Abstract
By reconsidering the epistemic implications underlying the marginal status to which the materials produced by South Asian exponents of various forms of ‘dissenting’ or ‘anti-traditional’ intellectual activity have been consigned, in this essay I propose revisiting our understanding of why many South Asian traditions that do not adhere to a dominant doxa have been omitted or given a permanent status of subordination. From this perspective I here argue the paucity of textual materials produced by the ‘dissenters’ – which now survive only in fragments – is the most striking proof that over the centuries these elements have not been considered as what they really are.

Keywords: Dissent, South Asian intellectual traditions, nāstika, early materialism, pramāṇa

1. Voices of dissent as essential elements in understanding the textual production of ‘orthodox’ traditions

In a short essay written in 1990, Friedhelm Hardy drew attention to a singular gap in the field of Indological studies. Taking as his example the marginal position to which certain South Asian religious traditions have been consigned, Hardy raised a number of thorny methodological issues. He argued that many of the supposed monolithic ‘givens’ (for example, the ‘true Vedic life’) to which we are accustomed are such only by virtue of the history of the discipline. Furthermore, he argued that the part played by ‘unorthodox distortions’ and ‘sectarian developments’ has not been attributed sufficient weight, and that their historical role may have been any-

* With the technical term ‘veridiction’ (borrowed from the French véridiction, itself a cognate of the medieval Latin term verdictum [from verumdictim or veredictum]) I wish to emphasise the pretension (or the veridical intention) which sustains statements claiming that a certain conviction, or persuasion, is the ‘real view’ or the ‘proper understanding’. This veridical act, a peculiar property of each nomos, is the prerogative of those juridical, religious, and philosophical discourses, in which speakers want to be perceived and acknowledged as ‘pronouncing truth’. I have also chosen to use the word veridiction because other English terms — such as truthfulness (‘the quality of being truthful’), truthful proposition, truth telling, truth claim (or truthful claim), true statement, or veridic discourse — do not properly express the political, relational, and competitive dimension of this specific form of speech act. Aspects of this latter are not extraneous to the ancient South Asian context. See Thompson 1998. For various usages of the notion of ‘veridiction’, see Fortier 1997; Landowski 1988; Coquet 1983; Greimas 1980.

In this paper, all the quotations, translations and references to the Mānavadharmaśāstra are taken from the critical edition of Patrick Olivelle (Olivelle 2005), whom I would like to thank for having given me the opportunity to consult and use his work before its publication. I am indebted with too many people to mention them all, but would at least like to thank those who directly helped me: Piero Capelli, Alessandro Graheli, Marina Rustow, Francesco Sferra, Gagan Sood.
thing but marginal. With his characteristic originality and incisiveness, Hardy outlined a research program:

Naively it has been assumed that what the dharmashastras lay down as rules corresponds to actual life. In fact, it is no more than an ideal, a blueprint for a perfect society. [...] From this follows that a considerable amount of religious life has been going on that is not as such described in the books on the Vedic dharma. No doubt these books, along with the belief in the Vedas etc., played a far wider role as prestigious norms and ideals than such a hypothetical calculation reveals. But they prescribe, not describe. Once it is realized that things need not actually be what they are supposed to be, according to some normative interpretation, it becomes possible to look at them in their own right and not write them off as ‘unorthodox distortions’ or ‘sectarian developments’ when acknowledging their existence at all. Thus a vast realm is opened up for the study of a ‘Hinduism’ after and outside the Veda in senso stricto [sic].

Hardy’s reasoning is attractive. Nevertheless, we should try to resist its appeal and consider the problems of his proposal: How can we shift the study of certain social and life environments (Lebenswelten) from the centre to the margins without appearing to make arbitrary choices? How are we to give actual importance to dissenting materials – or what remains of them – and remove them from their classic status of irrelevance? How could these materials contribute to our understanding of a certain historical event or a particular work belonging to a mainstream tradition? By working with the ‘unsaid’ is there not a danger that we may hear voices that have never actually been spoken?

Indeed, the difficulties of such research programs are numerous.

