Greece and the Patriarchate over the failure of the former to initially seek and receive the Ecumenical Patriarch’s approval of the candidate lists for the election of the bishops in such dioceses.
with more developed civil society structures. After the state, the Church is the second major actor in welfare provision in the country. In many ways Church and state are interacting (Dieillas 2003) but the Church has its own ‘Synodical Committee for Social Welfare and Benefits’ and seven central organizations for various aspects of welfare provision at national level and abroad. At the diocesan level each diocese has its own scheme varying in the aspects and the volume of provision from one diocese to another. However, despite the national and diocesan organization of Church welfare, the actual needs are such that the system is hardly adequate. By far more significant is the informal role of the Church in serving material and spiritual need at local level. This does not concern only the poor and the needy but people from all walks of life, who turn to Church and/or religion in extreme conditions of personal and family problems, illness, and death. Popular religiosity and the cult of the Saints and the Virgin, well embodied as they are in the ethos of the Church, serve as sources of comfort to which people turn on various occasions. In fact it is this aspect of the Church to which much of its strength in Greek society belongs.

Welfare, religion and gender

The positions of women and men in Greek society

According to the typology often used in gender studies, Greece is a ‘strong male breadwinner state’ . Expectations of the male as the primary breadwinner and of the female as home-maker and carer for the children and the elderly continue to prevail in Greece, despite drastic changes in this social structure and in the relationship between women and men in society, making this typology increasingly untenable. Certainly the importance of the family structure continues to be strong (e.g., according to a 1993 Eurobarometer survey, 99.4% of the population ranks family as their top priority on the value scale. At that time, Greece had amongst the lowest divorce rates in European Community (second only to Italy), and the lowest rates of one-parent families) (Papadopoulos 1996). However, birth rates are also amongst the lowest in Europe and marriage rates are declining, as couples increasingly cohabitate and rely on two incomes, meanwhile delaying childbirth.

At the same time, Greece has amongst the lowest rates of female participation in the labour force. In 2001, 48.8% of Greek women were in paid employment (with the European average at 60.1%) (Vlachantoni 2005). In other words, if as noted above the Greek family acts as the social safety net in the context of a weak welfare system, Greek women play a large role in providing needs in the home.
Gender policies

In general, taxation and social entitlements are based on individual rights, but there are some significant exceptions. For example, parents of four or more children receive a monthly allowance from the Ministry of Welfare (though, it must be noted, the sum is so minimal as to be completely inconsequential). Mothers of four or more children who are either married or above 23 years of age are granted a life-long pension. Such family-based entitlements stem from the demographic problem in Greece and are designed to boost population growth by providing financial incentives (or, combating disincentives though, as noted above, the sums are so minimal that they cannot be expected to make a difference in birth-rates!).

There are also several entitlements specific to single parents: single-parent families with a certain income and below are entitled to an allowance, which increases incrementally with each child beyond the third (Matsaganis 2002, p.163). Single parents are also allowed six extra days of annual leave, and their access to social support structures is facilitated (e.g., day care and housing benefits); they are also aided in access to employment through extra points given them in examination contests, and through prioritization in programmes offered by the Ministry of Labour. Most recently, a policy offering priority status for single mothers for housing subsidies was also extended to single fathers.

The Orthodox Church and gender issues

Concerning the official theological/ethical position of the Church about welfare, minority religions and gender, this must be sought within wider Orthodox theology. It is not customary within the Orthodox Church as a whole to state official theological positions on specific social issues, and issues of human rights generally are grounded in the theology of the person (Zizioulas, 1975; 1994). Welfare provision is theologically understood within the mission of the Church in the world as Diaconia (service), which is grounded both in the scriptures as well as in worship as the Eucharistic gathering of the people of God. Diaconia itself has an eschatological dimension as the pursuit and promotion of the Kingdom of God in the world (World Council of Churches, 1980). This theological position is central and linked to all aspects of welfare provision in the Orthodox Churches (see www.orthodoxdiakonia.net and http://www.goarch.org/en/ourfaith/articles).

With regard to gender the Orthodox Church of Greece and worldwide has been rather conservative and cautious of the feminist movement without opposing it openly. Within Orthodox theology women are respected with Virgin Mary as a prototype but the ordination of women to priesthood is unequivocally rejected on theological grounds without well worked out theological arguments (Limouris, 1992).
The general stance of the Church on issues of gender is largely pre-modern. It espouses the equality of the sexes (on the basis of the theology of the person) but does not take a proactive stance in the promotion of gender equality and perceives the role of women, especially in the family, as clearly different to that of men. In fact traditionally the Church has been one of the main institution which has contributed to patriarchy within the family and, perhaps, in society at large. Nevertheless, the women’s movement has prompted the Orthodox Church of Greece and the Orthodox Churches internationally to organize various conferences on the subject. The Church of Greece has in fact established a ‘Special Synodical Committee on Women’s Issues’ but this mainly concerns the women’s role in the Church, which falls short of taking a proactive role in promoting gender equality in society let alone formulating any policies to that effect.

The minority presence in Greece

Immigration patterns

During the last fifteen years the number of ethnic and religious minorities in Greece has grown very rapidly. Immigrants of various nationalities have been entering the country since 1990, most of them illegally. The foreign population living in Greece in 2001 was 762,191 (797,000 without Greek citizenship), but this number is estimated to be much higher as many illegal immigrants escaped census registration (Kasimis and Kasimis 2004:3, available on line http://www.migrantsingreece.org/files/RESOURCE_125.htm).

This has resulted in the formation of loosely connected foreign national groups in the country, with elementary or no organization of their own. In 1997 The Greek authorities invited all those immigrants who were in employment to register and legalize their status (Presidential decrees 358/1997; 359/1997). By the year 2000, 371,641 had applied for the ‘white card’ (residence permit). Their nationality was as follows: Albania 241,561 (65%); Bulgaria 25,168 (6.8%); Romania 16,954 (4.6%); Pakistan 10,933 (2.9%); Ukraine 9,821 (2.6%); Poland 8,631 (2.3%); Georgia 7,548 (2.0%); India 6,405 (1.7%); Egypt 6,231 (1.7%); Philippines 5,383 (1.4%); Moldavia 4,396 (1.2); Syria 3,434 (0.96%); Russia 3,119 (0.8%); Bangladesh 3,024 (0.8%); Iraq 2,833 (0.8%); Armenia 2734 (0.7%); Yugoslavia 2335 (0.6%); Nigeria 1,746 (0.5%); Ethiopia 931 (0.2%) (http://www.migrantsingreece.org/files/STAT_11.bmp). The actual number of foreign nationals in the country at present is estimated at over a million without official statistics to confirm or deny this number.

Over the last four years there is also a growing Chinese community in Greece. Their number is estimated to be between 15,000 and 18,000. They
appear to have elementary organization, with a weekly Chinese language newspaper published in Athens.

All the nationalities mentioned above have established some elementary association with an office, address and a telephone (http://www.migrantsingreece.org/who.asp). Some, like the Albanians, have various associations; others, such as the Armenians, have well and long established communities, associations and Armenian Orthodox Churches in Athens and other major cities.

Given that the (relative to the past) religious diversity in Greece is attributable mainly to immigration, it is useful to consider patterns of immigration in the country. Greece has historically been a country of outward migration, with a large wave between 1890-1914 and another one after World War II (1947-1970). During the last twenty years, however, the country has become a receiver of immigrants from all the nations mentioned above. First, 1985 to 1991 around 30,000 immigrants came from the ex-Soviet Union, from the area of Pontos (Black Sea) (Kasimati, 1992:68). These are Orthodox, of Greek ethnic origin, and few of them had fled from Greece during the Civil War. By now most of them have acquired Greek citizenship after special provision by the government, being of the same ethnic identity and religion as the majority.

The second wave of migrants came mainly from Albania in the early 1990s but the inflow continues to the present basically due to the reunification of the families. Albanians account for 57.5% of the total (Kasimis and Kasimi, 2004:4). According to the 2001 census the Balkan countries namely Albania, Bulgaria and Romania have been the main countries of origin. There was a third wave of immigration from the late 1990s to the present from other Balkan states, the former Soviet Union (Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Moldavia, etc.) and Iraq, Pakistan and India.

According to the 2001 census over half of the immigrants live in Greater Athens (Attica), with 206,000 Albanians (444,000 throughout Greece, accounting for 57% of the total of migrants) (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005:3) Albanians are spread throughout the country, working mainly in construction but also in agriculture and the women mainly in domestic service. Immigrants from other places of origin are also concentrated in Attica (about 50%). The rest are spread in other urban centres and around 15% work in the country. Men, mainly from Pakistan, increasingly seek work in the countryside. Women, from Bulgaria, Russia and the Philippines work almost exclusively in domestic service. Africans, very small groups, from each country, are predominantly in Athens and some in Thessaloniki. The Chinese, mainly in Athens and all the major cities, have concentrated in retail trade, mainly clothing. Immigrants in general are engaged in wage labour (90%) but some are self-employed (6.5%). They are employed mainly in construction (24.5%): in domestic work (20%); in agriculture (17.5%); and commerce, hotels and restaurants (15.7) (Kasimis and Kasimi, 2004:5).
Immigration legislation

The sudden influx of immigrants in such large numbers, proportionately to the population of the country, caught the authorities somehow by surprise and unprepared to face the situation. Certainly, there was lack of adequate legal framework and the infrastructure in services and institutional structures were elementary. Given also the general bureaucratic and largely inefficient character of the Greek public services the process of regularization and legalization, let alone integration, of the immigrants encountered great difficulties.

As most of the immigrants were initially unregistered (‘illegal’), the first concern was how they could be legalized. Thus, the first Act 1975/1991 concerned the ‘entry-exit, residence, employment, expulsion of foreigners and procedures for the recognition of the status of refugee for foreigners’. To implement this act, Presidential Decrees 358/1997 and 359/1997 invited immigrants to submit documents to acquire a ‘white card’, i.e. temporary residence permit. Out of the 371,641 who registered for the ‘white card’ (temporary residence permit) only 212,860 received a ‘green card’ (work and residence permit). According to Kasimis and Kasimi (2004:6), ‘It is estimated that less than half of the immigrants were registered during the first regularization programme’. The administrative process to acquire the ‘white’ and ‘green’ cards was arduous and extremely bureaucratic. In fact the policies were contradictory. In order to acquire the ‘green card’ one had to produce, among other documents, a certificate of 150 days paid contributions to national insurance (IKA), but how could one who was not registered and was working illegally produce such a certificate? To acquire the ‘white card’ applicants had to produce documentation to show that: they were residents in the country for at least one year; they were of good health; they had a clean police and court record; and had paid forty working days national insurance contributions (IKA) in 1998.

In 2001 the Parliament passed another Act 2910/2001 concerning ‘the admission and residence of foreigners in Greece and the acquisition of Greek nationality through naturalization.’ Through this policy unregistered immigrants could be legalized and expired work permits of those registered after 1997 could be renewed. Applicants were given six months to provide the required documentation for the acquisition of the work permit, which was a precondition for obtaining a residence permit. This policy was aimed also at employers who, on employing any immigrants, they had to issue an official contract, i.e. to pay official national insurance contributions to IKA etc. Along with the rest of documents (health, police etc.) applicants had to have a certificate of national insurance contributions paid for at least 200 working days and a copy of a contract with an employer along with a payment of 147 euro for each person over the age of 14.
By August 2001, the six month deadline, 351,110 applicants had submitted documents for the acquisition of work permit, which was a precondition for obtaining a residence permit. Yet, the process of implementing the policy proved exceedingly cumbersome, bureaucratic and slow. The government extended temporary residence to the applicants till October 2003 but even by then a backlog of applications had not been processed and with another act (3202/2003) residence permit was extended for two more years from January 2004, meanwhile new unregistered immigrants keep entering the country clandestinely. There is now substantial literature highlighting not only the structural and bureaucratic difficulties of the implementation of the policies of regularization of the immigrants (Kasimati, K. 2003) but also the extraordinary difficulties of developing any indicators of integration (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005).

There have been many protests by various organizations of the immigrants as well as by other NGOs and the Greek ombudsman’s reports have been very critical of the public services in their handling of cases of the immigrants. Amnesty International also in its report on Greece (2005) has been outspoken against the processes of handling the problem of asylum seeking in the country.

To date the whole process of regularization, let alone integration, of recent immigrant minorities in Greek society is far from satisfactory. Immigrants have to wait for long hours in long queues, often to meet unfriendly and even prejudiced public servants to tell them to come again tomorrow because their documents are not right. In many cases they have to spend much of their meagre resources to pay lawyers to handle the complex process of their regularization. It takes up to ten years before a foreigner immigrant can actually become a Greek citizen. In theory, if he/she has acquired work and residence permit is entitled to all the welfare benefits and services available to Greek citizens but in practice in order to get those permits and benefits ‘A mix of personal financial and managerial incentives seem to motivate officials’ behaviour towards implementing discriminatory and quite racist policies which, according to their opinion safeguard Greek society against the incoming “threat”’ (Psimmenos, I. and Kasimati, K. 2003: 368). Research now in progress in the area of care, health and education shows that the problems encountered by immigrants are considerable. Psimmenos (2006) argues that the social context and the organizational structures of the social services generate the social exclusion of the immigrants. It must be stressed, however, that Greek citizens themselves are far from satisfied with the way the social services function especially in the area of health.

The government designed an ‘Action Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants for the period 2002-2005’. The policy, amongst other things, included measures for training and integrating the immigrants into the labour market, improving their access to the health system, centres for immigrant support, and improvement of cultural exchanges among ethnic communities.
Yet, the implementation of the ‘Action Plan’, apart from the obstacles outlined above, was also stalled by the demanding budget for the preparation and carrying out the Olympic Games and also by the intervening Parliamentary Elections of March 7, 2004 (Kasimis and Kasimi, 2004:7).

Research has shown that the contribution of migrant labour to the Greek economy has been significant. Although unemployment over the last five years in the country at large is over 9%, immigrants have filled a gap in jobs, which native Greeks seem reluctant to take up. So, manual work in the construction industry and to a certain extent in agriculture is now taken up by immigrant males and the domestic service is filled by women. On the other hand high skilled and professional occupations ‘appear to be largely closed to migrants, whatever their educational qualifications’ (Cavounides, J. 2006).

Debates on immigration

Over the last fifteen years there is a constant debate about immigration in Greece. As the influx was sudden, and given the specificity of Greek identity (Kokosalakis and Psimmenos, 2005) Greek society seemed unprepared to face a transformation towards a pluralist model. An increase in criminality, especially in house burglaries with violence, in the early 1990s was attributed to immigrants mainly from Albania and Romania and as the media treated these phenomena with a certain degree of sensationalism, a climate of xenophobia seemed to be rising in the country (Kasimati, K. 2004). The media seem to frame migration discourses in Greece within an ethnocentric context (Triandafyllidou, A. 2001:103-106). The main voices in the discourse are politicians, academics, policy makers, sometimes churchmen and often immigrant representatives. The tone and the degree of ethnocentricity vary from one participant to another but the general assumption seems towards integration/assimilation rather than integration/diversity model. The debates are usually focusing on tension rather than cohesion. Two theatrical plays showing this season are critical of Greek society by highlighting the experience and the viewpoint of the immigrants.

Although at the general official level immigrant minorities seem far from being integrated into Greek society (Baldwin-Edwards 2005), at the informal everyday life immigrants and natives seem to coexist amicably without tension. This may derive from the fact that every Greek has immediate experience of such interaction as there is hardly any Greek household, which has not employed an immigrant either for domestic work or manual labour. This in itself, however, is not evidence that the majority of the Greek population has accepted immigrants as others, equals in a plural society.

