Reciprocity as Salvation: Christ as Salvific Patron and the Corresponding ‘Payback’ Expected of Christ's Earthly Clients according to the Second Letter of Clement

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Reciprocity as Salvation: Christ as Salvific Patron and the Corresponding ‘Payback’ Expected of Christ’s Earthly Clients according to the Second Letter of Clement*

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This article analyzes the widely misunderstood concept of ‘payback’ or ‘repayment’ (ἀντιμισθία) that, according to the so-called Second Letter of Clement, believers owe to Christ. Much of the secondary literature is laden with theological polemics (e.g. the author perverts Paul’s gospel of grace), rather than an attempt to understand this concept relative to social relationships in antiquity. I argue that Second Clement presents Christ as salvific benefactor and patron. Christ offers salvation to those who accept the terms of his patronage, terms that include the obligation to render ‘payback’—for example, in the form of praise, witness, loyalty, and almsgiving. A failure to accept these terms would jeopardize the relationship between Christ and his earthly clients and thus call their salvation into question. As a corollary, I propose that a likely purpose for Second Clement was to convince a Christian audience that the benefits of salvation come with recurring obligations to Christ, their salvific patron.

Keywords: 2 Clement, orthopraxis, reciprocity, patronage, soteriology

In recent scholarship, Second Clement seems to be best known for its many exhortations, its common (if not undisputable) designation as the earliest Christian sermon, and its intriguingly distinctive sayings of Jesus. This article focuses on the interplay between orthopraxis and soteriology in this writing. The author of Second Clement, I argue, presents Christ as salvific benefactor and patron and urges his audience to live in accord with their responsibilities as Christ’s clients. Striking among these responsibilities is that believers must

* In memoriam William L. Petersen (1950–2006): a kind and brilliant colleague taken from us too soon. For input and critique on this article, I am indebted to numerous colleagues, including Adela Yarbro Collins, Rosemary Jermann, Margaret MacDonald, Carolyn Osiek, and Clare K. Rothschild.
offer ‘payback’, or ‘repayment’ (ἀντιμισθία), to Christ or to God in return for the gift of salvation (2 Clem. 1.3, 5; 9.7; 15.2). This obligation is best understood as modeled on a patron–client relationship, in particular on the reciprocal responsibilities incurred by both patron and client(s).

1. The Necessity of Reciprocity

This study identifies a model grounded in Roman social interactions for Second Clement’s presentation of Christ (and God) as ‘judge’ to whom ‘repayment’ is owed (esp. 2 Clem. 1.3–5, discussed below). To this end, I comment briefly on the ancient Roman patronage system. The Roman social historian Richard P. Saller, building on a definition of patronage (Lat.: patrocinium) by Jeremy Boissevain, identifies

three vital elements which distinguish a patronage relationship... First, it involves the reciprocal exchange of goods and services. Secondly, to distinguish it from a commercial transaction in the marketplace, the relationship must be a personal one of some duration. Thirdly, it must be asymmetrical, in the sense that the two parties are of unequal status and offer different kinds of goods and services in the exchange—a quality which sets patronage off from friendship between equals.¹

Concurring with G. E. M. de Ste Croix’s view, Saller aims to refute the influential arguments of Louis Harmand, who cast doubt upon whether patronage continued to have an operative role in Roman society after the inception of the Principate by Augustus in 27 B.C.E.²

¹ Saller, Personal Patronage under the Early Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1982) 1 (emphasis original), building on the definition of patronage of Jeremy Boissevain, ‘Patronage in Sicily’, Man n.s. 1/1 (Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 1966) 18–33 at 18. Similarly, in regard to reciprocity, David Briones, ‘Mutual Brokers of Grace: A Study in 2 Corinthians 1.3–11’, NTS 56 (2010) 536–56 at 540: ‘Patron–client relationships entail an exchange of different types of resources... As such, each participant supplies the other from their own resources.’ Both Saller, Personal Patronage, 1–5, and Briones, ‘Mutual Brokers of Grace’, 539–41 acknowledge the difficulty of defining patronage, whether in an ancient or in a modern context.

² Saller, Personal Patronage, e.g. 2–3, concurring with G. E. M. de Ste Croix, ‘Suffragium: From Vote to Patronage’, British Journal of Sociology 5 (1954) 33–48, and persuasively refuting Louis Harmand, Un aspect social et politique du monde romain: le patronat sur les collectivités publiques, des origines au Bas-Empire (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957). In a nutshell, Harmand argues that after the establishment of the Principate and its (impersonal) distribution of services to the masses, personal patronage, whether from the emperor or other elites, became superfluous. Such an oversimplified application of Weberian sociological theory to the rather small Roman imperial administrative hierarchy is unhelpful, as Saller shows.
More recently, Jerome H. Neyrey has emphasized that the exchange of ‘honour, both given and received, is’ also ‘a significant feature of [patronage] relationships’. Additionally, Carolyn Osiek thoroughly critiques the notion that there were any significant differences between patronage relationships in the Roman West and the Greek East. Osiek’s finding is relevant to my argument. I do not propose that a culturally specific Roman (or Greek) form of patronage helps to locate this author or his community. Rather, I contend that patronage relationships, whether in the Roman West or the Greek East, were an integral part of ancient societies and offer a model for understanding Second Clement’s view of reciprocity between Christ the patron and his clients. Simply put, in antiquity such an expectation of reciprocity was nothing unusual.

With these points in mind, we note that a Lutheran concept of sola gratia is foreign to the ancient patronage system: both patron and client have obligations to each other; it is not a one-sided system in which the patron gives and the client merely receives. On the contrary, as Richard Saller points out, public expressions of ‘thanks’ (gratia) comprised part of a client’s obligation (obligatio) to his or her patron. The point is significant for this article’s analysis of Second Clement and thus worth underscoring: within such an asymmetrical relationship (Saller’s third ‘vital element’), reciprocity (Saller’s first ‘vital element’) is a sine qua non.

The surviving witnesses to patronage relationships give copious information about how the patronage system worked among the elites—above all, between the emperor and his elite clients. Osiek maintains that to understand how this system worked among ordinary people of the lower classes, a critical analysis of early Christian literature is essential. For such an analysis, I favor a broad

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4 Osiek, ‘Politics of Patronage’, 144–6. Naturally, more could be said by way of attempts to define patronage, but for the aims of this article these remarks suffice.


6 Osiek, ‘Politics of Patronage’, 146, writes: ‘[W]hile patronage and benefaction among Roman elites has been well studied, little has been done to study the same social structures among non-elites... [W]hat we have in the literary remains of the early Jesus followers is some of the best evidence for the social relations of non-elites in the early Empire, granted, with certain peculiarities not shared with their other contemporaries, but probably having more in common [than differences from] them... ’ Moreover, writing in regard to ‘Christians and the world of patronage’, Carolyn Osiek and Margaret MacDonald, *A Woman’s Place: House Churches in Earliest Christianity* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2005) 210 (cf. 194–219), go so far as
definition of patronage that includes, in divine–human relationships, expectations of gratitude and reward or punishment. Those features are found even in the Israelite conditional covenant (that is, if you keep the law, God will do thus and such for you): the relationship with the Lord (as patron) is asymmetrical, is intended to be an enduring relationship, and requires reciprocal duties according to the terms of the covenant. Psalm 116, which we will discuss below, highlights the psalmist’s obligations to the Lord in return for deliverance.

From the above discussion, two points are significant for this article. First, under the Principate patronage continued to be central in social interactions in both the Roman West and the Greek East. Thus, it is plausible that the author of Second Clement could expect his audience to grasp allusions to the patronage system. Second, one can readily ascertain in Second Clement Saller’s three ‘vital elements’ of a patronage relationship—(1) ‘reciprocal exchange’, (2) a personal and enduring relationship, and (3) an ‘asymmetrical’ relationship between parties ‘of unequal status’. In Second Clement, the latter two are clear, in that the relationship between Christ (or God) and those whom Christ ‘saves’ is personal and intended to be enduring and the relationship between God and God’s people is asymmetrical.

Saller’s first ‘vital element’, a ‘reciprocal exchange’, likewise plays a central role in Second Clement. One of the more striking aspects of the writing is the presumption of an ongoing transaction between Christ and believers that awaits believers’ ‘payback’ to Christ or God. The key term in Second Clement signifying this transaction is ἀντιμισθία, which may be translated as ‘recompense, payback, or repayment’. In German scholarship, the standard translation is ‘Gegenleistung’, although ‘Rückerstattung’ and ‘Rückzahlung’ would seem, at

to surmise, ‘Scholars now see that the model of networks based on informal and asymmetrical relationships for the exchange of goods and resources is the social reality underlying the relationships that created the early Christian communities’.  

7 My purpose here is not to dismiss the culturally specific ancient Near Eastern context that shaped the Israelite covenant. Rather, my point is that reciprocity within patronage appears in various ancient—in addition to Greco-Roman—contexts.

