Migration and Perceptions of War
Simultaneous Surveys in Countries of Origin and Settlement

Jonathan Hall
Abstract

This dissertation contributes to post-war public opinion research by examining the perceptions of migrants – the gastarbeiter, the refugee, the family reunited after war – and the local population in comparative perspective. Existing surveys of post-war populations are typically conducted in a single country affected by war. However, particularly following forced expulsion and campaigns of ethnic cleansing substantial portions of national communities affected by conflict no longer live within the boundaries of the state. Current research may therefore overlook important populations as well as contextual factors that shape post-war attitudes.

I help to address this problem by examining three widely held assumptions in the literature: that migrants hold more conflictive attitudes than the local population after war; that assimilation in settlement countries leads migrants to hold more peaceful attitudes; and that traumatic experiences lead migrants to hold more conflictive attitudes. These claims are largely based on theoretical accounts, case studies that suffer from selection bias and quantitative results that have proven unstable. By contrast, I examine new micro-level data: two large-scale surveys conducted simultaneously in post-war Bosnia and Sweden as a settlement country. Sweden's choice to grant permanent residency in toto to refugees from the Bosnian War in 1993 resulted in the vast majority remaining settled in Sweden. As a result, the population of ex-Yugoslavs in Sweden is arguably more representative than in other comparable settlement country contexts.

To explain differences among ex-Yugoslavs in Sweden and between these migrants and the local population in Bosnia, I connect social-psychological processes that help meet individuals’ basic psychological needs. These include: belief formation in the context of war; acculturation strategies in settlement countries; the development of nostalgic memories; and coping with traumatic experiences. The findings shed light on largely misunderstood processes. Under certain conditions, migration may provide an exit from detrimental wartime and post-war settings that produce and sustain conflictive societal beliefs after war. At the same time, the migration context may provide a richer set of socioeconomic and psychological resources for coping, offsetting the need to rely on conflictive beliefs as a way of dealing with the conflict crisis.

Keywords: civil war, migration, refugees, gastarbeiter, family reunification, exile, trauma, coping, nostalgia, conservation of resources, terror management theory, social identity complexity, assimilation, acculturation, surveys

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For Caroline & Sebastian
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List of Essays


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Introduction

This dissertation contributes to post-war public opinion research by examining the perceptions of migrants – the gastarbeiter, the refugee, the family reunited after war – and the local population in comparative perspective. Existing surveys of post-war populations are typically conducted in a single country affected by war (Brounéus 2010; Brounéus 2008; Gibson 2004, 2006; Kostić 2007, 2008; Pham et al. 2007; Pham, Weinstein, and Longman 2004; Thoms, Ron, and Paris 2010). However, particularly following forced expulsion and campaigns of ethnic cleansing substantial portions of national communities affected by conflict no longer live within the boundaries of the state. Data collection nevertheless remains truncated at the border as a result of ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002, 2003). Current research may therefore overlook important populations as well as contextual factors that shape post-war attitudes.

Three Key Assumptions

Three widely held assumptions about the attitudes of migrants provide the starting point for my analysis, which I outline in Essay I: that migrants tend to harbor more conflictive attitudes than the local population after war (addressed in Essay II); that assimilation in settlement countries leads migrants to hold more peaceful attitudes (addressed in Essay III); and that traumatic experiences lead migrants to harbor more conflictive attitudes (addressed in Essay IV). These claims are largely based upon descriptive and theoretical accounts (e.g. Anderson 1998; Kaldor 2001; Malkki 1995). Case studies that support such views illustrate migrant networks’ links with insurgencies and diaspora mobilization, but tend to be selected on the dependent variable and thus suffer from selection bias (e.g Adamson 2013; Angoustures and Pascal 1996; Fair 2005; Gunaratna 2003; Hockenos 2003). Moreover, within-case data are collected through observations of, and interviews with, members of diaspora organizations who undoubtedly selected themselves into such roles. Relying upon such evidence to help interpret their findings, quantitative studies make claims on the micro-level that cannot be validated by their macro-level data, and which have proved unstable (Collier and Hoeffler
An unhelpful interaction between qualitative and quantitative research thus seems to have uncritically perpetuated these assumptions. Lack of systematic data on the micro-level therefore impedes the study of migrant communities in the civil war literature (Salehyan 2007, 136), and undoubtedly contributes to the persistence of misconceptions about the nature and importance of the migration context. This is the subject of the first essay, *Diasporas and Civil War*.

In contrast to previous research, the empirical essays of this dissertation examine new micro-level data: two large-scale surveys conducted simultaneously in 2010 in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina\(^2\) and Sweden as a settlement country. Campaigns of ethnic cleansing displaced more than half the population during the Bosnian War (1992-95). Many of these refugees came to Sweden following earlier patterns of Yugoslav *gastarbeiter* migration to Europe (Van Hear 1998, 29-30). Sweden’s choice to grant permanent residency to these refugees in 1993 distinguishes it from other asylum countries. Today, 96 percent of the refugees remain settled in Sweden, making it home to one of Bosnia’s largest emigrant communities. By contrast, in Germany only 6 percent remain (Valenta and Ramet 2011). The population of refugees from Bosnia in Sweden is thus arguably more representative than in other comparable settlement country contexts.

My empirical approach makes the systematic investigation of migrants’ attitudes possible, but also allows for comparisons between those living in the migration context and those living in a homeland devastated by a brutal ethnic war. *Are Migrants More Extreme than Locals After War? Evidence from a Simultaneous Survey of Migrants in Sweden and Locals in Bosnia* provides the first systematic comparison of attitudes among migrants and the local population. In addition, *War Trauma and Intergroup Trust* examines the relationship between war trauma and attitudes under different conditions: the post-war and migration context. *Assimilation and Perceptions of War: A Micro-Level Analysis of Ex-Yugoslavs in Sweden* focuses on the settlement country context, examining how difference in assimilation and acculturation influence migrants’ attitudes towards conflict. Each of these essays therefore sheds light on how context shapes post-war attitudes, but in different ways.