The dimension of religion does not influence debates on immigration directly, but the issue of the Muslim immigration, especially, does influence
debates about church state relations. Albanians as the largest of immigrant minorities, although most of them are nominally Muslims, ‘seem to favour an assimilation strategy, with flexibility about religion, adoption of Greek names, baptism of their children as Orthodox.’ (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005:38). But religion is certainly a strong issue especially for Muslims from the Middle East, Pakistan, India and Africa. For these minorities and others the state is responsible for granting licenses for places of worship and the rights of passage such as funerals. Such questions have involved the media and the Church in debates and although religion in general and Islam in particular does not seem to be a causal factor for tension in Greek society, certainly the boundaries drawn by religion between minorities and the Greek Orthodox majority are very clear. This is evident and by the very high popularity enjoyed by two television series on Greek Orthodox/Turkish Muslim identity.

Minority welfare and rights

The question of the establishment of places of worship by minority religions in Greece has been controversial. There is in fact a tension implicit in the Constitution between Article 3 quoted in Historical developments (p. 252, above), which characterizes The Orthodox Church as ‘prevailing religion’ and the rights of religious minorities as stated in article 13 which states:

1. Freedom of religious conscience is inviolable. The enjoyment of civil rights and liberties does not depend on the individuals' religious beliefs. 2. All known religions shall be free and their rights of worship shall be performed unhindered and under the protection of the law. The practice of rights of worship is not allowed to offend public order or the good usage. Proselytism is prohibited. 3. The ministers of all known religions shall be subject to the same supervision by the State and to same obligations toward it as those of the prevailing religion…

In theory this article safeguards completely religious freedom both in terms of belief and practice but there are certain qualifications in terms of ‘known religions’ and by the prohibition of proselytism. ‘Known religions’ (see p. 251) should not have any difficulties in establishing their places of worship but in practice Jehovah’s Witnesses, for instance, on various occasions have been denied this right and have brought their cases to the European Court of Human Rights which in certain cases condemned Greece. In fact, between 1985 and 2001, 16 decisions of the Court for Greece concerned religion. (http://www.nchr.gr/category.php?category_id=53). In order for a minority religion to acquire a license for a place of worship there are many bureaucratic and legal entanglements, which in certain cases are made worse by the negative attitude of local bishops. There is still in force a necessity Law 1363/1938 and a Royal Decree 20 May/2 June 1939 which concern non-
Orthodox places of worship and this legislation permits the intervention of administrative, political and ecclesiastical authorities which make cumbersome and difficult the issuing of licenses of places of worship for minority religions. It is a legal offence, for a minority religious group, to build and/or operate a place of worship without a license, which it must obtain from the Ministry of Education and Religions. The Minister, however, in order to issue such license needs consulting documents from the local police, the mayor of the town or the borough, and from the local bishop and in certain cases from the Synod of the Church of Greece. The issuing and gathering of such documentation can cause endless delays and even denial of granting a license. In the latter case the applicants have the right to appeal to the Council of State but even when they are successful the ratification of the decision of the Council may take a very long time. The European Court of Human Rights has found the specific legislation mentioned as creating serious obstacles for the establishment and functioning of non-Orthodox places of worship. The National Committee for Human Rights (2001:4) proposed the abolition of article 1, para 1 and 3 of Royal Decree 20/2.6/1939 and also the depenalization of operating a place of worship without a license. These recommendations, however, have not been implemented to the present day. Meanwhile other organizations such as Greek Helsinki Monitor and Amnesty International USA have issued critical reports for religious freedom in Greece.

As noted above, outside Thrace there are no active mosques, as such; rather, Muslims worship in other buildings (often private apartments). This fact is hotly debated, as Greece is the only European country with a capital city, which has no active mosque. This was also especially a focal point around the time of the Olympics held in Athens in 2004: the mosque meant to be built in Athens in time for the Olympics never materialized and, though after the initial objections of the Church and some fundamentalist Orthodox Associations, the Church agreed for the building of such an agreement also has been passed by the Greek Parliament itself, the problem of where to build such a mosque persists. There are ‘difficulties’ to build it in the centre of Athens due to ‘lack of a big enough site’ and also due to the objections of various organizations for ‘cultural reasons’. An earlier suggestion to build the mosque somewhere near the Airport ‘Eleftherios Venizelos’ was opposed by some Church leaders including the Archbishop of Athens because the passengers arriving to Athens ‘would think they are entering an Islamic state’. A suggestion reopen an old mosque called Temenos in the heart of tourist area in Monastiraki (Athens) seems also to raise objections (Kathemerini, 2.4.06, p.21). The Church nevertheless has offered to provide a site of its own in the area of Schisto outside Athens for the Muslim Community to use it as cemetery.
Meanwhile the demand for mosque(s) for the Muslims in Greater Athens and other major cities increases. Muslims, of course, are worshipping in unofficial places, many of them without license, without surveillance or legal proceedings by the authorities, but the need for the establishment of official mosques remains urgent.

Religious minority-majority relations

The space in which minority-majority relations take place is largely influenced by the situation described above, in terms of the strong relationship between Orthodoxy and Greek national identity, and between church and state. These relationships have served to create a climate in which religious and ethnic minorities are, at best, ‘others’ who may serve a purpose in the Greek economy, or may have found a refuge in Greece from persecution, or extreme poverty, in their home countries, but who are not considered part of the Greek social fabric. To a large extent this perspective applies to Greek society as a whole; it may also be deduced from attitudes and activities of the Church. Still, it is important to try to distinguish between the Church and society in general, in so far as minority-majority relations are concerned.

Attitudes and activities of the Church

The attitude of the Orthodox Church of Greece to minority religions in general is rather distant and varies from one group to another. Christian minority religions, with the exception of Roman Catholics and Anglicans, are considered heretical from a theological point of view. Roman Catholics and Anglicans are not considered heretics because they have retained the Apostolic succession and other basic Christian doctrines such as the Trinitarian but they are schismatic because they are not in Communion with the Orthodox Church.

It is well known that there has been a long historical antagonism and even enmity between the Orthodox and the Roman Catholic Church. Much of that ethos had passed from theology and religious ideology to politics and society. In fact its aetiology was mainly political. There is much residue of that legacy within the Hierarchy of the Church of Greece today. Indicative to it is the fact that they objected to the visit of Pope John-Paul in the country in 2002, which was realized in the end as a state visit and many bishops also objected to archbishop Christodoulos visiting the Vatican. As a result of this legacy relations between the Church and the small Catholic minority in the country are rather cool.

Relations with the Muslim minority of Western Thrace are formal and guided by the Treaty of Lausanne and subsequent legislation. In certain aspects there is co-operation between the local bishop and the Mufti.
Archbishop Christodoulos also has made several positive gestures towards economic immigrants and refugees many of whom are Moslems (Forum, 2006, online at http://www.phorum.gr/viewtopic.php?f=8370). The Muslim Community has the legal status of Legal Person of Public Law.

The small Jewish community is well accepted by the Church and is also recognized as a legal person of Public Law.

Relations with the Protestant minorities are cool. In fact for small Protestant Churches, which are considered heretical the attitude traditionally has been negative and even hostile as they have been perceived as a threat and an intrusion to the religious ethos and the cultural homogeneity of Greek society. The Church has been especially outspoken in the past against Jehovah’s Witnesses and much of that attitude still remains. The Church is especially against small unrecognized cults and para-religious groups, which attempt to gain adherents in Greek society.

In this context, it must be noted that the Church has tremendous indirect influence over the experience of minorities in Greece (i.e., beyond its direct interaction with minorities) through its role in influencing negative public attitudes towards ‘others’, in general, and towards religious ‘others’ in particular. It certainly plays a very significant role in the difficulties faced by religious minorities in operating places of worship (see below), but also in Jehovah’s Witnesses’ harsh treatment under Greek law (and especially practice) for their conscientious objection from military service.

Despite the cool or generally negative stance of the Church towards religious minorities individually, in practice, its welfare services are open to all. During the sudden influx of immigrants in the early 1990s most parishes were open providing food, clothing and arranging temporary shelter. Many Albanians in fact became Orthodox and were baptized, a practice supported by an unspoken policy of the Church to this effect.

**Attitudes and activities of minority religions**

As noted above, the attitude of the Church towards minority groups varies from one group to another. The same applies of the minority groups’ attitudes towards the majority (towards the Church, and towards society more generally). To a certain extent the variations reflect those in the Church’s attitudes, and those of the society in general, towards different minority groups. However, there must certainly be also other factors involved, and in-depth research is required for insight into such factors.

Likewise, minority activities in relation to the majority largely depend on external support available to the religious minorities. This is strong in the cases of Christian minorities in Greece, and only for some Muslim groups with maintained links with religious leaders in their home countries. Such activities also depend, of course, on the relative level of social and financial
[attainment] in Greece: many Muslim immigrants work in agriculture and struggle to make ends meet; they are less likely to mobilize for religious rights and, rather, are satisfied at present to worship in informal spaces which simply operate as mosques.

At the national level negative attitudes amongst minorities towards the majority in general are not detectable: rather, only particular grievances on specific issues are expressed and, again, sporadically. For example, the poor distribution of welfare services to immigrant groups is a conspicuous problem in Greek society, though there are not widespread or vocal protests against this (riots on the scale of those which took place amongst mainly immigrant communities in Paris in 2005 are difficult to imagine in a Greek context).

Conclusions

Having examined relevant literature and documentation on our topic, a basic conclusion of this state of the art report is that welfare, values, gender and minority/majority relations in the country are in a state of flux. Welfare, in the broad sense, has entered a new phase in the context of wider socio-economic change and the increasing presence of immigrants in the country. All this produces various forms of social tensions and an upheaval in the realm of values. Traditional values related both to religion and the Greek ethnic identity are being challenged in the framework of a new pluralist social reality and in everyday life, which brings the majority face to face with its conceptions and prejudices of the other.

As noted at the outset, the WaVE research conducted in Greece is expected to generate important insight into some of the most critical problems facing contemporary Greek society. The specific time when the project takes place is conducive to the detection of transitions in society, and of values related to these transitions. The challenges posed by mass immigration and relatively sudden de-homogenization of Greek society make this a critical moment for being able to grasp values which lead to cohesion within society, or to tensions. Moreover the increasing presence of minorities in the country seems to generate a mirror image of the moral fibre and the deeper moral condition of society itself. Meanwhile, the project takes place in a period of deep transition, since the minority status of many new residents in Greece is in the process of change with various stages of EU integration (first experienced by the Poles in Greece, and now to be experienced by the Romanians and Bulgarians).

Already preliminary research conducted at the local level indicates that the research will help to dispel generalizations about particular minority groups. Attitudes and activities of Muslims towards the majority, and of the majority towards the Muslims, vary significantly: in many areas, there are
greater similarities between the Roma and the Albanians than between Albanians and other Muslim groups. The particular range of minority groups present in the locality under study allows an examination of four different Muslim groupings, two Orthodox-faith ethnic minority groups, and two Roma groupings. This situation is not dissimilar to the diversity of minority groupings at the national level in Greece. In-depth examination of it will offer significant insight into the differences in social cohesion or social tension generated by such factors as particular time of migration of the group (year, or decade), relative access to and ease with the Greek language, specific employment activities of the groups, EU relations with the country of origin, etc.

Finally, the Greek case study is one of only two majority Orthodox faith cases in the WaVE project. The comparison with the Romanian case will be very interesting for an understanding of the differing impacts of different historical trajectories in the relationship between church and state, on the issues studied in the WaVE project. To what extent does continuity in strong church-state relations in Greece lead to different results from Romania (where this relationship was halted during Soviet rule) in terms of the relations between majority and minority communities? Also, in what areas will Greece bear greater similarity to Italy rather than to Romania, due to more similar sociocultural, southern European bearings, or to similar politico-historical trajectories (including decades of membership in the EU)? The WaVE project promises a context in which such fruitful comparisons can be made.

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5:2 THIVA CASE STUDY REPORT

Effie Fokas

Abstract

This report presents the findings of the WaVE research carried out in Thiva, Greece, in the period between September of 2006 and December of 2007. Thiva is a medium-sized town reflecting many characteristics of contemporary Greek society insofar as co-existence between the majority and minorities are concerned, particularly in terms of the relative newness of the situation of a mass presence of immigrants. The research focuses on the interaction between the majority population and Indian and Pakistani male immigrants; Albanian immigrants (male and female); and female migrant labourers (from Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and Serbia), in the context of welfare needs and provision. The research entails mainly semi-structured in-depth interviews with both majority and minority individuals and participant observation in various settings of interaction between majority and minority individuals. Issues of bureaucratic inefficiencies are a central focus of this report inasmuch as difficulties faced by immigrants in the process of becoming registered and renewing their documentation constitute a central axis of majority/minority tensions from the perspective of minorities. Lifestyle issues factor into the perspectives of many majority individuals consulted regarding their attitudes towards the welfare of immigrants. Certain values amongst both majority and minority individuals may in some cases lead to tensions between them, but we cannot generally speak of a conflict of values in the case of Thiva.

Thiva in context – presentation of the town

General characteristics

Thiva is a medium-sized Greek town (pop. 24,443) 85 km northwest of Athens, located in the prefecture of Viotia. Thiva occupies the same space as ancient Thebes and accordingly is home to several archaeological sites and well-preserved ruins; these mark the otherwise architecturally typical modern city. A second significant marker is its recent past (and, to a limited extent, present) as a centre of industry. A boom in the 1970s and early 80s in the establishment of factories there began descending by the 1990s; today most of the factories in the region of Viotia (approx. 120) are based in and around Thiva. Factory closures are, to a large extent, responsible for the relatively high unemployment rate: in the period between 1981 and 1991, Thiva saw an unemployment rate increase of 184% (compared to 102% nationally) (Fokas 2006a). Based on the 2001 census, 1,293 individuals are
unemployed, of which 701 are women and 592 men.\textsuperscript{1} A third important marker of the town is its well-developed agricultural industry (mainly cotton, oil, cereals and potato), based for the most part in villages on the outskirts of Thiva.

Thiva is a relatively diverse Greek town, for a number of reasons. The presence of Arvanites has, historically, been a factor of diversity in Thiva.\textsuperscript{2} So has the fact that Thiva was a major hub of Greek industry, and thus attracted labour migration internal to Greece. The few remaining factories continue to draw immigrant employees, but most of Thiva’s immigration is drawn to its agricultural industry. This applies especially to third country (non-EU) nationals, as well as to much of the new arrival-EU (or candidate EU) member citizens. Thiva’s relative proximity to Athens is another key factor.

A further reason behind Thiva’s relative diversity is that the town was home to a refugee housing complex established for the refugees who came to Greece in the early 1920s following the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922).\textsuperscript{3} In the 1970s a number of Muslims from Thrace also moved into this complex; they were drawn to Thiva by a national regulation offering them jobs there (see below). Over time, this refugee housing (known as the ‘old refugee housing’, or sinoikismos) has housed a chain of immigrants coming to Thiva.

According to the 2001 census, of a total population in Thiva of 24,443, there are 17 citizens of other EU countries, and 2,365 citizens of non-EU countries (in other words, 9.74% non-nationals – i.e., non-Greek nationals). However, these numbers do not reflect the current situation because of the continued immigration in the years since 2001 (the Thiva ‘Office for Foreigners’, the municipality’s office dealing with the issuing of residence papers to immigrants, declares it has registered approximately 3,000 immigrants to date) and because of the large number of undocumented (or, ‘illegal’) immigrants (for which reliable estimations cannot be offered). Furthermore, there are no statistics available in Thiva with exact numbers for ethnicities or religions represented in the town. The Thiva Office for Foreigners does not keep even informal statistics about the country of origin of

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{1} The figure may be compared with the national figure of 508,180 unemployed: female 231,091, male 277,089. All figures cited from the 2001 Census are drawn from the website of the General Secretariat of National Statistical Service of Greece (www.statistics.gr).
\item\textsuperscript{2} Arvanites are a group settled in Thiva since the establishment of the modern Greek state in the 1820s. They speak a dialect quite close to the Albanian language; today they are thoroughly integrated in and indistinguishable from the majority community.
\item\textsuperscript{3} Otherwise known as the ‘Asia Minor Catastrophe’, the failed Greek campaign to recover predominately Greek territories of the Ottoman Empire (in Asia Minor, Western coast of contemporary Turkey) resulted in the Lausanne Treaty, which foresaw a population exchange between Greece and Turkey. The Greek refugees from Asia Minor were settled in various parts of Greece, and such ‘old refugee’ neighbourhoods as that in Thiva are scattered throughout Greece. The Lausanne Treaty also set special terms under which a minority of Greeks could continue living in Constantinople, and a minority of Turks could continue living in a region of Greece called Thrace.
\end{itemize}
applicants for residence papers (their documentation is on paper only). Accordingly, only estimates may be made regarding the size of various groups, on the basis of cross-referencing numbers cited by a range of sources.

