The Baltic Sea Region

Cultures, Politics, Societies

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Social capital and traditional-conservative values in the Baltic region

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In a globalizing world, national states are often said to lose power and influence. In contrast, both inter- and intra-national economic, cultural, and political regions are assumed to gain in importance and prominence. The Baltic region is one of the candidates for such increasing importance. The region is of a considerable geographical format and includes not only the coastline states of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Germany, but also a large hinterland including Norway, Belarus, Ukraine, and the Slovak and Czech Republics. All in all, the Baltic region covers a large area and it is inhabited by some 80 million people, speaking a number of different languages and demonstrating a substantive cultural diversity. Among the many variations of the Baltic countries, their different cultural heritages and languages, their different economic and industrial structures, their different welfare and living conditions, their different political systems and foreign alliances are often noticed.

But there are also important similarities between the Baltic countries. Over the years, the Baltic Sea has not only separated, but also connected the peoples living around its shores. Even if the region has witnessed previous periods of national isolation and aggression, it was mainly during the postwar period between 1945 and 1990 that the Baltic Sea lost its predominant integrative importance for the Baltic Region (Andersson & Sylwan 1997: 301). In contrast to this period, it is well known that Baltic people have witnessed a number of shared formative experiences during previous centuries. The Viking networks, the German Teutonic Order, the Kalmar Union, the Hanseatic league, the Swedish 17th century empire, and the Polish-Lithuanian 16th century union, are but a few examples of the common formative processes which have contributed to a shared Baltic social and cultural framework.

Generally, it can be concluded that the postwar period of segregation was an exception to the more frequent tendencies towards economic, political, and cultural integration of the Baltic countries. As for future developments, the economic integration of the region is said to become especially important for the smaller Baltic countries, and countries with similar languages are assumed to tighten their economic relations (Andersson & Sylwan 1997: 297). The Baltic region is also noticeably rich in creative scientific and cultural milieus. The Stockholm-Uppsala, Åbo, Helsinki, and St Petersburg axis has demonstrated great potential for scientific collaboration and development and the Baltic region is said to display substantial possibilities for developing a dominating influence in creative and artistic areas such as music, musical theater, ballet, film and theater (Andersson & Sylwan 1997: 319). In summary, it has therefore been concluded that “the Baltic region now has a considerable potential
for developing into an important global region with regard to scholarly and cultural co-operation" (Andersson & Sylwan 1997: 320; translated here).

Needless to say, there are substantial differences among the Baltic countries with regard to structural and institutional resources, but the Baltic people also possess important human and social resources for further developments of the region, such as their skills, value motivations and socio-political aspirations. This chapter will explore these kinds of resources, and analyze the world views and value systems of people living in the Baltic region. The focus of this paper will be on two basic dimensions of values and world views, which are known to differentiate in important ways between a large number of countries and regions throughout the world. Thus, the chapter will explore Baltic mentality in a wider context. The main conclusion will be that although the Baltic countries at first may look surprisingly similar in certain value dimensions, there are also noticeable differences. The Eastern part of the Baltic region appears to be significantly poorer on social capital, an important cultural factor for social, economic, and political development. However, it is also tentatively concluded that the lack of social capital in this part of the region might be repaired by successive population generational replacements, as well as by deliberate platforms aimed at the increase of such capital.

1. The European Value Study/the World Value Survey

The following analyses of the world views and value systems of the Baltic people are based on data from a large comparative research project, sometimes called the European Values Study (EVS), and sometimes referred to as the World Value Survey (WVS). The EVS project was launched at the end of the 1970s and aimed to investigate the degree of cultural integration with regard to basic individual level value patterns in Western Europe. In 1981, large-scale personal interview surveys were conducted in all countries of the European Community (EC), as well as in Spain, and the Scandinavian countries, at that time not all of them members of the EC. The research aroused interest in a number of other countries, and many of them joined the project. In order to explore value changes over time, a second wave of the EVS was fielded in 1990. This time all EC countries (apart from Greece) as well as Hungary, the Scandinavian countries, South Africa, Japan, the United States, Canada participated for the second time. In Austria, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, the Baltic States, and the former German Democratic Republic, the survey was conducted for the first time (see e.g. Ester et al. 1994). In 1990, the non-European part of the survey had grown considerably. This part of the project is often referred to as the World Value Survey (WVS). In 1996, the survey was conducted for the third time, mainly in non-European countries. In 1999/2000, a fourth survey has been conducted, both inside and outside Europe.

