Public Religions in Swedish Media

A Study of Religious Actors on Three Newspaper Debate Pages 2001–2011

Marta Axner
Abstract


This study addresses issues concerning religion in the public sphere, brought about by the debates over the perceived resurgence of religion and the post-secular. The aim is to analyze the participation of religious actors in the public, using three newspaper debate pages as the empirical material. Building on theories by Casanova, especially his concept of public religions, as well as mediatization theory and Habermas’ writings on religion in the public sphere, 639 opinion pieces signed by religious actors were analyzed. The mixed-methods content analysis was conducted in two steps: first a quantitative overview of the religious actors published, to what extent and on what issues. The second step consisted of three qualitative case studies based on the results of the first step: an argument analysis of the debate over same-sex marriage; an exploration of the specific position of the Church of Sweden and the idea of the national church as a public utility; and finally a discourse analysis of articles by Jewish and Muslim authors. These were analyzed on the basis of criteria for public religions developed from Casanova’s theory and from the media logic of debate articles. While the results show no clear increase in the number of religious actors during the period under scrutiny, one notices a clear presence of Muslim and Jewish actors, even though Christians of varying denominations dominate the material. There are also clear differences between the different religions: minority religion contributions are limited in terms of issues and scope, while Christian groups write about more varied issues. Muslims often relate to negative media discourse towards Islam, while Jewish signatories write on a limited number of themes closely related to the group itself. In many articles, one found a meta-debate over the place of religion in the public sphere even when specific issues were debated. The contribution of this dissertation is to critically discuss the concepts and assumptions underlying the debate over the place of religion in the public sphere. It stresses the importance of media perspectives as well as empirical studies for analyzing issues of authority, visibility, private/public and religion in late modern, mediated contexts.

Keywords: religion, media, public sphere, public religion, content analysis, mixed-methods, media logic, public debate, secularization, post-secular, mediatization

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In memory of my grandmother Annie Petrén

and to all the women in my family who along with her inspired me to pursue my thirst for knowledge.
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It takes a village to raise a child – Hillary Rodham Clinton made the (allegedly) African proverb famous with her book title in the mid-1990s. The authenticity of the proverb is contested, but its accuracy I am willing to accept completely, at least when it comes to doctoral dissertations. My dissertation project would never have started and much less grown and been finished without a large group of people around me, sharing their time, knowledge and enthusiasm. Actually, several “villages” or groups of people have been crucial during my time as a doctoral student, directly and indirectly.

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I have dedicated this dissertation to the memory of my maternal grandmother, Annie Petrén, who passed away a year and a half ago. Though she did not pursue any postgraduate education of her own (she was a school teacher in math and science), she never stopped learning new things up until the last few years of her 96-year-long life. She read, listened to the radio and travelled; when she retired she started learning new languages and in her eighties she learned how to use a computer for e-mailing as well as searching the internet. She was one of many examples in my family history, of showing that being a woman was never a reason not to pursue intellectual enterprises. Her thirst for knowledge has been a true inspiration to me as a scholar and as a person. If I can share some of the joy I have had in learning and exploring during my doctoral project through the text of this dissertation, then it has all been worthwhile.

Uppsala, August 2013
Marta Axner
1. Introduction

In February 2009, all bishops in the Church of Sweden except for the Archbishop were debating with each other, on the opinion pages of Sweden’s leading daily, Dagens Nyheter, the imminent new Marriage Act and its implications for the church’s willingness to conduct legally-binding marriage ceremonies. During the almost decade-long process that has led to this new law, a number of religious representatives from different religions have debated and discussed both in favor and against changing the Swedish law to a gender-neutral wording and move from a separate law of civil unions to same-sex marriage. This is a debate that takes place not in a church setting but on the opinion pages of Sweden’s leading national newspaper.

Is this a good example of the much-debated return of religion to the public sphere of a multi-religious, post-secular society? Or an example of how religious actors, while becoming visible and participating in a public arena in Sweden, in fact have to play by the rules of a secular public sphere? Thus, secularization is not reversed but, rather, takes a new turn in a late-modern globalized society. Or is it simply an entertaining debate, bearing witness to a mediatization of religion?

Background

During the past decade, the place of religion in the late modern society of Europe and Scandinavia has become a hot topic among social scientists as well as politicians and the media. In the Swedish context, the increased migration from especially the Muslim world, an increased interest from the authorities in religious actors within the welfare sector, together with an increased visibility of religion in other ways, have led to a debate similar to that on the European level. Still, the idea that religion is a private matter seems to be quite dominant in Swedish general opinion (Pettersson 2000). Though there is some evidence that this increased visibility is largely connected to media and that mass media is the most common place for people to meet religion in their everyday life (Bromander 2012), there is a shortage of empirical study of how religious actors participate in public debate and, more generally, of religion in Swedish media.

This dissertation aims to address this field: an empirical study of religious actors participating in a mediated public sphere. This mixed-method content
analysis study will look at debate articles signed by religious actors published in the major Swedish national dailies *Dagens Nyheter (DN)*, *Svenska Dagbladet (SvD)* and *Expressen (Exp)* during the years 2001-2011. As this field is potentially huge, I have limited my scope to focusing on debate pieces (as opposed to journalistic coverage of religion), to religious actors (as opposed to all writers discussing religious issues) and to national daily newspapers. I am studying a period of eleven years – it is not a historic study and I do not intend to draw heavy conclusions about changes over time, but it is a long enough time period to study connections with world and local events, several major debates on religion, elections and shifts of power. My ambition is not to fully examine the entire presence of religion in the Swedish public sphere but, rather, to look in detail at one way religious actors participate in public debate and to use that as my empirical case to contribute to the academic discussion on public religion, religious change and mediatization of religion.

The debate or emerging field of research that this dissertation is in relation to is often referred to as the ‘post-secular’ (cf. Beckford 2012; Dillon 2010; Gorski et al. 2012; Habermas 2008b; Harrington 2007; Nynä, Laissander, and Utriainen 2012; Sigurdson 2010; Vries and Sullivan 2006). I have quite consciously mostly avoided this concept in my thesis. I think the term ‘post-secular’ is a problematic name for an interesting conversation – mostly because it presupposes both a secular past and a social change already having taken place. Both these conditions are questionable or should at least be open to empirical investigation. Still, I see my doctoral work as a contribution to this field and hope it can be a small input to the conversation.

A key concept in this dissertation, as is already evident in the title, is ‘public religion(s).’ Though this study deals with religion in the public arena more broadly, I also use this concept in a specific sense, as presented by José Casanova. In his modern classic within this field, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (1994), he presents a theoretical framework and understanding of the place of religious actors in the public arena of modern, liberal democracies. This specific theory has informed the design of the study as well as the analyses and, while it will be complemented in a wider theoretical framework, it deserves mentioning here at the beginning as it is key for my understanding of the field as well as the research design.

Another part of the background of this study is of course my own personal history. Religion, media, politics and the public have not only been the field of my research but also, in a more personal way, important arenas for me over the years. Though I want to believe my research interest in these issues is mostly driven by academic curiosity, it is of course no coincidence that I have spent a lot of time discussing and reflecting on issues of religion and politics in public settings – mostly through blogging but also in more traditional media. With a background as an ordained minister as well as an elected official in the Church of Sweden and with some years in party poli-
tics, the field of religion, politics and the public could perhaps be seen as my own backyard. I have been careful, though, to choose a research design where there was no risk of studying debates where I have participated myself.

Outline of the dissertation

In this introductory chapter, I give a background and present previous research, my aim and research question and give the context of the religious situation and the media landscape in Sweden, including the specific genre of debate articles. In Chapter 2, I introduce important theoretical approaches on secularization and religious change and, specifically, public religion; theories on the public sphere; and finally on mediatization. I also discuss how these theories can be combined and present a theoretical framework for my upcoming analysis. In Chapter 3, I wrap up the introductory part of the dissertation with methodology, discussing my epistemological starting point, introduce the material and the research design and discuss my methodological choices and limitations in detail.

The results part of my dissertation start in Chapter 4 with an overview of the results of my study – who the religious actors in my material are, what and how are they debating and what patterns can be found in the material. In Chapters 5 to 7 these results are analyzed in more detail, focusing on three different aspects of the results, as cases in relation to the idea of public religion. First, the debate over the marriage law as a case of potential public religion; second, the Church of Sweden and its special place in the debate; and, finally, the religious minorities and their conditions for participating in newspaper debates.

In Chapter 8, I return to my theoretical starting points, discussing my results in relation to the framework presented here and especially how to understand the concept of public religions in the mediatized Swedish context. Finally I sketch a revised model for studying public religions in a media setting.

Previous research

Secularization and religion in public

The questions about the relationship between religion and modernity, and especially in the form of secularization theory, have been at the core of sociology of religion since its formation as an academic discipline in the late nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century (cf. Weber 1963; Luckmann 1967; Berger 1969; Martin 1978). During the last two decades the discussion on religion in the public arena and the patterns of religious
decline or resurgence of religion has taken a new turn, some of the previous assumptions have been questioned and new ways of discussing religion, the secular and modernity have risen (cf. Casanova 1994; Berger 1999; Asad 2003; Heelas and Woodhead 2005; Taylor 2007; Berger, Davie, and Fokas 2008; Joas and Wiegandt 2009; Beckford 2010; Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and VanAntwerpen 2011). This body of research, perhaps best described as a critical secularization paradigm, is the wider context of my study.

The development of the sociology of religion in Sweden and the other Nordic countries has followed a similar pattern. Previous Swedish research on secularization and the place of religion in public life has mostly been conducted within the secularization paradigm and has, to a large extent, been quantitative studies of either individual belief or religious practice, often in a comparative Nordic/Scandinavian perspective (for a good introduction to Swedish sociology of religion see Gustafsson 2005; see also: Gustafsson and Dahlgren 1985; Pettersson 1988; Gustafsson 1988; Pettersson and Riis 1994; Gustafsson and Pettersson 2000). Since the millennium, there has been a broader range of studies on religious change rather than just religious decline, connecting to the international shift described above (Bäckström et al. 2010; Bäckström, Edgardh Beckman, and Pettersson 2004; cf. Dahlgren et al. 2009).

**Religion and media**

Throughout the latter part of the twentieth century and up until today it has become increasingly difficult to talk about the public, or a public sphere, without taking into account the development of mass media and its increasing importance for communication in society. Scholars of religion have become increasingly aware of this development, but there is still a shortage of empirical studies of the place of religion in the mediated public sphere, though some interesting work has been done over the last decade. Still, it is more common for sociologists of religion to start an article or book with an interesting anecdote about the media, or reference a controversial media debate in passing, than undertaking ambitious and systematic empirical media studies (cf. Lövheim and Lundby 2013).

The research conducted within the field of media and religion has largely originated from the community of researchers connected to the international conferences on Media, religion and culture, the first one held in Uppsala in 1993 (Linderman, Hoover, and Lundby 1997; Hoover and Clark 2002; Marriage and Mitchell 2003; Hoover 2006; Morgan 2008; Lynch, Mitchell, and Strhan 2011). Closely connected to this group have been the researchers in the Nordic network on the mediatization of religion (Sumiala-Seppänen, Lundby, and Salokangas 2006; Hjarvard and Lövheim 2012; Hjarvard 2008a; Christensen 2010; Lundby 2009b). Since the early 1990s, this field has also had a strong base in Uppsala (Linderman 1995; Lövheim 2004; Larsson, Lövheim, and Linderman 2006; Sjöborg 2006; Axelsson 2008; Lö-
vheim and Axner 2011). Recently, some Nordic comparative studies have been undertaken within the NOREL-project, which is a comparative Nordic project studying religion in the public sphere over time in several different arenas. The media studies part of this project has studied representations of religion in newspapers from 1988, 1998 and 2008 (Niemelä and Christensen 2013) as well as signs of the mediatization of religion within the same material (Lövheim and Lundby 2013). There is also a small but interesting study made by the Church of Sweden: a survey of how the general population in Sweden views the participation of religious actors in public debate (Bromander 2011).

Swedish daily newspapers and debate articles
Within Swedish media studies on newspapers, there has also been extensive research on opinion pieces of different types, though many would use all types of opinion-based material without necessarily separating the debate pages from editorials, columns, cultural pages and letters to the editors. Some important studies and reports have been done more specifically on the type of articles studied here, for example by Kent Asp (1986), Olof Peterson and Ingrid Carlberg (1990), Marie Lindström (1996), Bengt-Göran Martinsson (1996); Håkan Hvitfelt (1992) and Anna Wahlgren (1998). The only international publication I have found regarding Scandinavian debate articles is an article by Danish-American media scholar Karin Wahl-Jorgensen comparing Danish and British debate pages (Wahl-Jorgensen 2004). There are a few Swedish studies on religion and public debates, mainly using the religious media as material. (Dahl 2000; Lövheim and Axner 2011; Wallinder 1990)

The contribution of this study
Though generally there has been a shortage of research on religion in media studies, and lack of media studies in the sociology of religion, in the last decade or so the number of studies has increased, together with interest from new fields. But most studies conducted or under way focus on religious content – how religious topics or symbols or representatives are covered in journalism, how issues of modernity, values and religion are discussed in the media or representations of religion in media and popular culture (Christensen 2010; Larsson et al. 2006; cf. Taira, Poole, and Knott 2012; Pew Forum 2012)\(^1\). As far as I have been able to ascertain, very few studies have been made focusing on the religious actors as participating agents in a media situation, at least in the Scandinavian context, and therefore this study will make a contribution to the research agenda and provide new knowledge.

\(^1\) See also ongoing Nordic projects: http://www.kifo.no/index.cfm?id=266100 and http://www.crs.uu.se/Research/impactofreligion/Theme_1/Mass-media/
This study also aims to contribute with empirical cases to the discussion on religion in the public sphere, especially to the theoretical claims by José Casanova, Jürgen Habermas and Stig Hjarvard.

Aim and research question

Aim
My main interest is to study the presence of religious actors in Swedish mediated public debate as an empirical case for studying religion in the public arena. More specifically, I want to focus the notion of public religions, and to see how useful Casanova’s ideas are in the study of religious actors in Swedish public debate. I am interested in the way the relationship between religion and modernity, and religion and politics, is negotiated and played out in the public domain, and how the conditions of the media affect that relationship.

The starting point of my study is this aforementioned discussion on the place of religion in the public arena, and I will study it using the debate article as my case, focusing on religious actors. The debate pages of the national major newspapers are still one of the most important spaces for starting or influencing public debate in Sweden, and are edited and run with an ideal close the Habermasian idea of the public sphere where individuals take part in debate by the power of the argument (Wahl-Jorgensen 2004). By studying these pages, and in my case the articles signed by religious actors during a time period of eleven years, I hope to be able to study how, with what arguments and to what extent (organized) religion is part of this segment of the public debate in Sweden. The decision to study religious actors, rather than religious content or topics about religion, is again inspired by Casanova’s writing on public religions, and his characterizations of what kinds of religion could have a legitimate place in a modern society. Also, it makes sense for a sociologist to take into account religious organizations and institutions – not only studying media representation disconnected from society but, rather, to study the mediated debate as part of a public sphere also connected to other societal structures.

Research questions
How did religious actors contribute to Swedish debate pages during the years 2001–2011; to what extent, on what issues and with what arguments? Can this participation be understood in terms of public religions according to José Casanova’s thesis, and, in that case, how and under what conditions; and what is the significance of the genre and logic of the debate article in these conditions?
Definitions and concepts

A study like this one inevitably comes across a number of difficult concepts that are often used in a vague and undefined way and, therefore, are in need of precise and stringent definitions. At the same time, one of the aims of this study is to see how words and concepts are used and if they potentially get meaning from their use in public debate. Defining concepts in such a study is a tricky balance between, on the one hand, the risk of circular arguments and, on the other, the risk of tying the analysis too tightly to a specific definition of certain concepts where the results of the study could be questioned just by altering the definitions of the key concepts used.

My main strategy to avoid this is to have clear but emergent definitions of the concepts discussed. The concepts used and discussed are being defined to function as tools for analysis and to select and limit my data. This does not mean that I have committed myself to a specific understanding of, for example, religion and claim that my definition here is “true” in any essentialist way. Rather, these should be seen as working definitions, and the usefulness and understanding of these concepts are things I will return to throughout the study. I would also like to highlight the inherent problem of analyzing debates where the same words and concepts are used simultaneously on several levels – by the debaters themselves in their texts, by me in my analysis and by the theorists I use. This confusion regarding terminology is a recurring and fundamental problem in this field, and something I will address at several points in this dissertation.

Most of the key concepts will be defined and elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3, but already here I would like to discuss my approach to the study of religion.

Religion

Defining religion is a risky task. Especially if part of the aim is to avoid essentialism and/or over-narrow categories. Though the risk of leaving it undefined, and thereby giving the concept implicit meaning, is perhaps not the better alternative. A nuanced and clear examination of the concepts used and the underlying assumptions possibly made is necessary.

Over the last decades there has been an increased skepticism and criticism about a generic concept of religion, and I sympathize with this tendency. In my understanding of how to approach the concept of religion in social science, I am highly influenced by James Beckford (2003), José Casanova (2006b, 2009, 2011) and Talal Asad (2003) among others. I will go into a lengthier discussion regarding my understanding of religion in Chapter 3 on methodology, but in this introduction a short note is still appropriate.

There is a tension between, on the one hand, the risks of a general definition of religion and the supposedly generic understanding of religion, poten-
tially even an essentialist one, which comes with it, and, on the other hand, the need for clear and well-defined framework to limit the scope of a specific scientific endeavor. I hope, in the forthcoming, to be clear on the fact that when I write about religion, religious organizations, religious arguments, etc., I do not intend to make any judgments on whether they are, in any sense “really religious” or make any claims of a specific religious nature on these. Rather, I will in my study try to find out in what ways the concepts such as the religious and the secular are used and what they come to mean. I will try to separate this more analytical discussion from the more hands-on need to operationalize or limit my study, and the concrete way of defining certain actors as religious. My method for doing this is also presented and discussed in Chapter 3. In short, I follow the argument of José Casanova in his later writings (2011). There he addresses some of the critique and discussions in the field of religious studies towards the concept of religion (Fitzgerald 2007), and finds it quite interesting that, while scholars are more skeptical about the concept of religion than ever, at the same time people around the world, including politicians and the media, relate to religion as a fact or reality. He writes:

I am bracketing out altogether the question which has dominated most theories of secularization, namely whether religious beliefs and practices are declining or growing as a general modern trend. I am only claiming that “religion” as a discursive reality, indeed as an abstract category and as a system of classification of reality, used by modern individuals as well as by modern societies across the world, has become an undisputable global social fact. (Casanova 2011:34-35)

Even more central in the discussion of religion and secularity and how the concepts are used and developed is Talal Asad. He mainly focuses on the category of the secular in his important book *Formations of the Secular* (2003) where one of his important points is that “religion” and “secular” are mutually constitutive categories impossible without each other, and that the construction of these categories in the European context has been very closely connected to the separation of private and public spheres.

Though aware of the risk of ending up in a circular argument, I believe it is possible to use a social constructivist approach to religion in general, not making generic or universal claims of the “nature” of religion but to use the study to try to understand what is seen as, or what becomes, religion in a specific societal context, and still use a hands-on operationalization to define what will be included in my study and what to leave outside.

**Religious actors**

A key category in the dissertation is religious actors, as I separate between religious actors and religious arguments/religious content. I will discuss this separation further on a theoretical level in Chapter 2, and the operationaliza-
tion and how I chose the material in Chapter 3. One point to make here is that the religious actor in my study is a nominal category, rather than an essentialist, inherent or ontological one. When I categorize someone as a religious actor, it is based on the title or claimed representation of a religious organization or a label chosen by the writer/actor in question. I do not make any claims as to these actors’ motivations, sentiments or character. This argument is developed further in the methodology section, p 62.

The Swedish context

Before moving on to the theories and methodology of this particular study, some more background is needed regarding the Swedish context. First, some information on the Swedish religious situation and the relationship between church(es) and the state, and continuing with the media situation with special focus on the genre of the debate article, which is the material for this study.

Religion in Sweden

Historical background

The dominant religious actor in Sweden, today and historically, is the Lutheran Church of Sweden, the former state church. By approximately the twelfth century the (Catholic) Church was well established in Sweden, and during the sixteenth century Lutheran reformation, finalized at the 1593 Uppsala Convention, the entire church turned Lutheran and was incorporated into the state. The geographical parish structure of the Church was the main organizational level in Sweden, and until the mid-nineteenth century the church was the main provider of all sorts of services such as schools and care of different kinds. The process of structural differentiation, where functions were moved from the church to secular/state functions in various ways, made a formal start in the separation between (church) parishes and (secular) municipalities in 1862. Many steps and reforms were taken up until the formal separation between church and state in the year 2000, where the old Church law was replaced with two new laws, the Act of Religious Communities (SFS 1998:1593) and the Church of Sweden Act (SFS 1998:1591). The Church of Sweden still has governmental functions, such as the right to solemnize marriages (which many other religious communities also have), the responsibility for graveyards and also the burial system for people not members of the church (besides, in two municipalities, for historical reasons) and the right to distribute state money for the care and restoration of historically-valuable church buildings. Members of the royal family still have to be members of the Church of Sweden, and ceremonies in connection with the beginning or end of a new year in schools, courts and the parliament are
often held in churches. Some of the former prerogatives of the Church of Sweden were also, in the year 2000, opened up for other faith communities, most importantly the ability to collect member fees via the tax system. (Bäckström et al. 2004:32–48; Claesson 2008; Gustafsson 2003)

Though the Church of Sweden has been dominant in many ways, is has not been the only religion present in Sweden. Jews were allowed to live in Sweden from 1779, though only in four specific places and with restricted rights, which increased throughout the nineteenth century. Though Sweden was not unaffected by the strong anti-Semitic currents in Europe leading up to World War II, Jewish refugees came to Sweden both before and, increasingly so, after the war. While still a relatively small community, the Jewish group is the non-Christian religion with the longest historical roots and establishment in Sweden (Dencik 2008).

Christians of denominations other than Lutheran have been present throughout history, while there was no general freedom of religion during large parts of the Lutheran era. After a period of trying to ban the spiritual influences of the revival movements in Europe during the eighteenth century, when deviating from the pure Lutheran faith was a crime, the Swedish authorities in 1858 eventually allowed groups of Christians to meet and pray without a priest present and, soon after, in 1860, other churches were recognized and conversions were allowed. Still, it was not possible to leave the state church without joining another religious community until 1951 (Gustafsson 2003:51–52). During the late nineteenth century several churches and congregations, sprung from the revival movements, were formed and consolidated, such as the Mission Covenant Church, the Baptist Church, Alliance Mission church and many others. These denominations, together with the later-formed Pentecostal Church, are often grouped together as “free Churches” (as opposed to the state church) and have formal as well as informal co-operations. During the late nineteenth and early- to mid-twentieth century, the free churches were strong popular movements and core parts of Swedish civil society. The free churches are sometimes called “domestic,” to distinguish them from “immigrant churches.” This says more about the (perceived) historical background and less about the actual member structure today, though the growth of the Roman Catholic Church, as well as several Eastern Orthodox churches in Sweden during the twentieth century, is directly related to increased immigration (Gustafsson 2003; Nyman 2008).

During the latter part of the twentieth century, Islam, through immigration, has quickly grown to be the largest minority religion in Sweden. Contacts between Sweden and the Muslim world have existed throughout history, perhaps most well-known with King Karl XII in the early eighteenth century, and there have always been converts. Smaller groups came as labor migrants from the 1950s onwards, but the majority of Muslims in Sweden are, themselves or their parents, refugees, first from Iran after the revolution
1979, from the Balkan countries in the 1990s and, later, from places such as Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq (Ouis 2008).

**Religious organizations, affiliation and attitudes today**

As there is no registration of religious affiliation in Sweden, and there are no regular censuses where religion is asked for, the numbers of people belonging to or identifying with different religions is a somewhat complicated issue. Today, about 75-80 percent of the Swedish population is a member of a registered Religious Community. Around 67.5 percent, 6.5 million people, belong to the Church of Sweden (Church of Sweden 2013), approximately 250,000 belong to one of the free churches, while around 100,000 belong to the Roman Catholic Church and around 130,000 to different Orthodox Churches, of which Syrian, Serbian and Greek orthodox are the largest. The Jewish congregations together gather around 8,500 people, while the varying Muslim organizations together gather around 110,000 (Swedish Commission for Government Support to Faith Communities 2012a). The number of Muslims in Sweden is a contested issue, though, as there are many different organizations and many people might self-identify as Muslim without necessarily belonging to one of the organizations registered with the authorities for state funding. Occasionally all Swedes with a migration background from a Muslim country are counted, which could total up to 400,000 people. The number of people identifying as Muslim is probably somewhere in between (Berglund 2012:263).

The Christian Churches cooperate in the Christian Council of Sweden, which functions as a formal institution acting as a reference group in state matters and the like; as an ecumenical meeting place for the different Christian groups; and supports different projects both on theological and social/diaconal matters. It runs programs like prison-, hospital- and university chaplaincies as well as different social and peace-building projects in Sweden and abroad, sometimes also participating in public debates, especially on issues relating to these areas. The CCS itself groups its member churches into four “families”: Church of Sweden, free churches, Catholics and Eastern; this classification will also be used in this study (Christian Council of Sweden 2013).

The Muslim organizational structure is quite different. There are four national organizations and a co-operational body, Islamiska Samarbetsrådet (Islamic Co-operational Council), which mostly functions as a coordinating body for funding, and with much fewer joint activities. In general, the character of the Muslim organizations has a much stronger focus on independent local congregations/associations and the national organizations are more about coordinating and networking, as opposed to the Christian organizations and also in comparison with other NGOs and organizations in Swedish civil society (Borell and Gerdner 2013).
Though many Swedes are members of the Church of Sweden, patterns of religious practice and belief are much less widely spread in the population. According to the 2006 World Value Survey, less than 8 percent of the Swedish sample attended a religious service once a month or more, while more than 50 percent never or practically never attended. In the same survey, almost 33 percent called themselves a religious person, the alternatives being “not a religious person” (49 percent) or “a convinced atheist” (17 percent). In the large Nordic study Religious and Moral Pluralism (RAMP) conducted in 1998, 18 percent of Swedes claimed to believe in a personal God. Only 12 percent stated that they did not believe in a god or higher power, leaving the vast majority in the categories in between (Botvar 2000:82). A further discussion in relation to secularization and other theoretical explanations will follow in Chapter 2 (p 30).

Media in Sweden

Compared to other European countries, the daily newspaper still has a strong position as important media outlet in Sweden. Daily newspapers are usually divided into a few different categories: Large city morning papers, published in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö, with a joint circulation of about 1 million on weekdays (in a national population of 9.5 million); Large city evening papers, published in the same cities which are not subscribed to and have a more popular or tabloid style, with joint circulation about 600,000; provincial newspapers, published outside of the three major cities and are mostly subscribed to, with a joint circulation of 1.5 million; and free papers of which some are daily and some local weekly, the daily ones have a circulation of about 1 million. (Hadenius, Weibull, and Wadbring 2011:141–142).

As a general trend, the evening papers have dropped in circulation since the 1970s, as have the city morning papers, while the provincial papers have decreased less. Still, compared to many other countries, the total circulation of newspapers is comparatively high – in 2007, 466 papers per 1,000 inhabitants in Sweden compared to 335 in the UK, 241 in the US and 156 in France, to mention a few (Hadenius et al. 2011:138, 145–146). One of the reasons for the high number of newspapers and circulation is the state press subsidy, which is monetary support for the second-largest newspaper in a city, designed to support competition and diversity in the media. This subsidy has been contested or at least debated for a long time, and the fact that a number of morning papers in smaller cities have merged indicates that the

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2 V186 How often do you attend religious services, worldvaluesurvey.org online analysis, http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalize.jsp. 9.5% answer “Only on special holidays”, 32% answer “once a year” or “less often”.

subsidy is not enough to support a diverse market. Still, the subsidy is so far intact (Hadenius et al. 2011:150–161).

Besides the newspapers, the main news outlets are TV and radio – public service as well as commercial actors – and, to an increasing degree, the internet. Still, the online news sources with the highest readership by far are the online versions of already-established news sources like newspapers and public service media, but online papers as well as news aggregators and social media play an increasing role, which also means that international media outlets reach further into the Swedish media market (Hadenius et al. 2011:126–133, 388–389). Regarding the broadcast media, public service TV (with two major channels and several smaller ones) and Radio (with three national channels, one local and several digital/online) still have a large portion of the viewers/listeners and high trust from the population, but have increasing competition since the 1990s when private, commercial actors were allowed (Hadenius et al. 2011:192–206).

The debate article – debate pages as important agenda setting arenas
The specific Scandinavian form of debate article, positioning itself as somewhere between the op-ed or guest column and the letter to the editor, has been the topic of Swedish and Scandinavian media research. Much less has been published internationally, and though debate articles are often part of the media material analyzed in different studies, less attention has been drawn to the specific type of genre that is the debate article. For this study, I have implemented my understanding of the debate article from previous research with interviews with the debate editors, and a more detailed presentation of the debate pages of the three newspapers I study can be found in Chapter 3, but a general introduction to research on debate articles will be given here.

Basically all Swedish newspapers – morning as well as evening, and most local newspapers – have a debate page separate from letters to the editor. The debate page is often, but not always, published next to the editorial page, typically with a separate heading and is often run by a separate debate editor. Debate articles are typically submitted by writers who want to participate in public debate and not commissioned. The writers are mainly politicians, scholars, and representatives of organizations such as unions, business, civil society organizations or others; sometimes other writers or journalists also contribute. Compared to traditional letters to the editor, debate articles are more of an elite kind of text, though formally anyone is able to submit an article. They are also typically longer in format, up to 4,000–6,000 characters compared to the usually much shorter letters. The debate pages are characterized by news value, and Dagens Nyheter’s debate page is especially seen as a very influential arena for agenda setting, to a point where it has been described as a democratic problem due to its dominant position (cf.
The main study of the influence of debate articles, more specifically DN Debatt, was made as part of the state-initiated Study of Power and Democracy in Sweden (Maktutredningen) by Olof Petersson and Ingrid Carlberg and published in 1990. This report (Petersson and Carlberg 1990) studied agenda setting, the mass media landscape and how the media influence the discourse on power and influence in Swedish society. They discuss the dominance of DN Debatt in initiating public debate, and the power of its editor in shaping Swedish public debate. As part of this larger study, they studied all published articles on the debate pages of Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet for one year, but they were also able to study the declined articles of DN for one month, and the reasoning behind the decisions by the debate editors. These were coded for varying factors, but religion was not one of these, neither as the affiliation of the signatories nor as a topic. Religious actors would most probably be found within the category of “other organizations and associations,” which during the year studied had 7 percent of articles in SvD and 11 percent in DN. The profile of published people and topic were similar between the two papers, which makes Petersson and Carlberg argue that it is more likely that decisions are influenced by the format or workings of the media rather than the personal opinions of the editors. In studying the refused articles, they conclude that it is mainly the individual citizen, not representing any authority, organization, political party or the academic/professional, that are almost always declined. DN debatt is in that sense an elite arena. News value is important, both as a factor of what articles get published, but also when – e.g., the same day as an important event, or to be the first with a new angle on a topic (Petersson and Carlberg 1990:176–186).

Political scientist Anna Wahlgren studied in her master thesis from 1998 the impact of debate articles from Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet. She studied how debate articles from the two papers during one month had been mentioned or had initiated debate in other media: i.e., how much they impacted public debate and what factors contributed to this. Her results show that DN has much higher impact than SvD, but not all DN articles have this impact. Less than 20 percent of DN debate articles were referenced in other media, and were mostly articles written by representatives of political parties and businesses/industry and more rarely from organizations or people with less formal influence (Wahlgren 1998).

In a dissertation from 2001, Åsa Kroon analyzes several media debates, including a case study of debate articles published on DN Debatt during the year 1998. Her main aim is to study how debates travel through different media and how the discourse is changing, but she also makes a few distinctions about the genre and qualities of the (DN) debate article (Kroon 2001:69–98). She describes the debate article as a genre hybrid, somewhere
between news journalism and the argumentative, reasoning text. While the main body of text often has a more linear or narrative structure and uses different forms of language (academic, emotive, political, etc.), the headlines and preambles are written by the editors. It also not unusual, according to Kroon, for debate articles to be presented on page one, together with the news articles, and sometimes reported on in other news media or the newspaper itself. Also the influence of editors on whose and what articles get published, and the (sometimes occurring) discussions between editor and writers strengthen the news aspect of the genre of the debate article (Kroon 2001:75–77). This same observation is confirmed by Matilda Wiklund in her dissertation on the debate in DN about schools and teachers. She also concludes that the debate presented in DN was rather narrow and few different perspectives were presented, and the dominance of DN (also pointed out by previous research) in agenda setting is problematic, according to Wiklund (2006:201–202).

As can be seen in the research referenced above, it has mostly been conducted up until the 1990s (Wiklund’s 2006 dissertation uses material from that period too). This means that there is little research as to how the internet has potentially changed the public debates on the debate pages (cf. Lövheim and Axner 2011). Even though my material comes from the physical newspapers, and their debate pages have changed only marginally during the time period studied, the debate pages today are now also published online, where they interact with other debates and blogs (through links) and have comment sections and plug-ins from social media sites like Facebook and Twitter. Not studying this further context is one of the conscious limitations of my study, as it would have made the research design too wide.
2. Theory

Secularization: A contested paradigm

Modernity and the assumptions of religious decline

To be modern is to find ourselves in an environment that promises us adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of ourselves and the world – and, at the same time, that threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are. (...) To be modern is to be part of a universe in which, as Marx said, "all that is solid melts into air". (Berman 1983:15)

This quote from the introduction to philosopher Marshall Berman’s classic book on modernity captures something of the ambiguity of the modern experience. Interestingly, he uses a famous quote from Marx on how all that is solid melts into air. Symptomatically he only uses the first part of the sentence; in the communist manifesto the quote continues with “... all that is holy is profaned...” (Marx, Engels, and Hobsbawm 1998:38). Perhaps it is no coincidence that, while the holy, or religion, was an important issue for Marx and Engels, it was seen as irrelevant in regard to definitions of modernity for an academic philosopher in the mid-1980s. Perhaps he would have made a different assessment today, when the role of religion in relation to modernity is not only discussed by the most engaged sociologists of religion but also by social scientists, philosophers and political minds in academia as well as in the media and the political arena.

Marshall Berman characterizes the modern experience as one of constant change, and modernity as simultaneous promise and threat. Many other scholars have tried to define modernity and the modern experience, locating its origins at different points in time and have tried to connect it with differing factors. Sociology forefather Max Weber, for instance, saw rationalization as the core process of modernity while Karl Marx regarded modernity as a phase in the history of capitalism mainly driven by material forces. The actual historical development of the twentieth century has, in Swedish society as well as in most parts of the world, brought significant economic, technological and social changes that are crucial to understanding not just the ideas of modernity. The shift from agricultural to industrial to service economy has meant huge structural changes in society that also changed the values and ways of thinking among people of late modern society, and also
crucial to understanding a changing place for religion in society (Bäckström et al. 2004:15, 21, 27, 31).

My understanding of modern society is largely informed by Anthony Giddens. He describes modernity as three important processes: *the separation of time and space* through technological development – from the invention of the mechanical clock and standardization of time to the possibility of travel and long-distance communication; the *disembedding* of social institutions, meaning that social relations are “lifted out” from their local contexts being rearticulated across time and space; and *reflexivity*, that everything we know is constantly weighed against new knowledge or under negotiation. In modernity, tradition is no strong ground for legitimacy, but everything should be scrutinized by reason; new knowledge and information is always a ground for questioning habits, traditions or rules (Giddens 1991:16–21).

**The secularization thesis and religious authority**

Ever since the social sciences assumed their modern form and sociology became an academic discipline in the late nineteenth century, attention has been given to the study of the relationship between religion and modernity, and the question of what place (if any) religion has in modern society. The early classics in the sociology of religion were all interested in religion in various ways (Durkheim 1976; Marx et al. 1998; Weber 2003) but during the first half of the twentieth century the view on religion as something foreign to modern society became more common.

Ever since the Enlightenment, the public or private place of religion in relation to modern society has been an issue of debate and often highly-normative views. Separating religion (or at least the institution of the Church) from political rule was one key point; the American constitution as well as the French *laïcité* are well-known examples of this, while the idea of religion as a private matter had other consequences in countries such as Sweden, where the state church remained intact while the political influence of religion decreased in other ways. Throughout the twentieth century in particular, in Europe as well as the US, the normative ideas of privatization of religion in different forms have been influential and not always been completely separated from the study of secularization and the effect of modernization. The study of the place of religion in modern societies has to varying extents been colored by ideals or normative ideas that religion *is* a private matter per se, or that it *should* be. In parallel, the distinction has not always been made clear – in scholarship as well as in political and societal debate – between the political doctrines of secularism, the historical process of secularization and the category of the secular. This confusion further adds to the sliding between normative and descriptive stances, and makes the discussion on secularization and religion in the public embedded in a field filled with not-always articulated ideas (cf. Asad 2003; Berger et al. 2008:23–70; Casanova 2009; Reichley 1985; Warner 2008).
In the 1960s and following decades the secularization thesis became such an established explanation that it was rarely questioned. The so-called classic secularization thesis can be summed up in one sentence: Modernity leads to religious decline. The thesis builds on the assumption that there is an inherent contradiction, or at least a tension, between the values and mechanisms of modern society on the one hand and of religion on the other. This thesis has been explained and motivated with a number of different arguments throughout the years (Berger 1969; Luckmann 1967; cf. Davie 2007a:46–66; Furseth and Repstad 2006:75–96; Woodhead and Heelas 2000:307–341).

From its formulation in the 1960s, theories of secularization were developed by scholars like Bryan Wilson (1966, 1976, 1982), David Martin (1978) and Karel Dobbelaere (1981). They focused on the decline in religion in different ways, including the lessening influence of the church(es) over the rest of society, decline in individual belief and behavior and marginalization of religion.

In the 1990s some of these theoretical assumptions were questioned and one interesting reconceptualization was made by Mark Chaves (1994). He suggested a shift in the definition of secularization, away from focusing on the decline in religion (however defined) and towards a decline in religious authority, even abandoning the category of religion from the study of secularization (1994:750). Chaves notes that, while several previous scholars of secularization have touched upon the issues of religious authority, foremost Bryan Wilson, no one had yet developed the argument fully. He returns to Weber and his definition of religious authority, stressing what makes someone’s authority religious is not the ends but the means. Modifying Weber’s conceptualization, Chaves defines religious authority structures in relation to means and legitimation, rather than to specific religious ends:

I will define a religious authority structure as social structure that attempts to enforce its order and reach its ends by controlling the access of individuals to some desired goods, where the legitimation of that control includes some supernatural component, however weak.

Religious authority, like other forms of authority, has a staff capable of withholding access to something individuals want. When that withholding is legitimated by reference to the supernatural, authority is religious.

(…) Secularization as declining religious authority, then, will refer to the declining influence of social structures whose legitimation rests on reference to the supernatural. (Chaves 1994:755–756)

Chaves moves on to discuss different ways this understanding of secularization can be used to study varying levels or types of organizations and societal structures. On the societal level, secularization as declining religious authority can be studied in terms of how religious organizations and religious leadership have a declining influence over other spheres of society, a result of differentiation. Other possible studies could be the declining control of
religious leadership over individual thought and/or (religious) behavior, or in religious organizations. Chaves also discusses models to study the interaction between a societal level and the individual, using typologies for differing levels of secularization (1994:760–762).

Casanova’s critique: De-privatization and public religion

In his 1994 book *Public Religions in the Modern World*, Casanova questioned the linear and universal concept of secularization and stressed the need to distinguish between the differing processes that together form what we usually call secularization and study them independently. He separates three different processes that together form secularization: (1) structural differentiation, that every institution in modern society moves towards a more and more separated and specialized place and refined task. In this process, religious institutions have moved from being general actors in society to having a more specialized religious profile and thereby becoming more marginal in modern society with less influence over other sectors; (2) Declining belief in religious dogmas and declining religious participation on the individual level; and (3) the privatization of religion in the sense of religion retracting from the public arena, especially of civil society. Of these three processes, Casanova claims that only the first one has an inherent connection to modernization as such. The other two processes are not necessarily consequences of the first, and need to be independently studied empirically in different times and contexts (Casanova 1994:19–39).

In his discussion on what a public religion is, he starts with distinguishing between different understandings of public and private, based on the typology of Winetraub (1997) and the consequences for establishing what a public religion is. He points to a threefold distinction: individual vs group religion; religious and political community; and religious and secular spheres (Casanova 1994:51–52).

Regarding individual vs group religion, he points to a development where what was previously presumed, that individual religion would flourish in the modern world into complete individualism, has not really become the case. Rather, individual religion has taken its place within denominations and, at least in the US situation (and, arguably more and more so in Europe), what were previously churches and sects in the Weberian sense have now become denominations, as Casanova describes them: “the modern, voluntary form of religious association based on religious freedom and religious pluralism” (Casanova 1994:55).

In relation to the religious and political community, Casanova’s discussion is in the terms of state churches and disestablishment, and the liberal

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4 In the 1994 book, Casanova refers to Winetraub (forthcoming), but the model discussed is identical to the one presented in Winetraub’s 1997 book.
principle of separating religion from politics. He claims that the state principle of separation is the same as the liberal normative prescription that religion must be privatized in other senses – modern liberal society is based on the individual right to privacy in the sense of the freedom of conscience both from state and organized religion. But, if accepting this sense of right to privacy, there might still be a place for de-privatized religion in modern society. Casanova assumes at least three types of instances:

1. When religious groups protect not only their own freedom of religion but also other basic freedom and rights, especially against a totalitarian state.
2. To question the ethical or moral basis of political leaders or the consequences of politics or capitalism, such as arms trade or poverty.
3. To protect the traditional life-world from the state – juridical or administrative – and thereby open up a discussion about norms and collective self-reflection. (Casanova 1994:57–58)

In these cases, religion would either serve the very basis of a liberal political order or participate in a debate over its limits and scope, and perhaps question of the assumptions made about too-rigid understandings of the public and private (1994:58). Further, he separates between three levels of the public sphere: the level of the state/jurisdiction; the level of political participation (foremost political parties); and finally the level of civil society or public debate. It is only on the level of civil society, according to Casanova, that this participation is compatible with liberal democracy, not as part of the state or engaging with politics on a more direct level.

Finally, he also discusses the feminist critique of traditional models of public and private, and whether certain issues are inherently private, such as moral or value matters, while others are questions of justice and thereby public. Casanova seems to agree with Seyla Benhabib (1992) and others that the boundaries between them should be the very subject of the open conversation, not excluding any issues or sectors of the functionally-differentiated society from debate. He sums up:

What I call the “deprivatization” of modern religion is the process whereby religion abandons its assigned place in the private sphere and enters the undifferentiated public sphere of civil society to take part in the ongoing process of contestation, discursive legitimation, and redrawing of boundaries. (Casanova 1994:65–66)

As he predicted, his empirical study of some cases from different parts of the world show no support for a necessary retraction of religion from the public sphere. Quite the opposite, as he describes the process of de-privatization, of a return of religion to the public arena existing parallel to or in conflict with a simultaneously ongoing structural differentiation and marginalization. At
large, he finds examples of public religion in the senses that he presented theoretically. He argues that it is not possible to stick to a traditional secularization approach if that assumes the disappearance of religion from the public sphere, as there is substantial empirical evidence against it. He also claims this presence is no threat to modern liberal society, as long the criteria he proposes are upheld.

He finds examples of where churches have played a legitimate public role in the modern world as part of civil society, with a task of mobilizing in defense of the traditional life-world when it is threatened either by political/state interferences or by market forces, but also to uphold the common good and point towards the need of moral responsibility in policy and in the market, and to contribute to the reflection of what the common good actually is (1994:228–230).

It should be pointed out that Casanova does not specifically study the media as part of his case studies, and he does not discuss the significance of mass media or the role of media in constituting a public sphere. Though some of his cases include discussions on the role of the church in relation to public debate and politics, which likely had media elements, the media perspective is not explicitly discussed either in the theoretical framework or in the analyses and results.

**Critique and further development of the idea of de-privatization**

As Casanova’s book and questioning of the secularizations thesis was hugely influential and well-cited, it also faced some criticism, among others by Talal Asad (2003). Asad questioned not only the west-centrism of Casanova’s study but also how he had a normative view of what kinds of religion would be acceptable in the public sphere. His main point, though, regarded the three sub-theses of Casanova’s description of secularization, where Casanova upholds the structural differentiation as a core part of modernization while the religious participation on the individual level is not, and the privatization of religion is false. Asad questions whether it really is viable to talk about structural differentiation as a core part of modernization and secularization (Asad 2003:182–184). Another critique refers to the fact that Casanova’s cases (all except one) are Catholic, and that his understanding both of what a religion is, its ideal relationship to the state and the type of questions legitimate for a public religion all originate from a Roman Catholic experience or way of thinking.

In response not only to Asad, Casanova has later refined and developed his theories of public religions and the de-privatization theses further in different articles. Though his main focus in this has been to take on more of a global approach, what is most relevant to the study at hand refers to the de-privatization thesis and, more specifically, to what types of public spheres are legitimate for religious influence or participation (Casanova 2006a, 2008).
In a longer argument regarding the separation of religion and politics, as well in terms of established churches and the participation of religious actors in the political systems as presented in the previous section, Casanova now argues that perhaps the separation is not as necessary and clear as he argued in 1994 (2008:106–113). The secularist principle of “no establishment” and “free exercise” as it is formulated in the US constitution seems to be at the same time insufficient and unnecessary – at least the “no establishment” part. Casanova argues that secular states are no guarantee for democracy (i.e. Soviet Union, Turkey, China), while several well-functioning democracies have state churches (the UK, the Scandinavian countries). A more compelling model, according to Casanova, is that of a “twin toleration,” formulated by Alfred Stepan (2001:218–225). The twin or double in question has to do with the relationship between religious authorities and state or political authorities and the other way around. Casanova defines it as a situation where religious authorities must "tolerate" the autonomy of democratically elected governments without claiming constitutionally privileged prerogatives to mandate or to veto public policy. Democratic political institutions, in turn, must "tolerate" the autonomy of religious individuals and groups not only to complete freedom to worship privately, but also to advance publicly their values in civil society and to sponsor organizations and movements in political society, as long as they do not violate democratic rules and adhere to the rule of law. (Casanova 2008:113)

With this view of a need for tolerance rather than strict separation, Casanova has also revised his view on the restriction of religion to only participate in the public sphere of civil society, not the state or political arena. As mentioned above, part of his normative view on what could constitute a legitimate public religion in a liberal democracy was the participation only on the level of civil society and public debate. This is, Casanova stresses, still a legitimate opinion (and still his own), but not a necessary condition for a modern public religion – as long as there is free exercise and protection of minorities, religious actors might have a viable place in other public arenas including the political ones (Casanova 2006a:21).

A public sphere

The public/private distinction

The concepts of “public” and “private” are central to the discussion on secularization and the place of religion in modern life, but have been used in varying ways and not always well defined (in relation to religion and in general). They are, like some of the other key concepts in this study, also problematic as they are at the same times used on several levels: in the
texts/articles analyzed, in the theoretical literature and as analytical concepts. As discussed briefly at the beginning of the last section, this is especially salient in relation to religion where ideas about the proper place of religion – as a private matter or with a legitimate place in the public sphere – have been contested since the Enlightenment. To sort through the varying ways these concepts are used, I will use the categorization by Jeff Weintraub (1997).

Weintraub questions the simplicity of the public-private distinction, arguing that it might blur our discussions more than clarifying them when used undefined. He separates different schools of thought or paradigms where the public-private distinction has been used, and has quite varying understandings both of what is private and what is public. These are, on the most basic level, separated between completely different understandings of what public or private refers to, namely “visibility” and “collectivity”:

1) What is hidden or withdrawn versus what is open, revealed or accessible.
2) What is individual, or pertains only to an individual, versus what is collective, or affects the interests of a collectivity of individuals. This individual/collective distinction can, by extension, take the form of a distinction between part and whole (of some social collectivity). (Weintraub 1997:5)

This separation between what has to do with visibility from what has to do with the individual/collective is fundamental to bear in mind when discussing some of the issues in this dissertation.

Weintraub then continues with presenting four different models or versions of the public-private distinction made in political and social analysis. These are sometimes descriptive but sometimes, to a varying degree, also normative, as they prescribe certain preferred ways for what should be seen as public or private in relation to political life, for example. Weintraub calls these distinctions or models the liberal-economistic model; the republican-virtue approach; sociability; and finally the feminist approach. (Weintraub 1997:7) Here, I will also put them in relation to some of the theories of religion presented previously and how they might be used in the study of religion.

The liberal-economistic model: The market and the state
In this way of thinking about the public and private, the key to distinct between them has to do with jurisdiction. What is public is the state, and what the state has jurisdiction and control over, and what is private is the free market run by logics other than the political in terms of authority and state intervention. This distinction has to do with the second of Weintraub’s understandings above: The tension between individual and collective. In this way of thinking, the tension is between the private, voluntary organization of
individuals versus the regulation or force from public authority (Weintraub 1997:8–10).

The view of the public as defined by jurisdiction and the state is often central to discussions on church-state relationships, not least in relation to the US constitution and the “no establishment” clause. The understanding of the private as the free market (and a positive view on it) is also clearly echoed in the rational choice theories of religion (e.g. Stark and Bainbridge 1987; Young 1997), though usually less present within the secularization paradigm.

The republican-virtue approach: Citizenship and the public sphere

In this model, we still mostly revolve around the tension between individual and collective, and a focus on the political, but in a quite different way. A key feature in the second model is citizenship, and the rights and obligation of the individual to contribute to the public or common good. The public sphere in this model is political as in the last one, but if the first public sphere was the state administrative authority, here it is collective, rational discussion, argument and decision-making.

A key difference between the two models is the normative difference in the view of the public. In the first model, the public, or state, is perhaps not inherently negative but should be limited, and the main view of where the “good” for society will happen relies on the free market. In the second view, the public is the place where people come together to create the good society, and is to be protected from commercialization and negative influences from over-strong special interests. Weintraub acknowledges that these two models differ in important ways, especially in their understandings of what the political and a society is, but they have together been hugely important to how we think about the public and private in relation to politics (Weintraub 1997:10–11, 16).

In relation to religion, this model is central to Casanova and his understanding of public religion, and Habermas himself (who is largely connected with this model) has in his works on religion discussed its place along these lines (see, further, p 42). As Weintraub argues, the first two models have a lot in common, and I would argue that they have been the basis of the more classic understandings of religion in public life and perhaps especially relating to secularism and the idea of a secular state. Separating between the notion of a secular state and a multi-religious society as a means of understanding modern public religion, for example, makes sense in both these models.

Sociability: Visibility and the collective life

In this understanding of the public, we move away from the traditionally political, and think more in terms of “public space” or “public realm,” i.e., concerning visibility rather than collectivity in decision-making. Weintraub exemplifies with how we might think that certain (Mediterranean) cities are
described as “having a rich public life” – this is usually thought of in terms of urban environments where people who do not know each other still interact or socialize. The opposite, the private, in this understanding has less to do with ownership or jurisdiction, but with domestic or family life (Weintraub 1997:16–18).

An interesting consequence is that civil society, or voluntary organizations, which in the first model is exactly what might constitute the private, is what constitutes the public in this model. Weintraub also remarks that this model is quite important for the understanding of public and private in the more general use in modern culture – the separation between the private, intimate sphere of the “personal life” in distinction from the public, which is open, visible and joint; whether that public is the market, civil society or the state is less distinct. (1997:20) It could be argued (though Weintraub does not make this point) that this is the understanding most commonly used in relation to the media – respecting someone’s personal life/privacy means not mediating it, or that the media is the more or less definition of what is public.

In relation to religion, we can in this model see other dimensions of how public and private have been used. In the debate over the “resurgence of religion,” one example often used is the increased presence of Islam in Europe and, thereby, its religious buildings and clothing. The wearing of religious clothing is a typical example of something that is considered private in the first two models, but public in the third, as it is visible and, perhaps, affects sociability.

This leads, especially in relation to media of various kinds, to new understandings of religion in public when understood in the visibility sense, as discussed by among others David Herbert (2011). He argues that neither secularization theory nor rational choice theory adequately explain the visibility of religion especially in post-colonial and diaspora communities. He calls this phenomenon the publicization, or re-publicization (in cases where religion was once privatized) of religion. When new media technology and user patterns make religious symbols and language circulate without necessarily being connected to the traditional institutions, but at the same time might be being used by them, new patterns of visibility and, potentially, changes in authority can take place. This sense of public religion, especially what Herbert calls re-publicization, has similarities with Casanova’s concept of de-privatization, but is connected to an understanding of public that is more in the visibility or sociability sense, than Casanova’s more citizenship-based model.

The feminist critique: Domestic life and making the private public
This fourth group is less of a distinct model and more an important category of critique deserving attention. Weintraub highlights how feminist critique has mostly been concerned with defining the private (or domestic) while the other perspectives presented (especially the first two) have been more inter-
ested in understanding or discussing the public. Though there is diversity in the different feminist approaches, Weintraub points to some broad tendencies.

One is that the “private” among feminist scholars is often used interchangeably with domestic – what is discussed is often how the domestic or family life is important for understanding gender power imbalance. One aspect is that the domestic sphere has been largely ignored by (male) political thinkers throughout history and seen as trivial; another that the asymmetric division of domestic labor, often hidden in this understanding of the domestic as trivial, is at the same time used to legitimize essentialized views on men and women and their abilities and rights in society. Finally, a feminist critique against the public/private distinction is that by separating the domestic/private away from the jurisdiction as well as visibility of the public, domestic violence and abuse has not been seen as a general or “public” problem (Weintraub 1997:27–29).

One particularly interesting feminist critic for my purposes, as she criticizes Habermas and is also referenced by Casanova, is Seyla Benhabib (1992). She is fundamentally positive about Habermas’ model, as she thinks it has more potential from a feminist point of view than other models of a public sphere because it does not limit the topics of debate per se. Her main critique is the un-problematized dichotomy of “public” and “private” in Habermas’ writing. Benhabib argues that this dichotomy – at least in its undefined form – must be questioned, as one of the key issues of power in society is about what is viewed as private and what is viewed as public and therefore demanding joint societal solutions. In the way that “private” has traditionally been viewed, issues regarding women have often been seen as private and not counted as political – a key part of women’s liberation has been to move issues such as rape within the marriage or care for children and the elderly away from the private sphere and put on the political agenda. Benhabib argues that a key part of a public sphere is the discussion about what should be on the public agenda, and about openness for a constant re-negotiation as to what issues are to be seen as public (Benhabib 1992:92–94).

There has been less discussion on the specific topic of feminist critique towards understandings of religion and the public. What is most relevant for my purpose, here, is questioning of the “neutral-ness” of what gets considered public or private. As Benhabib points out, there is power in definition and, as we will see, there are clearly issues of power at play regarding what kinds of religion and in what ways religion is thought to be able to be seen as public or private in the debates to be analyzed.

**How useful is the public/private distinction?**

With these different models, partly connecting and partly quite differing and often used without sufficient definition and qualification, is it really meaningful to keep using the dichotomy of public and private, at least on the ana-
lytical level? Weintraub gives no clear answer, though he seems to still find the terms useful; while pointing to the nuances and varying discourses presented previously, he seems to want to tone down the use of the terms as a grand dichotomy. As he states, there are at least two different scales going on at the same time, and it seems unfruitful to combine them into one grand dichotomy taking in the level of political/jurisdiction as one factor, as well as the sociability/visibility factor in one continuum of publicness/privateness. He summarizes:

Nevertheless, while the public/private distinction is inherently problematic and often treacherous, frequently confusing and potentially misleading, it is also a powerful instrument of social analysis and moral reflection if approached with due caution and conceptual self-awareness. (...) it can neither be conveniently simplified nor usefully avoided. (Weintraub 1997:38)

While I do agree with Wientraub on the unavoidable part, I do think there is a need for further caution, and specifically for definition and qualification. In particular, there is a need for clarity on when different meanings or aspects of the dichotomy are referred to, and perhaps also the use of other concepts such as personal, domestic or non-governmental on the one hand, or visible, mediated, political or common/joint on the other.

I believe this reflection is especially important when referring to religion, as there are highly normative statements being made about the private or public character of religion in the theoretical literature referred to here as well as in the material being analyzed in the empirical study. As the term religion itself is ambiguous and often used without proper clarity, especially in the non-academic debate, public or private are ascribed as characters of religion either inherently or in a specific political system, and, without clarifications and caution, the risk of circular arguments in discussing public or private religion is immense.

