



THE BALTIC SEA REGION

Cultures, Politics, Societies

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1. Armaments, arms control and disarmament

Several attempts have been made to explain why and how nations arm themselves, and the approaches are manifold. The main factor distinguishing different explanations is often the *level* of explanation, such as actor-characteristics (the actor is often defined as a nation or government); groups within an actor; characteristics of relations between actors; and the social system or the physical context.

Within the different explanations there are two “schools”, which have achieved special importance. The first tries to explain armaments mainly as a result of relational factors. Lewis F. Richardson’s mathematical study in 1960 may be considered the starting-point for one of the most influential approaches within this group, namely “action-reaction”. They generally focus on pairs of antagonistic major powers. Governments are treated as unified and rational actors with complete information. US-Soviet military relations were often presented in terms of this explanation.

During the 1970s, the simple assumptions in the action-reaction approach led to explanations building on the variety of groups and interests within nations. These types of studies



Figure 127. Building up the Lithuanian Army. Photo: Alfred F. Majewicz

do not confine themselves to antagonistic powers or bilateral “arms races”. Instead, they include more varied explanations, such as bureaucratic processes, conflicting interests among groups and individuals, pressure groups, as well as economic and technological constraints and demands. The so-called “military-industrial complex” (MIC) theory is the core theoretical approach in this group.

From the 1970s, different theoretical approaches have been combined and further developed, involving more factors. It is very likely that detailed armament studies of US-USSR rela-

tions during the 1980s, which are surely to be written, will find some support from all or most types of explanations. For instance, the general international antagonism as a prerequisite for their bilateral arms race behaviour with regard to nuclear weapons in particular, both quantitatively and qualitatively, may find support in the action-reaction theory. The qualitative

aspects could probably be applied, at least in part, to MIC factors. If one might dare make a prediction, it could be that domestic factors, political and not least economic, were the most important for the new arms control and disarmament agreements drawn up between the superpowers from the late 1980s.

The factors explaining “arms races” may, therefore, be useful in attempting to explain arms control and disarmament. But it cannot be assumed that the old theoretical explanations can just be “turned around”.

There are several issues affecting the military situation in and around the Baltic Sea. In particular, there is both old and new behaviour in terms of parallel armament and disarmament developments. Both may, in fact, be necessary in order for the region to achieve a state of security in the short term. Armament and disarmament policies in Russia and the Central European states, as well as in the USA, will depend upon the willingness of president Putin’s policies. In this, support by governments outside the Baltic region is important. Continued good relations between the USA and Russia, as well as a successful political balance between history and the future by the governments in the new independent states, is of central importance for European security in general and Baltic security in particular.

The new independent states are “remilitarising” – although on a low level – by formulating national defence policies and creating national defence forces. This is generally done in cooperation with western countries. This, as well as the interest of several of the new independent states in becoming members of NATO, has complicated Russia’s foreign policy, as well as that of USA, vis-à-vis these states and their own bilateral relations. It has been clear, however, that the previous US Clinton administration did not want to risk its relations with the Russian leadership by offering full NATO membership to the Baltic States.

In order to create a security community in the long run, however, further successful “arms build-down” and restructuring are needed, not only in Europe, but globally as well. Policy is “the art of the possible”, and it may be wise to remember that today is tomorrow’s yesterday. What we do not achieve today may be impossible tomorrow. In a security community, national military forces, defence and security policies must not increase uncertainty and mistrust regarding national military ambitions. In the Baltic Sea region, issues affecting national and regional (in)security – in whatever way – should be discussed and settled in democratic agreement among the nations concerned. Generally, open and good statesmanship is always a better recipe for security-building than secrecy and hostile statements.

The break-up of the Soviet Union and the consequent end of the bipolar world opened the way for new arms control and disarmament initiatives.

The agreements in 1991 and 1993 to reduce and limit offensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads on American and Soviet/Russian missiles (the START I Treaty, to which Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine also accede, and the START II Treaty), as well as decisions by France and Great Britain to either eliminate, reduce or no longer deploy certain weapons and/or nuclear delivery systems, are clearly important.

However, other agreements also had direct consequences for Europe and the Baltic region, in particular the 1987 INF (i.e. intermediate range nuclear forces) Treaty and follow-on agreements to the 1990 CFE reductions (i.e. conventional armed forces in Europe), as well as confidence and security-building measures discussed in the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

2. The Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Europe

The Treaty, formally known as the *Treaty Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles*, was signed in December 1987. It went into force in June 1988, and was the first nuclear disarmament treaty. As such, it is important not only for the peoples of the Baltic, but for all of Europe. It may be assumed that those missiles were all aimed at military and economic targets in Europe both inside and outside the respective military alliances.