The EVS/WVS project is one of the largest investigations ever of peoples’ values, attitudes and beliefs with regard to religion, morality, socio-economic life, politics, democracy, work, leisure time, family, marriage, gender roles, sexuality, social relations, ethnocentrism, etc. In each country, personal interviews of about 1.5 hours are conducted on representative samples averaging 1,400 respondents in each country and year. The project covers more than 65 countries from all inhabited continents of the world, and about 75 percent of the world population. The participating countries differ greatly on basic dimensions of social, political and economical life. Some of the countries are highly urbanized, while others are mainly agricultural in nature. The gross annual per capita national products of the countries range from very poor to very rich (from 300 USD to 30,000 USD), and the political systems vary from
long-established stable democracies to newly established authoritarian states. Thus, the project allows analyses of how value systems and world views differ in countries of very different economical, political, and social profiles. Since the project has collected data in 1981, 1990, 1996, and 1999/2000, it also allows analyses on how changes of value systems and world views are related to economic, political and social structural changes. Further information on the EVS/WVS project, including extensive bibliographies, can be found on the following websites: http://evs.kub.nl, and http://wvs.isr.umich.edu, respectively.

2. The Baltic region in a global perspective

In order to present a kind of very abstract overview of some of the EVS/WVS results, a global cultural map of the 1990 and 1996 EVS/WVS data is of considerable interest. The cultural map, which is presented in Figure 47 below, shows the location of 65 countries on two basic bipolar value dimensions. The vertical dimension corresponds to the polarization between traditional authority and secular rational authority and taps a value syndrome in which deference to “the authority of God, Vaterland and Family are all closely linked” (Inglehart & Baker 2000: 25). The horizontal dimension corresponds to the polarization between survival values and self-expression values and taps a value syndrome which emphasizes the importance of interpersonal trust, tolerance, subjective well-being, political activism and self-expression. These virtues are highly valued at the self-expression pole. Detailed information on the various

Figure 47. Locations of 65 societies on two dimensions of cross-cultural variation: Data from EVS/WVS 1990-1991 and 1995-1998. Figure taken from Inglehart & Baker (2000)
aspects of the cultural map, which is shown below, can be found elsewhere (see e.g. Inglehart 1997; Inglehart & Baker 2000; Pettersson 2000).

It has been demonstrated that a given country’s position on the cultural map can be fairly accurately predicted from economic indicators. Along the diagonal from the lower left quadrant to the upper-right, societies are becoming increasingly rich. Countries which score high on the self-expression values tend to be so called post-industrial countries with high levels of social security, and where a substantial part of the workforce is employed in the knowledge and service sector. In this sense, the growth of self-expression values seem to be linked to the rise of the new service and knowledge economy. On the other hand, highly industrialized countries score high on the secular-rational values, and the shift from traditional values towards secular-rational preferences seems to be linked to the shift from an agrarian mode of production to an industrial one. However, it must also be underlined that economic structural characteristics are not the only determinants of a country’s position on the cultural map. The value profile of a given country also appears to be path dependent. “A history of Protestant or Orthodox or Islamic or Confucian traditions gives rise to cultural zones with distinctive value systems that persist after checking for the effects of economic development. Economic development tends to push societies in a common direction, but rather than converging, they seem to move on parallel trajectories shaped by their cultural heritages” (Inglehart & Baker 2000: 49). Thus, both the degree of economic development and the cultural heritage of a country or region seem to have a profound impact on peoples’ value systems.