In terms of the groups upon which the in-depth research is based, their size is estimated below, based on numbers cited by the Thiva Office for Foreigners and the deputy mayor of Thiva who deals specifically with minority issues.

Table 5:2:1 Estimated size of immigrant group by nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Estimated size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>1,000-1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistanis</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the lack of local level statistical data, it is worthwhile to consider the relevant figures for the national level (Table 5:2:1); however, it is important to note that these figures do not reflect the presence in Greece of undocumented immigrants.
The ‘minority’ presence in Thiva

It is important to note first that the term ‘minority’ is used here in keeping with the practice within the WaVE project overall. However, the term is not used thus in the Greek nor the Thiva context. Most of the groups under study would be called ‘economic immigrants’ (oikonomiki metanastes), and certain groups are called specifically by their names, as for example the Roma, or the Muslims from Thrace (though numerically minorities, they would not be called as such).

It is also important to note the local geography of the minority presence in Thiva. The continuing significance of the ‘old refugee housing’ (palios prosfigikos sinoikismos; see p. 271) should be emphasized as a symbolic and tangible focal point for the minority presence. This neighbourhood is now

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4 There is a certain taboo in the use of the term ‘minority’ in Greece that is related to the Lausanne Treaty mentioned above, in its requirement of special treatment for minorities which – at the time – were in Greece the Turkish Muslims living in Thrace, emphatically referred to as a Muslim, rather than Turkish minority, and historically limited in their ethnic identity-related rights.
comprised mainly of minority groups; the rent is very low (e.g., €50-100 per month), and the living conditions extremely poor. The neighbourhood seems to serve as a ‘first stop’ for newcomers. It cannot strictly be described as a ‘ghetto’, though, given the continued presence of (now, a minority) of the majority population (mainly progeny of the original Asia Minor refugees).

The area where the Roma live can, however, be described as a ghetto. It is on the outskirts of Thiva, and is on a markedly lower scale in terms of provisions (quality of homes, availability of electricity, the state of the roads, etc.), but the degree to which the Roma live there by choice or not is a debated issue (much like the debate on whether the Roma choose their lifestyle or are simply unable to ‘escape’ it). Meanwhile, a large proportion of the Pakistani and Indian men (but especially Indian men) who work on farms seem to live in shacks owned by the landlord and situated on the land which they work. They are thus scattered throughout the villages on the outskirts of Thiva.

The groups present in the locality are listed in order of size and described below (please note: the information below represents a ‘mapping’ of the town terms of its minority presence; greater detail is offered only for those groups with which in-depth research has been conducted. See below):

Albanians
This is the first immigrant group (chronologically) to have a significant presence in Thiva, although the largest waves of immigration from Albania took place after the fall of Communism. Of all the minority groups present in the locality, Albanians are the most integrated, from certain perspectives: they tend to know Greek very well; they are more likely than individuals from other minority groups to be employed in jobs alongside Greeks; their children tend to fare fairly well in schools; and economically they are increasingly well-off, to the extent that it is also increasingly difficult to distinguish between Greek and Albanian status and lifestyles.

‘Southern Albanians’/’Northern Epirots’
This category requires separate listing because, both legally and socially, it exists somewhere ‘in-between’ the majority population and immigrant minorities. These are individuals who hail from that part of Albania where there was a sizable Greek minority dating back to the Ottoman period. This category bears a status as ‘of Greek background’ (linguistically and religiously defined), which awards them special immigration and welfare rights (see below). Yet they remain citizens of Albania. Meanwhile, this status as

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5 In accordance with immigration law 1975/1991, ‘Northern Epirots’ are ‘co-ethnics’. The law does not set out the criteria for definition as ‘co-ethnic’; a decision of the State Council (no.2756/1983) defines the term as ‘to belong to the Greek Ethnos’. A further State Council judgement (no.2207/1992) sets out that ‘coethnics from Albania are the people that descend
‘of Greek background’, possibly together with their special rights, affords them a significantly ‘higher’ standing in the perspectives of much of the majority community. This relates to what Triandafyllidou and Veikou (2002) describe as a ‘hierarchy of Greekness’.

Pakistanis and Indians

The Pakistani and Indian presence in Thiva is more recent, and mainly limited to this decade. Yet in this relatively short time span, they have a fairly established, and very visible, presence in Thiva. The two groups generally exist quite separate to one another, with little to no interaction except in cases where they are employed to work on the same farms. They are presented here (in this ‘mapping’ section) together though because of their marked similarities in terms of their experiences as minorities in Thiva, as well as in the local population’s attitudes towards the two groups. In fact, it is likely that most of the local population cannot distinguish between the two groups, except in the case of those Sikhs who wear turbans. This, however, is likely to change in time and with increased contact between the majority and both of these groups. It should also be emphasized that neither group is a monolith. The Pakistanis, in particular, are divided into at least two different groups with their own social networks (see below).

Most Pakistanis and Indians work as farm labourers. However, many have established shops, where they sell mainly imported food goods, and also run telephone services (serving as a ‘telephone booth’ for calls to the respective home countries). Most of those Indians and Pakistanis who live within the city of Thiva live in the ‘old refugee housing’. This immigrant group is almost solely male; there are very few Pakistani and Indian women or children in Thiva. Furthermore, one important characteristic of this group is the relative lack of knowledge of the Greek language. This significantly limits their job prospects and, of course, their level of integration with the majority population.

Roma

The Roma in Thiva are divided into two groups: the ‘permanent’ and the ‘temporary’. The ‘permanent’ Roma in Thiva have lived in a particular part of town (described above) for approximately 50 years, and their number is estimated at approximately 375 individuals. The ‘temporary’ are considered – by the ‘permanent’ Roma and by the local authorities – as the group most responsible for drug crime in Thiva; they live on the outskirts of the area

from Greek parents and their place of birth (theirs or their parents) is Vôrios Epirus’. See Triandafyllidou and Veikou 2002: 198.

6 As explained below, these are two very separate groups, but they are presented together because the same information presented here applies to both groups, in terms of their experience in Thiva and their general relations with the majority.
where the ‘permanent’ Roma live and are estimated to be approximately 250-300 people. Separate schooling for the Roma in Thiva has been estab-
lished; in general the schooling of Roma children is a source of contention between the majority and Roma population.

**Bulgarians and Romanians**
Bulgarians and Romanians began settling in Thiva since the early 90s. They
tend to know Greek relatively well, and to work mainly in shops, as cleaners,
etc. There seem to be more females from these two groups (particularly
amongst the Bulgarians). Most Bulgarians and Romanians in Thiva live in
the ‘old refugee housing’.

**‘Russian Pontics’**
The Russian Pontics are immigrants from the former Soviet Union ‘of Greek
background’ who migrated to the Soviet Union from Greek parts of the then
Ottoman Empire, or who left Greece around the time of the civil war to es-
cape persecution for their leftist ideologies. They are in essence ‘repatriates’,
and are treated as such by the Greek governments with the same immigration
and welfare privileges as those enjoyed by the Northern Epirots. However,
this group were granted Greek citizenship upon their arrival in Greece (Tri-

**Muslims from Thrace**
The Muslims from Thrace, also referred to as ‘Turks’ by the local popula-
tion, moved to Thiva around the 70s and 80s, during a period when a policy
was being employed to weaken the Muslim community of Thrace by offer-
ing people civil service jobs (e.g., as cleaners in public buildings and on
public roads) outside of Thrace.

**Jehovah’s Witnesses**
Jehovah’s Witnesses have a particular history in the area. In the mid-80s
they had attempted to build their headquarters for all the Balkan area on the
outskirts of Thiva: a large plot of land was purchased, and the buildings for
the headquarters were built. However, the local populations (supported by
many local clergy) reacted strongly against this, protesting at a mass level
against the operation of a Centre for Jehovah’s Witnesses in the area. By the
mid-1990s, the plan was abandoned, and the land was sold to the Ministry of
Justice. Today, there is a Jehovah’s Witnesses house of worship in Thiva,
but their number has not been established (nor estimated) by key informants.
Likewise, there is a Pentecostal presence in Thiva, estimated to be two fami-
lies who gather to worship in the home of one of these families. Both groups
are thought by key informants (non-members of these groups) to be com-
prised of Greek converts.
Others
Old Calendarists would not normally be described as a ‘minority’ by the majority population; they are Christian Orthodox, but follow the ‘old’, Julian calendar. The Old Calendarists have their own church, just outside of central Thiva. But they are otherwise indistinguishable from the majority population and only in religious terms may they be considered a minority group.

A note on religious characteristics of the groups: It should be noted that of all the groups listed above, except the ‘others’ category, only the Pakistanis and Indians are especially active religiously – each of course with their own areas of worship. The Pakistanis in Thiva have established a mosque (i.e., a building that operates as such), though legally the license they have is for the operation of a library. Most Indians in Thiva are Sikhs, and they tend to worship in warehouses. Religion, and their places of worship, serve as an especially important unifying factor for these two groups, and significantly marks their social and, to a certain extent, work life (e.g., through breaks for prayer). In the other groups listed, religion does not seem to be a marker of the groups. Specifically, for immigrants from Romania and Bulgaria, very little is known about their religious practices, both at the local and national levels, with no systematic research having been conducted on this subject.

The local welfare system
The government welfare provisions in Thiva can be described as a limited/poor as in the rest of Greece. The Greek welfare system is quite centralized, and so the gaps in the system overall are also present in the case of Thiva. In terms of local welfare activity, in Thiva, as in most Greek municipalities, the bulk of welfare services are based in the Welfare Office of the Prefecture, which deals mainly with the provision of benefits to people with disabilities and the uninsured, and one-off allowances for emergency situations (e.g. natural disasters). The municipalities themselves do not have ‘welfare offices’; rather, welfare activity is carried out only on an ad-hoc and short term basis, based mainly at a ‘Municipal Enterprise’ in each municipality (many short-term EU social programmes, in particular, are based at municipal enterprises).

The existence and role of municipal enterprises throughout Greece is explained as an effort towards privatization of the system; however, several interviewees describe the municipal enterprises as a ‘loophole’ through which politicians can more easily extend favours/jobs, without having to go

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7 The Viotia Prefecture Welfare Office is based in Livadeia.
8 The municipal enterprise in Thiva is entitled ‘Municipal Enterprise of Cultural and Urban Development of Thiva’ (DEPOATH).
through layers of bureaucracy, and without having to offer long-term contracts to employees. Much of the welfare activity at this level is, by extension, conducted on a short-term basis. Many short-term EU social programmes, in particular, are based at municipal enterprises.

All Greek citizens are offered the same welfare rights. In terms of non-citizens, the rights of these groups vary in accordance with a number of factors, including the relationship between the Greek government and their countries of origin. For example, as of 1 January 2007, Romanians and Bulgarians enjoy the same welfare privileges as all EU nationals in Greece. As for undocumented non-citizens, they have no rights to local welfare provision; only in cases of emergency are they admitted to hospitals. The documented immigrants tend to have some form of social insurance (usually OGA – for those working in agriculture). However, they are often unable to afford the insurance payments, in which case they sometimes sign off of the insurance policy and sign up for ‘emergency help’ from the regional welfare authority. Most of the recipients of this ‘emergency help’ in Thiva are Albanians and Roma.

As noted above, special rights are accorded to immigrants from two particular backgrounds: Northern Epirots and Russian Pontics. If they are uninsured, they have the right to an annual (renewable) access to medical care (hospital care and medications acquired through the hospital pharmacy).

**Role of majority church**

The majority church in the case of Thiva is the Orthodox Church, represented in Thiva by the Diocese of Thiva and Livadeia, which includes 110 parishes and 22 monasteries. A great deal of Church welfare activity for the general area covered by the diocese is based in Livadeia (the diocesan headquarters) rather than in Thiva. Welfare activities carried out by the Church in Thiva include:

- A home for the elderly.
- An institution for the housing and care for handicapped people and people with chronic illnesses (mainly, elderly people with difficulties in mobility).
- A spiritual and cultural centre linked to a parish church (‘Parish refuge’)
- One large ‘soup kitchen’ (*sisitto*), which is run primarily by the ‘Women’s Association of Love’.
- An International Conference Centre, which, in addition to hosting conferences, also provides housing for visiting scholars and students.
- Camps for Orthodox youth (from Greece and abroad)

9 Such associations exist in several parishes, but the largest (of approximately 100 members) is in Thiva. These women generally serve in diocesan ‘soup kitchens’, clean and decorate churches, and help to organize and run local religious festivals. The ‘Women’s Association of Love’ has its own statutory charter.
All of the above are organized and administered at the level of the diocese; beyond this, each parish has its own programme of activities. In some churches in Thiva and Livadeia, the Church has ‘soup kitchens’ for the feeding of the poor (again, operated for the most part by women). The Church also runs financial accounts for help to the poor (i.e., accounts to which parishioners can donate money to help the poor). There are also establishments called the ‘Associations for Women’s Love’ which operate in several parishes and which help the poor. There is a centre for Mission and Communication run by a particular monastery in Livadeia, and a Blood Bank run by a particular parish in Thiva. One parish also maintains a financial account for assistance to ‘resourceless’ young women. Finally, the Church runs a youth centre for individuals under 25 years old. The role of monasteries as centres of welfare deserves special mention. Their role as places of retreat and reflection, peace and solitude, worship and prayer serves what many in the Church identify as amongst the most important welfare needs – that of emotional, spiritual and psychological wellbeing. This is in keeping with conceptions of the person, and of the person’s welfare needs, as a ‘whole’ – beyond, that is, material and physical needs. This role of the monasteries, it should be noted, is not limited to people of the Orthodox faith.

The local Church has an especially strong focus on issues to do with psychological health; this fact is attributed to the work of a few particular priests in the area who have training in psychology and psychotherapy. The Church initiated the establishment of a boarding house for the rehabilitation and deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill, and it runs a psychological-help clinic housed in the Thiva diocesan building (see Fokas 2006a).

The aforementioned examples of church activities are the most obvious and observable. Less conspicuous is, for example, aid provided to individuals seeking direct assistance from the Church. Many minority individuals (often lacking formal rights to employment) seek employment in the Church and are given work cleaning the church, pruning the garden and cleaning the grounds outside, etc. People in need of financial assistance are often sent to the Church by both state and private-run welfare programmes: in fact, most of the contact between the clergy and minorities in Thiva is through the latter’s requests for financial assistance, and/or for food, clothing, or medication. In some cases money may be given directly to the person requesting it, but more often clergy will either give other items (clothing and food) or send the person in question to a particular supermarket or pharmacy (as relevant), having communicated with someone in the latter to give ‘x’ amount in food.