While public and private in some sense are clearly mutually constitutive categories (cf. Bexell 2005:63), they might limit our view if we see them as a one-dimensional dichotomy. As Weintraub also highlights, most of the models presented previously are actually mostly interested in one of the categories, while the other becomes a sort of residual category. Models 1 and 2 are most interested in the public, and the private is “the rest” while the feminist critique has put the focus on the private, and is less interested in defining the public (with model 3 as somewhere in between).

For my purposes, in this dissertation, it is the understanding of the public that is center stage. I will focus on varying ways that the concept and ideas around it come into play both theoretically and in the debates analyzed. The private will not be as central – but I do not want to treat the understanding of the private only as “the opposite of public,” as I regard the simplistic dichotomy as problematic. Though risking treating the private somewhat haphaz-
ardly, it will not be thoroughly examined in the way that ideas of the public will. Though I will return to distinction and the understandings of public and private in relation to each other in the final chapter, for now the public will be our main focus.

Habermas and the ideal of the public sphere
Since Jürgen Habermas’ book *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1989) first came out in 1962, and especially since its first English translation in 1989, it has been a key starting point in academic discussions on the public sphere and public discourse. Habermas describes the public sphere that arose when the bourgeoisie in European cities met and, as private citizens, disputed matters of general concern and thereby constituted a counterpart to the political life, but also to the private, in the sense of family life or the intimate. This public sphere – part historical reality, part ideal – had the conditions for a truly democratic conversation, both regarding the quality of the arguments and the participation or access by many. One of the key factors for Habermas’ idea of the public sphere is the merit of the rational argument – it should always be the (rational) weight of the argument that counts, not the position or power of the debater. He further argues that this public sphere has changed, mostly due to the powers of commercialization and the market, making a public conversation much more difficult today (Calhoun 1992; Habermas 1989). Habermas’ definition of the public sphere has been immensely influential, and his ideal of the public, rational discussion is still strong – also on the Swedish debate pages.

Habermas on religion
Having previously shown little interest in religion, Habermas gave a lecture in 2004 on the theme *Religion in the Public Sphere*. Since then he has published several pieces on religion (2006a, 2006b, 2008b). He is also often credited as the one coining the term “post-secular.” (Habermas 2008b) His first article on religion (2006b) deals mainly with questions concerning “the public use of reason” (Rawls 1997) and the possibility of religious contributions, secularist versus religious views and the place of religion in the public sphere. The concept of public sphere and public use of reason is meant in a political and philosophical sense, i.e., whether religion could have a place and even make contributions to politics in a quite narrow sense.

Habermas presents a conflict between traditionalist or fundamentalist religion and the secular states and secular “reason” of modernity, and whether it is possible to combine or at least find a way for these to move forward. His main point is that the Rawlsian concept of the public use of reason, which is the basis for the liberal state, needs to be developed further. The public use of reason means that all arguments and reasons for taking a certain stance or position in a debate should be taken on grounds that can be explained and
understood by everyone. It also takes the willingness to listen. In societies where some people are religious and some are not, a simplistic version of this could be that no arguments can be made on religious grounds, as that is not shared by everyone or cannot be explained. Habermas argues that this is not a good enough ground, and that it should be possible. Still, he means that the religious arguments must be “translated” to be understood, which would mean that secular people would have an advantage, as the discussion takes place in their philosophical “mother tongue.” Habermas argues that this requires a reciprocal learning process, that it is the responsibility of religious and secular people alike to make this discussion happen (Habermas 2006b).

One of the key points for Habermas, and one that has been criticized (Harrington 2007; Lafont 2009), is the idea of a translation process. What does it mean to translate religious arguments? And what is the difference between translating religious arguments and simply using secular ones? Though this might be a good picture or description of a process of religious actors stepping outside of their own arenas and using a more commonly accessible language to describe theological ideas, it is not very easy to use as a tool for analysis when studying a specific, published text. If a religious actor argues in favor of certain legislation using concepts such as discrimination or human rights – universal, secular reasons – and not expressions like “all men are created equal” or other more explicit theological concepts, does that make it a secular argument, or a translated religious one? If the actor is religious – or speaking on behalf of religion – does that make all his/her arguments inherently religious, though translated when a more secular language is used?

Habermas addresses this in a discussion with, among others, Judith Butler and Charles Taylor (Butler et al. 2011:109–117). In this context, Habermas stresses that this translation is mostly a question about language – not necessarily that religious actors have to translate their basis of the argument, but to put it in a more general language that can be understood by a wider audience. He again focuses the reciprocity in this situation, the possibility for mutual learning. He has also elaborated on the subject in a later article, regarding how to develop the “public use of reason” for a post-secular time (Habermas 2008a). There he describes this mutual learning process, or translation not as something necessarily applicable to individual statements or arguments but, rather, a shift in what arguments are viable and how secular and religious people to a larger extent can appreciate and accept each other’s views. While religious people throughout modernity have been forced to learn about other world views and have had to be challenged by science and secular reasoning, this has not necessarily been the case for secularists. Habermas claims that, now, the same self-reflection is needed among secular people who should start to appreciate the potential value from religious points of view, which also means a more nuanced view of modernity, less burdened with exclusive and rigid secularist claims.(2008a:137–139)
It seems Habermas is less interested in the exact nature of the argument in relation to the translation process (at least outside of jurisdiction or legislation), and more in the general attitude towards who gets to participate and whether the experiences and moral reflections from religious people should be excluded from the public sphere. There is some underlying lack of clarity in Habermas’ understanding of religion and religious people as having more or less a completely different cognitive base from secular citizens or that religious people would necessarily base their entire system of thought in non-rational bases. He does address this and discusses the fact that religious people might very well be capable of using several sources of thought, and that the cognitive is not necessarily the only, or main, part of being religious. But there is still a very strict separation between religious arguments and rational arguments, and a sense that these “religious citizens” that he describes are quite different from the secular ones. This echoes descriptions of “strong” and “weak” religions, or views of religion as being a complete set of ideas and cognitive understandings of the world that are radically separate from a science-based view. I doubt that this is what Habermas wants to argue, but the residues of a much dichotomized view of religion and secular reason still lies heavy in his texts.

Media and social change

As the media has become an increasingly important part of communication and interaction in late modern societies, scholars have used different concepts and frameworks to try to describe and explain this development and its importance and consequences regarding social change. One key concept, not least in the Scandinavian countries, has been the concept of mediatization. First launched by Swedish political scientist Kent Asp (1986) it has been discussed, criticized and developed in different directions (Couldry 2008; Hjarvard and Lövheim 2012; Hjarvard 2008b; Lövheim 2011; cf. Lundby 2009b; Strömbäck 2008). I will use Danish media scholar Stig Hjarvard as my starting point, for four main reasons: He has written extensively on the subject and been influential (though not the first) in the development of the field; his theory is developed in and specifically aimed at the Scandinavian context; he has a sociological understanding or underpinning to his theoretical framework which make it suitable to combine with my other theories; and he has studied the mediatization of religion.

Mediatization: Media as agents of social change

The main point of Hjarvard’s version of mediatization theory is that media are not something separate from culture or society but an integral part, and have become interwoven in more or less all sorts of social interaction and
communication between individuals and (foremost) institutions in late modern society. This is a double development: The media has become a more and more autonomous independent institution in society, and at the same time all other institutions have become more and more dependent on the media for their communication (Hjarvard 2011:122–123). It is not only the content or characteristics of a specific act of communication that is mediatized but that mediatization refers to a wider social change – this development is a more fundamental change in society as a whole (2011:124). He defines mediatization as

the process whereby society to an increasing degree is submitted to, or becomes dependent on, the media and their logic. This process is characterized by a duality in that the media have become integrated into the operations of other social institutions, while they also have acquired the status of social institutions in their own right. As a consequence, social interaction – within the respective institutions, between institutions, and in society at large – take place via the media. The term ‘media logic’ refers to the institutional and technological modus operandi of the media, including the ways in which media distribute material and symbolic resources and operate with the help of formal and informal rules. (Hjarvard 2008b:113)

This process has made different societal institutions, such as politics, education, religion, and others, more and more dependent on the media, and it has changed the institutions and society itself. Hjarvard makes a distinction between mediatization and the commonly used term ‘mediation,’ as mediation refers to how a specific message or piece of information, or the relationship between sender and receiver, is changed or affected by the fact that it is mediated, communicated via a medium, while mediatization refers to the larger, more overarching social change over time (Hjarvard 2008b:114–115).

This development of the media into an independent societal institution has taken place during the twentieth century and interwoven with a development of politics and capitalism in modern and late modern societies. Hjarvard describes a shift from a situation where media were more or less means for different interests in society, foremost political parties, and run with the logic of these interests. There followed a period (roughly 1920–1980) where the media were independent but governed by journalistic principles and public steering, and functioned mostly as a cultural institution. Around 1980 a new shift took place into today’s situation with strong independent media institutions, where commercial considerations and media logic are the key principles. (Hjarvard 2008b:120)

Media logic

The concept of media logic is central in mediatization theory, but also one that has been quite contested. When arguing that the sectors of society are to
an increasing degree adapting to the media logic, it is necessary to have a clear definition of what this logic is to be able to test the claim empirically. Still, the term media logic is used in a somewhat loose way among some scholars in the field.

The term media logic was first used by Altheide and Snow (1979) and has not just been used in mediatization theory. The term has been criticized by, among others, Knut Lundby (2009a). Lundby worries that the way the term is used, especially in the singular form, by for example Stig Hjarvard and Andrea Schrott (2009), risks turning mediatization into an over-linear and deterministic theory, or too much of a grand, overarching theory to be applicable to empirical testing. If it is not possible to define and operationalize media logic, the theory could be useless as a tool for analyses.

Lundby returns to Altheide and Snow and to their reading of Simmel which is key to their argument. According to Lundby, Altheide and Snow are not clear enough on their use of Simmel’s concepts of form and format, leading to some confusion in their terminology. Lundby advocates a focus on the social interaction – what is central to mediatization theory is not a uniform understanding of singular, testable media logic, but a contextualization. When focusing social interaction, we can study how specific acts of communication and interaction take place, and how they are changing and, in turn, influence society at large (Lundby 2009a:116–117).

For this study, what is central is the media logic of the genre of the debate article. The debate article has some key features: Newsworthiness is central, either as it connects to already-established news stories or events, or as it creates news and sets a new agenda. As debate articles are always signed, and, as they are often written not by journalists or contracted writers, who writes (or signs) them is often an important part of the news value and not just the content of the article. To a varying degree, the different opinion pages strive towards giving space to a multitude of voices, and thus giving a new perspective or a position not yet heard in a specific debate is valued by the editors (see, further, p 56, 64).

Though there are obvious risks in using the term media logic, and for example Hjarvard has in his later works been more careful about how he uses the term (often referring to the ‘modus operandi’ of the media, rather than logic), it is hard to bypass the idea of a specific way of doing things, that is inherent to the media (or specific media genres), and that, if using mediatization theory, this has a shaping impact on the surrounding society. I do agree with Lundby that the solution is not to abandon the theory altogether but to be precise in what is to be studied. The larger, deterministic claims can be put to one side while still studying how specific traits of certain media shape and change how other spheres of society interact not only with that media but also internally and with others.
**What is “news”?**

When it comes to journalism and also the opinion or debate sections of newspapers, a key concept for understanding media logic is news value or newsworthiness. These concepts have no locked and universal definitions, but are often used by journalists and editors themselves, as well as in media research, and knowing what is newsworthy is often a key part of a journalist’s professional skill.

There are many definitions of news value, and one of the attempts to formulate an empirically-based formula for news value was by Swedish media scholar Håkan Hvitfelt (1985), based on a study of first-page news in Swedish newspapers. This means that it is based on what, empirically, makes the first page rather than editors’ ideas about what should make the news.\(^5\) Hvitfelt’s formula for news value is a list of statements:

The probability that a news story will be produced, published, be placed on the first page and be the main article increases the more it deals with

1. politics, economy, crime or accidents
2. and there is a short geographic or cultural distance
3. to events or conditions
4. that are sensational or surprising,
5. deal with individual elite people
6. and are described simply enough
7. but are important and relevant,
8. take place during a short time span but is part of a theme,
9. have negative elements
10. and have elite people as sources. (Hvitfelt 1985:215–216)

Hvitfelt’s starting point is built on several previous studies of news value, among them Johan Galtung’s and Mari Holmboe Ruge’s early and very influential study of foreign news in Norwegian newspapers (Galtung and Ruge 1965). Though they have been criticized throughout the years, their article has been a point of reference for many academic discussions on newsworthiness (cf. Harcup and O’Neill 2001), and their points about what makes the news largely overlap with Hvitfelt’s. While Galtung and Ruge studied the published articles, another influential study was by Herbert J Gans, who made an ethnographic study of four newsrooms, observing and interviewing journalists in order to study what becomes news (Gans 1979). Among the factors stressed by Gans, one important to Hvitfelt is “story suitability,” namely how a specific story suits the format, genre and aims of a specific news magazine or TV news program, and that the end result depends both on journalistic assessment and the structures of the news system.

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\(^5\) This study is also referenced in Hadenius, Weibull, and Wadbring 2011, which in several editions has long been a core textbook in Swedish schools of journalism, so it is likely well known to many Swedish journalists.
Though perhaps not all elements of Hvitfelt’s formula above are directly relevant to debate articles, it is likely that editors reason along these lines when they try to determine whether a debate article has news value and whether it is relevant enough to be published. I will return to this theme later in this chapter (p 56) and when I present the interviews with the debate editors (p 65).

Mediatization of politics

Before moving into the field of religion, I will dwell on the first context studied in mediatization studies: politics. This is partly because the texts that are to be analyzed in this study, debate articles, are to a large degree situated within a political setting and can be seen as a political genre, but also because the mediatization of politics shows some of the processes of mediatization in a more direct way, and can be used for comparison in the upcoming analyses.

A comprehensive model is presented by Swedish media scholar Jesper Strömbäck (2008). His definition of mediatized politics is when politics are guided more by the logic of the media than the logic of politics. He describes four dimensions of a relationship between media and politics which can be useful for empirical studies of specific cases (Strömbäck 2008:235). Looking at different dimensions underscores the fact that mediatization is not a linear process but can be more or less mediatized in relation to the different dimensions. The dimensions refer to what extent is the media the main source for information about politics; the independence of the media as institutions from political powers; the degree to which political logic or media logic determine the content of the media; and, finally, to what extent political actors are governed by political or media logic. (Strömbäck 2008:234–235)

Strömbäck describes a development in four phases, which is more of a theoretical outline than a recollection of actual history. The first phase happens when media become the primary source for information on politics and societal issues, and can be labeled mediatized politics (Strömbäck 2008:36). This is the most important step, a clear shift from pre-modern societies and a prerequisite for the smaller, upcoming steps. In phase two media are governed more by media logic than political logic when reporting on politics, and mean an increased independence – coinciding with the professionalization of journalism and the commercialization of the media. The third phase is characterized by an increasing independence, as political actors and authorities have to adapt to the media rather than the opposite. In this phase the conflict or unease between media and politics can be very present, as everyone (NGOs, lobbyists, politicians, state authorities) have to adapt to the media logic while the media are still regarded as something foreign or at least outside the political system.
In the fourth phase, the political system has completely internalized the media logic, and the notion of newsworthiness, to the point where it is no longer seen as adaptation but as an integral part of the actual political process. In this phase, actors might not be able to separate a political logic from media logic – they are in constant campaign mode. Being able to set the news agenda of the day is a key priority, and avoiding the media is neither possible nor wanted. The media coverage is viewed rather as a factual part of the empirical reality to adapt to, like security threats or economic growth. This influence is stronger for elected officials but to a limited degree also a reality for other parts of the political, societal and state system. (Strömbäck 2008:240–241)

Mediatization of religion

When it comes to religion, Hjarvard has argued three main points about how mediatization changes religion. First, media have become an important source of information about religion and, as the mass media are both producers and distributors of religious experiences and information, the traditional religious institutions have lost (some of) their authority over religious issues and content. Secondly, religious narratives, symbols, experiences and beliefs become molded according to the genres of the media and lose their connection to tradition, and are used by the media in ways other than according to religious institutions. Hjarvard calls this “banal religion”, a mix of religious and mythical symbols and references forming a sort of religious and/or mythical universe of popular culture. Thirdly, the media have taken over functions in society from the religious institutions, such as rituals, mourning, guidance and forming a sense of community (Hjarvard 2011:124). In later articles, Hjarvard (2012) has specified these three points as distinct fields, or forms of mediatized religion that perhaps should be studied separately, or at least with a clear distinction in the way media and religious institutions are interacting.

The first form is religious media – media organizations or performances controlled by a religious organization or an individual. This could include anything from a large TV station or publishing house to a personal blog. It could also include religious content aired or printed in other media, such as Christian services broadcast on public service TV. This form is the least mediatized of the three as the religious actor still is in control of the content. Still, it is not unaffected by the process of mediatization, as the logic of the type of medium (blog, broadcast, etc.) and the media arena in general will influence choices of form and content, and probably also the authority and legitimacy of institutionalized and upcoming religious actors. (Hjarvard 2012:28–31)

The second form of mediatized religion is journalism on religion. In this case the religious actors participate mainly as a source for news articles or
features, and will be more directly subject to media logic, especially newsworthiness. The religious actors might – depending on their newsworthiness – get access to media, but they would rarely be able to control the outcome, and will also risk being scrutinized, as it would be the journalist or editor that would frame the article or choose the angle. An increased visibility of religion in terms of journalism on religion does not necessarily mean a positive portrayal or increased influence or authority of religion in the public domain. (Hjarvard 2012:31–34)

The final form is banal religion, as presented above. Hjarvard uses this concept inspired by Billig’s use of banal nationalism, meaning a backdrop or self-referencing system of symbols, narratives, characters or ideas from different religions or supernatural understandings. These references are detached from their original context and from the institutions or authorities claiming them, and molded by the genres of popular culture. They could also be combined with other forms of mediatized religion – Hjarvard’s example is a journalistic piece on the Catholic Church being accompanied with images of symbols not related to the story but chosen to allude to religiosity in general. Banal religion can be seen as the most mediatized form of religion, in the sense that the religious institutions have little or no control of this content and the authority of interpretation of these symbols and references is not being controlled by religious actors in any way. (Hjarvard 2012:34–36)

Previous versions of Hjarvard’s theory has met with some criticism regarding the understanding of religion, for example by Mia Lövheim who challenges his uses of the terms “weak” and “strong” religion and also his definition and measuring of religious change (Lövheim 2011:154–160). Her suggestions of how to further develop the thesis of mediatization is twofold: First, a more inclusive definition of religion that opens up for the communicational functions of religion and its dependence on social and cultural context while still being specific enough to be able to study religion as something distinct. Second, she suggests a less deterministic or linear view of the interplay between media and religion, where both the media and religious actors are seen as the actors shaping religion (2011:162–164). Though some of these points have been developed in Hjarvard’s later work, referenced here, especially the point on the interplay between religious actors and media actors, there is still validity to the point of being careful with the understanding of religion. Originally, Hjarvard argued for a quite linear understanding of mediatization contributing to secularization or religious decline (2008a) which has been criticized (Couldry 2008; Lövheim 2011) but, even though he has nuanced his claims, there is a need to be careful with what is presupposed. When combining mediatization theory with different understandings of religious change, or the place of religion in the public sphere, there is a risk of unconsciously blurring what is seen as causing change and what is evidence of change, or, to put it in more traditional social scientific terms, dependent and independent variables. This is especially important when
working with concepts such as religion, as the varying ways of understanding what religion is could alter the understanding of what has changed or not.

**Religious actor or religious content?**

Among the further developments of the mediatization theory that Lövheim has contributed to, one regards the distinction between religious actors and religious content in defining what (mediatized) public religion might refer to (Lövheim 2012). Her argument was sparked as a response to an article by German sociologist Jens Köhrsen (2012), where he criticized the post-secularist approaches or, more specifically, the broad assumptions concerning a return of religion to media and the public sphere. His main criticism is that the broad discussion rarely includes a precise definition of religion; hence it is very hard to make claims on the presence of religion. In a small empirical study, he concludes that most occurrences of religious actors (churches, in his case) participating in the media do not write or talk about what he with a narrow definition classifies as religious language or content. He therefore argues that this cannot be seen as public religion as the religious actors adapt to the secular or common language of the public discourse (Köhrsen 2012:280–282).

Lövheim is not convinced by Köhrsen on the fruitfulness of having such a narrow definition, as it leaves quite a small part of the public presence of religious actors to study and, though precise, it might be too narrow. Still, Lövheim uses his argument as a starting point to separate between religious actors and religious communication or content as two dimensions of religious participation in the media/public sphere, which form four categories of public performance of religion (Lövheim 2012:5–6). Lövheim does not give her own definition of religious communication but cites both Köhrsen’s “communication and/or practices referring to a supernatural – transcendent – reality” and Hjarvard’s view of religion as “human actions, beliefs and symbols related to supernatural agencies” (Lövheim 2012:5). She also notes Hjarvard’s distinction between the varying communicational functions: persuasion, rituals, information, critical scrutiny, entertainment, to name a few, some more associated with religious institutions or actors and other with the secular.

Using these categories, separating between the different ways religion is found in the public sphere is clear. While Köhrsen is right about the occasional lack of clarity in the debate, focusing only the argument/content and not the actor does not only make the scope of study very narrow, I would also argue that it does not correspond with other perceptions of religion in the public sphere. Of the main theoretical starting points for this dissertation, the sociological and organizational/institutional is central. For Casanova as well as Habermas, though content is not irrelevant, it is still the organiza-
Theoretical model for analysis

Reading these different theories about religious change, religion in the public and mediatization together, patterns and models for analyzing the participation of religious actors in the Swedish debate are starting to emerge. In this last section of the theory chapter, I will draw up some of these lines, further relating the different theories to each other; present some characteristics for a public religion in a mediatized public sphere and, finally, present some themes for the analysis.

Public religion, de-privatization and visibility of religion

In the secularization debate, the general discussion on the privatization of religion has often failed to make the distinction between different understandings of the terms public and private clear. It has sometimes meant the separation of church and state or a move away from religious influences of politics, perhaps mostly in the US context of no establishment; most of the theories referenced above, especially Casanova’s, use more citizenship-based understanding of the public sphere, and that the privatization (or not) of religion has to do with its influence over the rational decision-making. But there is also an understanding of the privatization of religion that has to do with the visibility or sociability; the most paradigmatic example is perhaps Luckmann’s (1967) description of invisible religion. Also the debates over religious clothing and buildings in many European countries are obviously based on an understanding of publicness that has to do with visibility – banning religious symbols from the physical public space to uphold the secularity of the public sphere or state only makes sense in that understanding of the public.
Returning to Weintraub’s two basic types of public/private distinctions, the individual/collective and the visible/accessible, both can be related to discussions on religion. They are also relevant to bear in mind in relation to the media, and mediated debate. When someone or something is either covered by the media or chooses to participate in a mediated debate, they become public in the visibility sense. But that is not necessarily the same as being public in the sense of collective decision-making, claiming authority or participating in the public use of reason as Habermas describes. Relating these categories to Hjarvard’s three models of mediatized religion, they relate to different types of publicness. While the third one, banal religion, only relates to the visibility spectrum, as it has little connection to decision-making and public debate and more to the genres of popular culture. The other two types, religious media and journalism on religion, can be related more to the collective decision-making aspect of publicness, but not necessarily. While religious media might be a way to promote opinions and to participate in a general public debate, it may also be a way to maintain a separate sphere or arena where no claims are made on issues more generally seen as joint or communal in society. Also in journalism on religion, there may very well be instances of where religious actors express opinions and participate in debate, or share experiences and therefore influence issues perceived as public in the Casanova-Habermasian sense. But it is not a prerequisite per se, as journalism can make religion visible without necessarily presenting any of these. So, while Hjarvard’s types relate to the varying ways of understanding publicness, they do not correspond exactly.

**Debate articles – a specific arena for religion in the public sphere**

In relation to the different concepts and ways of understanding public spheres, public religion and mediatized religion, the empirical material at hand, debate articles, are in no way the entire participation of religion in the media or public sphere but are an interesting example and a place to study mediated, public religion.

The debate article, published in newspapers and part of the editorial process, but written by the religious actors themselves, becomes an in-between type of religious media and journalism on religion. They are part of the editorial process and chosen and published according to journalistic principles and the media logic and, in that sense, are part of the journalism of religion. However, they are not written by independent journalists, are not part of the coverage of religion, but formulated and initiated by the religious actors themselves, and therefore also have traits of what Hjarvard describes as religious media. Debate articles are not separated from the other parts of news media – they are often written on topics covered in the news, and debate articles of high news value are often reported upon in other media, and their writers interviewed on radio and TV shows. Though the main criteria for publishing articles are news value and quality (according to the debate edi-
tors, see p 65) there is also the ideal of allowing different voices to be heard, and of a public debate where actors of different types, with particular knowledge and experience, take part in a public conversation. The main genre is to present an argument, often raising an issue or pushing for political action; other types of articles are also published, as we will see in the empirical material: testimonies of specific experiences or reflections and a different point of view.

With the earlier discussion of Habermas, presenting his view of the post-secular society as one where religious people have an equal right to present their knowledge and experiences, though based in a religion not necessarily shared by all, the debate article seems like an arena where this could be studied. Casanova also puts public debate at the center of his theory of deprivatization, as the key point is leaving the private sphere to take part in the public conversation. These were the main reasons for choosing this empirical material, and also points to some of the areas that will be central in the study.

Criteria for mediated public religion

Having placed the study within these different theoretical frameworks, it is time to return to the research question and see how these theories can help answer it. The overarching question of how religious actors participated in the debate pages will be the focus of Chapter 4 and mostly empirically driven. But the second question, how Casanova’s concept of public religions can be helpful in interpreting the results, and the importance of the media logic of the debate article, need some further elaboration.

First, it is important to note that both Casanova and Habermas are quite normative in their propositions: Habermas in particular, with his discussions on the public use of reason; and Casanova moves beyond the descriptive and analytical aim in his study of public religions and gives his normative view on what types of public participation are legitimate for religions in modern, liberal societies. Though he tones this down in his later publications, he is still firmly grounded in his view of liberal democracies and how they should work.

This study has no such normative approach. I do not intend to evaluate whether the religious actors studied behave in the way they “should” according to Casanova or Habermas, or to define whether they represent proper public religions. Still, Casanova’s normative traits for public religions are useful as criteria to see how the religious actors position themselves or are positioned in the debate. As he discusses certain basic positions, types of questions and ways to participate, his understanding forms a starting point from which to analyze the religious participation.

Combining these criteria with Weintraub’s distinction between different kinds of public, Habermas’ discussion on the public use of reason and religious arguments, and the theory of mediatization and how the media logic...
molds the public sphere of the media, we find some criteria or points to look for in the debate.

*Participating in collective issues – not just visible*

Though much of the debate over the resurgence of religion in Europe has revolved around an understanding of the public that has more to do with visibility than collectivity, in Casanova’s understanding – and even more so in Habermas’ – the focus is an understanding of the public that has to do with citizenship and decision-making. Therefore, in this study, the focus will be on studying how religious actors participate regarding collective societal issues, and separating that from visibility of internal or specific faith issues. The presence of potential visibility of religion is interesting, but needs to be analytically separated at this stage. Public religions in Casanova’s sense are not only publicly visible but also claim to bring contributions of their own to a joint or communal societal conversation.

To clarify: I see the visibility aspect of publicness, the visibility of religion, as a larger category, with public religion in this stricter sense as only one of potentially many instances of visible religion or religion in the public realm in a less defined sense.

*Focusing the “legitimate” questions*

Casanova presents a list of types of questions that are legitimate for religions to contribute towards in a modern society, though he does point out it is not exhaustive. My understanding is that they are based on his view of where religion might bring a specific contribution different from any other. As presented above, he points out as legitimate where religions protect freedom of religion and other core freedoms and rights, including protecting the basic liberties of democracy itself; to bring a moral critique against states or capitalism, protecting the weak in society or the common good; and where religions protect the life-world from intrusions by the state or other outside forces.

Habermas makes no such definition of what kinds of issues are legitimate for religions to participate in the discussion of them, but he also mentions that it is likely that on moral issues, for example, religion might have a specific contribution to bring.

This is perhaps the area where I find Casanova’s normative view especially limiting and quite problematic, especially regarding the last point. The very definition of what constitutes the life-world and what should be the joint concern for society is an issue in itself, following Benhabib, and one where religious actors may be found on both sides of the dividing line on a specific issue. I find it more reasonable to see the ambitions, or scope of questions addressed, of the religious groups as an empirical question. Still, for our analysis, it is a valuable category to look at, to see whether Casano-
va’s types of issues are relevant in describing whether or not religions participate in Swedish debate pages.

Accepting modern, pluralist society
One of the key points for Casanova as well as Habermas is the need for religions to accept a pluralist society and not, at least de facto, claim any ultimate truths or authority over the interpretation of reality. Only when accepting the basis of modern liberal democracy, including the freedom of religion, the right to privacy and the legitimacy of other religions or world views, can religious actors participate in the public debate.

As this is a comparatively clear and simple criterion, it will be a key to look for in the empirical material. But it also interesting, as it is possible to think that, though they have to adhere to the “rules” of the mediated debate, religious actors participating in debate also have to legitimize their points of view and their participation. While they have to accept pluralism, they would potentially also have to show what their specific contribution is, why they should be a participant in the debate.

Religious or commonly accepted arguments
Though Casanova does not specifically discuss the types of arguments used by religious actors (apart from leaving absolute truth claims aside), this is a point for Habermas. While it seems that his discussion about translating religious contributions might not be applicable as an analytical tool for individual statements, it could still be relevant to see to what extent the religious actors talk about issues relating to the transcendent or draw upon religious tradition or reference religious authority in the narrow sense defined by Chaves (see above, p 31). Using Lövheim’s typology, all material in this study falls into categories 1 and 2, as they are all written by actors associated with religious institutions. But it might be useful to distinguish between themes and articles that could largely be categorized as religious content and non-religious content. I would argue that it is also meaningful to see that this might be applicable both to the arguments or reasons provided, as well as the issue or theme of the articles itself.

Playing by the media logic
Most of the points presented above have started from Casanova’s or Habermas’ theories about religion in the public sphere. But an important aspect in this study is also the fact that these debates take place in a mediated arena, and the specific genre of the debate article. There are editors deciding who and what gets published, and the actors are to varying degrees conscious about the factors that lead to influence and attention, according to the media logic of debate articles. Following Hjarvard’s and Strömbäck’s writing on mediatized religion and politics, one would expect to see traits of these processes in the material. It is likely that articles adhere to criteria of newswor
thiness and genre conventions, the increased interest in high profile people and individuals rather than structure. Though the main perspective will not be mediatization, it is important to bear in mind the features of this specific type of text. An operationalization of the media logic of debate articles, based on previous research as well as interviews with debate editors, will be presented in Chapter 3, p 67.

**Use of theory in the upcoming analysis**

Though the overarching questions of public religion and media logic will be present throughout the dissertation, certain aspects of the different theories will be used more specifically in some of the chapters. The results overview, Chapter 4, is a mainly descriptive presentation of the empirical results of the first step of the study, while the three analysis chapters have different theoretical and methodological angles. In Chapter 5, discussing the debate over the Marriage Act, questions regarding public religions are at the forefront, especially regarding legitimate types of questions and religious arguments. In the second analysis chapter focusing on the Church of Sweden and its exceptional position, questions regarding mediatization and media logic and questions of different types of public will be posed as well as the criteria for public religions. These criteria will also be discussed in Chapter 7, analyzing the contributions of religious minorities, together with perspectives regarding media logic. Finally in Chapter 8, I will return to the different theoretical perspectives and discuss the results from the analyses in light of theory.
3. Methodology

Starting point: A social constructivist worldview

In their classic book *The Social Construction of Reality* (1967), Berger and Luckmann discuss how knowledge and meaning-making are constructed, sustained and handed over to new generations; how everything we know about the world is socially constructed. Our understanding of the world can only be internalized and maintained through language, in itself social and shared, and everything that is perceived is interpreted and given meaning through what we already know about the world. Though social constructivism has been well developed and expanded beyond that since, not least in philosophy (cf. Hacking 1999) and in connection epistemology of qualitative research (cf. Lincoln and Guba 1985), in my approach, I refrain from making any wider claims as to whether it is possible to study the world as such. In the most radical forms of social constructivism, the claim is made that no other reality than the socially constructed one exists. I would rather take the stance of James Beckford (whose position in relation to religion will be further developed in the coming sections) and simply state that all knowledge we can get comes via language and, to be meaningful to us as researchers and readers, it has to be interpreted with the tools and categories constructed in the social world. Hence, all we in fact can study is the socially constructed world, without making any claims or not whether any “actual reality” exists (Beckford 2003:4). To me this is more of an epistemological choice than an ontological claim. As everything we could study with the methods and theories of social sciences are shaped by the social interactions, communication, interpretation and meaning-making on the micro level as well as on a societal level, I believe that it is possible to study the socially constructed reality without making any truth claims outside of what is studied, but neither ruling the existence of such a reality out. Especially when studying a discursive subject such as a public debate and texts written in a context of discussion and negotiating of values and opinions, the study should be made with an awareness of the ongoing interpretations, constructions and negotiations regarding the very same thing that is debated.

Though using the term “discursive” here, this is not a study situated in the context of discourse theory, associated with Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985; cf. Torfing 1999). I am more inspired by Norman Fairclough’s (1992, 1995) critical discourse analysis, which sees discourse, or
the order of different discourses, as part of a social reality where text and discourse interact with the social structures. In Chapter 7, I will use Fairclough’s method for discourse analysis and will expand on how I use it. Here, I want to stress that the underlying assumptions of discourse theory are not a starting point for this study.

Another good argument for starting from a social constructivist point of view is that it is shared by both scholars of religion and media scholars. We will soon return to religion but, as an example of the latter, Friedrich Krotz discusses the social constructivist starting points for mediatization theory and its connection to the study of social change (Krotz 2009:28–31). He argues that a meta-theory like mediatization needs to be very clear about its foundations, such as its understanding of communication and the relationship between the individual and collective. He starts with Berger and Luckmann and social constructivism as the ultimate starting point for mediatization theory, that everything is communication; how we communicate and who we communicate with form the basis of the social reality.

It is also the base for studies of representation, within media and communication studies as well as wider cultural studies. Representation is defined by Stuart Hall as “the production of meaning through language” (Hall 1997:28). Communication is about interpretation and meaning-making rather than simple messages, and this is a process that includes the audience – when studying representation; it is not simply to study the contents of what is “sent out” – the meaning-making takes place just as much in the interpretation and receiving part: representations are given their meaning in a community, through a shared language. The symbolic practices of language are the focus of the study of representations in a constructivist framework rather than the material world as such (Hall 1997).

Starting with a social constructivist view where communication and language are key components of the entire social reality, it is not a big step to let media, communication and mediatization play an important part in the analysis of social change. If communication is the basis of society, and if our communication is changed in its core by media(tization), then also society itself will be changed by this process. To Berger and Luckmann, face-to-face interaction was central, though they do not attribute the same importance to mass communication. But in a late modern, mediatized society, the mass media constitute an increasingly important frame of reference for people, and an increasing amount of face-to-face interaction is in fact mediated (by mobile phones, e-mail, instant messaging and social media, for example), at least for the younger generation. Mediatisation in this view is a process where the conditions for communication and social interaction are changed and therefore the construction of the social reality, and society as such, will be changed (cf. Couldry 2011; Hall 1997).
The problematic concept of religion

In his book *Social Theory and Religion* (2003) James Beckford argues for the need to move past some of the common problems in studying religion, such as the risk of essentializing religion or being too focused on religious ideas and missing the lived aspects of religion. One core part of his approach is studying what counts as or becomes religion – the boundaries, conceptualizations and negotiations (Beckford 2003:1–2). Another important starting point for him is the study of religion as a social phenomenon, as he writes:

The start-point is the assertion that, whatever else religion is, it is a social phenomenon. Regardless of whether religious beliefs and experiences actually relate to supernatural, superempirical or noumenal realities, religion is expressed by means of human ideas, symbols, feelings, practices and organizations. These expressions are the products of social interaction, structures and processes, and in turn they influence social life and cultural meanings to varying degrees. The social scientific study of religion, including social theory, aims to interpret and explain these products and processes. (...) it makes very little sense, in my view, to think of religion as an object or a subject that could exist independently of human actors and social institutions. Religion doesn’t “do” anything by itself. It does not have agency. Rather, it is an interpretative category that human beings apply to a wide range of phenomena, most of which have to do with notions of ultimate meaning or value. (Beckford 2003:2, 4)

Beckford questions the use of religion as a generic concept, as it makes it tempting to compare or generalize very differing social phenomena over time and space, risking overlooking the social contexts. Therefore, he is also skeptical about universal definitions of religion, as they are both unattainable and problematic and they risk masking the complexity of the social processes of how things count, or do not count, as religious, and risk leading thought in an essentialist direction (2003:15–18). Instead, he argues for another strategy, namely

... to map the varieties of meaning attributed to religion in social settings, to discern the relative frequency of the prevailing meanings and to monitor changes over time. In this way, the twin dangers of arbitrariness and narrow essentialism would be avoided. (Beckford 2003:20)

This skepticism about a universal definition of religion, and uneasiness about religion as a generic concept, is something Beckford shares with other scholars of religion, among others José Casanova and Talal Asad, as discussed in the introduction (p 21).
Studying religion – separating definition and operationalization

This theoretical or conceptual discussion on religion, knowledge and communication is important as a background to the methodological choices and design of my study. As I aim to study the way (what is perceived or constructed as) religion takes place or presents itself in public debate, I need a definition, or rather an operationalization, of a religious actor or of someone who represents religion. Following Beckford’s discussion, above, I prefer a heuristic or tentative operationalization, close to the everyday “common sense” understanding of what religion or a religious actor/institution is, but not making any claims that they are “really” religious in any other sense. Also, as my interest is not in finding out whether these actors, as individuals, are “really” religious in any sense concerning faith, emotions, behavior, etc., a definition regarding any of those factors also seems unnecessary. My operationalization of a religious actor is someone who presents themselves with a title indicating a position (including membership) within a religion or religious organization marked by words or names connected to the world religions or organizations recognized as a Registered Faith Community by the Swedish authorities. In ambiguous cases, either regarding whether the organization is connected to a religion or the person signing the article is representing religion, I have made a generous interpretation and included rather than excluded articles from the material. This has sometimes been the case where the signatory does not use a religious title but where, in the lead paragraph, it is already clear that the article is written from an “insider” perspective of a religious group or community.

Using this operationalization, some things fall outside my scope. As my aim is to study people and organizations who present themselves (or are presented) as religious or representatives of religions, I have not studied the participation of all religious individuals or whether people who are writing articles think of themselves as religious. This also means that only articles with a presentation of someone as a religious actor according to the operationalization above are included in my material. There are obviously people who might be religious as individuals but hold public office or position where this is never mentioned or used in public in any way. There are also some people in my material who, for example, are ordained or elected officials of a religious community but also hold public office. When they write articles as MPs or politicians with no mention of their religious affiliation, their articles fall outside my scope and are not included in my material.

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6 Faith communities are registered by Kammarkollegiet, but a list of faith communities can be found at the Swedish Commission for Government Support to Faith Communities (2012b) http://www.sst.a.se/inenglish.4.7f968fe211eec33de80001945.html
while articles signed by the same persons using a religious title or representing a religious organization have been included.\footnote{It could be argued that Swedish newspaper readers in general might be familiar with these people’s religious affiliation and therefore read their articles as participation by religious actors, but that is not possible to take for granted or study within the scope of this dissertation. It could also be interesting to compare when these actors use their religious title and when they do not, but that also lies outside the scope of this study.}

**Focusing on religious actors, not religious content**

In this study, the point of departure has been religious actors and studying how they participate in the public debate, rather than studying religious content or who writes about religion. This obviously means I cannot make any claims about the entire debate about religion, but that is not my scope. The reasons for choosing to focus on religious actors rather than religious content are several.

My first reason starts from theory. As Casanova’s writing on public religions (1994) is the main theoretical framework for this study, focusing on the actors makes his concepts and ideas feasible to study, and makes the actor more central than the content. It also connects to Habermas’ discussion on participation of religious actors and the use of religious arguments in the debate. Though Habermas claims to focus on the argument more than on the contributor as such, his discussion on translation processes and what arguments are viable in public debate are to a large extent as much about who can participate as about what can be said. By singling out the religious actors instead of covering everything written about religion, I hope to say something about whether Casanova’s claim that certain criteria are necessary for participation by public religions in modern societies are actually relevant when studying the Swedish context.

My second reason is the lack of research in this field, as discussed in the introduction. Bringing new empirical knowledge on the participation of religious actors in media to the field is one of my aims with this study.

The third reason has to do with my understanding of religion, as I discussed in the previous section. Moving from a social constructivist, critical view rejecting a generic concept of religion, to a practical operationalization of what to study necessarily means compromise and trying to choose the least invasive way of defining what to study without getting locked into the definitions. To me, deciding what to count as a religious organization seems less problematic, as the organizations in many cases are defined by registration as religious, and the general understanding of what a religious organization or religious position is, is likely to be closer to a scholarly understanding of it, and there is no need to define what the “religious quality” of the organization is other than its name. Another advantage of this approach when studying debate articles is that the contributors themselves (perhaps in consultation with an editor) have written the article, and chosen their own title...
or how they are presented, making it the object of the study to make that distinction. It also makes it possible to leave out the step of choosing key words to operationalize religion, which risks locking in the definition further, and with this approach the analysis can be open to finding what religion becomes in the articles, rather than using a specific definition as a starting point.

**Religious content and religious arguments**

But is religious content really possible to leave out as a category? The simple answer is no. As will be clear throughout the study, questions regarding religious content are present, and there will be analyses on what the religious actors write about and how they argue, issues of authority and faith, and in that sense there will be some attention given to religious content. Still, it is central for the approach of my study that the starting point and core interest is what the religious actors write about, not to study what is written about religion.

In the following, when I refer to religious content, or a religious argument, it is based on the definitions presented in the theory section (p 51) following Lövheim (2012). With religious content, I mean direct and indirect references to a supernatural/transcendent reality. Indirect references could be references to the organizations, texts or concepts based on or connected with the transcendent (such as the Church, the Quran, etc.). This definition also has a parallel to Chaves’ definition of religious authority presented above (p 31), connecting religious authority to legitimation (though sometimes weak) by references to the supernatural. When I use the term religious argument, I use it in this sense: An argument directly or indirectly referring to or finding its legitimation in a supernatural reality.

Again, this definition should be seen as a practical operationalization, to be able to analytically separate between different types of content and arguments, not as a claim or position about what a religious argument or content “really” is.

**Material**

The main material for my study is debate articles from three national Swedish newspapers. The research design and methods for selecting, coding and analyzing the material will be presented in the next section but, here, I will present the three papers, their debate pages and the genre and media logic of the debate article.
The newspapers

The three newspapers I have chosen for my study are the two national morning papers, *Dagens Nyheter* and *Svenska Dagbladet*, and one of two national evening or popular papers, *Expressen*.8

*Dagens Nyheter* is Sweden’s largest morning paper, published in Stockholm. It is part of Bonnier AB, one of Sweden's major media corporations owned by the Bonnier family. The political label of the editorial page is “independent liberal.” On weekdays, *DN* has a circulation of 285,700, reaching 11 percent of the population.

*Svenska Dagbladet* is the second largest Stockholm morning paper, and the only one besides *DN* distributed throughout Sweden.9 It is owned by Norwegian media corporation Schibsted. Its political label is “independent Moderate” [as in Moderaterna, Sweden's major conservative party]. Its circulation on weekdays is 185,600, reaching 6 percent of the population.

*Expressen* is the second largest evening paper in Sweden (after *Aftonbladet*). It is also published in Stockholm, but its two local editions, *Kvälls-Posten* and *GöteborgsTidningen* (edited in Malmö and Gothenburg) are included in the numbers here. It is, like *DN*, owned by Bonnier and its political label is “liberal.” As it is an evening paper, it has no subscribers but rests solely on the selling of single copies. Its circulation on weekdays is 248,500, reaching 13 percent of the population. (TU, Swedish Media Publishers’ Association 2013)

The genre and media logic of debate articles

From the previous research done on debate articles (see above, p 19), one can find some common traits, though most studies have been on *Dagens Nyheter*. These studies have shown that, in publishing decisions, news value is central; that mostly elite people are published; that articles by people from civil society or other organizations10 (those not representing politicians, academics or business/unions) represent a quite small proportion of the articles (7 percent in *DN* and 11 percent in *SvD*) (in Petersson and Carlberg 1990) and that religion has not been singled out in studies, either as a topic or as a group of signatories. They have also shown that debate articles, especially in *DN*, are regularly but not always picked up by other media and therefore impact on a public debate outside the publication itself.

8 Regarding the motivation of the choice, as well as a discussion on strengths and weaknesses with using the material, see below, page 67.
9 The Gothenburg newspaper *Göteborgsposten (GP)* has a larger circulation, but is only distributed in the Gothenburg region.
10 As religious groups are not specified in the study, it could be theoretically possible that Church of Sweden representatives were coded as “state agency” as this study was done before the separation of Church and State in 2000. I find it unlikely, though.
One weakness is of course the age of these studies – the main one by Petersson and Carlberg is over 20 years old, and the newer ones use material from the 1990s. Even though I only studied the printed version of the newspaper, it is likely that the debate pages have been influenced by the online debate fora – not just the online version of the newspapers own debate pages but also the increasing presence of online debate on specific debate websites as well as blogs and social media. Though I do not specifically study the influence of the online debate, I would be careful not to assume that the decisions and influence of the debate pages are identical to those 20 years ago.

Interviews with debate editors
To complement the knowledge about the media logic of the debate article from previous research, I have also conducted background interviews with the debate editor of each of the three newspapers: Carina Stenson at Svenska Dagbladet (2012/08/28), Nils Öhman at Dagens Nyheter (2012/09/04) and Joel Holm at Expressen (2013/03/08). In these interviews the main focus has been to understand the process of publishing and editing debate articles, whether the newspapers have specific policies and how the editors reason on issues connected to my study. The interview guide can be found in Appendix VI. The answers were generally quite similar, and the differences between the editors were mostly marginal. I will not present the results separately for each paper, but give a general view and point to some variations. All three editors interviewed are relatively new to their posts (5 years or less) and were not in charge during most of the period studied here. I have therefore not asked questions about specific publishing decisions or articles but, more generally, what the editorial processes looks like.

All three editors describe the process quite similarly: most articles they receive are fully written, but they are also contacted by potential writers who want to discuss before they actually submit any text. Sometimes articles are initiated by the editors but, typically, the initiative comes from writers. In this regard Expressen seem to have a slightly different policy with a greater emphasis on initiating and contacting potential debaters, but the majority seems to be submitted spontaneously. When politicians and representatives of businesses (and sometimes other organizations) contact debate editors, it is not usually done by the signatories themselves but by press officers or other staffers, and sometimes PR agencies. In the cases of academics and journalists, as well as some smaller organizations, it is often the signatories themselves who contact the editors.

All editors seem to work quite independently. At Svenska Dagbladet, the two debate editors are not part of the political editorial staff but work straight under the editor in chief of the newspaper. At both Dagens Nyheter and Expressen the debate editors formally report to their respective political editor but work independently and do not see themselves as part of the political
editorial team. Some publishing decisions can be discussed with the political editors, but the decision lies with the debate editors.

When deciding what articles to publish, all editors agree that news value is the single most important criterion. They have no formulated definition but follow general criteria (cf. p. 47, above) and mention that a good debate article should bring new information, new ideas or show a new/shifted position by someone with power; or it brings a new voice other than the “usual players” in a debate. Who the signatories are matters but to what extent depends on the article. Sometimes the signatory is a key part of the newsworthiness, for example when someone changes a position, when unexpected people or groups co-sign an article or when the signatory represents a perspective or part not heard in a debate. It seems three parts interplay: the newsworthiness of the content of the article, the writer/signatory and the quality of the text itself. A very well-written and researched article in a hot debate can be published even if the writer is not a “heavy player” or that well known. Regarding signatories, Expressen has a slightly different approach. While the morning papers rarely publish debate articles by the general public or individuals with no specific position, Expressen has a wider take and people from the general public, professionals or someone with personal experience of a topic are published more often. They also have a wider definition of what a debate article is, or publish a wider range of genres; besides traditional debate articles, they also publish more personal testimonies or reflective texts. These more reflective texts are unusual on the debate pages of the morning papers, but can sometimes appear at major holidays, such as Christmas or Easter.

Though they all say that their main criterion is newsworthiness, and that the main goal for the debate pages is to add news value to their respective paper, all the editors also talk about the importance of contributing to the democratic conversation, where different perspectives and voices must have a place in the public debate. Stenson (SvD) talks about the importance of an arena where public actors can lay out their argument without interruption and that its function is quite different from journalistic coverage of an issue. Holm describes how Expressen has the tradition of focusing on the “ordinary person,” on issues and perspectives interesting to not only the elite and, therefore, it is also important for the debate page to give space to voices often not heard in public.

None of the editors claim to have a policy or strategy towards religion or religious actors. They are mostly seen as other actors in civil society or sometimes as representatives of minorities, but are also valued as being able to add to a debate from a different perspective. Though all editors talk about the importance of giving different perspectives in a debate and letting different voices be heard, none of them have systematic models for what actors or topics or political leanings, etc. get published. Some of them keep track over
time, which is used more for reflection than to specifically guide publishing decisions.

**Media logic of the debate article: An operationalization**

From the previous research as well as from the interviews with debate editors, some aspects of the genre and logic of debate articles can be derived. Still, giving a precise definition of the media logic of the debate article seems to be difficult at this point, at least one that is very precise and possible to use to measure the influence of media logic of specific debates or publications or effects. Instead I would like to point to some criteria or factors to look for when analyzing the debates that might point to a logic of the debate pages. Since the editors all stress the importance of newsworthiness in their publishing decisions, I will return to the criteria proposed by Hvitfelt (see p 47, above) to complement the features pointed to by the editors and previous research.

News value is by far the most important criterion according to the editors, but it is also a specific genre to debate compared to a report. A debate article can have news value both in the text itself, that it "launches" news, for example if a political party presents a new policy or researchers present results. But it can also have news value if it regards something already established as news, such as an ongoing political debate, wars, accidents or crime already covered by the news, or brings a new perspective to an issue specifically relevant at a certain time of the year. This connects to Hvitfelt's criterion of events taking place in a short time span but being part of a theme – a debate article can follow up on an already-ongoing news story or debate for example. The point about individual elite people might also be relevant here, both regarding topic, whether an individual is the “target” of an article, but mainly regarding the signatory. Even though the editors in my interviews rarely used the term “elite people,” they were all reflecting on the importance of who the signatory is, and that they rarely (apart from *Expressen* – sometimes) published articles by people without an elite or at least established position. The point about the sensational and surprising is also relevant in regard to debate articles, and perhaps also the point about negative elements. A more difficult point regards the “important and relevant” – a major task for the debate editors is to decide what is important and relevant.

This rather vague definition of media logic obviously makes it difficult if even possible to make clear deductions in the sense of testing whether certain articles or tendencies in the material are caused by media logic or by certain aspects of the place of religion in the public arena or something similar. But this is not the intention, either. I will, rather, use this concept of the media logic of the debate article as a “correction”, not to overstate or simplify the analysis or importance of the aspect of religion. Hypothetically, media logic could be visible in the material when a certain angle is used to increase conflict, point to individual elite people or attach to an ongoing debate or
news event. Though absence is difficult if not impossible to study, to some extent certain debates not taking place or aspects not addressed in a certain debate can also be the effect of media logic, though obviously opening up for speculation.

To sum up, when the debate articles are to be analyzed, I will look for factors regarding the content of the articles – arguments and discourse, most specifically – as well as the signatories or actors. But as the articles published have “passed” the criteria of the editors they, at least to a certain degree, adhere to the editors’ ideas about a good debate article and have, to some extent, news value as well as relevance to the debate or are seen to add a new perspective. This will mostly not be the main focus in the analysis, but a present perspective.

Research design

Mixed methods content analysis with an abductive approach

As an overarching concept, the method of my study can be described as content analysis. The method has traditionally been used in media studies, mostly quantitatively, as a model for analyzing the contents of large media materials: often in a quite reductionist way and assuming that messages have certain effects on people. Klaus Krippendorff (2004) puts content analysis within a much wider framework, including all methods of studying the contents of communication, whether quantitatively or qualitatively, and including many different types of sources. For example, he includes discourse analysis and rhetoric analysis as subcategories of qualitative content analysis (Krippendorff 2004:15–20).

While I have some reservations about the assumptions often made in media content analysis studies, especially regarding the epistemology and how effects are studied, on a practical level it best describes how my study has been conducted. Though the material studied here consists of newspaper articles, traditional media studies material, the questions asked are based firmly in sociology of religion, which means reflecting on methodology both from the tradition of media studies and from sociology. As I wanted to make both a quantitative overview and a more qualitative analysis, I have been inspired by the literature on mixed methods used within the social sciences.

There are a number of different terminologies and concepts regarding multi-, combined or mixed methods in different fields and research traditions. Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003:14–34) present and discuss a number of them and how to move towards a common terminology within the field of social and behavioral sciences. Teddlie and Tashakkori themselves advocate a paradigm of pragmatism as the foundation for mixed methods research, rejecting the either/or mentality or strong dichotomy between the two ways
of thinking traditionally connected with qualitative and quantitative research. The research question should be the starting point, and whatever methods needed to answer the question should be used. They also consciously avoid all references to concepts as “truth” or “reality”, as they could pose more problems than solutions in the research process. (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003:20–21)

My study can be described as a mixed methods one, as the analysis is made in two steps: first a quantitative descriptive overview of the results, and, based on the outcome of this overview, I chose what themes and patterns to focus on in the following, qualitative analyses. Of the models presented in the literature on mixed methods, it comes closest to what Creswell calls a Concurrent embedded strategy (2009:214–215) with the qualitative approach as the major one. Still, it is only one study, using the same material and coding, but using different techniques for analysis as opposed to Creswell’s models, where the mixing of different approaches includes different types of data. But though this is mainly a qualitative study with some quantitative elements, I would still rather prefer to describe it as a mixed methods study in another sense, as I consider it much closer to how Teddlie and Tashakkori describe their attitude to research and the connection to paradigms. I do not reject the post-positivist paradigm though I start from a clear social constructivist viewpoint, and the large nature of my material and the scope of the study make it not completely fit in with the small scale, in-depth character traditionally embraced by qualitative scholars. This also means, through the coding process, I possibly do a little more reduction than is usual in qualitative research. I will also use some of the concepts presented by Teddlie and Tashakkori to discuss the inference quality/validity of my study as I find them more useful than the way this has been discussed in the qualitative tradition (cf. Kvale 2007).

One of the main authorities on media studies methodologies, Klaus Bruhn Jensen (2002:254–272), also discusses the combination or middle ground between the qualitative and quantitative paradigms in his classic handbook in media methodologies. He states the main difference between the different forms of inference or types of reasoning in science: deduction, induction and abduction, and how these have been connected to the different methodological paradigms. Quantitative studies have typically had a hypothetico-deductive approach – creating categories from theory to be tested on material, or, start with a rule, test it on a case and get a result – while qualitative studies often describes their approach as inductive – creating categories from the material to be generalized into theory, or, start with a case, get a result and present a rule. The third option, abduction, means starting with a result, apply a rule and describe the case. Bruhn Jensen claims that there has been an abductive substream, present but not always articulated in recent qualitative media studies, where the researcher uses categories from the studied material but also interprets them and introduces categories or concepts from
theory to be tested against the material (2002:259, 263–265). As Bruhn Jensen describes the concept of abduction, it has a specific innovative or creative quality to it, opening up for unexpected or new interpretations. The concept of abduction or an abductive approach is not always used in this strict sense of the categories of philosophy of science, but has also been used in a more general way to describe a process where interpretation is an ongoing process and where the researcher moves back and forth between theory and empirical material (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000:30–32). It is also described as the most common way of making inferences in content analysis, according to Krippendorff (2004:36–38). Though no hypotheses are put forward in a strict sense and the categorization of the material is not pre-defined, the researcher still comes to the material with certain concepts or ideas about what to study, based on theory and previous research. As the research progresses, the findings alter or confirm the theoretical assumptions and new interpretations or categories can be tested or used to interpret the findings in the material, making the process more dialectic. Though obviously I am hoping for creative and innovative interpretations of my material, my use of the abductive concept is more in the sense of Alvesson and Sköldberg. I believe a strict inductive method is problematic, as no researcher comes to her material “blank,” with no preconceptions. All researchers start with at least some (sometimes unconscious) ideas about categories, what to expect from the fields and what to look for. Entering a qualitative study with more elaborate concepts and theoretical ideas, without necessarily having a strict hypothesis to test, for me, makes a more transparent process both of how questions are posed and how they are answered in the study.