However, to remove materials produced by dissenting and non-mainstream traditions from their ‘statutory’ patch of shade need not be an act of mere antiquarianism. On the contrary, it can significantly increase both the quantity of new data, which it is the historian’s task to address, and the quality of the reading of all the other data already present. Of course, introducing unaccustomed information into an already existing framework requires the creation of space and the rearrangement of the available elements. In other words, the network of the relations and dynamics of the entire intellectual context under scrutiny has to be redesigned. Re-qualifying and shifting the epistemic status of neglected materials and traditions would lead to at least two results: Although losing the marginal status of being insignificant and peripheral accessory facts, such neglected materials would also acquire the new status – probably corresponding more closely to its reality – of a constitutive part of the formative dialectic of South Asian intellectual production.

In this view, the history and sociology of intellectual traditions can come to our aid. Works in these fields show us how every thought or symbolic system produced  

1 Hardy 1990: 147. Of course, Hardy is not the only one aware of these problems. Consider also what Witzel said: ‘It is often overlooked that the Hindu texts, whether in Sanskrit, Middle or New Indo-āryan, or Dravidian, usually represent the voice of the Brāhmaṇ (the Buddhist, the Jaina, and so forth) establishment. Even originally countermovements (Tantra, for example) made their way into the received texts only after a period of “Brāhmanization”— entailing purification and adjustment to the norms of Hinduism’ (Witzel 1997b: 501).

2 Like those at the basis of Collins’s work (Collins 2001), which is partly devoted to South Asia. Furthermore, Collins 2002; Bourdieu 1983.
by an agent, while the expression of the individual’s agency, is also subject to and influenced by the various forms of constraint exercised upon him by the horizon of theoretical possibilities of which he is a part. The elements of these constraints enter into dialectical connection with the agent’s cogitatio, which is always socially situated and historically positioned, in the same way as the other conditions which enable its exercise. The effects of such interaction then penetrate the heart of the concepts, notions, and categories which he uses. Hence the imaginative capacity of an agent must always be set in relation to the objective interests deriving from his being situated in a specific position within the social sphere (a place with contours that are always definite and never abstract). The act and the outcome of the intellectual production are therefore closely connected with the social position of the producer and of his interlocutors.

Transferring these principles to dissenting, subaltern, and marginal traditions means that the intellectual production of a majority tradition is not only connected with its social position, but is also greatly influenced by the historical specificity of its epistemic condition. An intellectual production therefore takes shape within a context of relative autonomy, which is the objective outcome of the competitive climate established between the various occupants of the social field, including its dissenting traditions and marginalised subjects. A competitive climate, in which abilities and personal interests, the demands of the professional order or the parent corporation, the need – common to all corporations – to preserve the legitimacy of the existing objective and symbolic heritages, the processes of alliance or rupture which emerge from the interrelations of the various social entities, contribute to, and are responsible for the morphological outcome of the various forms of intellectual production.

Consequently, it is clear how important, if not essential, it is to seek out and listen to the dissenting voices, not merely for par condicio issues or out of fascination with minorities. Listening to such voices is, on the contrary, crucial if we are truly seeking to understand the reasons behind the theoretical structures that support the text of a dominant writer or the works of a majority tradition.

2. Tradition, criticism, subalternity: Strategies for establishing the marginality of dissent

Before beginning to think in this way, we must remove some of the structural faults of this method. We have to reconsider the epistemic implications underlying the marginal status to which the materials produced by the exponents of the various forms of ‘dissenting’ or ‘anti-traditional’ intellectual activity have been consigned. I am referring, in particular, to our understanding of why many South Asian traditions that do not adhere to a dominant doxa have been omitted or given a permanent status of subordination. Here the paucity of textual material produced by the ‘dissidents’, which now survives only in fragments,3 is the most striking proof that over the centuries these elements have not been considered as what they really are.

3 See Bhattacharya 2002a.
The first phase of this policy of omission and marginalisation is linked to ‘traditional’ intellectuals (*smārta*), who have excluded these awkward arguments from their treatises, except when driven by the need to contradict dangerously persuasive concepts. Subsequently, the neglect was reinforced by those who shared the historiographic idleness of certain ‘traditions’ of Indological studies. The force of inertia imposed by the received view has made them wary of inquiring into the strategic and political reasons behind the silence of the sources, and into the literary corpora actually transmitted by ‘hegemonic’ traditions.