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10 For more information on this institution, see A. Augoustidis (2001-2). The Church donated the building for the boarding house, and played a significant role in preparing the local population for the establishment of the boarding house. The institution is the first formal cooperation between state and church in the provision of psychiatric care. Today, the boarding house operates independently of the Church.
to the person, or to give the medication required. Most of the requests come from Romanians, Roma, Albanians, and few Bulgarians (none of the five clerics consulted on this matter had received requests from Indians or Pakistanis). Finally, the Church frequently collaborates with state and private institutions in short-term programmes, and on an ad-hoc basis (for example, the Church soup kitchen provides meals to be distributed by the social workers in the EU-funded ‘Help at Home’ programme).11

There are also a number of ‘private institutions’ present in Thiva which are, however, still linked to the Church in some way, or to the Orthodox faith. These institutions have no formal or administrational relationship with the Church, but their members and leaders often describe them as ‘the Church’ – in other words, part of the body of believers which comprise the Church and, hence, are essentially indistinguishable from ‘the Church’. Such private institutions tend to be established at the initiative of one person or a small group of individuals with a special interest in and commitment to welfare provision. These include an orphanage, a home for the elderly, and a ‘religious association’ (named after St. John Kaloktenis) which has practiced internal and external missionary work in Thiva since 1918. Of these three groups, the latter is actively involved in welfare provision to minority groups, as it collects food, clothing, furniture, etc. donated by its members and given to the local poor upon request, a majority of those requesting being immigrants (primarily Albanians, Romanians and Bulgarians; no Indians or Pakistanis have ever sought help there).

**Role of minority associations/networks**

Most of the minority groups in Thiva seem to have some form of established association, at various levels of formality, and offering various forms of social care though none of these is strictly a ‘welfare institution’. However, the largest – the Albanians – do not seem to have any centralized association. Instead, Albanians tend to congregate in ‘social groups’ based on their areas of origin, for social events and carrying out no welfare activity. The Roma have an association, operating officially in a small shack since 2005. They have a president who tends to lead discussions with the municipal authorities on behalf of the Roma. The association supposedly represents all the ‘permanent’ Roma living in Thiva.

The Pakistanis seem to be ‘divided’ into two groups at least. One of these is linked to the aforementioned mosque/Pakistani library. The members of that group tend to congregate, socially also, in that space. A second group present in Thiva calls itself the ‘Pakistani Association’, and it was established with the help of the Pakistani Embassy in Athens. According to its

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11 The information in this paragraph was gathered through interviews with 5 local Orthodox priests. The final piece of information, regarding ad hoc collaborations, was also confirmed through an interview with a social worker.
president, the first group mentioned (the one with the library) is comprised of ‘religious fanatics’. This association has been in operation since 2005 and is in the process of trying to rent or purchase a space to use as an office. When this research began, the group members meet in a space above a friend’s grill house, but by the end they had ceased to use this space for meetings, given that needs seemed to be efficiently communicated via mobile telephone to the handful of men who help those Pakistanis in need. Their main activities are: offering help to Pakistani immigrants to achieve a residence permit and to get their papers in order (social security, etc.), and offering aid to the poor and to the sick (they gather money from amongst the group). Originally they also pooled money to help the families of the deceased to afford sending back the body to Pakistan for burial, but recently the Pakistani Embassy has begun offering direct help for this. The group will also try to find a space for use as a mosque: currently they worship in an empty warehouse.

The Indians also have a formal association, with a designated president. The association is primarily religious in nature (rather than ethnic, the president calls it a religious association). Thus, its first priority is caring for the spiritual needs of the group, and it too is currently trying to find a space to use for worship. The association has been trying for three years to acquire a license for the operation of an Association, but has been unsuccessful thus far. Also, it is unable to afford – at present – the rent for a space it would use as an office. The association receives no aid from the Indian embassy. This association also gathers money to help send their deceased back to India for burial.

It should be noted here that there are significant bureaucratic barriers to the establishment of a space as a place of worship for religious minorities (and more so for actually building a place of worship) (see Fokas 2006b). Therefore, there is an automatic limitation in having a space for meeting amongst religious minorities in that they are unable – or must struggle to – have a space of worship which they can also use for social gatherings and for welfare provision. For Pakistanis and for Indians, shops that they establish (mainly selling clothing and food from their countries of origin) often function as the gathering place between them, where welfare needs are discussed and addressed.

The state of flux of the local situation

The situation in Thiva is in a tremendous state of flux, as is most evident in the differences between the experiences of the various groups under study. For instance, the Pakistanis and Indians thus far tend to be men living without their families: their situation may be drastically different after some time, when and if they will have brought their families over from the home coun-
try. The mere parenthood of children in Greek schools dramatically changes the level of interaction between minorities and the majority. Related to the degree of uncertainty and fluidity experienced by various groups are also geographical and cultural factors. Albanians for instance seem to feel more secure with better prospects for integration compared to Pakistanis and Indians.

In terms of gender too, the local situation is changing significantly due to the very visible presence of female migrant labourers. First, their increasing presence is to a large extent at least directly related to Greek women’s liberation from the household (whether this liberation leads to their entry into the labour force or simply to their freedom to do other things). Also, the society is gradually being increasingly exposed to mixed-ethnicity marriages: Greek men are increasingly ‘free’ to choose to marry a non-Greek, and this significantly influences gender relations within the majority society.

A further significant factor of change in the gender domain is the very visible presence of male Pakistani and Indian immigrants. The presence of such a large number of either single or unaccompanied (for those whose wives are in their home countries) men on the local scene is a new dimension.

From the perspective of religion, this is the least visible dimension of change at present in Thiva. The Indian and Pakistani presence significantly raises the levels of practiced religion (i.e., group worship) in the town, but still their religiosity is quite inconspicuous. And certainly their religious situation is in flux in the sense that they generally lack formal places of worship and thus currently worship in warehouses or other settings. Meanwhile, there is relatively little evidence of specific adaptations by the local Greek Orthodox Church to changes in society related to the minority presence, nor to changes in the gender domain, but it may be said to be modernizing in terms of its activities in relation to the youth (on this, see Fokas 2006a).

Context and timeframe

Municipal and prefectural elections took place on 15 October 2006. This entailed a disruption in the fieldwork as regards interviews with much of the local public sector in the period prior to the elections. It also influenced the research in the three months following the elections, as the party that had been in power before lost the elections; the new local government took office only in January of 2007.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that much of the research was conducted in the months of December/January 2006/7, March/April 2007, and December 2007. These periods coincided with the two holidays (Christmas and Easter) when immigrants who have applied for but have not yet received their residence and work permits are allowed re-entry into Greece, as long as...
they have been issued a certificate which verifies that their application is in the process of being examined (the ‘vevaiosi’). Most immigrants in this category use these times to visit their families in their countries of origin. This means that the activity in the ‘Office for Foreigners’, where these permits are issued, was especially heightened during much of my research, as immigrants visited the office repeatedly in hopes that their papers were ready.

Fieldwork was also conducted in November 2007, and the situation was comparatively much calmer then, as were both majority and minority expressions regarding the system of immigrant documentation. However, in this period significant debates had been taking place at the national level, regarding Greece’s inability to properly manage its large flow of immigration (e.g., the Foreign Minister’s comment that Greece has accepted too many immigrants, in October 2007, and the Mayor of Athens’ comment that Athens is like a bomb ready to explode, because of the large number of immigrants, in November 2007). These perspectives were reflected in discussion amongst the majority in Thiva, and there was noticeably more negativity in many majority individuals’ expressions regarding the minority presence in the town.12

Methods and sources
The fieldwork for the case study of Thiva was primarily qualitative, with quantitative material used where available. It is focused on the following main groups: 1. Albanians; 2. Male economic immigrants (Pakistanis and Indians); and 3. Female economic immigrants. These groups represent the main source of change in Thiva as regards increasing religious and ethnic diversity; therefore, this particular selection of groups helps us to grasp changes in society resulting from the increasing religious and ethnic diversity and, in particular, examples of conflict and or cohesion between (and within) minorities and majority.

The fieldwork was carried out through three main methods of gathering data. First, it entailed 72 semi-structured in-depth interviews (several of these interviews were follow-up interviews, and many were with 2-3 people, but not designed as focus group interviews;13 and throughout significant time

12 It should be noted that since the completion of the fieldwork and analysis, but prior to publication of this report, the Metropolitan of Thiva, Ieronymos, was elected Archbishop of Athens and all Greece (February 2008), replacing Archbishop Christodoulos after the latter’s death.
13 Hence, setting an exact number for the interviews and interviewees is somewhat arbitrary. In this report the interviews are numbered in terms of the order in which they took place. Each interviewee is ascribed one number, which appears in brackets, together with an indication of his or her gender, after each citation of an interviewee.
was spent in observation). Of these interviews, approximately half were conducted with majority individuals, and half with minority individuals. In the first group, members of the civil service (15), Orthodox priests (5), social workers (3), journalists (2) and members of the general public living in the ‘old refugee housing’ (8) were interviewed. In the second group, interviews were conducted 6 Albanian immigrants (including 3 children of immigrants, ages 16-23), 10 Pakistanis, 4 Indians, and 9 female labour migrants (from Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia and Romania). A further interview was conducted with the Pakistani Ambassador to Greece; this interview was informative and helpful in terms of placing into context the experience of Pakistanis in Thiva. Of these interviewees, three individuals became (through the research process) key informants: a journalist, a Polish woman, and a Pakistani man. The interviews with minority individuals usually began in the form of biographical interviews. The interviews were not recorded; detailed notes were taken during the interview and typed soon thereafter.

Formal qualitative methods have not been applied for the interpretation and analysis of the data, but the data has been analysed and explored systematically, and a careful effort has been made to maintain a distinction between raw data as such and interpretive frames and analysis. Inevitably successive interviews were to a certain extent influenced by those preceding them, particularly as more knowledge was gained on both ‘majority perspectives’ and ‘minority perspectives’ on the same themes. Dominant themes arising through the interviews, in terms of ‘saturation points’ (problems or aspects of issues on which respondents collectively concentrated and considered important) shape, to a large extent, the presentation of the results in Findings, below. Immigration policy and its pitfalls is one such theme. Special attention is paid to it because it serves as a first barrier to immigrant access to local state welfare provision, and because immigration policy and its related pitfalls serve as the primary source of tension between majority and minority, from the perspective of the minorities consulted for the in-depth research.

Gaining access to some respondents was initially quite difficult. To a large extent, this has to do with interviewees’ fear that I might be investigating their status as registered or not. Furthermore, it was difficult to determine the leadership of particular Muslim groupings: e.g., for one specific group two individuals claimed to be leader of the group, and neither acknowledged the important role of the other in the group.

A second main method employed in the research is **participant observation**. This method offered special insight into the general framework of interaction between structure and agency: through participant observation it was possible to see structural impediments to interaction between majority and minority and, more specifically, the limitations on resources and the overburdening of the local bureaucratic system which limited its ability to respond effectively to minority needs and demands. Participant observation
was practiced throughout the research as a whole, but was more concentrated during certain periods and in certain settings. The general work of the Office for Foreigners (mainly in Thiva but also in Livadeia), the Prefectural headquarters, the Centre for Antiracist Support, and the local police station were observed on several occasions. Observation of the interaction between the local Greek population and the immigrant population in the ‘Old refugee housing’ was also an important part of the research.

Third, the research entailed a search of the local print media. Specifically, a careful search of one local newspaper for any material related to minorities was conducted during a three month period (Viotiki Ora, October to December 2006), and a targeted search of three local newspapers in the period from January to November 2007, on dates when issues related to minorities had been covered by Viotiki Ora.

Findings

Examples of cooperation and/or cohesion between and within groups

Between majority and minorities
The following main areas of cooperation and/or cohesion between majority and minorities were identified through the research: first, in voluntary activities towards the provision of minorities’ basic needs. We see such activities in the majority Church and in one particular religious association (as noted above, on p. 281). These mechanisms were not established specifically for helping minorities, but rather for helping the disadvantaged, including the majority population. However, in both cases it is minority individuals who tend to seek help more – with the exception of Pakistanis and Indians.

A second visible example is in employer-employee bonds, specifically, the bonds established between some farmers and the immigrants who work on their farms. The relationships tend to go far beyond the work domain, and a certain level of trust and intimacy are developed in some cases. Another interesting though rare example is a majority individual who offers a house free of rent to an Albanian family which, over time, improved the state of the house significantly, which was quite poor initially. She also tutors the children in the family for their English language lessons; accompanies the parents to their places of employment or to certain civil services as needed; offers use of her office (computer and scanner) to the children in the family for completion of their schoolwork. Such strong relations are more likely to develop with extended close contact between the two groups/individuals,
and when the majority individuals see the minority individual suffering under poor policies or poor treatment by majority individuals.

Related to the above, we might identify ‘affection through contact’ as another area of cohesion between majority and minorities. This is detectable in the ‘old refugee neighbourhood’: in many cases, the same majority individuals who complained at length about the minorities living there and how the latter had ‘ruined’ their neighbourhood would nearly in the same breath praise the minority neighbours based closest to them, always referring to them as an ‘exception’. In other words, it is easy to shun the minority individual who you do not know, but in cases of extended close contact, feelings of compassion and cohesion tend to develop.

**Within groups**

In terms of cooperation and/or cohesion within groups, the first example of cohesion encountered, even through the preliminary mapping process, was group solidarity amongst Pakistanis, and group solidarity amongst Indians, respectively. Within each group, this solidarity is expressed through the activities mentioned above (pp.280-281). The importance of such networks cannot be overemphasized, given the relative isolation of both of these groups (i.e., relative lack of social contact with the majority or with other minority groups, including one another), and given their language limitations. In fact, the lack of Greek language skills amongst most Pakistanis and Indians creates a situation of dire need for a few individuals in each group who are willing to undertake the various ‘causes’ that arise (from helping to defend someone in court, to communicating with someone’s employer, to communicating with the civil servants in the Office for Foreigners). Religious worship is also a crucial factor of solidarity for the Pakistanis and for the Indians, as they meet in their respective groups for prayer. The groups’ internal cohesion is especially visible in the large ethnic and religious group celebrations which they organize, sometimes with the assistance of the local government (e.g., allowing use of public spaces, though usually at a cost), and of their national embassies based in Athens (the latter applies only for the Pakistanis and not for the Indians).

A second area of cohesion within groups is in female work networks. One aspect of this begins with contact and friendship between immigrant women of various backgrounds. There was also a great deal of conspicuous ‘female bonding’ developed around one of the key informants, who runs a kiosk in the central square. Herself an immigrant, but now living in Thiva for nearly 2 decades and speaking Greek fluently, she has developed friendships with a large number of women who she met at the kiosk and has developed a sort of network through this, passing on information about employment possibilities, and linking women with other women from their home countries.

But there is also a ‘darker side’ of female cohesion, in terms of negative results of female chain migration: two cases were encountered in the field.
work of women following their co-ethnic women into Thiva for work, but getting ‘trapped’ into similarly poor work situations, often situations of exploitation, including sexual exploitation.

Examples of tensions/problem points between and within groups\textsuperscript{14}

In terms of tensions or problem points between the majority and minorities, one domain in particular stands out as the problem most emphasized by minority respondents and, as such, deserves special attention: immigration policy and its implementation. This most conspicuous ‘problem area’ in majority-minority relations in Thiva – at least, from the perspective of minorities – is strictly a welfare issue, but the attainment of residence and work permits is a first hurdle that must be overcome for immigrant access to welfare provision. Meanwhile, immigrants constitute the overwhelming majority of minorities in Thiva and in this research. Accordingly, immigration policy and its implementation is the starting point of a series of welfare challenges faced by Thiva minorities, as well as the root of a series of tension-points between the minorities and the majority.

Greek immigration policy is voluminous and complicated and cannot be thoroughly explained in the context of this report.\textsuperscript{15} However, some significant problem areas will be identified here, as these arise repeatedly through the research. First, immigration policy was late in materializing, and – both in the initial legislation (2001) and in subsequent amendments and new legislation – policies were always following, rather than preceding, developments in immigration. Lack of foresight in immigration policy is common throughout Europe but the problem may be more pronounced in Greece given the disproportionately (to its size) large and rapid influx of immigration. A second and related problem is the aforementioned point regarding the volume and complicated nature of immigration policy: to a large extent because of immigration policy’s late development, there has been a constant flow of amendments and ‘clarification encyclicals’, making it exceedingly difficult for civil servants who must deal with immigration policy to know sufficiently well all of the relevant legislation. And third, it is rarely implemented properly, with significant delays in the formal registration of immigrants due to inefficient bureaucratic systems, thus extending the period during which immigrants are without proper documentation, and in turn,

\textsuperscript{14} This section is disproportionately longer, and substantiated with greater details and quotations, than the previous one focused on cooperation and cohesion. This imbalance should not be taken as a reflection of the reality on the ground, in terms of cohesion versus tension between majority and minorities.

