On the Edge

The Concept of Progress in Bukhara during the Rule of the Later Manghits

Franz Wennberg
Abstract

This work is a study of the concept of progress in Bukhara between approximately 1860 and 1920. It is based on unpublished and published sources from this period. The study suggests that not only the technological and social developments that took place on a global scale between 1860 and 1920 affected the conceptualization of progress in Bukhara, but that globalized narratives on progress did so as well. Cosmographical concepts and explanations that previously were more common were notably absent in what during the 1910s became a discourse on progress, but the concept of progress still had an important eschatological dimension and was closely related to apocalypticism.

Chapter One presents the context of the study. The second chapter discusses the theoretical framework and the analytical concepts. The next chapter continues by outlining the political, economic and cultural conditions in Bukhara during this period as well as providing a short historiographical discussion. The fourth chapter discusses the concept of geography and how it affected metaphorical constructions of time. Chapter Five is a study of how Bukharan travellers conceived of novelties. The following chapter discusses the direction of discontinuity and its eschatological implications. Chapter Seven studies how knowledge was temporalized and affected by a shift in the direction of discontinuity. Chapter Eight discusses the lexeme taraqqī, in which the concept of progress later was embedded, as well as various synchronic and diachronic orders. Chapter Nine discusses the eschatological and apocalyptic discourse in Bukhara during the 1910s. The last chapter contains general conclusions in the form of a discussion of the operational environment of progress in Bukhara between approximately 1860 and 1920.

Keywords: Bukhara, Manghits, Islam, Jadidism, Qadimism, Conceptual History, Progress, Apocalypticism, Eschatology

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Technical Notes

Transliteration

The transliteration of Arabic and Persian written in the Arabic script is based on the standards of the International Journal of Middle East Studies. Turkic is transliterated as Ottoman Turkish according to the same journal. The transliteration of Russian is based on the British Standards Institute. In bibliographical contexts, the transliteration of Tajik and Uzbek written in the Cyrillic script is based on the transliteration schemes of the Institute of the Estonian Language. Tajik written in the Latin script is left with the original upper and lower cases. In the text, however, Tajik written in the Cyrillic script is transliterated like Persian written in the Arabic script.
Abbreviations

Sources

$BSh$  $Bukhārā-yi sharīf$
$EI^1$  First Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1913–1936
$EI^2$  Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition
$MFMZ$  Maṭāli‘ al-fākhira va maṭālib al-zāhira
$NV$  Navodir-ul-vaqoe‘
$SI$  Shu‘la-yi inqilāb
$SVR$  Sobranie vostochnykh rukopisei Akademii nauk Uzbekskoi SSR
$TV$  Turkistanskiy vedomosti

Others

$AMBA$  Arkhiv Muzeya bukharskogo arka, Bukhara
$AMIS$  Arkhiv Muzeya istorii kul’tury i isskustva narodov Uzbekistana, Samarkand
$IVANRUz$  Institut Vostokovedeniya Akademii nauk Respubliki Uzbekistan imeni Beruni, Tashkent
$SOA$  Samarkandskiy oblastnoy arkhiv, Samarkand
$TsGARUz$  Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Respubliki Uzbekistan, Tashkent
1. Introduction

1.1 The locus of the research

This work aims to be a contribution to a conceptual history of progress in Bukhara between approximately 1860 and 1920. The operative environment of progress in Bukhara as well as elsewhere during this time, referred to by some as the Second Industrial Revolution, was coloured by a historically unprecedented period of economic growth, speed of invention, and speed of deployment of innovations. Yet progress cannot be extrapolated from technological development, because the human experience of time is dependent upon so many other things, and is also discursively manipulable. Hence, this attempt to write a conceptual history of progress in Bukhara is centred on four interrelated questions:

- What did the discursive landscape of progress look like?
- What or who made progress?
- How did something or someone make progress?
- What were the temporal and spatial boundaries of progress?

This study thus places the conceptual history of progress in the framework of an accelerating science-based industrial and technical development, economic growth, and new preferences of spatial and temporal organization during a colonial era, but also in the framework of apocalyptic expectations and rhetoric. It focuses on historical consciousness and the temporal experience and rhetoric of Bukharan “Muslim scholars” (‘ulamā), and to a lesser extent of the “elite in the fiscal administration and the Uzbek groups” (umarā), and the merchants during a period when they were increasingly exposed to the technological and social developments that took place during the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century.

The articulation of progress in Bukhara during this period took place in an Islamic context and discourse whose quest for perfection and temporal boundaries sometimes were difficult to reconcile with the trajectory of an ideal type of progress, with its temporally unlimited and open-ended future.

Some young Bukharan reformers, the “advocates of progress” (taraqqīparvarān) used a concept of progress close to an ideal type that in their discursive environment also signified an eschatological shift from a divinely led development leading towards terminal decay, a cataclysmic
apocalypticism, to an emphasis on human agency and the possibility of long-term improvement of the human condition on earth. However the latter “eschatological scenario” shared many features with transformational apocalypticism and progressive millenarianism.\(^1\) Instead of believing or arguing that a divinely predetermined end of the world was imminent, a small but increasing number of persons, including the advocates of progress, began to argue that a new era had arrived where the future was created by humans rather than by divine intervention. This eschatological shift resulted in a reframed and reformulated meaning of existence characterized by the use of some kind of concept of societal progress.

By juxtaposing the concept of progress with eschatology, this study suggests that the discourse on progress was a temporally and spatially transformed apocalyptic discourse where threats of absence of progress rhetorically served the same purpose as threats of a looming apocalypse; that is, progress also served to emphasize limited time in calls for change.

1.2 A short historical overview

The Uzbek Manghit dynasty ruled the emirate of Bukhara from 1753 until 1920. The last fifty years of this period, the focus of this study, when Bukhara became a de facto Russian protectorate, were characterized by intense industrial and technological development, the globalization of the concept of national states and hence new norms and preferences of social organization and political participation. The Afghan Emir Abd al-Rahman Khan (r. 1880–1901) built a strong powerbase centred in Kabul and in many ways laid the foundation for modern Afghanistan. The first Russian revolution occurred in 1905 and was followed by a limited Muslim presence in the Russian parliament (duma). Similar developments took place in other states that were for the Bukharans culturally and politically influential. The constitutional revolution in Iran took place between 1905 and 1911. In 1908 the Young Turks seized power in Turkey and ruled through the Committee of Union and Progress.

After the Red Army invaded Bukhara in 1920, the emirate gave way to the People’s Republic of Bukhara and the emir fled to Afghanistan. In the year that followed, the “modernizer” Reza Shah (r. 1925–1941) seized power in Iran. The Ottoman Empire was dissolved in 1922, and the Afghan Emir Amanulla Khan (r. 1919–1929) introduced the first constitution in Afghanistan in 1923. One year after Amanulla’s constitution, the People’s Re-

\(^1\) The terms millenarianism and millennialism are used interchangeably in this work and refer to a “belief in an earthly salvation, and no longer [imply] belief that the kingdom of God will last one thousand years.” See Catherine Wessinger, “Millennialism With and Without the Mayhem: Catastrophic and Progressive Expectations”, in *Millennium, Messiahs, and Mayhem*, ed. Thomas Robbins and Susan J. Palmer (New York: Routledge, 1997), 48.
public of Bukhara gave way to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan with a Tajik Autonomous Province (Oblast’). Muslim reformist sentiments also spread to Xinjiang, and in 1933 a short-lived Islamic republic centred in Kashgar was proclaimed.

The developments in Bukhara during the protectorate era were in many ways similar to those of other Muslim societies. The central power, supported by a colonial state, largely pacified the Uzbek groups and rural opposition, and fostered a polity expansion including new forms of military organization. The Muslim scholars, exposed to the experiences of other Muslim communities, faced new questions of the relevance, reproduction, and transmission of knowledge while confronting the intrusions of a centralizing power and the loss of traditional sources of income (like “religious endowments” [sg. vaqf] that were supposed to last until God inherited the earth), but they also profited from increased trade. Similarly, the merchants confronted new opportunities and challenges, benefitting not only from modern banking and the ease of communication and transportation, but also the relative protection they enjoyed under colonial jurisdiction. At the other end of the spectra were those who suffered from the introduction of cash crops, and a small but increasing number of workers in the industries that sprang up. The emirs and their children were increasingly attracted by the life and education that the colonial power had to offer, but they also benefitted from their engagement in economic ventures and global trade.

The growing exposure of the Bukharans to the rest of the world by means of the railway, telegraph, newspapers etc., triggered a process of acculturation of the elite of the emirate. Important elements in this process were experiences of technical and social developments in the Russian Empire, as well as other colonial empires, such as the Ottoman Empire. The Young Bukharans, inspired by the Young Turks, appeared in Bukhara during the 1910s.

From the above, it is not surprising that it has been argued that Bukhara made much progress during this period. In much of the Russian and Soviet historiography, this progress has been said to be due to the positive aspects of the Russian conquest of Central Asia. The causes of progress can also be discussed in terms of globalization during the second industrial revolution, but also in terms of an older, pre-modern development. Yet, the aim of this work is not to find out whether Bukhara made progress or not, or what the possible cause of progress was.

1.3 Previous research
In much of the historiography of the period calls for progress in Bukhara during this period have been viewed as associated with demands for educational reforms voiced by some Muslim scholars and merchants known as
“the new” (Jadid), advocates of progress, and “Reformers” (Islahkhvahun) etc. Calls for progress and reform voiced by other groups in the Bukharan society, including the elite in the fiscal administration and the last emirs, have received much less attention and been taken less serious. In much of the Soviet historiography on 19th and early 20th century Bukhara, “progress” has largely been a measurement of the level of conformity to western norms and preferences in terms of a transition from one stage of development to another more advanced stage that, in a Weberian sense, is more rationally organized as opposed to being more regulated by traditions and norms. In this historiography there is also a very Eurocentric distribution of historical periods such as the Middle Ages and the Enlightenment, with accompanying descriptions such as fanaticism, darkness, superstition, despotism, etc. One illustrative example of this is the historiography of the Bukharan Muslim scholar, Ahmad Makhdum “Kalla” (1827–1897). As a result of Soviet historiography he became known as the “progressive thinker” Ahmad Danish (daniš = “knowledge”), or by another of his nicknames Muhandas, which was translated as “construction engineer,” with his skills in astronomy being stressed rather than his skills in astrology, etc. The questions never really asked were whether Ahmad Kalla himself subscribed to some version of the concept of progress, and if so, how he conceptualized it. This is partly explainable by a lack of interest in conceptual history, a rather novel subject, but it may also be due to the constraints placed on the historical sciences by a totalitarian Marxist-Leninist state and its containment of progress and the apocalyptic.

In the large and ethnically and culturally heterogeneous Soviet Union, historiography became but one tool among many used in attempts to create a common past and future, with similar historical experiences for all Soviet citizens, a common frame of reference. In the Central Asian context, this historiography was also a way of downplaying the increased importance of

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3 See for example Adeb Khalid, “Society and Politics in Bukhara, 1868–1920”, Central Asian Survey 19, no. 3–4 (2000): esp. 384; Seymour Becker, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924 (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 107–121, 195–198. This is at least partially to be blamed on the dominance of the accounts of Sadr al-Din Ayni in this historiography, where the Jadid are generally described as the only committed reformers, while others were described as compromised due to their political ambitions and lust for power.
4 For a discussion on the latter, see Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modesty (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).
5 For Danish’s nicknames, see Rasul Hodizoda, Ahmedi Donish. Tarjimai hol va merosi adabiyyu ilmi (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1976), 19–24.
6 The most notable examples of this historiography include Ibragim Muminov, Iz istorii razvitiya obshchestvenno-filosofskoi myсли v Uzbekistane: kontsa xix i nachala xx vv (Tashkent: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo Uzbekskoi SSR, 1957) and Zarif Razhakov, Iz istorii obshchestvenno-politicheskoi myсли tadjikskogo naroda vo vtoroi polovine xix nachala xx vv (Stalinabad: Tadzhikskoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1957).
the contacts with Turkic and Persian communities both outside and inside the Russian empire during the 19th and especially the early 20th century, contacts that were a threat to the creation of a Soviet identity for the Muslims of Central Asia. Compared with Ahmad Kalla and his generation, born during the first half of the 19th century, many reform-minded Bukharan intellectuals or reformers, for lack of a better term commonly referred to as the “The New” (Jadid), born some fifty years later, maintained close contacts with Muslim communities, both inside and outside the Russian empire, during the early 20th century. Their Bukharan reformers called themselves advocates of progress.

In order to belittle the Bukharan reformers, who suffered greatly during the repression in the thirties,7 Soviet historians began to focus on the alleged indigenous predecessors of the early 20th century Bukharan reformers, especially Ahmad Kalla, who was called “the father of the Jadid ideas”.8 From the 1940s and onwards, Ahmad Kalla has instead been referred to as an “enlightener” (maorifparvar),9 theoretically excluding him from being a pan-Turkist or pan-Islamist like the Jadid. Ahmad Kalla was thus put on the same trajectory as 19th century Russian socialists and to a considerable degree analysed according to the same concepts as the European 18th century enlightenment.10 Valuable works certainly were published on Ahmad Kalla during the Soviet era as well, most notably Rasul Hodizoda’s detailed study

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8 See for example E. É. Bertel’s, “Sostoyanie rabot po izucheniyu istorii tadhzikskoi literatury”, in Zapiski Instituta Vostokovedenia Akademii nauk 3 (1933), and Mirzozoda, “Ahmad maxdumi Doniš mulaqqab ba Ahmadi Kalla,” Baroji adaBijjoti sotsialisti 3 (1936).

9 In Tajik the word “enlightener” was translated by the neologism maorifparvar. In the Entsiklopediyai Sovetii Tojik maorifparvarî, i.e. enlightenment, is defined as a cultural and sociopolitical movement, represented in Europe by Voltaire, Montesquieu, Lessing and Goethe. ( Entsiklopediyai Sovetii Tojik, s.v. “Maorifparwarî”). In the Tadzhikso-Russkiî Slovar’ the term is translated as prosvetitel’svo (“educational activities, cultural activities”), pokrovitel’svo prosveshcheniya (“patronage/support of education/enlightenment”), pooshchenie prosveshcheniya (“encouragement of education/enlightenment”). The terms thus hardly differ from ma’rifatparvar, i.e stornniki prosveshcheniya (“supporter of enlightenment”) and prosvetitel’ (“enlightener”). (Tadzhikso-Russkiî Slovar’, ed. E. É. Bertel’s, M. V. Rakhimi and L. V. Uspenskoi [Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’svo inostrannykh i nacional’nykh slovaret, 1954]). Although the 18th and 19th century quests for reforms by some of Russia’s Muslims, most notably the Tatars, were by the reformers themselves compared with the European reformation, (See Ahmet Kanlidere, Reform within Islam: The Tajdid and Jadid Movement among the Kazan Tatars [1809–1917]: Conciliation or Conflict [Istanbul: Eren, 1997], 58–60) this was fairly uncommon among the Muslims of Central Asia during the 19th and early 20th century.

from 1976.\textsuperscript{11} But as Hodizoda’s study also formally adheres to the enlightenment paradigm, it is not entirely unproblematic reading.