8 Ps 116.8a, 14a, 16–17a (RSV, modified): ‘For you have delivered my soul from death… [14a] I will pay my vows to the Lord… [16] O Lord, I am your servant. I am your servant, the child of your serving girl. You have freed me from my chains. [17a] I will offer to you a sacrifice of thanksgiving.’ I am grateful to Carolyn Osiek for advice on this point. See further below on J. B. Lightfoot on ἀνταποδιώκω in Ps 115.38, LXX (= Ps 116.12a).

9 See the discussion below on 2 Clem. 1.1, 4, 7 and, in particular, on σπέρμα.

10 2 Clem. 1.3, 5; 9.7; 11.6: 15.2.

11 For ἀντιμισθία, the translation ‘Gegenleistung’ is to be found in three recent scholarly commentaries: Klaus Wengst, Didache (Apostelllehre), Barnabasbrief, Zweiter Klemensbrief, Schrift an Diognet (Schriften des Urchristentums 2; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft; Munich: Kösel, 1984) e.g. 239; Andreas Lindemann, Die Clemensbriefe (Die Apostolischen
least to me, to be equally fitting.\textsuperscript{12} Αντιμισθία occurs five times in \textit{Second Clement} and is emblematic of a prominent theological construct that, as I shall suggest, needs clarification. Of the five uses of Αντιμισθία, four designate an obligation to render ‘repayment’ to Christ or to God.\textsuperscript{13} The other occurrence (2 \textit{Clem.} 11.6) calls attention to the ‘repayments’ that God will bestow on each person for his or her deeds (ἔργα). The transaction involves a ‘reciprocal exchange of goods and services’: in return for the gift of salvation (1.4), believers are to offer, for example, ‘fruit’ and ‘holy acts’ (καρπόν...δόσις, 1.3), ‘praise’ (ἂνων, 1.5), and a change in perspective (or repentance: μετανοήσομεν, 8.1–2; 13.1; 16.1–17.1).\textsuperscript{14}

I propose that the reciprocal exchange in \textit{Second Clement} is best understood with reference to the exchange expected within an ancient patron–client relationship and that \textit{Second Clement}’s many appeals to orthopraxis likewise call attention to believers’ obligations within such a relationship. I use the term ‘orthopraxis’ rather than ‘exhortation’ or ‘paraenesis’ because in \textit{Second Clement} one’s conduct has salvific implications.\textsuperscript{15} The author does not merely offer exhortations on how to live a better Christian life, but outlines numerous orthopraxes that are \textit{required} of Christ’s earthly clients as expressions of the divine–human patronage relationship. I do not claim that every reference to orthopraxis (or, for that matter, soteriology or christology) in \textit{Second Clement} is based in a strict sense on a concept of patronage. Rather, I wish to show how an understanding of reciprocal obligations within a patronage relationship is a model for \textit{Second Clement}’s presentation of Christ as salvific benefactor and patron and for believers’ resulting, and ongoing, obligations as Christ’s clients.

To support my proposal that an ancient patron–client relationship offers an apt model for understanding \textit{Second Clement}’s presentation of believers’ obligation to ‘repay’ Christ (or God), their salvific patron, the next three sections develop the following:

\begin{enumerate}
\item The author’s presentation of Christ (and God) as ‘judge’ (2 \textit{Clem.} 1.1) and beneficent bestower of salvation (1.4), whose work, even among believers, is ongoing.
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{12} Perhaps also ‘Abrechnung’.
\textsuperscript{13} 2 \textit{Clem.} 1.3, 5; 9.7; 15.2. The author is not consistent in regard to whether ‘payback’ is to be made to Christ (1.3, 5) or to God (9.7; 15.2). I return to this point below.
\textsuperscript{14} I develop this reciprocal exchange below in the section, ‘Orthopraxis as “Payback”’.
\textsuperscript{15} See e.g. ἵνα σωθῆσωμεν (2 \textit{Clem.} 14.1c), discussed below under ‘Orthopraxis as “Payback”’. 

\textsuperscript{16} Väter 1/HNT 17; Tübingen: Mohr, 1992) e.g. 199; Wilhelm Pratscher, \textit{Der zweite Clemensbrief} (Kommentar zu den apostolischen Vätern 3; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007) e.g. 69; See also A. Lindemann and H. Paulsen, \textit{Die Apostolischen Väter: Grieschisch-deutsche Parallelausgabe} (Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1992) e.g. 155.
(2) The obligation believers incur to give ‘repayment’ (1.3; 9.7; 15.2) or ‘remuneration’ (1.5) to Christ or God.

(3) Numerous orthopraxes indicating the expected reciprocal response to divine beneficence—a warning to those who may not realize that they have incurred ongoing obligations to their salvific patron.

In the article’s conclusion, I suggest that a likely purpose for this writing is to convince a Christian audience that the benefits of salvation come with recurring obligations to Christ, the salvific patron.

2. The Presentation of God and Christ as ‘Judge’ of Human Behavior, Including, or Especially, the Behavior of Christians

Second Clement begins with a characterization of God—and, by extension, of Jesus Christ—as κριτής: ‘Brothers, we must think of Jesus Christ as we do of God, as the judge of the living and the dead’ (περὶ κριτῶν ζῶντων καὶ νεκρῶν, 1.1). The author assumes an understanding of God as ‘judge’ and urges that Christ be understood in the same way.

An understanding of God as κριτής is attested in Hebrews, James, and the Shepherd of Hermas. The Acts of the Apostles, James, Second Timothy, and Polycarp’s Letter to the Philippians offer the only other references to Christ as κριτής in early Christian literature. Interestingly, the epistle of James presents both God (Jas 4.12) and Christ (5.9b) as κριτής, albeit in different contexts. Relative to these witnesses, Second Clement is distinctive for presenting both God and Christ as κριτής in the same sentence (2 Clem. 1.1).

16 Notably, the work begins without the characteristics of a Hellenistic letter. This ostensible omission does not, however, confirm a genre classification of this work as a ‘sermon’.

17 In a certain sense, there is no distinction here between the characterization of God and Christ, even if in 1.2–8 as a whole the author focuses not on ‘binitarian’ formulations but, rather, on Christ, to whom these verses refer.

18 Heb 12.23 (κριτὴς θεοῦ πάντων); Jas 4.12 (εἰς ἐστίν [ὁ] νομοθέτης καὶ κριτής); Herm. Sim. 6.3.6 [63.6] (δοξάζουσι τὸν θεόν, λέγοντες ὅτι δίκαιος κριτής ἐστι). Cf. Rom 14.10–12 (τῷ βήματι τοῦ θεοῦ, 14.10b).

19 Acts 10.42b (ὁ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κριτής ζῶντων καὶ νεκρῶν; Jas 5.9b (ἰδοῦ ὁ κριτής πρὸ τῶν θυρῶν ἔστηκεν; cf. Jas 5.7 on ‘the Lord’s parousia’); 2 Tim 4.8 (ὁ κύριος ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ὁ δίκαιος κριτής), where it is Christ Jesus who will ‘judge’ (κρίνεται, 4.1); Pol. Phil. 2.1 (διὰ ἐρχομος κριτής ζῶντων καὶ νεκρῶν). See also 1 Thess 4.6 (‘the Lord’ [κύριος] as ‘just avenger’, ἐκδίκος at 1 Thess 4.15, κύριος clearly refers to Christ at the parousia); 1 Cor 2.8–9 (on Christ’s judgment at the parousia); 2 Cor 5.10 (ἐμπροσθεν τοῦ βήματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ); Matt 25.31–46 (future judgment by ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου). I am thankful to Adela Yarbro Collins and Michael Öberg for feedback and suggestions on this point.

20 But note the reference to both God and Christ in Rom 2.16: ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὅτε κρίνει θεὸς τὰ κρυπτὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ τὸ εὐγενελίμον μου διὰ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ.
Frederick W. Danker defines κριτής as ‘one who has the right to render a
decision in legal matters’. 21 From the very beginning, Second Clement wishes to
impress upon its Christian audience that Christ’s work as ‘judge’, even among
believers, 22 is ongoing. In what follows, I argue that a concept of Christ’s
ongoing work as ‘judge’ is consistent with Second Clement’s warnings about a
potentially uncertain future for those who do not heed the author’s admonitions
to live in accord with the role they are expected to play as Christ’s devoted clients.