The cultural map shows that in a global comparative sense, the peoples of the Baltic countries are divided between four different cultural zones, which differ in one or other of the two dimensions which constitute the map. The Nordic countries belong together with Germany to the zone called “Protestant Europe”, while Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia are located in the “Ex-communist Baltic” zone. Russia is located in the “Orthodox” zone, and Poland in the zone labeled “Catholic Europe”. Since these four cultural zones differ significantly on the two basic value dimensions, it would certainly be misleading to conclude that the Baltic peoples are similar in their basic value orientations. However, disregarding the divisions between the cultural zones, the Baltic countries also appear to be fairly similar on the vertical axis, while they seem to differ far more on the horizontal. Thus, it can also be concluded that in a global perspective, the Baltic people appear to be fairly similar with regard to the importance they ascribe to secular-rational values, while they seem to be far more different with regard to different kinds of self-expression values. According to what was said above about the explanations for why countries differ in their locations on the cultural map, the similarities between the Baltic countries ought to be explained by their similar cultural heritages and/or economic structures, while the dissimilarities should be explained by their different cultural heritages and/or different economic structures. But whatever the explanations, the cultural map suggests that in a global bird’s eye perspective, the Baltic countries seem to be fairly similar and belong to the same part of the map with regard to one basic dimension of value systems and world views, while they differ with regard to another dimension.

However, what one sees in a global bird’s eye perspective may of course change when one takes a closer and more detailed look at the Baltic region as such. It cannot be excluded that careful and detailed investigations may reveal other patterns than abstract and general comparisons. The remaining part of this chapter will therefore take a closer look at the world views and value systems found in the Baltic countries.
3. Social capital and traditional-conservative values: Two basic value dimensions

For reasons of space, a more detailed discussion of the value profiles in the Baltic countries has to be confined to cover only two basic value dimensions, which will be used as the basis of a more limited cultural map of the Baltic countries. The horizontal axis of the global cultural map was said to tap “a syndrome of trust, tolerance, subjective well-being, political activism, and self-expression” (Inglehart & Baker 2000: 25). The starting point for the Baltic cultural map is that this syndrome shows obvious similarities to what is often called social capital, a key and much debated research topic in the social sciences (see, e.g. Levi 1995). Social capital has been considered an important factor with regard to social relationships (Coleman 1990), family life (Boisjoly et al. 1995), economic development (Fukuyama 1995; Knack & Keefer 1997), as well as a well-functioning democracy (Putnam 1993). In these regards, social capital is said to strengthen basic dimensions of social life, and it is considered to be the key component of a logic of action, which eases social cooperation and the attainment of collective common goods. Thus, social capital is assumed to allow “the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence” (Coleman 1990: 302) and to constitute a fundamental basis for a well-functioning democracy and a prosperous society. When social capital flourishes, “individuals, firms, neighborhoods, and even nations prosper” (Putnam 1993: 319).

In summary it can therefore be concluded that previous research on social capital has focused on social trust and trustworthiness, together with peoples’ active involvement in formal and informal relations as important cultural resources which are assumed to strengthen social, political, and economic development.

The vertical dimension of the global cultural map was said to reflect the contrast between societies in which religion is very important and where the family is a major theme and such
countries where such virtues are less adhered to. In a previous study of the 1981 EVS data, these values were said to be part of a “traditional-conservative” value dimension (Harding et al. 1986: 223, 232). Traditional-conservative values see religious institutions as important, and look to the church to give adequate answers to man’s spiritual and moral needs, and to people’s questions about family and social life. In traditional societies, family is crucial to survival, and traditional family values refer to strict relations between parents and their children, and a dislike for divorce and new forms of family relations. In traditional societies, a main goal in life is to make one’s parents proud and one must always love and respect them (Inglehart & Baker 2000:25).