The enlightenment paradigm was also applied to other Soviet peoples, providing various peoples in the Soviet Union with their own enlighteners. All Soviet peoples, past, present, and future, were proceeding along the same trajectory in accordance with Soviet monicausality through nation building towards socialism and communism.\textsuperscript{12} In Soviet historiography at least, the enlighteners completely overshadowed the Jadīdī until late perestroika when the Jadīdī were given more attention and ascribed a greater role as secular intellectuals, especially in Uzbekistan, in the creation of modern nations in Central Asia.\textsuperscript{13}

The Bukharan experience of the 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century was not necessarily more unique than that of other Muslim societies, but its history may have been more ideologically plagued than many others. In the very influential writings of Sadr al-Din Ayni (1878–1954), one of the few Jadīdī who survived Stalin’s purges, the “enlighteners” and the Jadīdī have been portrayed as the only genuine promoters of reform and progress in the emirate of Bukhara. This heritage, and the enlightenment paradigm, have contributed to a conceptual confusion and a problem of the contextualization of in particular 19\textsuperscript{th} century Bukharan intellectual history;\textsuperscript{14} a problem that has been aggravated by a late and post-Soviet approach to 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century Bukhara that views it in terms of secularism, modernity and a quest for reform and nation building, and focuses on reformist Muslim scholars and merchants. Other groups interested in reforming Bukharan society have largely been neglected. The research remains focused on the Jadīdī, their allies and Ahmad Kalla, rather than on the opponents of reform, commonly referred to as the “old” (Qadīmī),\textsuperscript{15} or Ahmad Kalla’s contemporary antagonists.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{11} Hodizoda, Ahmadi Donish.


\textsuperscript{14} For an early post-Soviet attempt to address this, see Sherzod Abdulloev, Maarifparvarī va ozodfikrī (Dushanbe: Al Jumhūri Tojikiston, 1994).

\textsuperscript{15} For a study on a qadīmī, see Franz Wennberg, An Inquiry into Bukharian Qadīmīsm: Mirzā Salīm-bīk (Berlin and Halle: Klaus Schwarz, 2003). See also the Russian translation of Salimbek’s history, Ta’rikh-i Salimī, i.e. Mirza Salimbek, Ta’rikh-i-Salimi, ed. A. S. Sagdullaev, trans. Naim Norkulov (Tashkent: Akademiya, 2009).

\textsuperscript{16} There have been a limited number of publications on some of his contemporaries. See, for example, Mirza ‘Abdal’Azim, Ta’rikh-i salatin-i Mangitiia, ed. and trans. A.M. Epifanova (Moscow: Izdatel’svo Vostochnoi literatury, 1962). There have also been some publications focusing on “literature” and “anthologies” (tażkira), such as R. Hadi-zade, Istochniki k izucheniyu tadhikhskoi literatury vtoroi polovini xix veka (Stalinabad: Izdatel’svo Akademii nauk Tadhikhskoi SSR, 1956) and Rasul Hodizoda, Adabiyoti tojik dar nimai duvvami asri xix (Dushanbe: Donish, 1968).
The reformist framework of Ahmad Kalla, his contemporaries, and his successors, shows many similarities with reformers elsewhere in the Muslim world. This included an increased emphasis on the Quran and the Sunna, as well as an emphasis on the “Pious Forefathers” (Salaf-i Şâlih), including thinkers such as Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328) and al-Ghazzali (1058–1111). The Bukharan Muslim scholar Ayni’s interest in Ahmad Kalla, which is reflected in his works from the late 1910s and onwards, was thus probably not due to his being a russified progressive enlightener, but because he translated al-Ghazzali’s “Alchemy of Happiness” (Kîmîyâ al-sa’âdat) and “Council for Kings” (Naṣîhat al-mulâık) into a call for reform in his work “Rare Events” (Navodir-ul-vaqoe) in 19th century Bukhara, and because he belonged to the same network of Muslim scholars that continued to refer to al-Ghazzali’s works, such as Abd al-Rauf Fitrat (1886–1938), in their calls for reform. The reformers of the early 20th century were thus no secular intellectuals, and their calls for progress were also similar to those of more reknowned Muslim modernists that emphasized spiritual restoration.

While post-Soviet scholarship has addressed some of the problems above and contributed to the social, historiographical, and religious history of Bukhara during the protectorate era, though some have continued to follow the

17 For Ahmad Kalla’s extensive use of al-Ghazzali’s Kîmîyâ al-sa’âdat and Naṣîhat al-mulâık, see Hodizoda, Ahmadi Donish, 224–230. In 1849 or 1850, Ahmad Kalla copied Kîmîyâ al-sa’âdat for Emir Shah Murad. This copy, like many other works of Ahmad Kalla, later ended up in the judge Muhammad Sharifjan Makhdum’s private library where Ayni probably got acquainted with it. Sharifjan Makhdum had several more copies of the work, see Šedmon Vohidov and Aftandil Erkinov, “Le fihrist (catalogue) de la bibliothèque de Şadr-i Ziyâ: une image de la vie intellectuelle dans le Mavarannahr (fin XIXe – début XXe siècles)”, Cahiers d’Asie Centrale 7 (1999): 165.

18 For Fitrat on Ghazzali, see especially Fitrat’s Rahbar-i najât, in, for example, Abdurauf Fitrati Bukhoroj [henceforth Fitrat], “Rohbari najot”, ed. Muhhabbat Jalilova, Sadoi sharq, no. 7–8 (1992): 16–59; and no. 9 (1992): 8–54.

“Soviet tradition”, there are as of yet no substantial studies of the history of central political, social or historical concepts used by the Bukharans during the protectorate era. It is this void that this study has the ambition to fill by focusing on progress as one of the concepts that was transformed during this period.

1.4 Main authors

The main authors and their key works are given short introductions here below. Other authors are given short introductions in the text. The prime criterion in selecting primary sources was having been written before the Red Army’s invasion of Bukhara in September 1920, as it is very difficult to retrospectively reconstruct the variations in the concept of progress before 1920 from works written after 1920. In this work too, there is a considerable focus on Ahmad Kalla and the Bukharan reformers of the 20th century, but several rarely studied persons and manuscripts are also included.

Ahmad Kalla received a traditional education, but later began to work for the emir, partly as an astrologist. He visited Russia together with Bukharan embassies in 1857, 1869, and 1874. He later worked as a judge in various districts around Bukhara. The works of Ahmad Kalla most frequently referred to here include his above-mentioned Rare Events. The version used here is the one edited and published by Rasul Hodizoda and Aliqul Devonqulov 1988 and 1989. This was also the first time a “complete” version of this work was published. It is a critical edition based on three out of at least eight manuscripts of the Rare Events. The first was written in 1881 by the author, the second copied in 1908, and the third in 1936. At least four manuscripts kept in Tashkent are not used, as is at least one manuscript kept in

Dushanbe. The latter was also copied in 1936 or 1937, while the three manuscripts kept in Tashkent were copied in 1903/04, 1910, and 1933/34. The fourth manuscript in Tashkent is not dated and is very short. If not otherwise stated, the references in this work are to the manuscript written in 1881 according to Hodizoda and Devonqulov’s edition from 1988 and 1989.

Ahmad Kalla’s “Treatise on the Manghit dynasty”, a history of the Manghit dynasty, was published in a critical edition of Abdulghani Mirzoev in 1960 as Risola yo mukhtasare az ta’rikhi saltanati khonadoni Manghitiya. It is based on five manuscripts. The first was written by Ahmad Kalla not later than 1878, the second was copied in 1935, the third in 1957, the fourth in 1933, and the fifth in 1944. Here too, if not otherwise stated, the references in this work are to the manuscript written not later than 1878.

Ahmad Kalla’s “Criteria of Religiosity” (Mi’yār al-tadayyun) was published in Dushanbe in 2010. The references in this work are, however, all to a manuscript kept in Uzbekistan (IVANRUz, no. 2187) dated 1894. Of the other manuscripts, two are dated 1894, one 1909, and one is not dated. The Criteria of Religiosity is a religious treatise that to a considerable extent was intended to give praise to the Sunni Hanafiya law school, but also to discredit the Shias. Compared to Rare Events and his Treatise on the Manghit Dynasty, the Criteria of Religiosity seems to have been more popular during Ahmad Kalla’s own lifetime, at least to judge from the number of manuscripts.

Another person who figures prominently in this work is Abd al-Rahman Bukharayi, better known as Tamkin (d. 1918). Only one monograph has been written about him, mainly dealing with the collections of his poems kept in Dushanbe. Three of his manuscripts kept in Tashkent are described in the SVR series. Abd al-Rahman Bukhara-yi Tamkin was a teacher at a madrasa in Bukhara until he retired, which probably occurred in 1905 or 1906. Among the works he wrote during the 20th century is the “Glorious Risings and Manifest Subjects” (Maṭāliʿ al-fākhira va maṭālib al-zāhira), a voluminous history of the world possibly finished in 1916 and extensively cited here.

22 See Mss. IVANRUz, nos. 4266, 814, 2095, and 5093/X.
23 Ahmad Makhduomi Donish, Risola yo mukhtasare az ta’rikhi saltanati khonadoni Manghitiya, ed. Abdulghani Mirzoev (Stalinabad: Nashriyoti Davlatii Tojikiston, 1960), I–V.
24 Ahmadi Donish, Meyor-ut-tadayyun (Dushanbe: ÈR-graf, 2010).
25 Hodizoda, Ahmadi Donish, 84–86.
26 Askar Jonfido, Abdurahmon Tamkin: Muntakhabi ash’or (Dushanbe: Donish, 1974).
27 Mullā ‘Abd al-Rahman Tamkīn Bukhārāyī [henceforth Tamkīn], Jarāʿid, Ms. IVANRUz, no. 2877, fols. 3ab.
28 ‘Abd al-Rahman Tamkīn Bukhārāyī [henceforth Tamkīn], Maṭāliʿ al-fākhira va maṭālib al-zāhira, Ms. IVANRUz, no. 8245. See SVR, 11: 31–32. Jarāʿid is dated 1905 and his Rubāʿiyāt-i Tamkīn (Ms. IVANRUz, no 136) is dated 1902. These two works are described in SVR, 2: 366–367. His work Mullastān is dated 1905.
According to Rasul Hodizoda, Tamkin belonged to a group of people that visited Ahmad Kalla every now and then and defended him against the “reactionaries” (irtijā’parastān) and spread his “progressive ideas” (fikrhā-yi pīshqadam). However, the works of Tamkin studied here do not support that claim. In one of the few places, possibly the only one, where Tamkin mentions Ahmad Kalla, he calls him “the liar of liars”, and tells a story about someone who visited Ahmad Kalla to receive astrological forecasts. In this context it should be noted that the lexemes irtijā’parastān (“reactionaries”) and pīshqadam (“progressive”) are both neologisms absent in the works of both Ahmad Kalla and Tamkin. Tamkin’s works are mainly referred to in this work to exemplify an author who, like Ahmad Kalla, did not use a modern concept of progress.

Sadr al-Din Aynī is also frequently mentioned in this work. He was educated in a village maktab and then at the madrasas in Bukhara. He began to work for the judge Sharifjan Makhdum (Sadr-i Ziya), who also was the link between Aynī and Kalla, and later became active in reformist circles in the emirate. He also worked at the cotton-ginning mill in Qizilteppa. The mill belonged to the Mansurov family, who were very active supporters of reforms in the emirate. Aynī wrote and published most of his works after 1920, but the works most referred to in this study date from the late 1910s. One work frequently referred to is his “History of the Intellectual Revolution in Bukhara” (Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro) written in 1918 but first published in 2005. Also frequently referred to is his history on the Manghit Dynasty, published in the revolutionary journal “The Flame of the Revolution” (Shu’la-yi inqilāb) between 1919 and 1921. This journal, based in the Shia community of Baghshumal in Samarkand, is also frequently referred to here.

Another journal of considerable interest is “The Noble Bukhara” (Bukhārā-yi sharīf), published in Kagan between 1912 and 1913. The first editor of the journal, Mirza Jalal Yusuf-zada, was originally from Iranian Azerbaijan. He had also worked for a newspaper in Baku. It is possible that he was only in Bukhara for a few years before being expelled by the Russian authorities in early 1913. Several of the articles mentioned here were written by him.

Mirza Siraj (1877–1914) was one of the initiators behind The Noble Bukhara. His father was a moneychanger. Mirza Siraj studied Russian at home, and later French, Turkish, Geography, and Mathematics in a Russian school in Kagan. He had also studied in a madrasa. Mirza Siraj was engaged in the cotton trade, visited Russia, Europe and the Middle East, and eventually

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29 Hodizoda, Ahmadi Donish, 55.
30 Abd al-Rahman Bukhārāyī Tamkīn [henceforth Tamkīn], Mullastān, Ms. IVANRUz, no. 337, fol. 45b.
opened a pharmacy upon his return to Bukhara in 1910. Next to the editor of the newspaper, Mirza Jalal Yusuf-zada, he published the most articles in the newspaper The Noble Bukhara. Mirza Sirja’s travelogue, “Gifts to the Bukharans” (Tuhaaf-i ahl-i Buxhārā), is extensively cited here.

Another travelogue cited in this work is the one written by Mahmud Khvaja Bihbudi (1874–1919), “Travel Memoires” (Sayāhat khātiralarī), which was published in the journal “The Mirror” (Āyina) in 1914. It mainly describes his travels in the Middle East. One of Bihbudi’s geographical works, “An Introduction to General Geography” (Madkhal-i jughrāfiyā-yi ‘umrānī), is also extensively used. It was published in Samarkand in 1905. Bihbudi’s father was a judge. Bihbudi was educated in the maktab and madrasa, and was an active supporter of reformed education. He travelled widely, especially in the Middle East.

One of the most prominent Bukharan Muslim scholars during the early 20th century was Abd al-Rauf Fitrat. He also came from a merchant family, and was not only educated in Bukhara, but also studied in Istanbul between 1909 and 1914. It was there that he also wrote two very influential works: “Debate between a Bukharan Teacher and a European in India about the New Schools” (Munāzāra-yi mudarris-i Buxhārā-yi bā yak nafar-i farangi dar Hindustān dar bāra-yi makātib-i ja’dīda) and “Tales of an Indian Traveller” (Bayānāt-i sayyāh-i hindī). In 1915 he also published his work “The

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33 There are several different editions; the one referred to here is the one published in Teheran, i.e. Mirzā Sirāj ad-Dīn Ḥājī Mirzā ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf, Safarnāma-yi Tuhaaf-i Buxhārā, ed. Muḥammad Asādī (Teheran: Bū ‘Ali, 1369 [1909–1910]). The original edition is Mirzā Sirāj ad-Dīn Ḥakīm b. Mirzā Ḥājī ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf, Tuhaaf-i ahl-i Buxhārā (Kagan: Buxhārā-yi Ṣhartī, 1912). There is also a modern Tajik edition, Mirзо Sirojiddin Hakim, Tuhaafī ahlī Buhkhor, ed. Salohiddin Solehov and Masrur Mirzoev (Dushanbe: Adib, 1992), and a French translation by Stéphane Dudoignon, Mirzā Sirādj ad-Dīn Ḥakīm, Souvenirs de voyage pour les gens de Boukhara.

34 Shimada Shizuo, An Index of Āyina (Tokyo, 2002), 74–75.

35 Mahmūd Khvāja valad Bihbūd Khvāja khaṭṭīb-i Samarqandī [henceforth Bihbūdī], Madkhal-i jughrāfiyā-yi ‘umrānī (Samarkand, 1905).

36 For a short but well-researched biography of Bihbūdī, see Shimada, An Index of Āyina, esp. 1–9; see also Adeed Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), esp. 80–81.

37 For a short biography of Fitrat’s reformist activities, see Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform, esp. 111–113.