Complementing the characterization of Christ as ‘judge’ (1.1), v. 4 states that
Christ ‘saved us while we were perishing’ (ἀπολλαμένους Ἰμᾶς ἔσωσεν, 1.4c).
The preceding simile, ‘like a father (ὡς πατήρ) he designates us as sons’ (1.4b),
need not—and, I would argue, should not—be taken as a reference to God (‘the
Father’). Rather, such a characterization of Christ, who ‘saved us while we were
perishing’, fits with the commonly paternal stance of a ‘patron’ (Lat.: patronus)
Toward his (or her) clients. Such a paternal christology may also be found in
several second- and third-century authors, including Melito of Sardis and the
Martyrdom of Justin. 23

In 2 Clem. 1.4c, the occurrence of the aorist ἔσωσεν merits additional
comment. Second Clement uses σώζω in the aorist tense six times, 24 which
suggests that the addressees’ salvation has, in a certain sense, already been
granted or completed. The soteriology in these six places contrasts with that
of the apostle Paul, whose usual preference for present and future forms of σώζω 25
suggests that salvation is to be realized in the future. The aorist uses of σώζω in
Second Clement are more akin to those in the deuteropauline Ephesians. 26 Seven

21 BDAG, 570 s.v. κριτής.
22 Note the opening admonition to the community as a whole: Άδελφοι, οὖν δεῖ Ἰμᾶς
fronείν (1.1a).
23 Melito of Sardis Peri pascha 9.63; Acts of Justin and Companions 4.8 (ὁ ἐλληνικὸς Ἰμᾶς πατήρ
ἔστην ὁ Χριστός [Musurillo, Acts of the Christian Martyrs 50 l. 22]); Clement of Alexandria
Paid. 1.6.42.2–3; Origen Matth. comm. 14.13. See further Gabriel Racle, ‘A propos du
Christ-Père dans l’Homélie Pascale de Méliton de Sardes’, RechSR 50 (1962) 400–8; V.
237–69; cf. Andrew Hofer, ‘The Old Man as Christ in Justin’s “Dialogue with Trypho”’, VC
24 See 2 Clem. 1.7a: ‘For he had mercy on us and compassionately saved [us] (Ἦλεγκον γάρ
Ἰμᾶς καὶ σπλαγχνισθείς ἔσωσεν) when he saw in us much deception and destruction
and that we had no hope of salvation except that [salvation] which [is] from him’. See also
2.7 (ἔσωσεν πολλοῖς); 3.3 (δι’ οὗ ἔσωσθημεν); 9.2 (ἔσωθησε); 9.5a (Χριστός, ὁ κύριος ὁ
σώσας Ἰμᾶς). See further Lindemann, Clemensbriefe, 201, who observes that in Second
Clement ‘[d]as zur Bezeichnung der Tat Christi am häufigsten gebrauchte Verb ist σώζειν...’
25 E.g. Rom 5.9 (σωθησομέθεθεν, two occurrences); 10.9; 11.26; 1 Cor 1.18; 15.2; 2 Cor 2.15. But see
Rom 8.24a (ἔσωθησεν), although with the immediately preceding τῇ γὰρ ἐλπίδι the focus
remains future/eschatological.
26 See Eph 2.5 (χάριτι ἐστε σωσμένοι) and 2.8 (τῇ γὰρ χάριτι ἐστε σωσμένοι).
other uses of σώζω in Second Clement also portray being ‘saved’ as a future outcome or goal.27

To summarize, Second Clement begins with an emphasis that Christ is now (and will be) ‘judge’ (1.1) and that, in the past, Christ has granted salvation (1.4, 7). This brings us to our next consideration, the author’s assertion that believers owe a fitting ‘payback’ to their savior and judge.

3. Believers Owe ‘Payback’ to Christ or God

Immediately before and after mentioning that ‘Christ saved us’ (2 Clem. 1.4), the author asks what ‘payback/repayment’ (1.3) or ‘remuneration’ (1.5) believers owe to Christ:

What repayment (τίνα...ἀντιμισθίαν), or what fruit worthy of what he gave to us, shall we give to him? (1.3)

What kind of praise or payment of remuneration (μισθόν ἀντιμισθίας), then, shall we give him in return for what we received? (1.5)

The argument in 1.3–5 flows from the ‘indicative’ statement about the gift of salvation to the ‘imperative’ of believers’ corresponding obligation.28 Two key terms—ἀντιμισθία (1.3, 5) and μισθός (1.5)—point to the believer’s obligation to Christ and therefore merit examination.

The latter term, μισθός, may straightforwardly be defined as payment for work done.29 In an ongoing business relationship, μισθός is a recurring obligation—that is, not something to be paid only once. Much more commonly in early Christian literature, μισθός predicates God’s reward or punishment for good or bad conduct.30 What is unusual in 2 Clem. 1.5—and, in fact, unattested in the NT or

27 These other occurrences of σώζω in Second Clement are 4.1–2 (two occurrences: σώσει...σωθήσεται); 8.2 (μετανοήσομεν...ίνα σωθῶμεν); 13.1c (μετανοήσαντες ἐκ ψυχῆς σωθῶμεν); 14.1c (ίνα σωθῶμεν); 15.1 (ἔστων σώσει κάμε); 17.2 (ὁποῖς σωθῆμεν ἄπαντες). See the discussion below of 2 Clem. 14.1c (ίνα σωθῶμεν), where I argue that, if these disparate uses of σώζω are interpreted within a context of a patron-client relationship, they do not pose a contradiction.

28 As Pratscher, Der zweite Clemensbrief, 237 eloquently observes, ‘Der Sache nach kennt er [der Verfasser] die Reihenfolge Indikativ—Imperativ’.

29 BDAG, 653, s.v. μισθός. See also e.g. Matt 20.8; John 4.36; Rom 4.4; 1 Tim 5.18; Jas 5.4.

30 BDAG, 653, s.v. μισθός. See e.g. Matt 5.12; 10.41–42; Acts 1.18; 1 Cor 3.8, 14; 2 John 8; Rev 11.18; 22.12; 1 Clem. 34.3; Did. 4.7; 5.2; Barn. 4.12; 11.8; 19.11; 20.2; 21.3; Herm. Mand. 11.12 [43.12]; Herm. Sim. 2.5 [51.5]; 5.6.7 [59.7]; Diog. 9.2. Likewise, Second Clement reflects this meaning of μισθός as believers’ future reward (3.3; 9.5; 15.1; also 20.4). Somewhat differently, 2 Clem. 19.1 (from a later redactor) refers to the ‘reward’ (μισθός) of a positive response from the audience (cf. Barn. 1.5).
elsewhere in the Apostolic Fathers—is a concept of payment (μισθός) that believers owe to Christ. The use of ἀντιμισθία in the genitive case with μισθός (μισθόν ἀντιμισθίας, 1.5) underscores this distinctive, if not unique, use of μισθός as compared with other early Christian literature. Believers have a recurring obligation to give Christ payment (μισθός) in return for what he has given them.

3.1. Ἀντιμισθία and Reciprocity: A Critical Overview of the Secondary Literature

In the term ἀντιμισθία (2 Clem. 1.3, 5), the prefix ἀντί- is emblematic of a reciprocal transaction, which, as noted above, is a key component of a patron-client relationship. Attested only in early Christian literature, ἀντιμισθία expresses the reciprocal (ἀντί) nature of a transaction as requital based upon what one deserves, recompense, exchange. After a review of secondary literature, we will analyze ἀντιμισθία in Second Clement and other early Christian literature.

Over a century ago, J. B. Lightfoot found a precedent for the ‘sentiment’ of ἀντιμισθία (2 Clem. 1.3) in a single verse of the Septuagint: ‘Though [ἀντιμισθία is] apparently not common, it is a favourite word with our author... The sentiment is taken from Ps. cxvi. 12 τι ἀνταποδόσω τῷ κυρίῳ κ.τ.λ.’ In the LXX translation of Ps 116.12, the verb ἀνταποδίδωμι occurs twice—asking what the psalmist could ‘pay back’ (ἀνταποδίδωμι) to the Lord in return for what the Lord has ‘given’, or ‘repaid’, (ἀνταποδίδωμι) to him. F. W. Danker defines this verb as ‘to practice reciprocity with respect to an obligation, repay, pay back, requite’. It is surprising to note that in the Hebrew of Ps 116.12 there is only one verb יוש, (‘to turn, return’), whereas ἀνταποδίδωμι occurs

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31 Lindemann, Clemensbriefe, 202, sees μισθόν ἀντιμισθίας (2 Clem. 1.5) as ‘somewhat artificial’ (’etwas gekünstelt’) and writes that ‘the homilist’ (’der Prediger’) wanted to make a connection to ἀντιμισθία in 1.3. A connection between vv. 3 and 5 is obvious, but I do not see μισθόν ἀντιμισθίας as ‘artificial’. Since ἀντιμισθίας is already pregnant with a concept of ‘wage’ (μισθός), the repetition of terms within the same semantic domain may be taken as rhetorically emphatic, not ‘artificial’. Thus, somewhat preferable is the earlier comment of H. Preisker, art. μισθός, TDNT 4.699–710 at 707 n. 28 on 2 Clem. 1.5: ‘Hier steht sogar die gekünstelte, rhetorische Zusammenstellung μισθόν ἀντιμισθίας’ [= TDNT 4.695–706 at 702 n. 28: ‘Here we find the artificial and rhetorical combination μισθόν ἀντιμισθίας’]. More helpful on this point is Pratscher, Der zweite Clemensbrief, 71 (on 1.5): ‘Die Wendung [von μισθόν ἀντιμισθίας] ist auffällig’.