In each essay I examine a range of attitudes related to societal beliefs about war, including respondents’ perceptions of the past and their group’s role during the war, ethnic cleansing and the forgiveness of perpetrators, the desirability of ethnic mixing and intermarriage across group lines, and prospects for peaceful coexistence among former adversaries living in the

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1 Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004, 575) widely cited analysis argues, for example, that post-war countries with large diasporas are at greater risk of conflict relapse, attributing this to the view that ‘Diasporas preserve their own hatreds: that is why they finance rebellion’. Later, Collier et al. (2008) reversed these findings, arguing instead that diasporas substantially reduce post-conflict risks.

2 Henceforth referred to as Bosnia.
To explain differences in attitudes, I make theoretical connections between social-psychological processes that, each in their own way, help to fulfill individuals’ basic psychological needs. These include: belief formation in the context of war (Essays II, III and IV); acculturation strategies in settlement countries (Essay III); the development of nostalgic memories (Essay II, but also Essays III and IV); and coping with traumatic experiences (Essay IV, but also Essays II and III). These essays are thus intimately related on a theoretical level. My hope is to advance the field with help of new systematic micro-level data and theory and, by shedding light on largely misunderstood processes, generate exciting new directions for future research.

Current State of Research

Terms such as ‘diasporas’, ‘migrants’, and ‘immigrants’ tend to be used interchangeably to denote those living abroad but maintaining emotional and social ties with the homeland (Brubaker 2005). The view that migrants harbor grievances from homeland conflicts as a way of resisting assimilatory pressures and asserting continued belonging in the homeland may be traced to the work of Benedict Anderson (Anderson 1992, 1998), though it was later popularized by Huntington (1996) and Kaldor (2001). The argument is that, situated far from homeland realities, migrants view the homeland situation through the lens of nostalgia rather than recent experience, yet appear highly motivated and capable of getting involved and wielding influence. Moreover, migrants may not pay the costs of conflict directly. As a result, migrants tend to be viewed as more extreme than the local population in the origin country (see Essay II for a review). A widely cited statistical study published by the World Bank provided a sense of external validity to these theoretical accounts, which found that post-war countries with large diaspora populations faced a greater risk of civil war relapse (Collier 2000). This finding was subsequently reproduced in a myriad of articles, policy briefs and edited volumes, creating the sense that the findings were based on solid ground. According to Collier and Hoeffler the results were easy to interpret: ‘Diasporas preserve their own hatreds: that is why they finance rebellion’ (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

Against this backdrop, following the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks a flurry of new research illustrated various cases of refugee and diaspora militancy, but some also highlighted instances in which migrants contributed to conflict resolution, democratization and development (see Essay I and the literature reviews in Essays II and III). It is not widely recognized, however, that Collier et al. (2008) discredited their previous findings, claiming instead that diasporas substantially reduce post-conflict risks. As a result, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) continue to set the tone with regard to this issue. A re-
cent review of the quantitative civil war literature finds ‘Diasporas, whether in neighboring countries or farther afield, driven by ethnic or religious sentiments often play a major role in rebel finance’. Meanwhile, case studies continue to attempt to trace the causal mechanisms of this seemingly well-established relationship (Adamson 2013). In the last few years, the conversation has died down as policy attention has shifted elsewhere, although a handful of qualitative studies have attempted to bring the discussion forward using case comparisons and multi-sited field research (Cochrane, Baser, and Swain 2009; Horst 2008; Horst and Falzon 2009; Koinova 2009, 2010, 2011; Leenders 2009; Orjuela 2008). An exception is Caarls, Fransen, and Ruben (2012), which uses survey data to explore the role of remittances and migratory contacts in the process of reconciliation in Rwanda. Their data do not attempt to capture the perceptions of migrants, however, and thus do not extend beyond the borders of Rwanda.

Before turning to the context of war in the former Yugoslavia and migration to Sweden, it is important to place the study of migration and conflict in historical perspective. Doing so sheds light on the origins of the assumptions these essays address and helps to clarify the reasons why migrants are so often viewed with suspicion.

The Development of the Migration-Security Nexus:
From the Chicago School to the Present

In the early 20th century, the Chicago School of Sociology devoted considerable energy to the study of immigration, race relations and social order in urban America. In the process, they developed a set of concepts that had a profound influence on the development of social science research, one of the most important being ‘assimilation’. According to this tradition, assimilation may be defined as ‘the decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences’ (Alba and Nee 2003, 11). Though it has much deeper roots, assimilation’s contemporary usage owes much to the structural functionalism of Talcott Parsons (Parsons 1937, 1951). Parsons work formulated a response to a question that has long preoccupied scholarly attention: what makes social order possible? Parsons drew inspiration from the work of Emil Durkheim. According to Parsons himself, Durkheim was primarily concerned with ‘the integration of social systems, of what hold societies together’ (Parsons 1982, 189). Parsons followed Durkheim by emphasizing the importance of shared values for generating social norms, solidarity and ultimately the stability of ‘social systems’. Immigration threatened social order by encouraging value pluralism. However, social order was

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3 The ‘race relations cycle’ developed by Park and Burgess (1921) included the phases of contact, competition, conflict, accommodation and finally cultural assimilation.
maintained because immigrants assimilated, adopting the superior cultural traits of the mainstream (Alba and Nee 2003, 2; Gordon 1964; Park and Burgess 1921, 396; Warner and Srole 1945).¹

Chicago School thinking was subsequently applied beyond the study of ‘race relations’ in America to explain the lack of political order in emerging post-colonial states.⁵ These societies, from which many immigrants to the ‘developed’ world originated, appeared to lack the cultural solidarity, cohesion and common political conviction typical of more developed nations, resulting in the need for ‘nation-building’ (Huntington 1968, 37-39; Park 1950; Stonequist 1961). Both origin and settlement countries thus appeared to require assimilation to establish and maintain cohesion and political order (Deutsch 1953; Hirschman 1970; Kolstø 2000; Weiner 1965).