38 Fitrat Buhhārāyī [henceforth Fitrat], Munāzāra-yi mudarris-i Buxhārā-yi bā yak nafar Farangi dar Hindustān dar bāra-yi makātib-i ja’dīda (Istanbul: Ḥikmat, 1327 [1909]).

Guide to Salvation” (Rahbar-i najāt), which is a call for progress with references to classical Islamic treatises, such as al-Ghazzali’s works mentioned above.

1.5 Empirical constraints

Writing a conceptual history of progress in Bukhara poses several methodological problems when it comes to selecting the sources. Access to primary sources, while plentiful in Central Asia, requires prolonged field studies, especially for unpublished sources but also of published ones. There are still no reliable OCR-programs for the Arabic script, so larger corpus databases with Bukharan texts from the 19th and 20th century are still lacking. This puts considerable constraints upon the empirical foundation of any conceptual history in Bukhara, a country that in a time span of less than 60 years went from being relatively isolated emirate with a pre-print culture and with hand made paper to a country integrated in the global world economy.

It is obvious that the sources used in this study cannot represent all variations in the concept of progress, either diachronic or synchronic. Also, the authors of the sources used for this research had in some cases very different audiences. By also considering the extremely rich manuscript collections only in Tashkent, it is obvious that the range of variations in the concept of progress is extremely wide. A study like this can thus not even pretend to be exhaustive. It should only be regarded as an adventurous and tentative first step towards a more comprehensive conceptual history of progress in Bukhara during the protectorate era. Considering the key sources here, however, this study at least sheds some light on how progress was conceptualized by some of those who often have been seen as the most progressive elements of the emirate, as well as on how a well-informed person like Tamkin could write a world history as late as 1916 without using a modern concept of progress at all and on some of Ahmad Kalla’s usages of the lexeme taraqqī. Bearing all this in mind, we can say that this work sheds light on at least part of the discursive landscape of progress during the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century.

40 The work was originally published in St Petersburg in 1915. Here modern editions are used, Fitrat, “Rohbari najot”, Sadoi sharq, no. 7–9, as well as Fitrat Hoji Abduraufi Bukhoro’i [henceforth Fitrat], Rahbari najot, ed. Abdulhay Mamadaminov (Dushanbe: Shujoiyon, 2011).

41 Zerspiegel is a very laudable project, although many of the sources referred to here are not found in it, accessed Sept. 16, 2012, http://zerspiegel.orientphil.uni-halle.de.

42 Bukhara was thus only relatively isolated in terms of western influence. In many ways Bukhara had been integrated in the Islamic world since the late 17th century. See for example Stefan Reichmuth, “The Interplay of Local Developments and Transnational Relations in the Islamic World: Perceptions and Perspectives”, in Kügelgen, Kemper, and Frank, esp. 19–21.
1.6 The structure of the work

The present chapter provides the reader with a clue as to what this work is about. The following chapter contains the theoretical framework and conceptual system that permeates the work. Progress is here discussed in terms of an ideal type where human beings are expected to gradually create a much better society on earth, rather than after a great war as in the eschatological scenario of cataclysmic apocalypticism. The latter scenario frequently emphasizes divine rather than human agency. But progress is also discussed here in terms of a concept that signifies optimization with regard to an eschatological scenario of progressive millenarianism and transformational apocalypticism, in which humans are expected to reach some kind of perfection.

The concept of progress in the 19th and early 20th century Muslim world is hence discussed against a background of millenarianism and reform, and in terms of a partial paradigmatic shift from a prophetic discourse with a focus on a looming end of the world, to a discourse of progress with a focus on a new beginning and where the end of the world is largely irrelevant. This chapter also includes a theoretical discussion of the concept of geography in terms of space as a predefined grid where things are located, and place, which is more of a social construct.

Chapter Three presents the historical setting and discusses the developments that took place in the emirate of Bukhara against the background of a hitherto globally unique rate of innovation and industrialization from the 1860s to the outbreak of World War I. For Bukhara, this was also the colonial era, when the emirate was under Russian control and became integrated into a global economic and political system to a degree never experienced before. This chapter also serves as a historical background to the subsequent conceptual history of progress.

Chapter Four discusses in general terms the concept of geography in Bukhara against a background of structural changes in a colonial time and the globalization of new form of spatial organization with an increased emphasis on a space-based concept of geography at the expense of a place-based concept of geography. It is argued that the conceptualization of progress is very different depending on the amount of geographical emphasis on place and space respectively.

Chapter Five explores the conceptualization of novelties in terms of a progressive perspective or in terms of a category such as the “marvels of creation”. It discusses an increased polarization of the “new” and the “old”, partly in terms of modernist aesthetics, but also as an aspect of the emerging concept of progress in Bukhara in the heyday of the second industrial revolution.

Connecting to the discussion in Chapter Three on how the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century marked a historical discontinuity, Chapter Six explores how this discontinuity was conceptualized in
Bukhara. This discontinuity was conceived not only in terms of progress, but also gave rise to apocalyptic expectations, or at least fed apocalyptic rhetoric. To a large degree, the temporal debate in Bukhara during this period reflected a disagreement over the direction of discontinuity. The end always implies a new beginning, but what was the nature of the end and of the new beginning?

Chapter Seven connects to the discussion of the nature of the technical and industrial developments during the late 19th and early 20th century, and how these were based on science and education as well as how the battle over reformed education also can be analysed in terms of a disagreement over the direction of discontinuity. Chapter Seven explores not only the temporal implications of the quest for reformed education, but also how this battle reflected a space-based concept of geography.

Chapter Eight discusses various explanations of progress and decline and their eschatological implications, including the transformation of eschatological agents. This chapter also includes a brief discussion of how cosmographical categories were used to conceptualize technical and industrial development before the appearance of a “discourse on progress”, and how the concept of progress was formed by the technological and social developments during this time.

The setting of Chapter Nine is the troublesome 1910s and the increased political struggle that not only involved various Bukharan factions, but eventually also the Bolsheviks. Not only did the political battles during this decade reflect a disagreement over the direction of discontinuity, but the Bukharan reformers were also challenged by the Bolsheviks’ attempt to confine progress, the advocates of progress, and the apocalyptic within the eschatological scenario of the revolution.

The last chapter, Chapter Ten, sums up the work with a brief discussion about the operative environment of the concept of progress in Bukhara between the 1860s and the 1920s.
2. A conceptual history of progress

2.1 Progress and concepts

Although it is our ambition to follow Kari Palonen’s call for a “conceptual history which should be practised as a history of the concepts used by primary human agents rather than as a history of concepts used by the interpreters,”\(^\text{43}\) we have to come up with some kind of definition of the concept of progress - an interpreter’s idealized model of progress or “an ideal type”, - as a point of departure. Largely following Reinhart Koselleck, we can say that progress signifies a technological-social process; it transgresses previous experience and raises expectations of a future that is different from the past. As such, it has an indefinite number of temporal extensions. The direction of progress is evident in its horizontal metaphorical structure and paradigmatic relationships with advancement and backwardness. That is, the temporal concept of progress has a spatial metaphorical structure, something that is also etymologically evident, as progress is derived from Latin *pro-* “forward” + *gradior* “to walk”.\(^\text{44}\) This metaphorical structure also emphasizes that progress belongs to the realm of human agency.

In very general terms we can argue that, for the Bukharans, the concept of progress was a borrowed concept, a conceptual loan embedded in the lexeme *taraqqī*, which some Bukharans began to use during the first or second decade of the 20\(^{th}\) century, and that historical consciousness, including the concept of progress, was very much influenced by Russian, Tatar, Ottoman, etc. discourses on history.\(^\text{45}\) Etymologically, *taraqqī* is derived from Arabic root *raqiya*, which, at least in Bukhara before the 20\(^{th}\) century, meant “to ascend”. Only first in the early 20\(^{th}\) century did *taraqqī* acquire a horizontal metaphorical structure in Bukhara. This suggests that before the 20\(^{th}\) century,

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taraqqī and progress had different metaphorical structures, different trajectories, and most likely different spatial and temporal boundaries.

In order to go beyond progress as a conceptual loan and shed some light on the discursive landscape of progress in Bukhara, we would need to write a prehistory of the concept in question. Here we have to be aware that by tracing a concept embedded in a lexeme back in time one runs the risk of projecting a concept onto a society at a time when the lexeme in question existed, but not the concept.\textsuperscript{46} If progress, as a conceptual loan, was embedded in the lexeme taraqqī by its users during the second decade of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century in Bukhara, it does not follow that it was done so earlier, or by everyone.\textsuperscript{47} Although Adeeb Khalid discusses “the centrality of progress to the Jadid project”,\textsuperscript{48} the majority of Bukharans probably did not use the concept. As we will see in this study, apocalyptic rhetoric in the form of the looming threat of an imminent end of the world is frequently encountered in 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century manuscripts from Bukhara. An example of the latter is an anti-Russian apocalyptic treatise that allegedly circulated in Bukhara at the time of the Russian conquest.\textsuperscript{49} We also have testimonies of expectations of the end of the world among Turkmens during the civil war and during the collectivization,\textsuperscript{50} as well as during early Soviet rule when the campaign to force women to unveil (the hujum) was taken as a sign that the end of the world was close.\textsuperscript{51}

Although expectations of an imminent catastrophic and cosmic apocalypse are contrary to our ideal type of progress above, at least some of those who held such expectations, or used such rhetoric, nevertheless used the lexeme taraqqī,\textsuperscript{52} and we will thus argue that “their” taraqqī did not contain the concept of progress, at least not the ideal type. Still, by tracing the lexeme taraqqī back in time, we will be able to shed some light on a changing discursive landscape and the appearance of the discourse on progress, though we have to avoid the fallacy of uncritical historical and contemporary conceptual translation of taraqqī as progress in the sense of an ideal-type.


\textsuperscript{47} Or not even after. For example, taraqqī is not be found in Sadriddin Aynī, “Lughati nimtašilī tojikī baroi zaboni adabī tojikī”, in \textit{Kulliyot}, vol. 12, ed. Rahim Hoshim (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1976). This work was originally written in 1938.

\textsuperscript{48} Khalid, \textit{The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform}, 107.

\textsuperscript{49} See ”O polozhenii nashikh del v Buharskom Khanstve,” \textit{Moskva} 25 (1898).


\textsuperscript{52} For the latter, see Wennberg, \textit{An Inquiry into Bukharan Qadimism}, esp. 53.
Progress, like any concept, is dependent upon its operative environment at any given time and place. It is polyvalent, has multiple signifiers, and is always changing. This conceptual approach is largely derived from German *Begriffsgeschichte* as represented by Koselleck, and the Cambridge School as represented by J.G.A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner. In this view, concepts have no “contemporary meanings”, only “contemporary controversies”\(^{53}\) or contested meanings affected by everyday speech acts that force the users to make constant reconceptualizations. A concept, according to this line of reasoning is always ambiguous, as it has many meanings, while at the same time it possesses “a substantial claim to generality”.\(^{54}\) The linear trajectory of the ideal type of progress thus stands in sharp contrast to any conceptual history of progress that has to take into account the fact that any concept is in a state of constant flux.

One could imagine that some kind of progress, embedded in the lexeme *taraqqī*, is a central concept of modernity and hence is highly coloured by ideology. A western orientation of this kind of progress could be seen as unavoidable, as the idealized cognitive model of the contemporary era during much of the 19\(^{th}\) and early 20\(^{th}\) century was situated to a considerable degree in the developed world and constructed by western technology, modes of social organization, and notions of bureaucracy. Calls for progress in the developing world were often framed in terms of a struggle to become contemporary, to achieve contemporaneity that was the struggling nations’ future.

This concept of progress could be contrasted with a *taraqqī* structured with a vertical metaphor, a vertical progress, where increasing spiritual sublimation and religious piety could be seen as some kind of spiritual progress with societal implications, and have a very different “historical causality”.\(^{55}\) This raises several questions. One is related to agency: what is making progress and how? This question is interrelated with a question of geography. That is, a nation or a state could be claimed to make progress, but that presupposes that there is a concept of a nation or state. How does a map-less society, where space has different mediators, allow us to conceptualize progress? This implies that progress is dependent on a concept of geography. Yet another question is: why progress? Why do people believe or not believe in progress, or refer to progress in their rhetoric? Is it because a rhetor has argued in favour of progress, or because of some external factors, such as a


\(^{55}\) For a brief discussion on this in Shia Islam, see Henry Corbin, *Spiritual Body and Celestial Man: from Mazdean Iran to Shi‘ite Iran* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990), esp. 236–237.
high rate of technical innovation, that make belief in progress more plausible?

2.2 Temporal boundaries

Koselleck’s macro-historical theory about the shift in the metahistorical categories of experience and expectation is based on his studies of German-speaking Europe at the time of the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. In his view, the French Revolution and the abolition of the old class society gave rise to new power structures that were far more flexible. This, combined with rapid technical developments during the Industrial Revolution, contributed to a shift in the formerly closely linked metahistorical categories of experience and expectation, and thus to a structural change in temporality; it caused a temporalization (Verzeitlichung), a shift from experience to expectation in the temporal structure of central political and social concepts. As long as the doctrine of the Final Day existed, the future had remained bound to the past, as any expectations beyond previous experience were directed to the hereafter.\(^{56}\) Acceleration, the alteration in the rhythm of temporal experience, was thus transformed from initially being “perceived in terms of an apocalyptic expectation of temporal abbreviation heralding the Last Judgement, […] into a concept of historical hope”\(^{57}\) and brought about an open-ended future devoid of its earlier threat of finality.\(^{58}\)

In this work at least, the metahistorical category of experience is not limited to directly perceived experiences, but also includes experiences mediated by other subjects and objects. This has, in a western context, been extensively elaborated upon by Stephen Kern, who discusses it in terms of a “spatially expanded present”, a “temporally thickened present” and the notion of “simultaneity”, whereby humans experienced an increasing number of events mediated by modern means of communication, such as the telegraph and newspapers. This new fabric of the present fostered a sense of unity of human experiences,\(^{59}\) and contributed to the formation of a common spatial and temporal framework for narrating human experiences and expectations.

The “bridging period”, “the origin of the modern”, in German-speaking Europe between the mid 18\(^{th}\) and the mid 19\(^{th}\) centuries is central to Koselleck’s theory.\(^{56,57,58,59}\)

\(^{56}\) Koselleck, *Futures Past*, 277.
\(^{59}\) For a eurocentric discussion on the “extended present” and the “simultaneity” it gave rise to, see Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space, 1880–1918* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), esp. chap. 3.
leck’s macro-theoretical approach to conceptual change, and is referred to as the *Sattelzeit*. This is a period marked by social and political structural change, when social and political concepts underwent a paradigm shift signified by a sense of discontinuity, and when the experience of the past and the expectations of the future drifted apart. The accelerated rhythm of experience contributed to a progressive perspective and a modernist aesthetic which included one among many of those polarizations that seem to have been typical of the ensuing period of “high modernism” - in this case between the new and the old. Koselleck argues that this tension generated a surplus of time, something that characterizes the time-producing concept of progress.