Research design in detail

As presented, my study was done in two steps. The first step was the content analysis. I used the predefined categories from Bromander’s previous study (Bromander 2011) but I also coded the material by theme in a more qualitative, exploratory way (see further description below). This process comes close to what Bruhn Jensen calls “thematic coding” which he describes as follows:

[A] loosely inductive categorization of interview or observational extracts with reference to various concepts, headings or themes. The process comprises, to varying degrees, the comparing, contrasting and abstracting of the constitutive elements of meaning. It is the very occurrence of a particular theme or frame in a context of communication which is of primary interest to qualitative research. (Bruhn Jensen 2002:247)

Though I work with published text and not collected material like observations or interviews, the principle is the same: To study what themes and
meanings are presented in this specific context of the debate article, and compare and find patterns in how this varies between actors and types of articles.

The three thematic chapters, or case studies, use different forms of textual analysis, which will be further presented in each chapter. In the first analysis chapter (5), the basis will be argument analysis/critical reasoning based on the model by Björnsson et al. (2009), used to analyze the arguments, reasons and assumptions used by Christian actors in the debate over marriage. In Chapter 6, the approach is more theory driven and will not contain detailed analysis of text but, rather, examples to illustrate the tendencies discussed. Finally in Chapter 7, I will analyze the articles using concepts from media theories and especially inspired by discourse analysis as it has been formulated by Norman Fairclough (1995, 2003).

These different methods are all text based and can, according to Krippendorf (2004:16), be gathered under the umbrella of content analysis, but use different techniques and also originate from different traditions and disciplines. Argument analysis is usually used in philosophy and rhetoric studies, while Fairclough’s version of discourse analysis is firmly based in sociolinguistics. As a sociologist of religion, I have no extensive training in either of these disciplines and in part they have different theoretical bases from my study. The choices of these methods were made after the initial analysis of the empirical material, and were mostly based on empirical reasons. I chose the cases to highlight both the theoretical aspects of public religion, and based on the empirical differences between the different religious groups. Starting from there, to study the religious minorities with a seemingly marginalized position, I wanted to use a text-based method well equipped to study power relations and thus chose critical discourse analysis. In studying the arguments of one specific issue, like marriage, I wanted a method focusing more on the reasoning and the arguments, and decided on argument analysis.

Using different methods for the three analysis chapters obviously has pros and cons. The main reason, as presented, was to find different things in the different cases and hence have a richer and more varied analysis. On the other hand, it is not possible to make strict comparisons between the different chapters. Had I, for example, used argument analysis for three different cases, the arguments used by different religious traditions could have been compared, and I could have drawn conclusions on the arguments used by religious actors on a more general level. On the other hand, it would probably have meant not being able to give a more detailed analysis of the discourses of religious minorities, which I now have been able to do. The three separate cases have been chosen mainly to say something specific in themselves, rather than to be comparable, and the use of three different methods strengthens this character of separate cases. The conclusions and comparisons that I have been able to make in the final chapter rest more on the over-
all picture and richness in these findings than that they have been identically conducted and are comparative in a strict sense.

**Selection of material**

The material used consisted of articles published on the debate page of each of the three newspapers, *Dagens Nyheter*, *Expressen* and *Svenska Dagbladet*, daily during the period of study: 2001-2011, signed by someone indicating representation or belonging to a religion or religiously affiliated organization. To narrow the material down, I chose to use only national newspapers, of which there are four in Sweden, two morning papers, *Dagens Nyheter* and *Svenska Dagbladet*, and two evening or popular papers, *Expressen* and *Aftonbladet*. *Aftonbladet* is the larger one, and I would have preferred to include both in my material. Unfortunately, due to the lack of good databases that cover *Aftonbladet* that are structured by section, collecting material from *Aftonbladet* using the same method and criteria as for the other papers turned out to be impossible within the time and resources available in my study. Hence, *Expressen* is the only evening paper in my material. This is obviously a lack in my study, and it is especially unfortunate as *Aftonbladet* has a different political leaning on its editorial page: Social Democratic (while the others are liberal or conservative). However, during the latter part of my dissertation work, a Master thesis project has been conducted, gathering and coding data from *Aftonbladet* during the same period using the same method; a discussion on the comparison regarding the validity will follow below (p 75).

I also considered including a local newspaper in the material, but the same lack of good databases occurred. Perhaps a local paper could have given perspectives and brought up issues other than those that take place in a national debate. Still, it is questionable if one specific local paper would have changed the overall picture, and whether it would have been possible to say something general from just one local paper.

Since the newspapers use different systems for archiving and can be found in different databases, the technique for gathering the material varied a little, and a detailed description of the process can be found in Appendix I. The main criteria for articles to be included in the sample were the stated organizational positioning of the signatories – the goal was to include all articles by religious actors. Included were representatives of denominations, congregations and religious councils, but also individual clergy (priests, pastors, imams, rabbis) as well as elected officials from church councils and congregational boards. Also representatives of religiously-affiliated organizations were included, such as the Christian peace movement, Swedish Muslims for Peace and Justice, and European Jews for a Just Peace, and religiously affiliated Aid and mission organizations, such as Diakonia, Islamic Relief and City missions. The few religiously-affiliated think tanks or political organizations that exist in Sweden were also included. Also, all articles
signed by individuals not representing organizations but signing their articles with a religious affiliation, such as “Catholic” or “Muslim” were also included. In unclear cases, the articles were included rather than excluded. A full list of organizations in the sample can be found in Appendix II.

The articles were found by going through all articles in the debate section of each paper (see details in Appendix I), and not by searching for keywords or specific terms. This approach was perhaps more labor intensive, but was done for a specific purpose. When using keywords or searches, the very definition of the terms to search for becomes the definition of what could be found. Had I searched for certain words as an operationalization of religion, I would have found articles dealing with the subject matter that includes the search words I had chosen, and not necessarily the actors (see discussion above). But also if I had chosen to search for certain keywords for specific organizations or types of position (e.g. bishop, imam, etc.), I would have narrowed the material to my own understanding of what might be in the material. With this method, all articles were examined.

Coding and analysis
The articles were coded and analyzed using qualitative research software (NVivo 9 and 10) and were coded for background variables such as paper and publishing date, for signatories and the organizations signing them, and also for themes and issues. This coding was done in a qualitative way, using some categories from the theoretical starting points but mainly letting the categories grow organically from the material. Each article has been treated as one item in the overview. Again, a detailed description of the coding process and all categories used can be found in Appendices I – IV.

Background interviews
As a background on the different newspapers and the genre of the debate article, I have met with and interviewed the debate editors of the three papers. These took place at a late stage in the work and have not been used in the selection of material or research design but, rather, as validating the interpretations made and to highlight the potential differences between the newspapers. The editors were contacted via e-mail and were informed about the research project and the aim of the interviews. They were not granted confidentiality (as the papers are named), but were given the chance to read and approve the sections where their interviews were referenced. All three editors participated, and the interviews took place at the newsroom of each newspaper respectively. The interview guide is placed in Appendix VI. A summary of the results of these interviews have already been presented in the Materials section (p 65).
Validity and transferability

Validity, being a key concept in quantitative research, has also been used in many ways in the qualitative field. Creswell (2009:190–193) argues that it is also useful and important in qualitative studies, but must be used in different ways. He argues that the strong validity is one of the advantages with qualitative research, and is determined by the accuracy of the findings – which in the qualitative tradition has more to do with trustworthiness and credibility (Creswell 2009:191). Creswell argues for the need of validity strategies, making sure to keep the process connected to the field, the informants and being aware of one’s own bias or starting points. His strategies are mostly based on qualitative studies made in a field using informants, and less applicable for a text-based study like mine. Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003:12–14) on the other hand advocate the use of the term inference quality as a way of deeming the accuracy of the research and findings. The term has been used mainly instead of the terms internal validity (quantitative) and credibility (qualitative), to refer to the ruling out of alternative explanations or interpretations, but Tashakkori and Teddlie argue that it could also be used in a wider sense to describe the accuracy of results stemming from research with mixed or combined methods. They propose two aspects of inference quality in mixed methods studies: design quality and interpretative rigor. (2003:35–42) Bruhn Jensen, finally, acknowledges the problem of applying the quantitative concept of validity to qualitative or mixed methods studies, and claims that the external validity of qualitative studies is often either left undecided until further research has been done, or it can be discussed in light of other research or via triangulation if there are comparable studies (Bruhn Jensen 2002:268).

I sympathize with Tashakkori and Teddlie in their aim to find concepts that are “neutral” in relation to both qualitative and quantitative research and especially in their critique of how the term “validity” has been used in so many ways that it has more or less lost its meaning. Though the terminology is perhaps less important than the actual academic rigor it refers to, I believe quality of the study might say more than validity, especially in terms of the qualitative parts.

Validity/quality and generalizability of my study

The most important part of giving the reader a chance to assess the quality of a study is transparency, accounting in detail for the procedures during the research process and the choices made. The accounts given in the previous sections, together with the appendices will hopefully give the reader enough information to this regard and, here, I would like to comment or discuss the benefits and risks with some of the methodological choices made.

One of the main strengths of the material is that it is not a sample but a census: i.e., complete material of the time and newspaper studied. The fact
that I did not use search words but manually studied the entire material makes the risk of systematic faults and insufficient operationalization of key words very low. The risks that do appear in relation to the material could be incomplete databases, or mistakes in the coding of the databases – leaving out articles that would have been found if the search had been completely manual (i.e., microfilm or pdfs used, not digitalized articles in databases). Another risk lies in the fact that different techniques were used for the different newspapers, as described above. Still, the alternative would have been less reliable, as the different databases gave different opportunities and the combination of methods for gathering material probably gave a result close to what was actually printed in the paper versions of the newspapers.

The question of generalizability or scope of the investigation is less obvious. Being mainly a qualitative study, it could be argued that this is simply a study of the newspapers and articles in the material and the scope is no wider than that. But the quantity of the material and the overarching method used makes it possible to claim that the generalizability is a little wider than that. I do not claim to have studied the entire public sphere of the Swedish media during the time period chosen but I do believe the results can be relevant in understanding the participation by religious actors on the debate pages of the daily press in general during the chosen decade. Again, one of Tashakkori and Teddlie’s concepts is useful: transferability, i.e., whether the results of a study or the inferences drawn are relevant and transferable to other contexts, other populations or time periods, for example. (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003:37–38). Though the results might not be generalizable in a technical sense, the tendencies and phenomena discussed in this study will probably be relevant in wider contexts and, potentially, in other populations, i.e. newspapers and perhaps also other types of opinion-based media.

**Comparison with other studies**

During the latter part of my doctoral project, master student Maximilian Broberg (2013) conducted a project using a similar research design and the coding template from the content analysis to study the debate page of *Aftonbladet*, the largest evening or popular paper that I did not include in my study. Though his material is not part of this study, the possibility to compare results strengthens the transferability of the results but also gives an indication on the inference quality. A comparison could also be made with the results of the NOREL-project, where coverage of religion in Nordic newspapers was studied for the years 1988–2008 (Niemelä and Christensen 2013). I will return to these two studies in the final chapter (p 190), discussing what the comparison can say about the inference quality and transferability of my study.
4. Participation of religious actors

In this chapter, the results of the first step of the study are presented. It is mainly a quantitative presentation of tables and charts in the first part, and in the second, a presentation of the most prominent themes, some overarching comments in relation to theoretical concepts, and finally a presentation of what will be the focus of further analysis in the upcoming chapters. As presented in the previous methodology chapter, each article has a unique number and is treated as one item in this analysis. As several themes and signatories can be coded to the same article, it might show up twice or several times in a table. For example, in table 4, an article published in DN signed by a catholic and a Muslim would be counted twice, as it would have been coded on both these nodes (Catholic and Muslim). Also with the themes presented later in this chapter, several issues and themes might be connected with a specific article.

Newspapers

The total number of articles in my material is 639. Svenska Dagbladet is the paper with the largest number of articles, publishing more than the total sum of the other two papers together.

Table 1. Articles by newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>No of articles in material</th>
<th>Total no of articles on debate pages</th>
<th>% of debate articles in material</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dagens Nyheter</td>
<td>103 (16%)</td>
<td>5664</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressen</td>
<td>141 (22%)</td>
<td>4258</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svenska Dagbladet</td>
<td>395 (62%)</td>
<td>7788-9735</td>
<td>4.0-5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sum</td>
<td>639 (100%)</td>
<td>17710-19657</td>
<td>3.25-3.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As this table shows, Svenska Dagbladet publishes significantly more articles by religious actors than any of the other two newspapers. This is partly due to the fact that Svenska Dagbladet publishes more articles altogether on their debate page Brännpunkt, but they also have the highest percentage of articles
by religious actors in my material. How the number of articles is distributed over the years can be seen in Figure 2.

![Figure 2. Articles per year](chart.jpg)

As the chart shows, there is no linear development in the number of articles, with 2003 and 2004 as the years with the highest number of articles (75 and 80) and 2002 and 2009 with the lowest number (40 and 38 articles, respectively). Though the number of articles varies over the years, it does not seem reasonable to speak of a simple increase or decrease of the presence of religious actors on the debate pages. Also, these numbers say very little about what kind of articles and contributors are actually published. We will return to themes, people and organizations further on.

The distribution of articles in each paper varies over time, as can be seen in Figure 3. As shown in the chart, Dagens Nyheter has a small increase for the years 2003 and 2004, but remains quite steady within around ten articles difference per year. Expressen shows a larger variation, with a high for 2004 and then a decrease over the latter part of the period. Svenska Dagbladet does not only have the highest number of articles, but also the largest variation, and no clear development regarding increase or decrease over time.

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11 This number is a bit uncertain due to the lack of a total sum of articles. Here, I have assumed an average of 2 or 2.5 articles per day.
For each paper, there is also a difference in the religious affiliation of the signatories of the published articles. In both of the morning papers Christian groups completely dominate with over 80 percent of articles. But in tabloid *Expressen*, the largest group is Muslim with over 46 percent of articles and Christian groups combined signing 43 percent. (Figure 4)

*Figure 3. Articles per paper per year*

*Figure 4. Religious affiliation of signatories by newspaper*
The articles were also coded for position of the signatories. *Dagens Nyheter* has the largest number of bishops, denominational leaders and national directors, together compiling over 40 percent of articles. *Expressen* shows a different pattern, with individual members and clergy (of which many are imams) publishing articles. Again we can see a difference between the Christian leaders publishing in *DN* while a broader palette of voices is heard in *Expressen*. *SvD* again has a different pattern, possibly due to the high number of articles. Also here there are a large number of signatures by bishops and church leaders, but also a fair number of other signatories such as clergy and experts. (*Figure 5*)

*Figure 5. Position of signatories by newspaper*
Organizations and people

The people and their positions

In the articles, a number of different types of signatories have been identified, and are listed in Table 2. Many are leaders or directors of national religious organizations, while other are clergy or professional staff (i.e., from Christian aid organizations, city missions or working for advocacy groups) while some are individuals not formally representing a religious community per se but presenting themselves as Christian, Muslim, etc. The latter group has been labeled Members. Generally, the first four groups (bishops, denomination leaders, national directors and chairpersons) can be seen as representing their respective organizations, while elected officials, clergy and members more often are local and not necessarily speaking on behalf of an organization in a formal sense.

Table 2. Position of signatories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>No of articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>199 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>104 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denominational leader</td>
<td>100 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>100 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>66 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National director</td>
<td>58 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected official</td>
<td>54 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishop</td>
<td>47 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other spokesperson</td>
<td>42 (7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Around a third of the articles are signed by one-time contributors, and have only been coded for the type of signatory, not an individual name. All recurring contributors have been coded with their own name. Though the focus of this study is on the debate rather than to study individual contributors, it might still be interesting to see if certain individuals dominate the debate. The people with more than 10 articles in my material are listed in Table 3.

As seen, this is a group of mostly men, mostly in formal positions in religious organizations. Not surprisingly, the two archbishops of the Church of Sweden during the time period are on the list, as well as the Roman Catholic bishop and representatives from the free churches as well as the president of the Swedish Jewish Council.

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12 In the following table, attributes of individuals were combined with category nodes for type of signatory. The category “Member” consists of number of nodes sign by named individuals with the attribute “member” AND/OR coded by the node “Member (non-named signatory)” and the same method for clergy, elected official, expert, etc.

13 The term clergy here include imams and rabbis, though most of them are Christian priests or pastors.
In all, 271 articles were signed by the top 30 people (who have signed 6 articles each or more) – 42.4 percent of all articles in my sample – so a relatively small group of people contributed almost half the articles.

Table 3. Most published contributors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position and organization(s)</th>
<th>No of articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bo Forsberg</td>
<td>Director of Diakonia (Christian foreign aid organization)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sten-Gunnar Hedin</td>
<td>Pastor and national spokesperson for the Pentecostal congregations in Sweden</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Weiderud</td>
<td>International office Church of Sweden and World council of Churches -2005, Chairperson of Brotherskapsrörelsen/Christian Socialists 2005-</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stefan Swärd</td>
<td>Pastor and Chairperson of the Evangelical Free Church in Sweden</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KG Hammar</td>
<td>Archbishop of Church of Sweden –2006</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anders Wejryd</td>
<td>Archbishop of Church of Sweden 2006--</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anders Arborelius</td>
<td>Roman Catholic bishop of Sweden</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan Moussa</td>
<td>Imam in the Stockholm Mosque and Chairperson of Swedish council of Imams</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abd al Haqq Kielan</td>
<td>Imam and Chairperson of the Swedish Islamic Society</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulf Bjereld</td>
<td>Board member of Christian socialists (and professor of political science)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anders Carlberg</td>
<td>Chairperson of the Gothenburg Jewish congregation</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lena Posner-Körösi</td>
<td>Chairperson of the Swedish Jewish council and of the Stockholm Jewish congregation</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annika Borg</td>
<td>Priest in the Church of Sweden</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gender

Giving a simple gender ratio of signatories, the number of men and women respectively who have signed articles, is a little more complicated than it might seem, due to the method I have used for coding the articles. Gender has only been coded for the recurring writers, and on many articles with several signatories both men and women have signed. As has already been seen, most of the frequent writers are men, which is also the case with many of the recurring but less frequent signatories. Of the people coded by name in the material, 36 (27 percent) are women. 129 articles, 20 percent, have at least one (coded) woman signing. Though I do not have statistics for the gender balance of one-time signatories, it seems to roughly match that of recurring writers. Over all, the material is heavily male-dominated, both in the number of articles by one or a few writers, and also in articles with many signatories where there almost always are a large majority of male signatories.
Religious affiliation

Looking at the religious affiliations of the signatories, the Christian groups dominate in numbers. The largest group is the Church of Sweden, followed by the free churches and the ecumenical/other Christian groups. Of the non-Christians, Muslims are the largest group, and Jewish groups are the only other substantial contributing non-Christian religion. (Table 4)

Table 4. Religious affiliation of signing organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious affiliation</th>
<th>No of articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church of Sweden</td>
<td>269 (42%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free churches</td>
<td>123 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian ecumenical/other</td>
<td>120 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>101 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>53 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>51 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>7 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4 (0.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multireligious</td>
<td>2 (0.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing the size of these different groups in terms of members/affiliated as well as with their position in Swedish society, some interesting observations can be made. The most surprising number in this table, in comparison with membership, is the very small number of articles from the orthodox tradition. In terms of membership, the orthodox churches have approximately 77,000 in comparison with approximately 110,000 Muslims and 100,000 Catholics (Swedish Commission for Government Support to Faith Communities 2012a). Still, the number of articles signed by orthodox leaders is very low, and almost all of them are co-signed by all members of the Christian Council of Sweden. For this reason, the orthodox will not be specified in the following, though included when all Christians are presented.

Looking at religious affiliation over time, there are no clear patterns of increase or decrease. The changes between the years vary for almost all the affiliations, as can be seen in Figure 6.
Types of organizations

Each organization was also given attributes for type of organization (Figure 7). These are differentiated in a few groups: denominations and congregations, religious advocacy groups (such as Young Muslims, Christian peace movement, but also more political groups like conservative Christian think tank Claphaminstitutet and the Christian socialist movement), aid- and mission groups, religious cooperation groups (i.e. Christian Council of Sweden, interfaith councils etc.), religious media and international/other groups.

The most common type of organization being represented is denominations and congregations, which could be seen as the core religious communities. Advocacy groups are also quite prevalent in the material. Cooperation councils as well as aid- and mission groups are present with 54 articles each.

Representatives of the religious media seem to make a fairly small group, and the actors assigned to this group are potentially to be seen as public intellectuals with media platforms rather than as representatives for institution-
alized religious media. They are also more often religious minority groups rather than from the established Christian media – no articles were published signed by someone from *Kyrkans Tidning*, the Church of Sweden newspaper, and only one by someone from *Dagen*, the major Christian newspaper in Sweden.

Themes and issues

Looking at themes coded, different patterns emerge. As the thematic coding was done in a more qualitative way, presenting lists and tables and charts of the number of coded articles at each node/theme would be neither enlightening nor fair to the material, I will present the most coded themes in the text. Full lists of theme nodes with the number of references can be found in Appendix II, while the lists of most coded nodes per religious group can be found in Appendix IV.

Most common areas or groups of themes

Seen as a whole, a number of themes or areas emerge as more common and prevalent in the material. Many of the coding categories overlap, but some fields or areas of interest stand out.

The most commonly coded node is visible religion and, together with themes such as freedom of religion, relationship between the state and religious communities, religion and political statements and political mobiliza-
tion based on religion, an area of religion in the public arena in a wide sense can be identified as one of the most prevalent themes. Combined, this area of themes covers over half, 329, of the articles. In some cases this is not the main topic of the article but more an underlying theme. But quite frequently it is also the main topic; some examples include when a church leader is criticized for taking a political position (DN 2001/12/01); the debate over religious clothing such as the wearing of hijab on public service TV (Exp 2002/11/19); the place of religion and religious education in public schools (SvD 2010/03/05); and also when church leaders intervene in debates over the bank crisis (Exp 2003/12/03) or classic debates over the tension between science and faith (SvD 2005/04/22).

Another very prevalent theme regards human rights, peace, justice and other social issues. As previously shown, the organizations dedicated to this work form a substantial part of the material, but denominations and congregations as well as individuals also contribute plenty on these issues. Combined, the area of human rights, peace and social justice covers 322 articles. Examples can be found regarding priests demanding a more humane Swedish asylum law (DN 2003/11/27); Christian peace organizations criticizing arms trade to South Africa (DN 2010/03/28); Muslim leaders denouncing terrorism (Exp 2005/07/09); or the Stockholm City Mission raising awareness about the increasing number of families in the city being evicted (SvD 2006/09/05). Partly overlapping are issues on diversity and cohesion or conflict in society. This is often discussed in terms of migration and integration, but also whether religion should be seen as a source of conflict or a potential source for social cohesion. Together with articles on racism, the conditions for Muslims living in Sweden and threats against religious minorities, this area of diversity, tension and cohesion makes up a little less than 300 articles. Many articles on this theme are written by or addressing Muslim groups, such as the debate over whether a sermon in the Stockholm Mosque endorsed violence (DN 2003/08/26 and 2003/09/04) and the debate over the need for a domestic education for Swedish imams (SvD 2006/02/14) but all religious affiliation can be found discussing Islamophobia (Exp 2001/09/25), anti-Semitism (Exp 2006/11/09) and tolerance (DN 2010/07/23).

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14 Content coded at any of the following nodes: new atheism; political mobilization and lobbying based on religion; religion and political statements; freedom of religion; secularization - religious decline or marginalization; visible religion; state relation to faith communities; faith and science.

15 Content coded at any of the following nodes: arms trade; environment; migration and integration (not asylum and refugees); human rights; climate change; peace; poverty and social inequality in Sweden; poverty and international justice; children's rights; asylum and refugees.

16 Content coded at any of the following nodes: antisemitism; antiziganism; asylum; discrimination; religious persecution or oppression; hate crimes and hate speech; honor violence; Islam and Muslims in Sweden; Islamophobia and threats against Muslims; migration and integration (excl asylum and refugees), racism; religion as source for conflict; religion as a positive social force; religious dialogue; religious extremism; terrorism.
Though many of the articles deal in different ways with religion in a broad sense, the articles were also coded for when they more specifically deal with religious content in a narrow sense, as defined above (p 51) but only in the direct sense, formulated as theological and faith issues for each religion. I have interpreted it as, for example, when they argue for or against a specific position on a matter of faith, use religious arguments (such as referring to the Bible, Quran, and Christian tradition or “according to Catholic faith…”) or, in other ways, make statements using religious authority or interpretations of faith (but not included are any more indirect references to any organizational or other connection to authority based on transcendence, as it would make the category too wide). Examples include the so called “Jesus-debate” where a large number of articles debated belief in Jesus, sparked by an article co-signed by leaders from the Catholic Church and the Pentecostals (SvD 2003/01/28) but also imams stressing the need for gender equality within Islam with theological arguments (Exp 2005/05/24) or an article signed by leaders from different religions embracing the donation of human organs (DN 2003/10/04). The different religions were coded separately, but together the number of articles with religious content was 195\(^{17}\) or around a third of the articles. The largest number being Christian (152 articles), but proportionally, religious content was most common in articles signed by Muslims (43 articles, 42.5 percent).

When it comes to more specific issues, the most recurring and prevalent one was the debate over same-sex marriage and how the religious communities should relate to a possible new marriage law. The law was changed in 2009 but the debate recurred at several points throughout the period studied. Combined with other issues of sexuality and relationships, gay rights and the religious communities’ right to perform legally-binding wedding ceremonies, this field consists of 84 articles.\(^{18}\) I will return to this debate in Chapter 5 as an example of how religious organizations debate a specific issue and at the same time debate a more underlying theme on the place of religion in the public sphere.

A set of themes that are interesting, not so much for their number but for specific relationship to Church of Sweden, have to do with the Church’s relationship to the general public and the sense of belonging; people’s potential need for religion or spiritual guidance but also the rights or place for dissident minorities within the church; and internal Church of Sweden matters, such as Church elections, election of bishops and internal conflicts. This is a more diverse set of themes but can generally be seen as more internal than what other religious groups write about, and can be related to what

\(^{17}\) Content coded at any of the following nodes: religious content Christianity; religious content Judaism; religious content Islam.

\(^{18}\) Content coded at any of the following nodes: Marriage; LGBT; Relationships and sexuality; Legal right to perform marriages.
Grace Davie calls *vicarious religion* (see p 123). 128 articles can be shown to relate to this theme\(^{19}\), and I will return to it in Chapter 6 for a deeper analysis.

These themes and areas cover a large part of the material and give the broad picture of the totality of the material. But there were a number of themes that were recurring but could not directly be seen as part of any of these areas. The most common ones were gender equality (40 articles), criticism against media (38), civil society and NGOs (38), school (26) elections and democracy (25), EU issues (23) and freedom of speech (20).

Other variables

**Time of year and holidays**

The articles were coded for religious festivals as well as memorials and other holidays to see if there were any patterns. The numbers of articles referencing a specific time of year or memorial were low. The only Christian holiday with more than a few references was Christmas, with 11 articles. Other Christian holidays were Easter (2 articles) and All Saints Day (2). No non-Christian religious festivals were specifically mentioned in any article. Non-religious memorials and yearly events that turned up were the annual Stockholm Pride festival (4 articles), Holocaust Memorial Day in January (3 articles) and Hiroshima Memorial Day (2). Only one article in my selection was published on 11 September to commemorate the events in 2001.

**Places**

As peace and justice are issues traditionally connected with religious participation in the public sphere, the articles referring to a specific conflict or situation in the world were coded to that country to see what conflicts or parts of the world were most present in the articles by religious actors.

Israel/Palestine completely dominates with 60 articles. The next, Iraq, has only 16 articles and the US the same number (of which many of the articles overlap) while Afghanistan has 10. Perhaps surprising, South Africa, not in the public eye during this time period in the same way as the previously-mentioned countries, is the topic of 7 articles; the reason for that is probably the longstanding relationship of Sweden and Swedish churches with South Africa.

\(^{19}\) Content coded at any of the following nodes: Ordination of women; Place of opinion minorities within the church; Election of bishops; Existential or religious needs; Internal organization; Folk church – people’s relationship to church; Church conflict; Church elections: 128
The prevalence of the situation in Israel and Palestine as a topic for articles calls for further attention. It becomes especially interesting if we look at the religious affiliation of signatories publishing on the subject, in Table 5. Not surprisingly, Jewish groups have published a large numbers of these articles. But a substantial number of articles are also published by Christian groups of different denominations. Muslim groups on the other hand seem almost silent on the issue. The participation of Jewish groups on this issue will be further discussed in Chapter 7.

**Replies**

On the Swedish debate pages, replies are, to a varying degree, allowed to facilitate an actual discussion. The newspapers have different policies on how commonly they publish replies (see p 26), which is visible also in this material. Out of the 639 articles, 195 (30.5 percent) were responses or reactions to previously-published articles and can be seen as more reactive to someone else's agenda rather than the religious actors themselves initiating the debate. It could on the other hand also be an indication of what groups are given the chance to respond, and whose issues are more frequently debated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Affiliation</th>
<th>No of replies</th>
<th>No of articles</th>
<th>% replies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Church</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church of Sweden</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecumenical/other Christian</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentages of articles being marked as replies, as can be seen in Table 6, are highest for the Jewish (40 percent) and lowest for the Muslim groups.
(17 percent) with the different Christian groups varying in between. When sorting by type of organization, Table 7, the groups with highest proportion of replies are denominations and congregations, while Aid and mission groups have the lowest.

Table 7. Replies by type of organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>No of replies</th>
<th>No of articles</th>
<th>% Replies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congregations and denominations</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious media</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy groups</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operational groups</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid and Missions</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Themes by religious affiliation

The most striking and interesting differences regarding themes can be found between the different religious groups. Before going into the in-depth analysis of the coming chapters, I will give a presentation of the different groups. As the exact number of coded items might be of less interest here, I am presenting an overview of the patterns. A list of most-coded themes for each religion can be found in Appendix IV. As mentioned in previous sections, articles signed by several religious affiliations will appear more than once, though only 12 articles were signed by representatives of more than one religion.

**Church of Sweden**

As the Church of Sweden is the largest group, it is also the most varied when it comes to themes. As has already been mentioned above, some of the themes are specific to the folk church character of the Church of Sweden, and will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 6. When it comes to other themes, there is a wide range and it seems as if representatives of the Church of Sweden, together with some other Christian groups, have the greatest opportunity, or the greatest inclination, to publish articles on themes not necessarily concerning their own organization or group. Still the themes broadly sketched above are also most prevalent in Church of Sweden articles.

The most common theme to be coded is *theological and faith issues*, but *visible religion, human rights and the relationship between state and the religious communities* are also common. The issues regarding gay rights, marriage and especially the Churches’ right to perform legally-binding wedding ceremonies are important issues among Church of Sweden articles. Also recurring are articles on international peace and justice, social and wel-
fare issues in the Swedish context, freedom of religion and internal and organizational issues for the church itself.

**Free churches**
The Free church group consists of congregations and denominations as well as advocacy groups and co-operative groups between the different free churches. The Free church foreign aid agency Diakonia is, as mentioned above, one of the largest contributors regarding number of articles (33 out of 123 articles by Free church contributors), and that is reflected in what themes recur among free church contributors, making *human rights* and international peace and justice issues among the most common themes for this group. Apart from these themes, the most common are visible religion, freedom of religion and the state's relationship to religious communities, theological and faith issues and religion in relation to politics and political mobilization. The Free churches also debate the changing law on same-sex marriage, if not to the same extent as Church of Sweden contributors. One specific issue for the free churches is a debate about the role of congregation leadership in the aftermath of the Knutby murders in 2004 when a highly conservative and closed Pentecostal congregation became the site of several murders (cf. Peste 2011).

**Catholics**
Articles signed by Catholics, like the other Christian groups, are most commonly dealing with theology or faith matters, or visible religion. One theme almost specific to the Catholics is abuse in religious environments, referring to the scandals of sexual abuse by Catholic priests around the world during the studied decade. Also, Catholic signatories more often than others write about medical ethics issues (such as euthanasia) and the potential conflict between faith and science. Compared to the other Christian groups, they seem to write a little less about international peace and justice and social issues.

**Co-operative and ecumenical groups**
The co-operative and ecumenical groups vary even more internally than the types of groups previously presented. Some of them are cooperations between the leaders of different churches and groups, most notably the Swedish Christian council. Others are advocacy groups not affiliated with a specific denomination but gather Christians of different denomination for a specific cause.

At the top of the list of issues for these groups we find human rights, peace and international justice. Another cluster of themes is public religion, freedom of religion and the relationship between state and religious communities. The interests of the advocacy groups, most of them belonging to this category, are the arms trade, EU issues, school issues and welfare, which
have more occurrences in this group than others. Compared to the other Christian, more denominational, groups, theology and faith issues are much less common here.

**Jewish groups**
The articles signed by Jewish representatives and actors are the most homogenous of all the groups in the material. Of the 53 articles, a surprisingly low number of different themes can be found. 31 articles, over 58 percent, are on the conflict or situation in Israel and Palestine. 21 articles (almost 40 percent) deal in some way with anti-Semitism. Other themes are human rights, religious freedom in Sweden and the relationship between state and religious organizations, in large focusing on the situation for Jews and Jewish groups in Swedish society.

Though the focus is narrow regarding the number of issues, the positions are not singular. Articles arguing for different positions regarding the state of Israel, peace plans, boycotts and Swedish foreign policy towards Israel.

**Muslim groups**
The Muslim group is more diverse when it comes to type of signatories, and the number of organizations represented, but still has a pattern that resembles the articles by Jewish groups when it comes to the themes. A larger number of different issues can be found in the articles (as there are almost twice as many), but a high number of them circle around a few themes closely connected to the Muslim groups. The most common themes are the situation for Muslims living in Sweden, freedom of religion and Islamophobia and threats against Muslims. Many refer to the discourse of terrorism (most commonly stressing how terrorism has no place in the true Muslim faith) and explanations of the Muslim faith aimed at a non-Muslim audience. Other common themes relate to immigration and diversity in Swedish society, and matters regarding the public display of religion and more general questions about religion and society. Fewer, but still recurring, themes include international conflict involving the Muslim world and international peace and justice issues.

**Other religious groups**
There are just a handful of articles signed by religions other than those already covered. These four articles are by groups from other religions, two by the Nordic Falun Gong association, one co-signed by several religious leaders including Swedish Hindu and Buddhists representatives, and one signed by many international leaders including the Dalai Lama. The two by the Falun Gong group both addressed issues of religious freedom in China, while the other two articles focused on peace issues.
International aid and mission groups

One group that stands out, mostly due to its homogeneity, is made up of the international aid- and mission groups, the domestic missions and diaconal centers. They have a smaller scope of issues; they often co-sign articles with other, non-religious organizations in their respective field and contribute 8.5 percent of the articles in the material. The international organizations mostly write about international aid policy, the arms trade, international trade agreements, poverty, justice and peace issues, while the domestic aid and diaconal organizations (such as the Stockholm city mission, Ersta diakoni, Hela människan) address social and political issues such as homelessness, alcohol and drug policies or welfare. The latter category in particular seem to position themselves as part of civil society as much as religious organizations, and also address issues such as the possibility for non-profit organizations to be part of the welfare system and the social economy.

Summary and comments

Looking first at the different newspapers and at what gets published in the different debate pages, we can see some differences between the papers. Morning daily *Dagens Nyheter*, with its highly competitive page, publishes the smallest number of articles by religious actors, and mainly by Christian groups and by official leaders, establishing more of an elite position. Tabloid *Expressen* has a very different pattern – a much higher number of articles by Muslims, but also a much higher number of articles by members or individual clergy. *Svenska Dagbladet* has not only the highest number of debate articles in total, as they are more generous in publishing replies than the other papers, and also, by percentage, they publish more articles by religious actors.

Focusing the signatories or contributors, we can see several different patterns. The largest religious affiliation is, unsurprisingly, the Church of Sweden, and the Christian organizations together have published the large majority of articles. When comparing the sizes of these different religious groups in terms of members, the most striking difference regards the orthodox Christians, in size comparable to Muslim organizations and the Catholic Church in Sweden but having almost no articles in the material. Interesting also is that the Jewish congregations, with about 8,500 members, have the same number of articles as the Catholics who have ten times the membership. Perhaps the number of members is less important and, rather, we should compare how well established and for how long the different religious groups have been institutions in Swedish society. Then, the Church of Sweden is obviously the most established, but the Free Churches have also been a key part of Swedish civil society for over a century, and they are of-
ten referred to as domestic. Of the minority Christian groups, the Catholic Church has a membership largely based on migrants, but as an organization the Catholic Church has been part of Swedish society for much longer than the orthodox churches. Also, the Catholic Church has a larger base of well-established (often converted) members of Swedish origin with good access to the public domain – journalists, scholars, cultural workers, especially in comparison to the orthodox churches.

When looking at religions other than Christian, the Jewish group is the most established with historic roots from several centuries back. Though for a long time Jews were only allowed to stay in certain cities, and Sweden was by no means unaffected by the strong anti-Semitic currents in Europe before and during the twentieth century, the Swedish Jewish community has long been the most established non-Christian religious group in Sweden. The different Muslim groups arrived in Sweden later and are less centrally organized, but still have a comparatively-large number of articles in my material. Perhaps one interpretation could be that, generally, the size and level of establishment of a religious group is an important factor for the likelihood of having articles published on the debate pages, but that also other factors are important. During the studied period, especially after 11 September 2001 (9-11), Muslims became not only actors but mainly the object of many debates and their presence in this debate should probably also be discussed in terms of mediatization and the media logic.

Moving on to types of organizations and their position in their respective organizations, a vast majority of the articles originate from denominations and congregations: the core religious groups. But the aid- and mission groups, as well as advocacy groups and co-operational councils, are also present in the material. Regarding the position of the signatories, the clergy formed the largest group followed by experts and individual members. But denominational leaders and national directors as well as different kinds of elected officials and spokespeople were also present in the material. The material can roughly be divided in half between actors who, foremost, speak on behalf of an organization or group, and actors who mainly speak on behalf of their own opinion but from a position within an organization or religion. The question of authority, or on whose behalf a contributor is writing, is no easy question to address simply with a definition of position or type of actor, and it will be addressed throughout the following chapters and especially in the discussion in Chapter 8.

When it comes to the individuals signing the articles, a relatively small group of 30 people have been involved in almost half the articles, and a few individuals have written a large number. Almost one third of the articles are signed by one-time contributors.
Issues for in-depth analysis

From what has been presented in this chapter, some themes have been chosen to be further developed in the following chapters. They have been chosen both in relation to previous research and the theoretical starting points, and based on the findings in this first part of the empirical study.

Looking at the Christian groups, we can see a wide variety between them. Though they seem to have the opportunity or choice to address a wider scope of issues compared to the minority groups, to a large degree they relate to a more underlying theme of religion in the public sphere and their own position in this debate. To investigate this issue further, in Chapter 5, I will use the case of the debate about marriage, as Sweden adopted a new, gender-neutral marriage law in 2009 and the religious groups debated both the law itself and the consequences for the religious understanding of the concept of marriage throughout the time period studied. This relates to another point highlighted in the discussion on religious change, namely the changing positions for religious groups when society becomes more pluralistic. It also relates closely to Casanova’s concept of public religions and his conditions for a legitimate place for public religions in the modern world, and to Habermas’ position on the place for religious arguments in a public rational debate. As seen in this chapter, it was also one of the largest debates, recurring throughout the decade studied.

In Chapter 6, the focus turns specifically to the majority church, the Church of Sweden. In this chapter I will look into the changing position of the former state church; to see how the internal issues of the Church of Sweden still has a surprisingly large role in the debate. Here the theoretical starting points are Grace Davie’s concept of vicarious religion and the idea of the (national) church as a public utility, but the analysis will also discuss its usefulness compared to an analysis using mediatization theory, and a comparison that separates these “public utility”-type articles from Casanova’s understanding of public religion.

In the general discussion on the assumed resurgence or return of religion in the public sphere in Europe as well as in previous research, several themes or explanations have been highlighted. One of them is the increased presence and visibility of religious minorities, mostly due to migration. As has been previously shown, above, there is a distinct pattern in my material when it comes to the religious minorities, Jewish and Muslim groups, in that they seem to address a smaller scope of issues, and mostly issues more or less directly related to the groups themselves. One possible interpretation is that they, as religious minorities, have a distinctly different position from the Christian majority religion. This will be further explored in the last analysis chapter. Here, the main theoretical perspective will be from mediatization theory and the assumed position of marginalization for the minority groups.
5. Debating the Swedish marriage law

In this chapter, we will turn to questions about how, and with what arguments, religious actors participate in public debate, and look more deeply into a case where the writers to varying degrees might be said to act as public religions. I will start by giving a brief history of the issue of the 2009 Marriage Act, give an overview over how the debate takes place in my material, analyze the arguments used and, finally, discuss these actors and arguments in the light of theory, especially the criteria for public religions. This chapter is based on the 55 articles coded at the node Marriage and, while not all of them specifically address the marriage law, almost all of them can be said to at least indirectly address issues of same-sex marriage or unions.\(^{20}\)

There are several reasons for choosing the debate over same-sex marriage as a case to examine more closely. One reason is empirical, as it is the largest recurring issue in my material in terms of the number of articles. But it is also an interesting prism, where law and religion meet and where a spectrum of issues concerning the relationship between religious communities and the state, religious arguments in favor or against a certain legislation, and also a theological issue as such taking place on the pages of daily newspapers. Finally, it is a potential example of an issue for public religions – both in the type of question (defending the life-world or standing up for rights of a minority) and that it refers to a collective sense of publicness.

New marriage legislation

At least since the sixteenth century, marriages have been performed by the Church in Sweden and, from 1734, a church wedding was mandatory for making the marriage legally binding. Different exceptions occurred, until every citizen was granted the right to a civil (non-religious) wedding act in 1908. (Regner 2007:108–109)

The question of same-sex marriage or, first, rights for gays and lesbians, arose on the agenda in Sweden like many other European countries in the mid-twentieth century. In 1944 homosexuality was decriminalized but still

\(^{20}\) The tables are based on the 55 articles coded at the node Marriage in my material. For the argument analysis some articles not regarding same-sex marriage were excluded. In the reference list there is a list of all articles analyzed in this chapter.
viewed as a medical problem. Up until 1979 homosexuality was classified as a disease by the Swedish National Board of Welfare (Sörgjerd 2012:170–171). After that turning point, a rapid shift took place in general opinion as well as in government policy on homosexuality, and in the following decades several new rules and regulations increased the rights of same-sex couples. In 1987 the “Homosexual Cohabitees Act” was adopted together with the new Cohabitee Act giving certain rights to couples living together without being married (Sörgjerd 2012:184–185). In 1994, after vivid debate and strong demands for gay rights, the Registered Partnership Act was passed, allowing same-sex couples to have (mostly) the same rights as married couples. The registered partnership could only be entered into in a civil ceremony; no religious communities had the right to perform partnership ceremonies. Other issues that were discussed in the partnership debate took longer to come into effect: In 2003 registered partners were allowed to adopt children, and in 2005 lesbian couples were granted access to assisted reproductive methods in Swedish hospitals (Sörgjerd 2012:187–191).

In 2004 the parliament voted in favor of a motion to form a committee to look into the question of same-sex marriage; in 2007, their committee report (SOU 2007:17 Regner 2007) was presented, proposing that the registered partnership act and the existing marriage act should be replaced with the new, gender-neutral marriage act. The committee report also suggested that the religious communities that wished so could keep the entitlement to solemnize marriages under the new law. As the government was not unanimous on the issue, no government bill was presented; in 2009 the parliamentary Committee on Civil Affairs drafted a proposal that was voted on in parliament. It was accepted with strong support by both government parties and opposition: 311 out of the 349 parliamentarians voted in favor. The law came into effect 1 May 2009 (Sörgjerd 2012:191–192).

The shift in attitudes towards homosexuality and gay rights was not only a legal or political one. During this time period, there was also a major shift in public opinion. According to the World Values Survey, in 1982 39 percent of Swedish respondents deemed homosexuality as “never justifiable” (1) while 18 percent answered “always justifiable” (10) on a scale from 1-10; the mean attitude was 4.4. In 2006, only 4 percent chose the lowest alternative while 71 percent chose the highest, with a mean of 8.4. The most dramatic shift took place between 1990 and 1996, when the mean increased from 4.5 to 7 in only six years – there is a likely connection between the partnership law and the increased legal rights as well as public attention to

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21 “Entitlement to solemnize marriages” is the term officially used by Kammarkollegiet, the state authority that grants the permission. In this chapter, I will use this concept interchangeably with “right to perform legally binding wedding ceremonies” or similar language constructions. In Swedish, this is just one word, making the English translation a little clumsy.
issues concerning gay rights, though there is no simple answer to questions of causality.22

According to legal scholar Caroline Sörgjerd, the main reason for the 2009 Marriage Act was to give same-sex couples access to the symbolic dimensions of marriage, rather than the legal (as the legal were mostly obtained by the registered partnership). Marriage – though there is no consensus on the concept – is legally speaking a contract but also has other implications, as it is not a contract that could be filled with any content. It also changes the persons’ civil status. Sörgjerd argues that Swedish marriage law throughout the twentieth century has been formed in a tension between the religious and secular understandings of what a marriage is, and has mostly moved away from an emphasis on the civil status or symbolic/religious parts and stressed the contractual understanding of marriage. She sees a shift in the 2009 Act, as the legal implications of the changes in the law are small, but the symbolic difference, that a marriage is not just constituted by (among other things) two parties that are a man and a woman (Sörgjerd 2012:320–326). The questions surrounding the symbolic dimensions of marriage are, as we will see, a central part of the debate by religious actors on this issue.

Throughout the years of debate, the churches and other religious groups in varying ways took part in the discussion. Many of the churches and communities were skeptical or negative about most of the reforms on gay rights (such as the partnership act, allowing adoption and the 2009 marriage reform), but within the Church of Sweden, the debate was vivid and a large group welcomed the reforms. Though the bishops protested against the decriminalization of homosexuality in 1944, a different approach was taken later. In 1974 a church-internal investigation was presented that suggested that the church should accept “genuine” homosexuality: i.e., long-term monogamous relationships. When the registered partnership was introduced, the bishops of the Church of Sweden proposed a ritual for prayer for the couples that had entered partnership, and in 2005 an official order for a ceremony of blessing for couples who were joined in partnership (much like a ceremony for the blessing of a civil marriage) was adopted by the Church Assembly. During the period of debate between the committee reform proposal in 2007 and when the actual act was voted on in 2009, the church board of the Church of Sweden wrote a reference statement on the issue. There, the church board was, in general, positive about having the same law for both heterosexual and same-sex couples, but wanted to keep the word ‘marriage’ only for heterosexual couples. In the statement, the church emphasized the wish to keep the right to perform marriages and would also be open to perform partnership ceremonies. (Church of Sweden 2009:21; Sörgjerd 2012:175–178)

22 According to World Values Survey, question F118. Data available online at http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalyze.jsp
In the other Christian churches and religious communities, the criticisms against the different reforms were more unified. The Christian Council of Sweden made a unanimous reference statement, expressing the wish to have equal rights but use different names, i.e. using the term “marriage” only for couples of different sexes. They were also positive about the opportunity to keep the right to solemnize marriages and the fact that such a right would not include a requirement to also marry same-sex couples (Christian Council of Sweden 2008).

According to the new law, the Church of Sweden would have to formally apply to the regional authorities for the entitlement to solemnize marriages just like the other religious communities. That meant that the Church of Sweden would have to make a formal decision whether or not they wanted this right according to the new law and, if they did not apply, their right to perform legally-binding marriages would cease a year later. The other religious communities did not need to make this formal decision but the changing law still put on the agenda the question about the right to perform marriages. Eventually, the Church of Sweden decided to keep the right to perform legally-binding wedding ceremonies under the new law, as did several other churches and religious communities. (Kammarkollegiet 2012)

From this background, we can identify some questions that might be interesting to look into. How did the religious communities who are directly affected by this law react, and how do their arguments play into this intersection between law and state on one side and the religious communities and theology on the other? Sørgjerd highlights the symbolic dimensions – how are they present in this debate? Are the religious communities acting as public religions in Casanova’s sense, and how do they position themselves? And finally, how does this debate relate to Habermas’ propositions regarding religious arguments?

Marriage on the debate pages

In my material, 55 articles in total were coded at the node marriage and, with a few exceptions, they all debate the blessing of civil unions; whether marriage (legally or conceptually) should be open for same-sex couples; the 2009 marriage act; or the entitlement of religious communities to solemnize marriages. Though they can be said to refer to varying specific issues or theses, it makes sense to regard this as one debate throughout the decade, over marriage and the place of the religious communities in relation to the state and the marriage legislation.
Time, actors, themes

Looking throughout the time covered in my material, there is an increase in the number of articles in certain years, relating to the political development. As can be seen in Figure 8, the high points are 2004, when the parliament voted on investigating the issue (Parliamentary Bill 2003/04:LU22 2004) and 2009, when the marriage Act was voted on, with the following discussion within the religious communities whether or not to accept it. Also, numbers from 2005, when the Church of Sweden decided to bless registered partnerships, and the years 2007–08 up until the new law was voted on, are a little higher than the other years.

![Figure 8. Articles on marriage per year](image)

Looking at the different religious affiliations as displayed in Table 8, this debate is almost completely dominated by Christians, and mostly by the Church of Sweden and the Free Churches. Three articles are signed by Muslim representatives, two of them signed by a large number of different religious representatives (DN 2004/01/09, SvD 2006/02/22), and three articles are signed by Jewish representatives. Also three articles are signed by catholic representatives, all of them by the Catholic bishop Anders Arborelius, and all of them in cooperation with other Christian or religious leaders. The greatest number of articles is signed by representatives from Church of Sweden – bishops, clergy, elected officials and members. There are also Free Church representatives, and some ecumenical groups, mostly advocacy groups. As can be seen, the Church of Sweden dominates the debate, at least numerically. Most striking is that, after the year 2008, there is not a single
article in my material from the Free Churches, Catholics or any other religions besides the Church of Sweden.

Table 8. Articles on marriage, by religious affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious affiliation</th>
<th>Number of articles signed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church of Sweden</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free church</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian ecumenical/other</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turning to the themes of these articles, a simple overview can be made by looking at what other themes are coded in the articles. In Table 9, it becomes quite clear that a vast majority of articles refer to LGBT issues but the relationship between the state and religious communities, visible religion and theological statements, discrimination and freedom of religion are also prevalent. Just looking at these themes, we can get a sense of what this debate is about.

Table 9. Themes coded in articles on marriage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coded themes</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LGBT</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State and faith communities</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to solemnize marriages</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theology, faith content Christianity</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible religion</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships and sexuality</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's church, people and CoS</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of religion</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecumenism</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion and political statements</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blessing of civil unions</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion minorities in CoS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family policy</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Åke Green legal case</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hate crimes and hate speech</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political mobilization based on religion</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 n = 55, one article can appear more than once in the table
24 LGBT = Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered.
25 n = 55, one article can appear more than once in the table
These themes co-appearing in the articles with marriage point us in several directions. This is a debate on gay rights, sexuality and family, but it is also a debate on the relationship between religion and the state or politics, it is about freedom of religion potentially in conflict with discrimination and it is a question of theology. By analyzing further the arguments used and the actors using them, we will see how these themes come into play and how they relate to questions posed in the previous section.

Types of arguments and the actors using them

Argument analysis: concepts used

To continue the analysis, I will use some concepts originating from analytical philosophy and the genre of critical reasoning or argument analysis, following a model inspired by Swedish analytical philosophers Gunnar Björnsson, Ulrik Kihlbom and Anders Ullholm (2009). This method is used to identify a thesis, pro- and contra arguments and their underpinnings and conclusions in order to analyze and evaluate critical reasoning. This can be done in a quite detailed and methodical manner and, in philosophy, the second step to evaluate or judge the reasoning is an important part. For my purposes, it is mainly to clarify the reasoning and to distinguish between different types of reasons that are relevant to study. I will not make an evaluation of the reasoning in the different articles, as my aim not is to find out “who is right” or who has the better argument, but to see how these arguments relate to an overall theoretical framework about the place of religion in Swedish public debate.

When analyzing arguments, Björnsson et al. suggest starting with determining what the thesis of the argument or article is, moving on to find the different reasons given, either for or against the theses itself, or to strengthen or weaken the reasons given for or against the thesis. After that, the reasons given can be described, distinguishing between different types of reasons or arguments. Reasons of cause and effect use the existence of something’s cause or effect as an argument in favor of the claim in question: for example if the claim is that global warming is increasing, then the fact that animals who used to live in southern Europe now live in the Scandinavian countries (a likely effect of global warming) can be used as a reason to strengthen the thesis. The reason of signs uses a sign of something to argue in favor of the claim: for example, if the pressure is dropping quickly on the barometer, it is

26 I have not been able to find a good English language methodology book using this exact model. A similar, but less detailed one, is used in Thomson (2002), and a more elaborate one but with a different model in Moore and Parker (2008). The main differences between these American books and the Swedish one is that the separation between finding/analyzing arguments and judging them is clearer in the Swedish one, suiting my purposes better.
a sign that it is going to rain (but as the barometer is not causing the rain, this is not a cause and effect reason). A reason of example is commonly used, presenting an observation or fact that is an example of what is claimed. A different strategy of argument is using reasons of authority: invoking a credible source in favor of your claim – someone or something that is generally trusted, and has knowledge in this specific field. In this context, it is possible to view references to religious authorities including religious texts and tradition as reasons of authority (for a discussion on religious arguments, see p 51). Reasons of analogy come in two variations: one where the situation or thesis in the claim is compared to a similar situation (for example, in a certain field this kind of policy was effective, therefore we should use it in this parallel field), and one where metaphors are used. Metaphors are often compelling but it is usually hard to judge their value as arguments. Reasons of consequence are usually used when arguing a normative thesis and means pointing to wanted or unwanted consequences of the policy, action or line of thought that you or your opponent is claiming. For example, the risk of killing innocent people could be a reason of consequence against the death penalty. Finally, their final type of reasoning is reasons based on rules. That means invoking a general rule – legal or moral – as an argument in favor or against your claim. (Björnsson et al. 2009:103–111). An overview of the different types of reasons, to facilitate reading of the upcoming analysis, can be found in Table 10.

Table 10. Types of reasons according to Björnsson et al (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of reason</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cause and effect</td>
<td>Using the existence of something’s cause or effect as an argument in favor of the claim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sign</td>
<td>Using a sign of something to argue in favor of the claim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example</td>
<td>Using an observation or fact that is an example of the claim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Invoking a credible source in favor of your claim, or invoking the authority of history, tradition or religious texts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analogy</td>
<td>Using a comparison to a similar situation, or using a metaphor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequence</td>
<td>Pointing to wanted or unwanted consequences of the claim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule</td>
<td>Invoking a general legal or moral rule</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the following analysis, rather than going into deep analysis of each of the articles and present the argument structure in detail, I will present three groups of articles, their main claims or theses and then some patterns in the types of arguments used and by whom. These arguments and reasons will then be discussed in the light of theory. In balancing between presenting quotes and examples to make the original texts accessible to the reader on
the one hand, and keeping the analysis clear and tight with good overview on the other, I have chosen an in-between model. Every section with a group of articles will begin with an introductory quote, typical for the articles analyzed, to illustrate and give some color to the text, while the analysis itself will not contain quotes but only references to the articles.

Separating three different debates
After removing the articles unrelated to the issue of same-sex marriage\textsuperscript{27}, three different layers of arguments or theses emerge. The most basic one, whether homosexuality as such, or homosexual relationships/actions, are acceptable – to faith and/or society – is one level which is rarely debated. It is indirectly touched upon in articles we will return to. More common is the related issue on the acceptance of and/or discrimination against gay people within the religious communities, without necessarily making any statements on marriage as such. The second issue is on the concept of marriage, whether a marriage is by definition, or should be, constituted by a man and a woman, or if the concept of marriage could (and should) be also used for same-sex unions. Finally, there is the discussion on whether the religious communities should be entitled to solemnize marriages.

To make a rough separation between the different waves of debate, the issue of marriage as such is more present in the years 2004 and leading up to 2009, when the changing of the law is debated, while the right to solemnize is the most vivid topic when the Church of Sweden as well as the other faith communities had to react to the law in 2009. Also, some issues relating to the blessing of registered partnerships are present in the early years of my material but, for obvious reasons, less so in the final years as the registered partnership ceased to exist as a legal form.

Still, it is not really possible to separate the different themes as stages in time. The issue of what the concept of marriage relates to is present in early as well as in the later articles, and the questions of the legal entitlement to solemnize also appear early on in the debate. There is a shift of emphasis, but not a clear break.

Most of the articles analyzed here are on these two topics, and either argues theses on the concept of marriage or on the entitlement to solemnize. I will analyze these debates separately. The rest of the articles argue somewhat different theses within this field, and I will look more closely at all these articles last.