Technological advancement appeared to support this ‘modernization’ process.⁶ Increased communication within the borders of the state would eventually bring about cohesion and assimilation. However, Walker Connor’s well-known critique of the nation-building discourse emphasized that technological change and increased communication between groups might foment ethnic conflict rather than build nations, setting the stage for Benedict Anderson’s influential theory of long-distance nationalism. Whether used to describe the incorporation of immigrants or attempts to absorb existing minorities into a common national culture, assimilation had always been conceived as both a creative and a destructive process: one of both nation-building and of ‘denationalization’ (Park and Burgess 1921, 396). However, by conceptualizing assimilation as the teleological endpoint of modernization many implied the process was benign. By contrast, Connor (1972) emphasized that nation-building was largely a process of ‘nation-destroying’ and criticized social-engineering attempts to steer it. He reproached the modernization literature for largely ignoring the issue of ethnicity and for

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¹ The relationship between ‘heritage’ and majority cultures in settlement countries was thus conceived as negative, linear and hierarchical, the former inevitably giving way to the latter. Such thinking has a long ‘liberal’ tradition. A dominant strand of thought in the 19th century regarded the cultural and linguistic absorption of minorities into ‘high cultures’ as inherently beneficial. As John Stuart Mill famously asserted: ‘Experience proves that it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed in another: and when it was originally an inferior and more backward portion of the human race the absorption is greatly to its advantage’ (Mill 1946, 294-95, cited in Kolstø 2000, 5).

⁵ Models of ‘political development’ strongly resembled Park and Burgess’s race relations cycle (e.g. Deutsch 1953; Rostow 1960).

⁶ Migration and technological change were intimately connected in the ‘modernization’ theory of Karl Deutsch. According to Deutsch (1953, 183), ‘social mobilization’ uprooted people from their local and parochial contexts and jammed them together again in increasingly urban environments where they came into contact with other migrants, growing markets and mass communication. Urbanization put great strains on people by rendering irrelevant the social anchors of local tradition, religion and dialect, but the need to cope with that stress produced assimilation into the overarching national culture. Thus Deutsch seemed to conceive of assimilation as a coping strategy and psychological response to the stresses imposed by modernization.
generalizing based on American models of immigrant assimilation. Nevertheless, Connor seemed to agree with the fundamentals of American assimilationist theory, which he argued worked largely because the impetus for assimilation came from the immigrants themselves. Elsewhere, pressures for assimilation were increasingly perceived by minorities as originating with the dominant group (Connor 1972, 345). The latter situation, he argued, occurred as a result of the technical changes that fed the ethnic consciousness of minorities in the modern era:

At least in terms of “assimilationist time” (the time required to produce full assimilation), the radio, telephone, train, motor vehicle, and aircraft are recent innovations, postdating the advent of the age of nationalism and its standard of ethnicity as the basis of political legitimacy. As noted, there is little evidence of modern communications destroying ethnic consciousness, and much evidence of their augmenting it. The movement prior to the nineteenth century appears to have been toward assimilation into a number of larger nations, but since that time the movement appears to be toward the freezing of existing ethnic groups (Connor 1972, 351).

According to this view, attempts to ‘telescope’ assimilation into a shorter time frame by increasing communication and contact between ethnic groups would backfire, raising ethnic awareness and fomenting conflict. In subsequent decades the nation-building discourse became less prominent. Over time, the conceptual Chicago School roots of assimilation became obscured and the two topics – immigrant assimilation and nation-building – developed as separate literatures.

Later, prominent scholars of nationalism concerned with the significance of globalization re-linked these two contexts but in a novel way, arguing that the failure to assimilate immigrants in settlement countries could destabilize the political situation in origin countries by producing ‘long-distance’ or ‘vicarious’ nationalism (Anderson 1992; Smith 1986). It was Benedict Anderson’s ideas that eventually proved most influential. According to him, long-distance nationalism occurs in the context of the new migration from periphery to core within the capitalist global system and as a result of rapid technological advances preventing slow assimilation. Anderson thus appears to draw heavily upon the thought of Connor (see citation above) as well as Smith (1986, 150-152), though neither is acknowledged. In effect, Anderson simply put more globalization/migration spin on Connor’s claim that techno-
logical change raised the potential for ethnic conflict. Given its weight in subsequent academic discussion, Anderson (1992, 13) is worth quoting:

It may well be that we are faced here with a new type of nationalist: the ‘long-distance nationalist’ one might perhaps call him. For while technically a citizen of the state in which he comfortably lives, but to which he may feel little attachment, he finds it tempting to play identity politics by participating (via propaganda, money, weapons, any way but voting) in the conflicts of his imagined Heimat – now only fax-time away. But this citizenshipless participation is inevitably non-responsible – our hero will not have to answer for, or pay the price of, the long-distance politics he undertakes. He is also easy prey for shrewd political manipulators in his Heimat.

From this starting point, many scholars today assume that the failure of assimilation in settlement countries results in migrants supporting conflict in their homelands. At the same time, assimilating migrants into the Western liberal core of the international system is believed to support modernization and peaceful development in the periphery. Shain and Barth, for example, argue diasporas are able ‘to act as bridges or as mediators between their home and host societies, and to transmit the values of pluralism and democracy as well as the “entrepreneurial spirit and skills that their home countries so sorely lack”’ (Shain and Barth 2003, 450; The Economist 2003, cited in Shain and Barth, 2003). This discussion is often characterized as a debate between those who describe migrants as ‘peace-wreckers’ versus those who uplift their role as ‘peace-makers’ (Smith and Stares 2007). However, the two share a common theoretical starting point with origins in the Chicago School: that assimilation will address the threat to social cohesion and order posed by migrants. As a whole, the way migrants are perceived in the literature on conflict is at times reminiscent of the mission civilisatrice: the colonial-era view that European imperial powers must ‘civilize’ dependent populations through cultural transmission (Paris 2002).