\textsuperscript{15} For a more thorough examination of changes in immigration policy, see R. Fakiolas (2003a) and (2003b).
thus influencing their access to welfare provision and preventing their legal employment and/or extending their illegal employment.\(^{16}\)

The main problems related to the papers as reported by the interviewees are:

**Cost:** The bi-annual residence permit costs €300. This is a high price for many immigrants employed on such low wages, and in order to abide by the law, they must pay this even if for long periods of time they are unemployed. Meanwhile, one of the requirements for permit renewal is that the individual is insured; therefore a vicious cycle is formed. There are also complaints regarding the cost of legal advice: often immigrants are required to employ lawyers to help in the process of acquiring the papers and managing employment issues related to the papers, and this is a cost – they argue – that could be avoided if the process were simpler.

**Delays:** Many immigrants pay every two years for the renewal of their residence permits, often without ever receiving the permits, and in most cases with significant delays. ‘We’ve been paying for 10 years’, declares one interviewee, ‘and my husband had never, not once, actually received the permit’ (15, F). Instead, he is obliged to ‘get by’ with a certificate that proves he has applied for the papers. According to the legislation, the immigrant’s documents should be ready two months after the application is submitted; but in Thiva and Livadeia (both served by the same Prefectural Office issuing the residence permits, which is based in Livadeia), the normal waiting period is 6 months to one year (70, M).

Three respondents also complain about delays in the papers necessary for family reunification: two of these individuals submitted their application two years ago; the third eight months ago, but with the help of his employer (counting back from December 2006). The former were jaded by the long wait and had lost confidence that the papers would come through; the latter, and his employer, were confident that the papers would come through soon.

Greece, one respondent complains, ‘is very behind [in terms of its relations] with foreigners’. He repeats the sentence twice and adds, ‘No Pakistani is happy with the papers situation. If have papers, can work no problem’ (28).

Meanwhile, in their eagerness to attain the permits, individuals return several times to the Office for Foreigners (or, in more extreme desperation, go straight to the source, i.e., the Prefectural Office) to find out whether the permit is ready or whether any new documentation is needed for the application to move forward. This requires missing work for at least several hours (if not an entire day, depending on the queues), and this of course also comes at a cost for the applicant, who is mostly working on the basis of daily or

\(^{16}\) In fact the delays themselves have led to the increase in volume of legislation; see Kiprianos et al. (2003).
hourly paid wages. Visits to the ‘Office for Foreigners’ are especially heightened during the ‘holiday’ periods (as noted above, pp. 282-283).

Insecurity: Related to the above, many immigrants complain that they are so limited by these delays and are unable to go to their home countries any time that might be necessary outside of those holiday grace periods—e.g., in the case of illness of a loved one back home. Furthermore, although the certificate is meant to suffice for re-entry during those periods, still some immigrants are afraid to leave. And with good reason: for example, in the Prefectural Office in Livadeia (where the residence permits are actually processed), one civil servant suggested to an immigrant who was worried about going home during the Christmas holiday without actually having received the residence permit: ‘Why don’t you call the border police at the border that you will cross and ask them if they will allow you re-entry with your certificate only?’ (33, F). The question was delivered with no small degree of irony, as both the civil servant and the individual in question know that there are many cases of abuse of power whereby the border police do not allow re-entry, and manipulation whereby immigrants manage to cross the borders only by paying someone off to get them through the border police. ‘We will not get through the borders’, declares one Albanian immigrant carrying only a certificate, ‘unless we pay a mafia-like guy who is clearly associated with the authorities on both sides (i.e., they must all receive a cut from this)... We would have to pay him something like €1000, a ‘taxi’, they call it, to transport us from the borders to Greece. It’s all set up. But who knows really: can you be sure he’ll bring you home and not do something else with you?’ (16, M).

Poor treatment by the civil servants dealing with immigration policy: Immigrant respondents issue complaints about the treatment they receive from civil servants working in the field of immigration policy, and on several counts. For one, there are complaints about the attitude of the civil servants: ‘Here, people are mean to us, just yelling ‘wait’ or ‘leave’!’; or, as another respondent expressed, ‘they yell at you there. They yell so much... and kids can end up in jail because of all that yelling’ [by ‘kids’ he means Pakistani men, regardless of their age; and by this he means that if a Pakistani man dares to respond to this yelling by raising his voice as well, he may be sent to jail] (27, M). One Pakistani man notes that the problem is especially bad for Pakistanis and Indians because of their lack of Greek language; whereas he expects that Albanians do not have this problem, since they speak Greek so well.

A second complaint related to poor treatment is that the civil servants will ‘ask for things one at a time’, rather than tell the immigrants at once all of the documents that they will need for the application for their permits. As one respondent notes:
The lady will send me back five times to get something, rather than telling me at the start what she needs from me. ‘Oh, I need this too’, and when I come back with that, she asks for something new… and in the meantime I have to leave work to do this. They treat me horribly. (16, M)

This is, in fact, one reason why a particular employer (a farm owner) explained that he ‘takes care of the papers’ for one of his employees, visiting and calling via telephone the Office for Foreigners himself, rather than sending his employee:

Orthodoxy [in one’s approach to the system] will get you nowhere unfortunately. And it is my responsibility to help [my employees]. Meanwhile, if I didn’t they would spend so much of their time trying to sort the papers themselves’ (29, M).

This situation leads to frustration on the part of many immigrants. One particular female respondent (whose husband has been paying for the permit for 10 years but has never actually received it), expresses her deep frustration as follows: ‘It’s easy to kill someone, but I think of my kids. They will say my mom went to jail because of me’ (15, F). Listening to her, one does not get the sense that she would actually resort to violence, but she expresses her anger thus, verbally, and she threatens to take the case ‘to the [television] channels’ – notably, not to the courts. (This statement says a great deal about the justice system in Greece and the inflated role of television in this – a subject beyond the scope of this report).

Another female immigrant expressed her anger in a similar manner in the Office for Foreigners in Livadeia (town neighbouring Thiva). She speaks of a senior official at the Prefectural Office -- an official whose name carries the weight of a dirty word amongst some immigrant circles (her reputation precedes her for the harsh way in which she speaks to immigrants): when told to ‘find a lawyer to help you, and go complain to the Prefectural Office’, she responds ‘I’ll pull [that woman’s] hair out if I see her’ (34, F). The senior official in question refused to take part in this research.

The ‘other side of the coin’ on immigration policy and implementation: It is interesting to note that in the research process major complaints were also expressed by the civil servants – complaints directed not against the immigrants, though, but against the system. One string of related complaints is that they are understaffed, and thus overworked, and lacking in basic resources. For example, only two men work in the Office for Foreigners in Thiva, to handle approximately 3,000 applications for residence and work permits, and their renewals on a bi-annual basis. The office has two desks, one computer (still unused, see above), and many piles of plain files, each of which contains an application and all the supporting documentation. There is no electronic filing system, and in terms of office supplies the space is very limited. These problems (understaffing, overworking, lack of re-
sources, and it should be added poor remuneration) are typical of Greek civil service.

Meanwhile, there is no ‘waiting room’, nor any chairs, for the immigrants waiting to be served there. In busy periods they are required to queue outside. This, together with the lack of resources, is quite significant, when considering the fact that the legislation requires that a percentage of the state income from residence permits and permit renewals (the €300 charge paid by each applicant) goes specifically for the needs of the local Office of Foreigners. In the case of Thiva, the amount spent on the office for the 2006-2007 period of research should have been approximately €70,000, but only a fraction of this amount is used for this purpose.

A further problem is the aforementioned volume of immigration legislation (see p. 287). In three different offices (including the local police), the civil servants there displayed large piles of paperwork which represented the legislation the civil servants were meant to be familiar with in order to do their jobs properly. One police officer stated that he had worked for two years in Athens in a police department working solely on immigration issues, and still he only knew 20% of the legislation well. (This of course carries difficulty for the immigrants as well, who struggle to keep up with new and changing requirements.)

In this situation, from an outsider’s perspective the civil servants working in the Office for Foreigners in Thiva, in particular, face a special challenge to juggle the large volume of applications they must process; implementing the policy properly; and being helpful to the immigrants where the latter do not understand or are unable to comply with what is being asked of them. In this challenging context, these particular civil servants seem to tread a fine line between expressing their own frustration and managing that of the immigrants. One civil servant based in a Livadeia office states: ‘This is the worst job, and it’s dangerous: these people don’t have education or culture. They may threaten me. This job is a punishment’ (70, M).

To a large extent, many of the problems discussed above relating to ‘the papers’ stem from aspects of Greek organizational culture and, specifically, its manifestation in the Greek civil service (see Psimmenos and Kassimati 2003).

A further area of tension between majority and minority – after those related to immigration policy – can be broadly termed as competition. One domain of competition, where one traces interesting debates, is in the area of competition for men, between majority and minority women. During the time of the research one particularly ‘hot’ issue was that of Greek men leaving their wives for immigrant (mainly Eastern European) women. There was one especially conspicuous case mentioned by a number of female respondents, but in general one could detect – both in the expressions of majority
women and of minority women – a tension around the increased number of Greek men choosing to marry immigrant women.

Three of the female migrant labourer respondents raised the issue themselves during the interview: they wish to address what they feel is a predominant Greek female majority opinion about Eastern European women, exhibited in the following words of one female migrant labourer: ‘In the shop [where I work, a fast food restaurant], people can be nice to me. Then they’ll see me on the street and don’t say hello to me. They view me as a prostitute…Greek women are jealous of us’ (55, F). She then asked my opinion on ‘why Greek men prefer us’, and subsequently offered her opinion:

Greek women don’t work, they don’t cook for their husbands…Rarely will Greek men marry a foreign woman [xeni], and if they do, they do because they will cook and a clean, etc. A Romanian woman will put family first, and then herself. She is low maintenance compared to the Greek woman who is always going for a manicure, to the gym, to get her hair done. The foreign women [xenes] are not so demanding, and don’t care for themselves so much (55, F).

This area of tension touches on interesting developments in Greek society (another situation of flux). But far more tangible problems between majority and minority individuals develop around their competition for work. There are several dimensions of competition. One, for example, is the competition between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ immigrants. One Albanian couple, with two high school-aged children in Greek schools, explains:

Most people get into jobs with some kind of connection [meson]. They take Bulgarians, Romanians, Russians, etc. who are illegal immigrants. Because this way they don’t have to pay insurance. We, because we are legal, have a hard time finding work. We look to tomorrow, not just to today. The others [new immigrants] are so desperate that they can think of just today [and so they will take jobs without insurance]. We need legal status especially for the kids, because otherwise they will not be able to be admitted to or receive a degree from the university. Because they are good students, we want this for the kids. I [the male spouse] go to apply for work at a factory, they say they will consider my application and get back to me, and then I learn that the post was filled by an illegal immigrant, someone without papers always gets the job. If I were to get the job, then the authorities are made aware that he has employed me, and he is required to pay my insurance. I am legal, and I have no rights. I can’t ask for anything. Whatever I ask for, they close the door. (16, M)

His Greek landlord describes this man as a ‘hostage of legality’.

Of course, in this debate over whether ‘legality’ or ‘illegality’ is preferable (a debate which is fairly widespread amongst my respondents), the other side is the great exploitation to which the ‘illegal’ immigrants are exposed in the labour market, and particularly in the daily-waged agricultural
work they tend to do – e.g., especially poor wages for hard work. ‘If they had papers’, one Pakistani man states, ‘they wouldn’t take such badly paid jobs’ (27, M).

Another dimension of competition is expressed by a Greek farm owner, who in a principled manner pays the same amount to his Indian employees as he does to the Greeks who have occasionally worked for him: ‘I have gotten a lot of heat from fellow farmers about this, who say I am ruining things for them [tous chalao tin piatsa]. And this is a big issue, how poorly the others pay their workers, fixing prices amongst themselves…’ (29, M).

Linked to the above is exploitation, another significant area of tension felt on the part of minorities towards the majority. Objectively, it can be said that those immigrants who have not become legalized are prey to a great deal of manipulation. This manipulation starts, in many cases, in their home countries, in some form of human trafficking: for example, many Pakistanis have paid ‘agencies’ in Pakistan in exchange for the promise to find the individuals work upon their arrival in Greece and to settle their papers: ‘People sell their homes in Pakistan to come here, and they can be sent back and do what? They are poor after having spent the money to come here. The biggest problem is the papers’ (9, M). According to the local police, in the last 2-3 years there have been 2-3 cases of kidnapping of Pakistanis by these ‘agents’ when the former have been unable to make the payments. ‘Milder’ forms of manipulation include the case of Albanians, for example, who paid €1,000 to someone who would lead the path walking across the Albanian border into Greece.

For others, the manipulation only began upon arrival in Greece. For example, one Lithuanian respondent in her early 20s arrived in Thiva for work at the suggestion of another Lithuanian woman who was already working there. Unwittingly she ended up in a job where she was expected to offer some type of sexual services; she was unable to leave this job until she could pay the owner the money she owed him for his ‘taking care of’ her papers. Similarly, a Bulgarian woman in her early 40s came to Greece for work following an advert for farm labourers in a town in northern Greece posted in her home town. Her employer took her and her fellow workers’ passports with the promise that he would ‘fix their papers’. She worked under terrible conditions for six months – unable to leave because she had neither passport nor any money – and was able to escape only by phoning the Bulgarian embassy for help. At the end of the six months, she received neither payment nor a residence permit.

More common than such cases are those of employers taking advantage of immigrant’s vulnerable position before they have attained residence permits, by paying them extremely little for many hours of hard work. One case was mentioned above, for Pakistanis working extended hours with little pay (while a Pakistani with papers works in a factory – with no further qualifica-
tions – for much higher wages). This vulnerability of immigrants without papers varies of course, but it is recognized and ‘exploited’, in some form or another, at several levels.

Another example of exploitation, but also discrimination, relates to that of the experience of some minorities in the housing market. One Albanian young woman described her family’s experience when they first moved to Thiva more than a decade ago: many advertisements for rent explicitly (in the local newspaper) excluded Albanian applicants and, in cases where they were considered as potential tenants, the prices were raised significantly, so that Albanians had to pay a premium for their ethnicity. This is a trend also noted in research in other parts of Greece (see Hatziprokopiou 2003). Notably, this informant emphasized on several counts that all of the problems that she and her family faced (in housing, in employment, even in trying to establish a contract for a mobile phone) would disappear were they from a few villages further south in Albania, and thus ‘Northern Epirots’ rather than just Albanians. In other words, she envied the privileges enjoyed by her Albanian neighbours who are able to claim some ‘Greek background’.

The ‘grey areas’ in between
A further ‘problem area’ between majority and minority, and one which exacerbates – or plays a role in perpetuating – some of the other problem areas, is communication problems. Communication between the majority authorities and the minorities is quite limited. This does not lead to conflict per se, but it certainly limits the potential for cohesion. One immediate problem, of course, is the fear on the part of the immigrants: in many cases they avoid contact with authorities for fear of being deported. This fear is of course higher amongst the undocumented immigrants, but it must be noted that amongst the documented immigrants there may also be a sense of insecurity in relation to authorities, for fear that the legitimacy of their documents might be questioned. Furthermore, this limited communication is exacerbated by (no pun intended) the problem of limited opportunities for immigrants to learn the Greek language in Thiva – again, especially a problem for Indians and Pakistanis. Meanwhile due to the language barriers they are, of course, the least able to argue their cause well amongst local leaders (the major and deputy mayors).