Since the traditional-conservative values refer to religious authorities, they can be related to secularization theory, which regards religion as a key component of cultural change. Secularization theory can also be related to social capital. Religion is often assumed to create social trust and to support norms of reciprocity, two of the major components of social capital, and secularization and the increased emphasis on individual autonomy have been looked upon as threats to collective norms and the maintenance of social trust. Stable family patterns and social contexts can also be seen as important conditions for social capital to emerge (Pettersson 1991: Halman & Pettersson 1999a). Such linkages relate the traditional-conservative values to social capital.

In contrast to the assumption of a positive relationship between traditional-conservative values and social capital, the prevalent view in secularization theories is that religion has gradually lost substantial parts of its former impact on social life. The secularization thesis asserts that modernization “brings in its wake (and may itself be accelerated by) ‘the diminution of the social significance of religion’” (Wallis & Bruce 1992: 11). Therefore, secularization theory seems to question the assumption of a positive relationship between traditional-conservative values and social capital. Secularization is associated with social differentiation, which refers to the process “by which specialized roles and institutions are developed or arise to handle specific features or functions previously embodied in, or carried out by, one role or institution” (Wallis & Bruce 1992: 12). The process of differentiation made each social sphere an increasingly autonomous specialized social unit with its own set of values and rules (Münch 1990: 443). The church has lost several of its traditional functions such as schools, hospices, social welfare, registry of births, marriages and deaths, culture, and the organization of leisure (Dogan 1995: 416). Institutional domains have become segmented in the sense that within each institutional sphere, norms and values became increasingly autonomous and self-referential. Arguing along such lines, secularization can be regarded as “the repercussion of these changes on the religious sub-system. It denotes a societal process in which an overarching and transcendent religious system is reduced to a sub-system of society alongside other sub-systems, the overarching claims of which have a shrinking relevance” (Dobbelare 1995: 1). In other words, according to secularization theory, religion has lost many of its societal and public functions and has become privatized and marginalized within its own differentiated sphere (Casanova 1994: 19). From this point of view, one would not expect a strong relationship between the traditional-conservative values and social capital; rather, these two value dimensions would by and large be independent of each other.

However, the diminishing social significance of religion has not occurred to the same degree in all parts of Europe (see e.g. Halman & Pettersson 1999b; Willaime 1998; Therborn 1995). The modernization, secularization, and individualization processes took a specific form in the Northern Protestant parts of Europe, whereas in Southern European Catholic countries, these processes developed in a different way. Religion’s impact on social capital can therefore
be assumed to be stronger in Catholic countries as opposed to Protestant ones. Further, it has been argued that the Eastern Orthodox tradition is more oriented towards collectivity than Western Christianity (Nagle & Mahr 1999: 53). Thus one might assume the relationship between traditional-conservative religious values and social capital to vary in different parts of Europe and to be strongest in Eastern Orthodox countries and weakest in Protestant countries, whereas the Catholic countries can be assumed to fall in-between the Eastern Orthodox countries and the Northern European Protestant countries. Since the Baltic region contains all of these religious traditions, one might expect both the traditional-conservative values and social capital to differ between various parts of the region.

4. EVS/WVS measurement of social capital and traditional conservative values

As can be easily imagined, the EVS/WVS project, which covers more than 60 countries from different parts of the world, is met by considerable methodological difficulties. “The cross-national survey faces all the problems of the national survey problems of conceptualization, sampling, interview design, interviewer training and so forth. There is, however, one major difference. In the cross-national survey all these problems ... are multiplied by the number of nations studied” (Almond & Verba 1970: 349). Since the EVS/WVS project works with more than 60 countries, various methodological difficulties are indeed frequent. However, and despite these difficulties, comparative analyses are essential for anyone seeking valid knowledge of a specific country or region. In order to find out what is specific to a given country or region, one has to compare it to others. “He who knows only one country, knows none” (Sartori 1991: 245). Comparative analyses are indeed difficult, but nevertheless necessary!