The fundamental drive behind such civilizing missions was, and remains today, the self-interest of Western nations (Duffield 2010). One prominent fear is that failure of social cohesion in origin countries will cause social disorder in settlement countries, since the former generates migration flows that increase cultural diversity in the latter. Diasporas played a prominent role in Samuel P. Huntington’s discussion of ‘faultline wars’ (Huntington 1996). Moreover, multiculturalism is often blamed for Europe’s Muslim ‘problem’ (Leiken 2005). In response, the Chicago School has powerfully reemerged. Referring to the classical view of assimilation outlined by Gordon (1964), Leiken (2005, 10, 13) argues for reinforcing ‘Western civiliza-

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9 According to Huntington, during faultline wars, ‘The most devoted and wholehearted support for the primary level parties normally comes from diaspora communities who intensely identify with the cause of their kin and become “more Catholic than the Pope”’ (Huntington 1996, 273).
tion’ in place of the ‘weakening trend of multiculturalism, a trend that is being rejected in countries such as the Netherlands’, and for ‘the development of a sense of peoplehood or ethnicity based on [the] host society’, while Fukuyama (2006, 15) claims that Europe’s failure to integrate Muslims is a ‘ticking time bomb’, the solution to which is to abandon multiculturalism in favor of ‘more energetic efforts to integrate non-Western populations into a common liberal culture’.

In response to such fears, states pursue a two-pronged approach: contain migrants within their region of origin and restrict immigration and integration policies, particularly towards refugees and asylum seekers (Duffield 2010; Huysmans 2000; Zard 2002). During the cold war period, asylum countries in the West usually provided refugees with the option of local ‘integration’, while developing countries tended to allow refugees the option of unassisted ‘self-settlement’ (Jacobsen 2001). However, a transformation of the refugee regime began during the 1980s, coinciding with a global economic crisis and rising unemployment. Today, the new politics of asylum frames migration as a security issue. Immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees are portrayed as negative aspects of globalization and linked in public discourse to global threats such as terrorism and international crime (Huysmans 2000). Migrants appear as conduits of instability that threaten social order, cultural cohesion and the welfare state. As a result, most countries now prefer temporary protection, including encampment and repatriation, to local settlement. In sum, migration and security may be conceived as one aspect of a larger ‘security-development nexus’ (Duffield 2010).

The Bosnian War and migration from former Yugoslavia to Sweden provide excellent contexts in which to examine previous assumptions embedded in this academic discourse. The fear that cultural breakdown and disorder could spread from conflict zones to Western countries through migration was popularized in the context of this war (Kaplan 1993, 1994). Today, much of this fear centers on discussions of assimilating Muslims in Europe, the Bosnian Muslims being one example. Anderson (1992, 9) relied on Yugoslavia to build his case for long-distance nationalism, referring specifically to the example of gastarbeiter migration to Europe as a context in which these attitudes were likely to develop. Sweden was a main destination country for Yugoslav labor migration during the 1950s and 1960s. Kaldor (2001, 85) based her influential theory of ‘new wars’ on the case of the Bosnian War as well. According to her, ‘diasporas’ contribute to such conflicts because they ‘…find solace in fantasies about their origins which are often far removed from reality’. Lischer’s (2005) comparative study, which involved

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10 Kaldor (2006: 13) exemplifies this view: ‘all parts of the world are characterized by a combination of integration and fragmentation even though the tendencies to integration are greater in the North and the tendencies to fragmentation may be greater in the South and East. Since 9/11 it has become clear that it is no longer possible to insulate some parts of the world from others.’
an examination of Bosnian Muslim refugees in Croatia, had a profound impact on refugee studies. She argued that refugees subjected to persecution on the basis of ethnicity were more easily organized for militaristic purposes, implying that traumatic experiences were important in shaping their attitudes. Sweden received a large portion of persecuted refugees from the Bosnian War. In the following section I describe the context of the collapse of Yugoslavia, war in Bosnia and migration to Sweden.

War in Former Yugoslavia and Migration to Sweden

Previously a unit of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia is comprised of three constituent nations: Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. The breakup of Yugoslavia eventually coalesced in the Bosnian War (1992-95), pitting these groups against one another in Europe’s most devastating conflict since the Second World War. Large-scale civilian victimization resulted in the rapid unmixing of society. More than 100,000 individuals lost their lives as a result of the conflict, at least half of which were civilians (Tabeau and Bijak 2005). Over 2 million of Bosnia’s pre-war population of 4.4 million fled their homes during the war, at least 1 million of which sought refuge outside the country. Half returned in the years that followed the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995. The other half settled abroad both within the region and further afield (Tuathail and Dahlman 2004). Today, approximately 38 percent of Bosnia’s citizens lives beyond its borders (Valenta and Ramet 2011, 1).

Those escaping the crisis in former Yugoslavia tended to follow pre-established patterns of Yugoslav gastarbeiter migration to Europe (Van Hear 1998, 29-30). As in Germany and Austria, Swedish industries attracted many labor migrants from Yugoslavia during the 1950s and 1960s. Sweden thus became a prime destination for asylum seekers during the Bosnian War. Most recipient countries offered only temporary protection to asylum applicants, expecting the crisis to be short-lived. However, Sweden took a different approach, taking a blanket decision in June of 1993 to grant 42,000 asylum seekers permanent residency (Frykman 2012, 2). Despite its small population size, Sweden accepted a total of 58,000 refugees between 1992-95, making it the third largest recipient of war refugees from Bosnia beyond the borders of former Yugoslavia. Policy differences among reception countries had a major impact on refugee settlement patterns. Today, 96 percent of refugees from Bosnia remain settled in Sweden. This may be contrasted with

11 Likewise, Lyons argues that ‘conflict-generated’ diasporas develop ‘perceptions of the homeland that are frozen in time or distorted by nostalgia rather than recent experience’ (Lyons 2007, 533), leading to more categorical and uncompromising attitudes and territorial attachments (Lyons 2006, 128).
the situation in Germany, where only 6 percent remain (Valenta and Ramet 2011, 4). As a result of this unique situation, Sweden now hosts one of the world’s largest immigrant communities from former Yugoslavia; the second largest foreign-born population in Sweden after those born in Finland.

