



THE BALTIC SEA REGION

Cultures, Politics, Societies

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38 Conclusions

1. Four main points to be considered

We have described four conditions that are important for the emergence of a security community in the Baltic Region. Initially, we asked, what type of relations in a long-term perspective are we heading towards as a region? We have illustrated a variety of possible threats in the region.

However, as Karl W. Deutsch suggests, a security community will not develop through threats but through *shared values, responsiveness, new behaviour and joint frameworks*. Clearly, the Baltic Region has been exposed to violence, often brought to the region rather than emerging from within. Particularly, relationships between the major actors in the region (Germany, Poland, Russia) and their counterparts (e.g. Britain and France) have been important. None the less, in a long-term perspective the Baltic Region has been heading towards what Deutsch would label “a security community”.

What have we learnt about the present state of affairs in the region? Does a security community exist today in the region as a whole or in particular relationships? What are the prospects of such a community developing? If there is no uniform development, which relations are problematic? The different chapters give us insights that need to be brought together in a systematic fashion. First, we may note that, as of today, the threat of war in the region is generally low. This does not mean, however, that threats have disappeared or that all people feel safe.

We illustrated three security dilemmas associated with strategic considerations, *consolidation of democracy, multi-ethnic state-building and economic development*. There is potential for serious conflict. The concept of a security community is a positive definition of peace. It suggests that there is something more than deterrence or isolationism that guides security thinking. It sets the goals higher than deterring the threat of war. It points to the need for preventive and comprehensive policies to reduce the danger of future wars.

We have also illustrated ways in which war can be avoided by peaceful means. During the past decade, we have seen considerable progress towards democratic forms of government. Almost everywhere the press is free. The roles of the military, police and intelligence services are, for the most part, curtailed.

In terms of *responsiveness and conflict resolution*, less has happened. Negotiations take place, nevertheless, on serious matters among the states of the region. In this regard, there is a positive tendency. The same is partly true for the development of non-military forms of behaviour. Defence doctrines are generally becoming more defensive and new relationships are being formed. At the same time, the search for more security by applying for membership in NATO is not considered benign by all parties. Nonetheless, in terms of institutional development, not

much has yet occurred. The region is still trying to find its position in the European security arrangement.

2. What have we learnt?

The table *“Assessing the Emergence of a Security Community in the Baltic Region, 1934, 1964, 1994, 2001”* summarises what we have learnt, focusing on relations among the littoral countries of the Baltic Sea. Rather than analysing all possible bilateral relations, some countries are grouped together. This is done for practical purposes and of necessity overlooks important nuances. For instance, Finland is treated together with the Baltic countries proper, in a group termed “Fenno-Baltic countries”, a group that may in fact not see itself as an actor. In all, there are 12 relationships. Furthermore, the table attempts to portray the developments of the region towards a security community. Thus, an assessment has been made with respect to each of the 12 relationships at four times: 1934, 1964, 1994 and 2001. These years indicate the situation in the period between the World Wars, at the height of the Cold War and a time in the post-Cold War era. 1934 marks the time when expectations were still high for the League of Nations as a vehicle for peace in Europe. 1964 was the time when major power *détentes* and tensions set the framework for what was regarded as “realistic”. 1994 can be seen as the time when practically all states in the table left the transitional phase towards democracy and market economy, and entered a phase of consolidation. 2001 shows the present “window of opportunity”.

The table requires some explanations. Relations between states, or groups of states, are found in the column to the far left. The next column indicates the most recent experience of war or politically significant armed clash in this relationship. The most recent important political crises are also indicated. Such experiences constitute important memories and might create fears for the future. The third column shows the year when all countries in the group attained a democratic state. This, as we have indicated, is an important factor for commonality of values in a security community. There are two periods of democracy-building: after the First World War and after the Cold War. Thus, for some countries, where democratic conditions were overturned, two different dates are indicated. In the three columns to the right, assessments are made of the state of the relationships in terms of attaining a security community at four different times during the last 70 years.