There are two important dimensions to this problem. First, the efforts exerted by the local authorities to address this particular need fall very short of the needs of the immigrant groups. Although both at the prefectural and the local level there are some language learning programmes, these reach an extremely small proportion of the immigrants, and most Pakistanis and Indi-

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17 In my study of the local newspaper over a three month period I was unable to find any such adverts, as this interviewee suggested that I would. But I believe it was quite likely for such adverts to have appeared in print ten years ago.
ans are unaware of their existence: as a former local deputy mayor explains, the programmes were advertised on Greek language posters and through the internet, in Greek, so of course few Pakistanis and Indians would have access to the information. Second, a great deal of EU funding has come to Thiva with just such intentions: the local OAED (Greek Manpower Employment Organization) office receives funding for programmes to prepare immigrants for the job market, but clearly the needs are not being met (currently OAED is operating an advanced Greek language course, focused on written Greek; one Polish respondent takes this course).

Meanwhile, there is a KEK (Centre for Professional Training) Programme in Thiva called the Centre for Antiracist Support (Kentro Antiratsistikis Ypostiriksis - KAYP). The programme is privately run and is fully funded by the EU and, as its name reveals, aimed at helping minorities (specifically: immigrants, repatriates and refugees) overcome any race-related barriers and to be integrated into the workforce in Thiva. Mainly, the Centre is meant to offer advice and support to the aforementioned minorities in terms of finding and maintaining employment, and handling any challenges they may have in relation to public authorities, etc. This, if any, seems a likely home for a programme for immigrants to learn the Greek language. But, after explaining in detail the intense competition in Thiva to win such programmes, specifically because of the significant amounts of money involved, the employee in the office responds to my question as to why it does not offer such a language learning programme by questioning what benefit this would have for the programme and its director. In other words, monies from the EU which would suitably be aimed at just this type of aid for immigrants are not being spent in this manner.18 Language, then, is the locus of a problematic situation, and one which serves to perpetuate a host of other problematic situations between majority and those minorities who have little Greek.

The experience of minority children in schools can also be described as a ‘grey area’ between cooperation/cohesion and conflict/tensions in the domain of welfare. When our research began, the Greek primary education system was in its first year of using new school books that had an aim to enhance integration between majority and minority communities. This aim was reflected, for example, in Mathematics texts which had drawings of children from different ethnic and racial backgrounds, and including reference to names from various ethnic backgrounds. One school teacher described the training she had undergone to be more inclusive towards minor-

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18 It should be noted that after two Pakistani respondents were brought into contact with the social worker at KAYP, specifically with the aim of exploring possibilities for Greek language courses, the KAYP social worker helped the two men prepare letters of request to be sent out to various agencies, one of which followed up on the request. In November 2007, a course of beginner Greek was due to begin for a number of Pakistani men brought together by the first two respondents mentioned.
ity children by, for example, asking them to share with the class how to say certain words or expressions in their own language.

The usefulness of such policies was questioned by certain minority children in Thiva. In particular, Albanian children found it problematic, given that they were often so integrated into Greek society that their classmates did not know they were not Greek, except when teachers drew attention to this fact. It is this group of children, in particular, who complained about negative treatment by their fellow students based on their being Albanians (see the Greek State of the Art report for background information on majority attitudes towards Albanians, and the experience of Albanian children in Greek schools).

The school in the ‘Old refugees housing’ is especially interesting because of its policy towards integration and cohesion between majority and minority. In that school the majority of the children is actually of immigrant background. According to one teacher there, special school policies aimed at cohesion between children of different ethnic, national and religious backgrounds is an absolute necessity, and it is relatively successful in this case. The teachers seem devoted to this cause, and find creative ways to implement their policies (e.g., through inter-cultural plays and musicals staged at the school).

A third ‘grey area’ is in the stance and the activities of the Church – or, more specifically, in various clerics’ (divergent) stances and attitudes – in relation to minorities. There is embedded in the Church welfare activity, as well as in Church-related associations (e.g. the St. John Kaloktenis group mentioned on p. 280), a tendency towards helping those in need. And given that the disadvantaged in Thiva tend to be minorities, there is an openness towards them expressed in a willingness to care for them and to try to address their material needs. This is found across the board with all interviewees in this category. As for minorities’ spiritual needs, however, any interest in these – much less effort in relation to these – is quite limited. Most conspicuous is the question of Indians’ and Pakistanis’ (i.e., non-Christian) spiritual needs: there is little knowledge about these, except that there exists a space used as a mosque, and there are widely varied attitudes towards the latter. Only one of five priests interviewed on this question was openly supportive of the mosque, and one was very much focused on the ‘relatively ok’ current status of the space used as a mosque, emphasizing that ‘if it were to become a mosque, then we would have a problem’ (66, M). Elaborating, he notes ‘if a minaret were built, and an imam were coming out and praying out loud, everyone would have a problem with this’ (66, M). When faced with the question of the lack of designated space for the fulfilment of Muslims’ and Sikhs’ spiritual needs, all resisted the notion that the Orthodox churches could be used for this, and all but one resisted the idea that buildings belonging to the parish churches (namely, buildings next to the churches where various gatherings take place) could be used for this purpose.
A special case: the ‘Old refugees housing’

The ‘Old refugees housing’ constitutes a special case in the sense that it is characterized by a great deal of ambiguity in terms of majority-minority relations. If ‘affection through contact’ is a factor observable in this area (see p. 286), so too is ‘disaffection through less immediate contact’: certainly it is the local majority population living in this neighbourhood who voice especially strong statements against the minorities, because their own daily lives are seen to be negatively affected by minorities’ presence. The tension they feel and express, then, is stronger than that of most majority respondents, because of their relatively more immediate contact with the minorities – though again the attitude changes with even more immediate contact, i.e., towards one’s immediate neighbour.

However, there are a very few (three, one female, two male), exceptions to this, whereby a sense of sympathy for the minorities is expressed due to the poor living conditions they experience in this area. Indeed, the local majority community living there today were once themselves the minorities, the outsider refugees from Asia Minor (or their descendants) who also faced discrimination and negativity from the majority local population, and also experiencing poor living conditions relative to the local majority (the neighbourhood was then on the outskirts of Thiva, and the houses very small and basic). These ‘exceptions’ express a sense of solidarity felt with the minorities over their poor living conditions.

For most of the majority community living in the area, though, these poor living conditions of the minorities – especially of the Pakistanis and Indians, who tend to live in large numbers in one small house (majority estimations range from 8 to 30!) – are more a source of frustration against the minorities, for lowering the standards of living in the area and, they complain, the health and cleanliness standards. Indeed, in some cases the houses do not have running water. Most majority interviewees in the area seem to blame the minorities for living in such conditions; relatively few blame the majority individuals (their former Greek neighbours) for renting out these houses in such poor conditions, just to make a bit of money.

Debates over this situation reached what seemed to be a climax in November 2007, when the mayor announced plans for the municipality to purchase from the owner those houses which are in a hazardous condition and to level them, building instead a parking lot in that area, or an open square. (Indeed, parking and traffic problems arise in the local print media much more than issues to do with minorities). When asked what would become of those minorities currently living in those particular houses, the mayor responded that warehouses on the outskirts of Thiva could be adapted into housing for them, building walls within the building to separate it out into rooms (35, m). (Note: in a later interview a deputy major suggested that there were no such plans regarding parking, or relocation of the minorities
[47, m]). Several majority individuals, commenting on the approved plan, stated that ‘this is ok, since they are used to and can live many people to one room’ (38, F; 53, M; 65, F).

This housing area, then, raises another case of cooperation or cohesion within a group, in this case between the majority individuals living there, most of them uniting behind this plan to ‘clean up the neighbourhood’ (which effectively means to be rid of most of the minorities, given that most of them live in houses that are in especially poor condition). And the instrumental factors of money and space are especially important in this case.

**Analysis: emergent values**

Beginning with the last example, **quality of life** emerges in Thiva as a value in which much of majority-minority interaction is couched, as an overarching value to which most of the following values in welfare areas are linked. Unquestionably, most minorities living in Thiva are there with the express purpose of improving their quality of life. Meanwhile, their work – to a large extent – allows for an improvement in the quality of life of the local majority. As one respondent notes, ‘without them, our crop would die and our economy would come to a halt’ (53, M). Yet at the same time, in many cases the mere presence of the minorities is thought to impinge upon the quality of life of the majority. Increased crime rates supposedly attributable to the minorities is the most clichéd of perspectives, and one which is emphatically espoused by one senior police official respondent (though his views were countered by one of his juniors). But we see the complaint in other areas as well – complaints of the standard of living being lowered by minorities in the ‘Old refugees housing’, and of family and commitment values being eroded by immigrant (Eastern European) women. (Note: there is a general assumption, on the part of most majority respondents in the ‘old refugees housing’, that the minorities living in those terrible conditions are satisfied with this situation and with their quality of life.) However, there are also opposing voices, emphasizing how the quality of life of the majority is made possible by minorities’ work, in the farms but also in the home, cleaning and caring for the elderly. The diversity brought to Thiva by the minorities, though, is not treated as a value by most interviewees (and this has to do with culture, and the extent to which religious identity is an aspect of culture: **cultural preservation** is indeed an element of quality of life, visible mostly in the majority). One exception is the view of one priest, who suggests that minority presence is a blessing, as it ‘gives us the opportunity to love something outside of ourselves, something different to us’ (65, M).

To the above is related **education**, as both an autotelic and instrumental value. This is a value generally shared by both the majority and minorities. Traditionally Greeks give much emphasis on education and make significant
family sacrifices in order to provide a good education for their children. This emphasis on education, as well as the element of sacrifice, is even more visible amongst minorities. The educational benefits to their children for being in Thiva (or, Greece in general) rank high amongst minorities’ reasons for being and staying in Thiva. This is especially the case amongst Albanians, whose children tend to do especially well in the schools and who have an advantage with the Greek language, but it also applies to children in all immigrant groups studied, except the Pakistanis and Indians who, again, are by and large without their families (thus far) in Thiva. Their own education, though, particularly in the Greek language, is important to them as their employment opportunities are largely influenced by this, but as we have seen, educating this group in the Greek language is not a value or priority for the majority population and administration.

**Employment** is a welfare area central in most majority-minority interaction in Thiva, given that most of the minorities have come to Thiva for work. And employment which can secure a certain level of welfare is the crux of all the aforementioned problems regarding immigration policy and its pitfalls: the question, for most of those minorities struggling with the immigration policy, is not about integration into society or about gaining, through employment (and through having the proper documentation) certain rights. Rather, it is about the ability to find and maintain work and, ideally, decent work (i.e., factory rather than agriculture, or a monthly salary in agricultural work rather than daily wages.). There is a great deal of variation in this domain, though, between the different groups. For example, for most Pakistanis and Indians, their employment is not generally about fulfilling a sense of identity; it is an instrumental function aiming to earn money which, in turn, is to win them a better life (to be able to bring their wives and children to Thiva too, to educate their children, etc.). For those minorities who are more integrated into Greek society and who have lived there longer, their employment expectations are greater, and the values that they link to these are more complex and include a sense of justice: e.g., for one Bulgarian female migrant labourer, she expects that she will have full access to Greek health care.

Indeed, **health** as a welfare area reveals different hierarchies of values depending on the relative status of the minority individual in question: access to health care is an expectation of those minority groups who are beyond the basic level of daily survival, and it is treated as a luxury by others. The Pakistanis and the Indians tend to the needs within their own groups, respectively, through their informal networks. If there is a critical medical need, they will together seek out medical help, but only in more extreme situation. This of course relates to their status as legalized or not (with even the legalized sometimes weary of seeking help from local authorities, including medical help, just in case their status might be questioned).
Meanwhile, in terms of social care, of relevance here is mainly the provision of basic needs of the disadvantaged. The Church and religious associations treat this as a priority, both in words and in deeds, though the provision does not even nearly meet the needs of the minorities (in fact, neither are majority needs met, insofar as care for the elderly is concerned, for example). Significantly, the reach of such activities is limited, in the sense that not all minority groups are equally likely to approach the Church or religious associations for help, and neither of the latter actually go out into Thiva to assess needs. Rather, their work is based on who comes to them seeking help. In both cases, Romanians and Albanians are cited as primary users, sometimes Bulgarians, but never Pakistanis or Indians. The latter, lacking their own family structures, operate as extended families within their networks (as noted above). For the other groups of minorities (Albanians, Bulgarians and Romanians), social care begins in the home, with the family, and is more or less limited to the home and family.

Assessing the links with religion, minorities and gender: an assessment of the research results from the case of Thiva suggests the following:

Regarding religion: religion in and of itself mainly operates as a value leading to cohesion. We have seen above examples of cohesion within minority groups (e.g., amongst the Pakistanis and Indians) and between majority and minorities via religious (church and religious associations) voluntary activities providing for the basic needs of the disadvantaged. Religion has as a conspicuous value amongst only the Pakistanis and Indians (not the other groups studied), and amongst some of the majority population. However, we cannot speak of religion acting actively as a factor of cohesion between majority and minority, neither looking from the minority perspective towards the majority, nor vice versa. For example, the majority religious activities in welfare provision are not geared specifically towards minorities: rather, they are driven by the Christian principle regarding caring for the needy, and many of the needy in Thiva happen to be minorities. The caring comes only in the form of material needs, and is not extended to include spiritual needs.

Nor, however, can we speak of religion as a divisive factor. It could be, it seems, if there were a drive towards the establishment of a ‘proper’ mosque – i.e., a religious building, together with its minaret. But this is not an issue currently in Thiva.

Minorities as an independent variable has an ambivalent character. As is made clear in the national State of the Art report for the case of Greece, as a country, Greece is only slowly becoming used to the idea that it is no longer homogenous, but a strong sense of national identity, as related to the Greek Orthodox Church, persists, and the same applies to the local level. Therefore, to some extent ‘minorities’ constitute a problem from the beginning, as multiculturalism is from the start not a national or local value, and assimilation is – in the dominant view – presumed impossible (i.e., romantic, ethnic notions of identity, rather than civic). That Albanians have, by and large, inte-
grated so well is not necessarily, from a majority perspective, a good thing – as is clear in children’s experiences in schools (with Albanian children wishing to hide their Albanian identity and, upon its discovery, being teased and bothered by majority Greek children).

At the same time, as noted above, so much of the local economy, as well as local majority quality of life and lifestyles, rely on minority work. This is why the poor state of immigration policy is particularly disturbing, and increasingly so to the immigrants who feel the exploitation intensely (i.e., having to miss days of low-paid work to beg for their ‘papers’, for which they have paid expensively, all the while facing negative stances from much of the majority population).

The question of whether racism is an element in majority-minority interaction is a recurrent theme in the research: many interviewees brought the term up themselves, either to defend themselves as not being racist, or to explain why, indeed, there are racist tendencies in their own and their fellow Greeks’ attitudes. This is a very difficult matter to assess: on the one hand, from a general perspective racism does not seem to characterize majority-minority relations in Thiva, in the sense that the local majority society seems reconciled to the fact that the immigrant presence is necessary and good, in the sense that it supports the local economy to a large extent. On the other hand, in specific, everyday interactions racist attitudes and practices may be detected. From the perspective of the majority of interviewees, though (including minorities and the majority), racism is a factor in majority attitudes and actions towards the minority.

Regarding gender, values related to gender become a factor in majority-minority relations in two main contexts. First, through tensions around the ‘competition’, so to speak, between majority and minority (mainly, Eastern European) women for men: in this context were heard expressions of somewhat different values from the majority female population and the minority female population. However, one cannot describe this situation as particularly pressing (i.e., no real open conflicts between majority and minority emerge from it). Furthermore, the issue is intimately linked to the question of national identity and culture: majority society’s (and majority women’s) resistance to ‘foreign’ women ‘entering’ Greek homes through relationships and marriage has much to do with an effort to maintain Greek culture and national identity within the home, and to exclude others from this. Indeed, it is an exclusive conception of Greek identity that plays a large role here. A second context is that of the predominately male Pakistani and Indian presence. Especially in areas where many individuals from these groups live – namely, the ‘Old refugees housing’, one can trace amongst the majority community significant negativity towards the lifestyle of these individuals. Their tendency to live together, many people living in one room, is perceived as a lifestyle choice rather than a result of financial necessity. There
are many Pakistanis (fewer Indians) who live together in homes within the town, some of them being unmarried (it is cheaper and convenient for three or four or more to live together) and some because they are unable, legally and financially, to invite their wives and children to join them.