Incentives for refugees to return remain low (UNDP 2007). Prior to the war, Yugoslavia was a relatively egalitarian society that enjoyed high living standards. The war both destroyed the economy and reshaped the demography of the country. Post-war economic growth is both jobless and unequally shared. Around a fifth of the population is below the poverty line and up to a third are poor in relative terms. Housing shortages and poor labor market conditions mean that returnees compete with locals for housing and jobs. Minority returns to majority areas therefore constitute a distinctly socially excluded group. Returnees suffer disproportionately from poverty and unemployment and face greater difficulty accessing public services and participating in political life.

Simultaneous Survey Data

The survey of Bosnia, conducted by Roland Kostić of Uppsala University in collaboration with the research firm Ipsos12 in 2010, is part of a long-term project tracking societal beliefs after war over time (Kostić 2007, 2008, 2012).13 I collaborated with Kostić to simultaneously conduct an additional large-scale survey of ex-Yugoslavs living in Sweden. This survey poses the same questions related to the war in Bosnia and captures a rich set of individual background characteristics. The survey in Sweden also includes information about the cross-border activities of respondents, including remittance-sending practices, ex-patriot voting, contact with homeland kin and conversations with these contacts related to politics and the war. This data will be used in future research.

Both surveys are designed to equally represent the members of each major ethnic group involved in the Bosnian War (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs). Post-war census data is not available for Bosnia. Therefore, a stratified random sampling procedure was followed in which three geographical strata were defined by ethnic dominance. Sampling also reflects the urban and non-urban distribution of each population. Oral informed consent was obtained before interviews, which were conducted door-to-door by experienced staff of the same ethnicity as those interviewed. The survey covers the whole

12 For more information see: http://www.ipsos.com.
13 Kostić conducted the survey in Bosnia first in 2005 for his PhD dissertation and again in 2010 for his post-doctoral research project ‘The ICTY and its Contributions to Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, financed by the Swedish Research Council. These data are collected and own by him.
of Bosnia and has a response rate of 67 percent (N=1500). For more details on the data and methods, see Kostić (2007, 52-53).

Census data on ethnicity are also not available in Sweden. However, conducting a door-to-door survey similar to the one in Bosnia was not feasible. Though there are ethnic neighborhoods in Sweden, migrants from the former Yugoslavia are not generally confined to them and instead live intermixed with other members of society throughout the country. One approach would have been to abandon all hope of a representative sample, instead relying on the ‘snowball’ sampling method. Many researchers who use this approach will contact members of diaspora organizations to begin the snowball. This method makes generalization to the broader population impossible, although it may be useful as a gauge of the attitudes prevalent within a given organization or network of respondents.

To overcome the problems of sampling bias, Kostić and I developed a unique sampling method. The three ethnic strata in the Swedish sample are defined according to Bosniak, Croatian and Serbian family names. Family names in former Yugoslavia often provide an indication of ethnicity. Kostić collected lists of names from online listings created by migrants from former Yugoslavia, many of whom are trying to reconnect with friends and family dispersed around the world largely as a result of the war. The names were then sorted according to ethnic affiliation. Within each group, every third name was then selected to use during searches of Sweden’s online public listings. This strategy proved very effective.15

Because the listings are geo-referenced, the survey is able to capture the geographical distribution of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in Sweden. Searches using common family names returned dozens of addresses in the form of a list, and included a map with their geographic location in Sweden. Individuals to contact were selected proportionally by location (city/village). Using this map, we were also able to zoom down to the level of the neighborhood. We took advantage of this function to carefully avoid selecting respondents that were geographically clustered at the neighborhood level, implying they might be members of the same family. We thus attempted to capture the attitudes of as many different families as possible, and in that way hoped to increase the representativeness of the sample. The survey covers the whole of Sweden, however most migrants from the former Yugoslavia live in the major cities of Malmö, Gothenburg and Stockholm. The survey was translated into the native languages of the respondents, included 71 questions and a cover letter providing basic information about the project, and was conduct-

14 www.eniro.se.
15 Our approach was to send the survey in blocks, one ethnic group at a time. Each time the surveys returned to us by mail, the majority self-identified on the survey with the ethnic group we were aiming to capture.
Kostić and I began our study in Sweden in the spring of 2008 by conducting an initial pilot study to test our survey guideline \((N=16)\). Then, in the winter of 2008 we conducted an initial round of data collection by mail \((N=239)\). Finding that the procedure worked very smoothly, we then rolled out the survey during the spring of 2010 in parallel with the survey in Bosnia \((N=475)\). I find no significant differences in attitudes between the two samples collected by mail and thus include data from both rounds in the analysis. Of the 2580 individuals contacted by mail, 714 responded. This yielded a response rate of 28 percent.

It is important to consider whether the unit non-response rate will affect the representativeness of the results. Due to steadily declining survey response rates in many countries over the past decades, a large body of research has emerged investigating the importance of non-response (Berinsky 2008). Numerous studies have shown that although respondents and non-respondents often differ demographically, correcting for non-response does not appear to substantially affect estimates of political attitudes. Broad reviews find that even surveys with relatively low response rates are highly representative of public opinion (Holbrook, Krosnick, and Pfent 2007).

The reason unit non-response does not necessarily result in more response error is that the factors that drive non-response may be uncorrelated with the variables of interest in the survey. In a series of experiments, the Pew Research Center (2012) finds that respondents are more likely to engage in political and social action than non-respondents. Yet such engagement is not correlated with political preferences, partisanship, ideology or opinions on a variety of other issues. It is therefore a reasonable assumption that the survey in Sweden is representative of the attitudes of migrants from former Yugoslavia, although it may over-represent those more likely to take action with regard to those attitudes. However, the political and social engagement of migrants is not the subject of the current project.