Koselleck’s theory of the *Sattelzeit* can be interpreted as postulating a problematic mechanistic appeal to progress, which is just as problematic as postulating a mechanistic appeal to the apocalypse. Stephen O’Leary argues that experiencing events such as cholera, war, earthquakes, etc. cannot serve as a “main predisposing factor determining the apocalyptic set”, because not all such events are followed by increased apocalyptic expectations. Someone still has to argue that certain events or things are signs of progress or the Last Judgement. An exclusively metahistorical approach to the conceptual history of progress thus runs the risk of not paying enough attention to discursive manipulations of historical time. Hence, a rhetorical approach to historical time includes not only the postulate that “human experience of time [is] subject to discursive manipulation”, but also that such manipulation is an instrument for social control and political mobilization. Progress can thus be seen as a concept that serves to open up a new temporal space for

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60 See Gabriel Motzkin, “On the Notion of Historical (Dis)continuity: Reinhart Koselleck’s construction of the *Sattelzeit*”, *Contributions to a History of Concepts* 1, no. 2 (October 2005): 145–158. For Koselleck the *Sattelzeit* is an analytical concept and does not correspond to any historical periodization made by those living at that time. However, both due to the direction of its discontinuity and its claim to structural change, the *Sattelzeit* is a periodization imposed by a historian (For example, Koselleck has failed to explain why the *Sattelzeit* ended around 1850. See Kari Palonen, “The Politics of Conceptual History”, 41) and it has an ideological colour. Still, Koselleck’s concept of the *Sattelzeit* and the temporalization which he claims occurred then are suitable analytical concepts for trying to understand the different and changing conceptualizations of time during an era which some Bukharans themselves called “the new time” (*zamān-i jadīḍ*). This analysis is thus less dependent on the academic concept of *Sattelzeit*, as some of the Bukharans themselves conceptualized many of the temporal changes Koselleck ascribes to the *Sattelzeit* during a time they themselves called the new time.


64 O’Leary, *Arguing the Apocalypse*, 44–45.
societal and political transformation, while a rhetor of the opposing camp would stress continuity with the past. It can be argued that even Koselleck’s metahistorical categories of experience and expectations are subject to discursive manipulation.

Koselleck’s macro-historical theory of metahistorical shifts is also challenged by a cognitive approach to the analysis of progress and apocalyptic expectations. Whether technological inventions are seen as signs of a new era and the beginning of a new world, or as signs of the end of the world, is a matter of perspective. Temporal categorization is subject to discursive manipulation and is not bound by technological extrapolation. It is here that the Sattelzeit meets a modified version of Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance. That is, when prophecy fails and the world does not end on an expected date, dissonance is sometimes reduced through redating or shifting the eschatological scenario; an old world is replaced by a new world, an old time by a new time. Even meliorism can thus be seen as an eschatological scenario that follows from a disbelief not only in an imminent end of the world, but also in the idea of a negative development ending in a terminal decay preceding the arrival of a saviour; it can be a result of a cognitive dissonance caused by an accelerated rhythm of temporal experience, but also of discursive manipulation. If one has a rhetorical perspective, the shift in eschatological scenario would thus be a human act of temporal manipulation, such as the renaming of the Millerite paper “Midnight Cry” to “Morning Watch”, and “Watchman’s Last Warning” to “True Day Star” after the Great Disappointment in 1844 when prophecy failed and the world did not end, yet the affair nevertheless contributed to the creation of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. These and other renamings signified a shift in temporal orientations, from the end to a new beginning, and had little to do, as far as we know, with technological development.

The eschatological shift that is ascribed to an accelerated rhythm of temporal experience during the Sattelzeit was thus not necessarily more significant for its “believers” than the transition from Millerism to Seventh-Day Adventism. The Sattelzeit likewise did not cause a “universal” metahistorical shift, as evidenced by the continuing belief in divinely led catastrophic apocalypticisms after the Sattelzeit. This leads to the conclusion that a metahistorical shift, like an eschatological shift, is an individual experience at a

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given point in time. It is only societal in the sense of an aggregation of individuals, and it is discursively manipulable. The shifts are not necessarily unidirectional, and the direction can change depending on the circumstances. Koselleck’s theories of the Sattelzeit reflect a period with particular circumstances that led to a shift in a specific direction perceived and achieved by individuals in the areas Koselleck studied.

While traversing possible discursive landscapes of progress, there will be some landscapes in which apocalyptic ideas are more prevalent than in others. All variations in the concept of progress are hence not necessarily detached from eschatology, especially if the old definition of eschatology whereby it signifies ideas about the last things is replaced with Catherine Keller’s “somewhat more nuanced translation of this root word, saying it is best rendered as ‘edge’, which suggests an important difference. Prophets and commentators refer to [the] apocalypse as The End, but its focus ultimately is always on a new beginning, a sudden shift in the order of the world”. It is tempting to push Keller’s translation a bit further and relate eschatology to ideas about temporal discontinuity, regardless of the temporal location of the observer.

It is evident that eschatology also has a political function, especially when juxtaposed with manipulation of temporal discontinuity. In this context the apocalypse is perhaps not best described as an absolute end, but rather just as “the end of the world as we know it,’ an extreme social and cultural disjuncture in which dramatic events reshape the relations of many individuals at once in history”. Depending upon the duration of the Sattelzeit, its apocalyptic qualities are, against the background just pictured, more or less salient. It signifies both an end and a beginning. The above also implies that the direction of discontinuity is disputed during Sattelzeit periods.

Eschatological, or millennial theory adds an important historical dimension, especially from a rhetorical perspective, to Koselleck’s Sattelzeit. It suggests that the direction of discontinuity can change when the eschatological scenario is shifting, something which downplays the metahistorical perspective on behalf of a rhetorical perspective. It also suggests that progress can be conceptualized as an aspect of millenarianism and as an eschatological scenario where a much better, or even perfect society will be created in this world. It is especially in terms of perfection, as optimizing, that progress seems to fit in the latter eschatological scenario. Here one should also


keep in mind that progress, as used by some European 17th century thinkers, had a terminus in perfection. Catherine Wessinger also notes that “[b]elief in progress combined with the expectation of a collective terrestrial salvation was widespread among early-nineteenth-century American Christians”. The idea of terrestrial salvation is also found in Marxism-Leninism, which echoes a strong belief that humans will be able to control nature and create a perfect society on earth. It also partly explains the struggle in the Soviet Union to contain the apocalyptic and historicize competing futures.

The Great October [...] opened a qualitatively new page in the history of the peoples of Central Asia, who, with the brotherly help of the Russian people and under the guidance of the Leninist party, came out onto the wide and illuminated road of constructing a new, free, and happy life in the name of communism.

The different eschatological scenarios referred to in this work are derived from Richard Landes’ categories of millennial beliefs and eschatological scenarios. His categories are focused on three questions and are illustrated by a graph (fig. 1).

- “The apocalyptic question: when and how would the millennial transformation come about?” Cataclysmic or transformational apocalypticism?
- “The question of agency: who does what to bring about this transformation?” Active or passive agency?
- “The millennial question: what would the millennial kingdom after look like?” Authoritarian or hierarchical versus anarchic or demotic millenarianism?

Cataclysmic apocalypticism is the idea that a new society will be created only after a great destruction in which evil, in whatever shape, is defeated. Transformational apocalypticism, here synonymous with progressive millennialism, instead implies that a new society will gradually be created, without any large-scale physical destruction.

We will address the question of agency slightly differently than Landes, arguing that instead of viewing agency as active or passive, it is more accurate to describe it in terms of an emphasis on divine or human agency. An agency is always active, and the question is thus if it is God or humans that will create the new society.

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73 Wessinger, “Millennialism With and Without the Mayhem”, 50.
The millennial question is secondary in this work, but it will be argued that demotic millennialism reflects a concept of progress where the new society is a collective human achievement, whereas hierarchical millennialism reflects a much less egalitarian and democratic order.

Figure 1. Landes’ diagram of Apocalyptic and Millennial Variations

Conceptualizing progress in terms of non-apocalyptic thinking with an endless number of temporal extensions and devoid of an end-state is obviously at odds with the figure above. Yet, some features of progress, at least rhetorically, fit well into the eschatological scenario where demotic millennialism is located, especially the emphasis on human agency and the direction of discontinuity.

The point here is that even if not all Bukharans considered the colonial era, or parts of the colonial era, to be an apocalyptic time, apocalyptic thinking was prevalent in Bukhara. This was a very important aspect of the discursive landscape of progress, despite the fact, as we shall see, that some Bukharans seem to have used a very modern concept of progress that was close to our ideal type above. In the discourse on progress it is not the end of the world that threatens if progress is not made, but the end of the community, of country, of state; the end of a way of life. This suggests a spatially and temporally transformed apocalypticism.

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76 Landes, “Roosters Crow, Owls Hoot”, 27.
2.3 Spatial boundaries

Koselleck’s macro-historical theory of the *Sattelzeit* is focused more on changing temporal boundaries than spatial ones. He remarks, however, that time is always metaphorically structured in terms of space.\(^{77}\) From this follows that the conceptualization of geography is related to the conceptualization of time. Modern maps facilitate, for example, the imagination of modern nations and the writing of their histories.\(^{78}\) The public time of the nation-state is hence related to a temporal structure that, at least in part, is mediated by modern maps; a time that makes it possible to compare states in terms of progress and advancement, and relegate them to different temporal levels of the same chronologically uniform time. Maps thus facilitate a certain spatial understanding of time and make possible new metaphorical structures of time and temporal concepts.

Historically there is nothing self-evident about describing the technologically and socially more developed (for lack of a better term) “other” in terms of time - as being more advanced, as preceding someone or something else in terms of time. In Europe, the evolution of the concept of progress was related to how exotic peoples were integrated into the Europeans’ own past after the 15\(^{th}\) century, an integration by which a temporal transition of the European social order was “imposed on the spatial relationship between the new worlds and Europe in its entirety”.\(^{79}\) This process was facilitated not only by a “rediscovery of the Europe’s own ancient past”,\(^{80}\) but also by developments in the discipline of geography and the globalization of the nation-state.\(^{81}\) Social differences were accordingly conceptualized as temporal differences. However, the boundaries between the different spatial entities became timeless in the course of an anachronistic mythologization of the states.

Binkley Messick argues in his analysis of geographical knowledge in Yemen, that in a mapless geographical tradition, space was continuously “produced” by actors (human or supra-human) who moved in space (and


\(^{80}\) This process is described in Agnew, *Place and Politics in Modern Italy*, 67–70.

time) between cities and villages, etc. Messick contrasts this “produced space” with the “filled” and more static conception of space mediated by modern maps. Although we would argue that all space is produced, Messick’s notion of “produced space” is very similar not only to Robert Sack’s agency-based theories of place and space, but also his notion of “produced space” and “filled space”, translates well into John Agnew’s theories of place and space.

Space is seen by Agnew as a dimension, or as a grid where things are located, while place is a social construct, is “process oriented”, and is “associated with the familiar”. In place-based geography, geography is constructed through social relationships, imagined or real, rather than through a grid, as in space-based geography. The spatial mediators in the two different geographical conceptual systems are thus different; in place-based geography, space is mediated by social relationships, while in space-based geographies, maps are essential for the imagination of the territoriality of nations, or what Thongchai Winichakul calls the “geo-body”, the spatial-temporal nexus of a nation with all the components that constitute it, from protecting borders to emotions. A map of a nation state is thus a metasign; it generates “values and meanings which have nothing to do with territory at all.”

The spatial mediators make up the central temporal mediators. In space-based geographies maps signify a public time of their own. Agnew discusses the translation of time into space as follows:

82 The Bukharan ḥajjānāmas, the accounts of pilgrims’ travels, serve as one example of mapless geographical narratives. Space, or rather place, became significant when the pilgrim stopped and descended from the cart or horse. Manzil meant not only to descend, but also caravanserai, one day’s journey, or a mansion of the moon. In this geographical tradition, distance was thus most commonly measured in terms of time rather than space; there were so-and-so many manzil between two cities, etc.


85 Agnew gives the concept of place three dimensions:

- “locale, the settings in which social relations are constituted (these can be informal or institutional)”
- “location, the geographical area encompassing the settings for social interaction as defined by social and economic processes operating at a wider scale”
- “sense of place, the local ‘structure of feeling’”

See John A. Agnew, Place and Politics: the Geographical Mediation of State and Society (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 28. See also Agnew, Place and Politics in Modern Italy, 16, where “sense of place” is described as a “symbolic identification with a place as distinctive and constitutive of a personal identity and a set of personal interests.”

86 Agnew, Place and Politics in Modern Italy, 16.

87 Winichakul, Siam Mapped, 16–19, 138. It should be clarified that a space-based concept of geography is not dependent upon maps; narratives can also sustain it. Iran is a good example in this context; see for example the brief note by Bert G. Fragner, “Central Asian Aspects of Pre-modern Iranian History (14th to 19th century)”, Central Asian Survey 12, no. 4 (1993): 465–471.
locks of space (countries or regions) are labelled with the essential attributes of different periods relative to the idealized historical experience of one of the blocks. Hence territories are named as primitive or advanced and backward or modern. Progress occurs when the backward start to become like the modern. The terms are always applied at a single geographical scale (usually world regions, national states, or regions within states) while ‘bracketing’ (assuming away) the others. An implicit comparison with an ideal type unit (at the same scale) is then used to make generalizations about the condition of the backward one.88

What complicates the concepts of place and space is that the lexemes in use in the two different geographical knowledges are usually the same, but have two completely different signifieds, possibly even for the same person at the same time. Classical examples of this in Central Asia are millat (sometimes corresponding to “law-school” [mazhab], but later also the lexeme in which the modern concept of “nation” and “people” would be embedded) and vaṭan (“home”, the lexeme in which the modern concept of “homeland” later would be embedded). In the language of scale of the space-based geography, millat and vaṭan could have the same size as imagined through a map. This use of millat and vaṭan was, according to Komatsu Hisao, introduced to the Bukharans with the publication of Fitrat’s Debate in 1911 (despite Komatsu here translating millat as “people”):

Fitrat introduced the new concepts of vaṭan (fatherland) and millat (people) to the Bukharans in a positive and integrative sense. In his opinion, these are the fundamental principles for the Bukharan struggle against external dependence and internal sectarianism.89

In place-based geography, however, vaṭan is a social construct spatially mediated by genealogies of social relationships manifested by an emir, a Muslim scholar, a prophet, etc.

The spatial mediators in place-based geography provide an answer to the question of how time translates into place. Historical time is here mediated by genealogies, by social relationships, real or mythological. One example of this, based on narrative sources, is the sacred history of Sayram in southern Kazakhstan, as analysed by Devin DeWeese. According to DeWeese, real and mythological persons, travels, and shrines, and the historical links between them, gave Sayram its place in the world, both spatially and temporally. Such spatial and temporal mediators were thus important “before the

88 Agnew, Place and Politics in Modern Italy, 59.
formulation of new ‘national’ boundaries and identities.” Adeeb Khalid remarks that this kind of “[h]istoriography was concerned primarily with providing a coherent explanation of the origin of the community, as well as a genealogical and cultural markers of distinction to elites within that community. It was not concerned with producing a documentary record of human progress.” The relevance of face-to-face interaction in judicial and financial matters also signified a place-based emphasis on geography. The spatial/temporal nexus in place-based geography is thus made up of actors linked to time and place, rather than the public time mediated by a map, as in space-based geography.

It should be stressed that space-based geography does not exclude place-based geography. They coexist and interact. To a large extent it is instead a question of what is emphasized. The argument here is that space-based geography was rarely emphasized by the majority of the Bukharans, who had relatively little conceptual need for it, and it was perhaps most common in handling local land issues. The emphasis on space-based geography, however, increased during the protectorate era. During this period, it was also increasingly politicized and used on a global scale.