32 See above on R. Saller’s first ‘vital element’ in a patron-client relationship.

33 BDAG, 90, emphasis original, s.v. ἀντιμισθία. See also H. Preisker, art. μισθός, 707 [= TDNT 4.702]: ’Das Wort [ἀντιμισθία] fehlt in der griech Lit. ebenso in Pap und Inschriften’.


35 Ps 115.3, LXX: τί ἀνταποδόσω τῷ κυρίῳ περὶ πάντων, ὑν ἄνταπεδοκέν μοι;

36 BDAG, 87 s.v. ἀνταποδίδωμι, def. 1 (emphasis original). Alternately, ἀνταποδίδωμι can mean ’to exact retribution, repay, pay back τίνι τι’ (def. 2 [emphasis original]).
twice in the LXX translation. Clearly there is a concept of reciprocity in Ps 116.12 (MT), which is even more explicit in the LXX’s somewhat expansive rendering.

Lightfoot is correct to observe that the author of Second Clement is not to be credited with inventing the expectation of reciprocity, or obligation, to the Lord. Even the NT contains elements of such an expectation. Less compelling is Lightfoot’s suggestion that the ‘sentiment’ of ἀντιμισθία in 2 Clem. 1.3 ‘is taken from Ps. cxvi. 12’. One should not curtail the author’s compositional strategy on the basis of a single, indirect parallel. Indeed, such expectations of reciprocity are not limited to appearances in biblical literature. These appearances also merit examination as analogous to ancient social relationships, including patronage.

The remarks on ἀντιμισθία by Holt L. Graham and Klaus Wengst may be reviewed more briefly. Graham’s attempt to connect ἀντιμισθία to teaching on wealth and poverty in 2 Clement 20 is unpersuasive and does not shed much light on the term. For his part, Wengst has recourse to the perennially vague category of ‘paraenesis’ (exhortation), a recourse that has little, if any, explanatory power. Nonetheless, he gives the helpful observation that Second Clement’s uses of ἀντιμισθία are linked to that author’s soteriology.

Andreas Lindemann contends, ‘Im Begriff ἀντιμισθία...wird ein wesentliches Element der Gott-Mensch-Beziehung sichtbar’. Lindemann rightly

37 The first occurrence of ἀντιποιδόδομι (115.3a, LXX) plausibly translates the verb ἐποίησε ('turn, return', Ps 116.12a). More remarkably, the second occurrence translates the substantive ῥῆμα (‘his benefits’, 116.12b) with ὁν ἀντιποιδόδοκε (μου (115.3b, LXX).
38 See e.g. Matt 6.14-15; John 13.14; Rom 13.8; 15.1; 27; Phil 2.12, 14; 1 John 2.6; 3.15–16 (ἡμεῖς ὀφείλομεν, in response to Jesus having laid down his life for us); 1 John 4.11 (ἡμεῖς ὀφείλομεν, in response to God’s love).
39 See immediately above on Lightfoot, Apostolic Fathers, I/2.212, emphasis added (on 2 Clem. 1.3).
40 In his brief introduction to Second Clement, Holt L. Graham (in R. M. Grant and H. L. Graham, First and Second Clement [The Apostolic Fathers 2; New York/Toronto/London: Nelson, 1965] 110) ties the occurrences of ἀντιμισθία to teachings about wealth and poverty in 2 Clem. 20.1–4: ‘The idea that [believers] are pursuing profit is encouraged by five references to compensation (antimisitia...) and seven to reward (misitio)... One can view this kind of teaching as a crude form of what is encountered in the Synoptic Gospels...’ Most scholars today, but apparently not Graham, regard chs. 19–20 as a secondary addition to this work, which weakens the case for using 20.1–4 as a basis for interpreting ἀντιμισθία in chs. 1–18. Additionally, in the occurrences of ἀντιμισθία in 2 Clem. 1.3, 5; 9.7; 11.6; 15.2 there is no indication that the ‘payback’ is to offer an alternate source of riches. Elsewhere in his commentary, Graham makes no mention whatsoever of the occurrences of ἀντιμισθία.
41 Klaus Wengst, Zweiter Klemensbrief, 239 n. 3 (on 2 Clem. 1.3); ‘ἀντιμισθία ist ein für den 2. Klemensbrief typischer Begriff, der...der Motivierung der Paränese dient. Mit diesem Wort ist das Interesse des Verfassers an der Soteriologie auf den Begriff gebracht.’ The explanatory power of Wengst’s comment is minimal. Additionally, one could ask of what ἀντιμισθία should be taken to be ‘typical’ (i.e. ‘typisch’) in Second Clement.
42 Klaus Wengst, Zweiter Klemensbrief, 239 n. 3. See the preceding note.
43 Lindemann, Clemensbriefe, 201 (on 2 Clem. 1.3).
calls attention to ‘a fundamental element’ of a ‘relationship’. Yet one may question why he overlooks the centrality of reciprocity in ἀντιμισθία. Conspicuousness (‘Sichtbarkeit’) is indeed essential for the author of Second Clement, but what is to be made ‘conspicuous’ (‘sichtbar’) is the completion of an exchange made within the context of a relationship. The relationship between God and humanity (‘die Gott-Mensch-Beziehung’) is not established once and for all; rather, a reciprocal exchange confirms and maintains that relationship.

Wilhelm Pratscher sees both legal and economic overtones surrounding the term ἀντιμισθία. Referring to a ‘Rechtsverhältnis’—a legal or fiduciary relationship—he holds that in Second Clement ἀντιμισθία ‘meint die Gegenleistung für das Heilshandeln Jesu. Diese Gegenleistung macht das Verhältnis Schenkender—Beschenkter zu einem Rechtsverhältnis’. Elsewhere, he explains ἀντιμισθία not in legal terms but as part of a commercial exchange: ‘Dadurch ist freilich der Aspekt des Kommerziellen, des Austausches von Leistungen schon wieder prägend’.

Pratscher is certainly on the right track, but his explanations for ἀντιμισθία—whether as a legal relationship (2 Clem. 1.3) or an economic exchange (11.7)—do not adequately account for the mutuality that is expected in this work. The reciprocal obligations described in Second Clement are not those of a legal or a commercial relationship but are part of a personal relationship between God and those whom God saves (cf. 1.4). In particular, Pratscher’s reference to the ‘giver—recipient’ (‘Schenkender—Beschenkter’) overlooks the reciprocity expected in a patronage relationship. According to Second Clement, it is first God, and then, in response, also believers who are ‘Schenkende’. In the personal relationship between Christ and his followers, each party has reciprocal responsibilities to the other. Within that kind of relationship, obligations for repayment can be difficult to commodify, whether by legal or economic criteria. The fulfillment of both parties’ mutual obligations is a conditio sine qua non for maintaining the relationship.

3.2. Ἀντιμισθία in Second Clement

In 2 Clem. 1.3 and 1.5, the one who is to receive ‘payback’ is Christ—not God. In 1.3, the antecedent for αὐτῶ is Jesus Christ (Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, 1.2c). The same is the case for αὐτῶ in 1.5, since Ἰησοῦς Χριστός remains the governing antecedent throughout 1.3–8. And Christ is the one who acted like a beneficent father toward those he saved (1.4).

44 Pratscher, Der zweite Clemensbrief, 69 (on 1.3) in reference to 2 Clem. 1.3, 5; 9.7; 11.6; 15.2.
45 Pratscher, Der zweite Clemensbrief, 140 (on 11.7, albeit referring to 11.6).
46 See immediately above on Pratscher, Der zweite Clemensbrief, 69 (on 1.3).
47 See above on ὁς πατήρ in 2 Clem. 1.4b.
Besides 2 Clem. 1.3, 5, there are three other occurrences of ἀντιμισθία in this writing (9.7; 11.6; 15.2). Two of these likewise call attention to the ἀντιμισθία that humans owe:

As long as we have time to be healed, let us surrender ourselves to the God who heals (τῷ Θεῷ τῇ ἰατρικῇ τῇ θεωτήτῃ), giving him payback (ἀντιμισθία). (2 Clem. 9.7)

For we have this payback (ἀντιμισθία) to give to the God who created us (τῷ Θεῷ τῷ κτίσαντι θημάζῃ): if (ἐάν) the one who speaks and hears both speaks and hears with faith and love. (15.2)

Interestingly, in these two passages it is not Christ but God to whom recompense is due (pace 1.3, 5). As a result, not only Christ but also God (the Creator) can be interpreted as ‘patron’ in Second Clement. Four of the five uses of ἀντιμισθία in Second Clement, then, point out what believers owe, whether to Christ (1.3, 5) or to God (9.7; 15.2).