Our work on the Survey in Sweden was organized as follows: I was responsible for selecting the questions related to cross-border activities to include, while Kostić was in charge of post-war societal beliefs. Together, we created the survey guideline in English. Thereafter, Kostić translated the survey into Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian. Other native speakers also checked these translations. I was responsible for physical mailing and collection of responses, as well as for the data registration. Under my supervision, two assistants recruited from our master’s program in Peace and Conflict Studies, Raluca Badan and Paola Dimario, contributed to the time-consuming practical aspects of this process.
Presentation of the Essays

Essay I

_Diasporas and Civil War_ provides a multidisciplinary review of research linking diasporas to civil war, conflict resolution and development in their homelands. At the outset I devote considerable effort to clarifying what is meant by the term ‘diasporas’ and how it relates to other associated concepts such as ‘long-distance nationalism’ and ‘transnationalism’.

Thereafter, I turn to the civil war literature. The role of diasporas has been very important in two explanations of civil war: the ‘greed’ explanation (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) and the ‘new wars’ explanation (Kaldor 2006). In both of these perspectives diasporas are thought to fuel rebellion, but they differ on the mechanisms they believe link diasporas to war. While the greed argument considers only diaspora financial contributions to rebels as significant, proponents of new wars argue that diaspora political support and ideological influence also have important effects. I review the key claims and evidence put forward by these two views. Essentially, an opinion has developed in which diasporas fuel homeland rebellion due to harboring war-related grievances and lacking assimilation in settlement countries. As a result, diasporas are often viewed as more extreme than the local population in the homeland.

Next, I review research that links diasporas to conflict resolution, migration and development. I find that both the quantitative and qualitative evidence reveal the positive impacts of diasporas in terms of their political, economic, social and cultural transnational activities. Looking across these literatures, it becomes clear that diasporas do not act as singular agents, but are instead characterized by diversity in terms of their attitudes towards homeland politics and conflicts, and the character and extent of their transnational engagement with them (Bercovitch 2007; Vertovec 2005). Questions that help us to understand and explain this variation have rarely been asked, however, and there is subsequently little by way of answers in the existing literature.

To further our understanding of diaspora agency in homeland conflict and peace, it is necessary to avoid previous essentialist descriptions of diasporas as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in relation to homeland civil war, and instead investigate this variation and its causes. Case studies have illustrated such variation (Cochrane 2007; Horst 2008; Lyons 2007). However, to my knowledge few have empirically examined its causes. We therefore lack a comparative understanding of diasporas and their impact on homeland politics and conflicts.
Essay II

In Are Migrants More Extreme than Locals After War? Evidence from a Simultaneous Survey of Migrants in Sweden and Locals in Bosnia, I examine a key assumption in the literature: that migrants harbor more conflictive attitudes than the local population in post-war countries (Anderson 1998, 74; Collier et al. 2003, 85-86; Kaldor 2001, 85; Lyons 2006, 128). This assumption is applied equally to cross-border refugees in neighboring states and those living further afield, typically Europe and North America.

The literature offers at least four motives for why migrants would exhibit more animosity than locals: 1) being removed from the situation, they have less realistic perceptions of the conflict; 2) they either do not pay the costs of war directly, or face fewer opportunity costs than locals in promoting a hard line; 3) being physically separated from the nation while living as minorities in their host societies, they benefit psychologically from maintaining their collective identity and homeland connection, which are imprinted with collective traumas, sectarian ideologies and territorial attachments; 4) following a peace agreement, local populations may become less polarized as they strive to rebuild their common lives, meanwhile migrants preserve the past, avoid contact with former rival groups and more easily harbor animosities. However, sound empirical support for these claims is lacking. Until now, no one has attempted to systematically compare the attitudes of migrants and locals after war directly.

In the first part of this essay I develop an alternative theoretical perspective. In essence, life on the outside may have an upside; migrants are less exposed to difficult wartime and post-war conditions as well as the societal communication that reflects and disseminates beliefs developed to cope with conflict and sustain the war effort (Bar-Tal 2000). Life in settlement countries is not without hardship. However, the coping strategies migrants employ to manage the stress of acculturation and displacement, including nostalgia, may reduce one’s sense of threat and thus the need to defend group identity (Juhl et al. 2010; Routledge et al. 2011; Sedikides et al. 2009). Moreover, coping positively with trauma requires a certain detachment from reality and the development of specific “illusions” (Taylor 1983). Being removed from daily life in conflict-affected societies, migrants may nurture less conflictive beliefs about what led to traumatic events, what is necessary to prevent their reoccurrence and the nature of former adversaries.

The second part of the essay offers a straightforward comparison of the conflict-related attitudes of migrants in Sweden and locals in Bosnia. First, I investigate responses to identical questions posed in the two simultaneous surveys in 2010 through cross-tabulations. Second, to ensure dissimilarities in beliefs are explained by country of residence and not other differences between the two populations I use regression analysis to control for a rich set
of individual background characteristics, such as personal exposure to violence, urban background and educational attainment.

The empirical analysis supports the essay’s novel theoretical approach. The cross-tabulations show in a detailed manner that migrants in Sweden indeed hold more peaceful attitudes than locals in Bosnia after the war. The regression analysis indicates that the effects of living in Sweden on conflict-related attitudes are highly significant, stable, substantively large and—apart from expressing pessimism about prospects for peaceful coexistence in Bosnia—in the expected direction. Migrants show less support for definitions of the war that are dominant in their own national group, hold more complex views of their own group’s role during the war, are more willing to forgive perpetrators, attach less importance to their own national belonging and are more positive towards ethnic mixing and intermarriage among Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. Migration may thus provide an exit from the spiral of local economic and political conditions and societal communication that sustain conflictive beliefs after war. To the extent that migration increase access to coping resources, it may reduce threat perceptions and thus the need to defend group identity.