2.4 Eschatological scenarios

The ideas of Muslim modernists, such as Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) and Rashid Rida (1865–1935), who were active in Egypt, were widely discussed among reform-minded Muslims during the 19th and early 20th century. Their ideas seem mainly to have been discussed among the Muslim scholars and were thus disseminated through their networks, either in face-to-face contact or through newspapers and journals. But newspapers also served to disseminate the teachings of older generations of Muslim scholars, teachings that now were accompanied by articles about an expanded present made up of space-based states. The teachings were thereby trans-

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91 Khalid, “Nation into History”, 129.


formed into space-based geography in order to delimit Muslim territories and serve embryonic nation-building processes that by definition had to be projected into the future. Concepts such as “law school” (mażhab), “nation” (mīllat), and “home” (vatan) were now increasingly conceptualized in terms of space-based geography, and certain traits were ascribed to the inhabitants of their territories.

Many ideas that the reformists advocated were denounced by their opponents. Abdurrahman’s criticism of “imitation (of religious authorities without proof)” (taqlīd)94 and his calls for a reinterpretation of the Quran made his opponents compare his thought with the Mutazili movement,95 an ancient Islamic movement regarded as excessively reliant on reason as opposed to revelation, and on Greek philosophy as opposed to Islamic sciences. Some of the reformers were also denounced by their opponents for promoting “religiously unlawful innovations” (bīda’), and some were persecuted, like the Bukharan reformists in 1917 and 1918, and the Bahais. Although the latter had broken with Islam, and were persecuted more persistently than those who still defined themselves as Muslims, the similarities between the Muslim reformists and the Bahais were in many respects so striking that they were confused with each other.96 The latter is probably less a result of the friendship between the Muslim modernist Abdurrahman and Abdulbaha, son of Bahaullah (the founder of the Bahai-religion),97 than by the similarities of their eschatological scenarios,98 which reflected an aspect of the widespread belief in progress at the time. It is also, however, a strong indication of how controversial many of the reformists’ ideas were. This also reflects the commonly encountered phenomenon of political dissent and communal disintegration being positioned in a discursive landscape of heresy. Many who had a modern concept of progress or advocated transformational apocalypticism thus faced the question of how to frame their calls for change in an Islamic context, a context that changed over time. However, the relationship

94 For this definition, see EI², s.v. “Taklīd”.
between communal disintegration and eschatological scenarios implies that eschatological scenarios are constitutive of group identity.\(^{99}\)

Changing conceptual boundaries of historical time during the 19th and early 20th century are evident in numerous Muslim communities. Rifaah al-Tahtawi (1801–1873), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897), and Abduh belonged to the first generations at the al-Azhar school in Cairo, who took central Islamic juridical concepts, such as imitation and \(\text{ijtihād}\) (literally “exerting oneself”),\(^{100}\) and transformed them into social concepts that became central to a reinvented history of the decline of the Muslim world.\(^{101}\) Here we can thus see a temporalization of central concepts. “Civilization” (\(\text{tamaddun}\)), as used by Abduh in the sense of “societal progress” is an example, a concept that has ethical limitations and only reaches perfection in a future perfect Islamic state:

It is the sum of all kinds of perfection, without exception, whether literary, material, sensual or metaphysical. Excelling in the industries is part of it; competing in the sciences is part of it, avoiding areas of deficiency is part of it; and adorning oneself with the most notable moral standards is its essence.\(^{102}\)

These ideas, to which we must reckon societal progress and the conceptual change and direction inherent in the temporalization, should be contrasted not only with the old legalistic conceptual system of which continuity and an uncorrupt chain of transmission of religious knowledge were important aspects, but also with what probably can be called a traditional mainstream Sunni-Islamic conception of history. According to the latter, human history stretches from the creation until the End of Days, and “[w]hile this terminus constantly recedes into the future, its finality is unquestioned.” Moreover, this “linear progression of history may be divided into ages in which certain event-types recur”.\(^{103}\) “Eternity without beginning” (\(\text{Azal}\)) thus comes to an end with the Creation. The latter is followed by the Cycles of the Prophets, the life of Muhammad, the Cycles of the Friends of God or the Renewers, the “Last period” (\(\text{Fitān}\)), “the Hour” (\(\text{al-Sāʾa} \)), which includes the day of Resurrection [\(\text{yawm al-qiyāma}, \text{Qiyāmat or Rastākhīz} \)] and the day of Judgement [\(\text{yawm al-dīn} \), which is to be followed by “eternity without end” (\(\text{Abad}\)).

\(^{99}\) See O’Leary, “When Prophecy Fails and when it Succeeds”.

\(^{100}\) \(\text{EI}\), s.v. “\(\text{ijtihād}\)”. Ingeborg Baldauf notices that “\(\text{ijtihād}\) is not just any ‘effort’ in layman’s terms, and as the word was widely used in Central Asian Turkī and Fārsī; but it refers more specifically to the effort to derive legal opinion directly from the Koran and \(\text{ḥadīṣ}, \text{i.e., from the fundamental texts of Islam} \.” See Ingeborg Baldauf, “Jadidism in Central Asia within Reformism and Modernism in the Muslim world”, \textit{Die Welt des Islams} 41 (2000): 75.


\(^{103}\) See also Julie Scott Meisami, \textit{Persian Historiography: to the End of the Twelfth Century} (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), esp. 11.
Each of these ages has its specific dynamics and agents. During the period of the Cycles of the Prophets, pre-Muhammedan prophets such as Adam, Noah, Abraham, Jesus thus come at times of great disorder and restore the divine law. With the death of Muhammad, the seal of the prophets, a new era begins, the cycle of the Friends of God or the Renewers. This period is characterized by degeneration towards terminal decay, and the Friends of God or the Renewers are weaker than the Prophets, and only temporarily can improve the human condition on earth. The human condition on earth will thus worsen, eventually leading to the last period which will be characterized by communal fragmentation, including discord, violence, and injustice, but also by disbelief and infidelity. Shortly before the resurrection, Jesus and, according to some traditions, the “Rightly Guided” (Mahdī) will return to earth and defeat “Anti-Christ” (Dajjāl) in a great battle. The Rightly Guided will then rule for some years on earth, after which the Post-eternal period will begin.

The period of the Cycles of the Friends of God or the Renewers, which is the concern of this study, thus contains an ethical possibility to postpone the cosmic apocalypse and to push the terminus further into the future. This is voiced for example by older influential theoreticians such as Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (1445–1505) and Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624). It is in some of the latter’s works that we find references to numerous traditions about the onset of decline after the death of Muhammad, as the following Hadith:

The best of my community is the generation in which I was sent, then those who follow them, then those who follow them.\(^{104}\)

In their writings we also encounter a belief in the Renower of “religion” (dīn), which is derived from the following hadith:

Certainly Allah will send to this community at the beginning [or end] of every hundred years one\(^{105}\) who will renew its religion.

In what must be interpreted as the pre-modern mainstream Sunni criteria for the Renower, Arthur Buehler writes:


\(^{105}\) The Muslim scholars have later referred to this man as the Mujaddid, see Ignaz Goldziher, \textit{Čelâl ud-Dîn us-Sujiṭî’s und seiner literarischen Thätigkeit} (Wien: Karl Gerold’s Sohn, 1871), 4–5. For a more exhaustive history of the Mujaddid tradition, see Ella Landau-Tasseron, “The ‘Cyclical Reform’: A Study of the Mujaddid Tradition”, \textit{Studia Islamica} 70 (1989).

[T]he Sunni criteria are that the [Renewer] revive the prophetic *sunnat* and eradicate any innovations (sing. *bid’a*), and that his contemporaries recognize the benefits of his activity. A renewer cannot be self-appointed nor retroactively appointed.\(^{107}\)

According to some scholars, however, in early Islam “the Renewer” was a title of honour and its bearer had no messianic powers. But as the signs of the imminent appearance of the Renewer were similar to those of the Rightly Guided, the Renewer became closely associated with the Rightly Guided.\(^{108}\)

The signs that forebode the Renewer were thus similar to those that forebode the Rightly Guided. In early Manghit Bukhara there are, however, also some examples of the Rightly Guided with the addition of “the era” ([*mahdī-yī* *daurān*], or “the time ([*mahdī-yī*] *zamān*), or “the century” ([*mahdī-yī*] ‘*aṣr*). This Rightly Guided seems thus to have had a similar function as the Renewer.\(^{109}\) This Rightly Guided, however, is not generally visible in the Bukharan sources of the later Manghit period upon which this study is based.

The belief in a gradual decline and a centurial return of a Renewer seems difficult to reconcile with an ideal type of societal progress, as does the concept of the Rightly Guided and beliefs in an imminent end of the world. Ideas like this were, however, very widespread in Bukhara during the protectorate era, as evidenced, among other things, by the numerous copies of Ahmad Sirhindi’s “Letters” (*Maktūbāt*) in the form of manuscripts and Indian lithographs found in collections in present-day Uzbekistan.

Sirhindi argued that the Renewer of the millennium would restore the Muslim community to the order it had at the time of the prophet through a “renewal” (*tajdīd*) of the Sharia\(^{110}\) and referred to the following Hadith in order to support his arguments:

> Islām began as a stranger and it will return to what it was. How blessed are the strangers!\(^{111}\)

This Hadith had usually been interpreted as referring to the arrival of the Rightly Guided who would “restore Islam to its original perfection”\(^{112}\) and rule for a few years, but Sirhindi believed in the possibility (read *his divinely assisted possibility*) to renew the Sharia. He argued that the millennium was

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\(^{108}\) Peter Heine, “I am not the mahdi but…….” in Baumgarten, 71. For an exploration of this and other possible origins of the Renewer, see Algar, “The Centennial Renewer”, esp. 292–293 and Landau-Tasseron, “The ‘Cyclical Reform’”.

\(^{109}\) For these various Rightly Guided, see von Kügelgen, *Die Legitimierung der mittelasiatischen Mangirendynastie*, 316.


\(^{111}\) From Sahi Muslim, Sahi Tirmidhi and others as quoted by Friedmann, *Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindī*, 16.

\(^{112}\) *EI*, s.v. “al-Mahdī”.

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“the beginning of the ‘last’ stage of Islamic history,” and that the world would not last more than 1000 more years.\textsuperscript{113} By comparing the Renower of the millennium with the “Great Prophets” (\textit{ūlī al-‘āzm}) he connected the Prophetic cycle to the cycle of the Renewers.\textsuperscript{114}

Like Sirhindî, Suyutî was eager to be acknowledged as the Renower. Suyutî argued not only that he was the most skilled scholar of the time, read all over the world,\textsuperscript{115} signifying the cosmic nature of his call, but also that the end of the world was not imminent, and thereby postponing the apocalypse. He hoped that “God might grant him the favour of being the Renower of the ninth/fifteenth century”.\textsuperscript{116} The signs to which he referred in order to support his call included:

(i) the Franks’ occupation of Granada and other parts of Spain, (ii) the appearance in Takrûr of Sunni ‘Ali, a sort of Timûr Lang who destroyed worshippers of God, and cities, and continued in this for twenty years until God caused his death in 897/1491–92, and (iii) the spread of ignorance throughout the earth, and the disappearance of scholars in all countries, a thing which has never been witnessed before in all the history of Islam.\textsuperscript{117}

Abduh’s belief in societal progress towards perfection involves a concept of progress that has ethical limitations and reflects a kind of utopianism that, at least by his most famous disciple, was translated into the notion of an Islamic state.\textsuperscript{118} Similarly, Suyutî’s and Sirhindî’s belief in the Renower can also be interpreted in terms of focusing less on the end of the world than on a new beginning, a restoration of what once was,\textsuperscript{119} a return to the paradoxical non-change of paradise or, in the words of Ted Daniels, a “cosmic recycl-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{113} Friedmann, \textit{Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindî}, 18.
\item \textsuperscript{115} “I alone have mastered all kinds of different disciplines, such as Qur’\'anic exegesis and its principles, Prophetic tradition and its sciences, jurisprudence and its principles, language and its principles, syntax and morphology and their principles, polemics, rhetoric and good style, and history. In addition to all this, there are my outstanding, excellent works, the like of which nobody has written before, and their number up till now is about 500. I have originated the science of the principles of language (\textit{usūl al-līghah}) and its study, and nobody has preceded me in this. It follows the same lines as Prophetic tradition and principles of jurisprudence. My works and my knowledge have travelled to all countries, and have reached Syria, Rûm, Persia, the Hijaz, the Yemen, India, Ethiopia, North Africa, and Takrûr, and have spread from Takrûr to the ocean. In all that I have mentioned, I have no equal, nobody else living has mastered the number of disciplines which I have, and as far as I know, nobody else has reached the rank of unrestricted \textit{iğtihād} except for me”. E.M. Sartain, \textit{Jalāl al-dīn Suyūṭī}, vol. 1, \textit{Biography and background} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 70–71.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Sartain, \textit{Jalāl al-dīn Suyūṭī}, 70. See also Goldziher, \textit{Gelāl ud-Dīn us-Suyūṭī}, 10.
\item \textsuperscript{117} Sartain, \textit{Jalāl al-dīn Suyūṭī}, 71.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Scharbrodt, \textit{Islam and the Baha’i Faith}, 154.
\item \textsuperscript{119} Daniels argues that “apocalypse is never about the literal end of the world. It never proposes the actual destruction of the physical planet.” Daniels, “Charter of the Righteousness”, 11.
\end{itemize}
Moreover, as both Suyuti and Sirhind had the ambition to be recognized as the Renewer, it can be argued that their postponement of the apocalypse was an expression of their own ambition to be recognized as the Renewer of their time.

From the mainstream Sunni-Islamic conception of history follows that invoking “the corruption of the time” could signal that the end would come unless the Muslims improved and lived according to the Sharia. Sirhind thus both invoked “the corruption of the time” and advocated stricter adherence to the Sharia. Unlike Sirhindi, however, the 18th century Syrian Muslim scholar Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi (d. 1731) did not invoke the “corruption of the time” and the apocalypse very much. Instead he argued that the “Prophet’s perfection continuously unfolds in time” and that “every possible truth is implicit in the metahistorical source of revelation”. Nabulusi’s concept of progress was one of vertical progress (embedded in the lexeme taraqqī) or, in the words of Samuela Pagani, “a progressive ascension”. He used it to deny the “corruption of time” in order to promote more liberal legal practice “in the same way as his adversaries emphasized the idea of decadence to enforce a stricter moral code”.

Both Sirhindi and al-Nabulusi seem to provide good examples of discursive manipulations of temporal experience in a God-centred world. Their concept of “progress” is thus a spiritual concept that also serves to postpone the end of time, and as such, it cannot but have societal implications. It does not, however, signify any technological progress.

Another example of vertical progress is found in the works of the Shia scholar Sadr al-Din Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Shirazi (1572–1641), better known as Mulla Sadra. Mulla Sadra believed in an esoteric interpretation of Quranic revelation and “proposed a more humanist vision of the world in perpetual progressive evolution towards spiritual perfection”. This was likewise in odds with the “Traditionalists’” belief in degeneration towards terminal decay. Mulla Sadra also shows that the dichotomization of human and divine agency is problematic, not least because his concept of human agency was more dependent on divine agency than on progress achieved by humans themselves. The successors to Mulla Sadra, the Shaykhis (who also were the predecessors of the Bahais), similarly have a “progressive evolutionary view of religious law that should follow human development, [but] they do not project a sense of commitment to social and individual material progress”. Accordingly, the Shaykhis did not believe in spiritual decay, but in a development towards spiritual perfection and fulfilment, where perfect men would lead the religious community until the arrival of the Rightly Guided. This shows similarities with an eschatological scenario of transformational apoca-

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120 The term belongs to Daniels, see Daniels, “Charter of the Righteousness”, 3. A concept of recycling is also present in Islam, see EI², s.v. "Ma‘ād”.
lypticism led by a divine agency that works through human beings. The Shaykhis’ monopolization of knowledge of the divine, which they considered to belong to the religious elite, makes it possible to see the Shaykhis as an example of a hierarchical form of progressive millenarianism.