The other occurrence of ἀντιμισθία designates the ‘repayments’ (plural) that God will give to each person for his or her ‘works’: ‘For faithful is the one who promised to give repayments (τῶς ἀντιμισθίας) in accord with each person’s works (ἔργα)’ (2 Clem. 11.6). Here, ἀντιμισθία has a meaning analogous to that of µισθός in many other early Christian writings (including 2 Clem. 3.3; 9.5; 15.1), designating a future reward from God.48

A concept of repayment, or payback, therefore represents a prominent theme in Second Clement. The author teaches that reciprocal ‘repayments’ both from human beings (1.3, 5; 9.7; 15.2) and from God (11.6) are to be made: each party is to render ‘payback’ to the other. Those believers who properly repay God (or Christ) for the gift of salvation (e.g. 1.3–7) can, in turn, expect to receive repayment from God (11.6). Such a concept of reciprocal ‘repayment’ is consistent with the other three occurrences of ἀντιμισθία in early Christian literature: in Paul’s undisputed letters and Theophilus of Antioch’s apology To Autolycus. We now turn to these to shed some light on the conceptual framework utilized by the author of Second Clement.

3.3. Ἀντιμισθία in Paul and Theophilus of Antioch

Paul uses ἀντιμισθία in 2 Cor 6.13 and Rom 1.27. In the former context, he complains that the Corinthians owe to him an ἀντιμισθία of openness in return for the openness that he and his colleagues have shown to them.49 Just as the apostle and his colleagues have opened their hearts to the Corinthians

48 See above on µισθός as an indication of believers’ future reward.
49 2 Cor 6.11–13 (NRSV, modified): ‘We have spoken frankly to you Corinthians; our heart is wide open (παρακολουθησάτε). [12] There is no restriction in our affections, but only in yours. [13] As recompense for the same (τῶν δὲ αὐτῶν ἀντιμισθίων)—I speak as to children—open wide your hearts also (πλατυνθῆτε καὶ ὑμεῖς).’
(πλατύνω, 2 Cor 6.11), the ἀντιμισθία that Paul implores to receive is that the Corinthians respond in kind (πλατύνω, 6.13). Paul expected a reciprocity of openness in his relationship with the Corinthians and, at the time he wrote this admonition, found them to be falling short of their responsibility. This use of ἀντιμισθία complements those uses in Second Clement that highlight believers’ reciprocal obligation to Christ or God (2 Clem. 1.3, 5; 9.7; 15.2), an obligation whose fulfillment the author of Second Clement may fear is lacking among some in his audience.

In Rom 1.27, Paul addresses a different kind of reciprocity, one with a necessary connection (ἐδει) between participation in unnatural sexual acts and the ἀντιμισθία that one receives for such ‘error’ (πλάνη). In Romans 1, Paul offers an almost mechanical—possibly Deuteronomistic—understanding of divine justice and of absolute parity between offense and punishment. For Paul, the ‘payback’ (ἀντιμισθία) in Rom 1.27 is inevitable, given the offenses; divine justice is a force that acts in response to human behavior. In this sense, the meaning of ἀντιμισθία in Rom 1.27 is similar to that of μισθος, for example, in 1 Cor 3.8, 14 and 2 Clem. 11.6, where one receives the ‘wage’ that one has earned. According to Rom 1.27, this ‘payback’ is both just and necessary, even if those who receive it may be oblivious to the ‘payback’ they receive as punishment. As mentioned above, in 2 Cor 6.13 Paul complains that he did not receive the ἀντιμισθία of openness that he ought to have received from the Corinthians. Thus, one may plausibly associate a concept of divine justice with the term ἀντιμισθία. Recalling Danker’s definition for ἀντιμισθία as ‘requital based upon what one deserves...’ we could infer that Second Clement complains about the injustice resulting from some believers not living up to their obligations to Christ or God.

Significantly, the two Pauline uses of ἀντιμισθία address different kinds of relationships. In 2 Cor 6.11–13, the context is human-to-human patronage.

50 See further on 2 Clem. 11.5–6 below.
51 Rom 1.27: ‘And in the same way also the men, giving up natural intercourse with a woman, were consumed by their passion for one another. Men committed shameless acts with men and received in their own persons the payback that was necessary for their error (τὴν ἀντιμισθίαν ἣν ἐδει τῆς πλάνης αὐτῶν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀπολαμβάνοντες). I am indebted to Robert M. Calhoun for suggestions on this point. See further his study, Paul’s Definitions of the Gospel in Romans 1 (WUNT 2/316; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011) and Robert Jewett, Romans: A Commentary (ed. Eldon Jay Epp; Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007) 180 (on Rom 1.27), who highlights the “reciprocal nature” of the punishment in connection with the participle ἀπολαμβάνοντες.
52 I.e. they are unaware of their resulting inability to understand God the Creator, as God could have been understood had they not participated in morally deviant conduct.
53 See above and BDAG, s.v. ἀντιμισθία.
54 Recall Paul’s paternal stance toward the Corinthians as one who ‘speaks as to children’ (ὁς τέκνοις λέγω, 2 Cor 6.13). See further the argument of Zeba A. Crook, Reconceptualising
within which Paul calls for reciprocity from the Corinthians. Yet in Rom 1.27, the ‘payback’ is a manifestation of God’s justice within a divine–human relationship (or lack thereof). These occurrences in different contexts illustrate the flexibility of the term ἀντιμισθία. That flexibility is consistent with a broad concept of patronage that includes notions of divine justice (and even covenant), as proposed earlier in this article.

Theophilus of Antioch offers the only other use of ἀντιμισθία in early Christian literature. In his apology To Autolycus, he explains that because ‘the people of God became bearers of the Holy Spirit and [became] prophets’, they were also ‘deemed worthy to receive’ (κατηξιώθησαν...λαβείν) the ἀντιμισθία of ‘becoming God’s instruments’ (ὄργανα θεοῦ γενόμενοι, Ad Autol. 2.9).55 The resulting ‘payback’ seems to presume that God’s people had acted faithfully and, as a result, became God’s instruments. If this interpretation is correct, Theophilus would likewise maintain a cause-and-effect relationship like that held in Rom 1.27 and like that expected in 2 Cor 6.13. The author of Second Clement also sees a cause (Christ is the salvific benefactor and patron) that ought to be met with a corresponding effect. The desired effect is that believers realize their responsibilities as Christ’s clients and act accordingly. Given the clearly related meanings of ἀντιμισθία in Paul, Theophilus, and Second Clement, Pratscher’s translation of ἀντιμισθία with three different terms is at least questionable.56

This article began with observations about ancient patronage and the presentation of Christ as both ‘judge’ and savor in 2 Clem. 1.1, 4. Subsequently, we examined the notion that believers owe some ‘repayment’ to Christ or to God. The picture that begins to emerge from 2 Clem. 1.1–8 is that Christ, who accomplished salvation (1.4, 7), is also the ‘judge’ (κριτής, 1.1) of whether believers are now offering a commensurate ‘payment’ (μισθός, 1.5) or ‘payback’ (ἀντιμισθία, 1.3, 5; cf. 9.7; 15.2) in return for their salvation. That is to say, Christ’s work as ‘judge’ is also brought to bear on his ecclesial clients. The discussion now turns to what, specifically, the author stipulates believers owe to Christ (or God) as ‘payback’ for their salvation.

55 The opposite outcome could be seen as becoming ‘instruments of the devil’ (ποίς ὄργανοις τοῦ διαβόλου, 2 Clem. 18.2).
56 Pratscher, Der zweite Clemensbrief, 69 (on 1.3) translates ‘Gegenleistung’ for the occurrences in Second Clement; ‘Vergeltung’ for Rom 1.27; and ‘Erwiderung’ for 2 Cor 6.13. Similarly also H. Preisker, art. μισθός, 707 [= TDNT 4.702].
4. Orthopraxis as ‘Payback’: Believers’ Just Response to Divine Beneficence

A central concern for the author of Second Clement is that some believers may ‘trivialize’ Christ, their salvation, or both, and may thereby not have realized what is involved in God’s call. After introducing God and Christ as ‘judge’ (κριτής, 1.1a), the author immediately admonishes his audience:

And we must not trivialize (μικρὰ φρονεῖν) our salvation, [2] for when we trivialize him [Jesus Christ], we also hope to receive but little. And those who listen as though these were small matters are doing wrong (ἁμαρτάνων); and we are also doing wrong (ἁμαρτάνων) when we do not realize from where, by whom, and to what place we were called, as well as (καὶ) how much Jesus Christ endured to suffer for our sake. (1.1b-2)

Within verse 2, the author switches from the first person (ἔλπιζομεν) to the third person (ἁμαρτάνουσιν) and subsequently back to the first person (ἁμαρτάνομεν). Those who stand rhetorically accused include the addressees. The occurrences of ἁμαρτάνομεν in 1.2 offer several possibilities for translation. Whether those rhetorically accused ‘do wrong’, ‘are in error’, ‘miss the point’, or ‘sin’, it is clear that Christ and the salvation he offers must not be taken for granted. With explicitly stated soteriological implications (1.1b-2), such an error, misapprehension, or even sin is a very serious matter.