Finally, it is important to remember that the Thiva case is very much in a state of flux, with most of the majority-minority interaction still being a fairly new phenomenon, and one which appeared fairly suddenly. Therefore, one might expect significant change over the next few years. Also, it should be noted that even in the short term, hierarchies of values and majority attitudes to immigrants are variable and highly sensitive to current events. Majority and minority stances and actions should not be considered as crystallized, and their sensitivity to national level developments and to socio-economic change at large should be recognized.

References


Appendices:

1:1 The WaVE team

In total, 34 researchers have been included in the WaVE project. The coordination committee is listed first, then the support team, and then the group of researchers involved in each case study. The senior scholar is named first, followed by the junior researcher.

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1:2 The Consortium of the WaVE project
Welfare and Values in Europe (WaVE) was a Specific Targeted Research Project within the European Commission’s 6th Framework Programme.
Thematic Priority: Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-Based Society. Project no: CIT5-CT-2006-028632.
The contractors who are responsible for the work in each respective country are the following:

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**Partner 3:**

**Partner 4:**
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2 Development of methodology
(Workpackage 2)

**WP2 leaders: Pål Repstad and Hans-Georg Ziebertz**

The development of methodology for the WaVE project (WP2) is an ongoing process taking place during different stages in the project, as the methodology is fine-tuned according to the specificities of our research fields. The Methodology workpackage is to produce three texts (deliverables), which are to serve as tools for the junior researchers for their research at the local level (commencing September 2006 and coming to a close in June 2007):

- Guidelines on the qualitative method as applied to the WaVE study (D3);
- Guidelines for the mapping process (i.e., the first stage of the fieldwork) (D4); and
- Guidelines for the collection of material (i.e., the second stage of the fieldwork – in depth research).

The material below will not apply equally well to all the case studies. Accordingly, researchers must use their discretion in applying the guidelines, under the supervision of the senior scholars. They should also raise any questions they have on the discussion forum of the WaVE website, as this will be most helpful for all the researchers.

In the pages that follow you will find:

**D3 – Guidelines on the qualitative method as applied to the WaVE study**

A. WaVE Central Concepts and Objectives
B. WaVE basic research questions
C. Hypotheses and counter-hypotheses
D4 – Guidelines for the mapping process
A. Background questions about the locality (see also ‘Appendix’)
B. Suggestions for how to go about the mapping process
   General suggestions
   Research ethics
C. Suggestions for classification of the material
   Categories
   Some typologies

D5 – Guidelines for the collection of material
A. Selecting the sample
B. Suggestions for the data collection
C. Indicators for group descriptions (if applicable)

Appendix – List of background questions about the locality

Deliverable 3:
Guidelines on the qualitative method as applied to WaVE
One of our starting points is the assumption that values cannot be grasped independently of practices: understanding values requires attention to how values are expressed in actual practice, as well as to ‘official’ values expressed verbally. We aim to understand lived values as they influence majority-minority relations and social cohesion and/or tensions throughout Europe. Accordingly, our study should include consideration of what people do, what people say they do, and how they explain their actions and any changes in their actions over time. Such material is not graspable through quantitative research alone. Survey and statistical information must be supplemented with observations and with interview material.

Furthermore, qualitative research allows the possibility of in-depth and intensive study, usually resulting in more nuanced information. This is important for the WaVE study, inasmuch as nuanced information is needed in working with stereotypes about various groups. The qualitative method also allows the opportunity to gather information from the context in which it is embedded; the researcher thus has access to a wider range of information, if (as is recommended) research is conducted in the informants’ everyday surroundings. Meanwhile, not constrained by pre-
constructed surveys (as in the case of quantitative research), the researcher has the ability to adjust his or her questions and methods of attaining information according to the lessons learned through the research process.

Thus, qualitative research allows us the necessary flexibility for grasping how values are expressed and developed on the ground and how, in practice, these values may affect majority-minority relations. It also enables us to capture nuance related to religion and different religious groups, to minority status and to different groups of minorities, and to gender patterns and changes within these amongst different groups. Meanwhile, by examining all of these dimensions through the prism of welfare, we are approaching the most fundamental level at which coexistence between different cultures, values and religions can be effectively examined – that of the expression of, and provision of, ‘basic’ individual and community needs (bearing in mind that what is considered ‘basic’ is itself an expression of values). It is through this approach that we can best supplement the existing quantitative research on welfare and values in Europe.

Our study of localities allows us to glean insight into at least three levels: the regional, the national, and the local levels. It also allows us to detect similarities and differences between these levels, and to compare these levels across the 12 countries in WaVE (i.e. local level could sometimes be similar across our countries, whilst the national level could be different).

Given the great diversity of context examined in the WaVE study – with tremendous differences in how WaVE central concepts are played out in the 14 case studies – the research will necessarily take different forms in the various case studies. Decisions regarding research sample and research methods must be made according to how the WaVE objectives can best be realized in each given context. It is therefore important that WaVE’s central concepts and objectives be reiterated here: it is this ‘big picture’ which should guide us as we enter the research field.

C. Hypotheses and Counter-hypotheses
This list of hypotheses and counter-hypotheses is to serve as a tool, to help us to bear in mind our broader questions as we enter the field, as well as to make us more aware of our own expectations. It is not a list of questions requiring a response from the researcher, although it may help
the researcher in planning the questions he or she will ask in the field. Nor is it an authoritative list: you may add your own hypotheses and counter-hypotheses, and/or you may overlook some of these as irrelevant to your own case study.

1. Religious institutions play a significant role in providing welfare services
2. Religious institutions play a significant role in shaping the discourse on issues of welfare
3. The activity of religious institutions in the welfare domain is a direct result of new welfare needs arising with the shrinking of the welfare state.
4. The activity of religious institutions in the welfare domain is not directly related to the shrinking of the welfare state, but to broader social and religious change in Europe.
5. Religions is an important factor in the shaping of welfare needs
6. Religious institutions express noble welfare values (e.g., advocating love of neighbours), but the most efficient provider of welfare is the state
7. Religioulsly provided welfare is better, more idealistic, allowing greater flexibility, closer to the recipients of welfare provision, etc.
8. Religiously provided welfare is discriminatory, thus more likely to lead to social exclusion
9. Religiously provided welfare tends to uphold certain gender structures
10. Gender-divided (i.e., men’s only and women’s only) minority group institutions uphold gender divisions and the subordination of women.
11. Gender-divided minority group institutions lead to the strengthening of women’s position within the group and within society as a whole.
12. Religiously provided welfare tends to uphold the dominant patterns of welfare provision
13. Instances of integration or polarisation between minority and majority groups will depend on the relations between the groups rather than on the specific characteristics of the group
14. Increased provision of welfare services to minorities will lead to increased cohesion between the majority and the minority.
15. Increased provision of welfare services to minorities will lead to increased conflict between the majority and the minority.
16. Minority group institutions uphold gender divisions and the subordination of women, thus justifying the feminist critique against them.
17. Majority and minority group institutions reveal the same gender divisions.
18. Increased presence of religion in the public sphere leads to decreased gender equality in society.
19. Increased presence of religion in the public sphere has no clear effect on gender equality. Effects depend on how and where gender equality is assessed.
20. Strict privatisation of religion may create a more peaceful society with less conflict.
21. Strict privatisation of religion may lead to a more polarise, conflict-ridden society.

**Deliverable 4:**

**Guidelines for the Mapping Process**
The mapping process is the first stage of our fieldwork in the selected localities and will play a critical role in helping us achieve WaVE’s overall aims. First, by providing information on minority presence, networks and associations in our localities, we will already be making a significant contribution to knowledge on minorities in Europe. Second, the mapping process is designed to help us make informed decisions about how to narrow the scope of and choose the sample for our in-depth research (second stage of the fieldwork), so that it will best reveal the sources of cohesion or tension between minority and majority communities, as observable through the domain of welfare. Accordingly, we will map quite broadly, taking into consideration what constitutes the ‘majority’ as well as all religious ethnic, national and (or racial groups which claim (or are conferred, by the majority), a minority status, irregardless of the size of the group.
It should be noted that at the mapping stage we are focusing on collection some basic information on groups, as such. Then, based on the results of the mapping process, we will decide on which groups, issues, themes and/or phenomena, etc., we should focus in each case study (in other words, we need not focus on groups, as such, for the in-depth research; see D5 for guidance on this matter). We will try to make decisions which ensure both comparability and contextuality (paying sufficient attention to case specificities which may have important theoretical implications for the study as a whole).

The mapping process is thus an integral part of the WaVE research, and it is an end in itself. Researchers are asked to map as broadly as possible, presenting the following basic information (please see D4, C for more specific questions):

a. What groups are present in the locality? (description of ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ communities, in accordance with D4, C – Categories)
b. Do they provide welfare service, either internally to the group or for other as well?
c. How do the various groups interact? (what information are you able to gather from gatekeepers regarding any notable tension, or cohesion, within and between varous groups, in the domain of welfare?)

The results of such a broad mapping process will enhance our ability to draw some basic comparisons across all case studies (this is especially important, since we are not able to conduct in-depth studies on the same groups and to draw comparisons this way).

Definitions of ‘majority’ and ‘minority’
Conceptions of ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ vary significantly across the 12 countries included in the WaVE study. For our purposes, by ‘majority’ we mean literally that part of the population which forms the numerical majority. In some cases, ‘majority’ will be closely linked to a ‘majority religion’, and so the two should be examined together. In other cases, there will be no particular relationship between the two. Also, we must be aware of the relative uses of the term ‘majority’: i.e., certain groups may be considered part of the majority, when viewed from a particular perspective. Accordingly, it is important that we describe as close to the
ground as possible, explaining our use of the term ‘majority’ in each given context.

Arriving at a common definition of ‘minority’ which is relevant across Europe is an especially difficult task. For the purposes of the fieldwork (WP3), we take a broad definition of minorities based on the following reasons:

a. We expect to find very different results in terms of the relationship (one of tensions or cohesion?) between majority communities and different kinds of minority communities (i.e., autochthonous or immigrant, primarily ethnic or religious, etc.).

b. We try to allow space for the different definitions of ‘minority’ in each case to arise. Different conceptions of minority may tell us something about the development of and/or potential for tension or cohesion.

c. We wish to include attention to a possibly vast array of self-definitions of the ‘minorities’ themselves (as these self-definitions may vary from those of the researcher or of the broader majority community).

d. Taking such a broad definition may help us to avoid reifying preconceived notions about conflict related to particular groups (i.e., modifying stereotypes).

We will study various levels of ‘authority’ within minority groups (e.g., leaders as well as general group members). This approach is helpful in allowing us to detect possible differences between leaders’ and others’ ability to distinguish between religion and culture. It will also enhance our ability to trace gendered differences related to different access to leadership positions.

We have chosen to examine whether minorities establish their own welfare activities) whether through formal organizations or informal networks). Assuming that the welfare state is about social cohesion, this focus will offer us insight into whether the mere existence of various welfare-providing minority organizations leads to greater fragmentation of society, or whether, instead, it strengthens civil society and the groups’ position within society.
The research will raise difficult questions of identity and identification of groups and of individuals. Specifically, it will shed light on potential tension between ascribed identities and self-identifications (both at the group and individual levels). We must seek to be sensitive to the relativity of identity (between majority and minority groups), as well as to the flexibility of localized identity (i.e., how identity may be linked to more than one place, beyond the locality and even beyond the national borders).

Finally, it should be noted that embedded in our research aims is a tension between comparability and contextuality. Emphasis on comparability is more conducive to the drawing of scientific and analytical conclusions, whereas emphasis on contextuality is more conducive to representing the complexity of reality on the ground. We will continually be seeking to strike a proper balance between these two aims.

The guidelines for the mapping process consist of four parts:

A. A list of background questions about the locality (see below and Appendix)
B. Suggestions for how to go about the mapping process
   General suggestions
   Research ethics
C. Suggestions for classification of the material
   Categories
   Some typologies

Part A: Background questions about the locality
First, as noted in D4 above, the very basic information we seek to gather in the mapping process is the following:

a. What groups are present in the locality? (description of ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ communities, in accordance with D4, C – Categories)
b. Do they provide welfare service, either internally to the group or for others as well?
c. How do the various groups interact? (what information are you able to gather from gatekeepers regarding any notable tension, or
cohesion, within and between various groups, in the domain of welfare?)

Beyond this, in order to understand the nature of interaction between majority and minority groups in the domain of welfare, we need to have a basic idea of the characteristics of the local welfare system, and of the majority church’s role therein. We thus begin our enquiry with questions related to these two subjects, and will then move on to consider minority groups specifically. **A list of background questions about the locality may be found in the Appendix to this workpackage.** PLEASE note: these are not meant to be interview questions, but questions to guide your gather of background information about the locality.

These questions will also be useful in our presentation of the mapping results, as part of our first draft case study reports (in other words, similar to the process for the writing of the State of the Art – Overview of the National Situation reports: in the first drafts we presented information in a format based on a list of questions; in the second drafts we re-organized that information).

It is also important to note that these questions will not be equally applicable to all case studies. Please use these questions to guide your mapping process, but if a questions or group of questions is not applicable to your case study (if, for example, there is no majority church presence in the domain of welfare), please simply indicate that this is the case.

Finally, please note that these questions may miss some very important background information for your particular locality. Accordingly, do not hesitate to add other similar information which is relevant to your particular case study (e.g., simply add a section at the bottom entitled ‘other information’).

**Part B: Suggestions for how to go about the mapping process**

1. **General suggestions**

First, we suggest that you begin by approaching the local authorities for statistical information regarding a. the local welfare system and b. minority groups and immigration. In most cases there will be local welfare
centres/offices: it is highly recommended that you establish contacts there and seek information from these offices as well. Statistics are a very important part of the mapping process, but they must be supplemented with interview data. Ask those who are responsible for this information to tell you their perspectives on it: whether it is comprehensive, up-to-date, etc.

Second, we suggest you visit central local offices of the majority church to attain information about the various welfare-related activities based in the diocese and in individual parishes (where applicable).

Third, we suggest that you also make contact with some representatives of minority groups and try to glean insight into different minority-group associations which may exist in your locality.

It may also be helpful to speak with representatives of the local media to ask about the nature and history of the minority groups present in the locality and about relations between minority and majority groups (you can cross-reference their responses with the information you have gathered for questions 1.f. above, on the issues currently debated in the local media).

In this way, you will try to make primary contact with individuals from various groups, rather than beginning with ‘gatekeeper’/‘insider’ individuals from only one group, which might give the impression of and/or possibly lead to a biased starting point.

Beyond this, the best way to approach individuals from particular groups will vary from case to case: accordingly, you must use your best judgement and try to find methods for the mapping process most suitable to the environment in the given locality.

It is especially important that we approach individuals and groups carefully, bearing in mind that they may feel vulnerable or may have developed a suspicion of outsiders because they have been victims of journalists’ or others’ creation of stereotypes against them. In this context, it may be immensely valuable to develop initial contacts with people who themselves have inside information about the minority groups (‘gatekeepers’, or ‘door-openers’) and who are interested in and willing to give information and to help researchers make contacts within the minority
groups. These individuals (as all contacts) should be shown gratitude and respect.

At the same time, it is important to try to maintain a balance so as not to bond too closely with particular ‘gatekeepers’/‘door-openers’, as this may close other doors for you. Thus, gratitude to particular individuals must be balanced with establishment of new contacts with other insiders, in order to be able to secure information from a range of different angles. This is vital for quality research, but it is also important for the ‘gatekeepers’ themselves, as close association with the external researcher could potentially create problems for him or her, especially if the researcher is considered by anyone as a possible threat (for instance as an investigator from the authorities).