Thus the words of dissent, which the ‘orthodox’ (*āstika*) authors had strictly consigned to the margins of their cultural universe, acquired a permanent, almost ontological, status of neglect. The traditional desire to shift these intellectual traditions to the sidelines has led, on the one hand, to the conviction that they were indeed marginal and, on the other, to establishing the unified, intact, consistent, and undifferentiated image of the majority tradition. This produced the dominant view – that is, if *exempli gratia*, the epistemic foundation of the legitimation of the myth of *sanatānadharma* – according to which the transmission of traditional knowledge has been carried out without interruption or disturbance because it has not been exposed to any real dialectical opposition.

To expose the flaws in this unrealistic argument, we have only to consider the position adopted by certain ‘traditional’ authors in relation to the specialist tradition that preceded them. This clearly reveals that their degree of concurrence with and deference to the authorities was significantly more limited than the image of non-conflict that tradition would have us believe.

Take, for example, the strength of the opposition and the ‘anti-traditional’ reasoning of an author such as Kauṭilya. The same can be said of other fields and genres in

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4 Note, in fact, that the famous theme of *sanatānadharma* enters Sanskrit juridical discourse from the *Mānavadharmaśāstra*. See *Mānavadharmaśāstra*, 4.138 (*dharmah sanatānah*); 7.98 (*dharmah sanatānam*); 9.64 (*dharmah hanyuh sanatānam*). The fact that it is not present in the previous *dharmaśūtras* indicates in part that new historical and political conditions nourish the author’s intentions. For other references to the condition of eternity of the norm and other related themes, see *Mānavadharmaśāstra*, 9.325; 10.7; 12.99. Another coeval work in which the theme of the *sanatānadharma* appears several times is the *Mahābhārata*. Further, for some considerations about modern revisiting of the notion of *sanatānadharma*, see Zavos 2001; Kaviraj 1999: 38–39; Halbfass 1990: 322; 341–346. Moreover, Goldman 1997; Heesterman 1985: 2.

5 The formula ‘Kauṭilya does not [say] so’ (*na iti kauṭilyah*) – expressing an apparent distance and opposition from the opinions of other people (opinions that are mostly attributed by the author to prominent personalities [*ācārya*] or, less frequently, to specific authorities [Manu, Uśana, Brhaspati etc.], or to previous teachings [*iti upadiṣṭānti*]) – is very frequently used in the work of Kauṭilya and it marks the argumentative and dialectical nature of its discourse. This formula is recurrently used within portions of the *Arthaśāstra* (*exempli gratia*, *Arthaśāstra*, 7.9.1–51; 7.12.1–25; 8.2.1–26; 8.3.1–61; 8.4.1–47; 9.1.1–34) dedicated to themes which, from a political point of view, are extremely important. See, for the occurrence of this formula in detail, *Arthaśāstra*, 1.4.7; 1.15.32; 3.11.47; 3.14.7; 3.19.20; 3.20.5; 7.4.9; 7.5.4; 7.5.13; 7.9.10; 7.9.15; 7.9.20; 7.9.24; 7.9.28; 7.9.33; 7.9.51; 7.10.13; 7.11.14; 7.12.10; 7.12.15; 7.12.19; 7.12.23; 7.13.32; 7.15.16; 7.17.4; 8.1.12; 8.1.22; 8.1.28; 8.1.37; 8.1.46; 8.1.55; 8.2.6; 8.2.10; 8.2.14; 8.2.22; 8.3.13; 8.3.27; 8.3.34; 8.3.42; 8.3.52; 8.3.58; 8.4.3; 8.4.6; 8.4.10; 8.4.14; 8.4.17; 8.4.22; 8.4.25; 8.4.28; 8.4.32; 8.4.35; 8.4.39; 8.4.42; 9.1.6; 9.1.13; 9.1.32; 9.2.22; 12.1.6. Kauṭilya also employs a more neutral way – but not less assertive – way of reinforcing his statements and judgements, using the formula ‘Kauṭilya [says] so’ (*iti kauṭilyah*). See *Arthaśāstra*, 1.2.8; 1.7.6; 1.8.27; 1.10.17; 1.15.50; 1.17.22; 1.17.30; 2.7.15; 2.9.12; 3.4.12; 3.4.36; 3.5.24; 3.7.3; 3.17.5; 3.17.14; 3.19.18; 5.6.23; 5.6.32; 7.1.5; 7.6.31; 7.11.38;
which dialectic, innovation, and the assertion of specificity or subjectivity have played a decisive role in the establishment of a tradition.6

And if this was the case within an individual tradition, we can imagine what took place outside it, where the coercive influence of group interests and bonds of belonging was less relevant.