In Second Clement, the problem accentuated by ἁμαρτάνουσιν... ἁμαρτάνομεν is soon shown to be more than merely hypothetical. The receipt of the gift of salvation is not a one-sided gesture from God to humanity but imposes on those who are saved responsibilities toward Christ (or God). Throughout 2 Clement 1–18, the author describes numerous actions (and here, orthopraxis is crucial), actions that would be asymptomatic of trivializing

57 Gk: περὶ αὐτοῦ, referring to Θεοῦ Χριστοῦ in 2 Clem. 1.1a, and clearly not to the feminine σωτηρίας in 1.1b (περὶ τῆς σωτηρίας ἡμῶν). The parallel uses of the preposition περὶ show that how one thinks of Christ (1.2a) and of one’s salvation (1.1b) are intertwined. Nonetheless, the translation by Michael Holmes, ed., The Apostolic Fathers (Grand Rapids: Baker, 3d ed. 2007), 139 of περὶ τῆς σωτηρίας ἡμῶν (1.1b) as ‘the one who is our salvation’ (emphasis added) is unnecessary.

58 Concurring with Holmes, The Apostolic Fathers, 138, I retain the reading ἁμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ ἡμῶν in 2 Clem. 1.2.

Christ or one’s salvation (cf. 1.1b-2). In other words, if the listeners heed the author’s advice, they need not worry.

In what follows, I discuss many actions that 2 Clement 1–18 commends, and I also consider how recognizing a relationship of patronage between Christ and his earthly clients sheds light on several of the admonitions. Whether (or not) one’s orthopraxis is consonant with one’s obligations to Christ will prove to have salvific implications. The author offers not merely admonitions but a long list of stipulations for those who would remain in relationship with their salvific patron.

1. Believers are to offer Christ ‘repayment’ (1.3a: ἀντιμισθία, discussed above) and ‘fruit’ (καρπός, 1.3b).

2. Believers are to offer Christ ‘praise’ (αἰνοῦς, 1.5a) and ‘payment of remuneration’ (1.5b: μισθὸν ἀντιμισθίας, discussed above).

3. Believers are to rejoice (εὐφραίνω, 2.1) and not grow weary in offering prayers to God (2.2).

4. Believers refrain from idolatry—that is, from sacrificing to or worshipping false gods (3.1a).

5. Believers ‘confess’ (ὁμολογέω, 3.2, 3; 4.3) Christ, ‘through whom [they] were saved’ (δι’ οὗ ἐσώθημεν, 3.3b) ‘by doing what he says’ (3.4); ‘by loving one another, by not committing adultery or slandering one another or being jealous, but by being self-controlled, compassionate, and kind’ (4.3a); and by having ‘sympathy for one another, and not be[ing] avaricious’ (4.3b; cf. 5.1a). In these uses of ὁμολογέω, confessing Christ is not specifically envisioned as taking place before persecutors but, rather, as concerned, in the broadest sense, with one’s moral conduct. As we shall see, a readiness to die is also expected (5.1b-5).

6. Believers ‘must fear not humans but God’ (4.4) and must ‘not be afraid to depart from this world’ (5.1b). The passing allusion to a readiness to be persecuted (5.1b-5)—especially that believers not fear the ‘wolves’ who can ‘kill you’ (5.4)—receives no further development in this work. It is noteworthy that 5.1b-5 does not use ὁμολογέω. For this author, the confession is to be made to Christ through one’s personal conduct.

7. In order to obtain (ἐπιτυγχάνω, 5.6a) ‘rest (ἀνάπαυσις) in the coming kingdom and eternal life’ (5.5b), believers must ‘live a holy and righteous

60 The reader will recall the caution expressed above that I do not intend to argue that every reference to soteriology or orthopraxis in Second Clement is based strictly on a model of patronage.

61 Cf. 2 Clem. 3.2–4; 4.3 on the necessity of readiness to ‘confess’ (ὁμολογέω) Christ. On this theme in the NT, see J. A. Kelhofer, Persecution, Persuasion and Power: Readiness to Withstand Hardship as a Corroboration of Legitimacy in the New Testament (WUNT 270; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010).
life, and regard these worldly things as alien to themselves (5.6b). Clearly, how one lives in the present has salvific implications for the ability to obtain the anticipated ‘rest’ and ‘eternal life’. This verse exemplifies my argument that the author offers not just exhortations but stipulations. A believer’s conduct matters for nothing less than obtaining ‘rest in the coming kingdom’.

8. Believers are to understand that ‘No servant can serve two masters’ (2 Clem. 6.1) and that they cannot be ‘friends’ (φίλοι, 6.5) with both ‘this age and the one that is coming’ (6.3). As a substitute for the demeaning designation ‘client’ (Lat. cliens), the term ‘friend’ (Lat. amicus) was commonly used in Roman society to describe the relationship between an aristocratic patron and an aristocratic client. The point supports my thesis that Second Clement’s soteriology is informed by a concept of patronage. If a prohibition against serving ‘two masters’ (δυσκυρίοις, 2 Clem. 6.1) finds parallels in Matthew, Luke, and, presumably, also in Q (δυσκυρίοις, Luke 16.13), a prohibition against divided friendship loyalties (φίλοι, 2 Clem. 6.5) is distinctive to Second Clement. This prohibition is consistent with the writing’s other allusions to a patronage relationship between Christ (or God) and those who will be saved.

9. The hortatory subjunction ἐγγενεσκόμεθα urges that believers ‘compete in the games’ (7.1) in order to be crowned (7.2) or at least to ‘come close to the crown’ (7.3). The author expects exertion but not necessarily perfection. The consequence of not engaging in such a competition is to become disqualified and to be eternally punished (7.4–6). As we shall see, the author poses additional stark alternatives in 2 Clem. 11.1 and 14.1. Clearly, then, there is no middle ground for those who would desire to receive the gift of salvation but not also desire to ‘compete’ in order to retain it.

10. Believers are to change their perspective (or ‘repent’: μετανοήσωμεν, 8.1 and 8.2; cf. 8.3) while they still have time to do so. This is the first of three hortatory uses in Second Clement of μετανοέω, ‘change one’s mind’. The desired change in perspective may not entail repentance for particularly bad conduct but seems principally to involve embracing the need for good conduct. Thus, 8.1–3 implies that the reciprocity that stems from changing one’s perspective is an integral component in this author’s soteriology.

62 In 2 Clem. 5.5–7, it is unclear precisely what τὰ κοσμικὰ ταύτα (‘these worldly things’, 5.6b) designates.
64 See below on the alternatives given in 2 Clem. 11.1 (being either ‘righteous’ or ‘wretched’) and 14.1 (being either ‘of the first church’ or of the prophet Jeremiah’s ‘den of robbers’).
65 See also 2 Clem. 13.1; 16.1–17.1 and BDAG, 640 s.v. μετανοέω def. 1. I am thankful to Jonas Holmstrand for his suggestion on this point.
11. Believers are to ‘keep [their] flesh pure’\(^{66}\) in anticipation of future judgment and resurrection (κρίνεται...ἀνίσταται, 9.1). Again, we find not simply exhortations for living a better Christian life but admonitions with salvific implications—that is, for future judgment and resurrection.

12. Believers are to ‘surrender’ themselves (ἐπιδόμεν ἐστι τῷ θεῷ, 9.7a) ‘to the healing God’ (τῷ θεῷ ἐπιτεθέντης θεοῦ, 9.7). The hortatory subjunctive ἐπιδόμεν calls mind to surrender over of a possession to another party or of one’s self to another’s control,\(^{67}\) and its use in this verse bespeaks an even more asymmetrical relationship than that typical of patronage. In ἐπιδόμεν...διδόντες the participle διδόντες explains how surrender is to be made: believers are to be giving ‘payment’ to their divine doctor for his healing services (ἀντιμισθίαν αὐτῷ διδόντες, 9.7b).

The subsequent rhetorical question, ποῖάν; (‘what kind?’ 9.8a), refers to ἀντιμισθίαν (‘payback’, 9.7b), preparing readers/hearers for an answer about ‘what kind of a repayment’ is to be given. The payment due is that they change their view (or ‘repent’: τό μετανοήσαι, 9.8; cf. 8.1–3) and offer ‘eternal praise’ (9.10; cf. 1.5a). According to 9.7–10, then, one surrenders control to God by changing one’s perspective on what God requires. That this is an obligation is clear from the use of ἀντιμισθία (9.7b); believers owe something to God for what they have received from ‘the healing God’.\(^{68}\) Should they not grasp that ‘payback’ to their ‘healing God’ is obligatory, they must change their view (μετανοεῖω) about their relationship to this God.

13. Believers are to do God’s will (10.1–5), for example, by pursuing virtue (διότι οὐχ ἕνα τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, 10.1). A special warning is given to those who ‘teach evil’ (κακοδιδασκάλιοι): ‘they will receive a double punishment’ (διοικήσῃ τῇ κρίσιν, 10.5). In 10.1–5, the content of this evil teaching is not specified. It could well have included a less rigorous conception of the orthopraxis required of the faithful. Aside from this overarching concern in Second Clement, the author names no particular ‘heresy’ emblematic of teaching evil.