The destruction required by the Treaty covered four types of US nuclear missiles (BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile, Pershing II, Pershing 1A and Pershing 1B) and six types of Soviet nuclear missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometres (SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, SS-23, and SSC-X-4). The missiles and associated equipment, except for the warheads, were completely eliminated by June 1, 1991. This included facilities in countries other than the USA and the Soviet Union where these missiles and support equipment were located. The Treaty also prohibits further production, testing and deployment of such systems, as well as ground-launched systems within the same range limits. The Treaty, therefore, eliminated this category of weapons from the inventories of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The INF Treaty laid the groundwork for follow-on reductions in conventional arms and new confidence-building measures in Europe. Its importance is not mainly in the actual destruction of these weapons – only an estimated five percent of all nuclear weapons at the time – but in the acceptance by both sides of on-site inspection on their respective territories to verify the destruction of these weapons and assembly facilities. This was a breakthrough in confidence building.

While the Treaty's inspection rules are limited to 13 years, the Treaty is of indefinite duration. It has established co-operative measures to enhance the use of reconnaissance systems and a Special Verification Commission as a forum for American and Russian representatives to discuss compliance issues and measures to improve the effectiveness of the Treaty.

3. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

The CFE Treaty was signed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) governments and the Warsaw Pact (WP) governments in November 1990. Rapid progress has been made largely due to Soviet acceptance of large reductions in WP's ground forces. The purpose of this treaty was not disarmament, but increased stability in Europe by reducing the military potential and by reducing the possibilities for a surprise attack. Although some types of equipment could remain, most equipment within the CFE region to be reduced was to be destroyed or converted to avoid a quick re-creation of the previous force structures.

The CFE includes conventional forces deployed in the member states from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU): tanks (weighing at least 16.5 metric tons with a gun of at least 7.5 cms), artillery (guns, howitzers, mortars and multiple rocket launchers of 10 cm calibre and above), armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. For all of these categories of weapons there is a maximum quantitative ceiling. As a consequence of the formulation of the Treaty, the USA had only to reduce its tank inventory by a few percent, while the Soviet Union had to cut it almost by half.

The complications and uncertainties with implementing the CFE Treaty caused by the dissolution of the Soviet Union were largely settled in 1992 and the Treaty came into power in November 1992. The new independent states were not parties to the initial Treaty and were therefore not bound by it. The three Baltic States were in what was defined in 1990 as the “expanded central zone”, together with the rest of the then four Soviet military districts including the Leningrad region. However, at a meeting on 10 January 1992 at NATO Headquarters the so-called High Level Working Group agreed that:

Treaty obligations assumed by the former Soviet Union should be wholly accounted for by all the newly independent States in the area of application and apportioned among them in a manner acceptable to all Parties to the Treaty.

The Treaty contains a commitment to follow-on talks – the 1990 CFE treaty is therefore referred to as CFE-1. In 1991 it was agreed to reduce the armed forces of a unified Germany to 370,000 personnel within 3-4 years of the start of the Treaty. Further, in 1992, troop level ceilings were agreed upon in the so-called CFE-1A talks.

Due to the fact that the Europe of 1993 was very different to the Europe of 1990, some analysts questioned the future relevance of CFE. The acceptance of the CFE provisions by the new independent states, plus the future complete withdrawal of Russian troops and equipment from these countries, means that much of the original basis for CFE-1 is, in fact, already outdated. For these reasons, there were important benefits to be gained by continuing the CFE negotiations.

On July 23, 1997, a joint consultative group on the CFE Treaty adopted an interim agreement on revising the treaty. The most important outlines of this revision are that the original idea of balance between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact members, was replaced by a structure of individual national arms limits, together with territorial limits that determined in which areas the military equipment would be allowed. The agreement also included several other important areas where either a revision or amendment was necessary: like, for example, an overall reduction in equipment in Europe; different kinds of transitional regulations that would allow stationing and temporary deployment, enabling new NATO members the opportunity to participate on equal terms in the alliance, while regional limitations would continue to neutralise any build-up of forces; the implementation of additional transparency measures; and the re-insurance and preservation of the Flank limitations which prevents deployment in the Caucasus region and on the borders to Norway and the Baltic States.

4. The Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe

The OSCE has come a long way from the initial steps in 1975, when the first important initiatives were taken in terms of diplomatic involvement in European security.

In 1975, thirty five states – including all NATO and WTO member states – concluded the Helsinki Final Act, which aimed at creating peace and stability in Europe. This was the founding document for the OSCE process. It included, among other things, a declaration about the inviolability of existing European borders, which meant that all European states and the USA accepted the post-World War II order in Europe. The agreement was divided into sections (“baskets”) dealing with specific areas:

1. Security and confidence-building measures
2. Economic, scientific and technological co-operation and environmental issues
3. Human rights, culture, education and free flow of people and of information.

Example of Factors Influencing Armaments

The different types of factors listed below are in most cases assumed to support armaments. Some, however, may also have a restraining effect.

- *Internal*: economic, bureaucratic, research, military, political interest and pressure groups or combined sectional interests.
- *Actor characteristics*, such as military mission, 'national pride', expansionist ideology, alliance position, conflict patterns or type of political rule.
- *Relations between governments*, such as specific political, economic or other relations to the opponent(s), as well as political, military, economic and other relations to allies and 'friendly governments' (see also alliance position as an actor characteristic).
- *Systemic characteristics*, for instance changes in long-term economic cycles, international 'power distribution', technological requirements, etc.

Adapted from Gleditsch & Njølstad 1990.