Removing such structural flaws from our method, however, requires that we distance ourselves from a whole series of stereotyped forms, foremost among which is that which Olivelle has neatly defined as ‘[...] the marvellous illusion of sanātanadharma and changeless India’.7 Fortunately, today we are in a position to review this state of affairs, thanks to the efforts of various researchers and the recent introduction of new approaches to the understanding of the process of intellectual history and the relationships between the different fields of cultural production, even in the sphere of South Asian antiquity.

Once the reasons for the oblivion to which the dissenting traditions have been consigned are understood, we can then attempt to redesign the structure, the systemic typologies, and the dynamics of intellectual production and transmission in South Asian, thus redeeming from an artificial status of marginality an agonistic aspect of cultural production which intrinsically is in no way marginal at all.

3. The struggle between ‘traditions’ for the semiotic primacy of veridiction

My basic assumption is that the monopoly on veridiction, which all traditions claim to possess, is always achieved through the imposition of principles of epistemic vision and social division. This monopoly accords a privileged status and can only be achieved by a tradition after passing over, assimilating, defeating, or even concealing the logical and historical legitimacy of its opponents and competitors. However, even if we accept the rationale of the model of semiotic conflict, to speak of ‘traditions against the tradition’ is only possible in effect when we can show the existence, at historical level, of a set of agents that actually hold, or claim to hold, a monopoly on veridiction. To substantiate this necessary condition, we must analyse the tradition’s representations of itself, its claims to truth, and its pretensions to primacy. In other words, we have to gather evidence of the operation of concrete corporative forms that have benefited from the outcome achieved by an initial policy of knowledge governed by a desire for cultural supremacy.

7.15.11; 9.1.43; 13.4.5; 15.1.22. Here we are clearly dealing with an intellectual practice which implies the critique of previous authorities and that, for obvious reasons, gained popularity, up to the point that Kauṭilya’s statements themselves have become the objects of further criticism. See, exempli gratia, Zimmerman 2000: 186–199.

6 This is clear if we consider the case of the authors of juridical texts: ‘They gave their texts a particular structure; they argued for particular positions in law and morality; they disagreed with other experts, both their contemporaries and their predecessors; and they had particular social, economic and political axes to grind. In all this they are not much different from modern authors’ (Olivelle 2002: 536–537). For a theoretical proposal concerning the authorial condition in classical South Asian textual materials, see Squarcini 2004.

7 Olivelle 1993: 246.
Fortunately, regarding the status of the Gangetic area in the centuries prior to our period, the existence and the scope of such a necessary condition has recently been corroborated by several studies. Consequently, it is now historically plausible to speak of the existence of a wide-ranging cultural project that attempted to establish, canonise, and regulate specific practices, cults, beliefs, visions, customs, institutions, and values.

If this is true, then we have satisfied the basic conditions and arguments that allow us to assume the existence of dialectic and dispute between the various bearers of different truths. Among these, those who prevailed then sought to subordinate, minimise, obstruct, and disregard the semiotic and cultural heritage of the others.

From these premises, we can begin to collect and then review what remains of such conflict, seeking to understand how and to what extent the different parties were dialectically involved in the internal struggles within the South Asian intellectual domain of their time.

And so we come to the ‘traditions against the tradition’ issue, which should thus be understood as a model in which different knowledge-producing and knowledge-spreading agencies, immersed within a pluralistic climate of semiotic and political strife, competed against each other for the monopoly on veridiction and sought the objective establishment of their own forms of knowledge about the world.

This model becomes even more plausible if, as Ramkrishna Bhattacharya has argued, in classical times words such as *lokāyata* referred to a sort of *disputatio*. Giving central importance to the practice of dialectics and dispute between different points of view appears now anything but out of place. On the contrary, this perspective allows us to re-examine a whole series of significant South Asian cultural phenomena, such as the strongly agonistic spirit of some Vedic poets or the structure of certain dialectical practices (such as *vikalpa*, *apoha*, *vivāda*, etc.). These practices were widely used and therefore achieved high levels of practical, theoretical, and lexical formalisation. Thus, as Kaviraj has recently pointed out, we must attribute considerable importance to the fact that

[The intellectual universe of Sanskrit possessed a culture of energetic, intense and vivid...]