Essay III

Assimilation and Perceptions of War: A Micro-Level Analysis of Ex-Yugoslavs in Sweden addresses another key assumption in migration and conflict research: that more assimilation in settlement countries leads migrants to hold more peaceful attitudes about war in origin countries, while less assimilation leads migrants to hold more conflictive attitudes about war in origin countries.

According to previous literature, cross-border refugees may turn their backs on homeland conflicts by intermarrying with locals and adopting their culture, while those remaining in camps maintain ethnic purity and participate in homeland struggles (Lischer 2005; Malkki 1995; Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989). In liberal settlement countries, some migrants may adopt progressive values through cultural assimilation, enabling them to contribute to peace-building and positive social transformation in origin countries (Caarls, Fransen, and Ruben 2012; Levitt 1998; Shain 1999). However, others respond to the loss of cultural heritage and status by maintaining ethnic distance from the majority and pursuing ‘long-distance’ or ‘vicarious’ nationalism (Anderson 1998; Smith 1986). The tendency is thus to view unassimilated migrants as more politically extreme.

However, such assertions are based largely on descriptive and theoretical accounts. Neither qualitative nor quantitative analyses have provided a careful treatment of the concept of assimilation and its empirical effects on migrants’ conflict perceptions. Doing this would require fine-grained data on the individual-level, which has not been available.
This essay offers both a theoretical and an empirical contribution. My theoretical contribution involves a more nuanced understanding of immigrant incorporation grounded in the assimilation and acculturation literature and connects this with social-psychological research on intergroup conflict and bias. There are two aspects to my argument.

First, I argue that by increasing access to coping resources *socioeconomic assimilation* may reduce the need to rely on conflictive beliefs in order to deal with the conflict crisis. Conflictive beliefs, which for example delegitimize out-groups, provide one set of psychological resources for coping with conflict. However, psychological research has shown that individuals with more personal and social resources are less likely to develop counterproductive coping strategies that involve, for example, hostility towards out-groups (Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009; Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, and Johnson 2006).

Second, I argue that acculturation in settlement countries may reduce the significance of intergroup comparisons related to homeland conflict to the extent that it fosters greater identity complexity. According to intergroup bias research, social identity complexity reduces the significance of intergroup comparisons and the importance of any particular in-group for satisfying psychological needs, undermining the motivational basis for intolerance towards out-groups generally (Brewer and Pierce 2005). Roccas and Brewer (2002) illustrate the concept of identity complexity using the example of immigrant biculturalism. Biculturalism, or simultaneous identification with both one’s heritage culture and the dominant culture in the settlement country, represents the most complex acculturation strategy available to migrants and should therefore be associated with less conflictive beliefs (the other strategies being assimilation, separation and marginalization). However, the relationship between the acculturation strategies of migrants and their attitudes towards conflict has yet to be examined.

The analysis of survey data on attitudes related to the Bosnian War among ex-Yugoslavs in Sweden supports these claims: both socioeconomic assimilation and biculturalism are associated with more peaceful attitudes related to the war. Each therefore may contribute independently to reducing the psychological need for conflictive beliefs in order to cope with the conflict crisis. On the other hand, assimilation as an acculturation strategy appears to be largely irrelevant since so few respondents adopt it.

The findings also uplift an additional source of identity complexity: cultural heritage itself, the maintenance of which is often equated with ethno-nationalism. Many respondents nurture a separate but inclusive Yugoslav (rather than ethnic) heritage. Moreover, those that combine inclusive heritage with new attachments in the settlement country hold the most complex identity and display the most peaceful attitudes. Incorporation may therefore reduce reliance on conflictive beliefs among migrants by encouraging identity complexity and socioeconomic security, not by diminishing migrants’ cultural heritage or doing away with ethnic distinctions. By implication, the
recent pendulum swing away from multiculturalism in Europe and elsewhere may inhibit the formation of complex identities and thus more peaceful attitudes among refugees and diaspora communities with links to war-torn origin countries.

Essay IV

*War Trauma and Intergroup Trust* sets out to examine how context shapes the political and social effects of war trauma. Research suggests that traumatic experiences such as forced conscription and the witnessing of atrocities may result in positive political and social engagement, which authors attribute to “posttraumatic growth” after war (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009; Voors et al. 2012). Yet such engagement may occur largely within rather than between social groups. By contrast, research on intergroup attitudes suggests exposure to violence increases intolerance and hostility towards out-groups, which posttraumatic growth may simply reinforce (Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009; Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, and Johnson 2006). This raises important questions. Under what conditions do individuals respond to the traumas of war with more conflictive attitudes? Under what conditions might exposure to violence result in more peaceful attitudes and positive posttraumatic growth after war?

This essay offers both a theoretical and empirical contribution. First, it uplifts the importance of context in shaping the impact of trauma on intergroup attitudes. According to the conservation of resources model (COR), stress results from the potential or actual loss of resources (Hobfoll 1989). Larger threats or losses during war should thus result in more stress. At the same time, awareness of death has the potential to induce paralyzing terror (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon 1986). Terror management theory (TMT) proposes individuals turn to meaning-providing structures to cope with death anxiety. To cope successfully with conflict situations, groups develop psychological structures that for example delegitimize out-groups (Bar-Tal 1998). Those most exposed to wartime violence and losses should therefore draw most extensively upon these conflictive beliefs to meet their basic needs. However, previous research has not paid adequate attention to the role of context in shaping the process of defensive coping. COR theory predicts how individuals will react to stress but does not predict which resources will be accessible to them. TMT predicts that mortality salience will promote the defense of shared beliefs, but not which beliefs will become salient in a given context.

The empirical contribution of this essay is to examine how traumatic experiences influence perceptions of war under different conditions: post-war Bosnia and Sweden as a settlement country. I investigate whether 1) serving in a military or fighting unit, 2) being physically wounded, 3) being imprisoned or placed in a camp, 4) having lost a family member, or 5) having one’s
property destroyed influences a comprehensive set of beliefs regarding the past and the war. These include perceptions of their group’s role in the war, justification of ethnic cleansing, forgiveness of perpetrators, the desirability of ethnic mixing and intermarriage, and prospects for peaceful coexistence between former adversaries.