Despite the differences in temporality, it can be argued that persons like Suyuti and Sirhindi on one hand, and persons like Abduh and al-Afghani on the other, called for a nativist revitalization expressed through apocalyptical rhetoric. The future of their communities is seen as being at stake, which is triggered by a perception of political evil and/or corruption. Yet, in terms of emphasis, there was a difference concerning whether perfection was to be restored by divine or human agency. Eschatologically, Abduh and other Muslim modernists could be seen as representing a progressive millenarianism where perfection would be restored through long-term human activity. Sirhindi and Suyuti instead emphasise divine agency. Perfection was to be restored on earth, either by the millennium Renewer or by the Rightly Guided – in the latter case only after a great battle resulting in a cataclysmic change, a violent end of the old order in which the sinners would perish.

In the Islamic reformism advocated by Abduh, and in the beliefs voiced by the later Bahaullah, the supernatural was downplayed in favour of human agency. Education became a prime tool. The Muslim modernists, for example, stressed the need to restore a bygone spiritual and ethical perfection through education. Education would address the contemporary religious corruption. The Muslim modernists also voiced belief in the existence of a contemporary world created through human agency and progress, the existence of a specific temporality, the beginning of something new. Similar to the teachings of Bahaullah, for the Muslim modernists it was a question of partly adapting to a new order that was already here on earth, in the developed world, rather than waiting for a kind of Messiah who would create it on earth or in heaven.

Many Muslim reformers of the late 19th and early 20th century thus put forward their belief in progress in an Islamic context that show similarities with an eschatological scenario of transformational apocalypticism and progressive millenarianism. The reformists argued, however, also that the end would come if their fellow Muslims did not accept their message, a mes-

122 For Mulla Sadra and the Shaykhis, see Mangol Bayat, Mysticism and Dissent: Socioreligious Thought in Qajar Iran (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982), esp. 31, 57–58.
123 See also discussion in Daniels, “Charters of Righteousness”, esp. 7.
124 See general discussion in Moojan Momen, “Millennialist Dreams and Apocalyptic Nightmares”, in Sharon, 102.
125 For the latter, see Momen, “Millennialist Dreams and Apocalyptic Nightmares”, 105–106.
127 For a discussion on the role of conversion in apocalyptic scenarios, see Daniels, “Charter of the Righteousness”, esp. 6–15.
sage that consisted of moral sublimation and the promotion of progress. For the reformers, influenced by space-based geography, the end that loomed was not cosmic, however; it signified only an end conceptualized through a space-based emphasis on geography; it was the end of their nation and of their Islam.

In the undertaking to save the Muslim world and the Muslim nations, the reformers stressed human agency rather than divine intervention. Theirs was a struggle to become contemporary by adopting European science and technology, but also an increased focus on the right of the individual believer to return to the foundations of Islam, the Quran, the Hadith, and “Quran commentaries” (tafsīr), instead of being limited to the rulings of the Muslim scholars and the law school. This was the message of some Salafists, whose movement advocated a spiritual return to the Pious Forefathers, and whose message reflected utopian visions and a millenarian temporal framework of restoration. Amal N. Ghazal remarks that “[i]f European modernity provided Muslims with the idea of nationalism, Islamic modernity imagined its own nation out of utopian Salafism”.128 The struggle for spiritual restoration and the struggle to become contemporary would together result in the perfect state, as described by Abduh: a modern contemporary state with an educated citizenry of Muslims with high morals.

This conceptualization of a contemporary world was related to an expansion of the present and the field of experience in the sense that one was able to experience a multitude of simultaneous (and remote) events through modern means of communication, especially the telegraph. The experiences of those Bukharans who were exposed to and used such novelties were relativized in contact with the experiences of other peoples as far away as Japan and the United States. To use a concept from reception theory (also subscribed to by Koselleck), the “horizons of expectation” moved closer and gave rise to preferences for different spatial and temporal boundaries, as well the idea that different states are located on different temporal levels.

The explicit struggle to become contemporary implied denying coevalness to one’s political opponents, who were described as belonging to other temporal levels. An example of this is how the changing perspective evident in the relativization of temporal distance was expressed in the political struggle for reform in Bukhara. At the beginning of the 20th century, some Muslim reformers refused to acknowledge others as being contemporary, while comparing their own situation with that of other prominent religious reformers, such as Luther.129 The common historical plane dissolved and was replaced by a multitude of temporal levels and abstract periodizations, sev-

129 See Kanlidere, Reform within Islam, 58–60.
eral of the latter having their own ideologically coloured labels, such as the “Middle Ages”, the “Contemporary Era”, the “New Time”, etc. In Bukhara it was only during the last decade of the emirate that the conflict between the different political factions was expressed in terms of time, as a battle between “worshippers of the new”, or “reformers” (jadīdī, islāhkhvāhān etc.), and “worshippers of the old” (qadīmī, qadīmparastān etc.).

Variations in temporality, in geographical emphasis, in the direction of discontinuity, and in the degree of emphasis on agency, make it possible to speak of different paradigms, not in a Kuhnian sense, but in Pocockian sense, i.e. as loose structures of thought and speech that are open to, interact and coexist with other paradigms.\textsuperscript{130} The paradigms might, however, become increasingly isolated from each other, or polarized, during periods of tense political struggle. This suggests that in such situations, within any one paradigm or eschatological scenario there are more or less strictly enforced paradigmatic suppressions, or containments, of rivalling paradigms, including their eschatological scenarios.\textsuperscript{131} We can thus discuss the ideal paradigm of progress in terms of an emphasis on human agency and space-based geography, but also, of a direction of discontinuity that is open toward the future. In the ideal type of the counter paradigm, what we might call the paradigm of prophecy, there is instead an emphasis on divine agency, place-based geography, and a direction of discontinuity that is open toward the past. It corresponds loosely to the eschatological scenario of divinely led cataclysmic apocalypticism, while the paradigm of progress shares some features with a transformational apocalypticism that has an emphasis on human agency.


\textsuperscript{131} See for example the role of Ţabarī translations as discussed in Meisami, Persian Historiography, esp. 35–37.
3. Bukhara during the rule of the later Manghits

3.1 The second industrial revolution

The time-span covered by this work, from the 1860s to 1920, corresponds roughly to a period that has been labelled the “Second Industrial Revolution”, and “the Age of Synergy”. It also corresponds quite well to the “Age of Empire”, the third part of Eric Hobsbawn’s classic history of “the long nineteenth century”. All three concepts belong to the realm of economic and technological history, albeit with societal implications. They signify that this period was characterized by a phase of rapid innovation and industrial development. Vaclav Smil views this period as characterized by its “unprecedented saltation”, as the innovations of the time were commercially adopted and diffused at a historically unique rate, and also rapidly improved: “a new civilization was born, one based on synergy of scientific advances, technical innovation, aggressive commercialization, and intensifying, and increasingly efficient, conversions of energy”. Many inventions of this period, such as dynamite, telephones, reliable incandescent electric lights, steam turbines, cars, movies, the wireless telegraph, synthetic aspirin, airplanes, radio broadcasts, etc. facilitated the creation of an anthropogenic environment, invigorated human agency and “ushered the world into the golden age of productivity and growth”.

Europe was, in Hobsbawm’s words, “not only the original core of the capitalist development which dominated and transformed the world, but by far the most important component of the world economy and of bourgeois society. Never in history has there been a more European century”. The difference between the developed and the rest of the world also increased rapidly during this period. Before 1880 GNP per capita differed little, but in 1880 the per capita income of the developed world was roughly twice that of

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133 This paragraph is based on Smil, *Creating the Twentieth Century*, esp. 8, 11, 13, 25. See also Hobsbawn, *The Age of Empire*, 42–43.
the “third world”, and by 1913 it was seven times as high.\textsuperscript{134} This economic growth and technical development affected the world on a global scale and led to the establishment and growth of new urban centres worldwide, but it also led to greater geographic inequalities on a global scale.

It is no surprise that this period has been conceptualized in terms of a great discontinuity, and it is tempting to compare it with a Koselleckian \textit{Sat-telzeit} and Landes’ shifting eschatological scenarios, in terms of being a new beginning for humanity with an increased focus on human agency and the end of a God-centred old world.

### 3.2 The Russians

#### 3.2.1 Colonial administration

The periods labelled as the Second Industrial Revolution, the Age of Empire, and the Age of Synergy, correspond largely with the Central Asian colonial period when Russia, following the conquest of Central Asia, imposed a \textit{de facto} protectorate status on the Khanate of Khiva and the Emirate of Bukhara.\textsuperscript{135} The remaining areas, including the former Khanate of Kokand, were incorporated into the Russian province of Turkistan, which was administered by the governor general in Tashkent who belonged to the Ministry of War.

The governor general was initially the point of contact between the Emir and the Russian empire. A lengthy discussion concerning a Russian diplomatic presence in the capital of the emirate ended only in the mid-1880s when an Imperial Russian Political Agency was established in Bukhara. The Political Agency not only protected Russian citizens and Russian economic interests in the emirate,\textsuperscript{136} but also fulfilled a number of functions: acting police chief, censor, judge, advisor to the emir, and gatherer of intelligence for Russian decision-makers.\textsuperscript{137} After the Russian Revolution in February 1917, the Imperial Political Agency in Bukhara became the Political Residency and remained so until early December 1917 when its power was challenged by the Revolutionary Committee in the Russian city of Novaya Bukhara outside the capital of the emirate.\textsuperscript{138} This was partly a consequence of

\textsuperscript{134} Hobsbawm, \textit{The Age of Empire}, 29–32.

\textsuperscript{135} In strictly juridical terms, Bukhara was never a Russian protectorate. See Namoz Khotamov, \textit{Sverzhentie émirskogo rezhima v Bukhare} (Dushanbe: Donish, 1997), 11–13. See also Abashin, Arapov, and Bekmakhanova, \textit{Tsentral’naya Aziya v sostave Rossiiiskoi imperii}, 294–295.

\textsuperscript{136} I.I. Umnyakov, \textit{Istoricheskii ocherk Bukhary}, Ts. SOA, f. 1762, op. 1, d. 77, l. 179.

\textsuperscript{137} Becker, \textit{Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia}, 130–133.

\textsuperscript{138} I.I. Umnyakov, \textit{Oktyabr’skaya revolyutsiya i Bukhara (vospominaniya)}, Ts. SOA, f. 1762, op. 1, d. 75, l. 3.
the ascent of Soviet power in the Russian Province of Turkistan, now renamed the Soviet Republic of Turkistan (Turkistsanskaya ASSR).

In very general terms, pre-revolutionary Russia ruled Bukhara by co-opting the elite in the fiscal administration and keeping an eye on the Muslim scholars. This largely reflected the political organization of the emirate in which the judges (Muslim scholars) and the governors represented a system of dual-supervision and reported independently of each other to the central power in the capital.\footnote{Wennberg, \textit{An Inquiry into Bukharan Qadîmism}, 11–32 and Wolfgang Holzwarth, “Community Elders and State Agents: Îlbêgîs in the Emirate of Bukhara around 1900”, \textit{Eurasian Studies} 9, no. 1–2 (2011): 224.}

The defeat of the Bukharan military forces by its Russian counterpart outside Samarkand in 1868 and the following pacification of important Uzbek groups, such as the Manghit and Keneges, probably provided most Uzbek groups as well as the Bukharan military at large with a sense of unavoidable subordination to Russia.\footnote{On the contact with the Russian military forces as an unique experience, see Donish, \textit{Risola}, 40–41, 44, 49, and especially Mîrzâ ‘Abd al-‘Aḍîm Sâmî, \textit{Ta‘rikh-i salâfîn-i Manghîtiya}, fols. 68b–69a.} The battle with Russia was different from the frequent earlier battles with regional rivals that had been far more equal in terms of the relative strengths they could muster, but possibly also in terms of military hardware and organization. Russia thus held the Bukharan army in very low esteem.\footnote{See Becker, \textit{Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia}, 153.} Russia no longer feared tribal rebellions as much as destabilization caused by “religious fanatics”, partly represented by the Muslim scholars. Outside threats were largely defined in terms of Anglo-Russian rivalry, but also in terms of Ottoman influence, pan-Turkism, and pan-Islamism. The increased contact between Bukhara’s Muslims and Muslims in other parts of the world, contact to which Russia contributed through the colonization of Central Asia, caused the Russian authorities much worry. The latter wanted to minimize outside Islamic influences that threatened Russia’s position in the region.

Russian policy toward Bukhara was framed in a civilization discourse where calls were made for “reforms” and “progress” in the “backward” and “lawless” emirate.\footnote{A classic example is D.N. Logofet, \textit{Strana bespraviya} (St. Petersburg, 1909). For a general description of this in Turkistan, see Daniel Brower, \textit{Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire} (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), esp. 88–125. For a very detailed discussion of this in Tashkent, see Sahadeo, \textit{Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent}, esp. 153–162.} The Tsarist authorities were, however, treading very carefully. When indigenous calls for reforms were voiced in the 1910s, the Russian authorities had to pay attention to the internal Bukharan opposition to these reforms,\footnote{Aynî, “Ta‘rikhî inqilobi fikrî dar Bukhoro”, 122, 131–132. See also Ts. TsGARUz, I. 3, op. 2, d. 215, no. 1.} as well as some of the Muslim scholars’ links with Otto-
man Empire, a rival to the Russian Empire and an enemy in World War I. Still, Russia wanted to favour social and economical development through, among other things, a reform of the taxation system in the emirate, including an easing of the tax burden, and the introduction of salaries for state servants and a state budget. Until 1917 the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs always ended up favouring non-intervention.

It was only after the February Revolution in 1917 that the head of the Russian Political Residency in Bukhara pushed for reforms, which were published in the so-called “Miller’s manifest”, and which were drafted according to the demands put forward by the Political Agency, rather than according to the wishes of the Bukharan political elite. The reforms included “the abolishment of arbitrary treatment”, reform of taxation, introduction of fixed salaries for all state servants, the creation of a state budget and a publishing house, etc. In the backlash that followed, these reforms came to nothing. Those who favoured reforms, including the Russian Political Agency, became less influential.

In 1918, support for reforms in Bukhara was also voiced by the Council of People’s Commissars in the newly created Soviet Republic of Turkistan (the former province of Turkistan). Its chairman, Feodor Kolesov, demanded that the emir recognize Soviet power in the Russian settlements in the emirate, take measures to democratize the government of Bukhara, and create an executive committee consisting of representatives of the so called “Young Bukharans”, a group of no more than 30 pro-reform Bukharans who had fled the emirate in 1917, and concentrate the executive power in their hands. When the emir did not respond to the demands put forward by the Soviet Republic of Turkistan, Kolesov supported by the most radical group of the “Young Bukharans”, most notably the Bukharan merchant son Fayzulla Khvaja, marched on Bukhara, but suffered a defeat at the hands of the Bukharan forces. With this event, the Russian influence in the emirate had reached a new lowest point. The new power in Tashkent probably considered the “Young Bukharans” to be the most pro-Russian group in the emirate. A contemporary Russian observer wrote that “there remain only

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145 Ts. TsGARUz, I. 1, op. 31, d. 723, no. 33 and 60.
146 Becker, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia, 211–225. See also Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 154.
147 Khotamov, Sverzhenie émirskogo rezhima v Bukhare, 104–105.
148 I.I. Umnyakov, Shýtuya v Bukhare, Ts. SOA, f. 1762, op. 1, d. 76, l. 9. See also Genis, Vitse-konsul Vvedenskii, 84–106.
149 Umnyakov, Shýtuya v Bukhare, l. 2a.
150 Umnyakov, Oktyabr’skaya revolyutsiya i Bukhara, ll. 5–6.
151 For a history of this, and the events surrounding it, see Genis, Vitse-konsul Vvedenskii, 132–147.
152 Khotamov, Sverzhenie émirskogo rezhima v Bukhare, 156–164.
scraps of the Young Bukharans that are still under the influence of our Russian ruins."^{153}

In September 1919, the Red Army under the leadership of Mikhail Frunze managed to break Alexander Dutov’s blockade of Turkistan. One year later the Red Army, still headed by Mikhail Frunze, but now also accompanied by some Bukharans who had fled the emirate in 1917 and 1918, made a successful attempt to invade the emirate, which afterwards was renamed the People’s Republic of Bukhara. The new governments in Bukhara and her successor states (Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) imposed reforms that increasingly were in line with Russian (Bolshevik) preferences in order to promote a development impossible for the ordinary Bukharans to imagine at the time of the Russian conquest some 50 years earlier.