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9 See Piantelli 1996: 50; 53.

10 See Bhattacharya 1998a; Bhattacharya 2000b. The word *lokāyata* is attested since Pāṇini (*Mahābhāṣya*, 7.3.45) and *Arthasastra* (Bhattacharya 1998b), but from the sixth century CE was largely used by epitomists, polemists, and doxographers to indicate ‘materialist’ philosophy. See Bhattacharya 2002b. Further, on the denigratory depictions of *lokāyata* and *cārvāka* by the ninth-century author Jayantabhaṭṭa, see Bhattacharya 2002c.

11 Emblematic is the poetic dispute (*vījina*) within the college of Vedic poets, where the revelation of the ‘connections’ (*bandhu*) was comprised within a context of serious objective interests. See, *exempli gratia*, *Rgveda*, 10.35.1–14; 10.71.1–11 (on poetic agonism); 10.81.1–7; 10.166.1–5 (on the victory against the colleagues). Further, Oguibénine 1998: 158–159; Gonda 1984: 1–67; Gonda 1975: 79–82; Durante 1976: 194–201.

critical discussion, a culture that revelled in controversy; and precisely because it considered disputation so important in the search for truth, it devoted great attention to devising rules for rational prosecution of intellectual debates.\textsuperscript{13}

If, however, we want to discover the factors that enable the development of these intellectual practices, we should not confine ourselves to the speculative and rational aspects of cultural production, thereby risking a banal accounting for everything by recourse to the ‘Indians’ love for specialised technicism’, but should rather look at the semiotic-political need to define reality. Indeed, if we look deeply into the social and economic conditions of ancient South Asia, we can find evidence to conclude that the development, justification, institution, and diffusion of such intellectual products could not come about merely for reasons of enjoyment. These practices, extremely demanding and complex, were necessarily stimulated and sustained by both logical and political causes.

A very good example\textsuperscript{14} is found in one of the seven treatises of the Buddhist Abhidhammapiṭaka. This work, eloquently entitled Kathāvatthu\textsuperscript{15}—probably written during the reign of Aśoka,\textsuperscript{16} and hence in a situation characterised by marked political and ideological tensions— is entirely devoted to a guided exposition of dialectical practice. That subsequent Buddhist authors felt the need to ascribe the structure of the Kathāvatthu to Buddha himself only confirms the importance they attributed to the proper conduct of a dispute.\textsuperscript{17} Buddha thus plays the role of guarantor and custodian of the principles of argumentative dialectics which must be observed during the search for the semiotic primacy of veridiction. As recently stated by Jonardon Ganeri,

\begin{quote}
The Kathāvatthu or Points of Controversy is a book about method. It describes, for the benefit of adherents to various Buddhist schisms, the proper method to be followed in conducting a critical discussion into an issue of doctrinal conflict.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

Nothing shows the strategies behind the intellectual vitality of South Asia in the centuries previous to our era better than this interweaving of veridical discourse, methods of dispute, doctrinal politics, and ideological interests.\textsuperscript{19} It is the inherent vitality of a context in which the agonistic procedures of dispute and opposition between different conflicting forms of veridiction were granted that confers the power to define the arrangement of the social space occupied by the exponents of different points of view.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} Kaviraj 2005: 125.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Within Buddhism the four mahopadesas constitute a very important antecedent, indeed. See Yang Gyu An 2003; Davids 1977.
\item \textsuperscript{15} See Kathāvatthu (Taylor 1894; 1897).
\item \textsuperscript{16} See Barua 1937: 367–370.
\item \textsuperscript{17} See Buddhaghosa, Atthasālinī (in PTS, p. 8).
\item \textsuperscript{18} Ganeri 2001: 485.
\item \textsuperscript{19} There is no doubt that these conditions are not exclusive to this period. \textit{In primis}, we can also refer to the important work of Vasubandhu (c. 360 CE), named Vādavidhi. For the edition and translation of its remaining fragments, see Frauwallner 1957; Tucci 1928. Further, Rangaswami lyengar 1953. The work that Dharmakīrti dedicated to the logic of the debate is another significant indicator of the activities of such a spirit. See Dharmakīrti, Vādanavāya (Gokhale 1993).
\end{itemize}
It is here that the urgency for the recovery of the agonistic context in which, since the Vedic era, the practices of intellectual production have taken place, merge with the need to imagine and then identify the actual profiles of the opponents, which are not recorded in detail in the accounts and productions of the traditions that attained primacy.