\textsuperscript{27} For instance an article on the upcoming crown princess’s wedding (\textit{DN} 2010/04/22)
Debate over the concept of marriage

In most of the articles on the concept of marriage, the positions can be divided into two separate, clear opinions: Either the concept of marriage is by definition constituted by one man and one woman (10 articles) or the concept of marriage is not constituted by gender but should be used by all legally-regulated unions of two people loving each other (7 articles). There are also four articles, all of them by bishops or scholars within the Church of Sweden, responding to articles on the concept of marriage but not taking a clear stance on the issue, at least not explicitly.

Advocating marriage as exclusively for a man and a woman

With strong theological support, we claim that there is a fundamental order of creation which is embodied in the marriage between a man and a woman. The ritual of the wedding ceremony in our church starts by referencing God’s creation of humanity – of man and woman – and connects marriage to the will of God. It is not theologically possible to only define marriage from its function and not take into account the genders of the parties, and their role in the reproduction of creation.

Creation is not uniform. Our position does not mean a judging of love between people, nor of human value which is equal for everyone. (Bishops Esbjörn Hagberg, Ragnar Persentius and Hans Stiglund, Church of Sweden, SvD 2007/09/27)

The articles defending the understanding of the concept of marriage as only between a man and a woman are written by different religious groups, though mostly Christian. Some of them are directed at the political sphere (political parties, government or parliament) or the general public, while some are directed at the Church of Sweden leadership. The arguments and reasons used vary slightly depending on whom the article is directed at.

In almost all articles, reasons of authority invoking the bible and/or the Christian tradition (and in a few cases other religious traditions) are used. Sometimes specific passages are cited (SvD 2009/08/06) but commonly more sweeping statements about scripture, tradition and history are presented. In terms of theology, the order of creation is invoked (DN 2004/01/09, Exp 2008/11/07, SvD 2007/09/27) as well as the divine establishment of marriage as a holy union (SvD 2004/01/30, SvD 2009/07/22). Several articles – sometimes with theological reasoning, sometimes more related to nature – also argue the binarity and complementarity of the genders as a reason for separating marriage from other kinds of relationships or unions (SvD 2004/02/17, SvD 2009/08/06)

One argument, which probably could be labeled as a reason of consequence or perhaps cause, refers to children and reproduction: as a cause, when it is argued that reproduction is a key feature of the constitution of marriage (with the assumption that same-sex couples cannot reproduce)
(SvD 2006/02/22, SvD 2004/01/30) or as a consequence in that calling same-sex unions marriage will lead to rights for same-sex couples to adopt or inseminate which will mean children will not have a mother and father, which, according to debaters, will not be in the best interest of the child (Exp 2008/11/07, DN 2004/01/09). Another recurring argument is popular support: several debaters claim that a majority, among the population in general or among Christians, do not support same-sex marriage. (DN 2004/01/09, SvD 2004/02/17b).

Some articles that are aimed at politicians or the state use arguments referring to freedom of religion, mostly as a reason of consequence. A changed law would also impose a new way of understanding marriage on the religious communities, especially if acceptance of the new law were a requirement for funding (DN 2004/01/09). This reason is not as prominent in this group of articles, but we will return to it in the articles regarding solemnization of marriages (where it is mostly used as a reason of rule). The articles aimed at the state or the general public are mostly signed by denominational leaders or other official representatives, mostly but not all Christian, from different denominations.

In articles aimed at the church leadership, we find a different argument: ecumenical concerns and internal conflicts as consequences of a changed theology. It is claimed that if the Church of Sweden changed its theological view on marriage, it would lead to separation from the other world churches; a breach of the treaties to consult with sister churches before major decisions; and it could also lead to severe inner conflict within the church (SvD 2004/01/30, SvD 2004/02/17b, SvD 2007/09/27, SvD 2009/07/16). These articles are mostly written by Church of Sweden clergy.

One common trait in almost all the articles is that they stress, with different nuances, the opinion that using the concept of marriage only for heterosexual couples should not be interpreted as derogatory against same-sex unions or relationships. Several articles stress their allegiance with and respect for a pluralistic society where people have the right to live in different ways (DN 2004/01/09) and accept the need for legal protection and acknowledgment of same-sex couples (SvD 2006/02/22, Exp 2008/11/07, SvD 2007/09/27). Some articles also point out that discrimination and hate crimes against gay people are unacceptable (SvD 2004/02/17b). While, in the other articles, nothing specifically is said on whether homosexuality as such is acceptable or not, none of these articles give any reasons for arguing that homosexuality is unacceptable. In one of the articles, a rhetorical question is posed about whether God is really willing to bless same-sex unions, but no answer is stated in the text (SvD 2004/02/10). Interestingly, all the articles in this latter group (not mentioning homosexuality as such) are signed by individual clergy, while the articles stating acceptance of pluralism, gay rights and denouncing discrimination are almost all written by bishops and denominational leaders.
Advocating same-sex marriage

What we mean by marriage [today] does not exist in the Bible, and when the Swedish translation uses the word ‘wife’, the original text simply uses ‘woman’. The remaining argument then is tradition, but concepts change their meaning during the course of history. The forms in which people live together are not constant either. It is for example not true that marriage has always been intended for one man and one woman. Based on tradition, it is possible to argue in favor of polygamy as well as child marriages. (Elin Engström and Richard Olofsson, priests in the Church of Sweden, SvD 2007/04/03)

The articles arguing the opposite point of view – some of them in direct dialogue with the ones just analyzed – are fewer and use partly different kinds of arguments and reasons. One shift between the two groups (pro- and anti-) is that the articles from this pro-group mostly argue by countering the arguments given by the “other side” and less by giving reasons of their own. Though obviously reasons against contra-arguments were also given by the anti-group, mostly against the claim that denouncing same-sex marriage means discrimination, they are distinctly more prominent in the articles advocating same-sex marriage. In this pro-group, all articles except one are written by bishops or clergy within the Church of Sweden. The last article is signed by the chairperson of the Christian socialist movement, together with other Social democratic party members (and no other religious actors).

As in the former group of articles, theological arguments of authority are also used by the advocates of same-sex marriage, either referencing the Bible or (much like their opponents) making more sweeping statements about theology, tradition and scripture. Several articles invoke the message of love as central in the Christian faith, and the equal value of all people as a Christian argument for acceptance of same-sex marriage (DN 2007/04/17, Exp 2003/08/02, SvD 2007/09/23). Claims about the authority of tradition are also evident, mostly in pointing to the Lutheran tradition of marriage as a worldly, not divine, order open to re-interpretation (SvD 2007/04/03, SvD 2009/07/28). Other theological arguments are also present, not so much invoking authority but, rather, as reasons of analogy or reasons of consequence when arguing against the reasons given, especially the theological ones, by the opponents in the debate. For example, the use of tradition as a reason to not accept same-sex marriage is compared (analogy) to whether churches were unwilling to marry people of different races (Exp 2003/08/02). The theological arguments are also countered by pointing to the assumptions or perceived flaws in the opponents’ reasons – one article claims there is no clear view of marriage in the bible (SvD 2007/03/27) and others that the passages interpreted as negative towards homosexuality could (and should) be interpreted differently (DN 2007/04/17). Also, here, an analogy is used, comparing this interpretation of the bible and tradition to historical interpretations of the bible used to oppress women or supporting slavery.
Another argument that is countered in this group is the reasoning regarding ecumenical considerations, where one article questions the ecumenical consequences by pointing to the fact that some international churches would welcome a decision in this direction (SvD 2009/07/28) while others question the importance of ecumenical harmony in relation to making a decision in favor of an underprivileged group (SvD 2007/04/03). Also countered are the arguments relating to gender differences and complementarity, criticizing both the historic Christian understanding of gender differences, and the consequences it has (had) on marriage being potentially an unequal or even oppressive institution (SvD 2007/03/27, SvD 2007/04/03).

One key argument in most of the articles regards discrimination, an argument of rule, invoking both the legal and moral rule of equal treatment as an argument for using the same law and the concept of marriage for all couples (SvD 2004/03/05, SvD 2007/09/23, Exp 2003/08/02).

Other articles on the concept of marriage

The main argument for the writers [of the article he is responding to] is ecumenical concerns. That is a strong argument. In my context it is taken most seriously. But it cannot mean that another church can veto, when the Church of Sweden is about to make decisions. Most of all, it cannot mean that a marginalized group should be sacrificed for “unity.” That would not be very Christ-like. (…) A church that can acknowledge that this is a difficult question for all of us, that we need to be careful towards each other in times of great challenges and that we would need to allow great diversity in our understandings without rushing to seeing that as breaches towards the given unity we all believe in, that church would have a lot to offer in our joint aspiration. (Archbishop KG Hammar SvD 2004/02/04)

The third group of articles on the topic of the concept of marriage argues for more vague or implicit theses. Three of the articles are written in response to articles arguing in favor of keeping the concept of marriage for only a man and a woman (SvD 2004/02/04, SvD 2004/02/12, SvD 2004/02/16b) and all of these three articles argue against their opponents, but without explicitly stating that they are in favor of using the concept of marriage for same-sex unions and giving explicit reasons for such a shift. The last article in this group (SvD 2007/04/01) is written in defense of the Church of Sweden national board’s reference statement in 2007 to recommend the state to use the concept of marriage only for a man and a woman while supporting legal equal treatment of same-sex and heterosexual couples. While it is written in defense of this decision, it does not clearly argue that the concept of marriage by definition should be or needs to be used only for man-woman relationships but that a change in its view on marriage would require serious reflection and time. Notably, less than two years later, the church board also changed its stance on the issue. Two of these articles (SvD 2004/02/04, SvD
A recurring argument in these articles revolves around the need for theological reflection: The opportunity to think about and interpret the Bible and the Christian tradition in new ways, opening up for a changed view on marriage and also on homosexuality. In that argument, reasons of authority are mainly used by referring to Luther and the Lutheran/reformation tradition but also in referring to biblical passages on the need for everyone to interpret the commandment of love. Also, reasons of analogy are used in comparing the need to rethink or reinterpret theology on marriage is compared to how the Churches have reinterpreted theology before, for example regarding the ordination of women. Analogies are also used to counter the arguments about an order of creation, pointing to how theologies on the order of creation have been used historically to legitimate colonization and racism as well as the subordination of women. A different analogy is used in countering the argument about reproduction and children being central in constituting marriage, as two articles point to the fact that the church weds mature couples who could not possibly expect to have children. All of the articles mention discrimination (again as reason of rule), mostly as an argument for the need to rethink theology as tradition might clash with a modern understanding of rights, and the care for the marginalized and/or discriminated group needs to be taken into consideration when reinterpreting the Christian tradition. Discrimination in a specific argument is used in one article, where the writer is pointing to the fact that the signatories of the article she is responding to are positioning themselves as a minority with rights (the right to hold a different opinion on the view of marriage), but it is argued here that the right to discriminate is not a valid “minority right.”

Debate over the entitlement to solemnize marriages

If the debate by religious actors over the concept of marriage is to a certain extent a theological one, the debate over the legal right to solemnize marriages has a different character. It involves very few theological arguments but focuses freedom of religion, the relationship between the state and the religious communities and discrimination and equal rights. In my material, 13 articles argue that the religious communities should not have the entitlement to solemnize, while 7 articles argue to keep the right under the new law. Among the signatories arguing against solemnization we find the different Christian traditions as well as one Muslim representative, while all the
articles in favor are signed by affiliates of the Church of Sweden. Also this debate might seem a little more complex, as there are several layers of argument perhaps not as easily discovered as those on the concept of marriage.

**Advocating cancelling the right of religious communities to solemnize marriages**

[T]he overwhelming majority of Jewish, Christian and Muslim believers, as well as the general population, wish to keep the word “marriage” for the relationship between man and woman. It cannot simply be expanded to a wider use. There is a point in taking into account faith and historic tradition especially when considering words that, to many people, are connected to religious beliefs. Regardless of how the parliament and the government will decide over the Marriage Act in the future, there should be a clear separation between law and worship. It is time to end our backwards position in relation to other European states that we have been forced to live with too long due to the state church system. (Krister Andersson, head of the Mission Covenant Church, *SvD* 2004/02/16a)

Among the articles arguing that the religious communities should themselves either refrain from solemnizing marriages, or that the legislators should choose a construction of the marriage law that leaves the religious communities outside the legal part, we find it is mostly — but not solely — religious actors who are also critical about changing the concept of marriage to include same-sex couples. Separating the religious communities from the legal responsibility to solemnize marriages solves problems is the main argument, as we will return to in detail. This is not the case for all the articles — some of the signatories stress that they embrace the spirit of the law and want to bless same-sex unions in the same way as heterosexual relationships but for reasons of principle, or to avoid conflict within the church, still advocate a separation between the legal registration and the religious blessing.

Most of the arguments rest on reasons of rules, invoking the separation of church and state and freedom of religion. It is mentioned for example that the right to solemnize marriage is a remnant from the old state church and should be abolished (*SvD* 2001/08/28, *SvD* 2004/02/16a, *SvD* 2008/11/28), that a neutral state in a multi-religious society should treat all people and religious communities equally (*DN* 2009/02/06, *SvD* 2009/02/22) and that the religious communities have the right to a divergent view on marriage in relation to the state, and that the state has no right to impose its view on the communities (*SvD* 2008/10/04, *SvD* 2008/11/03). In this context an argument of analogy is offered: when a child is born, the state registers the name and gives the baby a personal number, but many families either baptize or

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28 One article is signed by a Christian student movement, which is coded as ecumenical/other in my material, but is close to the Church of Sweden on many issues, and in this case (*SvD* 2009/10/22) the article is directed specifically at the Church of Sweden leadership.
circumcise the baby or have a secular welcoming party. The same principle could be applied to marriages (DN 2009/02/06).

Another recurring argument revolves around discrimination, but in different versions, both as a *reason of rule* and as *reasons of consequence*. It is argued in some articles in more general terms that a state registration of all unions and voluntary religious ceremonies would mean equal treatment and therefore avoid all discrimination (SvD 2004/02/17a), but some of the articles also discuss more in-depth what will happen if religious communities that do not accept same-sex marriages still have the general right to solemnize under the new law. Either the state would force the religious communities (or individual priests and pastors) to solemnize marriages they do not approve of, which would be a serious breach of the freedom of religion (SvD 2001/08/28), or the state would sanction discrimination by “outsourcing” the exercising of public authority to a group that discriminates against same-sex couples (SvD 2007/09/27).

A more specific argument occurs in an article by a Muslim actor discussing the *consequences* of a situation where solemnization might be seen as legal sanctioning of unequal rights for men and women. If religious communities (especially mentioned were Jewish and Muslim, where the right to divorce differs between men and women) have the right to solemnize marriages, people could end up in a situation where they are divorced by Swedish law but not, for example, by Islamic law, which could lead to punishment if entering a country under Muslim law. With the legal right to solemnize marriages, it could be seen that the Swedish state would sanction such unequal practices (SvD 2008/11/01a).

One counterargument that is mentioned repeatedly concerns whether an upheaval of the right to solemnize marriages would lead to a decline in church wedding ceremonies and, thereby, religious decline as well as a marginalization of the church and less connection between the church (of Sweden) and the people. This argument is countered with different reasons: There would be no big difference between a legal, binding ceremony and a non-legal one (DN 2009/02/06) and that the Church of Sweden would still have the best resources to facilitate beautiful and meaningful ceremonies (SvD 2008/11/28).

As in the previous group of articles advocating a view on marriage as constituted by one man and one woman, we can very commonly see in this group of articles explicit statements embracing a pluralist society and in most articles the acceptance of same-sex relationships and the need for legal protection for them. None of the articles in this group reject homosexuality as such.

The writers of these articles come from different Christian traditions, about half of them by people affiliated with the Church of Sweden. A majority of the articles (8 out of 13) are written by denominational leaders or bish-
ops, while the rest are written by individual clergy, elected representatives and a member of the church.

**Advocating continued entitlement for religious communities to solemnize marriages**

Gårder and Rubenson [who had written a previous article] have not taken into enough consideration the larger reality that the Church of Sweden acts within today. Constantly declining numbers of attendance and low participation in church election have become commonplace. At the same time, many Swedes testify to a spiritual need that they feel is not fulfilled. Thus, there is a divide between the church and the people. A core part of the problem is that the church is seen by many as backwards. Therefore it is important for the long term survival of the church to act against this picture and take action on issues such as same-sex marriage. (Kristoffer Moldéus and Mattias Irving, Christian Student Movement. *SvD* 2009/10/22)

In the articles advocating a continued right to solemnize marriages, most of the reasons given are counterarguments to those of their opponents. Also, some of the values or rules invoked by their opponents are used by this group, but with different conclusions. As mentioned previously, this group of articles is completely dominated by the Church of Sweden, with the article by the Christian Student Movement as the only exception. The positions of the signatories varies more, from bishops and elected officials, clergy and a national director.

Several of these articles discuss discrimination but use this as an argument against revoking the right to solemnize. On the contrary, these authors argue that solemnizing all marriages is an important non-discrimination reform (*SvD* 2009/02/15, *SvD* 2008/11/01). Some of the articles also argue that an upheaval of the right to solemnize will not solve the question of discrimination – that it is not ultimately a question of the legal right to solemnize but a question of whether the religious communities treat same-sex couples and heterosexual couples differently. Even with non-legal ceremonies the question of discrimination will be present (*DN* 2001/08/11b, *DN* 2009/02/07). Keeping the possibility for some religious communities or individual clergy not to have to solemnize all marriages is no problem, one article argues with a *reason of example*, since today there is no such rule; some communities do not marry divorced people, or only marry couples where both parties are from their own religion (*SvD* 2008/11/01b). One article disagrees on the possibility for individual clergy to abstain from conducting same-sex weddings, and argue that the right to solemnize should be individual but include an obligation to conduct all weddings, with regard to non-discrimination (*SvD* 2009/07/17). The *reason of rule* concerning freedom of religion and a neutral state in a multi-religious society is not as present in these articles, but one of them reasons that a neutral state is not in conflict with the right of
religion communities to solemnize, using the United States as an example (DN 2009/02/07). Reasons of authority are also used: for example, that there is a long historic tradition of the religious communities’ right to solemnize marriages (SvD 2004/02/29).

One of the most recurring groups of arguments in articles by actors from the Church of Sweden refers to the concept of the people’s church, *folkyrkan*, with the possibility for people to have access to the church as well as openness from the church to accommodate the needs of the people (in a sense wider than the core of congregation coming to church on Sundays). Church weddings are a part of this, and the articles argue that church weddings have wide popular support, are a key meeting place between the church and the people, and an upheaval of the right to solemnize marriages might cause a decline in church wedding ceremonies (SvD 2004/02/29, SvD 2008/11/01b, SvD 2009/02/15). But the argument of the people’s church is also used in another sense in the later articles, namely that there is wide popular support for the new law. If the Church of Sweden were to voluntarily refrain from the right to solemnize instead of embracing same-sex marriage, that would be understood as discriminatory, backwards and siding with the oppressors and would cause a distance between the church and the people, possibly leading to large groups leaving the church (SvD 2009/02/15, SvD 2009/10/22b).

**Other articles relating to same-sex marriage**

The church is not yet willing to accept homosexuals as full members of the church and of the creation. Homosexuals will have to put up with being the objects of a “process” that might “take many years.” We cannot expect any protection from the religious hate speech yet. And any right to get married in the church is not happening today either. (…) The problem for us homosexuals is therefore not only the “black robes” [svartrockar, derogatory nickname for conservative priests]. The silence and lack of support from the “good people” is also a problem. (Lars Gårdfeldt, priest in the Church of Sweden, Exp 2005/02/18)

The remaining 9 articles cannot be as easily divided into clear groups defined by the theses they argue, at least they seem a bit more diverse. Two of the articles are reactions by a large group of people from the Jewish community (DN 2004/01/15) and the Mission Covenant Church (DN 2004/01/20) respectively, protesting the fact that leaders from their respective communities co-signed an article together with many other religious leaders against same-sex marriage (DN 2004/01/09). Both of these articles argue no clear stance in the issue of same-sex marriage itself but mostly stress that the leaders in question do not speak for the entire community. A few articles (Exp 2005/02/18, Exp 2005/03/19) are written in relation to the Åke Green legal
case, a Pentecostal pastor preaching against homosexuality who was prosecuted for hate speech, and was first convicted in a local court but won his case in the court of appeals in 2005 (Österdahl 2006). Two articles refer to the blessing of same-sex partnerships (SvD 2005/10/27, SvD 2005/11/19) and one to the discussion of whether civil partnership ceremonies should be allowed to take place in churches (DN 2001/08/02). One is related to the concept of marriage, but is written in reaction to an article arguing to allow polygamy or group marriages, and in this article expresses support for a traditional marriage model (SvD 2005/08/17). Finally, one article more generally discusses the need for developing theology and ways of understanding to both stop discrimination of gay people within the church and to make sure that people who are more skeptical of this development still have a place in the Church of Sweden (DN 2004/07/28).

As this group of articles is more diverse, and many of the arguments used are similar to ones presented in the previous sections, I will only highlight some of the specificities in these articles. One is that, in some of these articles, the issue of whether homosexuality itself is acceptable is discussed to greater extent than in the rest. Here we also find the only explicit statement that homosexual practice is not acceptable to the Christian faith (SvD 2005/11/19). It is argued mostly with reference to the bible and Christian tradition, and a more general reference to a more literal or traditional understanding of the bible as a reason of authority. Still, it specifically mentioned in this article that it is a choice to live as the author suggests (himself living in celibacy with “homosexual emotions,” as he writes) and what he asks for is more recognition than claiming that this is necessarily the normative teaching of the church.

In the articles related to the Åke Green legal case, the issues regarding discrimination and hate speech are addressed. As we have seen, a large number of articles regardless of position on the issue at hand refer to discrimination and see this as an important aspect. But one of these articles (Exp 2005/02/18) stands out, not only for the fact that discrimination is not just mentioned as one of several arguments but as the main topic, but also that the writer is very critical of the then present situation for gay people within the Church of Sweden, accusing the leadership of being cowardly and wanting to discuss or process issues of gay rights for too long without action. It also stands out for its explicit language, quoting some of the hate speech or threats the author has received.

As mentioned, two articles were written in reaction to an article by a number of religious leaders arguing against same-sex marriage (DN 2004/01/09), where first a large group from the Jewish community (DN 2004/01/15) and then a large group of members and clergy from the Mission Covenant Church (DN 2004/01/20) want to stress that the signatories of the first article did not speak for the entire community. The articles are similar not only in theme but also in the arguments used. Both avoid taking any
specific position on the issue of same-sex marriage but stressing the need for non-discrimination and welcoming gay people in their respective communities.

In the other articles, we mostly see similar patterns of arguments and topics as were found in the articles presented in the previous sections. The positions of the signatories in this group varies – one bishop, some individual clergy and, in the last articles mentioned, they are signed by clergy, elected representatives and members together.

Discussion

In the previous section the articles have been analyzed and presented by the issues or the theses being argued, as there are two clear main issues within the theme of same-sex marriage: The concept of marriage itself, and the entitlement to solemnize. But it would also have been possible to separate the debate by target group or by writer and intended audience. As well as separating between the issues, it could be separated between, on the one hand, articles aimed at the general public and/or the political sphere, mainly signed by denominational leaders and bishops, with the perceived aim of influencing the general public’s view on the concept of marriage or entitlement to solemnize, and ultimately to influence legislation. The other group would then be the more Church-oriented debate, which with a few exceptions is an internal Church of Sweden debate, mainly signed by individual clergy or parts of the Church of Sweden leadership (mostly bishops), and with the perceived aim of influencing decisions made by the church itself, or the theology or debate going on internally within the church. The difference is striking, and there seems to be lots of space on the debate pages of national newspapers to debate what could be seen as quite an internal affair of a non-governmental organization. This points to the more overarching question about the specific status or character of the Church of Sweden compared to the other religious actors. We will return to this issue in depth in Chapter 6.

Authority and the religious argument

Turning now to Habermas and the religious argument; what arguments are used and can we see traces of the “translation process”? As we have seen in the previous sections, there are, depending on the theme of the article, some religious arguments used. I have sorted them into the category of reasons of authority, as they refer to such religious authorities as tradition, theology or religious texts, all directly or indirectly referring to a supernatural reality as stated in my definition (p 63). Some instances of direct quotes from the bible occur, and in some cases more elaborate discussion on theological reasoning and detail. But often there are more general, sweeping references to tradi-
tion, the bible, and the gospel of love or basics of theology without specifying more clearly. A possible interpretation could be that a too-specific, detailed or demanding use of theological or religious arguments would need an audience sharing at least knowledge and perhaps also the religious tradition or faith to accept the reasoning. Another possible interpretation is that the aim of at least some of these articles (mainly ones criticizing using the concept of marriage for same-sex unions) is perhaps not so much to change the opinions of people reading the articles as to claim their right to a divergent view based on religion and therefore be protected by freedom of religion.

An alternative interpretation of why these religious arguments are so general could be related to the medium – the genre and style of the debate article. Though a debate article might have more space for philosophical reasoning and longer arguments than some other journalistic genres, it is still limited. One of the key parts of the newsworthiness is importance and relevance, so that over-long or detailed reasoning on theology might make articles less relevant to a broader public in the eyes of the editors. “Too narrow” was one of the common reasons mentioned by the editors in my interviews as a reason for articles to be declined.

Interesting in relation to religion and arguments of authority is the consequent lack of reasons of authority other than the religious ones. When defining reasons of authority, Björnsson et al. describe them as arguments based on trusted sources, exemplifying with research, opinion polls or trusted public figures, etc. Almost no reasons or sources like that are quoted in any of the articles. For example, several articles claim that the majority (of the general population or of religious people) supports their view, but none of them quote any research or opinion polls to support their claims.

The other types of arguments that are commonly used are reasons of rules, most prominently non-discrimination and equal treatment, but also freedom of religion invoked as a general rule. Though relating to religion, and perhaps sometimes phrased as grounded in religious traditions, these are not arguments based on religious authority according to the definition by Chaves, but based on human rights and therefore on values possibly shared regardless of religious conviction. The same would probably go for the other recurring types of arguments, consequences and analogies. Though some of the analogies used refer to theology or tradition, the most common way they are phrased is more in relation to general principles than to specific, theological claims, such as comparing being against same-sex marriage to not allowing people of different races to be married in the past.

Looking generally at the types of arguments used, we mostly find rules, analogies, consequences and religious authority. The number of reasons of other types, cause and effect, examples, signs and reasons of authority more related to research or other sources are strikingly less frequent. Perhaps it is not possible to draw any clear conclusions on this; it seems as if most of the types of arguments used relate more to normative ways of reasoning, and to
principles and ideas, while the more fact-based types of reasoning are not very prominent. One possible interpretation of this could go along the lines of Sörgjerd’s observation regarding the law itself, that this is first and foremost an issue of symbolic value. What are debated here are the symbolic dimensions – principles, ideas and theology, rather than facts and figures.

Though this could be described as an issue concerning the life-world as discussed above, and potentially a question regarding freedom of religion as well as other freedoms and rights, it is also a question where theology or religious authority is used to debate legislation and public policy. But there is also potential for some influence going in both directions. When the state decides to reinterpret the concept of marriage to include same-sex couples while offering religious communities the right to perform the ceremonies, some of the debaters claim that this means that the state forces the religious communities to adopt this view of marriage. Others claim that this is not the case but that the new situation means several different concepts or understandings of marriage are present at the same time in society. Either way, there is an interesting potential tension in how the religious groups skeptical or against the new marriage law reflect on how this new law affects their understanding of the concept of marriage, or their relationship to the legislators and the authorities, especially if they were to keep the entitlement to solemnize under the new law.

Unfortunately, this is not possible to study in my material. Once the law was passed, or actually for several months before, no more articles were published by any of the religious groups other than the Church of Sweden. And after the Church of Sweden decided to keep the entitlement to solemnize, no more articles were published on the subject. Some of the later articles by the Church of Sweden leadership, as we have seen, point towards the need to reinterpret theology, but that is obviously not done on the debate pages of the newspapers included in this study. Looking at the list of religious communities still having entitlement to solemnize (Kammarkollegiet 2012), we find several of those criticizing the new law and arguing in favor of a separate civil marriage law where religious communities should not be tied to the legalities of marriage. Though the law does not require the communities to wed all couples (i.e., it is possible for a religious community not accepting same-sex marriage to legally marry only couples of different genders), it would be very interesting to study how the internal debate and decisions, and potential negotiation between the legal concept of marriage and the theologies of the religious groups have played out. This will have to be the object of potential future research, though.

Majority and minority positions

As have been mentioned several times, views on homosexuality as such are rarely elaborated, especially negative views. Only a few articles state specif-
ically, and not always explicitly, that homosexuality is unacceptable. More common is to state that homosexuality is acceptable, but that is actually not often elaborated either, but more taken for granted. What is explicitly stated is the equal value of all people; the need to end discrimination and hate crimes; the willingness to welcoming gay people into the religious communities; and to affirm that there is no difference between the love of heterosexual and homosexual couples. In the cases where the writers argue against same-sex marriage in some way, they are almost always explicitly giving support to non-discrimination of LGBT people, or acknowledging a pluralist society where their opinion is just one of many.

There is an interesting dynamic in these articles when it comes to majority and minority and what is to be seen as the “default position” or taken for granted as the norm. Clearly, it seems that denouncing homosexuality as such is a fringe opinion, and it is rarely stated. Groups writing against same-sex marriage are arguing in ways to ensure that they are not seen as against homosexuality per se but, rather, as defending a valid minority position on the issue of marriage protected by freedom of religion against the mainstream general opinion. But in the same articles we find arguments positioning themselves as a majority – mainly within the religious traditions, pointing towards history, theological traditions and religious texts as authorities, but also the history and tradition of the Swedish society in general as well as support of an alleged majority of the population.

Interestingly, a similar dynamic can be found in the articles written by their opponents. They position themselves as a minority within the religious traditions, stress the need to rethink and reinterpret in spite of history and tradition and position themselves as in support of a marginalized and historically oppressed group. But at the same time they invoke not only the majority opinion among the general population for their claim but also a more vague general development, painting their opponents as backwards and warn that religions (especially the Church of Sweden) will be abandoned by people if it distances itself too far from what contemporary society sees as right and fair. So, it seems the people defending same-sex marriage in a similar way position themselves at the same time as a minority and the majority or norm.

The fact that the group in favor of same-sex marriage mostly uses counter-arguments, and that both groups mostly discuss the arguments put forward by the opponents of same-sex marriage, could be interpreted in different ways in terms of the “default position” or what is the taken-for-granted normative position. It could be seen as an expression of the group in favor of same-sex marriage being the norm – or perhaps more likely, that non-discrimination, pluralism and acceptance of homosexuality is the default

29 Alleged, as both sides claim to have majority support, but none of them refer to any source for their claim.
position in the general debate. It would mean that this is the starting point that most writers relate to, and more reasons or arguments are “needed” to go against what is perceived as the default position than in defending it, which could be said to be the very definition of something being taken for granted. It could on the other hand also be argued that the group criticizing same-sex marriage has, if not a majority position in society, still a kind of default position in the sense that its members are defending the status quo – they defend what is seen as the traditional position of the religious groups themselves as well as society, and they defend the present legislation (at the time of the articles). By proposing arguments, they could also be said to define the debate, as most article discuss – in favor or against – the reasons and arguments put forward by them.

This whole discussion over who is the majority or minority, or whose view is the norm or is taken for granted, echoes discussions within media studies over whether there is a mediated “center” of society, if the media is upholding or constructing a center. Nick Couldry (2011) among others is very critical about this assumption, calling it a myth in need of deconstructing. This construction of what is taken for granted or seen as obvious or natural is not taking place in a vacuum or empty space but is constantly constructed and reconstructed by the media, and has implications of power. (cf. Hall 2006, 1997)

Pledging allegiance to pluralist society

The constant presence of the pluralist society, and the acceptance of different positions, is striking in the debate. Though the subject matter of the articles has to do with such potentially authoritative themes as legislation and religious doctrine, especially among the leadership of different religious groups, there seems to be almost a consensus that there is and should be not only a general freedom of religion and conscience in Swedish society but that the pluralist society is a good thing. Several articles point to the neutral or secular state as a guarantee of this pluralism and freedom and seem to assume that their own position is not to be seen as authoritative outside of their own group or even within it, in the sense that they defend their right to their opinion rather than give authoritative recommendations or ultimate truth claims.

As seen especially in articles written by church leaders, this is present, and often stressed by not only giving support for the pluralist society in general but also to certain legislation or institutions, such as the need for legally-regulated civil unions/partnerships for same-sex couples, and the need to work against discrimination. This can be seen as a typical example of one of the criteria for public religions: they have to accept that they are one voice among many in a pluralist society and they cannot make ultimate truth claims (at least outside their own church/tradition), in many ways accepting some of the Enlightenment critique of religion. By positioning themselves
either as advocates of a traditional religious position in defense of a traditional understanding of family or as defending the rights of a marginalized group in need of a reinterpreted theology, religious leaders in different positions in this debate tread the line of public religions carefully, making sure not to lose their relevance. Defending the pluralist society could of course also have other grounds or at least another consequence: If you are holding a minority position, a neutral or secular state defending equal treatment in a multi-faith and multi-cultural society obviously gives you protection.

Expressions of public religion?

Concerning the issues that are appropriate for public religions to get involved with, the debates analyzed here could be said to touch upon all three types mentioned by Casanova and elaborated above (p 55). The articles claiming freedom of religion and the right to a diverging view on marriage might be seen as an example of debating to protect the freedom and existence of pluralist, liberal democracy itself. Articles arguing for same-sex marriage could be defined as an example of arguing for the rights of marginalized or oppressed groups to enjoy the same rights and freedoms as others, an example of Casanova’s second type of legitimate question. Finally, debaters defending a traditional understanding of marriage and family probably see their participation as a defense of the traditional life-world, as Casanova describes his third type of legitimate question.

When it comes to defending the life-world, Casanova addresses the issues of religions (in his case, the Catholic Church) defending what could be generally seen as going against modern society and liberal principles. Casanova still sees this as a valuable contribution and should not be seen just as some sort of backlash against modernization; both for modern society and for religious traditions. He writes:

[Even in those cases in which religious mobilization could be explained simply as a traditionalist response to modern processes of universalization, which are promoted or protected by the state juridical interventions and which disrupt, for instance, the traditional patriarchal family or established patterns of racial or gender discrimination, the deprivatization of religion may have an important public function. By entering the public sphere and forcing the public discussion or contestation of certain issues, religions force modern societies to reflect publicly and collective upon their normative structures. …]

In the very process of entering the modern public sphere, religions and normative traditions are also forced to confront and possibly come to terms with modern normative structures. (Casanova 1994:228)

Judging from this, the position itself, whether liberal or not in relation to the development in modern societies, Casanova seems to think that a question such as same-sex marriage (though that example was hardly on the agenda
when his book was written in 1994) could be a typical example of a valid question for public religions to engage in.

Perhaps it is possible to make a distinction between different parts of the debates analyzed in this chapter; not by issue or thesis but by aim or intended audience. Above, I argued that it could be possible to divide the debate thus: one part trying to influence the general public and/or political actors, and where the articles were often signed by different religious groups; the other debate aimed at influencing the decisions of the religious group of the writer him/herself, almost always the Church of Sweden. Looking from this perspective, it is definitely clearer how this first debate could be seen as public religion in Casanova’s sense – religious groups taking part in public debate to influence society. It is not as clear to me whether individual clergy of a church writing in public to influence its own leadership (or the leadership defending/discussing its stance) is to be viewed as public religion in the same way.

Conclusions

In Sörgjerd’s study of the changed marriage law, one of her conclusions was that the symbolic dimensions of marriage were the key point of the new law – there were no major changes in the legal protection but the main point was to give same-sex couples access to the symbolic dimensions of marriage and to remove the legal separation of the two institutions of marriage and registered partnership. These symbolic dimensions have also been present in the debates analyzed here, perhaps especially in the articles relating to the concept of marriage as such. The arguments used and how the religious actors position themselves largely relate to keeping the then present symbolic dimensions of marriage as they were and, later, the right of religious groups (and other minorities) to keep an alternative understanding of marriage in relation to the assumed upcoming law; or to advocate the importance of same-sex couples also being given access to the symbolic dimensions of marriage within the religious communities.

I have shown in this chapter how the religious – mostly Christian – actors in large take part in the debate within the parameters of public religions. There is also a presence of religious arguments but they are, at least partly, either already “translated” into an accessible form or given in more general terms. We can also see a separation not only between the different issues being discussed – the concept of marriage and the entitlement to solemnize marriage as the main ones, but also a difference between the debate aimed towards influencing society at large, general opinion and the political decisions, and that trying to influence the decisions of Church of Sweden; the latter debate does not necessarily fit as nicely into Casanova’s understanding
of public religion. An alternative way to understand these kinds of articles will be presented next.
6. A church of the people: the Church of Sweden as a public utility

Though the Church of Sweden was disestablished in the year 2000 and is no longer a state church, it still holds a dominant position among the churches in Sweden – not only in membership and number of buildings, employees and services but it still also has a specific legal position. All other religious communities have their legal status regulated in *Lagen om trossamfund*, the Act on Religious Communities (SFS 1998:1593) while there is a specific Church of Sweden Act (SFS 1998:1591). These were both the result of the long process of disestablishment, coming into effect after decades of debates, governmental investigations and negotiations (Gustafsson 2003; Stegeby 1999).

The Church of Sweden Act does not only regulate technical and economic matters and the like, but also determines what the Church of Sweden is.

§ 1 The Church of Sweden is an Evangelical-Lutheran religious community that manifests itself in the form of parishes and dioceses. The Church of Sweden also has a national organization.

§ 2 The Church of Sweden is an open national church, which through a democratic organization and the ministry of the Church carries out nationwide activities.

The wording “open national church,” in Swedish *en öppen folkkyrka*, is a key in the self-understanding of Church of Sweden, and has been under theological as well as ideological debate and reflection for almost a century. Without going further into the history of the concept, it is today used in varying senses – sometimes referring to the democratic character of the decision-making bodies, sometimes to its majority status, sometimes to its (historical but also contemporary) connection to “Swedishness” and the nation, and also to the notion that the Church should be there for the people, accessible to and caring for everyone, regardless of their individual piety or faith (Bäckström et al. 2004; Edgardh and Pettersson 2010; Ekstrand 2012; Ryman 2005). As we will see, all of these aspects are present in the debate articles to be analyzed in this chapter.

This character of a national church, a “folk church” that separates Church of Sweden from other religious communities in Sweden can be
traced in some of the debates. In some cases the articles, as was presented in Chapter 4, do not really follow the pattern assumed by Casanova on public religions, where the religious leaders mobilize on an issue. Rather, some of the articles could be seen more as internal debate, or discussing the Church of Sweden as such, rather than a specific issue. I already presented the idea that this might be understood in terms of vicarious religion, or the Church as a public utility. In this chapter, I will explore this idea further.

I will begin by presenting Grace Davie’s concept of vicarious religion and the idea of the religion as a public utility and how they have been applied to public debate, by Davie as well as others, and critique how it has been used, and discuss the concepts in relation to different understandings of public, and mediatization. I will then move on to present how ideas of vicariousness, public utility and popular access to Church of Sweden and ideas about the national church are present in the debate articles, show an example of the opposite to further illustrate my point, and conclude with a discussion on the national church, a public utility and mediatization.

Public debate and vicarious religion

When studying the religious situation especially of the national churches in northern Europe, Grace Davie describes the idea of vicarious religion. By that, she means “the notion of religion performed by an active minority but on behalf of a much larger number, who (implicitly at least) not only understand, but, quite clearly, approve of what the minority is doing” (Davie 2006:277). At the heart of the concept of vicarious religion is the notion of the church/religion as a public utility, something that everyone has access to in case of need and that is funded collectively (via taxes, member fees or otherwise). Even though many European countries no longer have formal state churches, the idea of the church/religion as a public utility remains. This model is quite different from, for example, the American situation where religion is organized as member organizations in a market, which also mean fundamentally different theoretical models can and should be used to study the place of religion in the European societies compared to the US. (cf. Berger et al. 2008; Davie 2006:278–281). A key part of this is the European historical background with state churches, where the Church was more of a public utility in a concrete sense, paid for by taxes and catering to all, regardless of personal involvement or choice (Davie 2006:280).

Davie points to four ways in which the church takes on a vicarious role that is empirically possible to study:

- Churches and church leaders perform rituals on behalf of others;
- Church leaders and churchgoers believe on behalf of others;
• Church leaders and churchgoers embody moral codes on behalf of others;
• Churches can offer space for the vicarious debate of unresolved issues in modern societies. (Davie 2007b:23)

Davie’s concept of vicarious religion has spread and has been widely used, but not without criticism. Among others, Steve Bruce and David Voas (2010) argue that more reasonable explanations can be made for the British patterns of (lack of) religiosity. Davie herself has also discussed the methodological challenges to the concept and admits there is a need for more empirical studies and operationalization of the concept of vicarious religion. She also acknowledges the fact that vicarious religion should by no means be seen as a singular grand theory explaining every aspect of the religious situation in Britain or Europe, but could still be a valuable concept for studying certain traits of it (Davie 2010).

Davie’s own use of the concept of vicarious religion has mostly focused on the relationship between the national churches and the general population in the respective country, where the people are thought to give silent or passive support for the church and its operations. Her main interest in relation to the concept has not been to discuss the place of religion or religious actors in the media. Still, as she has suggested, the vicarious debate is one potential way of understanding religion in relation to public debate, which will be the focus here. She discusses this in terms of church leaders debating difficult moral issues as a vicarious way of handling difficult issues or moral shifts in a society (Davie 2007b:24–25).

Vicarious religion, the public and mediatization

In her writings on vicarious religion, Davie does not discuss in depth her understanding of the concept of the public. Relating to the different models discussed above in Chapter 2 (p 36), there seems to be present both the aspect of visibility and the aspect of collectivity, though in different ways. When writing about the church as a public utility and something that people in general want access to, the view of the public quite clearly connects to collectivity, though it is somewhat unclear if it refers more to the state (model 1, p 37) or more to citizenship and a public sphere in Habermas’ sense (model 2, p 38). But there is also, especially in her last point about the public debate, an element of visibility. Many of her examples, especially regarding vicarious rituals, are mediated events such as televised funerals or services; and some of the other examples, such as people gathering in churches at the time of crisis, has an element of collectivity but also of visibility and sociability in the sense of the “public square” where people meet (model 3, p 38).

One way of thinking about vicarious religion in this context might actually be to separate between these two aspects of public and think in different
ways of how to interpret the phenomena Davie is describing. When religious ritual, such as the funeral of royalty or the pope, is aired on TV, or when the church leaders debate a moral issue on the debate pages, is it a public event in the sense that it is collective, that it is on behalf of and involving the general population, or is it public in the sense of visibility, that the general public might take interest in just watching and enjoy without participating? I would argue that for an action to be vicarious, on behalf of, a population or a larger group, they would have to be or think of themselves as part of – as citizens or another political agent – the events or organization and not just an audience.

When Davie presents the idea of a vicarious debate where the church becomes an arena for solving or at least addressing moral shifts in society, she poses a rhetorical question in relation to the debate on homosexuality in the Anglican Communion.

Is this simply an internal debate about senior clergy appointments in which different lobbies within the church are exerting pressure? Or is this one way in which society as a whole comes to terms with profound shifts in the moral climate?

If the latter is not true, it is hard to understand why so much attention is being paid to the churches in this respect. If it is true, sociological thinking must take this factor into account. (Davie 2007b:24–25)

Whether it is hard to understand why the media would find any interest in such a debate if it is not vicarious probably depends on whether you look for the keys to understanding the debate within the church itself (and/or its relation to the population) or within the logics of the media. If we look for explanation in mediatization theory or in the media logic, other explanations or ways of thinking will arise. This is done in Christiansen’s (2012) study referenced below in certain aspects, but there are several points I would like to address before looking at the results of his study.

Starting from mediatization theory, there would be several possible explanations for media interest in church debates that have less to do with the inner life of the churches per se. Hjarvard describes one type of mediatization of religion, journalism on religion, as an increased interest from news media to cover religion within the genre of critical scrutiny. As large and potentially important institutions or member organizations, in at least Scandinavian societies, the majority churches are scrutinized in the same way other powerful or important institutions and organizations are. Hjarvard points especially to the fact that this scrutiny appears when the churches, in opinion or behavior, differ from the modern, secular values of the surrounding society (Hjarvard 2012:31–34, 40). In the criteria for newsworthiness in the genre of journalism, it is not only issues of common concern that make the news as presented previously. Also what is “sensational and surprising” as Hvitfelt puts it, especially if it fits within a larger story (see p 47). In some
of the cases regarding homosexuality, religious groups might be some of few groups publicly stating a differing view and therefore attract attention when news journalists are looking for a different angle.

I believe Davie is underestimating the importance of looking at these debates as specifically mediated, and the need to also take into account the logic of the media and not just look at the relationship between the church and the general public. Still, this does not mean it is fruitful to ignore this relationship, or to study the different views or understandings of the church in this debate. It does show, though, the need to keep both the different understandings of the public as well as potential effect of mediatization in mind when studying it.

Previous studies of debating on behalf of society

To test Davie’s claim about vicarious debates, the Danish sociologist of religion Henrik Reintoft Christensen has used Davie’s main example of a vicarious debate, homosexuality, using Scandinavian media material to see how themes of religion and homosexuality are covered (Christensen 2012). He looked at how themes of the relationship between Christianity and homosexuality were addressed in some Danish, Swedish and Norwegian newspapers during three months in 2006, relating the debate both to Davie’s claims about a vicarious debate around something difficult yet important in society and to Hjarvard’s claims about mediatization of religion. Christensen’s results point quite clearly against Davie’s claim. He argues that there really is not much support for the claim that this is a vicarious debate. Rather, he argues, it seems as if the church representatives are dealing with an issue that society at large has already dealt with – the shift in the majority’s values came before the church debate. Also, it seems in his material that it only enters the media when church actors represent views seen as contrary to general opinion. There is media interest in the most conservative actors seen as furthest from the mainstream views, indicating that the processes studied are better explained by theories of mediatization than by describing the debate as vicarious (Christensen 2012:74–75).

Looking at my own material, I largely agree with Christensen in his criticism against how Davie uses vicarious religion in regard to public debate. How the religious actors debate homosexuality has been dealt with in length in Chapter 5, and also here it seems like an unreasonable conclusion that the churches are giving space for a debate too difficult for society to resolve. Rather, it seems as if the societal debate or development pushes the churches so they need to respond or deal with the issue.

Looking at the rest of my material, there are a few articles debating moral issues such as euthanasia or other questions regarding medical ethics written by religious actors (SvD 2006/12/18, SvD 2006/12/21, Exp 2008/12/23). These are probably the ones coming closest to this general moral debate that
Davie envisions. Still, these are often written in response to articles by medical professionals or researchers, and articles by these other professions are frequently published on these and other issues. To claim that the churches or religious actors vicariously pursue a debate on behalf of all of society is not a very accurate description of the debate.

Debating a public utility, not a vicarious debate
Since the idea of a vicarious debate, where the churches or religious communities address issues on behalf of a wider society, seems to have little empirical support, I would argue for a more useful approach to the concepts of vicarious religion and the notion of the church as a public utility in relation to public debate. My proposition is, rather, to use the opinion pieces and the debate as empirical material to study whether the way the Church of Sweden is treated and debated might itself be an expression of vicarious religion, or, in more general terms, reveal an understanding of the church as a public utility. I see these articles as a distinct type, and distinct from articles which I have described as public religion-type articles, where the religious actors live up to the criteria based on Casanova’s writings that I presented in the theory chapter (see p 54). Public religion-type articles are where religious actors “step into” the debate to try to influence political or other matters, while public utility-type articles are when the church itself is the topic of debate, as something of a general concern for a wider public, or where the character of the church is debated.

As presented in Chapter 4, there is a group of articles that could loosely be called public utility-type in this sense, and it refers both to the ideas presented and how the Church of Sweden is debated. In this chapter I conduct a qualitative content analysis and present some different themes and ways in which the public utility-sense is present.

Though this argument is firmly based on the empirical findings of my study – looking for vicarious religion as a theme was not part of my initial research question but a theme that struck me as I analyzed the articles – this chapter and the analysis here will be more theory-driven than the previous and the following chapters. I will not go into depth and do a systematic analysis of all articles regarding Church of Sweden, nor pick a specific case. I will present some of the tendencies I see, arguments for claiming that the Church of Sweden is treated as a public utility in the material, and exemplify this with some different articles and quotes. To further highlight my thesis, I will also present some articles illustrating when the Church of Sweden does act like a public religion in Casanova’s sense. The main separation between these two ways of seeing the Church of Sweden as an actor in public debate – as a public religion or as a public utility – comes down to the positioning. The main key to the church acting like a public religion is when it “steps out” of its own arena to debate joint or common issues, as has been defined
throughout this study. The position of the church as a public utility is present when it does not have this character, but rather is the object of debate, or its intended audience is not outside but within the Church. This distinction should be made clear by the examples. After presenting these tendencies, I will compare with a potential alternative explanation, using mediatization theory, and highlight both the strengths and weaknesses of this approach.

Church of Sweden as a public utility: examples from the debate

In the debate, both explicitly, when the nature or features of the church are discussed, and implicitly, when matters of the majority church are discussed publicly, some different themes occur that together point towards this understanding of the church as a public utility. I have grouped these different themes and will present them in this section: public debate of internal matters; people’s access to the church; organization and elections; and gender equality. All of these are themes and discussions that rarely appear in debates on or from religious communities other than the Church of Sweden, and point towards the special position of the former state church. It should be pointed out that not all articles signed by someone from the Church of Sweden fall into any of these categories – as previously discussed, in this wide definition of vicarious or the public utility-group I have coded 128 out of 269 articles by Church of Sweden writers. In this group a few articles by other writers also appear, but they are few and, comparatively, this theme is striking with regard to the Church of Sweden.

A public debate on internal matters

One way that the Church of Sweden stands out in this respect has to do with the way the internal matters of the church are publicly debated. Though not the majority of the articles, it is striking that internal organizational matters or other issues of concern primarily for the members of the church are recurrently debated in the newspapers. Some of these examples refer to the church elections, both in terms of who to vote for and the electoral system itself, and in some cases the elections of bishops and a few instances of other appointments. There are also a number of articles on gender equality as well as different themes regarding the economic management of the church’s resources and buildings.

I will return to the content of these debates, especially the ones regarding gender equality and the elections and the running of the church, but the first point here is that they all relate to the internal administrative or organizational structures of the church, typically matters for the members of an or-
ganization rather than the general public. I find this especially striking when it comes to some of these examples, such as a debate over the appointing of a new dean to the cathedral in Visby (SvD 2007/05/25, SvD 2007/05/28); recurring debates over the organization of church funds, such as whether they should be handled at the diocesan or national level (SvD 2007/04/29, SvD 2007/05/03); or how the national economic management has consequences for local parishes (SvD 2004/05/03) or the Church of Sweden Abroad (SvD 2002/06/16, SvD 2002/07/03). Another is a debate over Bishop Caroline Krook’s decision to no longer allow lay person Olof Buckard the right to preach in churches in Stockholm (SvD 2003/11/22, SvD 2003/11/26, SvD 2003/11/28).

When these more-or-less-internal matters are debated, implicit and explicit references to the identity as a national church are frequent. One example is from an article debating a suggestion to centralize the administration of the forests and other assets of the dioceses:

The properties of the Church were once given from the Swedish people to facilitate the building of a parish church [sockenkyrka] and pay a priest’s salary. Late last century the administration of these assets in form of forests, land and capital were transferred to the dioceses in two steps.

This decision was far-sighted. It created incentives and resources for an efficient administration where independent units spur each other to better results and creative solutions.

Simultaneously an important principle of vicinity was upheld. That people feel participation in what the church owns is an important aspect of a democratic national church [folkkyrka]. (Bishop Claes-Bertil Ytterberg and Diocese Forester Åsa Tham, SvD 2007/04/29)

Perhaps the articles on the elections are more expected in national newspapers, as the church elections potentially involve a large proportion of the population and there is no internal church media that reaches a large proportion of church members. Also the articles regarding gender equality might have more newsworthiness, as I will discuss further below. But they often address how the church should handle the position of the small minority that does not accept the ordination of women, and some of these articles refer to quite specific, local cases (DN 2003/06/18, SvD 2002/12/23, SvD 2004/01/18).

There are a few instances where similar internal issues are debated in other denominations, besides the examples regarding homosexuality or marriage that were discussed in the previous chapter. The two most striking ones are the debate over the style of leadership in certain Pentecostal congregations after the murders in Knutby 2004 (Exp 2004/01/14, SvD 2004/01/15, SvD 2004/01/27, SvD 2004/02/05) and some articles after the scandals of child abuse and molestation in the Roman Catholic Church (DN 2010/04/10, SvD 2010/04/15, SvD 2010/04/17). But both these cases were caused by
criminal offences, thereby outside the internal organizational arena and having in a more direct sense a public (i.e. collective) character compared to the articles concerning Church of Sweden.

Access to the Church

One of the important frequent elements in these articles is the importance of varying aspects of access to the church. This seems to be a key feature when regarding the church as a public utility. Access is discussed both in physical terms – the keeping of the buildings and historic artifacts – but also the access to the services provided by the church.

The responsibility of caring for the thousands of churches around the country – often in rural areas with a very different population structure today from when the churches were built centuries ago – was one of the important issues discussed in the process of separating church and state (cf. Gustafsson 2003). Though the matter was supposedly settled before the period studied here, the issue still occurs in the debate. It appears in articles demanding increased economic support from the state to care for the old buildings (DN 2009/05/20, DN 2009/09/08), but also in a more general discussion on how to solve the dilemma of a continued popular interest in keeping the old buildings while the membership rates and the economic base of the Church of Sweden is continually decreasing. A priest suggested that hundreds of churches should now be torn down instead of becoming a future economic hazard, bleeding the church of all resources (SvD 2011/10/02), while others were less drastic, but still pointed towards this discrepancy (SvD 2006/10/15, SvD 2008/01/08, DN 2009/05/20). Arguments used in these articles refer to the historic value and the church buildings as a joint cultural heritage for the entire population.

More often than the church buildings themselves being the topic of the articles, they are one of several examples when writers discuss the people’s access to the church in a more general way. What is usually focused on here is the access to the church’s services at important life events, such as baptisms, weddings and funerals, but also in times of crisis and need (SvD 2006/06/16, SvD 2006/11/03, SvD 2007/12/24). The arguments regarding weddings and the right to solemnize have been covered extensively in Chapter 5, but similar arguments are used in other instances. For example is the recurring debate over the tradition to hold the ceremony at the end of the school year in churches, where representatives of the Church of Sweden mostly defend this tradition with regard to openness, the popular character of the church and cultural heritage (SvD 2010/06/04, SvD 2010/06/26). For example, Bishop Eva Brunne of Stockholm and national director of the Church of Sweden, Lars Friedner, write:
For the Church of Sweden, it is natural to open up the church buildings for graduation ceremonies. We do it because they are rooms that for almost a thousand years have been important to people. They are rooms that are a central part of people’s identity, both as individuals and for a local community. They are everyone’s cultural heritage, an open room where people are welcome regardless of ideological or religious affiliation. (SvD 2010/06/04)

This is not the only view from Church of Sweden representatives – other clergy argue that, in a pluralist society, it would be better not to have mandatory school gatherings in churches but, rather, that the churches as well as other religious communities should invite schools as visitors on equal terms while the schools’ own ceremonies take place on “neutral ground” (DN 2007/01/11, SvD 2011/12/12).

These articles are to a large extent written by Church of Sweden clergy or elected officials. A few articles are written by people presenting themselves as “ordinary members,” but it is mostly a debate where the formal representatives of the church present arguments for a view of the church as belonging to the people, or the importance of access for people in general.

Elections and the church political system

Other, quite small, groups of articles published are in relation to church elections (8 articles) and the elections of bishops (5 articles). These are interesting in relation to the idea of a public utility not only in themselves but because the running of a member organization is debated in the newspapers. They are also interesting, both as they argue for (or against) voting in a specific manner to ensure the folk church tradition and as they argue for or against the current system of voting itself.

One of the residues of the state church is that there are political parties within the church organization as part of the decision-making bodies. Today there are three types of electoral groups: political parties, such as Social democrats and Center party; groups affiliated with but formally not part of political parties, such as Liberals in the Church of Sweden and Environmentalists (green party) in the Church of Sweden; and groups with no ties at all to the political system. On the national level there are three major non-political groups; they are also represented at the local level in many places, together with local non-party affiliated groups.

The system of direct elections and political parties has been debated since before the state-church reform, and some articles can be found in my material, mostly written by debaters questioning the current system. The most common argument is that the system is a connection not to the people but to the political system, and the separation of church and state is not complete without a new electoral system (Exp 2001/09/15, SvD 2007/11/10, SvD 2007/11/15). It is described both as a problem for the church, being run by
political concerns, and as a problem for the political parties, making them connected to a specific religious faith.