3.2.2 Economy and trade

In the emirate of Bukhara, the most notable markers of technological progress were visible in the Russian settlements. Like other colonial empires, after the conquest in 1867 the Russian authorities constructed several Russian cities alongside the old Muslim cities in Bukhara. Unlike Muslim cities, the Russian settlements adhered to modern city planning. Their inhabitants mainly came from other parts of the Russian Empire, especially in connection with the construction of the Transcaspian railroad, the establishment of the Russian garrisons, custom posts, Amu-Darya flotilla, and the construction of the Tashkent-Samarkand highway. In 1898 there were some 12 150 Russian subjects living in the emirate, mainly in such Russian settlements. In addition to these there were some 8 000 Russian soldiers. In 1917, there were approximately 50 000 Russian subjects in the emirate, not including Russian soldiers.\(^{154}\)

The first and largest Russian settlement was Charjou, established in 1886.\(^{155}\) Kerki was set up in 1887,\(^{156}\) Novaya Bukhara in 1888,\(^{157}\) and Patta-

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\(^{153}\) Umnyakov, Shãytya v Bukhare, l. 2a.


\(^{155}\) Charjou, an old oasis town surrounded by the steppe, was a major trading centre between Central Asia and Iran and situated in one of the richest provinces of the emirate. The Russian city grew fast, and at the outbreak of World War I it had a population of approximately 15 thousand people. It had some 300 small commercial institutions and 10 small factories. It obviously had all the other institutions that a small city would need, including police, schools, etc. Charjou also had railroad work-shops, and the base of the Amu-Darya Flotilla, which belonged to the Russian government, was also located there. Most of the Russian working class people in the emirate were tied to the latter (Fomchenko, Russkie poseleniya v Bukharskom êmirate, esp. 14, 23).

\(^{156}\) Kerki was an important trading town on the road from Bukhara and Samarkand to Afghanistan. The development of trade between Russia, Eastern Bukhara, and Afghanistan led to rapid growth of the city. In 1912 the city had almost 6 000 inhabitants, excluding soldiers. (Fomchenko, Russkie poseleniya v Bukharskom êmirate, 16).
Gissar (close to Termez) in 1894. There were also several minor Russian settlements that emerged after Bukhara became a part of the Russian customs zone in 1894. Russian customs checkpoints were established in Kerki, Kelif, Patta-Hissar, Ayvaj, Saraev, Chubek, and Bogarane. Border posts were set up along the Amudarya, Panj, and Qizyl-Su. Many of these Russian settlements were important trading centres and hosted many industries serving not only the local Russian market, but increasingly the indigenous Bukharan market as well.

Bukhara’s northbound trade was on the increase well before the Russian conquest. After an initial economic collapse as a direct result of the war with Russia, the economy of Bukhara soon recovered. Bukharan–Russian trade was further improved by the construction of the railroad, the necessity of which “rested on visions of progress on which Russian reformers and prestige-minded rulers could agree.”

The railroad held an almost mystical attraction for Westerners in the nineteenth century. It was the principal arm to conquer space and time. It overcame the natural obstacles put in the way of land travel into the innermost reaches of the continents. It brought the greatest achievement of industrial technology directly into the lives of millions of backward peoples. It demonstrated the technological prodigies of which the industrial economy was capable.

The Transcaspian railroad reached Charjou in 1886. The Orenburg railroad opened in 1906 and made journeys to Russia shorter, as one did not have to cross the Caspian Sea. The Bukharan line, however, connected only the Russian settlements. Old Bukhara was not connected until 1916. The inclusion of Bukhara in the Russian customs frontier in 1895 was also an important

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157 Novaya Bukhara was located close to the railway station Kagan, ca 12km from the city of Bukhara. The city contained many different buildings, including a palace for the emir of Bukhara. Novaya Bukhara was the centre of banking activity in the emirate. The political agency, pharmacies, three hospitals, a library, and several factories were located here. There were also several minor industries serving the domestic Bukharan market located here, including a printing house. By the time of the outbreak of World War I, there were 15 industrial enterprises in Novaya Bukhara. In 1917 the population of Novaya Bukhara reached 12 000 persons (Fomchenko, Russkie poseleniya v Bukharskom émirate, 15, 22–23).

158 The construction of Noviĭ Termez began in 1895. The city became a centre for trade with Afghanistan and northwestern India. In 1902 the Samarkand–Termez post road opened. In 1916 Termez was connected with Kagan by railroad. By the time of World War I, Noviĭ Termez had some 2647 inhabitants, excluding military personnel (Fomchenko, Russkie poseleniya v Bukharskom émirate, 16–17, and Becker, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia, 141).

159 Fomchenko, Russkie poseleniya v Bukharskom émirate, 18.


161 Brower, Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire, 81, and Becker, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia, 120–127.
factor that promoted Russian–Bukharan trade at the expense of Bukharan trade with Afghanistan.

The most important export products from the emirate during this period were cotton and Karakul hides. As a consequence of the American Civil War 1861–1865 when cotton exports shrank, Russia prioritized domestic cotton growth. Between the years 1850 and 1860, approximately 820 metric tonnes of cotton were exported from Bukhara. By 1916 this number had risen to more than 36 million metric tonnes. In 1916 cotton made up 40 percent of all exports from Bukhara, and 13 percent of all Central Asian cotton was grown in Bukhara. In the whole of Turkistan there were two cotton-ginning mills in 1880; in 1914 there were 220.\textsuperscript{162}

Interest in Karakul-hides increased rapidly after the Great Exhibition in London in 1851, and exports grew even more after the construction of the railroad. In 1833 Bukhara exported some 200 000 Persian lamb skins, less than half of which went to Russia. In 1912 the trade in Karakul made up some 40 percent of the total Bukharan exports; some 2 000 000 hides were exported to or through Russia at that time. This reduced the area available for food crops in Bukhara, making the emirate dependent upon import.\textsuperscript{163}

During the 1910s, land concessions to Russian subjects also became common.\textsuperscript{164}

Many merchants, especially those belonging to ethnic minorities, became Russian citizens,\textsuperscript{165} which provided them with Russian judicial protection and gave them the possibility to live and trade according to Russian law.\textsuperscript{166}

Russian settlements in Bukhara were important economic and financial centres, and “safe havens” for Bukharan merchants, but at times also “safe havens” for the Muslim reformists of the emirate. The Jadidi partly based their publication activities there and had their “charitable organizations” funded by economic enterprises that were partly based there.

The Bukharan economy continued to grow until World War I, when the situation worsened, especially after the Russian revolution of 1917 when trade became increasingly difficult and Russian banks and financial markets

\textsuperscript{162} Abashin, Arapov, and Bekmakhanova, Tsentral’naya Asia v sostave Rossiiskoi imperii, 152.


\textsuperscript{164} Khotamov, Sverzhenie émirskogo rezhima v Bukhare, 66–67.


\textsuperscript{166} When protectorate status finally was imposed on the emirate in 1873, Russian merchants had been granted free trade in the emirate. All Russian citizens in the emirate were also provided with judicial protection in so far as trials involving at least one Russian citizen were to be decided by a Russian rather than a Bukharan court.
ceased to function. The outbreak of World War I also had severe consequences for the food situation in the emirate, as the import of grain was disrupted.

In the aftermath of the October Revolution the ownership and management of many cotton-ginning mills and oil pressing plants in Turkistan were challenged by the new power. Yet to a considerable extent, the emir continued to rely on Russian managers, at least in parts of the modern sector of the Bukharan economy. The Bukharan reformers, now persecuted in the emirate, to a large extent had to befriend the new authorities in Russian Turkistan and in the Russian settlements in Bukhara in order to deal with the difficult political and economic situation after 1917.

3.3 The elite in the fiscal administration

3.3.1 The central power

The increased centralization of power in Bukhara with its small professional army had already begun before Emir Nasrullah (r. 1826–1860). The non-tribal standing army, trained by Iranians, British-Indian deserters, and Russian slaves, did not attract Uzbek warriors, and, at least during Emir Nasrullah, could suppress “all Uzbek military uprisings”. In the mid-19th century the former Uzbek military estate was thus marginalized. The Uzbek groups also gradually ceased their earlier almost yearly plundering raids against neighbouring states, which probably should be interpreted as signifying an increase in the central power.

167 Khotamov, Sverzhenie émirskogo rezhima v Bukhare, 164–168.

168 The import of grain was down by 54 percent in 1915 compared with 1911, sugar by 11 percent, and textiles by 34 percent. Fomchenko, Russkie poseleniya v Bukharskom émirate, 40. Before the war some 260 railway cars with flour reach Bukhara every month; in March 1917, only 25 cars reached Bukhara. The food situation in 1917 was further aggravated by a bad harvest and negligence by the new power holders in Russian Turkistan with regard to earlier water-sharing agreements of the water from Zarafshan. Genis, Vitse-konsul Vvedenskiĭ, 69, 110.

169 An example of this was the cotton-ginning mill in Qiziltippa. Sadr al-Din Ayni’s old friend and supporter, Abd al-Qadir Muheit al-Din, was in charge of this factory. See Akhmed Saidgireevich Subkhankulov, “Vospominanie”, Ts. AMBA, no. 20316/II-5, II. 2, 9. Muheit al-Din was also accused of having instigated the Red Army’s invasion of Bukhara in 1920 because the emir had confiscated all his property, see Genis, “S Bukharoi nado konchat...”, 78.

170 See for example Genis, Vitse-konsul Vvedenskiĭ, 149–150.


172 Such as the earlier annual “Holy war of the Qizilbash” (Ghazā-ī Qizilbāsh) in Khurasan during Shah-Murad (r.1785-1800) when their freedom of action was curtailed in Bukhara. (See S.M., “Ta’rikh-i silsila-i manghītiya ki dar Bakhārā ḥukmērāda and 4: zikr-i julūs u ḥukūmat-i amīr Shāhāmrūd”, Sī 52 [27 Sep. 1920]: 2.) (For a positive account of this, in the framework of a just ruler attacking Shias, see Donish, Risola, 21, and in the framework of...
increased centralization of power in Bukhara as well as in neighbouring states. In the aftermath of the Russian conquest of Samarkand in 1867 and the subjugation of an internal Bukharan rebellion against Emir Muzaffar (r. 1860–1885), the central power gained an unprecedented degree of control over remote areas.

The rebellion against Emir Muzaffar was triggered by the defeat of the Bukharan forces at the hands of the Russians and the manifest weakness of the Emir, but it also reflected an attempt by Uzbek groups to regain the power they had lost during the rule of Emir Nasrullah (r. 1826–1860) who had favoured the Shia Muslims (Irānī) at the expense of the Uzbek elite. It was also, however, an attempt by Emir Muzaffar’s sons Abd al-Malik and Nur al-Din to seize power. The Emir proved unable to suppress the rebellion and called for Russia to assist him. Russia assisted him in quelling the strongest Uzbek groups (the Manghits and the Keneges) while the Shia Muslim head of the fiscal administration suppressed less powerful Uzbek groups (such as the Kungrats), as well as the local rulers in eastern Bukhara. Even the area of Shahr-i Sabz, home of the Keneges, was now for the first time in the history of Manghit Bukhara made subject to Bukhara and ruled by governors sent by the central power. Another example of how successful the new standing armies were at suppressing local revolts is found in the uprising in 1888 among the Uzbek group Loqay in the relatively remote eastern part of Bukhara. This uprising was quelled by some 1000 regular troops (sarbaž) sent from provincial centres in the area. By 1900 at least it was thus customary for the central government in Bukhara to send commanders to provincial centres where regular troops were garrisoned. These troops were largely recruited from the non-Uzbek population.

Moreover, after the Russian conquest of Central Asia, Russia sanctioned royal succession. As a consequence of this, crown princes or new emirs were no longer challenged or questioned by the Uzbek groups as before. Not a single major rebellion against the emir broke out among prominent Muslim scholars or the Uzbek

being supported by the fatvas of the Muslim scholars, see Mîrzâ ‘Abd al-‘Azîm Sâmî, Ta’rîkh-i salâtîn-i Mangîhiyya, (fol. 62b.)) Or the regular Bukharan attacks on Shahr-i Sabz during the reign of Nasrullah (r. 1826–1860) (See “Ta’rîkh-i amîrân-i Mangîhiyya-yi Bûkhârâ 8: zîkr-i jûlûsî amîr Husayn, amîr ‘Umar u Naṣrulla Bahâdur Khân”, SI 57 [18 Nov. 1920]: 5. But the regular Khivan attacks on Bukhara during the reign of Muhammad Rahîm Khân had also ceased by now. (See “Ta’rîkh-i silsila-yi Mangîhiyya ki dar Bûkhârâ ūkmrânda and 7: zîkr-i jûlûsî amîr Haydar b. ShâhmuTABLE] 56 [15 Nov. 1920]: 4.))


groups after the pacification of the rebellions immediately following the Russian conquest of Samarkand and surrounding areas.

Emir Abd al-Ahad (r. 1885–1910) was the first Bukharan emir whose succession was sanctioned by Russia. Despite having 12 brothers, Emir Abd al-Ahad’s enthronement in 1885 went relatively smoothly and the protection that Russia provided him, even enabled him to permanently settle in Kermine outside Bukhara, while he sent his brothers to internal exile in Bukhara, something unique in Manghit history. Only one of the brothers, Mir Akram Khan, retained his position as governor.177

Emir Abd al-Ahad died in 1910 and was replaced by his son, Alim Khan (r. 1910–1920). Neither the Uzbek groups nor the emir’s brothers or other relatives threatened this succession. Since the clashes between the Shia and Sunni communities in the capital in 1909, if not earlier, it was evident that the largest threat to stability came from the political elite and the forces they could mobilize in the capital. The riots took place against the background of an intensifying struggle within the fiscal administration, but mobilized (Sunni) Muslim scholars were as well.178 Although the riots seem to have died out by themselves, in connection with them Russian troops entered the capital of the emirate for the first time. The “crown-prince” (tūra), Alim Khan, had also met up with them in the Russian settlement of Kagan, while his father, Emir Abd al-Ahad, refused to leave Kermine.179 One of the outcomes of these clashes was that Shia Muslims lost their former standing in the administration in favour of the Uzbek.