As already mentioned, this chapter will present findings from the 1999 EVS data for the ten Baltic coastline states of Denmark, the former Federal Republic of Germany, the former Democratic Republic of Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Russia, Finland, and Sweden. In each of these countries, the 1999 EVS investigation covered representative samples of the adult population (aged 18-75) of about 1,000 respondents, except for Russia where the sample size was 2,500. All in all, the following analyses of the Baltic countries are based on data for 11,743 respondents.

In order to compare the Baltic countries on the dimension of social capital, I will use the following measurements:

1) **Interpersonal trust** is measured by a 3-point indicator, which is based on one item which asked the respondents whether other people can be trusted or not, and one item on whether it is important or not to show other people respect and tolerance (those who favor both opinions get a score of 2; those who favor neither get a score of 0).

2) **Social relations** are measured by a 3-point indicator, which is based on two batteries, one on doing voluntary work for a number of social movements, and one on how often one meets other people (those who both do voluntary work for at least one social movement, and who meet friends, workmates, or movement co-members regularly each month get a score of 2, those who do neither get a score of 0).

3) **Post-materialism** is measured by a 4-point indicator, which is based on a standard four-item battery (see e.g. Inglehart 1997) on post-materialist priorities for giving people more influence on important decisions and for protecting freedom of speech,
as compared to the materialist priorities of maintaining order and fighting rising prices, respectively (those who give first and second priority to the two post-materialist options get a score of 4; those who give first and second priority to both the last-mentioned materialist options get a score of 1).

4) *Protest behavior* is measured by a 4-point indicator, which is based on a battery of items which asked about the respondents’ experiences of signing a petition, joining a boycott, or attending a lawful demonstration (those who have been engaged in or could imagine being involved in all three kinds of social protest get a score of 3; those who have not and cannot imagine being involved in any of the them get a score of 0).

In order to compare the Baltic countries with regard to the *traditional-conservative* values, I will use the following measures:

1) *Religion* is measured by a 12-point indicator, which is based on one battery which asked whether the church gives adequate answers to man’s spiritual, social and familial problems, and on one 4-point indicator which taps how important religion is in one’s life (those who say that the church gives adequate answers to all three problems and who say that religion is very important in their lives get a score of 12 \((3 \times 4 = 12)\), while those who say that the churches do not give adequate answers to any of the three problems and who say that religion is not at all important in their lives, get a score of 0 \((0 \times 1 = 0)\)).

2) *Family* is measured by a 24-point indicator, which is based on a battery of six questions which ask about family views and one 4-point item which asks how important the family is in one’s life (those who say that the family is very important in their life, and who are of the opinion that 1) marriage is not an outdated institution, 2) that parents are obliged to do the best for their children, even at the expense of their own well-being, 3) that children are obliged to love and respect their parents, regardless of their qualities and faults, 4) that a child needs a home with both mother and father in order to grow up happily, 5) that a divorce is never justified, and who 6) disapprove of a woman who wants a baby but who does not want a stable relation with a man get a score of 24 \((4 \times 6 = 24)\).

With regard to the measurements I use for traditional-conservative values, it should be noted that they do not include any component which taps the “nationalistic” strand of these values (cf. above on this aspect). The reason is simply that the questions in the EVS/WVS questionnaire on national pride and national belonging, which might be considered for this purpose, did not give easily comparable data for the various Baltic countries. This is a good illustration of the fact that the data from the EVS/WVS project meet considerable methodological problems, for instance with regard to the degree of comparability of data from different countries. With regard to the Baltic region, it is therefore important to ask whether or not the data from such differing countries as Russia, Germany, and Sweden can be meaningfully compared.

![Figure 48](image-url)
Fortunately enough, there are ways to investigate this problem. The interested reader can find a clarification of such issues in the book *Methods and Data Analysis for Cross-Cultural Research* (Vijver & Leung 1999). In order to demonstrate that the indicators described above can be used for comparisons of the Baltic countries, I have performed a set of factor analyses. The results of two of these are described in Table 4.