If someone wants to promote a clear separation of church and state, it must have consequences all the way. It is about time that the political parties withdraw and stop the paternalism of the church. Not only for the sake of the church but also for their own credibility. (…) In Sweden there is no real separation between church and state. That is the work of political parties in their fear of allowing too many independent players in the public arena. (Yngve Kallin, priest and elected member of the Church General Synod, *SvD* 2007/11/10)

The argument used against this point, is that the political parties give the church a connection to a wider base in the population, and keeps the church from becoming an elite fringe group only for the most dedicated – the opposite of the open, democratic national church.

The Church of Sweden is a people’s church, where the common priesthood – the joint responsibility of all baptized – constitutes an important foundation. This is stated in the Church Ordinance, the overarching regulation of the Church of Sweden. (…) We do not want to see a development where only the innermost clique makes the decisions, a kind of elite church. (Mats Hagelin, Marianne Kronberg, Annette Lundquist Larsson, Hans Ulfvebrand, all members of the Church General Synod for the Moderate (conservative) party, *SvD* 2007/11/14)

Also, besides the specific question of whether political parties should run in church elections or not, the system and its strength and weaknesses is debated, for example, in relation to the relative success of the right-wing populist Sweden democrats in church elections (*DN* 2001/08/11); or of groups who do not accept the ordination of women (*DN* 2001/07/30, see further in the next section). Present, too, is the ideal of a church widely anchored among the general population, and not one being taken over by fringe groups.

Some articles are also published in relation to the election of bishops – in total, 5 articles. Three of them discuss different candidates in the archbishop’s election of 2005 (none of which turned out to be strong contenders), while one is written by the high-profile Pentecostal pastor Stanley Sjöberg, urging the diocese of Stockholm not to elect a liberal bishop, and not to jeopardize ecumenical relations (*SvD* 2009/02/08).

It is hard, if not impossible, to judge whether a number of articles or a certain topic is small or not when there is no previous research to compare with and with a research design that does not put forth a testable thesis on the matter. But, to me, the number of articles (8) about church elections is surprising in that it should arguably be of more concern to a larger part of the population, since all members of church of Sweden are allowed to vote, than some of the other “internal issues” presented previously. Whether this is best
understood in terms of mediatization and media logic or in terms of the relationship between the Church of Sweden and the general public will be addressed in the last section of this chapter.

Gender equality and “opinion minorities”

One theme in the articles about the internal affairs of the Church of Sweden regards gender equality. Or, to be more precise, how to deal with the small group within the church that does not accept the ordination of women. Several articles call for firmer action from the church leadership against clergy who do not accept the ordination of women (DN 2003/06/18, DN 2006/02/26, SvD 2003/10/22). No articles published argue against the ordination of women, only one article signed by a lay woman questions the reasons for celebrating the 50th anniversary of the ordination of women in 2008 (SvD 2008/03/08), arguing that women clergy are not oppressed in the church; rather, people of a more conservative, or “classic” understanding of the Christian faith are marginalized. Other articles defend the place of so-called “opinion minorities” within the Church of Sweden, an expression used to describe varying groups, rarely defined, but who define themselves as having a more traditional or classic understanding of Christian doctrine and a more conservative view (though not necessarily literal) of the Bible than the Church of Sweden leadership or the majority of clergy and members. Several of these articles are written on the issue of marriage, discussing the need for a situation where not just the majority position should be legitimate in the church (see above, pp. 104, 109), but similar arguments are found on the place for people with a diverging view on the ordination of women (SvD 2002/12/23).

The connection to the concept of a national or people’s church is strongest in the articles arguing for measures to be taken against the group who refuse to accept the ordination of women. It is argued that a key feature in a democratic church is to work against discrimination, and that giving space for opinions so far from the general public’s view (which has massively supports the ordination of women for several decades) will alienate people from the church. The arguments are similar to those presented on the issue of same-sex marriage and the two issues are often addressed in the same article. For example, several articles were published in response to a decision by the national leadership of the Church of Sweden to initiate talks with opinion minorities in 2001. Church of Sweden priest Karin Långström Vinge writes together with Irma Irlinger from the state gender equality office:

starting discussions of whether women should refrain from fully performing their profession is an absurd idea. That question was decided upon in 1958. (...) Since the church was separated from the state in 2000, the church of
Sweden is now bending itself to the maximum to accommodate the opponents of women clergy by granting them church spaces. (…)

The Church of Sweden has an enormous symbolic value in society. The citizens turn to the church in happiness and sorrow for baptisms, confirmations, weddings and funerals. It is at those times, among others, that priests can give hope or comfort and share the biblical thoughts about the equal value of all people. At these moments, someone who is rejected cannot experience anything other than a deep violation. The Church of Sweden should therefore work towards keeping, with Christ as its center, the idea of the national church of freedom, openness and forgiveness. (Karin Långström Vinge, Irma Irlinger, DN 2006/02/26)

The groups defending the place of opinion minorities rarely use the concept of a national church (at least not in a positive sense) but they do present arguments based on democratic principles: the right of a minority to have a diverging view and the right not to be discriminated against, for example. Other arguments are more prominent, though, such as arguing that the majority of the church leadership is either guided by party political concerns or political correctness and less by the bible or Christian tradition.

It is interesting that the only gender equality issue addressed when it comes to the Church of Sweden’s internal organization concerns the ordination of women or, rather, how to handle the opposing view. Looking at the entire material for this study, there are several articles concerning gender that address issues in society in general, such as violence against women (DN 2004/11/19, SvD 2010/12/24), and quite a number regarding gender equality in Islam (Exp 2001/12/11, Exp 2005/05/24, SvD 2007/06/17). But these and other issues are not discussed in relation to the organization of the Church of Sweden, at least not as internal gender equality issues – there are no articles about differences in wages, or the representation of women among elected officials, or sexual harassment within the church, for example.

It is obviously not possible to know the reasons for this lack of other articles – whether they have not been submitted or not published. It is still interesting that it is only this very church-specific gender issue of the ordination of women that makes it to the debate pages, not the more general ones such as wage discrimination.

The contrast: Examples of public religion-articles

I started this chapter pointing out that the tendency focused on here, that the Church of Sweden is at times functioning more as a public utility than presenting itself as a public religion in Casanova’s sense, was not applicable to all articles by or addressing the Church of Sweden. As I have shown throughout the chapter, the imagery of the national church as well as explicit
arguments advocating it have been present in articles with a diversity of topics. I would still like to stress that this is not the case for all articles by writers representing the Church of Sweden. On the contrary, as the Church of Sweden is so dominant in numbers in the overall material, they are also common signatories on articles representing public religion in Casanova’s understanding. To keep this in mind, and to illustrate the contrast between public religion stepping outside its own realm to defend its values in the public sphere on the one hand, and as public utility being the object of debate that everyone should have access to on the other, I will show some examples of these public religion articles signed by official representatives as well as individual clergy and members from Church of Sweden.

Besides the themes regarding marriage already addressed, some recurring themes that were also presented in Chapter 4 regard international issues, and peace and justice. These are often co-signed by several churches or Christian organizations, and sometimes together with other NGOs or sections of civil society. Most commonly they are signed by the Archbishop or other representatives of the church leadership, but occasionally also by individual clergy. They are sometimes published in relation to events in the news or on the political agenda, sometimes sparked, for example, by church fundraising campaigns.

Judging from the number of articles, international issues concerning foreign aid as well as peace and justice are important to the Church of Sweden. A few examples of the many in this category are when the Director of the International office of the Church of Sweden criticizes the idea that money earmarked for foreign aid in the state budget should be used for defense (SvD 2007/01/19); or when the retiring Archbishop KG Hammar and his successor Anders Wejryd discuss poverty and social injustice as causes of human trafficking (SvD 2006/05/31). Though addressing international issues, the articles are clearly directed at politicians and authorities in Sweden, calling for political action. This is the case when Archbishop Anders Wejryd together with the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (Naturskydds-föreningen), UNA Sweden (Svenska FN-förbundet) and the Swedish Association of Graduate Engineers (Sveriges Ingenjörer) criticize the government for not having high enough goals in bringing down carbon emissions to prevent climate change (DN 2007/10/15). In this longer quote from that article, some of the typical features of this type of articles are illustrated:

We who sign this article speak for four organizations that represent large groups in Sweden. We are united in a wish that the Swedish government should show leadership and set the bar high enough that we will not once again try to solve the problem by putting the homework in the laps of our children. We will, through our organizations, educate and raise public opinion that all individuals and agents take firm action to decrease emissions of greenhouse gases. (…)

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In the urgent situation we are now in, it is not possible to think in terms of “either-or”. We have to increase the tempo both at home and far away. Rich countries like Sweden have a responsibility to both sharply decrease their own emissions and contribute so that poor countries can continue to develop.

But the Swedish government seems to be moving in the opposite direction. The government is still lacking a Swedish climate goal, but is talking about a goal where they will count both lowering of emissions in Sweden as well as support and export of technology to other countries. Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt is even claiming that money spent in other countries produces more results, which is very uncertain in the long term. (…) We believe that a government proposition about a forceful and all-embracing climate strategy, developed in broad political cooperation, can find a majority across the aisle in the parliament. The proposition should first and foremost include a Swedish decrease of emissions at a steady pace, with a minimum of 40% lower emissions by the year 2020, and be supplemented with a goal of Swedish support for the lowering of emissions to the same degree in developing countries, so that Swedish climate policy is contributing to fulfilling UN’s Millenium Goals. With such a policy, Sweden can credibly push the climate issue during the Swedish EU presidency 2009. (Anders Wejrýd, Church of Sweden; Svante Axelsson, SSNC; Alexander Gabelic, UNA Sweden; Ulf Bengtsson, Swedish Association of Graduate Engineers. DN 2007/10/15)

The articles signed in cooperation with other NGOs are often formulated like this one, not using a specifically-religious language but, rather, pointing to human rights, protection of the environment, the need for social and economic justice and the call for political responsibility on these issues.

Another issue where a perspective of international peace and social justice is formulated in demands on Swedish national politics is the arms trade. The Church of Sweden, the Christian Council of Sweden as well as the different Christian peace and aid organizations write frequently on this issue, often with concrete political suggestions or calls for political action. This is often done by the leadership of these organizations but sometimes also by individual clergy or activists. One example is this article (Exp 2009/10/04) by Annika Spalde, deacon in the Church of Sweden and peace and animal rights activist, criticizing Alf Svensson, then party leader for the Christian democrats, who supports the Swedish arms industry and trade.

Most of the war equipment manufactured in Sweden today is exported. It is therefore impossible to discuss the defense industry without talking about the arms trade. According to Svensson’s party colleague, MP Mikael Oscarsson, we have regulations on arms trade that works fine. Is that really true? Is it strengthening Sweden’s credibility as a global actor that we supply the dictatorship of Saudi Arabia with weapons? That both India and Pakistan, who have an unresolved border conflict, are big buyers of Swedish weapon systems? That the US invasion of Iraq, against international law, was made possible with the help of grenades from Karlskoga, telescopic sights from Malmö and band wagons from Örnsköldsvik?
I wonder what these facts mean to Alf Svensson. A Christian view on humanitarianism and solidarity can be interpreted and expressed in many ways, but it cannot mean that Swedish jobs are valued higher than fellow humans’ right to safe lives. (Annika Spalde, Exp 2009/10/04)

Not all articles of this type are about international issues. Social issues in Sweden are also high on the agenda, and the most recurring one regards the rights for asylum seekers and refugees in Sweden. Some of these articles are more generally advocating solidarity and support but, most commonly, they either regard a specific case or the call for changed policy. One instance was when the Christian Council of Sweden initiated a call for a general amnesty for asylum seekers when the law on the asylum process was changed in 2005. The so called “Easter Call” (Christian Council of Sweden 2005) was signed by more than 150,000 people and 64 NGOs besides the Christian churches and was presented to the government in May 2005 (Dierckx, Vranken, and Elander 2012:167–168; cf. Qviström 2005). Though this campaign was mostly taking place in media other than the debate pages studied here, one article was published where the leadership of the Christian Council of Sweden further argued for a general amnesty for asylum seekers:

So far the government has dismissed our demand for an “amnesty” or decree of time of residency [vistelsetidsförordning] for the thousands of people whose applications for asylum have been rejected but cannot or do not dare return to their countries of origin.

To our delight, five political parties have realized that there is a need to take into consideration this group in the transition to a new regulation and have in a joint motion specified the spirit of the demands of the churches for an “amnesty”. The parliament will vote on the motion on September 14th. (…)

An “amnesty” according to the five-party motion is important from a human rights and a humanitarian perspective. At once, we can give the government reform the best conditions possible; put the rights of children first and take into consideration the time of residency and connection to Sweden of asylum seekers.

The demands of the Easter Call remain. Hidden people live among us with almost no rights and filled with fear. Children fare badly. Through our member churches we meet these people’s desperation and longing for a normal life and demand change. See the human! Let us together restore faith in a Sweden that care about human rights and humanity! (Leadership of the Swedish Christian Council: Göran Zettergren, Mission Covenant Church; Anders Arborelius, Catholic Diocese of Stockholm; KG Hammar, Church of Sweden; Tikhon Lundell, Serbian-Orthodox Church. DN 2005/08/05)

Though the Easter Call in the Swedish context is probably the most famous effort from the churches on the issue of refugees and asylum seekers, there are many other articles on the topic from both before and after these events and not only from church leaders. Examples include an article signed by 28 clergy in the Church of Sweden calling for a more humane treatment for
asylum seekers including changing specific policies (DN 2003/11/27) and an article signed by a number of NGOs and Archbishop Anders Wejryd urging the government to stop deporting asylum-seeking children to Malta (SvD 2010/03/14).

All these examples have clear indications of the things Casanova mentions as constitutive of a public religion and elaborated in the theory chapter: They address collective, not just visible issues; they accept modern, pluralist society; they use generally accepted arguments; and to a large extent they address “legitimate” issues that protect basic human rights, defend the interests of weak or voiceless groups in society or bring a moral critique to the state or to capitalism (though these examples mostly focus the state or political responsibility). Though they mostly address politicians or a political agenda, they stay quite clearly within the realm of general public debate rather than influencing policy on a direct level. Also by co-signing and cooperating with different agents within the civil society, the Church of Sweden positions itself clearly in that sphere.

Discussion: A public utility or a mediatized debate?

All the themes presented earlier in this chapter point towards a discussion on the debate pages revolving around the Church of Sweden that is of quite a different character from what Casanova describes as public religion, as illustrated above. It is not a case of church leaders stepping out of their own sphere to bring their perspective on an issue of joint concern, at least not on the types of issues that Casanova presents as reasonable for a public religion to engage with. I have argued that the idea of the church as a public utility is a more fruitful way of understanding these themes, and the examples presented above strengthens this interpretation, I believe. My main point for arguing this is not that this is the only way the Church of Sweden participates in the debate (it is not), but that there are very few similar articles from other religious groups. They either act, or try to act, as more typical public religions in Casanova’s sense, contributing to a debate regarding society at large, or their own rights such as freedom of religion; or in some cases, perhaps mostly in case of Muslim writers, they defend their rights or try to explain their point of view to a larger audience. This way of positioning a religious group as a public utility is a phenomenon specific to the Church of Sweden.

Still, though I regard the case as strong for this thesis, the picture is not unambiguous. Or rather, there are tensions in the material, as not everyone agrees on the ideal of a national church, a church of the people. Questions are raised by groups who see themselves as marginalized, especially in relation to who has authority over the official positions taken by the Church of Sweden. This tension could perhaps also be seen in the tendency that mar-
ginal groups – and the people opposing them – get recurring attention on the debate pages. If the image painted by several of the debaters is true, that the vast majority of the members support the mainline character of the church, why do minorities if not dominate, then at least have a substantial presence in the material?

**Traces of the media logic of debate articles**

To some extent, the public utility articles can be understood in the light of the media logic of debate articles. An important part of the newsworthiness of debate articles is if they give a new angle on topics that are already news. They might also focus what is spectacular or odd, and have a clear dramaturgy as a specific case within a longer narrative.

All these aspects are present in some of the articles analyzed here, perhaps clearest in the ones relating to opinion minorities and gender. Conservative views regarding the ordination of women are both spectacular (in the sense that they are far from the views of the general public) and at the same time play into a longer story or ideas about the church as conservative or backwards and might play into stereotypes of old conservative men against young, modern women. They also portray the church as filled with conflict, which both contrasts with an idea or stereotype of Christians as meek and friendly while at the same time playing into a longer story about conflicts within the church.

Interestingly, public religion-type articles are in some ways more typical of the genre of debate articles, as in a more traditional way they address a political/social issue or argue a thesis with an intention to influence a general public or authorities. Some of the public utility-type articles follow this genre and argue a thesis, but not all of them; some argue a thesis but one which is more internal and aimed at the organization itself rather than a general public as we have seen previously. It seems that the logic of debate articles gives some clues to the material but not an exhaustive explanation.

**A more general effect of mediatization?**

Looking beyond the specific genre of debate articles and the logic of the debate pages, there are two other factors relating more to the overarching mechanisms of mediatization that might be relevant to discuss in relation to these articles.

In regard to the presence of “opinion minorities,” they might play into a more general effect of mediatization. If these articles on topics connected to how the church leaderships handle certain issues are interpreted in terms of journalistic genres, they could be seen as a form of critical scrutiny. Though the debate articles are written by the religious actors themselves – either groups who feel marginalized in the church or by people who think that these groups have too much influence – and thereby can be seen only to a certain extent as journalistic, they are published on the debate pages and by
editorial decision. Though this is not necessarily the intention of the signatories of the articles, the editors might publish articles for journalistic reasons along the lines of scrutiny or criticism against a powerful institution in society with high public interest. Perhaps while what is seen here is a residue of the state church, and formally only members have an interest or are part of the Church of Sweden, there seems to be more of a general public interest from the looks of these articles. In this context, this points to a view of the public more along the lines of collectivity, that the church is an institution that matters to people in a collective way, and/or to a higher degree than other organizations that people might or might not be members of.

Another possible interpretation within an explanation of mediatization is to see this interest more in terms of entertainment. The media are looking for or draw attention to the odd and scandalous, and groups within the church with unusual views or opinions usually not expressed publicly become interesting just because of their unusual character. This points towards an understanding of the public more in terms of visibility, and does not assume a relationship between the church and the people other than visibility. It could even be argued that such coverage of religion, or publishing debate articles with the goal more of entertaining with the odd and unusual, could lead to a distancing between the Church of Sweden and the general public.

Hjarvard (and Christensen) highlights that the critical scrutiny of the church as a public institution becomes clearest or most intense when it is (perceived as) not in line with modern, secular values. Of the examples seen above, regarding the articles on gender equality and opinion minorities, this seems to be quite clearly the case. Perhaps the articles around the church elections and the presence of political parties in the Church of Sweden could also be understood in these terms. These examples point to an interpretation that mediatization might be a better explanation for, or way of analyzing, these articles than vicarious religion.

More than mediatization
But when it comes to the articles revolving more around access to the church, or the ideas about the open national church with broad support from and connection to the people, then the explanations from media logic or seeing them as an example of critical scrutiny is not as convincing. The fact that this high number of articles discussing the inner life and organization of the church points to a wider interest than just the scrutiny of a powerful institution, and the fact that the arguments for popular access to the church are widespread also point in that direction. I do believe it is not possible to explain this special treatment of, or place for, the Church of Sweden in the public debate only in terms of mediatization and journalistic scrutiny of a residually powerful institution (though no longer a state church) or the entertainment value of the odd or intriguing opinions seldom debated in the me-
The concept of the national church as a public utility still seems useful to understand at least some parts of these debates.

Conclusions

In this chapter I have explored the concepts of vicarious religion and the church as a public utility, as presented by Grace Davie, and how they could be used to interpret the place of the Church of Sweden in the public debate. Davie has claimed that public debating by church officials could be interpreted as a kind of vicarious debate where difficult moral issues are debated and handled on behalf of society, an interpretation questioned by previous research and also in my own study. I have instead argued for an interpretation where the idea of the church as a public utility is useful to understand why the Church of Sweden has a quite specific place in the debate in my material. Though the Church of Sweden does act to a large extent as a public religion in Casanova’s sense, which was also illustrated in some examples, a significant part of the articles by Church of Sweden writers discuss issues concerning internal matters. Many also debate issues concerning access to the church or use arguments revolving around the idea of the open, accessible, democratic national church, of and for the people. Though, as I discussed above, it is not enough to only analyze these debates in terms of what they express concerning the relationship between the church and the people. It does matter that the debate takes place in the media, and I have also shown some possible interpretations with concepts from mediatization theory and in different views of what the public might mean. They seem useful, and I do think there is a lot of merit to seeing this as partly an effect of mediatization.

Still, it does not explain all the cases or types of articles. Though it is naïve to think the debate only says something about the relationship between the church and the people, it would also be limiting to completely put the ideas of the national church to one side and only see the debates over the Church of Sweden as a residue of the state church, a critical scrutiny of a more-or-less-powerful institution in society. At least, since the arguments about the importance of an accessible church are used frequently, the writers themselves seem to think this is a valid and important topic, as do the editors who publish them. I also think it seems questionable to interpret all these debates only as an effect of mediatization.

Besides the interesting nuances in the articles themselves, and the highlight they bring to the debate on Church of Sweden and its place in Swedish society, I believe the analysis in this chapter has also brought attention to the importance of keeping several analytical frameworks in mind at the same time. The debates can simultaneously say something about the importance of the media logic and how the debate is molded by the fact that it is mediated in a specific genre, and also say important things about the self-
understanding and societal place of an institution like the Church of Sweden and about the ideas that surround it. Without these different theoretical or analytical glasses, our knowledge will be more one-sided.
7. Muslim and Jewish participation: public minority religions?

So far, the analysis has centered on the Church of Sweden as the majority church and to some extent on other Christian groups. Not only are they the most represented in the material of this study in the number of articles but the majority or mainline churches have also been the focus of José Casanova and his previous work on public religions. This focus on the Christian, or rather western majority religion, in Casanova’s work has been criticized by, among others, Talal Asad (2003:192), which was also addressed in the theory chapter (p 35). In this chapter, I will look at the participation of the actors from minority religions, mainly Muslim and Jewish, as a part of challenging and developing Casanova’s view on public religion. In the last part of the chapter, I will discuss what, if any, consequences the study of religious minorities has for Casanova’s theory.

Most recent studies, especially of Muslims but also other minorities in the media, place themselves within the tradition of post-colonial studies inspired by, among others, Frantz Fanon (1966), Edward Said (1978, 1997) and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988), using critical theory to study practices and knowledge regimes focusing power, discourse and identity, among other things. Though I am partly inspired by these works and will reference some of this previous research, adapting the post-colonial theoretical framework would mean introducing a large body of theory which is not altogether compatible with the theoretical starting points and epistemology of this study.30 Therefore, I have no ambition to make a contribution to, or place this chapter into, the tradition of post-colonialism.

In the results in Chapter 4, religious minorities had a presence in the material, though the debate was dominated by Christian groups, especially the Church of Sweden. But there were also distinct patterns, where the themes varied largely between the different groups. The Jewish actors were mostly published on a small number of issues, and the Muslim actors on a somewhat wider scope, but still not the diverse number of issues that the Christian groups addressed. These patterns, and the assumption that they point towards different positions within the Swedish societies and different strategies from

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30 See also my discussion on discourse analysis vs discourse theory, p 58, 146.
The religious minorities in relation to these different positions, will be the starting point for this chapter.

The aim of the chapter is to study how the religious minorities participate in public debate, what strategies they use and how they negotiate their place and identity as minority religions. The overarching question is if and how these groups act like public religions, and how their conditions and situation in Swedish society could be seen as factors in their ability to do so (or not). I will use critical discourse analysis, inspired by Norman Fairclough (1992, 1995) to study some examples of the participation of the minority groups, to set these media texts into a wider societal context, focusing both media perspectives as well as the minority position.

One important point to make here is the big demographic differences between these two groups. The Jewish community in Sweden is much smaller, and the organizational structure is quite distinct. The Jewish congregations form the Jewish Central Council, and they are the only main organization for Jews in Sweden, with around 8,500 members. This means that it is a religious organization as it is formed around the Stockholm synagogue and the equivalents in other cities. But it is also the main organization for everyone identifying as Jewish as their ethnicity, and also guarding and promoting the Jewish cultural heritage in Sweden outside religious functions in a more narrow sense.

These traits distinguish the Jewish community from their Muslim counterpart, which is a heterogeneous group in several aspects. There is no singular national organization for Muslims in Sweden, though there are some collaborative structures. Together, the registered Muslims religious organizations serve around 110,000 people, from varying faith traditions and ethnicities (though some large congregations are not included in that number, cf. p 25).

This means it is on some levels impossible to compare the two groups as equal or comparable entities. I will not make two similar analyses and just compare the two groups either, but will allow each part of the chapter to be formed by the empirical material from each group. Still, there are some interesting parallels between the two groups that I will address.

Media representations of religious minorities

Previous research on representation

The studies of religious minorities in the Scandinavian setting have often been conducted not specifically as studies of religion but, rather, as studies of ethnic minorities or attitudes to migration. Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia have often been studied with post-colonial perspectives, more in terms of racism and discrimination than religion. Examples include reports from the
(now no longer existing) authority for integration Integrationsverket, the last one in 2007 (Integrationsverket 2007), and the yearly survey of attitudes toward ethnic diversity conducted by sociologists at Uppsala University, Mångfaldsbarometern (Mella, Palm, and Bromark 2011), which also studies questions relating to religious diversity. Some studies of the ideas of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism has also been conducted in Sweden (Bachner 1999; Berggren 1999; Gardell 2010; Larsson 2006b; Malm 2009). Swedish media studies of the representation of religious minorities have mostly, but not exclusively, focused on Muslims; most notably by Hvitfelt (1998), Larsson (2006a), Levin (2006) and Ghersetti and Levin (2002), while a few studies have been made focusing on Jews, such as those by Bachner (2006) and Wright (1998).

Just over the last few years there has been a large number of articles, books and anthologies published concerning the representation and participation of Muslims in western and especially British and US (news) media (Elgamri 2008; Fāruq 2009; Flood et al. 2012; Petley and Richardson 2011; cf. Poole and Richardson 2006; Poole 2001). Though there is a long history of stereotypical and negative representation of Muslims in western media, and an extensive literature on it since Said’s Covering Islam (1997), the focus has been intensified since the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and a perceived shift in political and mediated discourse.

Negative stereotypes and the “Good/Bad Muslim” dichotomy

The studies mentioned above – in the US and UK as well as those in Sweden – all with different variations bear witness of these negative and stereotypical representations. Robin Richardson (2011) sums up the negative stereotypes: in western media, Muslims are all the same, all religiously motivated, all totally other, all inferior, all a threat and all impossible to work with (Richardson 2011:27–28). These negative stereotypes lead to certain allegations or narratives often reproduced in news media in relation to Muslims. Among other things, there is a strong connection made between Muslims and violence, terrorism, and oppression of women (cf. Flood et al. 2012; Levin 2006; Lewis, Mason, and Moore 2011).

A recurring feature in the representation of Muslims in western media, highlighted by several of the aforementioned researchers, is a dichotomizing in the discourse, between “good Muslims” and “bad Muslims” (Mamdani 2004). As Muslims in general are being represented as the “other,” there is also a stereotype of the “good” Muslim, denouncing terrorism and violence and embracing what is positioned as modern or western values. In a study of editorials in a Canadian newspaper, the National Post, Krista Riley (2009) shows how this dichotomy is used to frame certain Muslims, especially public figures and representatives in Canada, as “modern,” “moderate” and “progressive” and contrasting them with the “bad Muslims.” She highlights three prevalent themes in these articles: display of national loyalty as part of
the identity of the “good Muslim;” the need for “good Muslims” to fight the threat of Islamism; and finally the connection to issues of gender and sexuality in constructing the “good Muslim” (Riley 2009:61–69).

The same phenomenon is what American media scholar Nabil Echchaibi has called a ”double trap of representation” – when Muslims want to counter the massive negative stereotypes in the news and other media, they try to give other perspectives. But as the starting point is so completely negative, it is very difficult to completely change the conversation and, by focusing on countering the negative images, they risk reaffirming the stereotype of the “good Muslim.” While the aim might be the exact opposite, to nuance the conversation and counter the stereotypes, the effect is reinforced, hence being trapped in the dichotomy of “good” and “bad” Muslims. (Echchaibi 2012)

**Jewish stereotypes**

As mentioned earlier, over the past decade the literature on representations of Muslims in western (and to some extent, Swedish) media has increased dramatically, while there is not much written on the other religious minorities specifically relating to media representations, including Jewish groups (covering the time after 1945), studied here. There is a vast literature on anti-Semitism, both historical and contemporary, in Europe as well as in Sweden, but studies of recent media representation of Jews and Judaism are lacking and mostly concern the US (Woodbury 1998) or Israel and the conflict in the Middle East (Cohen 2012; Parfitt and Egorova 2004).

**Media discourse**

Of the theoretical concepts presented in Chapter 2, what will mainly be drawn upon here is the media logic together with the overarching questions regarding public religion, while using critical discourse analysis following Fairclough. Key elements in the representation of minorities are genre conventions and other typical features of media logic. In terms of genres, the research presented above mostly refers to representations and images of religious minorities: i.e., when journalists (or creators of popular culture) depict people, groups or religions, which is not the case of the genre at hand here: debate articles. They are still part of an editorial process, when an editor makes decisions on what to publish and there is sometimes a discussion between editor and author before the final submission of the text, but it is still quite a distinct type of media text compared to news coverage by journalists. This means that the focus of this analysis will not be so much on what the texts analyzed say about the religious minorities but, rather, how the authors of the opinion pieces position themselves, and negotiate, and what strategies are used to influence debate or position themselves.
To analyze the articles in this chapter, I will use Fairclough’s concepts from his book *Media Discourse* (1995). He points to three key questions that can be posed about any (media) text:

1. How is the world (events, relationships, etc.) represented?

2. What identities are set up for those involved in the programme or story (reporters, audiences, ‘third parties’ referred to or interviewed)?

3. What relationships are set up between those involved (e.g. reporter – audience, expert – audience or politician – audience relationships)? (Fairclough 1995:5)

He calls these three aspects *representation, identity* and *(social) relations*, and these will be central in my analysis. As my texts are not written as reports by journalists, the types of identities and relations might be a little different – identities at play could be the signatories, the audiences and their “targets”: i.e., legislators, the public at large, Swedish majority society or other actors addressed. When articles are written in reply to a previously-published article, the writer of the previous article could also be of interest. All these, as well as others, could also be interesting to look at in terms of social relationships.

Fairclough presents an analytical framework that connects the text with the wider sociocultural practices. He sees the discourse practice – the production and consumption of the text – as mediating between the text itself and the wider sociocultural practice. The text is influenced and influences wider society, not directly but indirectly, as sociocultural practice influences or sets the terms for both text production and its interpretation and consumption, and texts can influence wider society through discourse practice (Fairclough 1995:58–60). He describes different types of analysis of texts relating to these different levels of discourse – textual analysis can be either linguistic or inter-textual (and in the latter case more related to discourse practice); discourse practice is studied either in terms of production or consumption/interpretation of the text; and sociocultural analysis focuses the wider societal context – both related to the institutional processes or narrow context of the text, and the wider structures of economic, political and cultural context (1995:61–62).

Important to Fairclough is the separation between discourse when used in the abstract sense and in the concrete, when used in reference to a specific discourse. He defines discourse in the abstract as “language use conceived as social practice” while a discourse is a “way of signifying experience from a particular perspective” (Fairclough 1993:138). Another key concept to Fairclough is the *order of discourse*, which he defines as the “totality of discursive practices of an institution, and the relationships between them”
By this distinction, he argues that there can be several discourses present within a field, competing or negotiating, and by studying how different discourses are used within, for example, the media, it also possible to study social change. (Fairclough 1995; cf Winther Jørgensen and Phillips 2002:66–69)

When studying discourse in the way Fairclough suggests, there is almost a dialectic process – studying discourse and language as expressed in specific texts and the study of discourse in relation to the social context. It can focus power as it is exercised and/or negotiated in language as well as study discourse as (part of) strategies to negotiate power exercised in the social context. This connection between language and the wider sociocultural context makes his approach useful in a sociological study.

In the text analysis of the articles below, I largely follow the model proposed by Fairclough in Discourse and Social Change (1992) and inspired by how it is used by Lövheim (2004:78–80). Though the three main aspects presented above (representation, identity and relations) are the most important, I will also study the texts in more detail. Not all the aspects that Fairclough suggests are relevant (such as turn-taking and interaction) but I will examine the structure of the text, such as cohesion, grammar and actors in the text, and also wording and metaphors. I will also look for traces of intertextuality and interdiscursivity and thereby try to see these texts in the wider order of discourse. (Fairclough 1992:231–238)

Material

In my material of 639 articles, 156 (24.4 percent) are signed by at least one person from a non-Christian religion. Only four of them are signed by someone from a religion other than Judaism or Islam, making these other minority religions almost completely invisible in the material. 101 articles are signed by at least one Muslim, and 53 by Jewish actors. As shown in Chapter 4, the themes of these articles distinguished them from the themes in articles by Christian actors, mostly in that they write to a lesser extent about topics that are not in a narrow sense of their immediate concern (meaning that the group in question is involved or affected), and that they write about a narrower scope of issues.

In the following, I will start by presenting and analyzing the articles by Muslim signatories, focusing on a case of three articles where Muslim representatives react to or comment on recent events connected to violence. I will then move on to study the discourses in the articles by Jewish writers. Finally, I will return to some theoretical questions as well as relating the results to the question of public religions.
Articles by Muslim actors

The 101 opinion pieces signed by Muslim writers cover a wide range of topics and concrete issues, but they circle around some recurring themes. These are mainly connected to situations and themes that could be said to concern Muslims in Sweden directly. They address Islamophobia or racism, freedom of religion and the situation of Muslims in Sweden. To a large extent, they address or mention theology or religious content. These are often in terms of explaining the Muslim faith, or what Islam is not about (violence, terrorism, oppression of women, etc.).

The Muslim actors form a diverse group. Not only are Muslims the largest religious minority in Sweden, but there is no one singular national organization speaking for all Muslims in Sweden. The group is also diverse when it comes to ethnic background and religious traditions. In the material, we find articles signed by imams from various Mosques and traditions, representatives of several different national and local associations, as well as individual Muslims. We also find a number of articles by international writers.

A more common feature in these articles is the language. Of course there are variations and nuances, but a striking number of the articles are written in ways that echo the patterns presented previously in relation to the negative stereotypes and the double trap of representation: a defensive tone, denouncing terrorism and violence and other negative traits stereotypically connected with Islam in the orientalist tradition, describing the peaceful and positive things in Islam and showing support for and allegiance with Swedish society; thereby it seems they are acting more or less consciously like “good Muslims.” Investigating the negotiations between positions in this field and the language used will be the aim of this part of the chapter.

Presentation of the articles

The most common coded node in articles by Muslim actors is the situation of Muslims in Sweden, with 78 articles that represent 77 percent of articles by Muslims. Over half of the articles discuss religion in terms of a source of conflict – that is usually not the point argued by the writers, but is still the presupposition for the discussion. As only 11 articles discuss religion as a positive social force, the negative image is a strong starting point for this group.

Over 40 articles refer to theological or faith issues, which is the highest percentage compared to Jewish and Christian signatories. But the way they are used is distinct; while Christian writers either use theological or faith-based arguments in a discussion (as was seen in the previous chapters) or when a faith issue is the topic of the article, Muslim writers more commonly address faith or theological issues in an attempt to explain or teach about Islam. Another common way to use religious arguments is for Muslim actors
to distance themselves from or condemn other Muslim leaders or people seen as Muslim representatives, such as international terrorists, extremists or others – sometimes named, sometimes referred to in general terms. One example:

What led me to write this was a conversation with some young people who had seen some pages on the internet, where people in the name of Islam are spreading hate and extreme thoughts. I see it as a Muslim cause and especially for imams and other Muslim representatives to firmly make Islam’s view of these thoughts and behaviors clear to the Muslims.

The Prophet Mohammed says: “Someone not supporting the truth resembles a mute evil spirit.” Therefore it is all our duty not to let the fanatics represent Islam. (Hassan Moussa, Imam, Exp 2004/05/22)

The social issues most frequently addressed in the articles by Muslim signatories are migration/integration, terrorism, freedom of religion, peace issues, human rights, and racism and gender equality. These often coincide in the same articles. Often they connect the international issues, concerning for example terrorism and peace or human rights on an international level, with the situation for Muslims in Sweden. In many articles, there are two different perspectives present, sometimes at the same time: Islamophobia, discrimination, racism and the vulnerability of Muslims in Sweden on the one hand and the need for Muslims themselves to act as agents for peace, condemn terrorism, violence and unequal practices and in different ways adjust to or integrate in Swedish society on the other.

Though these two lines of thought are often present at the same time and very rarely, if ever, does anyone argue against them, the writers do not always agree with each other. There are several instances of Muslim leaders, usually from different traditions or organizations, arguing over who is more representative of Islam, or accusing each other of not being clear enough in denouncing terrorism and violence.

As the articles by Muslim actors are diverse in specific topics and issues, while quite similar in discourse and broader themes, I have chosen a case of three articles to illustrate this (see Appendix V: Full Articles Analyzed in Chapter 7).

Case: Reactions to violence on behalf of Muslims

For the case study in this part of the chapter, I have chosen three articles published by individuals or groups of Muslims in reaction to news events involving Muslims and violence in different settings. The first article published in Expressen in 2005 is by Imam Hassan Moussa of the Stockholm Grand Mosque as a reaction to the London bombings (Exp 2005/07/09). The article is a denunciation of all violence and terrorism in the name of Islam. Hassan Moussa has been a recurring writer on the opinion pages of Exp-
pressen and one of the top ten published people in my material. The second article (SvD 2002/01/26) was published in Svenska Dagbladet soon after the murder of Fadime Sahindal, who was shot by her father in Uppsala in 2002 for having a Swedish boyfriend. The crime received massive media attention and is still the most well-known case of so called honor violence in Sweden (cf. Kurkiala 2003; Wikan 2008). This article was published as a reply to an article by several Kurdish-Swedish actors wanting to stop Muslim parents from raising their children religiously (SvD 2002/01/23). The article analyzed here is signed by several Muslim actors, including Muslim women’s organizations and Imam Abd Al-Haqq Kielan, a Swedish convert who is also a top signatory in the material.

Article 3 was published in the aftermath of the Danish publication of the Mohammed Cartoons, causing outrage among Muslims worldwide and a heated debate on freedom of speech (Exp 2008/02/16). This article by the chairperson of Young Muslims of Sweden, Omar Mustafa, was published a while after the initial controversy, when three people had been arrested for attempted murder of the cartoonist. In the article, he discusses the reasons for the outrage among Muslims in reaction to the cartoons. All these articles, in the original and in translation to English, can be found in Appendix V.

**Article 1: Condemning terrorism**

The headline is “Hassan Moussa condemns terror attack: Bombs from hell,” and the article strongly condemns the bombers and also preachers who risk dragging young Muslims into terrorism, and calls for clear stances on this issue among Swedish Muslim leaders.

Generally, the article is written in uncomplicated language. Some wordings stand out, especially the use of the term barbarous/barbarism that is used twice in the article (and once in the preamble, which is probably written by the editor) to describe the terrorist attack. The word barbarous and its derivative barbarian stem from Greek and were originally used by the ancient Greeks to describe other (non-Greek) peoples, with strong connotations of (un)civilization and otherness. The use of this wording is quite interesting in this context, as it is used in orientalist discourse and is, to its core, othering a group by defining them as alien and inferior (cf. Fitzgerald 2007). Also interesting are the words used to describe the teachings and acts that the writer wants to warn against. They are “dangerous” and “false,” and young Muslims might be lured by them.

Also notable are the descriptions, or lack thereof, of the Swedish and European majority society. Though common in many other articles in the material for this chapter, this article lacks any description of Swedish majority society as negative towards Muslims or in need of adapting better to become a true multicultural society. Quite the opposite, as both London and Sweden are described in only positive terms and the call is for the Muslim leaders to increase their efforts. London is described as “the capital of the many reli-
regions and cultural diversity” and the bombers are condemned as they “betrayed the nation that has accepted them when they were in need of shelter.” Swedish society is not described directly, but Muslims are called to act for “the benefit of Sweden and Europe,” and the article ends with a wish “May Allah protect our country Sweden.” At one point, in describing the social and political causes for which young people might seek extremism, it is not entirely clear if the phenomena listed (the lack of social justice, poverty and unemployment) are only to be understood as a description of the Muslim world, but also of the West. If so, it is not done in a confrontational way.

At several points the author makes authoritative statements about Islam, as he describes what is true according to Islam and what is not. Islam bans the killing of innocent people, the Prophet Mohammed condemned violence against the innocent, and the terrorists can expect hell. Regarding intertextual links, the wording as well as the clear unambiguous message alludes to both calling (in western media and politics) on Muslims to condemn acts of terror, and the war-on-terror discourse. This writer has previously (Exp 2003/12/23, Exp 2004/04/10) also been accused of not being clear enough on his distance from extremists and violent Islamist groups, so this strong language used could be a reference to those previous discussions.

Here we can see several examples of representations, in terms of “what the world looks like,” as discussed by Fairclough. The descriptions of the terrorist acts as well as of Swedish/European majority society and the authoritative statements about Islam can be seen as attempts to explain the world in a way that opens up for positioning and constructions of identity.

The aim of the text as I read it is to clearly condemn acts of violence but also to distance itself from what are described as “hate preachers.” These appear as the real danger, as they might tempt young people into committing acts of terrorism. There is also a strong affinity with the Swedish majority society, perhaps a wish to align with the majority and show that the values of Islam are actually the same as, or compatible with, the values of Swedish majority society. A key word is responsibility – the Imams and other Muslim leaders have a responsibility to speak up, to make sure the young people are not led astray and to contribute to work on integration. The word responsibility is never used in relation to any other actors.

In showing this strong solidarity with and responsibility towards Swedish majority society and in the language used to describe the terrorists and the Muslims defending them and accepting or encouraging violence, we see a strong dichotomy. The “bad Muslims” are described, at least partly, with a language often used in orientalist discourse, being Othered as the enemy in contrast to the “good Muslims.” The acts of terrorism are said not only to be un-Islamic but also to violate Muslims and being one (or the) cause of racism and hatred against other Muslims, making the “good Muslims” the victims of the terrorism together with other civilians.
To return to Fairclough, there is a construction and reaffirming of identity going on in this process, by constructing a “we” consisting of Muslims denouncing hatred and violence in distinction to the others. There is a reaffirming of social relations, as the writer connects himself and “us” with the broader society and mainstream positions. Also, as mentioned, the word responsibility is used in a way that might imply a need, or perhaps willingness, by the writer to largely accept the current position or relations for Muslims in Swedish society and perhaps adapt accordingly.

**Article 2: Islam forbids violence against women**

In this article, representatives from both national Muslim organizations and Muslim women’s organization write together to counter the accusations that the killing of Fadime Sahindal was based on religion or a strict religious upbringing. Intertextually, they relate most directly to the previously-published article they are replying to, but also to the media coverage of the murder and the media discourse on Muslims and violence. The genre or type of discourse is partly argumentative as it argues for increased funding and support for Muslim Women’s shelters and other societal action, but is also explanatory or information-focused, wanting to explain or define what Islam is.

Using Fairclough’s categories, my interpretation is that this text is to a large degree about representation, in forming and positioning Islam as something compatible with Swedish, modern values. By pointing towards actions that can be taken – mostly through information and enlightenment – the goal seems to be cohesion and aligning the “we” in the text with majority society rather than taking on conflict.

The main goal of the article, both in structure and choice of words, seems to be to separate Islam from violence and the oppression of women, in showing that the murder and other acts of violence and oppression are in fact against Islam. The groups practicing gender mutilation, dowries or accepting rape within marriage need to be informed that all these practices are in fact “against the teachings of Islam,” as they write. In “certain groups of immigrants” there are lingering inequalities between men and women, a double standard regarding sexual behavior and men trying to control and/or punish the behavior of women. But this is, according to the writers, not because of Islam but the exact opposite. Their description is that this is due to attempts by some groups to adapt to Swedish society and therefore “get rid of Islam … but keep the oppression of women intact” in an unfortunate combination of “assimilation and secularization.” By the choice of words and markers in the text, the writers connect “us Muslims” or “we Swedish Muslims” with support for girls and women, for a multicultural society, knowledge, information and self-criticism. The writers of the previous article who want to limit the religious upbringing of children are accused of having a “Stalinist” view of the children belonging to the state, and acting against the UN Con-
vention on the Rights of Children. The violence and actions they want to condemn are labeled “pre-Islamic” or traditional and even “barbaric” (cf. discussion above):

We Muslims claim that knowledge about the difference between pre-Islamic traditions and the message of Islam can be crucial for the situation of Muslim women. For example, when Somalis learn that female genital mutilation is not prescribed in Islam, when for example Bengalis realize that burdensome dowries are a Hindu, not Islamic custom, when Muslims realize that battering of women and rape within marriage is a crime according to Islam, then a change for the better can come about for both women, children and men.

Traditional ideas about the supremacy of men and the subordination of women clash both with the message of the Quran and the increasing demands from women on human rights and influence in family and society.

There is an interesting parallel to make here, to what Linda Woodhead has described as “the sacred narrative of European progress” in an article about the debate on covering in Britain (Woodhead 2009). She describes this as a strong, important narrative based on the enlightenment tradition in Europe, with the idea of modernity that there is a move forward, where everything dark, old, traditional and bad is left behind to reach what is light, new and the modernity of enlightenment; and where religion is very often seen as something to be left behind while the liberation of women and human rights are core parts of what is seen as progress. In this narrative, it is incomprehensible how, for example, women would choose to wear a veil as it would mean that they voluntarily choose something that was supposed to have been left behind (Woodhead 2009). In an analysis of a debate over a Swedish TV program Halal-TV, on Islam and Swedishness, Mia Lövheim and I found similar ideas in the Swedish debate (Lövheim and Axner 2011). Interestingly, the article analyzed here could be said to use the same rhetorical figure or narrative but placing Islam not in the past category of what should be left behind but, on the contrary, together with modernity, liberation and progress – and thereby belonging in Swedish society. A typical example can be found in the quote above where the message of the Quran and women’s liberation is placed together on the same side, against “traditional ideas.” But also, in the invoking of the Convention of the Rights of Children, in the claim that Muslims “strive towards self-criticism” and in supporting integration Minister Mona Sahlin and her work to improve the conditions for women, the authors place themselves together with Swedish majority society and on the side of modernity and progress. The things needed to be left behind – violence, control of women, injustice – are repeatedly described as being against the teachings of Islam.

This could be described, in Fairclough’s terms, as a negotiation within the wider order of discourse of the media, between different discourses. The writers of this article want to use the strongly-positive narrative of progress
and modernity rather than negative discourse connecting Islam with violence.

In the description of majority Swedish society there are similarities in this article compared to the first one analyzed. The writers largely take on a non-confrontational attitude and write themselves into, and wanting to be a part of, Swedish society. Though there is no real explicit criticism, there are some implicit points – the need for increased resources for Muslim women’s shelters and similar projects is pointed out and a general need for more action from “society” and the general striving in Sweden for a multicultural society is appreciated but described as happening “tentatively” [trevande]. Though the main criticism in the article is directed towards the writers of the previous article wanting to minimize religious influence (besides the obvious criticism of the violence and oppression of women), there is possibly an implicit criticism of other actors, or Swedish majority society when it uses the same secularist arguments or wants to connect Islam with the negative things the writers want to distance themselves from. Explicit, in the article, are only instances or aspects of Swedish majority society’s striving towards multiculturalism, freedom of religion (as in the Convention of the Rights of Children) or working for the rights of Muslim women, but since this article is written within a media discourse where this is not the only image or opinion given of Swedish majority society, it could also be read as a criticism, or an appeal for these positions to be stronger in the mediated debate.

**Article 3: The global context of European Islamophobia**

This third article has a different tone from the two previous ones and a somewhat different emphasis. In the discourse of both wanting to highlight struggles and problems for Swedish Muslims and on the other hand the responsibility for Swedish Muslims to contribute themselves, the two previous articles put their emphasis on the latter while this article mainly focuses on the first. In his article, Omar Mustafa, spokesperson of Young Muslims of Sweden, addresses the situation of Muslims in Sweden and Europe after the Danish publication of the Mohammed Cartoons (cf. Klausen 2009). I read this text mostly, in Fairclough’s terms, as dealing with social relations. The writer points towards the unequal relationships and unfair treatment of Muslims in Europe and in other parts of the world by western media and other actors, which also influences other social relationships.

Islamophobia is at the center of the argument in this article, discussing how Swedish and European Muslims are constantly expected to take responsibility for the “stupid” things done by “a few people out of the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims.” Muslims are met, the writer argues, with the prejudiced view that they do not want freedom of speech or other democratic rights, and that it is “taboo” to talk about the connection between different violent and negative situations involving Muslims and structures of power or acts of oppression or violence from western powers.
There are several comparisons or metaphors in the text. The situation for Muslims in Europe, and the Islamophobic discourse in the media, is compared with the situation (for Jews, but not explicitly stated) in Germany in the 1930s and with George Orwell’s 1984. The cartoon is compared with hate speech: if it had had a homophobic, anti-Semitic or sexist target it would have been illegal, it is argued.

Regarding the actors and agency in the text, the main criticism is directed towards majority society but there are not many specific actors or institutions mentioned besides the media, which is repeatedly mentioned, and racist political parties. Many statements describing the Islamophobia that Muslims in Europe are met with are stated in a passive form, or the subject or agent is vague, often using the form “man” in Swedish, meaning “they” or “people in general.” The media is specifically mentioned as having “set the verdict” and “are quick to show their sympathies” but there are no specific examples mentioned.

In the two previous articles, there was a clear strategy from the writers to dichotomize and distance themselves from the Other, whether that was Muslim extremists (in article 1) or groups misinterpreting Islam (article 2) and siding with majority Swedish society. In both these articles, the criticism towards Swedish majority society was either absent or implicit. In this article, the strategy is different. Though not supporting or defending Muslim extremists, the writer is not actively using the “bad Muslim” to align himself with Swedish majority society. The people responsible for threats or violence in the name of Islam are described as a “few” who “unfortunately … protest outside the law” but are not defended. The writer instead aligns himself with the values of democratic society and connects Swedish and European Muslims with these, while it is Swedish or European majority society that actually fails to deliver or live up to their ideals of democracy and freedom. The problem or responsibility is not mainly with the Muslims to adapt or be enlightened, as in the previous articles, but that the European or western society has a double standard – not giving the same rights and the same respect towards its Muslim citizens as to others:

When people in Denmark of all countries decide to teach Muslims a lesson about freedom of speech, by offending what all Muslim keep closest to their hearts, it seems they themselves have a lot to learn about the fundamental grounds in a democratic society.

What are we supposed to do with values like respect, coexistence and minority rights when freedom of speech is abused for attacks and violations? The idea that Muslims are against freedom of speech is a common prejudice and a misleading argument in the discussion. As a matter of fact, many of Sweden’s Muslims have fled here from the oppression and prosecution of dictatorships – precisely to practice Islam and to express their opinions in a Sweden of freedom and tolerance. (Exp 2008/02/16)
While this article is much more critical of Swedish majority society and increases the level of conflict compared to the two previous articles, it still has some of the double discourse presented previously. Intertextually it refers, both explicitly and implicitly to the media coverage of the Mohammed caricatures specifically, and more generally to the media representations of “angry Muslims,” and the demands on Muslim representatives to detach themselves from violence and terrorism. While the core aim seems to be to criticize majority society, and especially the media, the writer does still mention that he and other Muslims denounce acts of violence time and again. Even criticizing this exact phenomenon, he still has to make the same distancing to balance out his criticism. Also, the sweeping nature of the criticism, not pointing out specific media or political actors, lowers the level of conflict. A direct confrontation against specific actors would have increased the level of conflict and this more generalized criticism could be interpreted as a way of keeping this otherwise harsh article more “polite,” one strategy Fairclough uses, though mostly when analyzing oral speech (1992:162–166).

A double trap of representation?

Returning to the “double trap” or the dichotomy of “Good Muslim/Bad Muslim,” there are several similarities in the articles here. In article 1, denouncing terrorism, this pattern is perhaps clearest. By distancing himself and the true Islam from the Other, dangerous extremists, and by taking on a leadership role in calling for others to do the same, the writer effectively positions himself as “the Good Muslim,” both in terms of condemning violence but also by showing strong allegiance with Swedish society, and the pattern is similar in the second article. The third article has a different tone and is more critical but, as discussed above, the writer cannot completely get away from the position of the “good Muslim” in distancing himself from violence and promoting the values of freedom and democracy.

One of the strategies mentioned by both Riley and Echchaibi is for Muslim actors to pledge allegiance or prove that they belong and are loyal to Canada/America. Though there may not be the same ideals and language regarding national security in Sweden, the issue of belonging is central. The patterns are complex, though, as there is a tendency in the articles to accept this discourse and show loyalty towards society, while simultaneously there is criticism against not being allowed to belong and ambivalence towards what it means. There is also criticism of Swedish society for not living up to its ambitions regarding freedom and democracy and protection of minorities.

Another interesting feature is the recurring attempts to explain what Islam “really” is and is not. Though the conscious aim might be different or even the opposite, the constant statements about what Islam truly teaches, or what Islam is or a Muslim is or should be, risk confirming a view of religion in general and Islam in particular as something fixed. And in this, they might
end up confirming a stereotypical, perhaps orientalist understanding of Islam and Muslims as un-reflexive and with common features, perhaps unable or unwilling to combine with modernity.

I have recurrently presented the observation of a two-sided discourse, or perhaps two competing discourses within the larger order of discourse of the media: on the one hand Islamophobia and Muslims as an exposed group in society and, the other hand, the need for Muslims themselves to act for peace and adjust to Swedish society. This tension between belonging and not, of being exposed and being responsible, is, as we have seen, present to a high degree in these analyzed articles. It can perhaps also be seen as similar, though differently formulated, to Echchaibi’s double trap of representation: Muslims have little agency to act or be represented outside the already-established stereotypes in the media and, when trying to change this pattern by playing by rules of the media, they reaffirm the same stereotypes. Criticizing phenomena in mainstream society (or the media) or claiming rights is often not possible without also accepting a minority position and to some extent take responsibility for or adapting to someone else’s agenda.

Articles by Jewish actors
Moving now to the other empirical part of this chapter, it is time to study the Jewish actors and their participation in the debate, using a somewhat different analytical strategy.

Analysis of articles
When sorting the articles signed by Jewish actors by theme, they are easily formed into a few groups. As mentioned, a few topics dominate this group. Over half of the articles debate the conflict or situation in Israel and Palestine; a large topic is anti-Semitism (mostly in Sweden); and other topics relate to freedom of religion and the relationship between state and religion, often on topics specifically relating to being Jewish in Sweden. There are a few exceptions, articles signed by leaders from different religions on other matters, such as same-sex relations (Exp 2005/03/19), tax deduction for donations to charity (DN 2010/01/05) and organ donations (DN 2003/04/10). Looking at organizations and positions, there are a few different groups. Most articles are written by official representatives of the Jewish community in Sweden: the Jewish congregations in the major cities and the Jewish Central Council of Sweden. Some articles are written by people affiliated with Jewish organizations, most notably European Jews for a Just Peace and its Swedish branch Judar för israelisk-palestinsk fred (JIPF), and the Jewish publications Judisk Krönika (Jewish Chronicle) and Menorah. A substantial
number of articles are also signed by individual Jews, presenting themselves as such.

The articles by Jewish signatories, when looking at both themes and signatories, can be divided into different groups. First, when relating to the conflict in Israel and Palestine, we often find the official representatives for Jewish congregations writing in support of Israel, while criticism is voiced by Jewish peace activists and individuals. A common genre in the articles on Israel/Palestine is the manifesto or call for change/action signed by a large number of people – some official representatives, some professionals or individual members. Articles discussing anti-Semitism and freedom of religion for Jews in Sweden also have different characters – some are more traditional debate articles voicing a concern, criticizing policy or media or calling for awareness and/or change. But there is also a group of articles which perhaps could be best be described as testimonies, where usually individual Jews, often without any formal position, write about their experiences of being a Jew in contemporary Sweden.

**Israel/Palestine: official voices**

In a number of articles, official representatives of the Jewish community write on the subject of the conflict in the Middle East and/or the state of Israel. In almost all of these cases, the articles show support towards the state of Israel, though not unconditionally – some criticism occurs against specific acts of war, for example (*SvD* 2004/07/10, *SvD* 2008/05/17). Signatories to these articles are representatives of the Jewish congregations and the Jewish Central Council of Sweden. The articles signed by the editor of *Judisk krönika* (the Jewish Chronicle) can also perhaps be said to reflect an official voice.