In this regard, the exploration of the way in which the sources connect the relation between description of the argumentative dialectic and prescription of the moral judgement is revealing. The more strictly theoretical treatises technically codified the dialectic method in line with precise forms and roles – later codified in terms of various forms of debate (vāda, jalpa, vitanḍa, etc.). Elsewhere, attempts to usefully employ the semiotic power derived from the success achieved in the dialectic conflict task the form of questioning the adversary’s moral status, seeking to support the theoretical dimension with the strength of practical considerations. It is no coincidence that the moralisation of differences and opposing positions has always been the preferred approach of those who promoted specific symbolic and ethical construction of social reality, strongly marked by hegemonic claims.

This is why Brahmanic sources describe their intellectual adversaries in disparaging terms, promoting a negative picture of their values and moral qualities. They are divided into ‘opponents’ (vipratipakṣin, pratīvādin, pūrvapakṣin), ‘skeptics’ and ‘dialecticians’ (tārkika, hetumat, hetuvaḍin), and ‘disputants’ (vivāḍātmaka), but they are also presented as ‘bearers of false visions’ (mithyāṛṣṭin), ‘polemicists’ (vaitāṇḍika), ‘deniers’ (nāṣtika), and ‘materialists’ (bhūtavādin).

Some of these epithets are morally charged signs of real disputes, whose real protagonists are opposing social agents – although their morphology is often obscured in the texts. They act dialectically within a specific domain, are driven by conflicting interests, and are seriously involved in the contest for the primacy of veridiction. It is clear that they do not debate simply out of vis polemica. Some dissenters, for example, are perfectly aware that demolishing a given belief, or an axiomatic system, provokes an epistemic rupture that, in turn, generates other epistemic breaks destabilising the entire system of representation. In other words, when a ‘denier’ (nāṣtika) claims that one must attribute primacy and ‘priority’ (yjeṣṭhatā) only to ‘sense perception’ (pratyakaṣa), he asserts that the scriptures (āgama) are not a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa). By saying so he induces others to think that what

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20 I’m referring to the existence of ‘deniers of gods’ in the Rgveda (exempli gratia, Rgveda, 2.25.5; 8.100.3–4 [where the god Indra is denied]) and to those who deny the ‘divine’ status of the Veda. See Ronzitti 2001. Another example of this attitude is Kautsa’s words cited in Yaska, Nirukta, 1.15–16. Further, but related to a different period, Slaje 1998.

21 These notions are among the constitutive elements of the epistemological structure of the initial nyāya knowledge system. See Gautama, Nyāyāsūtra, 1.2.1–20; 1.1.32–41.


23 This in brief is what is said in one of the oldest remaining fragments of the ‘materialist’ philosophy — included within the conversation on the liberation of Janaka, king of Mithila (Mahābhārata, 12.211.1–48) — where the lack of real evidence of the existence of an entity separate from the body is discussed as a sound reason not to believe in the authority of the ‘scripture’ (āgama). See Mahābhārata, 12.211.21–45 (in part. 12.211.26–27; pratyakṣaṁ hy etayor mālam krānta iti hy ayor api| pratyakṣo hy āgamo ‘bhinnah krānto vā na kimcana || yatra tatrānumāne ‘sti krātam bhāvayate’pi vā | anyo jīvāḥ śarīrasya nāstikānāṁ
the authorites declare about other aspects of real life is also unfounded. Such a polemic attitude, if not disproved, risks becoming a more general ‘doctrine of the negation of the Veda as a valid means’ (vedaprāmāṇyaniṣedhavāda).24 This is the type of threat most feared by ‘orthodox’ (āstikā) traditions,25 such as that championed by the author of the Mānavadharmaśāstra. In this regard, the arguments used to stigmatise the critical approach mentioned above are emblematic:

10. ‘Scripture’ should be recognized as ‘Veda’, and ‘tradition’ as ‘Law Treatise’ [dharmaśāstra]. These two should never be called into question in any matter, for it is from them that the Law has shined forth. 11. If a twice-born disregards these two by relying on the science of logic, he ought to be ostracized by good people as an infidel [nāstika] and a denigrator of the Veda [vedanindaka].26

In the wake of these threats, other exponents of the ‘orthodox’ tradition later declared that the primary intention of logical reasoning (nyāya) was to ‘protect the validity of the Veda’ (vedaprāmāṇyavrākṣā).27 It is evident that this is not just a struggle for knowledge but also – or perhaps mainly – a struggle for symbolic power and primacy of veridiction. The object of such a dispute to win the right to speak, which consists in the right to formulate propositions. These propositions, owing to the link between the performative force of the speech-acts and the political interest in establishing certain sets of meanings, have the power to give knowledge reality.

The ironic image of the struggle for knowledge could still make some sense in relation to intellectual practices such as ‘philosophical scepticism’,28 even if it would be reductive to see them as devoid of non-theoretical interest, since – extending Randall Collins’s explanatory model to this sphere –29 these too can no longer be represented as mere philosophical approaches. But this argument loses strength in the face of ‘committed’ forms of dissent.

mataṃ smṛtah || [Critical ed.]. The śloka following this one is ascribed to the nāstika in the commentary of Nīlakaṇṭha.

24 We have evidence of this attitude cited by its detractors. The following aphorisms ascribed to the author of the Mānavadharmaśāstra are indicative of such a position: ‘let the rites of dharma not be practised’ (na dharmaṃś caret) in Vātsyāyana, Kāmasūtra, 1.2.21–24 (21. na dharmaṃś caret. eyyat phalatvā. samśayikatvā ca | 22. ko hy abālsīḥ hastagataṃ paragataṃ kuryāt | 23. varam adya kapotaḥ śvō mayyārāt | 24. varam sāṃśayikān nīskād asāṃśayikāh kārṣāpanāḥ | iti laukāyatikāh ;); ‘let dharma not be done’ (dharma na kāryāḥ) and ‘let its instructions not be considered trustworthy’ (tad upadeśu na pratyetavyam) in Jayantabhaṭṭa, Nyāyamaṇījārī, āhnikā 4 (ed. Varadacharya 1969: 647–648).

25 One of the traditional etymologies of the term — based on Pāṇini, Aṣṭādiyā-, 4.4.60 (astināṣṭidīṣṭam matīḥ) — says ‘he whose opinion is that iṣvāra exists’ (asti iṣvāra iti matīr yasya). Other definitions include ‘opposite of nāstika’ (nāstika bhīma); ‘he whose idea is that iṣvāra exists’ (iṣvāra asti iti vādit); ‘he who considers the Vedas as authorities’ (vedaprāmāṇyaśād). Further, according to Hemacandra, āstika is a synonym for ‘he who believes’ (śraddhālā) and for śraddhā. See Rājārādhākānta 1961: s.v.

26 Mānavadharmaśāstra, 2.10–11. Further, on these ‘offenders of the Veda’ (vedanindaka), Mānavadharmāśāstra, 2.11; 3.161; 4.163; 11.57.


28 New contributions have recently been made to the analysis of the role played by Scepticism and by systematic doubt within South Asian intellectual traditions. See Bhattacharya 2000a; Butzenberger 1996; Franco 1994; Bhattacharya 1987; Matilal 1985; Franco 1984; Franco 1983; Gupta 1981.

The ‘materialistic’ discourse connected with the figure of Bṛhaspati, for example, was not just a sort of intellectual and doctrinal distancing from a given point of view, but rather a clear ethical and moral rejection, by which certain individuals reacted to a given social condition. It is fairly evident that certain dissenters voiced their criticisms against cultural orders that they considered oppressive and as harbouring hegemonic pretensions. Their main objective was to reveal the unsoundness of the theoretical basis of certain ethical-regulatory structures. This is what can be gathered from the intentions of certain ancient theoreticians at the forefront of ‘materialist’ traditions, such as Bṛhaspati.30 Indeed,

Bṛhaspati’s assertion that inference is not a means of valid cognition had a pragmatic purpose: to cut off any divine or supernatural factor from the foundation of social and ethical theories.31