Table 4. Results from two varimax rotated principal component analyses of 6 scales based on the 1999 EVS data from 10 Baltic countries. Entries are varimax factor loadings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale:</th>
<th>Aggregated data (n = 10)</th>
<th>Individual level data: (n aprx 11,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Factor 1</td>
<td>Factor 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>-.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social relations</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>-.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialism</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>-.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest behaviour</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>-.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results shown in Table 4 demonstrate that the factor structure for the six indicators of social capital and traditional-conservative values is the same, both at individual level data and at the aggregated level of the national means for the six indicators. In this regard, the results from a so-called confirmatory factor analysis of the six indicators and their relation to the hypothetical two-factor structure on a 25% sample of the data from the 10 Baltic countries (n = 3,021) should also be noted. The results confirm the two-factor structure (Chi-square: 18.43, 8 degrees of freedom, p = .02; RMSEA = .02, p = 1.0; AGFI = .99; cf. Byrne 2001). As already mentioned, the inclusion of questions about national belonging and national pride into this factor structure disproved the model. Therefore, this aspect of the traditional-conservative value dimension had to be omitted from the analyses.

Furthermore, since the confirmatory factor analysis did not affirm that the factor loadings were equivalent in each country, I have not calculated factor scores for the two dimensions, but for each country and each dimension simply calculated the mean score for two additive scales, one for each dimension. Thus, the additive scale for social capital gives one point each for 1) value 2 on interpersonal trust, 2) value 2 on social relations, 3) value 3 on protest behavior, and 4) values 3 and 4 on post-materialism. The combined scale for social capital thus ranges between 0 and 4, where 0 means that none of the above criteria are reached, and 4 means that all four criteria are met. The additive scale for traditional-conservative values gives one point each for 1) values 16-24 on the family values, and 2) values 9-12 on the religious values. The combined scale for traditional-conservative values thus ranges between 0 and 2, where 0 means that none of the two criteria are met, and 2 that both criteria are fulfilled.

5. A cultural map of the Baltic region

Based on the results from the three factor analyses and the measurements described above, the location of the 10 Baltic countries on social capital and traditional-conservative values can be plotted on a cultural map for the Baltic region only. The Baltic cultural map is shown...
in Figure 49 below. It should be noted that for the sake of comparability with the global cultural map discussed above, the traditional-conservative values are inverted on the Baltic cultural map. Thus, a high numerical value on this dimension of the Baltic cultural map indicates a low value on the traditional-conservative dimension. It is obvious that the Baltic cultural map in many respects coincides with the pattern displayed on the global cultural map. Thus, with the exception of Poland, the Baltic countries seem fairly similar with regard to the level of traditional-conservative values, while the differences on social capital appear more pronounced. On social capital, the three Nordic countries score highest, while Russia, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland score lowest. Interestingly enough, the two parts of Germany are fairly similar on social capital, while the ex-communist Eastern Germany scores lower on the traditional-conservative values. A cluster analysis of the results shown in the Baltic cultural map, ends up in three clusters: one for the Nordic countries, one for the two parts of Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Russia, and one for Poland (p < .01). Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania can therefore be said to be more similar to Germany than to the Nordic countries, while Poland can be seen as a kind of outsider in the Baltic context, scoring comparably high on the traditional-conservative values and low on social capital. This combination seems to be unique in the Baltic context. With regard to the Baltic cultural map, it can be concluded that comparatively high levels on the traditional-conservative values, and especially the religious values, do not seem to be a necessary condition for high levels of social capital (cf. the above discussion on this topic).