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66 See 2 Clem. 8.4 (τὴν σάρκα ἐγνήν παράσχοντες) and 8.6 (παράσχετε τὴν σάρκα ἑγνήν).
67 See BDAG, s.v. ἐπιδίδωμι and esp. Acts 27.15 (ὑπέκλεισαν ἐπιδίδοντες ἐφερόμεθα): those attempting to steer the ship surrendered control to the wind; 1 Clem. 14.2 (ἐὰν ἰψοιχινδόνως ἐπιδόμεν ἐστιν τῷ θεῷ, τῆς ἐπιτεθέντης τῶν ἀνθρώπων), an appeal not to yield to the will of people of questionable character.
68 On doctors and imperial patronage, see Saller, Personal Patronage, 63–4; R. Herzog, ‘Arzthonora’, RAC 1 (1950) 724–5. For my exploration of possible allusions to patronage in some of Second Clement’s admonitions, this use of ἀντιμισθία (9.7b), too, seems to be significant: medical services, like the services of an orator/attorney, could be exchanged within patronage relationships: one could ask a client to offer services to another ‘friend’ or client. The recipient of medical services would then incur a debt or an obligation, whether to the physician or to the physician’s patron.
14. Believers understand that they face a stark alternative between being, or becoming, ‘righteous’ (ἐσόμεθα δίκαιοι, 11.1a) and being, or becoming, ‘wretched’ (ταλαίπωροι ἐσόμεθα, 11.1b), depending on whether they serve ‘God with a pure heart’ (11.1–4; on other such alternatives, see 7.1–6; 14.1). Yet again, the author acknowledges no middle ground between the extremes. Each believer is entreated to examine his or her standing relative to these extremes—and is advised how to confirm to which of them he or she belongs.

15. Believers ‘endure in hope’ (2 Clem. 11.5), trusting that God is ‘faithful to give repayments to each person according to his [or her] works’ (πιστός...τὰς ἀντιμισθίας ἀποδίδοναι ἐκάστῳ τὸν ἔργον αὐτοῦ, 11.6). This is the fourth of five occurrences in Second Clement of ἀντιμισθία. The parallels between 9.7 (believers must give ‘repayment to the healing God’) and 11.6 (God will offer ‘repayments’ to each person) are significant. Both verses have a form of [ἅπα]δίδωμι used with ἀντιμισθία. Together, these verses convey that there is a reciprocal obligation on the part of both human beings (9.7) and God (11.6) to ‘give repayment’ to each other.

As noted above, a mutual, reciprocal obligation is a vital element of a patron–client relationship. If one accepts such a relationship as a model for the author’s uses of ἀντιμισθία, Andreas Lindemann’s contention would seem to be unpersuasive that 2 Clem. 11.6 is meant ‘to substantiate hope’ but is not meant as a ‘threat’. Second Clement’s many admonitions, which comprise the bulk of this writing, suggest that the author is indeed concerned about at least some of the addressees. If there were no need for concern, these admonitions—and, by extension, the writing itself—would not have been necessary. Those who offer reciprocity to God can expect reciprocity from God. For these faithful clients, 11.6 would indeed ‘substantiate hope’. But for others, the sharp warning, if not a ‘threat’, provokes somber reflection.

16. Believers are continually to ‘wait for’ (ἐκδεχόμεθα) the kingdom of God: ‘Let us wait, therefore, hour by hour for the kingdom of God with love and righteousness, since we do not know the day of God’s appearing’ (12.1). A common meaning of ἐκδέχομαι is ‘to remain in a place or state and await an event or the arrival of someone’. In a patronage relationship,

69 See above on the three ‘vital elements’ of patronage in Saller, Personal Patronage, 1.
70 Lindemann, Clemensbriefe, 234 (on 11.6): ‘[D]ie Ankündigung der bevorstehenden Vergeltung nach den Werken hat hier natürlich nicht die Funktion einer Drohung... sondern will Hoffnung begründen’.
71 Cf. Matt 6.14–15 on reciprocity (i.e. forgiving others) as a stipulation for receiving forgiveness. Requiring that one must forgive others in order to be forgiven could likewise be taken either as a cause for hope or as a warning.
72 BDAG, 300, emphases original, s.v. ἐκδέχομαι.
a regular obligation of clients was to be in place to greet the patron in public, thus repaying the patron by adding to his or her stature.\textsuperscript{73} I regard it as possible, albeit not certain, that 2 Clem. 12.1 alludes to a client’s obligation to greet his or her patron in public. In order to enter the kingdom of God, the believer must be in place to welcome, or ‘await’, its coming.\textsuperscript{74} This interpretation offers a plausible explanation for the author’s use of ἐκδέχομαι in 12.1.

17. Believers are to change their mind (or ‘repent’, μετανοῆσωμεν, 13.1a) and not live in such a way that God’s name is blasphemed (13.1b-4). This is the second of three times that the author makes a hortatory use of μετανοέω (cf. 8.1-3; 16.1-17.1). The clear connection to orthopraxis in 13.1b-4 again suggests that a change in perspective in regard to how one is to conduct oneself (and not repentance from bad conduct or sin) is the primary referent of μετανοῆσωμεν.

18. By doing God’s will, believers ‘will be of the first church’ (ἐσομέθα ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας τῆς πρώτης, 14.1a). In 14.1b, a stark alternative is given between being of the ‘first church’, on the one hand, and being associated with the prophet Jeremiah’s ‘den of robbers’,\textsuperscript{75} on the other hand. These occurrences of ἐσομέθα recall 11.1a-b, where the author discusses facing the extreme alternative between being, or becoming, either ‘righteous’ or ‘wretched’.\textsuperscript{76} At both 14.1a and 14.1b (and elsewhere in this work), ἐκκλησία could plausibly be translated as ‘assembly’, ‘group’, ‘congregation’, or even ‘church’. Regardless of how organized or structured an ἐκκλησία is presupposed in Second Clement (a feature on which our author does not elaborate), at issue in 14.1a-b is that these (later) believers must maintain, or return to, a place of purity posited for their movement’s pristine beginnings.

19. The author reiterates the soteriological implications of his admonishments: ‘So let us choose, therefore, to be of the church of life (ὧ ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας τῆς ζωῆς), in order that we may be saved’ (ἵνα σωθῶμεν, 14.1c). ‘The church of life’ (14.1c) is apparently equivalent to ‘the first church’ (14.1a). But unlike the strategy in 14.1a-b (or 11.1a-b), no antonym is given for ‘the church of life’.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{73} On this, see e.g. Saller, Personal Patronage, 128: ‘In the Republic the client’s presence at the morning salutation was a symbol of respect for his patron and a means of honoring him’. See further on the morning salutatio pp. 11 n. 15, 61–2, 128–9.

\textsuperscript{74} See also Acts 17.16 (Ἐν δὲ ταῖς Αθηναίαις ἐκδεχομένου συνόδου τοῦ Παύλου); 1 Cor 11.33; 16.11; Heb 10.13; 11.10; Jas 5.7; Herm. Sim. 9.10.5 [87.5] (Εκδεέξα με ὢδε ἐος ἐρχομαι); Herm. Sim. 9.1.2 [88.2] (Ἐκδέξομαι συνόδον ἐος ὑπέρ); 2 Clem. 20.3.

\textsuperscript{75} See Jer 7.11; cf. Mark 11.17 par.

\textsuperscript{76} See above on 2 Clem. 11.1 (ἐσομέθα δίκαιοι…ταλαίπωροι ἐσομέθα).

\textsuperscript{77} Perhaps, for this author, to speak of a hypothetical ἐκκλησία τοῦ θεοῦ (in contrast to ‘the church of life’, 14.1c) would have posed a contradiction. Alternately, the author may have wished not to associate believers of bad conduct with any form of ἐκκλησία.
Earlier in this article, I called attention to six occurrences of the verb σώζω in Second Clement that treat salvation as if it were a past, completed act. These six uses contrast markedly with seven others in the work—three in the future indicative (4.1, 2; 15.1) and four in the subjunctive mood (8.2; 13.1; 14.1c; 17.2). In addition to a call for belonging to the church of life, in order to be ‘saved’ in 14.1c (Ἰνὰ σωθῆμεν), the author twice mandates a change in perspective (or repentance) as a means to the same end. In these other seven passages, salvation is a goal or an expected outcome, not a fait accompli.

These disparate uses of σώζω in Second Clement may seem to be a contradiction or a lack of precision in the author’s soteriology. But if our interpretation is within the context of a patron–client relationship, there need be no contradiction. As benefactor and patron, Christ offers salvation to those who accept the terms of his patronage. A failure to accept the terms would, however, result in the forfeiture of salvation by former, or would-be, clients, since indifference to their obligations would nullify the relationship. By implication, in Second Clement being ‘saved’ (whether in the past or the future) is tantamount to being faithful in fulfilling one’s obligations to the heavenly patron. In 14.1c, being ‘of the church of life’ depends not on accepting a particular dogma or recognizing the authority of a particular ecclesiastical authority. Rather, what again appears to be at issue is orthopraxis, which sets apart the author’s ideal manifestation of ἐκκλησία from less rigorous competitors.