A similar critical approach can be found in the specialised domain of the Buddhist pramāṇa tradition, which exhibits a similarly sceptical and polemical stance toward the Brahmanic social vision.32

If the dispute among different traditions over the monopoly on veridiction had lacked non-theoretical foundations, South Asia would never have experienced the extraordinary intellectual ferment of its writers, who took part in lengthy and heated debates with clear monopolistic intentions. A good example of this tension is the secular dispute on the criteria to be adopted for discerning the validity of the ‘means of knowledge’ (pramāṇa). What developed into the ‘discourse on reliable warrants’ (pramāṇavāda) was at the centre of a heated debate that lasted for centuries. Through the production of several specialised works, originating from the most diverse ideological and religious convictions, the criteria for establishing the authority of the sources of knowledge were subjected to meticulous scrutiny.

Consider, for example, the long-standing debate – which generated an immense literary production – that can be traced to the idea of pramāṇa presented in the work of Bhartṛhari (450–510 CE) and extends through the Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga (480–540 CE), to the Pramāṇaviniścaya and the Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti (600–660 CE) – an important text which has given rise to numerous commentaries –33 to the Pramāṇalakṣaṇa of Sarvaṇīṭman (c. 1027 CE), the Pramāṇantarbhavapракaraṇa of Ratnakīrti (c. 1070 CE), the pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṃkara of Vādi Devasūri (1087–1150 CE), the Pramāṇanīṃmāṣā of Hemacandra (1089–1172 CE), the Pramāṇamaṇjarī of Sarvadeva (c. 1200 CE), the Pramāṇalakṣaṇa of Madhvācārya (1238–1317 CE), the Pramāṇapaddhati of the famous dvaitavedāntāṭikākāra Jayafūra (1335–1385 CE), the Pramāṇasundara of Padmasundara (c. 1550 CE), the Pramāṇapramoda and the Prāmāṇyavāda of Hariṛama Tarkavāgīśa (c. 1640 CE), and the later Prameyaratnāvalī of Baladevavidhyābhūṣaṇa (c. 1780 CE).

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30 See Namai 1976.
33 Such as the Pramāṇavārttikāṭikā of Śākyamati (c. 710 CE), the Pramāṇavārttikāṭikā of Śaṃkarananda (c. 800 CE), the pramāṇavārttikāṭikā of Jina (c. 920 CE), the vṛtti of Manorathananand (c. 950 CE), or the Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra of Prajñākaragupta (c. 750–810 CE).
This is to mention only a fragment of the vast number of treatises and texts – a list of which would take up many pages – produced in the attempt to ground and legitimise distinct theoretical constructs through the priority granted to certain sets of pramāṇa.34

But behind the technicism of the ‘discourse on reliable warrants’ (pramāṇavāda) hides the much more thorny question of authority, which inevitably brings into play issues of the sociology of knowledge. This has been clear since the origin of the notion of pramāṇa. Recently investigating one of the first occurrences of the term, Wezler defined pramāṇa as ‘authority as the relevant instance’ (Wezler 2004: 638). And it is precisely this placing of the notion of pramāṇa in close relation to the problem of authority which brings to the fore the agonistic climate underlying the debate on the definition of pramāṇas. It is therefore, for all interests and purposes, a dispute on veridiction, which clearly exemplifies the difficulties faced by anyone wishing to elevate his own criteria to super partes principles. This became evident with the influence on the discussion on the pramāṇas assumed by Buddhist authors such as Dharmakīrti or Dignāga, who introduced the notion of ‘one who is (like) a pramāṇa’ (pramāṇabhūtapuruṣa), so as to invest particular persons with full veridical authority, leaving them the last word regarding the correctness of modes of knowing.35 Such interested agonistic usage of the notion clearly shows how contemporary research into the types and history of pramāṇa must now avail itself of interpretative models borrowed from the sociology of knowledge, unless we wish to keep repeating the situation where “[i]t is not absolutely clear what theories of pramāṇa were meant for” (Oetke 2003: 199).

All this confirms the fact that every forma mentis exists, and can be experienced, starting from a tangible, objective, and incarnate modus vivendi. This is the concrete dimension that gives strength to the abstract. And it is precisely because of such osmosis that intellectual postures and positions within the social sphere need to be seen as closely connected.

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