In order to give a more direct and easily read presentation of the magnitude of the differences between the ten Baltic countries with regard to social capital and traditional-conservative values, respectively, Tables 5 and 6 present response rates for each country and components of the two dimensions. In Table 5, the countries are ordered from highest to lowest on social capital. As expected, the response rates presented in Table 5 demonstrate substantial differences between the Baltic countries for each of the five ingredients of social capital. In the Nordic countries, the levels of social trust are about three to four times higher compared to the countries that score lowest (Latvia, Estonia, Russia). In a similar way, considerably more people are socially engaged in the Nordic countries, and the percentages who do voluntary social work and who demonstrate strong informal connectedness are about two times higher there (20-30% as compared to 10%). In the Nordic countries, people are also more prone to take part in various kinds of social protests (50-70% as compared to 20%). Nordic people are also more likely to demonstrate a post-materialist value orientation, which is said to be “only one aspect of a still broader process of cultural change that is reshaping the political outlook, religious orientations, gender roles, and sexual mores of advanced industrial society” (Inglehart 1997: 31).

In summary, it can therefore be concluded that the 1999/2000 EVS data demonstrate a substantial East-West difference in the Baltic region, where the
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Eastern part appears considerably poorer on social capital, the social resource which has proven essential for a positive social, economical and political development.

Table 5. Percentages meeting five criteria for social capital in 10 Baltic countries. Results from the 1999 EVS investigation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Social trust</th>
<th>Voluntary soc. work</th>
<th>Informal connections</th>
<th>Protest proneness</th>
<th>Postmaterialism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany: West</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany: East</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Social trust**: Say that others can be trusted, and that it is important to respect others

**Social work**: Do voluntary work for at least one social movement

**Informal connectedness**: Meet friends, workmates and/or movement co-members monthly

**Protest proneness**: Have done or can imagine signing a petition, taking part in boycott, lawful demonstration

**Post-materialism**: Favour post-materialist values (score 3 or 4 on post-materialist index)

In Table 6, the countries are ordered in descending order by their average levels of traditional-conservative values. In connection with the Baltic cultural map, it was said that apart from Poland, the Baltic countries seemed to be fairly alike with regard to these values. This conclusion is, however, substantively moderated by the data presented in Table 6. With regard to religion, the differences between the countries are far from minor and negligible. In Poland and Russia, about four out of ten people are of the opinion that meaningful answers to man's spiritual, social, and family problems can be found in the teachings of the churches. In Sweden and Denmark, substantially fewer or only about every tenth person is of this opinion. Religion is also seen as substantially more important in, for instance, Poland and Lithuania compared to Estonia, Denmark, and Sweden. In the former countries, more than 50% of the adult populations say that religion is an important part of their lives; in the latter countries it is only a minority of about 20-30% who share this opinion. Thus, with regard to the religious component of the traditional conservative values, the Baltic countries do indeed differ significantly.

Quite as expected from the factor analyses presented above, the results presented in Table 6 demonstrate that the countries which score high on religious involvement also score high on a traditional-conservative view on family life. Also in this regard the Baltic countries show different patterns. A traditional view on family life is expressed of about 90% of the Polish population, as compared to only one third (about 30%) in Sweden and Denmark. This is indeed a substantial difference. However, this difference does not imply that the family should be of significantly lesser importance in the Nordic part of the Baltic region. On the contrary,
Table 6. Percentages meeting four indicators for traditional-conservative values in 10 Baltic countries. Results from the 1999 EVS investigation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Church adequacy</th>
<th>Religion important</th>
<th>Traditional family view</th>
<th>Family important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany: West</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany: East</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Church adequacy**: Thinks that churches give adequate answers to man’s social, spiritual and family problems

**Religion important**: Say that religion is important or very important in own life

**Traditional family view**: Favor at least 4 out of six indicators of traditional family view

**Family important**: Say that family is very important in own life

In almost all of the Baltic countries, the family is seen as a very important part of the respondents' lives. This positive evaluation of the family is, however, less pronounced in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. However, in a general sense one can say that the differences in family values seem to pertain more to the kind of family life one prefers, and less to the importance one ascribes to family life, regardless of what kind it is. Most people say that the family is very important, although the kind of family life they prefer may be different.