These articles are of different types – some are part of manifestos, signed by large numbers of signatories, often co-signed by politicians, cultural workers and other intellectuals, scholars and sometimes other religious actors. A recurring type of co-signer, also for articles with fewer signatories, is organizations relating to Israel, such as the Swedish Israel Information Center (Svensk Israel-information) and Samfundet Sverige-Israel (Sweden-Israel Society). Also recurring is The Swedish Committee Against Anti-Semitism.

The articles on the Israel/Palestine conflict by the official voices have different characters – some are more directly addressing the situation and the conflict as such, discussing specific decisions by the Israeli government or the actions of Palestinian groups. These often have a strong emphasis on representation: descriptions of reality and writing of history, situating actions and events in a context so as to position the actions of the state of Israel as just or reasonable (*DN* 2003/02/04, *SvD* 2006/07/18) and the actions by for example Hamas or Yasser Arafat as unjust (*Exp* 2004/04/10, *SvD* 2006/07/18); and how the responsibility for problems in the peace process are not to be blamed on Israel, at least not entirely (*SvD* 2002/01/15). A re-
curring figure in almost all of these articles is a tone of wanting to “set things straight” and explain how things are, where opponents are described as either biased or not knowing enough about it. For example, signatories of a call to boycott merchandise produced on the occupied territories are described as choosing to, one-sidedly and ignorantly, put the blame for the present situation on Israel. Not by a word is the other party’s blame in the conflict mentioned – Palestinians are only seen as victims. (...) We who sign this call for composure and balance in the view of the conflict in the Middle East claim that the peace that we all long for will not benefit from unfair and illegal measures taken against any part in the conflict. (DN 2003/02/04)

We think it would be desirable if they [signatories of a previously-published article] based their views on facts and didn’t unilaterally blame Israel for the effects of a war the country neither started nor wanted. (SvD 2008/05/17)

Another feature along the same lines points towards how Israel is treated differently from other countries, criticized more harshly and held accountable in way other states are not. For example, regarding criticism against the wall, or barrier as it is called here, built on Palestinian territory:

The International Criminal Court in Hague has declared the building of a barrier towards the West Bank by Israel as illegal and the UN is threatening with sanctions. There are reasons to question the exact placement of the barrier though it has already stopped many Palestinian suicide terrorists from crossing the border to Israel – considering the hard consequences this has for the Palestinian population. There are similar barriers in other places in the world, for example along the 767 kilometer line between India and Pakistan in the contentious region of Kashmir and Jammu – but it is only the building by Israel that has ever been addressed and been condemned by the UN and in an international court. (SvD 2004/07/10)

The other types of articles more generally discuss the state of Israel and the relationship between Jews (in Sweden or the rest of the world) and the state of Israel, and how that connection sometimes risks turning criticism against acts by Israel into anti-Semitism (DN 2002/04/09, DN 2003/10/28, Exp 2003/10/08). I will return to the specific theme of anti-Semitism in the next section but just share a few observations here. Several articles explicitly discuss the problematic way Jews are either expected to have an opinion on or allegiance with Israel, and how the Jews as a people are confused with the state of Israel. In an article concerning a case of alleged hate speech in a Stockholm Mosque, the attorney general (Justitiekanslern) chose not to press charges, and representatives from the Jewish congregations write:

What we find notable is that the AG (Attorney General, JK) has accepted the language used by Islamist extremists considering the parties of the conflict in
the Middle East, who the AG refers to as “the Jews and the Palestinians.” Not between Israelis and Palestinians!

Accepting this formulation of the problem, the AG is painting himself into a corner. “The Jews” as a people are no party in this conflict, which should not be necessary to point out to the most prominent lawyer in Sweden. (Exp 2006/03/27)

A recurring theme in some of the articles by official representatives is that the position of the signatories is stressed, explicitly or sometimes implicitly. The clearest example is in a reply to a previous article, signed by Jewish peace activists stating that they do not intend to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the state of Israel due to the situation. This reply starts with the statement “We, the elected representatives for the Swedish Jews, want to celebrate Israel on its 60th birthday…” (SvD 2008/05/17), perhaps to place themselves as the elected i.e. true representatives as opposed to the peace activists writing previously. In other instances it is more subtle, such as stating that the signatories speak on behalf of the Jewish congregations in Sweden (Exp 2005/09/10) or more generally for a Jewish “we” (DN 2002/04/09).

Israel/Palestine: alternative Jewish voices

If the articles on Israel and Palestine by official representatives keep within quite a narrow or familiar discourse, the articles on the same topic signed by other Jewish actors are more diverse. They are generally more critical towards Israel but range from generally supporting Israel, via reasoning and negotiating in a more academic manner, to harsh criticism using a very different language from what we saw in the previous section. In the articles most critical against the state of Israel, usually signed by peace activists, not only is the building around the West Bank called a “wall” but use terms to describe Israeli policy and warfare such as “ethnic cleansing” (SvD 2011/01/24, SvD 2008/05/14), “racism” (SvD 2003/11/10), “colonization/colonial” (SvD 2003/06/03, DN 2006/04/10), “terrorism” (SvD 2008/05/14) and in one case “apartheid” (SvD 2003/06/03).

In these, and also in articles with more cautious wording, there is a focus on describing the everyday life and suffering of the Palestinian civilians, and descriptions of Israeli violence and oppression are lively and common. Some examples:

Day by day concrete is growing in Palestine. It is rising between houses, across roads, through olive groves and fields. The wall is separating friends and relatives from each other. It blocks the way to schools and work places. It blocks in entire villages in ghettos, cuts the Palestinian territory into pieces and increases the space for Israeli colonies on occupied land. (DN 2006/04/10)

What resistance do you Dov Ben-David [whose article this is a reply to], deem acceptable for a people who have been occupied for 36 years? After
Palestinian cities have been blocked off behind walls and the free movement of people has been made impossible, after their dignity has completely been stripped off them, after confiscation of land, collective punishment, torture of political prisoners and daily deadly shootings of protestors and stone-throwing children? (SvD 2003/11/10)

The articles (especially the more cautiously worded ones) are often co-signed with other peace groups (DN 2006/04/10) and with other religious organizations, almost always Christian (DN 2003/01/18). As we saw in the previous group where the representation of the situation and conflict and writing of history is important, the same task seems to be important in this group, but a very different picture is painted.

In this group we also find articles of more analytical tone or that, in a less confrontational way, discuss the current situation. Some of them are written by people on formal positions with Jewish heritage, some by international writers. These are usually more critical towards Israel than the articles written by the official representatives but more analytical in their approach to understanding the conflict and ways forward. There are also a few articles signed by individual Jewish actors in support of Israel, some of them manifestos where the official representatives have also signed, some more belonging to genre of individual testimonies that we will return to in the next section.

As in the previous section, we find here several articles distancing Jewish identity from the state of Israel; some of them as part of a discussion on anti-Semitism, some more in relation to criticism against Israeli policy:

… it [is] relevant to mention that Swedish citizens of Jewish descent living in Sweden do not occupy Arabic territory. Suggesting that hatred against Jews could be justifiable with regards to Israeli policy, whatever it may be, is undeniably anti-Semitic. (DN 2003/11/04)

This superficial connection between Jewishness and the present Sharon government is far from correct and is a misconception that simply does not give justice to Jews and Judaism’s moral understanding.

In the Jewish community there is, and has always been, a lot of debate and disagreement. Many Jews question the assumptions about Israel and Zionism that the current governing powers make. This critical, scrutinizing process has been going on since the start of Zionism and is a sign of the multifaceted moral understandings of the Jewish people. (SvD 2003/11/05)

In the same article that this last quote comes from, we find one of the rare occurrences of explicit references to faith or theology in the debate over the situation in Israel/Palestine. In almost all articles, there are no religious arguments or religious content, and there are almost no references to Judaism/Jewish religion (as opposed to the Jewish people). There are, in articles on anti-Semitism in Sweden relating to the situation in Israel, some refer-
ences to Muslims and Jews as distinct groups (where Muslims are pointed out as a group in which anti-Semitic sentiment is found), but no more specific than that.

**Anti-Semitism and freedom of religion for Jews in Sweden**

As seen in the previous section, the connection between (criticism against) the conflict in Israel/Palestine and anti-Semitism in Sweden is recurring in the articles. But anti-Semitism also has a strong presence as a topic outside of that context. On this topic there is no clear distinction between the official and alternative voices, as anti-Semitism seems to be a joint concern for many writers.

In some instances the media, or mediated statements, are criticized for anti-Semitism. Examples include the general media coverage of Israel (*DN* 2002/04/09), a Swedish comedian (*Exp* 2005/11/04), and left-wing intellectuals (*Exp* 2003/10/08). These are generally criticized for their content or that there are traces of anti-Semitic imagery and stereotypes implicit in their statements. There are also several articles more in the genre of individual testimonies, often from younger writers, describing harassment, violence and threats for being Jewish. Here, the connection to the conflict in the Middle East is present, explicitly or implicitly. But there is, again, a negotiating or reflexive discussion in some of the articles on the relationship between Jewishness and Israel:

I am a Jew, 14 years old, born in Gothenburg. And scared every time I walk alone in the city – to school, to practice, to friends. I am scared because I get threatened. I am threatened, attacked and have been thrown off the street car because I wear the Star of David, showing that I am Jewish.

The people who do this are always (with one exception) young Muslim or Arabic guys from the Middle East. I don’t know if they are born here or there. They are never adults, and never girls, only boys. (*Exp* 2004/01/28)

"Jewish swine," yells the young guy on the bus. Everyone in the back of bus 690 quietens. I feel punched in the stomach by the wings of history.

Before, I hardly noticed anti-Semitism other than in movies and books. But the climate in society has changed and I am left with a feeling, hard to describe, a mixture of anger and shame that is strengthened for every humiliation; every time somebody identifies me with inconceivable precision and attack me with insults. These people have been of different ethnic background. It doesn’t matter what color or origin a racist has. But it is time to change the image that a racist is a shaved young man with a “Bomber jacket” [a garment connected with neo-Nazi groups in Sweden in the 1990s]. (…)

A couple of weeks ago I met two pop guys on Södermalmstorg who yelled that they hated Jews and that there were too many Jews in this city. I started talking to the young guys and am told that Jews actually have the power in Sweden and am asked if I am not actually an “alliance Jew.” What is that, I asked? Someone who has the task to recruit new Jews was the an-
swer. The guys are firmly reassuring me that they are no racists, only criticizing Israel. (Exp 2006/11/09)

It can be noted that all these “testimonial” articles are published in Expressen, which has (as was presented in Chapter 4) more articles from the general public than the other two papers, and more articles of a more personal and less polemic or political character. Expressen is also the paper with the highest number of articles published by Muslim signatories, so the readers of this paper have probably also come across similar articles written by Muslims.

A common theme in these articles, whether of the more testimonial type or more traditional debate articles criticizing media or politics, is the representation of the Jewish community in Sweden as an exposed or perhaps vulnerable group. This, sometimes implicit, theme is also present in articles that do not address anti-Semitism in the same explicit way but, in more general terms, address the freedom of religion and conditions for Jews living in Sweden. At the same time, the Jewish identity is not depicted as foreign or completely different from Swedish majority society. In an article on the need for police protection for a Jewish cultural festival, the leadership of the Jewish congregation in Stockholm writes:

The upsetting attacks on Jews in the city of Malmö during this year have shown that our caution is justifiable. Also in Gothenburg and Stockholm we have had serious incidents that should increase the actions by society towards the security of the Jewish minority.

Jews in Sweden have lived in this country since the end of the 18th century and is today a well-integrated minority. We have been able to keep our traditions and at the same time completely participate in Swedish society and contribute to its development. This is manifested in the rich Swedish-Jewish cultural treasure that the Jewish congregations in Sweden strive to develop and spread. (Exp 2010/09/01)

The recurring specific issue regarding freedom of religion for the Jewish community is circumcision. One article criticizes the custom (SvD 2008/08/19) but the others defend it (Exp 2009/05/28), stress its importance for the Jewish identity (SvD 2001/05/28), and argue that a limitation or ban on circumcision would make it difficult for Jews to live in Sweden and would mean a severe breach of freedom of religion, compared to other democratic states (DN 2001/08/05). There are also a few articles defending freedom of religion and the positive contributions of religion to society in more general terms (Exp 2007/07/28), and one article by the official representatives of the Jewish congregations speaks out against violence and discrimination against Muslims, Roma and other minorities (SvD 2010/09/18).

In these articles, religious content is more present than in the articles discussed in the previous section, with references to religious rituals, traditions,
texts and the legal protection of freedom of religion. But Jewish religious practices in these articles are often discussed in close relation to, or in terms of, cultural heritage and the minority rights of the Jewish people as an ethnic group, where the lines between the two are not always clear.

Negotiating Jewish identity

Returning now to Fairclough’s concepts of representation, identity and relations, we can see some broad patterns in the articles presented and analyzed above. The representations, in answering the question of what the world looks like, are, as we highlighted previously, a key part in the debate over the conflict in the Middle East. The depictions of the current situation: who is responsible for what; what are justifiable and desired actions (by the parties in the conflict and by others, such as the UN or the Swedish government), are quite contrasting. This ongoing negotiation regarding images of reality and writing of history seems to be a core part of the debate.

This also connects with the representations regarding the situation for Jews in Sweden. The perceived image of Sweden as a peaceful and non-racist country is challenged by testimonies of harassment and violence, and by discussions regarding anti-Semitic stereotypes or traces in media and public discourse.

But perhaps the strongest of these three concepts is identity. In many of the articles there is an ongoing negotiation – implicit or explicit – around Jewish identity. The Swedish Jewish community is at the same time a small and potentially vulnerable minority but which also has legal protection (as one of five recognized language minorities by the Swedish state) and a proud cultural heritage, often highlighted in the articles. Many articles seem to have an ambivalent relationship to Israel – not wanting to be defined by the state of Israel but still recognizing its importance, especially when criticism turns into anti-Semitism affecting Jews in Sweden.

Perhaps this relationship to Israel can be seen as an interesting paradox: almost everyone in the material who explicitly addresses the relationship between Jewish identity and Israel makes clear that s/he does not want this connection. Still, a vast majority of all articles by the Jewish actors mention Israel – most of them as the main topic and in others a side-theme or aspect. By constantly returning to this subject – and not writing on many other themes – the impression the reader of these debate pages gets is still, though unintentionally, a strong connection between Jewish actors and the debate over Israel. As one of the writers of the testimonies put it:

If you show your Jewishness openly in Sweden, you have to expect to be scoffed at, ridiculed and beaten … And when you do get abused it will likely not be by Nazis but by radical Islamists who see the situation in the Middle East as an excuse to dust off the old classic anti-Semitic myths (…) But the
debate is still on a level of “you-started-it.” While they are stuck in the sandbox I am expected to take a stance, for or against. Black or white. Fascist or self-hater. I am expected to answer to decisions made in a democratic state thousands of miles away where I am not a citizen. The state of Israel, however amazing and fascinating in some ways, is obviously a misery I as a Jew will never get away from. (Exp 2005/01/27)

One of the things Fairclough suggests studying, though notoriously difficult to do, is the silences, what is not there in different texts: perspectives, pieces of information, voices. Perhaps, here, we can see a void or a silence on other topics. The connection made between Jews and Israel is reinforced by the lack of articles on other subjects. The fact the pieces written by Jewish actors concern almost completely either Israel or very closely related topics itself stresses these connections, and the impression is that the Jewish community stands out more as minority addressing its rights (justifiably so), rather than a public religion speaking out in a more general way.

As addressed before, there is no way in this study of surely knowing how much this lack of voicing of general concerns depends on the interests of the editors or the interests of the writers, as there is no access to any of the unpublished articles. And there is likely a strong aspect of media logic here: The conflict in Israel and Palestine has been on the agenda throughout the period studied here, making articles on the topic likely to be seen as news-worthy by editors and therefore published. But regardless of the (complex) causal links, the impression stands.

Discussion

Coming back to the concepts presented at the beginning of this chapter, some interesting observations can be made when comparing the results from the analyses of the two groups. I will look at the strategies used by the two groups, discuss the importance of the media as an arena and media logic, and finally say something about the places and possibility for agency in Swedish society for the two groups in relation to a public religion as described by Casanova.

Different minority positions: two different strategies

As has been clear in the analysis of the two groups, the participation differs when it comes to topics, language and writers, for example. Although every person or group may have different strategies, agendas and ways of reasoning when deciding to submit an opinion piece, there are distinct patterns in the two groups. The articles written by Jewish actors address predominantly Israel and anti-Semitism or other topics closely related to the group itself,
and are written by a fairly small number of official representatives and a more diverse group of Jewish individuals. The Muslim group is more diverse in many ways, also in the topics and themes of their articles, but the articles are predominantly related to a specific discourse and, though often critical of it, still repeating and thereby reaffirming or reconstructing it.

In comparing the two groups, the differences are perhaps obvious. But we can also see some similarities. Being minorities, there is a pattern of negotiating belonging and minority status. This is a major theme in the Muslim articles, as discussed above. But we could also see it, though perhaps less obviously, in the Jewish articles. The balancing act between guarding one's minority rights and positioning oneself as an exposed group on the one hand, and still showing that the group is a well-integrated, contributing part of Swedish society is there, too. For both the Jewish and Muslim minorities, being an exposed minority is not a chosen position but a discursive and social reality, as can be seen in the statistics on attitudes as well as hate crimes (cf. Bunar 2007; Lööw 1995; Mella et al. 2011). Negotiating Swedishness and belonging, being part of mainstream society and still being viewed as different, might be an experience shared by many in both groups, though the media discourses regarding the two groups are quite separate.

It seems the dichotomy of “Good Muslim/Bad Muslim” seen in international research can to a large extent be said to be also relevant for Swedish Muslims wanting to participate in public debate. The stereotypical framing of Muslims in Swedish media also seems to set the terms on which Muslims have to at least start their participation in debate. Muslims debating rarely have the opportunity to move outside the realm of topics relating to their own group, and they often use – embracingly or critically – the discourse connecting Islam to violence or in the need to adapt and take responsibility. The negotiation, or perhaps ambivalence, between, on the one hand, defending themselves, pointing towards Islamophobia, threats and vulnerability and, on the other, the responsibility to act in ways that will lead to being accepted runs through many of the articles. This contributes to a sense of defensiveness. Though there is diversity within the group, and sometimes there are controversies between Muslim representatives, these are exceptions rather than the rule. It seems, mainly, that the Muslims have to, and therefore do, accept these terms to join the debate, as the alternative might be perceived as even stronger stereotyping.

The Jewish group seems to be less in conflict with, or relating to, a specific media discourse, at least not specifically relating to Jews as a group in Sweden; unfortunately, we do not have any comparable research to start from. More present as a joint feature in the articles by Jewish actors is the underlying focus of negotiating Jewish identity: in relation to Israel, in the light of Anti-Semitism and in being a small-but-established, protected-but-exposed minority in Sweden.
Caught in the media logic

When actively choosing to participate in mediated public debate by submitting a debate article, someone also accepts, at least to a certain degree, the logics or rules of the media. The genre of the debate article – though it might be stretched a little into more personal texts, as we have seen in this chapter – sets certain limitations. Though the editorial process is different from that of a news article, and the opportunity to present your own voice is probably better when writing it yourself, compared to being the source for a journalist or participating in a moderated debate on radio or TV, the power over what gets published still lies with the editor. The different papers have slightly different strategies and policies, but the key in all cases is newsworthiness, which also is an important factor in journalist media logic. This influences which articles get accepted or refused, but it probably also influences the writers even before submitting. As discussed in the theory chapter, one of the traits of mediatized politics according to Jesper Strömbäck (2008; cf. Hjarvard 2011) is when politicians do not only adapt to the media but incorporate the media logic into their entire enterprise. Though that might not be the case with these religious actors, it is still likely that, at least the ones writing more than once, they are well aware of what topics and what claims make the news and therefore will be published. It is also likely to influence the discourse or wording used in articles.

Newsworthiness, or the media logic of the debate article, in this respect, can be a factor in the strong presence of the “Good Muslim/Bad Muslim” dichotomy and the relation to a discourse connecting Muslims to violence and terrorism. As these narratives were consistently present in the news and topics high on the agenda throughout the time period studied, these issues and this discourse were likely to be an important part of what made these articles newsworthy – though many of them were trying to counter the currently mediated negative stereotypes.

As discussed in the section about the Jewish group, it is impossible to know exactly to what extent the narrow scope of topics is a result of what they have chosen to write about or what has been accepted for publication. Is it the editors or the writers who have a narrow scope? In line with the reasoning above, it might very well be a combination – writers know they have a better chance of being published when writing about certain themes, or they do not even bother writing articles they know will have a low chance of being published. Potentially editors also come to expect certain articles from certain actors, in line with the media logic of having “Pros” and “Cons,” one on each side.

When it comes to the high number of articles on Israel and Palestine, the constant newsworthiness of the conflict throughout the studied period might be one factor. It is interesting, though, that the Jewish groups comprise a large part of the debate on Israel and Palestine, and are seen – by themselves...
and/or by editors – as a relevant party in discussing it, while Swedish Muslims are (almost) silent on the issue. The Jewish groups debate with each other, with Christian groups or with non-religious debaters. One important factor here could be the presentation or framing of different participants in the debate, by themselves or by editors. It is quite possible that people writing on the situation in Israel presented or presents him/herself as a Jew, but would use another title when writing on something else; a Muslim Palestinian might be presented as a Palestinian and therefore not be included in my material. A systematic study of the titles, and thereby the framing, of debaters on the debate pages would be very interesting but lies outside the scope of this dissertation. But some clues to the preoccupation with Israel among Jewish writers might be found in the media logic, hence also the potential paradox discussed previously: Jewish writers stress the need to separate Jewishness and Jewish identity from the state of Israel, but this connection is (unintentionally) reinforced by the large number of articles.

Can a minority be a public religion?

One of the starting points for this chapter was the observation in Chapter 4 that the minority religions do participate in the debate but the patterns of topics and themes was quite different from the Christian groups. While Christian groups discuss their internal issues and topics relating to religion they do, at least sometimes, also discuss matters falling within what Casanova would call legitimate concerns for public religions, or themes that resemble them, as discussed extensively in previous chapters. As we have seen here, the possibilities for Jewish and Muslim groups to do the same seem more limited.

When stating that, I do not only refer to the themes or topics discussed. It could be argued that peace issues (including the situation in Israel and Palestine), discrimination and racism (including Islamophobia and anti-Semitism) as well as multiculturalism and integration, for example, could be valid topics for public religions, in Casanova’s understanding. But in the light of the discourses used and how these topics are addressed by the different groups, it is doubtful whether these interventions in the debate can be seen as that.

There is in Casanova’s writings the implicit understanding that a public religion is a group “stepping outside” of their own territory, speaking for the whole people or the common good or protecting threatened values in society. Though he never explicitly says that only a majority (or former majority) church or religion can be a public religion, there seems to be an implied ability to speak on behalf of either a majority of people, or on behalf of the values of majority society. Is it possible to speak out for the common good for society if you constantly have to negotiate your own belonging to that society?
When the religious minorities do write articles more along the lines of a public religion, it is usually together with other organizations, typically the Church of Sweden, the Swedish Christian Council, Christian peace organizations or other well established actors in Swedish (civil) society. One interpretation is that religious minority groups need the “approval,” or at least support, of a more established actor to step outside their usual role; by being one of several religious actors they can together represent religion in a wider sense than Muslims or Jews are perceived to do on their own.

Returning more specifically to the criteria for public religions discussed in the theory chapter (p 54), they are partly applicable to the articles analyzed in this chapter. Generally the writers accept or even embrace pluralist society and refrain from ultimate truth claims. They sometimes use religious arguments or discuss religious content, the Muslim writers more so than the Jewish. These references to theology often have an ambition of teaching or explaining, giving them less of an authoritative character. Regarding the criteria of playing by the media logic, the minority groups seem to negotiate different ways of participating, as we have seen throughout the chapter. Regarding all these criteria or aspects, it seems as if the minority groups, at least in some cases and under certain conditions, have the ability or opportunity to become public religions.

But looking at the remaining two criteria, on collectivity and visibility and regarding the legitimate questions, the picture becomes more complicated. I set as a premise that a public religion should not only be a mediated, i.e. visible, display of internal religious matters but have a collective character (p 55). But what defines whether a question has a collective character? Are the questions regarding, for example, freedom of religion for Jews or Muslims in Sweden seen as a general, collective issue of human rights, or as a special interest? A public religion should also, according to Casanova, address certain types of issues and, as discussed above, the definition of the “common good” might be challenged in a pluralist society. Here there is a clear parallel to Seyla Benhabib’s discussion on the power of who sets the agenda, of deciding what is public or private (1992, cf. p 39 abovepå sidan 39).

Perhaps this opens up for a discussion on another criterion for public religions that is implicit in Casanova’s writing. To really be a public religion, a group has be allowed, or be able, to speak for a collective rather than just the group itself. It seems in my analysis that this possibility is not equally accessible to all religious groups. What consequences this has for the understanding of public religions will be further discussed in the final chapter.

Conclusions

In this chapter I have studied the participation of religious minorities in the debate pages, starting out with Talal Asad’s criticism against Casanova re-
garding whether his theory was only applicable to western majority religion. Though there is definitively a presence of religious groups other than the majority church in my material, the analysis has showed that their place is more contested.

The participation of religious minorities has a distinct pattern compared to that of the Christian groups. Both Jewish and Muslim actors write on a narrower scope of issues, especially the Jewish actors who almost exclusively write about Israel/Palestine, anti-Semitism and freedom of religion regarding Jews in Sweden. The Muslim actors – who are a much more diverse group – write about a wider range of specific topics but mostly concerning the group itself and in a more restrained and balancing discourse.

I found some interesting differences and parallels between the two groups. Even though there were differences in topics and language, there was a similar pattern between them as they, as minority groups, seem to negotiate their identity and place in Swedish society. The Jewish actors are a well-integrated minority with a long history in Sweden and a legally-protected minority status but at the same time exposed and potentially the subject of anti-Semitism and hate crimes. The Muslims in Sweden – as well as in most of Europe and other parts of the western world – are an exposed minority and this, when trying to join in the public debate in a media landscape characterized by negative stereotypes, sets the terms for their participation. There is ambivalence in many of the articles, where on the one hand there is a criticism against Islamophobia and negative attitudes towards Muslim but at the same time an acceptance that Muslims need to denounce violence and adjust to majority Swedish society. Muslims risk ending up in another stereotype: the “Good Muslim.”

It seems difficult for the minority religions to move outside the topics and discourse set – whether by themselves or by the media – and act as public religions in Casanova’s sense. This might be an indication that the participation in public debate, as well as in other parts of society, is not a given for minority groups, and the strategies used are likely ways of handling this position.
8. Public religions in contemporary Sweden

Returning to the research question

In the introduction, I discussed my aim with this study and formulated the research questions:

*How did religious actors contribute to Swedish debate pages during the years 2001-2011; to what extent, on what issues and with what arguments? Can this participation be understood in terms of public religions according to José Casanova’s thesis, and, in that case, how and under what conditions; what is the significance of the genre and logic of the debate article in these conditions?*

In this final chapter I will discuss my results and point forward. First I will summarize and discuss my results in relation to the three parts of the research questions – how the religious actors participated, relate this to the criteria for public religions and the importance of the media logic. Then I will evaluate the research design and some of my theoretical and methodological choices before sketching a model of revised criteria for future studies of mediated public religions.

**Participation of religious actors**

Though the main question for this study is not whether we live in a post-secular society, or whether there is evidence of a return of religion to the public sphere, these questions and the debate around them were quite evident when I started this study. It was especially the frustration over the often imprecise and sweeping statements that were made that inspired me to find a way to empirically study the participation of religious actors in public debate, being careful to also take the media perspective seriously.

As there was no previous research on this type of empirical material and study of religious actors (as opposed to content), there is no way of determining whether there has been a return or even increase of participation of religious actors on the debate pages, or what should be considered a small or large presence of religious actors. Also, I want to be careful regarding talking about change over time in my material as it covers a limited amount of
time, and the differences between the years vary significantly. Still, to interpret my results as religious actors having a strong presence in public debate or as a sign of a post-secular society would probably be more wishful thinking than anything else. On the most influential debate page, DN Debatt, religious actors contributed with 1.8 percent of articles during the period, and somewhere around 3.5 percent in all three papers. There is no increase in my material during these years – the variation between the years is much greater than the difference between the first and the last year. If any trend can be noted, there are more years with high numbers at the beginning of the period studied than in the later part. By pointing this out, I want to clarify that my aim is not to dwell on the issue of “how much religion there is” or whether there is an increase or decline of religion or what this says about claims of secularization per se. I am more interested in the “how” questions, in what ways the religious actors that participated did so, the conditions and the relationships. But I also want to stress that my intention is not to be normative or prescriptive. In this study I have no validation as to whether it is a good thing for religious actors to act as public religions, or to participate in public debate in any other way either. My ambition has been to understand the presence of religious actors and what it says about the relationship between religion and modernity and ideas about the public, rather than to evaluate or encourage a specific way of participating.

Who is participating and to what extent?

The short, quantitative answers to the questions of which religious actors participated on the debate pages, and to what extent, have been presented in Chapter 4. Christian actors – most commonly from the Church of Sweden but also other Christian churches, as well as Christian aid organizations and advocacy groups – dominate the material. The two largest religious minorities, Muslims and Jews, also participated but to a lesser degree. The general extent of religious actors contributing to the three debate pages varies over the years, and there is no clear increase or decrease. No religious affiliations were clearly increasing or decreasing, either, which is a contrast compared to the findings of the Nordic comparative study of religion in the public sphere, NOREL (Niemelä and Christensen 2013:15), where coverage of the majority churches was declining while coverage of, mainly, Muslims was increasing. While the participation of religious actors on the debate pages does not differ completely from the coverage of religion on the news pages of newspapers, the patterns are not identical. One explanation could be the difference in genre: in debate articles the religious actors speak for themselves (though passing the debate editors as gatekeepers) while that is not necessarily the case in journalistic coverage of religion (cf. Hjarvard 2012). While there has been an increase in articles mentioning Islam in the NOREL material, this might not mean an increased opportunity for Muslims to address the public
from the debate pages. As discussed in Chapter 7, the participation of Muslim actors is also characterized by the stereotypes and negative discourse on Muslims and Islam in western news media, which affects the starting point and way of writing for Muslim signatories.

As presented in Chapter 4, the majority of articles are written by Christian actors. This is no surprise, as the Christian churches, as well as other Christian groups like ecumenical councils, peace and advocacy groups and missions are well established in Swedish society. They have more members, a longer history, more funding and stronger ties to other institutions in Swedish society. The factor of establishment – in terms of history as discussed in the introductory chapter (p 23) – is more crucial than size, looking at what groups are present in the material. In relation to membership, it seems the domestic free churches, Jewish groups and to some extent the Catholic Church are comparatively more frequently published, while orthodox Christian and Buddhists in particular are significantly underrepresented in the material. The orthodox churches have more members in Sweden, around 130,000, than the Catholic Church (around 100,000) and the Muslim congregations (around 110,000), while the Buddhist cooperation council represents around 4,500 people compared to the Jewish central council’s 8,500 members (Swedish Commission for Government Support to Faith Communities 2012a). As discussed in Chapter 4, Jewish and Catholic groups have a long history in Sweden. Another factor which becomes evident here is the importance of the representatives or individuals. Within the Catholic as well as the Jewish group, there are a number of people who are to some extent public intellectuals – academics, cultural worker, writers. They also have people in leadership positions that are well established in Swedish society. This is especially interesting in relation to the Catholic group – among members of the Catholic Church in Sweden, a vast majority are immigrants, or children of immigrants, from eastern or southern Europe, or from Latin America (Nyman 2008). Among the Catholic signatories in my material, most have Swedish as their first language and many are converts, among them Bishop Anders Arborelius.

This should be understood in the light of the genre and logic of the debate article. All the editors I interviewed stressed the importance of the writer, that it was a clear advantage if it was a person who was well known and known to be a good writer. Already-established intellectuals and academics or people with experience from media and the culture sector can probably more easily pass the gatekeepers of the debate pages. One of the factors difficult to analyze in my material is the importance of the individual writers, especially in relation to fact that the debate article is in many ways an elite genre. The position and organizational representation is an important factor, but it is not always enough to be a representative of a large organization. Being well-known probably increases the news value, as well as possibly making contacts with debate editors easier.
This importance of the individual can also be seen if we look to the entire material. In Chapter 4 I argued that, though difficult to define strictly, there was still a rough separation between signatories writing on behalf of an organization – national leaders, bishops, elected chairpersons, media representatives etc. – and signatories mostly representing themselves – individual clergy, imams and local, elected officials as well as independent writers or scholars. These groups seem to be roughly the same size, which means there were a lot of articles published that were not written by elite people in the sense of national leadership. Still, it is mostly in Expressen that more “ordinary members” of any religious group are published. The non-leadership people published in SvD and DN are to a large extent clergy, expert staff (for example at the Church of Sweden international office) or people who are ordinary members in their religious group but hold some kind of elite position in other organizations, such as members of parliament or well-known journalists or scholars (cf. Broberg 2013 who discusses this issue in depth).

This also points to the problem of representation in my material. This regards the leadership signatories to a larger extent, but also some of the writers I have labeled as individual: how far do they speak for themselves, how far for their respective organization and its members, and how far for a tradition, creed or community of faith? In some cases it is quite clear that the leadership of an organization, such as the Swedish Christian Council, is speaking on behalf of their organization on issues well anchored among members; in some cases the writers have no claim to speak for anyone other than themselves. But in many cases this is not very clear. Can someone who is ordained, or holds an even higher office such as bishop, publicly speak as a private person and not for the church? Can rabbis and imams speak as individuals without claims to represent their faith communities? Also the opposite situation is present in my material, where individual members or sometimes clergy claim to speak for a tradition or creed. This leads to the difficult question about legitimacy and authority that I will return to later in this chapter.

On what issues and with what arguments?

In Chapter 4 I also presented the most frequent themes and issues in the articles by religious actors. The largest areas of issues revolved around visible religion or religion in the public arena. In this area I included both themes that more specifically addressed religion in relation to collective issues, and hence public in a more narrow sense, and the more overarching theme of visible religion or religion in public in a more visibility sense, as Weintraub (1997) separates between the two types or understandings of the public. I will return to the more specified sense of public religion in the upcoming section of this chapter, and first discuss visible or public religion in this wider sense.
This high number of articles addressing visible religion can be read as an ongoing meta-debate over the place of religion in the public arena. In many of these articles, religion as such or a specific question regarding religion in the public sphere is the main theme, such as school ceremonies in church (DN 2007/11/01), the wearing of the hijab by TV presenters (Exp 2002/11/19), or religious organizations as providers of state-funded welfare services (SvD 2003/06/01, SvD 2004/05/15). But there are also many articles where one of these is not the main topic, but is still a theme addressed and discussed, sometimes as an argument for why this/these specific writer(s) should address a specific issue.

I understand this meta-debating as a negotiation over their place in the public debate, a way of giving arguments for, or legitimizing themselves: debating a specific issue, but at the same time arguing why this religious group should be able to discuss this specific issue in public. Sometimes it is clear that the matter debated is of direct concern for the group or individual debating, but when it is not, different strategies are used. This can be seen as a sign that the religious groups do not have authority to speak on whatever issues they please but need to legitimize or establish authority in the same way as any other author – or even more so. The need for religious actors to legitimize their participation in public debate can itself be seen as a sign of the secularization or privatization of religion. By this, I mean that in a less secularized society religious leaders might have access to the media in more direct ways, or have the authority to speak in public as part of their already established authority. If religious actors need to legitimize and establish authority based on other grounds than their religious leaderships, this could be an example of what Chaves (1994) means by declining religious authority (cf. p 31).

As mentioned previously, the scope of issues varies between the different religious groups, only in part a relation to the number of articles. Writers from the Church of Sweden have the broadest range and the religious minorities the smallest, with the other, different Christian groups in between (not counting advocacy groups, more concentrated on specific issues for obvious reasons). The more established the group, the wider the possible scope of issues seems to be. I discussed in Chapter 7 that it seems more difficult for the minority religions to take on the role of public religion, and this pattern of what issues are legitimate to talk about, or possible to be published on, points in the same direction.

Besides this ongoing meta-debate over the place of religion in the public arena, there were a wide variety of issues addressed, as presented. Many of them regard issues that religious groups have historically been engaged in, such as social justice and peace, or matters connected to morality, relationships and the family, for instance. Also recurring were articles that in a more explicit way were addressing faith or religious content according to my defi-
A different angle on discussing how religious actors participated could be in looking at the types of articles and how they related. As presented in Chapter 4, I coded the articles for time of year or holidays and events, and it was mostly Christian holidays that recurred. These also point to a different genre compared to the traditional debate articles: it is not unusual in my material that during major Christian holidays, such as Christmas or Easter, a religious actor writes articles published on the debate page that are more reflective or provides thoughts in the spirit of the season, or has similar ambitions. These are, with one exception (Exp 2006/12/24), written by Christians. They are sometimes similar to the more personal testimonies by religious minorities presented in Chapter 7, also giving fewer arguments and sharing experiences or perspectives.

The question of what arguments the religious actors used has been addressed foremost in the case study of the debate over marriage, in Chapter 5. While there is not the same detailed argument analysis of the material as a whole, the material was coded for theological or faith content. This does not necessarily mean religious arguments in the sense of claiming authority based directly or indirectly on the transcendent (cf. p 101), but it does give an indication of how much the different religious groups discuss within these terms. Proportionally, writers with Muslim affiliation had the highest share of articles with theological or faith content, 42 percent, though the total number of articles by Christians coded with this theme was higher. In total, around a third of the articles were in this category. That means that two thirds do not use religious arguments in a narrow sense, do not refer to religious authority or debate faith matters. Clearly, in a majority of articles, the issue at hand is not in a narrow sense religious or that the arguments used are within what could be seen as generally accessible arguments. Either they are not related to religion or religious sources at all, or they are “translated” to arguments referring to human rights or the common good, for example. A more in-depth discussion on the translation of arguments will follow later in this chapter (p 183).

To see how religious arguments were used in the cases where they did occur, some examples were found in the analysis in Chapter 5. There I showed that while religious arguments were used to some extent on both sides of the debate, it was mostly done in a quite sweeping, generalized way, and rarely in any detail. Generally, arguments based on analogies, rules, consequences and religious authority were more frequent than other, more fact-based arguments. This could be due to the symbolic nature of the issue at hand, marriage, and should perhaps not be generalized into the whole material. Still, in the results there is an indication that, while religious arguments are used by the religious actors, they are not necessarily made with ultimate truth claims or claiming any absolute religious authority. On the contrary, these were
often used in articles where the writers were also stressing pluralism as an important value in society.

Another illustration of how religious arguments were used, though in a less direct way, can be found in Chapter 7 in the case study of three articles by Muslim writers. Though the arguments as such were not the focus of that case, there are still some examples of another way of using religious content. If the marriage debaters mainly used religious arguments as arguments of authority in a quite generalized way, the use of theological claims were different in the articles in Chapter 7. They were used more for teaching about Islam, explaining what the Muslim faith is – and is not – about: a theme that was also common in many of the other articles signed by Muslims. Theological discussions, quotes from the Quran, examples from history or other contexts are used to show how Islam is a peaceful faith and that people using violence in the name of Islam are not representing the true faith. Thus, these theological arguments contribute to the establishment and reinforcement of the discourse of the “Good Muslim/Bad Muslim” dichotomy.

Though these are two cases and not an analysis of the entire material, it still highlights a clear difference in how religious arguments are used, and the different starting points for different religious groups. As has been shown throughout the results, there are substantial differences between the possibilities for minority and majority religious groups, and this is one example where the difference is visible.

To sum up, while religious arguments and theological or faith-based claims are not absent in my material, the majority of articles do not use these kinds of arguments and when they do, they are mostly done in a non-authoritarian way. As a general trend, most of the participation by religious actors in my material seems to go along the lines of Habermas’ claims on religious actors in the public debate; that they either use arguments based on grounds shared with other debaters or “translate” them into language more accessible to a wider audience. How they participated in terms of Casanova’s criteria for public religions will be discussed next.

Criteria for public religions – discussion of results

In this part, I will go through the different criteria proposed for public religions in Chapter 2, and discuss the results in relation to each of them. I will also address two other major themes that were not in the criteria set up, but have proved to be salient in the analyses. The last criterion, regarding media logic, will be addressed in the next major section, as it connects to the third part of the research question.
Participating on collective issues – not just visible

The first criterion regards the type of issue addressed by the religious groups. For a participation to be counted as public religion in the stricter sense, it has to regard issues that could be defined as public in the collectivity sense, not only visible religion. This refers to the separation that Weintraub (1997:5) makes between, on the one hand, understandings of the public/private distinction regarding what is hidden or withdrawn versus what is open and visible, i.e., the visibility sense, and a distinction based on what considers an individual versus a collective of people, i.e., the collectivity sense (see p 36).

Many articles in the material live up to this criterion: all groups, to varying extent, address collective issues. But large parts of the material also fall outside this category. Some of the things falling outside are internal issues of a religious group and I would also classify some of the articles dealing with faith issues, as their main topic did not meet this criterion. For example, for the articles analyzed and discussed in Chapter 6, that I labeled as public utility-type articles rather than public religion, this was the point where they most obviously did not meet the criteria of public religion. Regarding this point, it is important to see that studying the genre of debate means that a lot of media participation that is just about visibility is not part of the material – such as coverage of religious groups not making any claims on collective issues, or the use of religious symbols in popular culture, for example.

Some of the examples of articles on collective issues have been thoroughly analyzed and presented in Chapter 5, on the debate over marriage. This is perhaps a paradigmatic example of a collective issue where religious groups have interest and opportunity to participate and contribute to the public debate. But there were also many other examples presented in Chapters 6 and 7, such as the rights of refugees, the arms trade, and the social cohesion of Swedish society addressed by religious minorities. Perhaps the meta-debate on religion discussed in the previous section can also be interpreted as a collective issue, as it addresses the place of religion in a joint society, freedom of religion and the formal and informal rules of living together in a multi-religious society.

At the heart of this criterion, that the questions addressed should be collective lies the definition of the public. Though the distinction may be clear in one sense, it may come down to a discussion on what really is a public, i.e. collective, issue. What, or more interestingly, whose, questions count as collective? Here the parallel to Benhabib’s (1992; see p 39 above) discussion on what counts as public or political is obvious. Being able to position an issue as being of general concern is part of having or achieving influence, and also likely in having the opportunity of getting debate articles published. In Weintraub’s categorization of types of public, a key in his second model (on which Casanova’s argument rests) is citizenship; what is public is that which concerns all citizens. Benhabib’s point is that one of the keys to the
success of the women’s movement has been to challenge and redefine issues that were traditionally seen as private, such as domestic violence, to become public issues in need of political action; the power to define certain issues as public or private is part of political and societal change.

In relation to the religious groups, it can be interesting to make a comparison with membership – is this an issue concerning members but that becomes visible for other people, or is it actually of concern for people outside of the group? As Benhabib’s point is that there is power in this definition when it comes to defining “women’s issues” as public issues, so is there power in defining the issues of other marginalized groups like religious minorities as joint concerns of public relevance. Are the experiences of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia problems for the individuals exposed, or is it a societal, collective problem? In that sense, this criterion is not neutral but opens up a discussion on power and normativity.

Focusing the “legitimate” questions

The second criterion regards the type of issues that are addressed by religious actors. Casanova discusses three types of issues that are legitimate for religions to participate in, though he does not claim this list is exhaustive. In short, these three types are:

- Defending democracy itself and the functions, especially freedoms, of democratic society. This includes freedom of religion.
- Defending vulnerable and marginalized groups, or to morally critique power and the effects of power exercised by states, capitalism or others.
- Defending the “life-world” from intrusions from the state, and thereby opening up a discussion on norms and morality in society.

As discussed in Chapter 2, this list is not unproblematic. Casanova uses these in a normative way, though in his later writings he has loosened up the strict understanding of what is possible for religions in liberal democracies. Still, the last point especially might suggest an implicit understanding that certain issues related to the family or domestic sphere, i.e., life-world, need protecting from the state. For example, issues like abortion, euthanasia and same-sex marriage could be argued to be legitimate questions to be either for or against using Casanova’s criteria – is abortion an intrusion into the life-world or the right of the woman; is same-sex marriage a threat to traditional family values or the right of a marginalized group? This points to a problem if certain things are, a priori, outside of what can be seen as public or of joint interest.

If we look at the types of questions that Casanova suggests, we can find many examples of all of them in the material. In the first category, there are articles defending freedom of religion, but also other features in democratic
society. Several articles defend a pluralistic, multi-faith society, and it is often Christian groups that defend the freedom of religion for other religious groups. But there are also several examples of articles encouraging people to vote in general elections or pointing towards the importance of a strong and independent civil society, for example.

The second category has many examples: many articles, at least to some degree, either critique power or want to highlight an issue where there is a marginalized or vulnerable group. Almost all articles on international issues, include peace and justice but also social topics within Swedish society. The treatment of refugees in Sweden, the arms trade, the conflict between Israel and Palestine, homelessness and poverty are all topics that fall within this category.

In relation to my hesitation about the third category addressed previously, what falls within this category is less simple to define than the previous two. It could be argued though that articles on abortion, euthanasia and perhaps the marriage law could fall in this category, at least in relation to the examples Casanova himself uses (Casanova 1994:58).

All cases are not clear cut, and could be seen as part of more than one type. For example, an article discussing racism and discrimination might defend a marginalized group and at the same time address more general issues regarding democratic society. Many articles are perhaps not clear examples of one or the other but have elements of both.

There are articles that do not meet these criteria – perhaps mainly the ones analyzed and discussed in Chapter 6 that I have called public utility-type articles, which address internal Church of Sweden issues, or questions relating to the access to the church and its relation to the people. More specific faith issues would also fall outside these criteria – though predominantly religious arguments or content is present in articles on a specific issue that might or might not fall within Casanova’s legitimate topics, there are also some articles where the main topic is clearly theological, such as the debate in SvD in 2003 about the nature of Christ and whether it is necessary for Christians to believe literally in the virgin birth (SvD 2003/01/28, SvD 2003/02/02).

There are also questions or topics that are not so clearly within or outside Casanova’s criteria. It should be said that Casanova himself does not seem to think that these exact limits are very important, as he claims there are at least three types of legitimate questions. But it could be argued that it is not only the scope of issues that could place an article in one of these three categories but also the angle, framing or arguments used in addressing this issue. As discussed above, it is not always a matter of clear-cut examples of one of the types of issues Casanova mentions but whether the arguments used or the way the problem is presented is according to his criteria. A large scope of political issues could be framed as or discussed in terms of democratic society itself and its freedoms, and/or the protection of marginalized groups or a
moral critique of power, and there are many examples of this in my material. This raises the question of whether it is really the scope of issue, the legitimacy of the question, that is really the best factor to look at. Still, this makes a starting point for separating between different ways religions participate in the public debate, though it perhaps is not as clear cut a criterion as Casanova presents it.

In this discussion, I also want to problematize Casanova’s underlying understanding of religions “stepping out” of the private sphere and entering the public sphere of debate to defend values and rights, according to the criteria presented here. The results of my study show that there are several types of questions or ways they participate, and there is not always a clear line between legitimate and other types of issues. There is also, as my results show, not always a clear line between what are internal church/religious community questions and what are questions of interest to a larger population. The debate over whether the Church of Sweden should want the entitlement to solemnize marriages is a prime example, but there are also others. For example, the care of church buildings is a Church of Sweden issue, but part of the debate regards state funding for the cultural heritage. The situation present in my material where different spokespeople for the same church or religious group debate with each other does not really fit into his model. Neither does the fact that people who are in prominent positions in other spheres in society but without any leadership or formal position in their religious community write on some occasions on behalf of religion, or as a religious person/representative. This highlights a situation where part of what takes place in my material is also an internal debate, perhaps not only over the issue at stake but over authority and over who has the right to speak for the religious group in question.

Accepting modern, pluralist society

This point is perhaps one of the clearest results of the study – the acceptance or even embracing of pluralist society runs through all different types of articles. It is often clearly stated; while in other articles it is more an underlying, taken-for-granted condition. There are very few articles that make normative religious statements for the whole of society – in some cases there are statements made about what a certain faith group should believe or practice, but usually marking that this should not be read universally, and if there are ultimate truth claims, they are not presented as universal. Moral claims in critiquing power sometimes have more of a universal character, but rarely in a way that questions the values or ideas connected to liberal, modern society; rather, they often relate to human rights or other values commonly agreed upon.

Is this perhaps to be seen as the most fundamental of all conditions for public religions? Accepting modern, pluralist society and refraining from
ultimate truth claims, at least in a way that claims authority on a more societ al level, seems to be a requirement for participating – at least it is one condition that more or less all articles live up to. Perhaps this is such a crucial part of what it means to take part in Swedish media debate that it really is a condition for articles to be published in the first place.

Still, there are variations in how this is done in the different articles – when the claim is explicit, or even embracing pluralism, different strategies and models are used. One interesting recurring type is articles where pluralism is used together with arguments concerning the protection of minorities by conservative Christian groups. As we could see in the marriage chapter but also on other issues, embracing a pluralist society is an argument for the right to maintain a diverging view on issues like same-sex marriage or abortion in relation to the majority society. There, pluralism becomes an argument for being allowed to have a conservative view on issues connected to traditional family values.

This is quite distinct from the articles written by the mainline churches, the Christian Council of Sweden or articles written in cooperation between different religious groups, stressing a more general freedom of religion or need to accept minority groups in society, including religious minorities. One interpretation is, again, that the possibility to speak on behalf of a greater collective rather than just stressing your own rights is connected to majority status, position in society and in some ways to power. This is an issue we will return to soon.

Religious or commonly-accepted arguments

This criterion relates, as discussed in Chapter 2, not to Casanova in the same straightforward way as the others but more to Habermas and his discussion about religious arguments. Though Casanova has no requirements for specific types of arguments for a public religion to be legitimate, it is still interesting to connect the potential presence of religious content and/or arguments in the debates and Habermas’ idea of the need for translation with Casanova’s concepts. Though they both are concerned with factors which make religious participation in a rational debate in modern, liberal societies possible, they focus on different aspects. Where Casanova seems less interested in the actual reasoning and arguments given, and more in how religions get involved in public debate, Habermas on the other hand discusses the language and reasoning of religious participation.

The religious arguments used in the marriage issue were, as presented, often not very detailed but rather sweeping statements or references to the biblical message, the tradition of the church or the message of love. In Chapter 5 I discussed this in terms of media logic (as the articles are written for an intended audience not familiar with the language or references of a tradition-
al Christian theology) and that they might have the aim more to mobilize their own audience than to convince opponents.

These vague religious arguments could also be interpreted as an attempt to achieve Habermas’ claim of the need to translate religious arguments into more general accessible ones, or into a language also accessible to non-believers. By not going into detail but giving these more general formulations, the writers might have the ambition to argue in a way that is more accessible to readers not sharing their stance. They do still rely on or give reference to a transcendent authority when referring to the Bible or the history and tradition of the church, but perhaps this more general reference is a way to “translate” the argument in the way Habermas proposes – as he talks about a mutual translation process, he expects the non-believing reader to also play their part of this process and listen to arguments they may not share. This does point, though, to the two problematic parts of Habermas’ call for a translation process that I discussed in the theory chapter (p 42): the difficulty in recognizing or analyzing a translated argument, and the understanding of religious people and the arguments they use as something fundamentally different from rational conversation.

Who can act as a public religion? Majority/minority perspectives
Moving on from the criteria I set out in the theory chapter based mainly on Casanova’s writing, there are some other themes that have been salient in the analysis that need addressing. Throughout the different chapters, the theme of a majority and minority has recurred. Both in terms of majority and minority religions and in terms of opinion minorities and a majority population, the dynamic of being part of a majority and/or minority has occurred in varying ways. While most obviously in the analysis of Muslim and Jewish participation, it also occurred in relation to the marriage debate and the Church of Sweden articles.

In the last part of Chapter 7 I posed the question of whether only a majority religion can be or become a public religion in Casanova’s sense. I think this question deserves some additional attention. As I discussed there, it seems challenging for religious groups who already need to negotiate their belonging to Swedish society to also claim to speak for the common good or for a group wider than themselves. This is pointing towards an imbalance of power; an already marginalized or at least less-established group may be able to make such broad claims to a lesser extent.

The way Casanova describes the core of what he means by public religion, that they “step out of their assigned place in the private sphere,” shows an understanding of the public sphere but also of the religious groups – who these groups are, who belongs to them, what their “turf” is. In all his case studies in his book from 1994, the religion in question was a majority or
large, established church, and the conditions for minority religious groups might be quite different.

It seems that groups with more power and establishment in Swedish society have more “wriggle room” to participate in the debate – regarding what topics to address as well as arguments used and claims made. The Church of Sweden shows the largest variety, some recently-established groups such as Orthodox Christians or Buddhists rarely participate at all while Muslim groups, for example, participate but under much more restricted conditions compared to the Christians. But all these religious actors can be said to play an “away game” when they participate in the debate pages. No religious actors have the “natural” authority to speak without to some extent legitimizing their point, arguing about the issue at hand but often, at the same time, arguing why they as a religious voice can or should participate in public debate, at least on collective issues. This seems potentially easier in other types of articles such as the more personally reflective ones, or articles more in the genre of testimony, discussed in Chapter 7. But in these articles there are no or few claims, no real intention of authority or ambition to influence, at least in a direct sense, other than to inspire or give food for thought to the audience. This directly alludes to Chaves’ (1994) definition of secularization as religious authority decline, as the religious actors in these cases do not claim any authority over the potential readers.

On the other hand, not all articles seem to have the ambition of influencing a wider audience or the political/societal powers, as I discussed in the chapter on the Church of Sweden. The public utility-type articles seemed to be more internally directed and also, in other cases, the aim or intended audience might not be evident, or not even be the one explicitly addressed. As pointed out in the analysis on the marriage debate, some articles might be explicitly addressed to a wider audience or directed towards legislators or government in the thesis argued. But the aim might be just as much to position themselves on an issue important for their own core group, or strengthen the identity of the group itself.

Also, debate editors, as well as journalists or other media decision-makers who facilitate other types of public debates, have their own, or at least potentially different, agenda in giving space to religious groups in public debate. This is one of the core points where mediatization comes in. Though the religious actors have agency in the process, and formulate the text themselves, who and what gets published is ultimately decided by editors in accordance with their professional assessment, making media logic a strong factor.

These differing, and potentially conflicting, aims that religious groups may have for participating in public debate, besides trying to influence society in a wider sense, further complicate or at least nuance Casanova’s concept of public religion, and neither do they necessarily fit Habermas’ discussion on how religious actors or people can participate in the public use of
reason. How these other types of presence in the debate should be understood needs further reflection, I believe.

A last point on the dynamic of the majority and the minority regards the negotiating taking place, especially by minority groups. An interesting comparison can be made between the ways both groups in the marriage debate position themselves as simultaneously minority and majority, as seen in Chapter 5, and the way the minority religious groups negotiate between being an exposed and marginalized group while at the same time taking responsibility for situations, as discussed in Chapter 7. In the case of the marriage debate, both the people defending the idea that marriage is only for a man and a woman and those wanting to change the marriage law to include same-sex couples negotiated between the majority and minority position, often claiming to have the support of a majority while being or defending a marginalized minority (cf. p 116). In many of the articles by Jewish and Muslim actors, there was a balancing or negotiation going on between wanting to show their experiences of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia and that, especially Muslims but to some extent also Jews, they are exposed and marginalized groups in Sweden. At the same time, they are often keen to take responsibility, distancing themselves from violence and extremism and stressing that their respective groups want to be respectable and dependable actors within Swedish society (cf. p 167). These examples of negotiation and ambiguity raise questions about power, belonging and legitimacy – who has the opportunity to speak for the good of society and the place of minorities in relation to the concept of public religions.

Visibility is not authority

Another key aspect when reflecting on the results of my study regards the two concepts of visibility and authority. Though visibility has been discussed throughout, especially in the theory chapter, the questions on authority have been implicitly present but largely unaddressed in the analyses. This is partly because authority was not a key concept when I started. But as I have conducted the study, it seems more and more a necessary thing to address. Many of the questions I have discussed in this last chapter touch upon this – such as who has legitimacy to participate in public debate and what claims are made. Partly, what is going on in at least some of these debates are negotiations over authority, either in regards to a specific religious community or in relation to society at large. There is a parallel here to what Henrik Reintoft Christensen showed in his 2010 dissertation, where different kinds of religious authority were used in relation to different religious traditions. But as his material mostly consists of sources (parliamentary debates and newspaper articles in general) other than the religious actors themselves, the point I am trying to make here is not so much regarding what types of authority are
used in relation to religion but, rather, how religious actors negotiate authority in relation to other actors in society (cf. Christensen 2010:189–200).