The last line in the table shows a considerable move towards a security community in the region. In 1934 only one relationship met the criteria set for a security community, namely the intra-Scandinavian relations. In all other relationships, democratic conditions were weakened by 1934 (e.g. in Germany, Latvia, Estonia; Poland soon to follow) or never given a chance to develop (Russia). Responsiveness between the states was low, military action was on the rise, and no common institutions existed, apart from the League of Nations. By 1964 only one relationship had achieved a firm change, the one between the Scandinavian states and Germany. For these countries, the Second World War was more a memory, democratic conditions in Germany appeared secure and the threat of war among these states was subsiding. By 1994 relationships had changed considerably. The end of the Cold War meant that more secure relations were established among many states, formerly divided by block confrontation. Thus, a change had clearly occurred, centred on the attainment of domestic democratic conditions, and other factors. The current situation indicates a trend towards even more secure

relations. In 1994 only three relationships met the criteria for a security community, and in 2001 the number has risen to five.

The table suggests that a long period without war does not necessarily constitute a security community. The limited and historic war experience between Norway and Russia, and between Denmark and Russia still did not prevent dangers. The Cold War legacies coloured many relationships. The fact that wars occurred a long time ago, e.g. between Sweden and Russia (1809) did not mean that fears subsided. Thus, time in itself does not make for a security community. Something has to happen, in concrete terms. Some relations meet the conditions of a security community despite recent wars. This is true for Germany's relations with Scandinavian countries, and indeed the current relation between Poland and Germany. There is no fear of war in these relations any longer. There might be tensions, but they are manageable within the existing frameworks of co-operation. This means that the commonality of values (democracy) as well as responsiveness and new forms of behaviour are clearly visible. Institutions, such as the OECD, might be useful for handling economic relations. To be sure, responsiveness contributes to predictability and confidence.

Of the twelve relationships described, in 2001, five are in security communities, and are likely to remain so in the future. Another two show positive developments. These relations are described as "emerging" in the table. This label is chosen from the expectation that democratic conditions are durable, and that a gradual learning process in responsiveness and new behaviour is taking place. Organisational frameworks may be developing as well.

For Russia there is uncertainty in four relations. The basic reason is the prospect of the continuous stability of democratic institutions. Russia is the country most recently democratised. The recent presidential election can be seen as a landmark in this development. The stabilisation of democratic institutions, increased responsiveness and participation in international institution-building might be important for the emergence of a security community in Russia's relations.

In none of the relationships is there an expectation of war in the near future. The conclusive picture of the region shows that it finds itself in a dynamic phase in which there are many possibilities. It is for public debate, civil society and political leaders within and outside the region to realise the possibilities and grasp the opportunities at hand.



Figure 128. Photo: Katarzyna Skalska

Table 18. Assessing the Emergence of a Security Community in the Baltic Region, 1934, 1964, 1994, 2001

Relations between states or groups of states	End of most recent war, int. crisis or forced milit. presence	All states democratic since**	Security Community:			
			1934	1964	1994	2001
Fenno-Baltic relations*	not relevant	1922/1991	no	no	emerging	yes
Scandinavian states and Baltic states	1721	1922/1991	no	no	yes	yes
Scandinavian states and Poland	1721	1917/1990	no	no	emerging	emerging
Scandinavian states and Russia	1809 (Cold War crises)	1993	no	no	no	no
Intra-Scandinavian relations	1814 (1905)	1914	yes	yes	yes	yes
Baltic states and Poland	1922	1922/1991	no	no	no	emerging
Scandinavian states and Germany	1945	1918/1949	no	yes	yes	yes
Baltic states and Germany	1945	1922/1991	no	no	emerging	yes
Russia and Poland	1945 (1956, 1970, 1981)	1993	no	no	no	no
Poland and Germany	1945	1918/1990	no	no	emerging	yes
Germany and Russia	1945 (Berlin: 1953, 1958, 1961)	1993	no	no	no	no
Baltic states and Russia	1945 (1952, 1993, 1994)	1993	no	no	no	no
Number of relations with "No Security Community"			11	10	5	4

Note:

* Finland and Baltic states constitute the group of "Fenno-Baltic" states. Sources: Doyle 1986, yearbooks

** Two years in the column indicates that democracy has vanished and returned

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