A fourth section states that regular review conferences be held in order to continue and strengthen the multilateral process that was started by the Helsinki Conference. The central theme of confidence-building measures in the Final Act from Helsinki in 1975 has been the basis for all discussions. The OSCE member states come together regularly to meetings and conferences, represented by their Heads of State, to review conferences, and various council and committee meetings.

The OSCE approach to security is comprehensive and co-operative: comprehensive in dealing with a wide range of security-related issues including arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence and security-building measures, human rights, democratisation, election monitoring and economic and environmental security; co-operative in the sense that all OSCE-participating States have equal status, and decisions are based on consensus.

Following the end of the Cold War, the OSCE has increased its activities. In particular preventive diplomacy, minority questions and the strengthening of democratic institutions have been on the CSCE agenda. As a result of this, an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR) was set up in Poland, and in 1992 a High Commissioner on National Minorities was appointed. The task for the Commissioner was to provide early warning and early action with respect to tensions where national minority issues were involved.

During the past decade, the OSCE has sent a number of Missions to areas of tension and conflict, for instance to Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Estonia, Moldova, Latvia, and Tajikistan. The CSCE is also actively involved in efforts to settle the conflict about Nagorno-Karabakh in the Caucasus region. All European states in the Baltic Region are members of the CSCE.

At a summit in Budapest on 5-6 December 1994, the OSCE adopted a document entitled "*Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era*". This document confirmed that the confidence-building measures that started in 1975 had evolved from their original idea of being a process, into being an organisation. As a result, a decision was taken to re-name CSCE to OSCE, the Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe that would reflect that it was no longer simply a conference.

At the Lisbon summit in 1996, the OSCE officially adopted a "common and comprehensive security model for Europe for the twenty-first century". The Lisbon Document stated that:

Freedom, democracy and co-operation among our nations and peoples are now the foundation for our common security. We are determined to learn from the tragedies of the past and to translate our vision of a co-operative future by creating a common security space free of dividing lines in which all states are equal partners.

We face serious challenges, but we face them together. They concern the security and sovereignty of States as well as the stability of our societies. Human rights are not fully respected in all OSCE states. Ethnic tension, aggressive nationalism, violations of the rights of people belonging to national minorities, as well as serious difficulties of economic transition can threaten stability and may also spread to other states. Terrorism, organised crime, drug and arms trafficking, uncontrolled migration and environmental damage are of increasing concern to the entire OSCE community.

The new and active role that the OSCE has come to play in the security dialogue in Europe was further confirmed in Istanbul on 18-19 November 1999 with the adoption of the “*Istanbul Summit Declaration*”. Apart from current security matters of concern for the OSCE, the foremost important aim with the declaration was the strengthening of the organisation. In the declaration, five areas of concern were pointed out: A) adopting a platform for Co-operative Security to enhance co-operation between the OSCE and other international organisations and institutions. B) Developing the OSCE role in peacekeeping operations. C) Creating Rapid Expert Assistance and a Co-operation team (REACT) to speed up staff employment. D) Expanding the OSCE ability to carry out police-related activities. E) Establishing an Operations Centre at the secretariat to facilitate the effective preparation and planning of rapid deployment of OSCE field operations. F) Establishing a Preparatory Committee under the direction of the OSCE Permanent Council to improve the consultation process within the OSCE. Together with the adoption of the declaration, the 30 signatory countries also signed the Agreement of the Adoption of the Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which adjusted the 1990 CFE Treaty to better reflect the changes brought about by the ending of the Cold war.

It is clear that the OSCE has an important role to play. The newly independent states are part of the new European architecture, agreeing on the common values defined in the OSCE negotiations. Both the documents from Paris in 1990 – the Paris Charter for a New Europe, the Lisbon document of 1996 and the Istanbul document of 1999, define a new Europe and extend the future roles of the OSCE in crisis management and conflict resolution, including the possibility of military peacekeeping operations.

Some major multilateral arms control agreements

Geneva Protocol, 1925, prohibits the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in war. The *1993 Chemical Weapons Convention*, in addition to usage, also bans the production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The Convention is under ratification and is not yet in force.

Partial Test Ban Treaty, 1963, bans testing of nuclear weapons on the ground, under water or in outer space. In 1992 the USA made 6 tests and China 2. In 1993 only one nuclear test (under ground) was made (by China) and in July the USA declared a moratorium to September 1994. This moratorium is accepted by Russia, France, Great Britain and China. Negotiations based on a Swedish proposal for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, are presently going on. If accepted, this would completely prohibit all nuclear tests. The prospects for such an agreement are presently better than at any time since 1963.

Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968, prohibits the transfer of technology for nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states. Requires safeguards on nuclear facilities. Non-nuclear states undertake to have their nuclear facilities under IAEA inspection.

Biological Weapons Convention, 1972, prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons.

Inhumane Weapons Convention, 1981, is an umbrella convention covering protocols that a) prohibit weapons intended to injure by fragments that cannot be X-rayed, b) restricts or prohibits the use of mines, booby-traps etc., and c) restricts the use of incendiary weapons.

The CFE Treaty, 1990 and its amendments in 1999, sets a ceiling for five categories of military equipment (tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters) from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains.

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