This negotiation can especially be seen in debates where different actors from the same or closely-related religious communities participate; in negotiations over who can speak on behalf of a community and when s/he only speaks for him/herself, as discussed above. Though some cases are clear, many are not and the line between being a spokesperson with a larger mandate and being a public intellectual or a representative in a less formal sense is not clear-cut. Who or what decides who can become these intellectuals, and what factors make someone a “publishable” person according to media logic? And, perhaps more interestingly, how would these people themselves reason or negotiate between these positions? This would be an interesting topic for further research.

A specific type of actor with a different dynamic regarding authority and legitimizing strategies are the aid and mission groups present in the material. As would be expected, they write on a small range of issues relating to their own agenda or field of interest. In comparison with the actors from denominations and congregations, they take part to a much lesser extent in this meta-discussion on the place of religion in public as discussed above, and they use less space legitimizing their participation in the debate. Perhaps these groups fit more easily into the formula or place of actors in civil society – potentially they act as, and are understood as, NGOs rather than churches/religious communities and, therefore, have less need to legitimize their authority in their own area of expertise. An interesting parallel can be made with a study of religious welfare providers in Norway, which was part of the European comparative WREP-project. There, Olav Helge Angell (2010) found that the religious actor with the highest credibility, both as welfare provider and as a critical voice or debater on social justice issues, was the Church City Mission (CCM). The reason for this was, according to Angell, the high credibility built up by doing practical social work with and for homeless people and other vulnerable groups – they were “walking the talk,” and, thus, they also had high credibility as debaters and critical voices (Angell 2010:72–75). This could also translate to a certain degree to the missions and aid groups in my material. Trusted and well-established help organizations and advocacy groups might have enough legitimacy from their hands-on work that they can be less anxious about negotiating their own authority or legitimizing their participation in the debate.

This all leads up to one of the key points of this dissertation: visibility is not authority! The fact that religious actors are present in the debate, or the fact that there might be an increased interest in or coverage on religion in the media (which can itself be questioned), should not be interpreted as a “return of religion” or secularization being reversed. Significance, influence and authority need to be studied in themselves, and quantitative studies of the amount of religion in the public sphere by studying articles mentioning reli-
gion, or articles written by religious actors for that matter, should not be confused with either of these mentioned concepts.

When relating this discussion to the wider framework of secularization theory and the place of religion in public arena, my results do not really challenge the overall picture of a decline in religious authority, which was Chaves’ (1994) claim (see p 31). It also fits with the basis of Casanova’s idea that structural differentiation is a core part of modern societies and in that sense religions lose influence. The result, though, is not a complete retraction of religion from public arenas, but that the way religion manifests itself, and religious actors and institutions behave, are changed to its core by modernity. Casanova’s main point in *Public Religions in the Modern World* (1994) is de-privatization, that the process of structural differential does not necessarily lead to the privatization of religion, but that there is a possible place for religions in the public arenas of modern, liberal democracies. My results do not challenge that claim either.

### Importance of the logic of the debate article

Moving to the third part of the research question, it is time to look at the logic and genre of the debate article, and what importance the fact that these debates take place in a specific media setting has on the articles. In the methodology chapter, I presented an attempt to operationalize the media logic of the debate article based on previous research and my interviews with debate editors. Though I did not formulate a precise definition but, rather, a set of characteristics likely to be important, I have been able to use it in the analyses in the different case chapters.

As presented at the beginning, a key factor in the genre of debate articles is newsworthiness, and by using the different criteria proposed by Hvitfelt (see p 47) I identified some more relevant debate articles, based on previous research and my interviews with debate editors. These criteria would be that articles might attach themselves to already-established news events, being a short story in a longer narrative; include individual elite people; to some extent be sensational or surprising; and in the eyes of the editors include something important and relevant. The genre of debate has further aspects outside of the strict news value, though, as editors to varying degrees also stress the importance of letting a variety of voices be heard and alternative perspectives presented.

Looking at the overall results of my study in the light of the genre and logic of the debate article, some reflections can be made. First, as I already have addressed, the fact that these articles were published means that they already passed the gate keepers, the editors, meaning that, by definition, they live up to the criteria. As the editors mentioned in the interviews, a vast majority of submitted articles are never published, so just being part the materi-
al means that these articles have been judged as good enough in relation to these criteria. Looking at what actually does get published can be helpful in revising or at least nuancing the criteria for the logic of the debate article presented previously.

As has been presented throughout the chapters, many articles in different ways live up to several of the criteria of newsworthiness. They often connect to issues already on the agenda, and they sometimes bring a surprising or spectacular element when opinions or groups far from the mainstream gain attention, as discussed in Chapter 6. Issues constantly on the news agenda, such as the conflict in the Middle East, have been the topics of many articles, and, in other cases a topic such as the marriage law can also make groups connected to this topic or interested in it gain access to the debate pages. But this effect might work both ways – being an expert or relevant actor in relation to a newsworthy topic can mean potential access to debate pages but it is also possible that groups or people who already have the resources to gain access to the debate pages will have a better chance of getting their issues on the agenda.

The organizations in my material have very different circumstances – some of them are large, reasonably well funded, which means they have access to full-time professional staff working with the media and could potentially afford paying for PR consultants or other professional lobbying or for other services. Their ability to both write debate articles according to the criteria of newsworthiness and to have the connections to the editors makes it much more likely that they will be published, compared to smaller groups with fewer resources, with no professional staff and with less experience in writing journalistically or academically in Swedish.

Besides the differences in resources, there are also other differences between the actors regarding conditions that might increase the chances of being published. One factor is the importance of the individual writer or signatories. From the material it is hard to conclude how important it is to be a well-known individual, in the sense of being a “strong personality” or even famous. In my material there are, as seen throughout the study, official representatives – some of them more publicly known than others – as well as some writers not recurring and/or who speak from a professional experience such as individual clergy and expert staff at Christian advocacy groups or aid agencies. But there are also people who have no formal position on a national level but are still recurrently published, and people who are famous or established in society for reasons other than being religious, who, in certain debates, invoke their religious affiliation or background to speak on an issue, such as Catholic poet and columnist Marcus Birro (DN 2010/10/04) or author and comedian Jonas Gardell, member of the Church of Sweden (SvD 2003/02/17). As my research design has not focused individuals or used theories of individualization as a main framework, the importance of the individuals has not been thoroughly investigated. Still, this tendency would
make sense to understand in terms of individualization and a shift in authority from organizations to individuals well documented in recent research within sociology of religion (cf. Heelas and Woodhead 2005; Rosen 2009; Mendieta 2012; Pessi and Jeldtoft 2012).

The importance of the individual, as well as this previously-discussed factor of resources that improve the chance of being published could play into a potential mediatization of at least the larger, more established organizations. As the organizations improve their skill in getting published (if they do), chances are that they choose to an increasing extent topics and ways of writing that adhere to the logic of the debate article and newsworthiness, as discussed in some of the chapters above (cf. Moberg and Sjö 2012). At the same time, some of the structures within the organizations might be challenged by people who are members with no formal position yet have great opportunities to be published. This can give them the opportunity to both criticize their leadership and to become a voice for other positions and opinion, thus negotiating what this religious identity or organization stands for. Examples of this were plenty in the case of Jewish actors, but have also recurred in debates by varying Christian actors presented in this study.

It is important to remember, though, when discussing the media logic in relation to publication of debate articles, that this logic is not singular and linear – it does not mean that there is an exhaustive list of criteria which every article needs to fulfill. As Lundby argues, media logic is not a fixed set of rules but should be understood in terms of social interaction (Lundby 2009a:110–111). Media logic refers to the format and genre conventions, as well as news value that guide, but do not completely steer publishing decisions.

Rather, these different criteria are weighed against each other – newsworthiness, signatory, elements of surprise/spectacular or playing into an established new story, as well as chance factors: if a certain topic had already been aired the day before, an article otherwise likely to be published might now not be, and, on a “slow day,” articles that might not stand a chance another day might be published. The editors weigh or negotiate between these different factors and the logic or genre of the debate article should also be seen as something potentially developing or at least dynamic. Also, as we have seen in the material, at certain times such as national holidays, other types of articles are published that are not in the genre of debate article at all but are more of a personal reflection.

Evaluation of the research design

Returning to the research question, summing up and discussing the results of my study inevitably also raises the question of whether the research design
and methodology were actually helpful in answering the questions, and how the choices made early in the process affected the outcome.

My first reflection regards theory. I chose some quite normative theories – Casanova in particular but also Habermas and to some degree Hjarvard give normative statements on the place of religion in public in late modern society, while my own agenda is clearly non-normative. I have no intention of giving any recommendations or evaluating whether religions behave in the “right” way. Was it useful or even possible to use such normative theories for a study like mine? That is partly up the reader to decide, but I believe it has been useful. One of the peculiarities of the debate over religion in the public sphere is that it often takes place at several analytical levels simultaneously and unarticulated ideas about religion are present, as has been pointed out by among others Jens Köhrsen (2012). These theories are more overt in their understanding of religion, which I believe is more helpful than damaging, and by combining them and critiquing them, I hope to have exposed some of the weaknesses but also helped to bring light to the complexities of the issues present in my empirical material. I also think it has been helpful to have one main theory, using Casanova’s understanding of public religions and others to complement it, rather than having several equal theoretical frameworks in parallel.

Regarding the choice of research design, looking at all articles published on certain debate pages, rather than using search words or looking for specific actors, gave my study an originality that made it possible to see and study new things. While a more conventional approach for media studies such as using search words or doing a stricter quantitative content analysis – the models used in most studies of representation of religion in mass media (cf. Niemelä and Christensen 2013; Taira et al. 2012) – would have given better opportunities for comparative studies, I still believe the advantages trump the weaknesses in this respect. In studying all the articles actually published, I have an empirical base of what is in the papers rather than what for example the leaders of specific groups experience in relation to participating in media debates, or what would be found given a specific definition of religion operationalized in search words. Still, studies of the religious actors’ own views on the topics presented here would be an interesting follow-up study for me or someone else to conduct. My contribution here is to give one angle on the presence of religious actors in mediated debate. It is still an important angle from which to look at, to choose a material based on actors and not just content, which has been the common strategy in studies of religion and media previously.

The methodology used, with an abductive approach and a mixed method design, gave several advantages such as richness and complexity to the material and allowed me to develop the design of the latter part of the study in accordance with the results found early on. It did have some substantial weaknesses too, especially a lack of stringency and therefore also explana-
tion value. A stricter quantitative approach in the first part, and clearer use of theory not only in the analysis but also more consciously in the categories used in coding would have given a higher degree of clarity. Part of the abductive approach was to not have over-strict categories initially, which increased this effect. Still, this more organic approach gave richness to the material and gave me the opportunity to be more surprised by the empirical material.

In this study, I have focused the theoretical perspectives regarding religion and the public in different forms, and used media theory more as a subordinate perspective. It is hard, if not impossible to determine in a simple way whether factors of the media or factors of the public sphere or of the religious actors themselves have the highest explanation value in my results. This was also one of the reasons to not have as my aim to evaluate which of the perspectives had the stronger explanation value, as to why the participation of religious actors looks like it does. I chose to focus on the factors regarding the place of religion within the public sphere, as this is the core issue for the sociology of religion, and where I thought I could bring the most valuable contribution. But it is impossible to imagine a public sphere today that is not largely mediated, and media factors must necessarily be taken into account, at least to the extent shown here. More elaborate media studies would bring more and deepened knowledge to this field.

To give some clues to the inference quality of my study and the transferability of my results, I suggested in the methodology chapter (p 75) that comparisons could be made with some other studies that also study religion Swedish in newspapers: Maximilian Broberg’s Master’s thesis (2013) and the content analysis of Nordic newspapers undertaken as part of the Nordic comparative NOREL-project (Niemelä and Christensen 2013).

Broberg studied debate articles in the Swedish tabloid Aftonbladet, using the same method as I did for gathering and coding the material, making the results comparable. Broberg’s results show clear similarities with mine: the average overall percentage of articles by religious actors in my material is around 3.5 percent, in Broberg’s study 3.4 percent. The differences in frequency between the varying religious affiliations also show similar patterns compared to my results, as well as the variation over time. In numbers of articles and distribution over time, Aftonbladet resembles tabloid competitor Expressen most nearly concerning the religious affiliation of actors published; Aftonbladet does not have the same large number of Muslim writers that distinguishes Expressen but, rather, resembles Svenska Dagbladet. (Broberg 2013)

The similarities in results strengthen the inference quality of my study and indicate somewhat of transferability: Though the results of my study might not be transferable to all public debate in Swedish media, it shows that the claims of my results might have a wider relevance than for just the papers I
have studied. It does indicate, though, that some of the specificities of *Expressen* might not be transferable to all evening papers.

It is also possible to compare with the results of the NOREL-project, where coverage of religion in Nordic newspapers was studied for the years 1988, 1998 and 2008. Two interesting findings from their Swedish material are relevant, as they largely coincide with my findings: there is no clear resurgence of religion; rather the presence of religious key words in the material varies over the years but with a small decrease, similar to my results. Second, the dominant tradition being covered in the Swedish material is the national church, the Church of Sweden, which is also similar to the results of this study (Niemelä and Christensen 2013).

Towards a model for studying public religions

Throughout this chapter, I have discussed my results in relation to theory and the aims of my study. One recurring feature in this discussion has been pointing towards aspects that have not been completely addressed by my theories or research question, and fields in need of further research. Some of my categories have served me well, while others could be added or exchanged. In this section, I will sketch a list of revised criteria for public religions: what a future study of religious actors in public debate could look for or examine. I have formulated these to be less normative than Casanova’s, and should be read less as criteria to live up to in order to be a valid public religion but, rather, a set of questions or themes to analyze when studying mediated public religion – in media texts, when studying editors or journalists or religious actors, or when studying audiences’ responses. They are not necessarily restricted to media studies but could be used for studies of public religion in other settings, such as broader studies of political influencing or lobbying by religious actors. Obviously, a study must be situated in the context in which it takes place – what field, material, actors are studied depend of course on the context. Also, these are criteria formulated in relation to the results of my own study in the contemporary Swedish context. Even though I do not think these are relevant only for the Scandinavian situation, I cannot claim to be certain they are useful when studying a very different situation, for example in a non-democratic context, or where very different formal or informal rules apply to the participation of religious actors in public life. My suggested themes are:

- Type or definition of the public
- Claims, authority and legitimation
- Intended audience and/or aim of the participation
- Type of issues, or framing of these issues
- Use of religious language and/or arguments
Media logic of the genre used

Type or definition of public and private
A first condition for studying religion in the public sphere, of any kind, is to be clear about the understanding of what the public is. It is of course necessary for the researcher to have a definition of her/his field, but I would also argue that this question needs further reflection. As has been a recurring theme throughout this study, there is no consensus of what the public means, and depending on what understanding of the public/private distinction is used, the results will vary significantly. This needs to be done not only in the definitions of the study itself but should be part of the analysis of the material. Is it a participation in public debate that relates to collective issues, or is it a question of visibility? When someone in a debate is claiming that religion should be a private matter – does that mean in relation to the state, in relation to what is visible for others or in the sense of citizenship and individuality? As my results show, the boundary of public and private is filled with power, and what definition is used – by the researcher as well as by actors in the material studied – is not neutral but should be one of the objects of study. Especially relevant would be to take questions of power and normativity into consideration.

Claims, authority and legitimation
In this study, I used criteria for what issues were legitimate, and whether religious actors accepted a pluralist society. These were useful in my analysis but, as has been discussed throughout, they did not highlight all tensions and negotiations taking place in the articles, and I now suggest three different questions or themes to cover what these two criteria analyzed. The first one of these is a question regarding claims, authority and legitimation.

By this I mean to look for what claims religious actors make and what authority they aspire to or draw from. Do they make more universal claims to speak for the common good or do they claim their right to a diverging view? Does the writer or speaker claim to talk on behalf of others – her/his own community, a larger group of religious people or the whole of society? What authority is s/he claiming and on what grounds? (cf. Chaves 1994; Christensen 2010; Broberg 2013) As part of this theme, interesting things to study could be strategies used to legitimate participation in public debate, how authority is claimed and negotiated, and tensions between speaking as an individual and on behalf of a community. This could be studied on a discursive or socio-linguistic level but also take sociological factors into account regarding the individuals or organizations at hand, such as majority and minority positions, establishment, funding and history; or, on the individual level, gender, race, class but also education, position, and connections to other elite spheres.
Intended audience and/or aim with the participation

As recurrently discussed, it is possible to separate articles based on intended audience or aim of the participation. Though some are straightforward in addressing policy makers or the general public, some seem to be more directed against the leadership of the organization itself (or another organization). Some articles have a clearly intended audience, such as legislators, but seem also to have aims more connected to building alliances, strengthening the core group and forming identity. This is connected to the questions raised in the previous section on authority and claims, but can be analyzed as a separate feature. Looking for what the intended audience is – explicitly or implicitly – as well as other functions of the text in relation to the group itself or other groups is a relevant question for understanding religious participation in public debate. It can also help in understanding the factors of authority – if the aim is more to establish identity for the group itself, the authority question might be more interesting to look at in terms of the group itself rather than wider society.

Type of issues, or framing of these issues

One of Casanova’s core questions and one of the main criteria discussed throughout this study is what types of questions are legitimate for a modern public religion. As I have addressed recurrently, Casanova’s approach and his actual categories are not unproblematic. Though part of the problem is Casanova’s normative stance, I have also shown that it is not always self-evident whether an issue is in fact living up to his criteria of a legitimate question. This comes down to how the problem is formulated or posed, what is also called framing (cf. Entman 1993). I would suggest, instead of having a certain criteria or type of question that is legitimate or even looking for what questions the actors address, studying how the issues are framed and how the writers legitimize their authority to speak on the issue at hand is important. It could be useful to have sets of questions or themes to see what issues religious actors focus on and address in public; the more interesting question is how they do it. As discussed previously, part of the news value of a debate article is to show that it is important and relevant, and the framing is a key part of that.

Potential questions to ask could be whether there are certain ways that religious actors debate, if issues are negotiated or constructed as especially relevant for religious actors to debate, and what those ways of framing are. Are there certain values frequently invoked? Potentially, Casanova’s criteria on morally critiquing power and defending democracy are relevant to look out for, but also framing strategies that make the participation more legitimate for religious actors.
Use of religious language and/or arguments

The use of religious arguments was a criterion not taken directly from Casanova but more inspired by Habermas and some of his critics, though not irrelevant in relation to Casanova. As I have shown through the thesis, religious arguments are used but not in a majority of the cases, and when so, often in a sweeping way. I have also shown that the way religious language or theological statements are used can differ and fill different functions for different groups.

When studying public religions, I do think the use of religious arguments, or perhaps even more the use of religious language, is a relevant factor to look at. It is interesting to study both the absence of religious language and, when present, how it is used. Is it used as an argument of authority, or more to build identity? Is religious content the main theme of the article or does it fill other functions? In some of the articles by Muslim writers there was a tendency to teach about Islam – the use of religious language was filling a different function compared to the articles on marriage analyzed previously.

This theme is not to be seen as completely separate from the criteria presented above. Rather, the use of religious language, or the absence of it, could be a relevant factor to look for when analyzing the questions of authority, identity and framing of issues, for example. Especially the model presented by Lövheim (2012), separating between religious actors and religious content, as I discussed in the theory section (p 51) could be useful and potentially further developed in relation to this.

Media logic of the genre used

Finally, I think media logic, or the affordances of the genre and medium used, are a crucial component when studying public religion – in media studies obviously, but also in wider studies, as it is difficult to imagine any public arena in modern societies to at least a certain point not being mediated or affected by mediatization. Though taking in concepts from media studies does not make the analyses simpler – rather the opposite – I believe I have shown throughout this study that the fact that the debate takes place in the media, and in a specific medium in a specific genre, has a strong impact on the debate itself. Debate articles, the material at hand, follow a certain genre, have to live up to certain criteria and are produced and decided upon under certain circumstances by certain people. A study of sources for news coverage or of religious actors interviewed in feature articles or of TV debates would need to take the specificities of the genre and logic of the medium at hand into consideration. This is especially clear in cases of media studies, but could be applied also to other types of studies. Town hall meetings, online lobby campaigns and formal reference statements also have certain affordances or become text according to certain genres that could be studied.
with the concepts from mediatization theory and especially media logic, given that they are properly discussed and defined for the context at hand.

Though it might never be possible to completely determine whether a certain way of participating by religious actors depends mostly on media logic or on the conditions for religion in the public arena in a specific context, not taking the media into account risks missing a central part of the conditions and context at hand.

Final remarks

A doctoral dissertation, though seeming like a huge endeavor for its author, is never enough to exhaustively cover a subject. What has been presented here is a piece of the puzzle, some empirical data and thoughts on one corner of the public sphere of the Swedish media; one of many ways and places where the negotiation of the place of religion in the public arena takes place. The results and arguments presented here hopefully give perspectives, insights and new knowledge, but it is only in relation to other studies, to the whole body of research that my contribution is meaningful.

Still, my ambition has been to not only add more data but also to question and discuss some of the recurring features of this existing body of research. The debate over the so-called post-secular, and many studies of religion in the public sphere, have often not taken the media perspective seriously enough. In the debate over the perceived return of religion to the public sphere of western societies, there is not enough clarity on what this public really is. As visibility is not the same thing as authority, more empirical studies as well as critical reflection are needed. My dissertation is a humble attempt to contribute to both these things.

If this debate is going to move away from anecdotal evidence of mediated events and debates, a more stringent understanding is needed. It is interesting that there is a perceived interest in religion, but it is only relevant for secularization or religious change if it is put in relationship to power and influence. Hopefully, that is where the future studies of religion in the public arena are headed.
References


Fanon, Frantz. 1966. _The Wretched of the Earth_. New York: Grove Press.


Interviews with debate editors
Carina Stenson, debate editor Svenska dagbladet, interview 2012/08/28
Nils Öhman, debate editor Dagens Nyheter, interview 2012/09/04
Joel Holm, debate editor Expressen, interview 2013/03/08
Debate articles cited

Chapter 4

DN 2001/12/01
Ärkebiskopens budskap beklagligt [The Archbishop’s unfortunate message]. Berith Öhrnberg, Kyrkoherde em, Stockholm; Juhani Rantanen, Prost, Borås; Eric Muhl, Präst, Stenungsund; Lennart Widing, Kyrkoherde, Örgryte; Bo-Gunnar Åkesson, Kyrkoherde, Hyltebruk; Glenn Håkansson, Kontraktsprost em, Helsingborg

DN 2003/08/26
Fredrik Malm bedriver hets mot muslimer [Fredrik Malm pursues agitation against Muslims] Ahmed Ghanem, Ordförande Islamiska förbundet i Sverige

DN 2003/09/04
Muslim om moskémötet: “Religiösa ledaren stödde massmord” [A Muslim on the meeting in the Mosque: “Religious leader supported mass murder”] Amin Rostom (pseudonym)

DN 2003/10/04
Gud välsignar organdonation. [God blesses organ donation] KG Hammar, Ärkebiskop Svenska kyrkan; Anders Arborelius, Biskop, ordförande Sveriges kristna råd; Philip Spectre, Rabbin Stora synagogan, Judska församlingen i Stockholm; Mahmoud Khalfi, Imam Sveriges muslimska råd

DN 2003/11/27
Allt fler flyktingar går under jorden [Increasing number of refugees go underground] Tord Nordblom, kyrkoherde, Spekeröd-Ucklum; Carl-Gustaf Stenbäck, prost, Torestorp; Leif Dahlin, kyrkoherde Bergsjön; Henrik Svensson, kyrkoherde, Orust; Caesarius Cavallin, Östanbäcks kloster; Hans Wolfbrandt, komminister, Lysekil; Göran Madeland, kyrkoherde, Stockaryd; Eva Brunne, kyrkoherde, Flemingsberg; Åke Wiklund, komminister, Stenungsund; Mikael Löwegren, komminister, Agunaryd; Lars-Gunnar Ottestig, komminister, Luleå; Gustaf Björck, redaktionssekreterare, Uppsala; Anders Gripp, komminister, Hjälmseryd; Mats Egfors, kyrkoherde, Malmö; Per-Olof Olsson, kyrkoherde, Hunnebostrand; Mikael Nordin, komminister, Sollentuna; Per Englund, komminister, Knivsta; Kjell Petersson, kyrkoherde, Ryssby; Bo Johanneryd, komminister, Markaryd; Henrik Lindeskog, komminister, Upplåt; Göran Simonsson, kyrkoherde, Tranemo; Luca Cesarini, komminister, Fjärås; Björn Gusmark, skolpräst, Oskarshamn; Kjell Blomberg, komminister, Grimslås; Mikael Isacson, komminister, Uppsala; Bengt Birkesson, missionssekreterare, Göteborg; Hilding Egestål, kyrkoherde, Göteborg; Ingo Söderlund, komminister, Göteborg

DN 2010/03/28
Försäljningen av Jas till Sydafrika måste stoppas [The sale of JAS (fighter planes) to South Africa must be stopped] Desmond Tutu ärkebiskop emeritus, Sydafrika; KG Hammar ärkebiskop emeritus, Svenska kyrkan; Thabo Makgoba anglikanska ärkebiskopen i Kapstaden; Karin Wiborn ordförande i Sveriges kristna råd
DN 2010/07/23
Är vi beredda att älska juden och muslimen? [Are we ready to love the Jew and the Muslim?] Sven-Bernhard Fast generalssekreterare Sveriges Kristna råd; Caroline Krook biskop emeritus Svenska kyrkan; Peter Weiderud ordförande, Sveriges kristna socialdemokraters förbund; Karin Wiborn missionsföreståndare Svenska baptistsamfundet

Exp 2001/09/25
Misstron mot oss är delvis självförvållad [The distrust against us is partly self-inflicted] Ammar Makboul, svensk-palestinsk muslim

Exp 2002/11/19
SVT sänder fel signaler [SVT sends the wrong signals] Enisa Stenvinkel Kielan, ordförande för Svenska islamiska samfundets kvinnoförbund, SISK.

Exp 2003/12/03
Skandias kris är frikyrkans kris [The crisis of Scandia (bank) is the crisis of the free church] Stefan Swärd ordförande i Evangeliska Frikyrkan

Exp 2005/05/24
Muhammeds kamp för självständiga kvinnor [Mohammed’s struggle for independent women] Hassan Moussa ordförande i Sveriges imamråd.

Exp 2005/07/09
Bomber från helvetet [Bombs from hell] Hassan Moussa är ordförande i Sveriges imamråd samt imam i Stockholms stora moské.

Exp 2006/11/09
Jag blir attackerad för att jag är jude. [I get attacked because I am Jewish] Jonathan Leman 25 år, studerar till gymnasielärare och bor i Stockholm

SvD 2003/01/28
Jesus mer än en myt [Jesus is more than a myth] Anders Arborelius biskop, Stockholms katolska stift; Sten-Gunnar Hedin, föreståndare Filadelfiaförsamlingen Stockholm

SvD 2005/04/22a
Är det sundare att tro på vetenskapen än på Gud? [Is it healthier to believe in science than in God?] Anna Sophia Bonde, präst och frilansskribent Lund

SvD 2005/04/22b
Statsråd kränker Broderskap [The minister is offending The Christian socialists] Samuel Stengård, förbundssekreterare Broderskapsrörelsen - Sveriges kristna socialdemokrater

SvD 2005/04/22c
Folkhälsoministern använder argument från 1800-talet [The Minister of public health uses arguments from the 19th century] Anders Arborelius, biskop Stockholms katolska stift
Även vetenskapen är en fara för mänskligheten [Science is a also danger to humanity] Bengt Wadensjö, biskop i Karlstad 1986-2002. I dag direktor och styrelseordförande i Centrum för samtidsanalys.

Vi är beredda att driva imamutbildning [We are ready to start education for imams] Dag Klackenberg, ordförande; Jan-Håkan Hansson, rektor vid Ersta Sköndal högskola AB

Varje år berörs 1 000 barn av vräkningar [Every year 1000 children are affected by evictions] Marika Markovits, direktor, Stockholms Stadsmission

Farligt förminska kristendomens roll. [Dangerous to reduce importance of Christianity] Tuve Skånberg direktor Claphaminstitutet, adj. professor kyrkohistoria, Fuller; Bengt Malmgren läkare Kjell O. Lejon professor i religionsvetenskap, Linköping; Ivar Gustafsson docent i matematik, Chalmers. Artikelförfattarna är fellows vid Claphaminstitutet

**Chapter 5**

Ingen ny praxis om partnerskap [No new practice regarding partnerships]. Caroline Krook Bishop

Fegt att avstå från vigselrätten [Cowardly to abstain from the entitlement to solemnize]. Bengt Wadensjö Bishop of Karlstad

Civiläktenskap modell för alla [Civil marriages a model for everyone]. Krister Andersson, Missionsföreståndare Svenska missionsförbundet, ordförande Sveriges kristna råd

Homoäktenskap hotar fria kyrkor [Gay Marriage Threatens Freedom of Churches]. Abd al Haqq Kielan Imam, Svenska islamiska samfundet; Mahmoud Aldebe Konsulent, Sveriges islamiska råd; Meir Horden Rabbin, Judiska församlingen i Stockholm; Anders Sjöberg Missionsföreståndare, Evangeliska Fosterlandsstiftelsen; Anders Arborelius Biskop, Katolska kyrkan; Dositej Motika Biskop, Serbisk-ortodoxa kyrkan samt ledamot i SKR för de ortodoxa kyrkorna; Krister Andersson Missionsföreståndare, Svenska Missionskyrkan; Anders Bengtsson Missionsföreståndare, Svenska Alliansmissionen; Björn Ottesen Missionsföreståndare, Svenska Adventistsamfundet; Lennart Hambre Missionsföreståndare, Evangeliska Frikyrkan; Rolf Roos Kommendör, Frälsningsarmén; Sten-Gunnar Hedin Pastor, Pingstförsamlingen; Stefan Swärd Ordförande, Evangeliska Frikyrkan; Lars-Ivar Nilsson Ordförande, Pingst - fria församlingar i samverkan.
Rabbin Horden talar inte för oss [Rabbi Horden does not speak for us]. Philip Spectre, rabbin, Stockholm; Lena Posner-Körösı, ordförande Judiska församlingen i Stockholm; Anders Carlberg, ordförande Judiska församlingen i Göteborg; Berndt Katina, ordförande Judiska församlingen i Malmö; Gabriel Urwitz, vice ordförande Judiska församlingen i Stockholm; Magnus Neuberg, församlingsfullmäktiges ordförande, Stockholm; Lisa Abramowicz, informationsföreståndare, Stockholm; Gunilla Davin, synagogföreståndare, Stockholm; Hans Köpiński, ungdomsföreståndare, Stockholm; Henrik Salamon, utbildningsföreståndare, Stockholm; Miriam Andersson, kultursekreterare; Reuven Ben Dor, advokat; Björn Bjelvenstam, journalist; Evan Brotman, företagare; Marina Burstein, förläggare; Lena Einhorn, tv-producent; Stefan Einhorn, professor; Basia Frydman, skådespelare; Pierre Fränkel, regissör; John Gradowski, journalist; Stefan Gustafsson, florist; Eli Göndör, debattör; Jackie Jakubowski, chefredaktör; Sara Janowski, psykoanalytiker; Cecilia Katz eff, fil doktor; Berry Katzstein, läkare; Mirjam Kellermann, designer; Stefan Levy, psykolog; Gerald Nagler, ordförande Svenska Helsingforskommittén; Yvonne Rock, kulturproducent; Gabriel Rodau, studerande; Regina Rodau, läkare; Rita Salamon, personalchef; Madeleine Salomon, journalist; Allan Schönkopf, företagare; Nina Solomin, författare; Barbara Spectre, rektor Paideiainstitutet; Leif Zern, journalist; Natan Zlotnik, konsult

Religiösa ledare talar inte för hela Missionskyrkan [Religious leaders do not speak for the entire Mission Covenant Church]. Katarina Alexandersson, pastor i Svenska Missionskyrkan; Boel Algulin, medlem i Andreaskyrkan, Södra missionsförsamlingen; Ölle Alkholm, pastor i Svenska Missionskyrkan; Anna berger kettner, landstingsråd i Stockholms läns landsting, pastor och medlem i Tensta Missionsförsamling; Lena Björneld, medlem i Majornas missionsförsamling, Göteborg; Hanna Czitrom, diakon i Svenska Missionskyrkan: Per Duregård, pastor i Svenska Missionskyrkan; Carl-Göran Ekberg, pastor i Svenska Missionskyrkan; Britt-Marie Ekhjord, medlem i Majornas missionsförsamling, Göteborg; Ulla-Marie Gunner, pastor i Svenska Missionskyrkan; Göran Gustafson, pastor i Svenska Missionskyrkan; Erik Herngren, medlem i Andreaskyrkan, Södra missionsförsamlingen; Lena Björneld, medlem i Majornas missionsförsamling, Göteborg; Ulla-Marie Gunner, pastor i Svenska Missionskyrkan; Göran Gustafson, pastor i Svenska Missionskyrkan; Erik Herngren, medlem i Andreaskyrkan, Södra missionsförsamlingen; Kristina Herngren, medlem i Andreaskyrkan, Södra missionsförsamlingen; Leif Herngren, pastor i Svenska Missionskyrkan; Lars Ingelstam, professor, medlem och tidigare styrelseledamot i Svenska Missionskyrkan; Per Jennervall, pastor i Svenska Missionskyrkan; Åke Jonsson, teol doktor och pastor i Svenska Missionskyrkan; Anna Karlsson, docent, medlem i betlehemskyrkans missionsförsamling, Göteborg; Valborg Lindgren, rektor för teologiska högskolan, Stockholm, medlem i Västerkyrkan, Lund; Jan Lindvall, journalist, tidigare chefredaktör tidningen Broderskap, medlem Södertulls-kyrkan, Uddevalla; Sven Mannervik, professor, medlem i Immanuelkyrkans församling, Stockholm; Christina Molin, pastor i Svenska Missionskyrkan; Lennart Molin, pastor i Svenska Missionskyrkan; Marianne Pettersson, medlem i Andreaskyrkan, Södra missionsförsamlingen; Ingvar Stenberg, pastor i Svenska Missionskyrkan; Ulrika Svalfors, pastor i Svenska Missionskyrkan; Marie Zingmark huld, folkhögskolelärare och diakon i Svenska Missionskyrkan.
DN 2004/07/28
Respektfulla samtal krävs om homovigslar [Respectful talks are needed on gay marriage]. Caroline Krook, biskop i Stockholm

DN 2007/04/17
Ja till homo-äktenskap [Yes to gay marriage]. Martin Lind Biskop i Linköping

DN 2009/02/06
Kyrkans rätt att viga måste nu avskaffas [The church’s right to marry must be abolished]. Carl Axel Aurelius, biskop i Göteborg; Esbjörn Hagberg, biskop i Karlstad; Antje Jackelén, biskop i Lund; Lennart Koskinen, biskop i Visby; Caroline Krook, biskop i Stockholm; Hans-Erik Nordin, biskop i Strängnäs; Ragnar Persenius, biskop i Uppsala; Hans Stiglund, biskop i Luleå; Sven Thidevall, biskop i Växjö

DN 2009/02/07
Biskopskolleger förordar kyrklig diskriminering [Our fellow bishops support religious discrimination]. Erik Aurelius Biskop i Skara; Tony Guldbrandzén Biskop i Härnösand; Martin Lind Biskop i Linköping; Thomas Söderberg Biskop i Västerås

DN 2010/04/22
Victoria måste tänka om när det gäller bröllopet [Victoria needs to rethink regarding the wedding] Annika Borg, teol dr, författare och präst i Svenska kyrkan.

Exp 2003/08/02
Släpp in kärleken i Svenska kyrkan [Let love into Church of Sweden]. Birgitta Ohlsson riksdagsledamot (fp); Cecilia Wikström riksdagsledamot (fp) och präst i Svenska kyrkan

Exp 2005/02/18
Homosexuella sviks av Svenska kyrkan [Homosexuals are being let down by the Church of Sweden] Lars Gårdfeldt präst samt doktorand vid Karlstads universitet

Exp 2005/03/19
Bögar får gärna gifta sig i synagogan [Gays are welcome to marry in the synagoge] Morton Narrowe överrabbin

Exp 2008/11/07
Klockan klämtar för dig, Hägglund [Time is running out for you, Hägglund]. Åke Green, pastor

SvD 2001/08/28
Låt kyrkan behålla vigselbegreppet! [Let the church keep the concept of marriage]. URBAN GIBSON, ledamot av Svenska kyrkans kyrkomöte och i nomineringsgruppen för Folkpartiet liberalerna.

SvD 2004/01/30
Hammars moraliska nollvision [Hammar’s moral Vision Zero]. Anna Sophia Bonde, Bo Brander, Eva Hamberg, Bengt Holmberg, präster i Svenska kyrkan.
Osjälvisk kärlek aldrig synd [Selfless love is never a sin]. KG Hammar, ärkebiskop Svenska kyrkan.

Guds ordning är man och kvinna [God’s order is man and woman]. Anna Sophia Bonde, Bo Brander, Eva Hamberg, Bengt Holmberg, präster i Svenska kyrkan.

Ousund människosyn styr prästutbildare [Unsound view of man guides pastoral teachers]. Elisabeth Gerle, rektor för Svenska kyrkans pastoralinstitut docent i etik vid Lunds universitet.

Frånta kyrkan vigselrätten [Remove the entitlement to solemnize from the church]. Kristerna Andersson missionsföreståndare Svenska Missionskyrkan.

Vad säger kyrkan om homosexuell åtrå? [What does the church teach on homosexual desire?] Ola Sigurdsdot, docent i systematisk teologi ; Jayne Svenungsson, ledamot av Svenska kyrkans forskningsråd lektor i systematisk teologi

Mona Sahlin diskriminerar homosexuella [Mona Sahlin discriminates against homosexuals]. Magnus Kronberg, Andreas Möller, pastorer i Svenska baptistförbundet

Omöjligt välsigna homovigsel [Impossible to bless gay marriage]. Jonas Jonson, biskop i Strängnäs

Folkkyrkan hotas om vigselrätten tas bort [The people’s church is threatened if the entitlement to solemnize is removed]. Lars Friedner t f generalsekreterare Svenska kyrkan.

Kyrkor bör viga homosexuella [Churches should marry homosexuals]. Anna Berger Kettner Broderskapsrörelsen (m fl) Nalin Pekgul, Ardalan Shekarabi, Eric Sundström, Håkan Andersson, Inger Segelström, Börje Vestlund, Mikael Damberg, Elisebet Merkström, Christina Axelson, Hillevi Larsson, Anders Bengtsson, Anita Johansson, Fredrik Olovsson, Helena Zackariasen, Lars U Granberg, Siw Wittgren-Ahl, Carina Ohlsson, Ewa Arvidsson, Jan Emanuel Johansson, Maria Öberg, Inger Jarl Beck, Joe Frans

Gruppäktenskap är knappast en lätt modell [Group marriage is hardly an easy model] Lennarth Hambre missionsdirektör Evangeliska Frikyrkan; Stefan Swärd styrelseordförande Evangeliska Frikyrkan
SvD 2005/10/27
Säg nej till välsignelsen [Say no to the blessing] Erik Eckerdal Komminister Knivsta pastorat; Anders Johansson Kyrkoherde Knivsta pastorat; Per-Anders Josenby Komminister Knivsta pastorat; Helene Gg. Lindström Komminister Knivsta pastorat; Hans Stigzelius Komminister Knivsta pastorat

SvD 2005/11/19
Jag avstår från homosex[I abstain from gay sex] Erik Johansson ordförande i Medvandrarna kommunister i Almby församling

Svd 2006/02/22
Bevara begreppet äktenskap [Protect the concept of marriage]. Anders Arborelius, biskop Katolska kyrkan; Sten-Gunnar Hedin, föreståndare Pingströrelsen; Gunnar Weman, ärkebiskop em Svenska kyrkan; Bertil Werkström, ärkebiskop em Svenska kyrkan; Marianne Andreas, pastor Pingströrelsen; Salomo Berlinger, f d ordf Judiska församlingen; Abd Al Haqq Kielan, ordf Svenska Islamska Samfundet; Stefan Gustavsson, generalsekr Evangeliska Alliansen; Misha Jaksic, samordnare Ortodoxa kyrkorna; Rolf Åbjörnsson, advokat; Siewert Öholm, journalist

SvD 2007/03/27
Förklara äktenskapet, Wejryd [Explain marriage, Wejryd]. Elin Engström Rikard Olofsson, präster i Svenska kyrkan

SvD 2007/04/01
Vi har bara byggt på Luther [We only built on Luther]. Anders Wejryd, Ärkebiskop Svenska kyrkan

SvD 2007/04/03
Samkönade äktenskap viktigare än ekumenik [Same-sex marriage more important than ecumenical concerns]. Elin Engström Rikard Olofsson, präster i Svenska kyrkan

SvD 2007/09/23
Det är inte kön utan kärlek det hänger på [It is not a question of gender but love]. Martin Lind biskop i Linköping; Sören Juvas ordförande RFSL

SvD 2007/09/27
Gör tydligt att äktenskapet är för man och kvinna [Clarify that marriage is for man and woman]. Esbjörn Hagberg biskop, Karlstad; Ragnar Persenius biskop, Uppsala; Hans Stiglund biskop, Luleå

SvD 2008/10/04
Vi avstår från vigselrätten [We renounce the entitlement to solemnize]. Sten-Gunnar Hedin, föreståndare för Pingst – Fria församlingar i samverkan

SvD 2008/11/01a
Vigselrätten främjar ojämlikhet [The entitlement to solemnize fosters inequality]. Anne Sofie Roald docent i religionshistoria IMER, Malmö högskola; Bjarne Stenquist journalist
Äktenskapet ska omfatta alla [Marriage should include everyone]. Kajsa Ahlstrand präst i Svenska kyrkan, professor i missionsvetenskap; Petra Carlsson präst i Svenska kyrkan, doktorand i systematisk teologi; Thomas Ekstrand diakon i Svenska kyrkan, docent i systematisk teologi; Boel Hössjer Sundman präst i Svenska kyrkan, teologie doktor i kyrkovetenskap; Göran Lundstedt präst i Svenska kyrkan, teologie doktor i kyrkovetenskap; Peter Lööv präst i Svenska kyrkan, filosofie magister

Civilrättsligt bra för alla parter [Civil registration good for all parties]. Christer Sturmark, ordförande förbundet Humanisterna; Sten-Gunnar Hedin, talesman för Pingströrelsen; Karin Wiborn, missionsföreståndare Svenska Baptistsamfundet; Anders Arborelius, biskop ocd Katolska kyrkan i Sverige; Göran Zettergren, missionsföreståndare Svenska Missionskyrkan; Morgan Johansson, folkhälso- och socialtjänstminister 2002-2006

Svenska kyrkan haltar på båda sidor [Church of Sweden limps on both sides]. Ingvar Laxvik, präst i Svenska kyrkan

Även nio biskopar kan ha fel [Even nine bishops can be wrong]. Olle Burell Socialdemokraternas gruppledare i kyrkomen; Karin Perers Centerpartiets gruppledare i kyrkomen

Håll juridiken utanför kyrkan [Keep the law outside the church] Lennart Koskinen biskop i Visby stift; Carl Axel Aurelius biskop i Göteborgs stift; Caroline Krook biskop i Stockholms stift; Hans Stiglund biskop i Luleå stift

Svenska Kyrkan riskerar bli isolerad [The Church of Sweden risks isolation]. Jan-Anders Ekelund ordförande Frimodig kyrka; Berit Simonsson vice ordförande Frimodig kyrka

Präster ska inte kunna säga nej till att viga homosexuella par [Clergy should not be allowed to refuse marrying same-sex couples]. Helen Törnqvist kandidat till kyrkomötet (C)

Svenska Kyrkans identitet hotad [The identity of the church of Sweden is threatened]. Sverker Tronët kyrkoherde emeritus

Äktenskapet inte sämre för att fler inkluderas [Marriage is not weakened by being more inclusive]. Antje Jackelén biskop i Lunds stift

Folket kan inte ändra på Guds instiftelse [The people cannot change what God has established]. Sverker Tronët kyrkoherde emeritus
Kyrkan borde ge upp vigselrätten [The church should give up the entitlement to solemnize]. Nils Gårder advokat, ledamot och reservant i Kyrkostyrelsen; Samuel Rubenson professor i kyrkohistoria, ledamot i Svenska kyrkans teologiska kommitté

Svenska Kyrkan måste ha framtiden för ögonen [Church of Sweden must look to the future]. Kristoffer Moldeus ordförande KRISS, Kristna Studentrörelsen i Sverige; Mattias Irving ordförande KRISS Stockholm

Chapter 6

DN 2001/07/30
Snällhet kväver debatt [Kindness suffocates the debate]. Bo Hansson, docent i etik och kandidat för "Öppen kyrka - en kyrka för alla" i Göteborg.

DN 2001/08/11
Kyrkans eget fel [The Church’s own fault] Tuulikki Koivunen Bylund, Domprost i Uppsala

DN 2003/06/18
Vi anmäler kyrkan till JämO [We are filing a complaint against the church with the Gender equality Ombudsman] Annika Borg, Johanna Almer, präster Svenska kyrkan

DN 2003/11/27
Allt fler flyktingar går under jorden [Increasing numbers of refugees go underground] Tord Nordblom, kyrkoherde, Spekeröd-Ucklum; Carl-Gustaf Stenbäck, prost, Torestorp; Leif Dahlin, kyrkoherde Bergsjön; Henrik Svensson, kyrkoherde, Orust; Caesarius Cavallin, Östanbäcks kloster; Hans Wolfbrandt, komminister, Lysekil; Göran Madeland, kyrkoherde, Stockaryd; Eva Brunne, kyrkoherde, Flemingsberg; Åke Wiklund, komminister, Stenungsund; Mikael Löwegren, komminister, Agunaryd; Lars-Gunnar Ottestig, komminister, Luleå; Gustaf Björck, redaktionssekreterare, Uppsala; Anders Gripp, komminister, Hjälmseryd; Mats Egfors, kyrkoherde, Malmö; Per-Olof Olsson, kyrkoherde, Hunnebostrand; Mikael Nordin, komminister, Sollentuna; Per Englund, komminister, Knivsta; Kjell Petersson, kyrkoherde, Ryssby; Bo Johanneryd, komminister, Markaryd; Henrik Lindeskog, komminister, Uppland; Göran Simonsen, kyrkoherde, Tranemo; Luca Cesaroni, komminister, Fjärås; Björn Gusmark, skolpräst, Oskarshamn; Kjell Blomberg, komminister, Grimsås; Mikael Isacson, komminister, Uppsala; Bengt Birgersson, missionssekreterare, Göteborg; Hilding Egestål, kyrkoherde, Göteborg; Ingo Söderlund, komminister, Göteborg
DN 2004/11/19
Regeringen oroande passiv i kampen mot kvinnovåld [The Government worryingly passive in the fight against violence against women] Gabriel Baraqasho Präst Syrisk-ortodoxa kyrkan i Södertälje; Angela Beausang Fd ordförande Riksorganisationen för tjej- och kvinnojouner i Sverige, Roks; Lars Gårdfeldt Präst Svenska kyrkan, doktorand Karlstads universitet; Gun Heimer Professor och klinikchef, Rikskvinncentrum i Uppsala; Lars Jalmert Forskare Stockholms universitet; Anncha Lagerman Barnrättsexpert med inriktning på mobbningsfrågor; Leif Johansson Kriminalinspektör, Länsriminalen i Stockholm; Kicki Nordström Ordförande Synskadades riksförbund; Gunnar Sandell Fd ordförande i Manliga nätverket; Eva-Britt Svensson Styrelseledamot i Hyresgästföreningen, EU-parlamentariker (v); Barbro Westerholm Ordförande Sveriges pensionärsförbund

DN 2005/08/05
Amnesti enkel och snabb åtgärd för dem som lever i osäkerhet [Amnesty quick and simple solution for people living in insecurity] PRESIDIET FÖR SVERIGES KRISTNA RÄD: Görans Zettergren, Missionsföreståndare, Svenska missionskyrkan; Anders Arborelius, Biskop, Stockholms katolska stift; KG Hammar, Ärkebiskop, Svenska kyrkan; Tikhon Lundell, Präst, Serbisk-ortodoxa kyrkan

DN 2006/02/26
Delning av Svenska kyrkan löser våra interna strider [Splitting the Church of Sweden would solve our internal fights] Irma Irlinger fil dr i ekonomisk historia, utredare, JämO; Karin Långström Vinge Präst i Svenska Kyrkan

DN 2007/01/11
Dags att sluta fira skolavslutningen i kyrkan [Time to stop graduation ceremonies in the Church] Ragnar Persenius Biskop i Uppsala stift

DN 2007/10/15
Ansvarslös senfärdighet i klimatfrågan, Reinfeldt. [Irresponsible tardiness in climate issue, Reinfeldt] Anders Wejryd Ärkebiskop; Svante Axelsson Generalsekreterare Naturskyddsföreningen; Aleksander Gabelic Ordförande, Svenska FNförbundet; Ulf Bengtsson Ordförande Sveriges Ingenjörer

DN 2009/05/20
Regeringen värre än mögel för kyrkans kulturskatter. [The Government is worse than mold to the cultural treasures of the church] Anders Wejryd Ärkebiskop

DN 2009/09/08
Trygga kyrkans kulturmiljö. [Safeguard the care for the cultural heritage of the church] Inger Davidson (KD) Tidigare statsråd, riksdagsledamot; Carl Gustaf Von Ehrenheim (M) Tidigare ordförande i Kyrkomötet; Sören Ekström (S) Tidigare statssekreterare och generalsekreterare i Svenska kyrkan; Bertil Hansson (FP) Tidigare statsråd; Carl Axel Petri tidigare statsråd, hovrättspresident och ordförande i flera stat-kyrkautredningar; Anders Svärd (C) tidigare riksdagsman och vice ordförande i Svenska kyrkans centralstyrelse
Min Gud dras i smutsen av präster och biskopar [My God is dragged through the mud by priests and bishops] Marcus Birro katolik, poet och författare

Exp 2001/09/15
Driv ut partierna ur kyrkan [Push the parties out of the church] Knut W Nygaard, Ordförande föreningen Folkkyrkan i Upplands-Bro och partipoliti(s)kt engagerad som 1:e vice kommunfullmäktigeordförande.

Exp 2001/12/11
Islam hjälper kvinnor att frigöra sig [Islam helps women liberate themselves]. Pierre Durrani, Sekreterare i Unga svenska muslimer

Exp 2004/01/14
Sekterism hör inte hemma hos oss [Sectarianism has no place with us] Sten-Gunnar Hedin, pastor i Filadelfiaförsamlingen i Stockholm

Exp 2005/05/24
Muhammeds kamp för självständiga kvinnor [Mohammad’s struggle for independent women] Hassan Moussa, ordförande i Sveriges imamråd

Exp 2008/12/23
Därför behövs kyrkan i dödshjälpsdebatten [That’s why the church is needed in the debate over euthanasia] Antje Jackelén, biskop i Lunds stift

Exp 2009/10/04
Jesus skulle inte sälja vapen, Alf. [Jesus would not trade arms, Alf] Annika Spalde, 40, är diakon i Svenska Kyrkan, och en av initiativtagarna till ickevåldsorganisationen Avrasta.

SvD 2002/06/16
Aktiekurs stänger utlandskyrka [Stock-exchange rate closes church abroad] Lennart Sjöström, prost i London

SvD 2002/07/03
Kyrkans framtid hänger på alla berörda [The future of the church depends on all concerned] Jan Madestam direktör, Svenska kyrkan i utlandet

SvD 2002/12/23
Klassisk kristendom marginaliseras [Classic christianity is marginalized] Björn Fyrlund, teologie doktor kyrkoherde i Vessige m fl församlingar Göteborgs stift

SvD 2003/10/22
Gör rent hus i kyrkan! [Clean out the Church!] Ulf Ulfvarson professor em i arbetsvetenskap, KTH, kyrkopolitiskt aktiv i Lidingö församling

SvD 2003/11/22
Krooks bannbulla förvånar [Krook’s bull of excommunication surprises] Stig Ulfström, teol lic i religionsfilosofi, kyrkoherde Fresta församling Upplands Väsby
SvD 2003/11/26
Jag utövar bara biskopens tillsynsuppgift [I practice only the episcopal supervisory role] Caroline Krook biskop i Stockholms stift

SvD 2003/11/28
Biskop Krook vägrade försoningssamtal [Bishop Krook refused talks of reconciliation] Olof Buckard satiriker och predikant

SvD 2004/01/15
Farlig sektlära i Knutby [Dangerous sect teachings in Knutby] Sten-Gunnar Hedin, pastor och föreståndare Filadelfiakyrkan, Stockholm

SvD 2004/01/18
Vem ansvarar för prosten Sandahls trygghet? [Who is responsible for the security of pastor Sandahl] Björn Fyrlund, kyrkoherde, Vessigebro ersättare i Domkapitlet i Göteborg Yngve Kalin komminister, Hyssna

SvD 2004/01/27
Pingstkyrkan räds skolning. [Pentecostal church fears education] Göte Olingdahl, teologie doktor universitetslektor, Uppsala. pingstvän och teolog

SvD 2004/02/05
Stelnad kyrka kräver apostel. [Rigid church needs apostle] Pascal Andréasson, pastor Rhema Center.

SvD 2004/05/03
Mer pengar till storstärdarnas kyrkor. [More money to the churches in the major cities] Levi Bergström, 1:e vice ordförande i Kyrkostyrelsen Svenska kyrkan.