20. The faithful will heed the author’s ‘advice’ (συμβουλία) ‘about self control’ (περὶ ἐγκρατείας, 15.1a). This advice, too, has salvific implications: those who follow it ‘will save both themselves (ἔσωσιν σώσει) and me [the author] as their adviser’ (15.1b; cf. 15.1c: εἰς τὸ σωθῆμα).

21. One gives to God the Creator the ἀντιμισθία of speaking and hearing ‘with faith and love’ (15.2). This fifth of five occurrences of ἀντιμισθία in Second Clement has been discussed above. The focus on orthopraxis remains consistent, if not also consistently vague.

22. A third hortatory use of μετανοεῖν (16.1–17.1; cf. 8.1–3; 13.1a) comes with the appeal to ‘conquer’ one’s ‘soul’ (τὴν ψυχὴν ἵμων νικήσωμεν, 16.2). The act of ‘charitable giving’ exemplifies ‘repentance from sin’ (ἔλεγμοσύνη ὡς μετάνοια ἀμαρτίας, 16.4a). Here, too, the use of μετανοεῖν does not

78 See above on 2 Clem. 1.4, 7; 2.7; 3.3; 9.2, 5.
79 2 Clem. 8.2 (μετανοήσαμεν...Ἰνὰ σωθῆμεν); 13.1 (μετανοήσαντες ἐκ ψυχῆς σωθῶμεν). See also 2 Clem. 4.1–2 (Ἰνὰ σωθῆμεν: ἔσωσιν σώσει); 15.1 (ἔσωσιν σώσει κόμη); 17.2 (ὁπώς σωθῶμεν ἄπαντες); cf. 19.1 (Ἰνὰ καὶ ἐσωτερικά σώσετε); 19.3 (Ἰνὰ εἰς τέλος σωθῆμεν). The formulation in 2.5 (ὅτι τοὺς ἀπολλυμένους σώζειν [cf. 2.7]) does not speak directly to this issue. Pratscher, Der zweite Clemensbrief, 71, notes the differing uses of σώζω in Second Clement but does not offer an explanation for them.

80 See David J. Downs, ‘Redemptive Almsgiving and Economic Stratification in 2 Clement’, JECS 19, no. 4 (2011) 493–517 at 514 for an argument ‘that, in the face of an individualized
seem to entail repentance for a particular sin but, rather, a changed perspective in regard to a believer’s obligation—in this case, ἔλεημοσύνη. David J. Downs has recently argued persuasively that ‘the exhortation for readers to participate in ἔλεημοσύνη in 2 Clem. 16.1–4 functions as an invitation for all believers to practice mutual assistance within the “church of life”’. Since the author of Second Clement elsewhere speaks of the ‘payback’ that believers owe to Christ or to God (ἀντιμισθία, 1.3; 9.7; 15.2), one may infer that ‘charitable giving’ (ἔλεημοσύνη) to others is an acceptable means of payment of what, in fact, is owed to God. According to Second Clement, ἔλεημοσύνη enjoys a greater importance than fasting or prayer (16.4b) and can even alleviate the burden of sin (κούσιμα ἀμαρτίας, 16.4c).

23. In 17.2a, the author implores, ‘Therefore let us help one another to restore those who are weak (τοὺς ὀσθενοῦντας) with respect to goodness, so that we may all be saved, and let us admonish and turn back one another’. Again we see the author’s concern for those whom he designates as ‘the weak’, who may be missing the mark. The suggested remedy is for the whole community to ‘restore and counsel’ each other (ἐπιστρέψωμεν ἄλληλους καὶ νοοθετήσωμεν, 17.2b).

The author also warns that severe and lasting judgment (e.g. ‘their worm will not die and their fire will not be quenched’, 17.5c) awaits not only non-believers but also those who have ‘perverted (παραλογίζομαι) the commandments of Jesus Christ’ (17.6b). By contrast, only those who will have ‘done well and endured torments and hated the pleasures of the soul (τὰς ἡδυπαθείς τῆς ψυχῆς)’ will be counted among ‘the righteous’ (οἱ δίκαιοι, 17.7a). Both here and earlier, at 10.5 (about those who ‘teach evil’ [κακοδιδασκαλοῦντες]), our author attests to a plurality of opinion and a competition for influence over the addressees.

24. Second Clement ends with a call to give thanks (18.1) and candidly reveals the (implied) author’s own temptations and attempt to ‘pursue righteousness’ (σπουδάζω τὴν δικαιοσύνην διώκειν, 18.2). Such righteousness is not definitively given by God; nor is it a lasting byproduct of one’s faith or conversion. Like the author, all believers must continue in its pursuit.
5. Conclusion: Reciprocity as Salvation in Second Clement

This article calls attention to three main points. First, the author of Second Clement presents Christ (and God) as ‘judge’ (κριτής, 2 Clem. 1.1), who has also accomplished salvation (1.4, 7) and whose work as ‘judge’ is ongoing, even among believers. Second, believers have incurred an obligation to give ‘payback’ (ἀντιμισθία, 1.3; 9.7; 15.2) or ‘remuneration’ (1.5) to Christ or God in return for salvation. Third, numerous orthopraxes are pointed out as examples of the expected response to ‘Christ who saved us’ (e.g. 1.4) and ‘to the healing God’ (11.6). These obligatory practices have salvific implications, depending on whether one accepts them. The central thesis for which I argue is that an ancient relationship of patronage offers a fitting model for the ‘payback’ (ἀντιμισθία) that the author of Second Clement expects believers to make, whether to Christ (1.3, 5) or to God (9.7; 15.2). In this reciprocal transaction, God is likewise expected to make ‘repayments’ (ἀντιμισθίας) ‘in accord with each person’s works’ (Ἐγένο, 11.6).

Various kinds of patronage relationships existed at numerous levels of Greco-Roman society and in different parts of the Empire, even under the Principate. It is therefore plausible that the audience of Second Clement would have understood the author’s use of patronage as a model for soteriology and the relationship between Christ and Christ’s earthly clients. Within this patronage relationship, the terms for receiving or maintaining salvation include, inter alia, changing one’s perspective (μετανοήσωμεν, 8.2; 13.1; 16.1–17.1), being ‘righteous’ rather than ‘wretched’ (11.1a), and associating with the ‘first church’ rather than with a ‘den of robbers’ (14.1a-b). Such signs of loyalty to Christ (or God) are emblematic of offering the ‘payback’ (ἀντιμισθίας, 1.3, 5; 9.7; 15.2) that believers owe.

Believers can either confirm or lose their salvation (e.g. ἵνα σοθῶμεν, 14.1c), depending on whether they embrace the author’s mandates to a life of consistent orthopraxis. Salvation, then, is not a fait accompli but requires the preservation of the patronage relationship between Christ (or God) and his earthly clients. Within that relationship, it is necessary that a reciprocal exchange continue to take place. That is to say, salvation entails not simply the receipt of a gift but also requires reciprocity from those who would receive that gift. As benefactor and salvific patron, Christ offers salvation to those who accept the terms of his patronage. Furthermore, it is necessary to avoid the influence and example of those who teach evil (10.5) and ‘pervert’ Jesus’ commandments (17.6b), since a particularly severe judgment is reserved for such ‘heretics’ (17.7).

According to Second Clement, reciprocity to Christ (or God), who ‘saved’ us (e.g. 1.4, 7), is tantamount to, or at least confirms, salvation. A failure to accept the obligation of reciprocity would jeopardize the salvation of Christ’s former, or would-be, clients. Disobedience, or even neglect in rendering sufficient honor, thanks, and praise, can ultimately nullify the patron–client relationship.
On the basis of the author’s presentation of reciprocity within the patronage relationship, we may propose a likely purpose, or occasion, for this writing: he endeavors to convince a Christian audience that the benefits of salvation come with recurring obligations to Christ, their salvific patron.

One could further ask what difference this author’s particular soteriology could have made in the lives and practices of his followers. Naturally, no definitive answer can be given. It is possible, though, that a need would eventually arise to keep track of how often one practiced, inter alia, praise, witness, loyalty, and almsgiving. Although I would hesitate to construe Second Clement merely as a steppingstone en route to an emerging asceticism, the door is certainly open to such development. In terms of the history of Christianity, moreover, one could explore models of soteriology that posit Christ as salvific patron—considering such things as possible precedents for Second Clement, the author’s use and editing of traditional materials, and subsequent developments, including the manifold competition for influence among bishop-patrons on various points of doctrine and praxis. Second Clement offers no clue that ecclesiastical officials (below), exalted martyrs (above), or others could play a mediating role in confirming that the needed ὀντιμισθίαι have, indeed, been paid. But neither does anything in this writing preclude the engagement of additional parties in arbitrating the terms of the expected reciprocity within the economy of salvation.

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84 E.g. Matt 6.14–15; 22.11–14; Rom 15.27; 1 John 3.16.
86 On the role of such ‘brokers’ in Roman patronage, see the helpful discussion of Briones, ‘Mutual Brokers of Grace’, 539–43.