### 6. Concluding remarks

This chapter has discussed differences and similarities with regard to two basic value dimensions between the ten Baltic coastline states of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, together with Eastern and Western Germany. When seen in a global perspective, the Baltic countries were located in four different cultural zones. In a bird's eye global perspective, the Baltic countries could also be seen as fairly similar with regard to secular-rational values, but different with regard to values for self-expression and individual autonomy. A closer look at the Baltic region indicated however that Baltic people were substantially different on four components of social capital, and also different in their views on religion and family values, but only to a lesser degree. These differences demonstrated that the Baltic countries could be subdivided into three subregions, with the Nordic countries in one cluster, and Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the two Germanies in another, while Poland seemed to constitute a kind of cultural “outsider” in the Baltic region.

Thus, the greatest differences between the Baltic countries were found with regard to a set of indicators of social capital, where the Eastern part of the Baltic region demonstrated a comparatively restricted access to this important resource for social, economic and political
development. However, this fact does not necessarily imply that the national differences in this regard need continue. Values may change and social capital can grow. According to a well-known theory of such processes, value shifts at the societal level often occur via generational population replacements, where the younger birth cohorts gradually replace the older ones (see e.g. Inglehart 1997). Signs of greater access to social capital among the younger generations may therefore signal future increases in social capital, and the size of the generational differences may anticipate the speed of the changes. The greater the generational differences, the faster the expected changes.

Separate comparisons of social capital in successive birth cohorts in the different Baltic countries indicate that the “generational gap” in social capital is greater in those parts of the Baltic region where social capital is lowest. The younger generations in the Eastern part of the Baltic region are e.g. comparatively more rich on social capital in comparison to their older countrymen than the younger generations in the Nordic countries are in comparison to the older generations in those countries. In the Nordic countries, those who are between 18 and 30 years of age, show a mean value for social capital of 1.83, while the corresponding value for those who are between 61 and 75 years of age is 1.35. The younger are, in other words, richer on social capital than the older. The ratio between the values for the youngest and the oldest generations in the Nordic countries is 1.83/1.35 = 1.39. The corresponding ratio for the remaining Baltic countries is, however, higher (0.87/0.57 = 1.53) and the generational gap in social capital is in other words greater in the non-Nordic part of the Baltic region. Based on the assumption that value changes occur by generational population replacements, this difference can be said to indicate a possibly faster increase in social capital in the Eastern part of the Baltic region in comparison to the Nordic countries.

One of the of the seed-beds for increases in social capital in the Eastern part of the Baltic region is, in other words, positive. It can not be excluded that further analyses of the EVS/WVS data from the Baltic countries may add to this optimistic conclusion. That the conclusion is optimistic can be substantiated from a number of analyses which show that in each of the Baltic countries the relationship between social capital and a democratic outlook, a positive view on gender equality, a less ethnocentric attitude, an emphasis on work achievement, a reluctance towards anti-social behaviors, and last but not least subjective well-being, respectively, are all heading in the expected directions. Only with very few exceptions, these good social fruits appear related to social capital in each of the Baltic countries.

In a discussion of the declining levels of social capital in the United States during the last decades, it is said that the decreasing levels of social capital “threatens educational performance, safe neighborhoods, equitable tax collection, democratic responsiveness, everyday honesty, and even our health and happiness” (Putnam 2000: 367). As a remedy to these threats, a platform for finding ways to, e.g., increase the level of civic engagement among the younger generations, to make the workplaces more family friendly and community-congenial, to reduce the amount of time needed for traveling and to increase the time available for connecting with neighbors, to reduce the time spent in front of de-activating TV-sets, and to make people more interested in politics and communal public life, is suggested (Putnam 2000: chap. 24). Whether such a platform would also work in the Baltic region is an open question that deserves attention.
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Artistic Identity