SvD 2006/05/31
"Vi kräver politisk handling" [We demand political action] KG Hammar, ärkebiskop; Anders Wejryd, blivande ärkebiskop Svenska kyrkan

SvD 2006/06/16
Gör inte som Reinfeldt [Don’t do like Reinfeldt] Monica Tanner Krantz, adjunkt och SFI-lärare (medlem SvK)

SvD 2006/10/15
Stäng alla tomma kyrkor [Close all empty churches] Johan Wierup, präst

SvD 2006/11/03
Föakra inte Svenska kyrkans betydelse [Don’t despise the importance of the Church of Sweden] Ewa Lindqvist; Mikael Mogren, präster i Svenska kyrkan

SvD 2006/12/18
Döden - livets svåraste val [Death – the most difficult choice in life] Erwin Bischofberger, jesuitpater och professor

SvD 2006/12/21
Svik inte människor i nöd [Don’t let people in need down] Louise Linder, präst i Engelbrekts församling, vd Prästbyråns AB; Henrik Hammar斯基öld civilekonom
Tomma anti-intellektuella fraser [Empty anti-intellectual phrases] Erwin Bischoffberger, jesuitpater professor em i medicinsk etik

SvD 2007/01/19
Biståndspengar ska inte gå till svenska soldater [Aid money must not go to Swedish soldiers] Margareta Grape, Svenska kyrkans utrikeschef

SvD 2007/04/29
Låt stiften sköta kyrkans miljarder [Let the dioceses take care of the church’s billions] Claes-Bertil Ytterberg Biskop; stiftsjägmästare Åsa Tham

SvD 2007/05/03
Kyrkan ska inte driva näringsverksamhet [The church should not run businesses] Staffan Holmgren ledamot i Kyrkostyrelsen; Bertil Persson, ersättare i Kyrkostyrelsen

SvD 2007/05/25

SvD 2007/05/28
Att våga nedmontera och bygga nytt [Have the courage to dismantle and rebuild] Lennart Koskinen, biskop; Inger Harlevi, kyrkorådsordförande

SvD 2007/06/17
Hets mot muslimska kvinnor [Hate speech against Muslim women] Mohamed Omar poet och chefredaktör för tidskriften Minaret; Mohammad Fazlhashemi, docent i idéhistoria vid Umeå universitet; Cherin Awad, jur stud och ideellt engagerad i bland annat Systerjouren Somaya (en hjälpjour för utsatta kvinnor)

SvD 2007/11/10

SvD 2007/11/14
Snudd på kränkning av invalda kyrkopolitiker [Almost offensive to elected church politicians] Mats Hagelin, präst, ledamot av kyrkomötet (m); Marianne Kronberg, diakon, ledamot av kyrkomötet (m); Annette Lundquist Larsson, lekman, ledamot av kyrkomötet (m); Hans Ulforbrand, präst, ledamot av kyrkomötet (m)

SvD 2007/11/15
Partier låter sig knappast styra av Guds ord [Parties will hardly let themselves be run by the word of God] Lars B Stenström kyrkoherde i Olaus Petri, kontraktsprost i Örebro

SvD 2007/12/24
Kyrkan bättre än vi trodde [The church was better than we thought] Margareta Skoog, f d sjukgymnast; Anders Lundberg, företagsledare; Eva-Maria Munck, musikstuderande; Dag Skoog, f d sjöofficer; Gita Andersson, präst; Anders
Hälltorp, ingenjör; Jennifer Lundberg, produktledare; Per Holmqvist, serviceingenjör; Lars Nordgren, ingenjör; Carl Forsner, it-konsult; Carl Henry Lundin, f d direktör; Verksamma vid Svenska kyrkan i Sollentuna

SvD 2008/01/08
Rädda kyrkan i S:t Petersburg [Save the church in St. Petersburg] Thomas Stoor, kyrkoherde, prost Svenska Gustafskyrkan i Köpenhamn

SvD 2008/03/08
Feministteologer förrycker kvinnor [Feminist theologians oppress women] Ann Lång, kyrkvärd

SvD 2009/02/08
Riskera inte ekumeniken med liberal biskop [Don’t risk ecumenical concerns with a liberal bishop] Stanley Sjöberg, frikyrkopastor

SvD 2010/03/14
Sverige blundar för barns bästa [Sweden closes its eyes to what’s good for children] Anders Wejryd ärkebiskop i Svenska kyrkan; Bengt Westerberg ordförande Svenska Röda Korset; Birgitta Dahl ordförande Unicef Sverige; Martina Anler ordförande Röda Korsets Ungdomsförbund; Margareta Blennow ordförande Svenska Barnläkarföreningen; Ingeborg Sevastik ordförande Flyktinggruppernas och Asylkommittéernas Riksråd (FARR); Inger Ashing ordförande Rädda Barnen

SvD 2010/04/15
Celibatet skapar inte pedofiler [Celibacy does not create pedophiles] Bitte Assarmo katolik och fri skribent

SvD 2010/04/17
Bara sanningen kan läka såren [Only the truth can heal the wounds] Christina Doctare läkare och författare, reserv i Europaparlamentet (KD) (katolik)

SvD 2010/06/04
Kyrkans rum är en del av allas kulturarv [The rooms of the church are a part of everyone’s cultural heritage] Eva Brunne biskop i Stockholms stift; Lars Friedner generalsekreterare för Svenska kyrkan

SvD 2010/06/26
Vems ärenden går Skolverket? [Whose errands are the Agency for Education running?] Eva Cronsoie, Lisa Åslund Präster i Vallentuna församling

SvD 2010/12/24
Låt det bli kvinnornas jul i år [Let it be a Christmas for women this year] Eva Brunne biskop i Stockholms stift, Svenska kyrkan; Anders Wejryd ärkebiskop, Svenska kyrkan

SvD 2011/10/02
Dags att riva svenska kyrkor [Time to tear down Swedish churches] H B Hammar docent i etik, tidigare domprost i Skara och kyrkoherde i Rom

SvD 2011/12/12
Tiden är inne att låta skolan vara sekulär [Time to let school be secular] Mats Ekström präst, fd kyrkoherde i Skärholmen

**Chapter 7**

DN 2001/08/05
Vi skall utsättas för kampanjer [We are the target of campaigns] Lisa Abramowicz, Informationsföreståndare Judiska församlingen i Stockholm; Lena Posner-Körösi, Ordförande Judiska centralrådet och Judiska församlingen i Stockholm

DN 2002/04/09
Partisk press uppmuntrar hat mot judar [Partisan press encourages hatred against Jews] Lena Posner-Körösi, Ordförande Judiska församlingen, Stockholm; Anders Carlberg, Ordförande Judiska församlingen, Göteborg; Bernt Katina, Ordförande Judiska församlingen, Malmö; Hadar Cars, Ordförande Samfundet Sverige-Israel; Elisabeth Abramowicz, Ordförande Svensk Israelinformation; Sverker Oredsson, Svenska kommittén mot antisemitism

DN 2003/01/18
Sluta att köpa israeliska varor [Stop buying Israeli goods] K G Hammar, ärkebiskop Svenska kyrkan; Anders Ehnmark, författare; Ylva Johansson, fd statsråd; Maj-Lis Lööw, fd statsråd och EU-parlamentariker; Håkan A Bengtsson, chef för Arenagruppen; Lennart Weiss, egenföretagare; Gudrun Schyman, partiledare vänsterpartiet; Gun-Britt Märtensson, ordförande HSB; Barbro Hedvall, DN-skribent; Carl Tham, ambassadör Berlin; Mats Hulth, fd borgarråd i Stockholm; Rolf Alsing, fd chefredaktör Aftonbladet; Hanna Zetterberg, studerande, ledamot i vänsterpartiets partistyre; Yvonne Fredriksson, sjukkörsäterska; Anna Karin Hammar, präst Svenska kyrkan; Gustaf Ödquist, präst i Svenska kyrkan; Göran Greider, chefredaktör Dala-Demokraten; Olov Abrahamsson, politisk chefredaktör Piteå-Tidningen; Dror Feiler, musiker, tonsättare; Nina Blomberg, redaktör SSU:s tidskrift Tvärdrag; Elsie Bäcklund, förbundssekretarie ABF; Thomas Bridin, internationell sekreterare Broderskapsrörelsen; Torbjörn Bredin, förbundssekreterare SKTF; Yvonne Hirdman, professor i historia; Per Wirtén, chefredaktör tidskriften Arena; Gunno Sandahl, kulturchef Folkets hus och parker; Eduardo Grutzky, programansvarig Fryshuset; Paulina de los Reyes, docent i ekonomisk historia; Sven-Eric Liedman, professor i idé- och lärdomshistoria; Stefan de Vylder, nationalekonometrisk forskare; Stefan de Vylder, nationalekonom; Suzanne Osten, regissör Arbetaren; Marie-Louise Eriksson, studiesekreterare KFUK-KFUM; Ulf Andersson, journalist Arbetaren; Tija Torpe, vd SRF Iris AB; Mikael Löfgren, författare och kulturkritiker i DN; Marie-Louise Eriksson, studie sekreterare KFUK-KFUM; Ulrika Kärnborg, kulturjournalist i DN och författare; Roger Mörtvik, samhällspolitisk chef TCO; Kaj Fölster, författare och debattör; Ken Schubert, översättare, judisk fredsaktör-
DN 2003/02/04

Skulden kan inte ensidigt lastas på Israel [The Blame cannot be put on Israel unilaterally] Alf Svensson, partiledare (kd); Jan Björklund, vice partiledare (fp); Fredrik Reinfeldt, riksledamot (m); Mikael Odenberg, riksledamot (m); Gunnar Hökmark, riksledamot (m); Carl B Hamilton, riksledamot (fp); Johan Persson, riksledamot (fp), ordförande justitieutskottet; Annelie Enochson, riksledamot (kd); Tuve Skånberg, riksledamot (kd); Mikael Oscarsson, riksledamot (kd); Olle Schmidt, EU-parlamentariker (fp); Lennart Sacrédeus, EU-parlamentariker (kd); Per-Årne Arvidsson, EU-parlamentariker (m); Per Stenmark, EU-parlamentariker (m); Oskar Lindkvist, fd riksledamot (s); Bertil Gärtnér, biskop emeritus; Gustaf Douglas, föreståndare; Hadar Cars, ordförande Samfundet Sverige-Israel, fd statsråd och EU-parlamentariker; Staffan Scheja, professor, konserterapeut; Marianne Ahrne, ordförande, regissör; Roland Pöntinen, konserterapeut; Lena Posner-Körösi, ordförande Judiska centralrådet i Sverige; Gabriel Urwitz, Ph D; Fredrik Malm, ordförande Luf; Daniel Schatz, Kosmopol, Luf; Christoffer Fjellner, ordförande Muf; Bernt Jakobson (s), ombudsmannen; Georg Klein, professor; Eva Klein, professor; Jovan Rajs, professor emeritus; Per Heister, redaktör Svensk Tidskrift; Barbara Nelson, senior relationship manager; Peter O Sellgren, ordförande Fria moderata studentförbundet; Jens Ahl, generalsekreterare Nordens konservativa studentunion; Ulf Öfverberg, ledarredaktör Neries Allehanda; Pierre Fränckel, fd vd Riksteatern; Leif Nelson, konstnär; Judith Narrowe, universitetssektor; Siwert Öholm, journalist; Göran Holmberg, journalist (s); Anders Carlberg, ordförande Judiska församlingen, Göteborg; Maynard Gerber, kantor Judiska församlingen, Stockholm; Berndt Isaksson, metodistpastor, Vetlanda; Sten-Gunnar Hedin, föreståndare Filadelfiaförsamlingen, Stockholm; Patrik Öberg, doktorand; Carl Berman, direktör (s); Talia Svensson, kommunpolitiker (m); Daniel Rock, vd, försäkringsmaklare; Ulf Gran, teaterregissör; Jerzy Wasserman, professor; Paul Movschenson, biträdande överläkare, Röda korsets rehabcenter; Lisa Abramowicz, ordförande i Svensk Israel-information; Josef Zorski, legläkare; Henri Sieradzki, legläkare; Leo Kantor, ordförande Internationellt kulturforum; Luisa Simberg, civileningenjör; Kristian Molda, studerande; Inge-Britt Lundin, avdelningschef; Ruben Aagnarsson, chefredaktör Världen i dag; Franz T Cohn, fd chefredaktör Menorah; Thomas Cohn, konsult; Michael Cohn, legläkare; Eli Göndör, skribent; Cecilia Brinck, kommunpolitiker (m); Magnus Neuberg, jur kand; Richard Wolff, jur kand; Eva Meiton, jur kand; Claes de Faire, pr-konsult; J Gunnar Olson, ordförande i ICCC, Internationella kristna handelskammaren; Dmitri Vasserman, systemanalytiker; Kid Kumljen, bildkonstnär; Peter Mangell, överläkare; Sassa Åkervall, frilansjournalist; Vera Wolff-Stolov, legläkare; Leonid Stolov, civilingenjör; Salomo Berlinger, direkttör; Norman Bodlander, ordförande Jeshurun; Håkan Lindblom, fil mag, civilin-
DN 2003/04/10
Gud välsigner organdonation. [God blesses organ donation] K G Hammar, Ärkebiskop Svenska kyrkan; Anders Arborelius, Biskop, ordförande Sveriges kristna råd; Philip Spectre, Rabbin Stora synagogan, Judiska församlingen i Stockholm; Mahmoud Khalfi, Imam Sveriges muslimska råd

DN 2003/10/28
Judar orsakar inte antisemitism [Jews do not cause anti-semitism] Per Ahlmark, författare; Marianne Ahnre, regissör; Lars M Andersson, historiker; Henrik Bachner, idéhistoriker; Stéphane Bruchfeld, idéhistoriker; Agneta Dreber, vd; Ljiljana Dufgran, PEN-ordförande; Lena Einhorn, filmare; Pia Enochsson; Birgit Friggebo, landshövding; Kristian Gerner, historieprofessor; Kay Glans, chefsredaktör; Lars Gyllensten, författare; Sven Hagströmer, styrelseordförande; Magnus Henrekson, ekonomiprofessor; Håkan Holmberg, chefsredaktör; Jackie Jakubowski, chefsredaktör; Ernst Klein, fd chefsredaktör; Georg Klein, professor; Hugo Lagercrantz, professor; Stieg Larsson, chefsredaktör Expo; Stina Lundberg Dabrowski, tv-journalist; Heléne Lööw, historiker; Mikael Tossavainen, historiker; Johan Norberg, författare; Sofia Nerbrand, redaktör; Sverker Oredsson, historieprofessor; Agneta Pleijel, författare; Lena Posner-Körösi, ordförande, Judiska centralrådet; Mats Qviberg, vd; Hans och Märit Rausing; Arne Ruth, publicist; Staffan Skott, DN-journalist; Göran Skytte, journalist; Margit Silberstein, journalist; Per Svensson, kulturredaktör; Marcus Storch; Robert Weil; Peter Wolodarski, journalist; Olle Wästberg, fd chefsredaktör; Maciej Zaremba, kulturskribent DN; Leif Zern, kulturskribent DN

DN 2003/11/04
DN 2006/04/10
Svenska skattepengar går till Israels ockupation. [Swedish tax money goes to the Israeli occupation] Shora Esmailian, ordförande Nätverket bojkotta Israel, Sten Andersson, före detta utrikesminister, Ulf Bjereld, professor i statsvetenskap, Frida Blom, ordförande Svenska freds- och skiljedomsföreningen, Dror Feiler, ordförande EJJP (European jews for a just peace), Per Gahrton, ordförande Palestinasgrupperna i Sverige, Ammar Makboul, medievetare, Lars Ohly, partileader vänsterpartiet, Nael Touqan, ordförande Palestinas föreningen i Stockholm, Maria Wetterstrand, språkrör miljöpartiet, Sören Wibe, riksdagsledamot (s) och professor

DN 2010/01/05
Skatteavdrag för gåvor bör gälla även ideella sektorn [Tax deductions for charity should also benefit the voluntary sector] Lena Posner Körösi ordf Judiska Centralrådet i Sverige; Gabriel Urwitz ordf Stiftelsen Paideia

Exp 2003/10/08

Exp 2003/12/23
Blunda inte för det islamiska våldet. [Don't close your eyes to Islamic violence] Muhammed Emin Narozi är imam, utbildad i turkiska Kurdistan.

Exp 2004/01/28
Jag får inte bära min davidsstjärna i fred. [I am not left alone when wearing my Star of David ] Nadav Meyer är 14 år gammal och bor i Göteborg

Exp 2004/04/10
Vill Moussa ha en tvåstatslösning? [Does Moussa want a two-state solution?] Anders Carlberg är ledamot i Judiska centralrådet.

Exp 2004/05/22
Vi behöver en intern diskussion. [We need an internal debate] Hassan Moussa är ordförande i Sveriges imamråd

Exp 2005/01/27
Även jag är en överlevande. [I am a survivor too] Jonatan Fried läser litteraturvetenskap vid Stockholms universitet.

Exp 2005/03/19
Bögar får gärna gifta sig i synagogan. [Gays are welcome to get married in the synagogue] Morton Narrowe är överrabbin och var i 33 år verksam vid Stockholms judiska församling.

Exp 2005/07/09
Bomber från helvetet. [Bombs from hell] Hassan Moussa är ordförande i Sveriges imamråd samt imam i Stockholms stora moské.
Exp 2005/09/10

Exp 2005/11/04
Antisemitismen i Parlamentet. [Antisemitism on the TV show 'the Parliament'] Willy Silberstein är politisk kommentator och reporter på DI TV som premiär-sändes 7 november.

Exp 2006/03/27
Islamisters språkbruk har accepterats av JK . [The language of Islamists has been accepted by the AG] Lisa Abramowicz Ordförande i Stockholms judiska församlings informationskommitté; Anders Carlberg Ordförande i Göteborgs judiska församling; Bernt Katina Ordförande i Malmö judiska församling; Lena Posner-Körösi Ordförande i Judiska centralrådet tillika ordförande i Stockholms judiska församling; Jesper Svartvik Ordförande i Svenska kommunäten mot antisemitism

Exp 2006/11/09
Jag blir attackerad för att jag är jude. [I am attacked for being Jewish] Jonathan Leman är 25 år, studerar till gymnasielärare och bor i Stockholm

Exp 2007/07/28
Religionsfriheten behövs för Sveriges välfärd. [Freedom of religion is essential for Sweden's welfare] Robert Weil, ordförande i Proventus, konsthallen Magasin 3 och Judiska teatern

Exp 2008/02/16
Vi muslimer blir inte arga utan anledning. [We Muslims are not angry without cause] Omar Mustafa, talesperson för Sveriges unga muslimer

Exp 2009/05/28
Tack för att jag blev omskuren som liten. [Thank you for circumcising me as a child] Benjamin Gerber är småbarnspappa och pedagog vid Judiska församlingen i Göteborg.

Exp 2010/09/01
Vi har rätt till en säker folkfest. [We want a secure festival] Robert Weil är ansvarig för kulturfrågor i Stockholms Judiska Församling; Lena Posner-Körösi är ordförande i Judiska Centralrådet i Sverige; Stefan Böhm är ordförande i Stockholms Judiska Församlings Kulturkommitté.

SvD 2001/05/28
Omskärelse okej om doktorn säger ja. [Circumcision ok if doctor says yes] Morton Narrowe överrabbbin emeritus Judiska församlingen Stockholm

SvD 2002/01/15
Soldaten Arafat skadar Palestina. [Arafat the soldier is hurting Palestine] Jackie Jakubowski chefredaktör tidskriften Judisk Krönika

SvD 2002/01/23
Mordet kunde ha stoppats.[The murder could have been stopped] Soleyman Ghase-
miani; Karim Shahmohammadi; Haideh Daragahi; Esmail Moloudi; Parvin
Kabloy; Sara Mohammad

SvD 2002/01/26
Krossa mäns överhöghet. [End the supremacy of men] Enisa Stenvinkel ordf i Syst-
terjouren Somaya; Anne Sofie Roald ordf i IMKU, Internationella muslimska
kvinnounionen Sverige; Karima Lindberg föreståndare Systerjouren Somaya;
Abd Al Haqq Kielan ordf i Svenska islamiska samfundet; Malika Fermane
Husby islamska kulturcenters kvinnoavdelning; Pierre Durrani Sveriges unga
muslimer

SvD 2003/06/03
Demokrati eller folkmord? [Democracy or genocide?] Lasse Wilhelmson medlem i
JIPF (Judar för Israelisk-Palestinsk Fred)

SvD 2003/11/05
Fredsljusen har tänts. [The candles of peace have been lit] Mayer Schiller rabbin i
New York

SvD 2003/11/10
Det är ockupationen som dödar oss. [It's the occupation that kills us] Dror Feiler
tonsättare och musiker, medlem av exekutivkommitén för EJJP (European Jews
for Just Peace)

SvD 2004/07/10
Demoniseringen fortsätter. [The demonization continues] Jackie Jakubowski, kultur-
skribent och chefredaktör för Judisk Krönika.

SvD 2006/07/18
Hamas vill inte prata gränser [Hamas do not want to talk about borders] Anders
Carlberg , ordförande judiska församlingen i Göteborg och författare till Oslo-
processen - framsteg

SvD 2008/05/14
Vi firar inte Israels 60-årsdag [We will not celebrate the 60th anniversary of Israel]
Henry Ascher, läkare; Inga-Lill Aspelin, föd bibliotekarie; Jorge Buzaglo, docent
i nationalekonomi; Anja Emsheimer, gymnasielärare; Dror Feiler, tonsättare,
musiker, konstnär; Tigran Feiler, journalist; Lisa Graner, föd bibliotekarie;
Lennart Grosin, docent i pedagogik; David Henley, barnläkare; Robert Lyons,
universitetslektor; Jakub Srebro, civilingenjör; Gil Tarschys, lärare; Zolten Ti-
role, chefredaktör; Maj Wechselmann, filmare; Juliana Weiss, leg psykolog;
Vera Önner, föd bibliotekarie

SvD 2008/05/17
Inte en enda dag av fred. [Not a single day of peace] Anders Carlberg ordf Judiska
församlingen, Göteborg; Lisa Abrahamowicz Svensk Israel-information; Lena
Posner-Körösi ordf Judiska centralrådet; Bernt Katina ordf Judiska församling-
en, Malmö
SvD 2008/08/19
Omskärelse av små pojkar är barbari. [Circumsicion of baby boys is barbarian] Edu-
ardo Grutzky verksam vid ALMAeuropa, som arbetar mot hedersförtryck

SvD 2010/09/18
Främlingsfientlighet berör oss alla [Xenophobia concerns us all] Lena Posner-Körösi
ordförande Judiska Centralrådet; Alf Levy ordförande Judiska Församlingen i
Stockholm; Georg Braun ordförande Judiska Församlingen i Göteborg; Fred
Kahn ordförande Judiska Församlingen i Malmö

SvD 2011/01/24
Bildts politik för Mellanöstern ett totalhaveri. [Bildt's policy for the Middle East is a
complete disaster] Jonatan Stanczak styrelsemedlem, Judar för israelisk-
palestinsk fred (JIPF)

Chapter 8

DN 2007/11/01
Dags att sluta fira skolavslutningen i kyrkan [Time to stop end of schoolyear celeb-
rations in churches] Ragnar Persenius Biskop i Uppsala stift

DN 2010/04/10
Min Gud dras i smutsen av präster och biskopar [My God is dragged through the
mud by priests and bishops] Marcus Birro katolik, poet och författare

Exp 2002/11/19
SVT sänder fel signaler [Public service TV sends the wrong signals] Enisa Stervin-
el Kielan är ordförande för Svenska islamiska samfundets kvinnoförbund,
SISK.

Exp 2006/12/24
Därför är Jesus en av islams största profeter [This is why Jesus is one of Islam’s
greatest prophets] Sofia Aouinti, aktiv i Sveriges unga muslimer

SvD 2003/01/28
Jesus mer än en myt [Jesus more than a myth] Anders Arborelius biskop, Stock-
holms katolska stift; Sten-Gunnar Hedinföreståndare Filadelfiaförsamlingen
Stockholm

SvD 2003/02/02
Farligt att krympa Jesus [Dangerous to shrink Jesus] KG Hammar, Ärkebiskop

SvD 2003/02/17
Jesus är inte Harry Potter [Jesus is not Harry Potter] Jonas Gardell
författare som i mars utkommer med boken ”Om Gud,” om Gamla Testamentets
gudsbilder

SvD 2003/06/01
Gud stärker samhällsbygget [God strengthens our building of society] Sven-Gunnar Lidén, sociolog och baptistpastor Stockholm; Annika Damirjian, informationssekreterare Svenska Baptistsamfundet

SvD 2004/05/15
Ersta vill driva storsjukhus [Ersta wants to run a large hospital] Eva Fernvall Vårdförbundets ordförande; Thorbjörn Larsson, direktör Ersta diakonisällskap
Appendices

Appendix I: Detailed methodological description

Finding articles

My three different newspapers are indexed in different databases and with varying attributes which makes it impossible to use the exact same method to collect the data. When needing to adjust the technique, I have chosen strategies that would give me material as accurate and with as similar outcome as possible, rather than applying strictly the same parameters or criteria.

My goal for the data gathering has been to find all articles published on the debate page of each respective newspaper within my time frame (1 Jan 2001 – 31 Dec 2011) that was signed by a person in the capacity of representing religion – a religious organization as such, or an individual speaking as a religious person. To find all these articles, different approaches were chosen for the different newspapers. My reasons for choosing this approach rather than searching for keywords have been discussed in the methodology chapter.

The database Presstext holds full-text articles published in certain Swedish newspapers during my period, and they index not only attributes but also in what section each article was published. That makes this database ideal for my approach. Unfortunately, Svenska Dagbladet was only indexed in this database from 2010 and not indexed by section in a way that made the same technique possible. Also, for Expressen, the indexing varied over time, making a small adjustment necessary to make the outcome comparable with the other papers.

For Dagens Nyheter, I searched in Presstext limiting the searches by newspaper, dates (one year at a time) and the section DN Debatt. I then manually examined the lists of results, adding all articles where at least one of the signatories was presented as a representative of a religious organization according to my definition, or presented as an individual speaking from a religious position. In ambiguous cases, I marked the articles, sometimes deleting them later. Articles were downloaded and saved.

For Expressen, I used the same method but, there, other types of articles, such as opinion columns, were indexed in the same section, Sidan 4 (which is the name of the Expressen debate page). To make the end result compara-
ble with my selection from *Dagens Nyheter*, I also indicated article type as
in Debatt. Though not completely identical, my assessment is that this ap-
proach gave me a more comparable end result.

For *Svenska Dagbladet* another approach was necessary. The paper was
not indexed in Presstext until 2010 and, in the other databases accessible to
me, no indexing of section was made. Instead, I used *Svenska Dagbladet’s*
own online archive. It is well indexed by section and well maintained over
time, functioning more like an actual archive than a non-updated web page.
For the first years of my selected period I used the web-based pdf archive of
the print newspapers, going through them manually, but from the year 2004 I
used the online search function, limiting it by section and year. To comple-
ment this, I also used the database Factiva for the years *Svenska Dagbladet*
was indexed (2004–2006), limiting by content type Letter. There, search by
section was not possible, but each article section was indicated, separating
between debate articles and Letters to the editor. On the debate page of
*Svenska Dagbladet* (called Brännpunkt), mostly debate articles were pub-
lished but also quotes from other papers' opinion pieces. I have excluded
these from my material, only using the full text original articles published
there. This makes my selection more similar between the papers and more
compatible, but makes it difficult to compare the total numbers of articles
published in each paper, for example by year, as these quotes are indexed as
articles in the archive (sometimes all quotes from one paper in one post,
sometimes as separate posts) making it seem as if the total number of articles
is much higher in *Svenska Dagbladet* than the other papers.

For all of my papers, the intention has been, as far as possible, to study
the articles as they appeared in the print version of papers. In the case of
*Svenska Dagbladet*, that has only partially been possible, as the paper started
to publish debate articles exclusively online with only the headline in the
print version of the paper, with no possibility of distinguishing between the
two kinds of articles in the online archive. *Dagens Nyheter* has a similar
approach, but their exclusive online content is not indexed in the Presstext
database that I used. Though this means the selections differ on this point,
my assessment is that it does not systematically change the selection, so even
though it is possible that some articles from *SvD* appear in my selection
though they in fact were never printed in the paper version of the newspaper,
I find this a minor problem not influencing the results in any systematic way.

The articles, when gathered and saved, were indexed in an Excel spread-
sheet, given an individual number and coded by newspaper, date of publish-
ing and the variables on “subject” from the Church of Sweden survey on
religious participation in public debate for future comparisons (see p 73) and
the text of each article pasted into the spreadsheet. This entire spreadsheet
was then imported to the NVivo 9 software for qualitative analysis.
Coding

Once the material was imported, a node was created for each article, and nodes were created for themes and issues, People, Organizations, Anniversaries and Holidays, and a few other categories. These were further developed during the coding, growing organically in a qualitative way. The themes were partly the ostensible subject of each articles, but also themes more implicit in the article. For example, an article arguing for the boycott of products produced in the occupied territories of the West Bank would be coded for Peace issues, Human rights, Trade, as well as the conflict/area of Israel/Palestine. An article arguing for the right to wear the hijab in schools would be coded for themes like School issues, Hijab, but also Muslims living in Sweden, Visible religion, Religious freedom.

These categories are not mutually exclusive and, as in all qualitative analysis and coding, the judgment comes down to interpretation and assessment. Therefore it might not be very meaningful to compare the exact number of articles being coded at certain nodes to see which ones are more prominent if the differences are small. But the prevalence of certain themes and the lack of others still give an overview of what is present and what is not, and the combination of themes gives a mapping from which to start the analysis.

Each article was coded with the themes of the article, with all religious organizations that were represented among the signatories, with either their name (if they were recurring) or the type of signatory (clergy, member, expert/staff, etc.) and some other specifics, such as if it was co-signed by people outside the scope of my study and whether it was a reply to a previously published article.

Organizations, Articles and People were given attributes to be used in the different coming analyses. For organizations, the attributes were type of organization and religious affiliation. For People, the attributes were gender, position and religious affiliation and, for articles, Paper, Date of publication, Year of publication and Topic referring to the Church of Sweden Study.
Appendix II: List of organizations in the material

Annan religion [Other religious group]

Frikyrkor eller huvudsakligen frikyrkliga organisationer
[Free Churches or mainly free church dominated organization]
Evangeliska fosterlandsstiftelsen EFS
Evangeliska frikyrkan [Evangelical Free Church]
Frälsningsarmén [Salvation Army]
Livets ord och trosrörelsen [Word of Life Congregation, Word of Faith Movement]
Metodistkyrkan [Methodist church]
Pingstkyrkan och pingstförsamlingar [Pestecostal congregations]
Svenska Adventistsamfundet [Seventh-day Adventist Church]
Svenska Alliansmissionen [Swedish Alliance Mission]
Svenska Baptisterikyrkan [Swedish baptist church]
Svenska evangeliska alliansen [Swedish Evangelical Alliance]
Svenska missionskyrkan [Mission Covenant church]
Sveriges frikyrkosamråd [Swedish Free Church Council]

Bistånds- och hjälporganisatörer, diakoni [Aid, mission and help organizations, diaconal institutions]
Brommadialogen
Caritas
Diakonia
Ersta diakoni
Hela människan
Islamic Relief
Kristna Fredsrörelsen [Christian Peace Movement]
Läkarmissionen
PMU Interlife
Stockholms stadsmission [Stockholm City Mission]
Stora sköndal
Svensk pingstmission
Svenska missionsrådet [Swedish Mission Council]

ICCC, Internationella kristna handelskammaren [International Christian Chamber of Commerce]
Internationell kristen org [Other international christian association]

Judiska organisationer [Jewish organizations]
enskilda judar [Individual Jewish signatories]
European Jews for a Just Peace EJJP
Judas for Israelisk-Palestinsk fred
Judiska centralrådet [Official council of Swedish Jewish Communities]
Judiska församlungen, Stockholm [The Jewish Community, Stockholm]
Judiska församlungen, Göteborg
Judiska församlungen, Malmö

Katolska kyrkan [Roman Catholic Church]

Kristen friskola [Christian School]

Kyrkopolitiska partier [Parties in Church elections]
Centerpartiet (som kyrkoparti)
fp - fisk (fölkpartister i svenska kyrkan)
Frimodig kyrka
lokal kyrkopolitisk grupp
Moderaterna (som kyrkoparti)
Socialdemokraterna (som kyrkoparti)
Vänstern i Svenska kyrkan
Öppen kyrka - en kyrka för alla

Religiösa medier [Religious media]
Dagen
Inblick
Judisk krönika
Menorah
Minaret
Trons värld
Världen idag

Muslimska organisationer [Muslim organizations]
enskilda muslimer [Individual Muslims]
Husby islamska kulturcenter
Internationella muslimska kvinnounionen
Islamiska förbundet i Sverige
muslimsk friskola
Nassirmosken
stockholms moske
Svensk Islamisk Litteratur- och Mediebevakning
Svenska Islamiska Akademien
Svenska Islamiska Demokratiska Institutet
Svenska islamiska förbundet
svenska islamiska församlingarna
Svenska islamiska samfundet [Swedish Islamic Communion]
Svenska Muslimer för Fred och Rättvisa
Sveriges imamråd
Sveriges islamiska råd
sveriges muslimska förbund
Sveriges muslimska råd
Sveriges unga muslimer

Tankesmedjor, påverkansgrupper etc. [Think tanks and advocacy groups]
Broderskapsrörelsen Kristna socialdemokrater
Claphaminstiutet
EKHO (ekumeniska grupperna för kristna hbtq-personer)
Kristna studenrörelsen
Kvinnor i Svenska kyrkan
Påskuppropet
Seglora smedja
Sigtunastiftelsen

Religiösa studieförbund [Religious adult education organizations]
Ibn Rushd
Sensus

Serbisk-ortodoxa kyrkan [Serbian Orthodox Church]

Svenska kyrkan [Church of Sweden]

Sveriges kristna råd [Christian Council of Sweden]
Appendix III: List of all theme nodes

Visible religion 189
Human rights 183
Theology, faith content Christianity 152
Peace 134
State and faith communities 121
Religion as a source of conflict 114
Freedom of religion 105
Islam and Muslims in Sweden 93
Religion and political statements 81
Poverty/international justice 78
LGBT 61
Religion as a positive social force 59
Terrorism 59
Marriage 55
People's church, people and CoS 55
Islamophobia and threats against Muslims 53
Migration and integration (excl asylum) 51
Political mobilization based on religion 47
Welfare, health care 45
Existential or religious needs 44
Theology, faith content Islam 43
Poverty and social injustice in Sweden 41
Religious extremism 41
Gender equality 40
International trade 40
Anti-Semitism 39
Criticism against the media 38
Internal or organizational issues of faith communities 38
Racism 38
Volunteering and civil society 38
Relationships and sexuality 37
Rights of children 37
Discrimination 35
Foreign aid 33
Religious dialogue 29
Right to solemnize marriages 29
School 26
Elections and democracy 25
EU 23
Faith and science 23
Hate crimes and hate speech 23
Freedom of speech 22
Refugees and asylum 22
Arms trade 21
New atheism 21
The Jesus manifest 20
Opinion minorities in CoS 19
Abuse in religious environments 18
Medical ethics 18
Criticism against religion 16
Culture, arts 15
Family policy 15
Knutby murders 15
Church conflict 14
Environment 13
Individual morals, power and moral 13
Abortion 12
Ecumenism 12
UN 12
Christmas 11
Mohammed caricatures 11
Ordination of women 11
Secularization 11
Defense 10
Honor violence 10
Swedishness, Swedish culture 10
Oppression and persecution based on religion 9
Violence against women 9
Blessing of civil unions 8
Church elections 8
Taxes 8
Climate change 7
Corruption 7
Education of imams 7
Financial trade 7
Veil 7
Åke Green legal case 6
Circumcision 6
Homelessness 6
Public health 6
Work life, labor market 6
Election of bishops 5
HIV AIDS 5
Values 5
Sthlm Pride 4
CoS Abroad 4
Creationism ID 4
Holocaust Memorial Day 3
Accessibility 3
Anti-ziganism 3
Ship to Gaza 3
Theology, faith content Judaism 3
All Saints' Day 2
Easter 2
Hiroshima Day 2
Criminal justice system 2
Crisis, catastrophes 2
Funeral 2
New Age 2
Professional secrecy 2
Prostitution and trafficking 2
Research 2
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<td>The pope</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>9/11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advent</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Peace Day</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Women's Day</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language minorities</td>
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<td>Opus Dei</td>
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<td>Social media</td>
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Appendix IV: Most coded nodes per religious affiliation

**Church of Sweden**

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<th>Topic</th>
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<tr>
<td>Visible religion</td>
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<td>Human rights</td>
<td>74</td>
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<tr>
<td>State and faith communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>People's church, people and CoS</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBT</td>
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<td>Marriage</td>
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<td>Poverty/international justice</td>
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<td>Religion and political statements</td>
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<td>Peace</td>
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<td>Religion as a positive social force</td>
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<td>Internal or organizational issues of faith communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Welfare, health care</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freedom of religion</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and social injustice in Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>Existential or religious needs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relationships and sexuality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Right to solemnize marriages</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opinion minorities in CoS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
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<td>Rights of children</td>
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<td>Political mobilization based on religion</td>
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<td>Religion as a source of conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious dialogue</td>
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<td>Refugees and asylum</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign aid</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>International trade</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>Church conflict</td>
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<td>Gender equality</td>
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<td>Culture, arts</td>
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<td>Israel/Palestine</td>
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<td>Migration and integration (excl. asylum)</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>Environment</td>
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<td>Racism</td>
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<td>Terrorism</td>
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<td>Ecumenism</td>
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<td>The Jesus manifest</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ordination of women</td>
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<tr>
<td>New atheism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islam and Muslims in Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>Church elections</td>
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<td>Medical ethics</td>
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240
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<th>Topic</th>
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<td>Blessing of civil unions</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Family policy</td>
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<td>Hate crimes and hate speech</td>
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<tr>
<td>Homelessness</td>
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<td>Islamophobia and threats against Muslims</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Secularization</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Financial trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Criticism against religion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious extremism</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections and democracy</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Arms trade</td>
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<td>Freedom of speech</td>
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<td>Election of bishops</td>
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<tr>
<td>Åke Green legal case</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual morals, power and moral</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoS Abroad</td>
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<td>Violence against women</td>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Abortion</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Work life, labor market</td>
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<td>Public health</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Defense</td>
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<td>Knutby murders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abuse in religious environments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
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Article 1

Exp 2005/07/09

Hassan Moussa fördömer terrorattacken: Bomber från helvetet

De barbariska terroråldén i London har kränkt en och en halv miljard muslimer.

Det skriver Hassan Moussa, som nu vänder till alla imamer i Sverige: Våra ungdomar får aldrig hamna i klorna på demokratins fiender.

Än en gång slår terrorismen blind mot oskyldiga civila människor. Denna gång drabbades London, de många religionernas och den kulturella mångfaldens huvudstad, just som staden firade sin vinst över att få arrangera OS 2012.

Dessa barbariska terrorhandlingar, orsakade av människor utan vare sig vett, förstånd eller medmänsklighet, är resultatet av en rubbad och obalanserad förståelse och beteende, hur kan man annars förklara handlingar som dessa?

Utan förbehåll förödmör jag dessa handlingar, oavsett vem som ligger bakom barbariet. Man har verkligen överskridit alla gränser. Dessa gärningsmän kan inte tala i islams namn, eftersom islam förbjuder att oskyldiga människor dödas.

En som begär sådana handlingar kan vänta sig helvetet.

Profeten Muhammed har varnat oss för att döda civila och fredliga oskyldiga människor oavsett bakomliggande orsaker. Dessa gärningsmän har skadat sin stora religion och de mänskliga värden som islam bjuder folk att efterleva. De har också bedragit nationen som har tagit emot dem när de var i behov av skydd.

Denna barbariska handling har kränkt en och en halv miljard muslimer.

Den riskerar att befästa hat och rasism. Det gynnar ingen att sprida hat och intolerans, så som vissa predikanter och imamer har gjort.

Det går inte att kasta ogrundade fatwor hejvilt omkring sig, med avsikt att (som man säger) bekämpa de nya kors-tågsfararna/islams fiender eller i annat syfte.

Dessa fatwor, utspridda av okända predikanter på bland annat internet har drivit en del unga till ovett och extremism. En hel generation riskerar att stå utanför samhället. Avsaknaden av demokrati och frihet i den muslimska världen, imamer som har valt att stå bredvid makthavarna, diktaturskap, avsaknaden av social rättvisa, fattigdom och arbetslöshet, har lett till att dessa ungdomar söker en räddare, även om den skulle vara djävulen själv klädd som ängel. Vi är i stort behov av att enas och stå emot detta farliga fenomen som riskerar att urarta, oavsett raser, nationer eller religiösa tillhörigheter.
Jag riktar från Expressen en vädjan till alla imamer i Sverige att ta sitt religiösa och civila ansvar och bekämpa dessa idéer och avslöja deras falskhet för att skona våra ungdomar från att hamna i händerna på dessa intoleransens spridare.


Jag sänder mina förhoppningar till alla skadade människor om att de snart ska vara återställda. Må Allah skydda vårt land Sverige och låt hela världen leva i fred.

HASSAN MOUSSA
är ordförande i Sveriges imamråd samt imam i Stockholms stora moské.

**Hassan Moussa condemns terror attack: Bombs from hell**

The barbaric terror attack in London has violated one and a half billion Muslims, writes Hassan Moussa and appeals to all imams in Sweden: Our youth must never fall into the claws of the enemies of democracy.

Once again terrorism hits out blindly against innocent civilian people. This time London was hit, the capital of many religions and cultural diversity, just as the city celebrated its victory in gaining the 2012 Olympics.

These barbaric acts of terror, caused by people without sense, reason or compassion, are a result of a twisted and unbalanced understanding and behavior; how could acts these in any way be explained?

Without reservation I condemn these acts, no matter who is behind the barbarism. They have truly crossed all borders. These perpetrators cannot speak in the name of Islam, since Islam bans the killing of innocent people.

Someone who commits such acts can expect hell.

The Prophet Mohammed has warned us against killing civil and peaceful innocent people regardless of the underlying causes. These perpetrators have harmed their great religion and the human values that Islam invites people to live by. They have also betrayed the nation that has accepted them when they were in need of shelter.

This barbaric act has violated one and a half billion Muslims.

It risks consolidating hatred and racism. It does not do anyone a favor to spread hatred and intolerance, as some preachers and imams have.

You cannot just throw ungrounded fatwas around wildly, with the intention (as they say) of fighting the new crusaders/enemies of Islam or for other purposes.

These fatwas, spread by unknown preachers, sometimes on the internet, have driven some youngsters to abuse and extremism. A whole generation
risks standing outside society. The lack of democracy and freedom in the Muslim world, imams who have sided with powerful dictatorships, the lack of social justice, poverty and unemployment, have led these youngsters to seek a savior, even if it turns out to be the devil himself dressed as an angel. We have a great need to unite and stand up against this dangerous phenomenon that risks degenerating, regardless of race, nations or religious belonging.

From the pages of Expressen I call on all imams in Sweden to take up their religious and civil responsibility and fight these ideas and expose their falseness to spare our young ones from ending up in the hands of these spreaders of intolerance.

We must work towards promoting coexistence and positive integration, for the benefit of Sweden and Europe. Friday prayer, where thousands of people participate, should be used more efficiently to spread this spirit. I also call on our ulama/jurisprudents to repudiate acts of this kind, condemn them and work constructively to remove these dangerous ideas that risk blazing up and harming everyone in its path.

I convey my condolences to all the stricken families. I send my hopes to all the injured people that they may soon recover. May Allah protect our country Sweden and let the whole world live in peace.

HASSAN MOUSSA
Chairman of the Swedish Imam Council and Imam of Stockholm Great Mosque

Article 2
SvD 2002/01/26

OPINION Krossa mäns överhöghet

Många muslimer i Sverige blev bestörta när de, i sorgen efter mordet på den unga Fadime, läste Brännpunkt den 23 januari. I stället för att analysera de verkliga orsakerna till skammorden i vårt land hetsar debattörerna mot religioner och kulturer, och, tyvärr, speciellt mot islam.

Det är viktigt att påpeka att mordet på Fadime är ett brott, och vi lever tack och lov i ett rättssamhälle. Vi har en myndighet som har till uppgift att doma. Så varför ska andra spela domare och döma ut en hel religion och de som följer den?

Författarna till Brännpunktsartikeln tror att problemen kan lösas genom att förbjuda föräldrarna att uppföstra sina egna barn. "Barn kan inte och får inte tilldelas ansvaret att själva besluta om de ska ta på sig slöja, om de ska bli omskurna, om de ska få äta fläsk … Denna konflikt med religion, kultur och föräldrar måste samhället ta – inte barnen", framhåller debattörerna. En närmast stalinistisk fixering vid att staten ska fostra barnen kommer till uttryck: "Staten måste forma lagar och skyddsnät som skyddar barn och ungdomar mot religionernas tvångströjor."
Den här attityden strider mot barnkonventionen, som ger barn rätt till liv, hälsa, trygghet, skydd mot övergrepp, respekt för sina åsikter, identitet, språk, kultur och religion. Så gott som alla världens länder, inkluderat de muslimska, har undertecknat barnkonventionen. Barnkonventionens artikel 30 har innebörden att barn som tillhör minoritetsgrupper eller ursprungsbefolkningar har rätt till sitt språk, sin kultur och religion. Medan Sverige erkänner och strävar efter det mångkulturella samhället, må vara tidvis familande, tar artikelförfattarna avstånd från denna vision. Strävar de i strid mot barnkonventionen efter ett samhälle, där barnen tillhör staten?


Vi muslimer hävdar att kunskap om skillnaden mellan förislamiska traditioner och islams budskap kan ha avgörande betydelse för muslimska kvinnors situation. När t ex somalier får kunskap om att könsstympning inte föreskrivs i islam, när t ex bengaler inser att betungande hemgifter är en hinduisk, inte islamisk sed, när muslimer inser att kvinnomisshandel och våldtäkt inom äktenskapet är brott enligt islam, kan en förändring till det bättre bli möjlig för både kvinnor, barn och män. Traditionella föreställningar om männens överhöghet och kvinnans underordning krockar med både Koranens budskap och kvinnors ökande krav på mänskliga rättigheter och inflytande i familjen och samhället.


Ändå finns det män som menar att det är deras religiösa rättighet eller plikt att ta lagen i egna händer och mördade familjens kvinnor om dessa beter sig på ett sätt som männen inte gillar. Förislamiska föreställningar om skam och ära spelar stor roll, liksom en kombination av maktnisshuk, kvinnoförtryck och okunnighet.

För att som invandrare anpassa sig till det sekulariserade Sverige, gör man sig av med islam och en del traditioner, men behåller kvinnoförtrycket intakt. Inte så att man som minoritet uttalar det öppet gentemot majoritetssamhället, men inom familjen och den egna gruppen är kvinnoförtrycket
självskrivet. En effekt av assimilering och sekularisering är svåra generationsskonflikter och familjekonflikter.


ENISA STENVINKEL
ordf i Systerjouren Somaya
ANNE SOFIE ROALD
ordf i IMKU, Internationella muslimska kvinnounionen Sverige
KARIMA LINDBERG
föreståndare Systerjouren Somaya
ABD AL HAQQ KIELAN
ordf i Svenska islamiska samfundet
MALIKA FERNANE
Husby islamiska kulturcenters kvinnoavdelning
PIERRE DURRANI
Sveriges unga muslimer

Break the supremacy of men

Many Muslims in Sweden were alarmed when they, in grief over the murder of young Fadime, read Brännpunkt on January 23rd. Instead of analyzing the true causes of the shame murders in our country, the debaters incite against religions and cultures and, unfortunately, especially against Islam.

It is important to state that the murder of Fadime is a crime, and thankfully we live in a community founded by the rule of law. We have authorities that have the task of ensuring that justice is done. So why should others play judge and condemn an entire religion and its followers?

The authors of the Brännpunkt article think that the problems can be solved by prohibiting the parents raising their own children. "Children cannot and should not be given the responsibility to decide whether they should wear a veil, if they should be circumcised, if they should eat pork... This conflict with religion, culture and parents must be taken by society – not the children," the authors emphasize. An almost Stalinist fixation that the state should foster the children is expressed. "The state must have laws and safety nets that protect children and youth from the straitjackets of religions."
This attitude conflicts with the Convention on the Rights of Children, which gives children the right to life, health, safety, protection from abuse, respect for their opinion, identity, language, culture and religion. Almost all the countries in the world, including many Muslim countries, have signed the convention. Article 30 of the convention claims that children of minority groups and indigenous peoples have a right to their language, their culture and religion. While Sweden acknowledges and strives towards a multicultural society, though sometimes tentatively, the authors distance themselves from this vision. Are they, contrary to the intention of the Convention on the Rights of Children, striving towards a society where children belong to the state?

Murder as a tool, in the name of religion, for political goals, to restore honor, to terrorize dissidents is so terrifying because it is planned and in cold blood. We should not connect this barbaric act of violence with the concept of honor. Shame killing is more correct. That shame killings continue in Sweden is a huge, but hopefully temporary, setback in integration policy. We appreciate the work that Mona Sahlin [at the time Minister of integration] and many with her have taken on improving the circumstances for women and girls in segregated environments. They struggle uphill, but they can count on the support of Swedish Muslims.

We Muslims claim that knowledge about the difference between pre-Islamic traditions and the message of Islam can be crucial for the situation of Muslim women. For example, when Somalis learn that female genital mutilation is not prescribed in Islam, when for example Bengalis realize that burdensome dowries is a Hindu, not Islamic custom, when Muslims realize that battering of women and rape within marriage are crimes according to Islam, then a change for the better can come about for both women, children and men. Traditional ideas about the supremacy of men and the subordination of women clashes with both the message of the Quran and the increasing demands from women on human rights and influence in family and society.

In some immigrant groups there is a double standard regarding accepted behavior for men and women. Men can without consequence engage in pre- and extramarital liaisons, they are even expected to, totally in contrast with the decrees of Islam. Women on the other hand risk, at the slightest suspicion or allegation, losing their reputation or are killed, also completely against the law of Islam, where false accusation is a serious crime.

Still there are men who claim that it is their religious right or duty to take the law into their own hands and murder the women of the family if they act in a way the men do not like. Pre-Islamic notions about shame and glory play a huge part, like a combination of abuse of power, oppression of women and ignorance.

To adjust, as an immigrant, to the secularized Sweden, people get rid of Islam and some traditions but keep the oppression of women intact. Not that
they speak openly about it in the majority society but, within the family and the group, the oppression of women is natural. An effect of assimilation and secularization is difficult generational conflict and conflicts within the families.

We must never accept that shame killings and other barbaric customs could take root in Sweden. We Muslims strive towards self-criticism and intensification of education in the field. We prepare imam- and social work education at the university level, to get to these great problems of integration and reach out with knowledge and support to the people concerned. Resources are needed today for women's refuges where Muslim women educated in the specific context of the problems of women and girls can work. So far there is just one Muslim women- and girls' crisis center, The Sisters' Shelter Somaya. It is constantly overcrowded and bombarded with phone calls, and struggles with low funding. Statistics show the needs that this center fulfills. Here we hope for the contributions from society. There is a need for resources, support and acknowledgement to enhance the positive values of the Islamic religion and tradition.

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Husby Islamic Cultural Center’s Women’s league
PIERRE DURRANI
Young Muslims of Sweden
Omar Mustafa, talesperson för Sveriges unga muslimer, om karikatyrkonflikten:

**Vi muslimer blir inte arga utan anledning**

I veckan publicerade flera danska dagstidningar den mordhotade danske tecknaren Kurt Westergaards teckning av profeten Muhammed med en bomb i turbanen. Protesterna i den muslimska världen växer. I dag skriver Omar Mustafa att muslimska organisationer nu förväntas fördöma muslinsk terrorism och visa sina sympatier för dem som kallas yttrandefrietets hjältar. Men ser man helheten och den utsatthet muslimer lever under kan man lättare förstå varför förnedringen av profeten Mohammed är outhärdlig för muslimer, skriver han.

Efter en tid av lugn i den hetsiga debatten har nimbildscirkusen kommit igång igen. Den danska polisen har arresterat tre personer misstänkta för mordförsök på en dansk Mohammed-tecknare, och innan man presenterar några som helst bevis har medierna redan fastställt domen. Västerländska politiker, journalister, men speciellt muslimska organisationer förväntas nu fördöma den "färliga muslimska terrorismen" och visa sina sympatier för "yttrandefrietets hjältar".

Så fort några enstaka personer av världens 1,5 miljarder muslimer får för sig att göra något dumt, ska vi som europeiska muslimer stå tills vars. Vi förväntas fördöma terrorattacker, kvinnoförtryck och könsstympning vare sig det sker i Afrika, Asien eller Amerika. Vilket vi gång på gång faktiskt gör. Men så fort vi försöker att gå till grunden med problemen för att förklara anledningarna till muslimernas frustration och aggressivitet, möts vi av islamofobiska påhopp. Det har blivit tabu för oss muslimer att skylta terrorismen på den amerikanska utrikespolitiken, problemen i Mellanöstern på den Europeiska kolonialmakten och radikaliseringen av muslimska ungdomar i Europa på segreghänsyn och vardagsislamofobin. Islamofobin är ett allvarligare hot mot vårt demokratiska samhälle än vad många befarar. Å ena sidan har de rasistiska partierna i Schweiz, Österrike, Belgien, Sverige, Danmark och övriga Europa enats genom att definiera muslimerna som den gemensamma fienden och det största hotet mot Europa. Många av argumenten känns igen från 30-talets Tyskland, i detta fall är det dock muslimerna som representerar "faran".

Å andra sidan bidrar denna mediala och politiska islamofobi till häftiga och ibland extrema motreaktioner av ett fåtal muslimer. Tyvärr finns det inom alla religioner och i alla samhällen människor som visar sin protest utanför lagens ramar. Problemet löser sig knappast av att beskylja en hel grupp eller religion, som vissa gör. När man i Danmark av alla länder be-
stämmer sig för att lära muslimerna en läxa om yttrandefrihet, genom att kränka det alla muslimer har närmast om hjärtat, visar det sig att de själva har mycket att lära om de grundläggande fundamenten i ett demokratiskt samhälle.


Kränkningar av muslimer är skrämmande nog vanligt förekommande runtom i Europa. För många muslimer ser den internationella världsrättvisningen mörk ut; man bombar muslimska städer i demokratins namn, man torterar oskyldiga muslimer i rättvisans namn och man förföljer muslimska minoriteter i frihetens namn. En värld som snarast kan liknas vid Orwell's 1984. Därför blir en sådan sak som förnedringen av profeten Mohammed outhärdlig om man ser det i sitt globala sammanhang.

OMAR MUSTAFA  
Sveriges unga muslimer

*We Muslims do not get outraged for no reason*

This week several Danish newspapers published the drawing by the threatened Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard of the prophet Mohammed with a bomb in his turban. The protests in the Muslim world are growing. Today, Omar Mustafa writes that Muslim organizations are now expected to condemn Muslim terrorism and show their sympathy for those called the heroes of freedom of speech. But seeing the bigger picture and the exposure Muslims are living under, it is easier to understand why the
degradation of the Prophet Muhammad is unbearable for Muslims, Mustafa writes.

After a period of calm in the heated debate, the circus about the scurrilous portrait has started again. The Danish police have arrested three people suspected of attempted murder of a Danish Mohammed cartoonist and, before any evidence whatsoever has been presented, the media has already set the verdict. Western politicians, journalists, but especially Muslim organizations are now expected to condemn "dangerous Muslim terrorism" and show their sympathy for the "heroes of the freedom of speech".

As soon as a few people out of the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims get into their heads to do something stupid, we European Muslims are to be held accountable. We are expected to condemn acts of terrorism, the oppression of women and genital mutilation whether it is happening in Africa, Asia or America. Which, over and over again, we actually do. But as soon as we are trying to really get to the bottom of the problem of explaining the reasons for the frustration and aggressiveness of Muslims, we are met with Islamophobic attacks. It has become taboo for us Muslims to blame terrorism on American foreign policy, the problems in the Middle East for the European colonial power, and the radicalization of Muslim youth in Europe on the policy of segregation and everyday Islamophobia. Islamophobia is a more serious threat to our democratic society than many think. On the one hand, the racist parties in Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark and the rest of Europe are united through defining Muslims as their joint enemy and the greatest threat to Europe. Many of the arguments are familiar from Germany in the 30s, in this case it is the Muslims that represent "danger."

On the other hand, this medial and political Islamophobia contributes to fierce and sometimes extreme counteractions by a few Muslims. Unfortunately, in any religion and in every society there are people who protest outside of the law. The problem is hardly solved by blaming a whole group or religion, as some do. When people in Denmark of all countries decide to teach Muslims a lesson about freedom of speech, by offending what all Muslims keep closest to their hearts, it seems they themselves have a lot to learn about the fundamental grounds in a democratic society.

What are we supposed to do with values like respect, coexistence and minority rights when freedom of speech is abused for attacks and violations? The idea that Muslims are against freedom of speech is a common prejudice and a misleading argument in the discussion. As a matter of fact, many of Sweden's Muslims have fled here from the oppression and prosecution of dictatorships – precisely to practice Islam and to express their opinions in a Sweden of freedom and tolerance. The right to expression is a natural and fundamental right most people care about. Whether you are defined as Muslim, secular or just Swedish. History, on the other hand, has taught us that majorities can abuse this right to oppress weaker groups in society.
Western media were quick to show their sympathies for the cartoonists and their rights. When an Iranian newspaper, urged by the government, announced a contest for cartoons ridiculing the victims of the Holocaust, they were not so quick with their defense and ovations. Since we Muslims cannot be considered a people or an ethnic minority, we unfortunately do not have the same legal protection as other minorities in society. Should such violations, as these cartoons actually are, have a homophobic, anti-Semitic or even sexist character the response should be completely different. I am convinced of it.

The humiliation of Muslims is alarmingly common around Europe. To many Muslims the international world order looks dark; Muslim cities are bombed in the name of democracy, innocent Muslims are tortured in the name of justice and Muslim minorities are persecuted in the name of freedom. A world mostly comparable to Orwell's 1984. Therefore a thing like the degradation of the Prophet Mohammed becomes unbearable seen in its global context.

Omar Mustafa  
Young Muslims of Sweden
Appendix VI: Interview Guide

Inform interviewee (again) briefly about the study, save the results for the end of the interview.
Inform interviewee about the conditions of the interview:

- This is a background interview, fact finding
- The interviews are not part of the empirical data, will not be analyzed. No anonymity, do not say anything not to be quoted.
- The final version of the section based on this interview and potential quotes will be sent for approval before printing.

1. How would you describe the task or role of the debate page – in your newspaper and in a wider societal context?
2. Can you describe how you work as a debate editor? How many people work on the debate page; do you have different responsibilities? How closely do you work with the political editor and/or the editorial page?
3. Is there an official policy as to how you choose what articles to publish? If not, what criteria do you use to select articles? (follow up on concepts such as news value, etc.)
4. Roughly, how many articles are turned down? What are the most usual reasons for refusing an article?
5. Do you keep statistics over who gets published – different sectors, types of signatories, etc.?
6. Do you commission or initiate debate articles, contact potential writers? Do you pay for them (in these cases or generally)?
7. How important is the signatory compared to content when valuing newsworthiness of an article?
8. What is your view on the debate page’s (official or actual) stance towards religious organizations and writers?
9. Is there anything else you would like to tell me to give me a fuller understanding of how your debate page is run?
10. Do you have a feeling if and then how the place of religion on your debate page has changed over the last decade?
7 The Assyrian Heritage: Threads of Continuity and Influence. Önver Cetrez, Sargon Donabed, Aryo Makko (Eds.) 2012.
8 Consolidating Research on Religion: Moving the Agenda Forward. Colloquium on interdisciplinary research programmes 2–4 May 2011, Uppsala University. Anna Row, Per Pettersson (Eds.) 2012.