Please bear in mind that this process is to help us decide on which groups to focus in conducting the more in-depth research. Accordingly, even in your first contact with groups in the locality, you can begin trying to determine which groups are interesting to study from the perspective of interaction between the minority and majority communities (whether ‘positive’ or ‘negative’/harmonious or tense). In other words, bear in mind that we do not plan to focus on the groups themselves as much as on the interaction between majority and minority groups.

In this context, it is useful to be aware of different types of associations that could be included in the research. For example, beyond general groupings of individuals from a particular religious, ethnic or national background (e.g., the ‘Muslims of Gävle’ or the ‘Pakistani Association of Thiva’), there may also be ‘issue-specific’ groups, operating either within those larger general associations or separate from them (e.g., a youth group, a children’s play group, a ‘Mothers against Violence’ group, etc.). Attention to such associations will offer insight into the diversity within particular groupings; it is also more likely to lead us to perspectives of women and children, given that the larger general associations tend to be led by men.

Finally, it is also important to consider factors which fluctuate over time and which may change the nature of the interaction between particular groups over the course of our study. For example, broader economic factors – i.e., international, European, national and local economic conditions – which may be affecting what we see on the ground in terms of
welfare needs and practices, and which may change over the course of our research.

2. Research ethics

In all our contact with respondents we must abide by our code of research ethics:

First, please see ‘Research Ethics Guidelines’ on p.22 of the WaVE Researchers’ Handbook: it is the responsibility of each researcher to follow these guidelines.

Second, please follow the more detailed guidelines below (the following points are borrowed and translated from a text prepared by Pål Repstad):

Sensitive information: One issue which is especially important when conducting research amongst ‘vulnerable’ minority groups is how we should handle controversial, ‘unpleasant’ information which might arise from the research in relation to a particular group. For instance, what if we come across instances of systematic violence or oppression internally in a group? Or of minorities within minorities which are subjected to differentiated treatment? Such data should not be ignored in the name of solidarity with the group as such, or for fear of stigmatisation by the majority. On the other hand, such data must be checked and re-checked, and not transmitted based on hearsay alone. Finally, such information should be placed within a context: e.g., what are the possible reasons for such a situation to arise, and how can it be dealt with constructively?

Anonymity: In dealing with such delicate information, principles of anonymity are very important, especially concerning the possibility of whistle-blowing victims. It is more difficult to maintain anonymity of leaders and others in formal positions in small-to-medium sized towns: the anonymity of such individuals can hardly be secured when the names of the towns are presented in the reports. Meanwhile, people in public positions do not have the same right to anonymity concerning matters of work. Accordingly, we should be careful not to promise anonymity where we cannot guarantee it. At the same time, we need not use people’s names in our reports: the occupations or positions of individuals are important, not their names.
**Offering written summaries for review:** We should think carefully about whether we will promise informants the opportunity to read the written summary or minutes from their interview. This can be useful and give additional information. However, it is quite time-consuming, and there is always a risk of second-thought tactical changes. There is no ethical duty to offer this service to informants, and it should be considered in each case. There is, however, and ethical duty to keep our promises, once given.

**Part C: Suggestions for classification of the material**

**Categories:** Classification of various groups may be quite complicated: some groups may seem to you to be defined primarily by their ethnicity, whilst they may claim first and foremost a religious group identification. Thus we suggest that you present the results of the majority/minority mapping process bearing in mind the following distinctions (and presenting statistics accordingly, *where possible*):

1. **Citizenship:** what is the breakdown of percentages of citizenship in the entire locality (what percentage of the population holds citizenship of the country in which they live and, for the rest, what other national citizenships do they hold?)

2. **Ethnicity:** what ethnicities are represented in the locality? (again, please present figure *where possible*)

3. **Religion:** what is the breakdown of percentages of religious affiliation in the locality (what percentage is considered to be members of the majority church *where applicable*; what percentage claims a different religious affiliation, and what is the breakdown of different faiths/denominations?)

4. **Autochthonous or immigrant:** are the particular minority groups present in the locality ‘old’/native to the locality, or are they immigrant groups?

5. **Gender:** what is the gender compositions of the group (percentage of male and female members); what is the gender composition of the group leadership?
6. Generation: if members of an immigrant group, are they first, second, third, etc. generation immigrants (or a mixture: how many generations of immigrants present in a particular community?)

Please note: We must be specific in explaining our definitions of ‘immigrant’. Does ‘immigrant’ refer to someone born abroad, or also further generations? Also, be careful with the term ‘national minority’, if it is used in your locality: are these self-declared minorities, or is this a title conferred on them by the authorities? If presenting statistics, what do these figures relate to: a census, or estimations? And finally, in cases where you have both ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ data, please present both, but with some explanation of the source.

Some Typologies: This list is to help in our presentation of the results: it is not exhaustive.

1. Is the local welfare system a universal system – a centralized structure for provision of all basic needs – or a diverse system of several groups tending to different types of needs? Or would you describe it otherwise?

2. Is it a universal system for all, or means-tested (i.e. providing help only to those who can demonstrate need), or something in between?

3. What is the division of labour between private and public sectors, in the domain of welfare?
   This last typology is more appropriate for the second stage of the fieldwork:

4. Can we detect differences between secular versus religious welfare providers in terms of a sensitivity to receivers’ religious profile and b. sensitivity to receivers’ needs? (note: ‘sensitivity’ here does not include a moral judgement but rather a value-free consideration of whether and the extent to which these factors are taken into consideration).

Deliverable 5:

Guidelines for the collection of material
Given the diversity of cultures and contexts included in the WaVE project, the methods for the collection of material will necessarily be varied, in accordance with what may be most appropriate and
most effective way in a given context of grasping WaVE’s objectives. Thus, the following guidelines entail a range of suggestions for the researcher; but, most importantly, WaVE’s central concepts and objective must be born in mind (see D3, A).

The guidelines for the collection of material consist of four parts:

A. Selecting the sample  
B. Suggestions for the data collection  
C. Indicators for the presentation of the material

A. Selecting the sample

Based on the results of the preliminary mapping conducted in each case study, we have agreed that the best way to fulfil WaVE’s objectives is to design our in-depth research based upon what groups, issues, phenomena, etc., help us to fulfil those objective most effectively (and efficiently: e.g., other factors to take into consideration are practicality, access, time resources, etc.). Thus, the Methodology WP leaders will not suggest that we conduct in-depth research with particular groups, or on particular issues. Instead, junior researchers, together with the senior scholars, should take decisions that are most appropriate for the local context, and they should be able to justify their decisions with reference to WaVE’s objectives.

Examples of selection criteria:  
The best way to get to the WaVE objectives will vary from case to case and, accordingly, cannot be prescribed. However, it may be helpful to consider some examples.

E.g., in order to grasp values which may lead to minority-majority conflict or cohesion in the welfare domain, one may choose to focus on the concept of pluralism as evinced in the field of education (how are pluralistic measure pursued and received by the local minority and majority communities?). Or, for example, one may choose to shed light on mechanisms which lead to social cohesion or tension: e.g., a community centre focused explicitly on providing services to women of different ethnic, racial and religious backgrounds, together in the same space (what effect does this have on tension or cohesion between various groups?)
Size of the sample:
It is suggested that we follow the ‘principle of saturation’ in deciding when to stop collecting material: when you start hearing the same information being repeated most of the time, it is probably wise to stop. The number of informants required will depend upon the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the case: If the field is homogeneous, fewer informants are needed than if there is a multitude of experiences, stories and points of view.

B. Suggestions for the data collection

Preparation for the field
1. Before embarking on the fieldwork, it may be useful to make a note of any expectations we may have as researcher (in terms of the research results), so that we may be aware of possible biases/prejudices we may have, and so that we can track any changes in these. (Making your own list of hypotheses may be helpful).

2. It may also be useful to prepare a short, informal text with which to introduce yourself and the project to your potential respondents. (In some cases, the WaVE brochure can be used; in others, a shorter and less formal text may be appropriate; and in yet others, only verbal communication will be the best approach). In any case, we should be prepared to point out our independence from local, national and EU authorities, so as to avoid scepticism as well as unrealistic hope for help and immediate results in terms of improved conditions of life.

Planning the in-depth research
1. Most effective for our purposes would be to begin with observation of practices in a process of interaction with the groups and actors (e.g., if possible and appropriate, taking part in group activities), and only after this to begin conducting interviews. This will allow us to pick up on concrete examples of issues related to WaVE’s objectives, and to notice possible contradictions between discourse and practice; on this basis, we can then incorporate such concrete examples into our interview sessions.

2. We should aim to gather as much material as possible from different sources and contexts: e.g., read local media, attend local meetings and religious gatherings, etc., and also collective qualitative data from as
many sources as possible. This will allow us to develop a broader understanding of the groups and phenomena we are studying. It will also allow us to cross-reference information.

3. Related to the above: the fieldwork should be broad in scope. Rather than being limited to interview research and collection of printed material, WaVE should include such methods as biographical approaches, ethnography, participant observation, etc. Attention to place and space are important (e.g., where is a particular religious organization situated? What are its buildings like? What does graffiti in the area convey?). The research methods employed to gather data will vary from case to case in the WaVE project: it is suggested that researchers use the methods most appropriate for the given context (and these may vary even with the locality), and those method with which the researcher is most comfortable and with which he/she may have more experience. Please seek advice from your senior scholars, from the coordination committee, and from one another as needed.

In the interview context

1. In the interview context, questions related to respondents’ values should be specific and related to practices which are indicative of values, rather than general questions provoking general value statements. For examples, ask: ‘How do you usually tackle a situation where a family is facing financial difficulties’, rather than ‘Do you think egalitarian values are important?’

2. One useful approach is to ask about the informant’s own practice, and then go on to ask whether this is a practice typical to the group to which he or she belongs, or whether there are other practices prevailing in the group. This could lead to an explicit discussion about specific situations.

3. Researchers should ask for documentation of practices (statistics and so on) where relevant (in a careful manner, so as to not appear suspicious).

4. We should try to get a sense of individuals’ system of priorities and whether they communicate a hierarchy of needs: how do people prioritise their own needs, and how do they evaluate others’ needs within a system of priorities?
5. We should pay attention to any detectable differences between the attitudes and actions of individuals in positions of authority and of individuals who are members and/or employees within a particular group. (As noted in D4, we should try to meet with individuals from various levels of authority).

**Recording and reporting our results**

1. In reporting the results we should *describe as close to the ground as possible*. Thus, when recording the information (i.e., keeping your own notes), be specific and very descriptive. Analysis and evaluation should come at a later stage. This approach – reserving analysis and evaluation for *after* the collection of data – will help us be more sure to capture *values* rather than attitudes, as we will then have the opportunity to consider a range of statements together with practices, with the added insight of events and developments in which those statements and practices are embedded. It will also help us to avoid homogenising minority groups on the basis of one or two examples of behaviour of particular individuals within a particular group.

2. Also, we must be careful in reporting our results to distinguish ourselves and our voices from those of our respondents.

3. Guidance on the *format* for reporting our results will be given at a later stage.

**C. Indicators for the presentation of the material**

*For those researchers studying groups in depth, it will be helpful to take into consideration the following indicators:*

- a. size of the group membership
- b. change in size of membership over time
- c. range of ages of members
- d. gender composition of group membership
- e. education level of its leaders
- f. rates of unemployment within the group
- g. types of employment: white collar/blue collar/agricultural, etc.
APPENDIX (to D4)

List of Background Questions about the Locality (for the mapping process)

Reminders:
- In addition to the information indicated below, the mapping process is also to produce responses to the following basic questions:

a. What groups are present in the locality? (description of ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ communities, in accordance with D4, C – Categories)

b. Do they provide welfare services, either internally to the group or for others as well?

c. How do the various groups interact? (what information are you able to gather from gatekeepers regarding any notable tension, or cohesion, within and between various groups, in the domain of welfare?)

Beyond this, the following list of questions about the locality is important background information that will help us to understand the nature of interaction between majority and minority groups in the domain of welfare.

Note that the questions below are not meant to be interview questions, but questions to guide your gathering of background information about the locality.

Finally, please indicate if a question is irrelevant for your particular case study, and please add similar information which is not covered by these questions but is relevant to your own study.

1. Characteristics of the local welfare system

a. Are there any easily observable differences between the national and local level welfare systems? (Please refer to your response to question 2.a of your ‘Overview of the national situation report’: we should place our description of the local welfare system within the context of our description of the national welfare system as a whole. Is the national system centralized or decentralized? And what is the specific relationship between the local and national levels in your particular case study?).

b. If so, can you provide any information about the reasons for these differences?
c. Please present an overview of the local public welfare provision (what public services are provided?). Please quantify where possible (i.e., number of welfare offices, numbers of requests received there, etc.)

d. Are there easily observable gaps in the local welfare system?

e. Which challenges to the local welfare system can be foreseen in the near future (migration, demography, patterns of gender and family, etc.)?

f. Which issues concerning the organization of welfare are currently debated? (what issues are debated in the local media?)

g. How can the roles of women and men in the welfare sector be described (include figures if available)?

h. Which issues concerning gender in relation to welfare are high on the agenda in public debate (e.g. lone mothers, elderly/immigrant women, burn out syndromes, trafficking, violence against women, the willingness of men to take on different types of care)?

i. Are there explicit sources of conflict related to welfare provision regarding religion, minorities or gender?

*For points e-i, try to indicate distinctions between the local and national level.*

2. Majority church role in the local welfare system

a. Is there a formal (i.e., endorsed by the local public authority) role for the majority church in the local welfare system? How is this related to the role of the majority church in welfare provision at the national level? (i.e., are the local specificities determining the role of the church in this particular locality?)

b. What are the welfare-related activities of the local church? Please quantify where possible (including number of institutions/organizations, and numbers of persons seeking aid from these).

c. Are there easily-observable links between the majority church welfare activities and local minority communities?

*In general, for points a-c, please try to indicate distinctions between the church at the national and at the local level, bearing in mind the extent to*
which the role of the church at the local level depends on the overall role of the church in society and in the welfare system specifically.

3. Overview of the minority presence in the locality

As noted above, the mapping process is designed to help us decide how to narrow our focus and select our sample for the second stage of the research. Accordingly, for this first stage of the fieldwork, we will map quite broadly, providing a picture of all minority presence in the locality, regardless of size.

a. What minority groups are present in the locality (religious and ethnic, immigrant and autochthonous)? Please provide percentages where possible.

b. What is the official local governmental policy in relation to these minorities and their welfare needs? Do they have the same rights and formal access to public welfare as the population at large?

c. What have the major patterns in immigration to the locality been? (immigration primarily from certain places? during certain periods?)

d. If there are autochthonous minority communities, can you provide some information about their development as communities in the locality?

e. If there are immigrant minorities, are there relations between the immigrant community and the ‘old country’ (country of origin) that are significant for our study (for instance for issues of integration)?

f. Are the minority groups organized in denominations, associations or other organized forms? If so, describe these organizations and the type of activities with which they are generally involved.

g. Have the minority groups established their own institutions which are either explicitly welfare-providing institutions or social organizations dealing with welfare needs?

h. If these institutions provide welfare services, can you ascertain a. in which sectors (what kind of services do they provide?), and b. why they provide these services?

i. Can you determine the source of these institutions’/organizations’ funding? (do they receive any state funding? Are they based on private donations?)
j. What is the content and tone of current debate on immigration (as reflected in the media)? (e.g., Is there discussion about assimilation more so than about diversity? Who are the main voices in the debates? Is there a focus on tension and conflict, or on social cohesion?)

k. Are there particular debates related to the Muslim presence in the locality? If so, what is the content and tone of these debates? (Do they focus on tension/conflict, or on social cohesion?)

l. Are there issues concerning gender in relation to minority religions which are on the agenda in public debate? If so, what is the content, and tone, of the debate?

m. Are there any such gender-related issues specific to Islam?

n. Have religious minority groups encountered difficulty in establishing their own places of worship?

o. Have Muslim groups faced particular difficulty in establishing mosques?