The findings indicate that deep traumas generally increased conflictive attitudes in Bosnia but not in Sweden. Moreover, the victims of physical violence in Sweden exhibit more peaceful attitudes. Comparing victims in the two countries, those in Sweden display more peaceful attitudes but are not more willing to engage across ethnic boundaries. In addition, they express more pessimism regarding intergroup cooperation in Bosnia. To the extent that migration provides more and different material and psychological resources to victims – resources that are not nested within the conflict situation itself – it may enable victims to move on from the traumas of the past. However, whether or not victims embrace a common future may depend more upon the extent to which intergroup cooperation is part of their everyday lived experience.

Conclusions

By way of conclusion, I would like to address the scope conditions of my arguments and potential avenues for future research. I claim that migration may offer an exit from detrimental wartime and post-war conditions that produce and sustain conflictive societal beliefs after war. At the same time, the migration context may provide a richer set of socioeconomic and psychological resources for coping, offsetting the need to rely on conflictive beliefs as a way of dealing with the conflict crisis.

These arguments do not apply under all conditions. Not all post-war societies are caught in ‘no war, no peace’ situations. In some cases, major crises such as war result in social revolutions that overturn exclusionary ideologies and transform social relations for the better. A case in point occurred during the first half of the 20th century on the very territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the Second World War, dramatic social revolutions swept across Europe. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, after the fascist Ustaša regime of the Independent State of Croatia fell to the partisan movement the territory became part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – a modernizing and multiethnic state governed under Josip Broz Tito’s motto of ‘brotherhood and unity’.

In this context, networks of political exiles formed abroad within the Croatian diaspora that continued to nurture fascist and nationalist ideologies during the Cold War (Hockenos 2003). These very same groups contributed to ethnic mobilization and the Wars of Yugoslav Succession during the 1990s. Yet, the Croatian diaspora also included post-war gastarbeiter migra-
tion and later incorporated the refugees from the wars of the 1990s. Until now, the mistake has been to generalize from observations about fascist groups and other political exiles to, for example, the Croatian diaspora as a whole, or to the migration context more generally. Nevertheless, the case of these fascist Ustaša exiles has implications for nostalgia as a psychological mechanism, which may have different outcomes for political attitudes depending on historical context. It must be recognized that in some cases nostalgia for the past may uplift exclusionary ideologies.

At the same time, in certain settlement contexts migrants may actually have access to fewer coping resources than in the homeland. Examples may include cross-border refugee camps (Lischer 2005). Although camps may provide respite from worsening conditions in the home country, in some cases refugee crises continue long after the war ends. Undoubtedly, there are instances in which the ideological climate of refugee camps and settlement countries reinforce the conflictive ethos among refugees. Examples might include the situation of Hutu refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Pashtun refugees in Pakistan, or the political exiles from Eastern block countries such as Cuba that settled in the West during the height of the Cold War.

A fruitful direction for future research would address these differing contexts with survey data collected both within and beyond the borders of other post-war societies. Post-war public opinion research has become increasingly common, with large-scale surveys having been conducted in places such as Israel, Rwanda, South Africa and Cambodia (Brounéus 2008, 2010; Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009; Gibson 2004, 2006; Gibson, Sonis, and Hean 2010; Halperin and Bar-Tal 2011; Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, and Johnson 2006; Pham, Weinstein, and Longman 2004). Expanding these research efforts to include multiple data collection sites would allow research to address important questions with new data and allow for fruitful comparisons across different origin and settlement contexts and conflict types.

Comparative research such as this would help us to address key questions. Do refugees targeted on the basis of ethnicity tend to harbor more grievances than refugees from other conflict situations, as Lischer (2005) argues? Moreover, how are the effects of these traumatic experiences influenced by the settlement context? How much do we really know about ‘typical’ diasporas and refugee communities believed to support conflict in their homelands? Recently, case studies have uplifted the diversity of groups such as Irish Americans, Iraqis, Somalis and Tamils (Cochrane 2007; Cochrane, Baser, and Swain 2009; Horst 2008; Leenders 2009; Orjuela 2008). Moreover, multi-cited ethnographic field research has begun to address the problems of ‘methodological nationalism’ (Horst 2008; Horst and Falzon 2009; Orjuela 2008). Yet these studies tend to be descriptive and focused on organized diaspora networks. More comparative case studies, fieldwork and survey research would thus provide an excellent contribution to current research.
The present analysis also has important implications for the immigration and incorporation policies settlement countries choose to implement. Settlement country policies inevitably affect the resources available to migrants to cope with stress, war traumas and war-related losses and thus may influence their perceptions of homeland conflict. Reducing resources for coping may encourage individuals rely more on conflictive beliefs, while increasing coping resources may discourage it. The trend towards placing greater restrictions on immigrants, the encampment of refugees, policing of immigrant communities, racial profiling, and public demands for cultural assimilation in ‘liberal’ settlement countries is therefore troubling.

A common strand of thought since the founding of the Chicago School has been that unassimilated migrants tend to be marginalized and psychologically vulnerable, thus representing a threat to social order both in settlement countries and in their homelands. However, this dissertation uplifts the fact that cultural separation is entirely compatible with peaceful attitudes among migrants from war-torn countries, as those who nurture a separate but inclusive Yugoslav heritage culture illustrate. Moreover, biculturalism offers greater opportunity for identity complexity than cultural assimilation. Thus, upholding multiculturalism models and the socioeconomic welfare of immigrants in the face of xenophobic reactions to traumatic events such as terrorism may promote peace rather than encourage extremism, as others have tried to suggest (Fukuyama 2006; Huntington 1996; Huntington 2001; Leiken 2005, 2005). Lastly, no one should be allowed to forget that providing refugees – human beings exposed to violence – respite from wartime conditions is in and of itself an important action, regardless of its impact on the self-interest of the settlement country.
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