After the February Revolution in 1917, Russian influence in the emirate was reduced. But despite the new government, Alim Khan remained the emir of Bukhara until he was forced to flee to Afghanistan in 1920. During these three years the main threat came from the Soviets in Tashkent who during these turbulent years, also plagued by famine, were responsible for the killing of tens of thousands of people, mainly Central Asians, and who also successfully organized the crushing of the so-called Turkistan Autonomous

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177 For this, see for example ‘Aynī, Ta’rīkh-i amīrān-i Manghīṭiya-yi Bukhārā, 83.
178 These clashes, or riots, were triggered by the alleged killing of a student from Fergana who had ridiculed the Shia while they were celebrating Ashura. The clashes between the two religious communities lasted for several days and were accompanied by looting and pillaging. After the riots ended, Burhan al-Din, who was the next highest servant after the chief judge, and came from Khattlan, was demoted and sent to serve as judge in Qarshi. The Shia head of the fiscal administration was replaced by a Sunni Muslim. This was the first time the emirate had a Sunni head of the fiscal administration during the protectorate era. Mirza Nasrullah was thus the first in a successive line of three Sunni heads of the fiscal administration, the last of whom, Usman-bik, was sentenced to death together with Burhan al-Din, the last of the chief judges from Khattlan, by a “revolutionary” court after the Bolshevik invasion in 1920. For a contemporary Russian account of the riots, see G. Tsviling, “Bukharskaya smuta (9 ianv. 1910 g.)”, Srednaya Aziya 2 (1910), for an overview, see for example Wennberg, An Inquiry into Bukharan Qadīmism, 17–20.
Government in nearby Kokand, during which thousands of people were killed and the city plundered.\textsuperscript{180} As mentioned above, the invasion of Bukhara in 1918 failed, however.

Alim Khan’s seemingly relative autonomy with regard to Russia after the revolutions in 1917, should be contrasted with earlier accounts of dependency upon Russia, and a gradual russification of the emirs during the protectorate era which, as we later will argue, was not so superficial, but was a part of an acculturation process reflecting an adoption of western preferences and modes of social organization up to and including a new concept of the state.

Alim Khan’s grandfather, Emir Muzaffar, had at the time of the Russian conquest asked for Russian permission to go on pilgrimage to Mecca and into exile. The Russian authorities refused, however. The suppression of the rebellions by the Russians and the Shia Muslims thus also served the purpose of reinstating Emir Muzaffar. Emir Muzaffar drew benefit from the newfound power he received as a result of the Russian conquest and the ensuing supression of rebellions among the Uzbek groups and among the population in the eastern parts of the emirate.\textsuperscript{181} There was, however, a paradox in the fact that by gaining domestic supremacy in return for accepting protectorate status and practically losing control over foreign affairs to Russia, the later emirs were able to go into semi-retirement and spend most of their time outside the capital of the emirate. Their reduced interest in the daily political affairs of the emirate was also exhibited in their extensive stays in Crimea.

3.3.2 Russification

The later emirs and some of the state servants in the fiscal administration had seen more of Russia than most other Bukharans and belonged to the most russified elements of the emirate.\textsuperscript{182} Many of the senior Bukharan state servants since the time of Emir Muzaffar had visited Russia. Bukharan governors also engaged Russian interpreters.\textsuperscript{183} Some of Muzaffar’s sons and

\textsuperscript{180} For a description of the turbulent situation in Tashkent during these years, see Sahadeo, \textit{Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent}, 187–223.
\textsuperscript{181} A classic early work on the events surrounding the Russian conquest is V. V. Bartol’d, “Istoriya kul’turnoy zhizni Turkestana”, \textit{Obshche raboty po istorii Srednei Azii}, vol. 2, bk. 1, ed. B. G. Gafurov (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Vostochnoĭ literatury, 1963), esp. 400–408.
\textsuperscript{182} An anecdotal testimony in support of this is found in Semenov’s travelogue about his trip to remote Hisser before the end of the 19th century. The newspaper \textit{Tsvet’} was read regularly, and on the walls of the reception room in Karatagh there were some paintings and oleographs taken from Russian and foreign journals. Moreover, Semenov and his company were served tea in glasses and with spoons. See A. Semenov, \textit{Na rubezhe Afganistana: 1. V Blagodatnom Khissare (Putevye ocherki)} (Moscow: Tovarishchestva I.N. Kushkerev i Ko, 1900), 6–12. For “superficial examples of Westernization” before and after the enthronement of ‘Abd al-Alahad, see Becker, \textit{Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia}, 107–121, 195–198.
grandchildren had studied in Russia and were not only well versed in Russian culture, but also spoke Russian. The last emir, Alim Khan, had studied at a military school in St Petersburg for three years, knew Russian well, and was interested in Russian literature.\footnote{I. I. Umnyakov, “K istorii novometodnoĭ shkolĭ v Bukhare”, Byulleten' Sredne-Aziatskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta 16 (1927): 89 n. 1; Ėrgashev, “Iz istorii obshchestvennopoliticheskoi zhizni Buhkary nachala xx veka”, 49.} During his first trip to Russia as emir he became a major general in the Russian army. In a classified letter, the governor general of Turkestan wrote that Alim Khan had tasted the “rudiments of civilisation”, knew Russian, and read the Russian press. He also warned, however, that the new emir was inexperienced and weak-willed, and understood that he had to listen to Russia.\footnote{M.S. Yusupov, Karvan-saray gor. Bukhary kontsa xix i nach. xx vv., Ts. AMIS, no. 825, l. 87.}

The quest for modernization partly affected the realm of military affairs with the introduction of new military hardware and modes of organization, including Russian uniforms.\footnote{M.S. Yusupov, Armiya, Ts. AMIS, no. 814, l. 87.} This modernization went so far that in 1912 or 1913 it contributed to the closure of eight small shops in the bazaar in Bukhara that used to sell coats of mail, shields, bows and arrows, and armour.\footnote{M.S. Yusupov, “K istorii novometodnoĭ zhizni Buhkary”, 50–51. Mikhail Frunze’s impression of Alim Khan in 1920 was similar, see Genis, “S Bukharioi nado konchat’”, 11–12.} Abd al-Ahad could thus withdraw to Kermine accompanied by 250 well-equipped and trained Cossacks who stayed with him\footnote{L. I. Rempel’, Dalēkoe i blizkoe: Stranitsy zhizni, bytâ, stroitel’nogo dela, remesla i iskusstva staroi Bukhary [Tashkent: Glafur Gulyam, 1982], 135–136.) and Umnyakov, Shštaryya v Bukhare, l. 5a. Even in remote areas, such as Kulub, soliders (Sarbāz) had uniforms at least as early as 1898. Sh. Yusupov, Ocherki istorii Kulyabskogo bekstva v kontse xix i nachale xx veka (Dushanbe, 1964), 42.} and served as regime support. All this paved the way for an increased centralization of power. The adoption of Russian uniforms, the use of “broken” Russian as the language of command, and the establishment of a military orchestra which played European marches,\footnote{L. I. Rempel’, Dalēkoe i blizkoe, 79.} testifies that these military acquisitions did not only have an immediate military significance, but were also a part of an acculturation process.

Unlike his predecessors, the last emir did not only pursue military reforms, but probably envisioned other reforms as well which are not entirely possible to explain by a wish to please the Russian authorities.\footnote{On how the emirs tried to ingratiate themselves with the Russian authorities with donations, see Khalid, “Society and Politics in Bukhara”, 371.} Soon after his enthronement and less than a month after the Shia-Sundi clashes, Alim Khan proclaimed that he intended to reform the emirate. The reforms in-
cluded tax cuts, amnesties, judicial reforms, and salary raises in the army. He also banned the tradition of giving presents to state servants for performing their duties,191 banned extravagant weddings, announced the creation of the position of a school inspector, and the opening of a medical clinic in Bukhara. The new emir also donated money to the Red Cross, the Women’s Gymnasium in Tashkent, a hospital, and the fight against locusts.192 But, perhaps as the governor general had stated, due to the emir’s lack of experience and willpower he soon backed down from his calls for reform, and between 1914 and 1917 there were no signs in the press of any calls for reform in the emirate.193 To some extent this might also have been a question of accommodating two very different visions of the state in Bukhara. Alim Khan, for example, received Russian state servants in the new Russian inspired building in the palace complex in Sitara Mahi Khasa, while his Bukharan subjects were received in an older building194 and in accordance with older customs.195

3.4 The Muslim scholars

3.4.1 Economy

The Russian conquest of Samarkand and its immediate aftermath brought havoc to the Bukharan economy in general and to religious institutions in particular. Although the Bukharan economy soon recovered,196 the economic damage was permanent for those religious institutions that had their religious

191 The abolishment of tārtūq and ālūq, gifts given to the emir in order to win favours, seems to have been done because it increasingly was considered a burden on the common people (fuqarā) who indirectly had to pay for those gifts. Even some of those who spoke out against tārtūq and ālūq continued to receive them, however, like the emir, (Érgashev, “Iz istorii obschestvenno-politicheskoi zhizni Bukhary nachala xx veka”, 52) and/or did little in practice to abolish them, like the head of the fiscal administration Astanaqul bin Muhammad Sharif. On Astanaqul bin Muhammad Sharif and tārtūq in 1914, see T.G. Tukhtametov, Russko-Bukharskie otnosheniya v kontse XIX-nachale XX v. pobeda Bukharskoi narodnoi revolyutsii (Tashkent: Fan, 1966), 28. It is interesting to note that as early as 1880 the Russian governor general in Tashkent banned Russian state servants from accepting gifts from Bukharan state servants. It was, however, very difficult to enforce this ban. See Bartol’d, “Istoriya kul’turnoi zhizni Turkestana”, 422.

192 Érgashev, “Iz istorii obschestvenno-politicheskoi zhizni Bukhary nachala xx veka”, 50. Another sign of the emir’s support is found in the correspondence between him and the Russian authorities concerning the emir becoming the patron (pokrovitel’) of the Tashkent Modern School (Real’noe Uchilishche) in 1913. See TsGARUz, f. 2, op. 1, d. 347.


194 Rempel’, Dalëkoe i blizkoe, 152.

195 Bartol’d, “Istoriya kul’turnoi zhizni Turkestana”, 420.

196 For example, between 1865 and 1871 the Bukharan import from Russia grew by more than 1200 percent, while the export to Russia grew by more than 900 percent. See Veksel’man, Rossiiskii monopolisticheskii i insotrannii kapital v Srednei Azii, 14.
endowments in areas conquered by Russia, as they lost their main sources of income. This was not compensated by a transfer of religious endowments that had lost their religious institutions to Russia, as such religious endowments were instead confiscated by Bukhara and the chief judge (qāẓī-yī kalān). As a result, the Bukharan Muslim scholars, including the students, lost large parts of their incomes and had to resort to various forms of commercial activities in order to earn a living. Some of the most infamous objects of commercial transactions were the students’ rooms (hujras) in the madrasas where they lived.

The increased trade with Russia and the rest of the world after the conquest, much facilitated by modern banking and the construction of the railroad, also created new economic opportunities for the Muslim scholars. For example, Emir Abd al-Ahad formed a partnership with the chief judge to produce and export, among other things, large amounts of tin ware to Russia. The blossoming cotton industry also offered ample opportunities to make money. Some of the most active supporters of educational reform and modernization in Bukhara derived their incomes from the cotton and textile industry. The growing ease of trade and transport also increased the number of pilgrims to Mecca and Medina, which involved not only an exchange of ideas with other Muslims, but also an exchange of goods. Another phenomenon visible in Bukhara (but not unique to Bukhara) towards the end of this period, was that instead of being funded by religious endowments, many new educational activities were funded by Bukharan charitable organizations. Still, most low-ranking Muslim scholars probably had a very difficult situation, as their resources and employment opportunities were limited, although students continued to come to Bukhara. There was a large community of students from the Fergana-valley in Russian Turkistan and most likely a large number from Khattlan, an area in southern Bukhara that, unlike

\[\text{197 'Aynī, Ta'rikh-i amīrān-i Manghītiya-yi Būkhārā, 76.}\]
\[\text{198 Rempel, Dalēkoe i blizkoe, 82.}\]
\[\text{199 Russian banks played an important role in providing loans, especially for the increased cultivation of and trade in cotton. The Russian authorities had encouraged cotton cultivation as a consequence of the American Civil War when Russia, and especially the Russian military, faced shortages of cotton.}\]
\[\text{200 Like the Muhī al-Dīn family and Mirza Siraj al-Dīn. For the link between the merchants and the Jadīdī see also Fedtke, “Jadids, Young Bukharans, Communists and the Bukharan Revolution”, 509–510.}\]
\[\text{201 For an almost contemporary account on how this affected the conflict between the Jadīdī and the Qadīmī in Russia, see Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Būkhoro”, 44–45. See also Stéphane A. Dudoignon, “Qu’est-ce que la qadimīya? Éléments pour une sociologie du traditionalisme musulman, en Islam de Russie et en Transoxiane (au tournant des xix° et xx° siècles)”, in L’Islam de Russie: Conscience communautaire et autonomie politique chez les Tatars de la Volga et de l’Oural depuis XVIIIe siècle, Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Dāmir Is’haqov, and Rāfyq Mōhāmmātshin, ed. (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 1997), 207–226.}\]
\[\text{202 Khalid, “Society and Politics in Bukhara”, 374.}\]
the Fergana-valley, suffered from the inclusion of Bukhara in the Russian customs frontier.203

To some extent it can be argued that, through the charitable organizations, a few Muslim scholars regained some of the autonomy of which they had been deprived in the wake of the Russian conquest, but their restored autonomy was compromised due to their increased dependence on the merchants. Besides, some of the reformists’ vision of a modern state included the abolishment of income sources that historically had supported the autonomy of the Muslim scholars vis-à-vis the state servants in the fiscal administration. That is, the reformists were not only more dependent upon the merchants and less on the religious endowments, but at least one of them, Damla Ikram, was even against the muhrāna, the fee paid by the client to the judge (qāżī) “for the stamp” when issuing legal documents. Instead Damla Ikram wanted to receive a salary from the state, which he also did when serving as a judge.204 Many of the reformists, including Damla Ikram, also protested against the renting of the students’ rooms, a transaction that possibly to some extent may also have supported the autonomy of the Muslim scholars. Both these examples should be put in the context of the reform-minded Muslim scholars’ call for a state budget, which never had existed in the emirate, a budget that would have been controlled by high-ranking state servants

203 The rivalry between the Russian and British empires, including the establishment of the Russian customs frontier and the Afghan emir Abd al-Rahman’s suppression of Afghan Turkistan, which was an aspect of the former, led to a northward reorientation of Bukhara. The southward trade to India, on the other hand, decreased by 75–80 percent between 1895 and 1905 (Becker, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia, 176. See also Gankovskiī, Rossiya i Afganistan, 134–149). This probably had severe consequences for the formerly important trading centre of Kulab in Khatlān in eastern Bukhara. Khatlān was also origin of the most prominent family of judges, which during the protectorate era had provided the emirate with three generations of chief judges. During the protectorate era, non-Khatlānī Muslim scholars held the chief judge position for less than 18 out of a total of 43 years, and the Tūmānī chief judges were generally considered the weakest. Despite this, until 1910 there had been rotation between the Khatlānī and the Tūmānī Muslim scholars of the posts as chief judge and the position just beneath the chief judge, each one of them usually serving at least 10 years. Sadr al-Din was the first chief judge from a family of three chief judges from the bāyīzī avlād (family) from Khatlān. Sadr al-Din served as chief judge from some time at the beginning of the 1860s until his death in 1296/1878–79; his son, Badr al-Din between 1306/1888–89 and his death in 1908; and the latter’s son, Burhan al-Din between 1914 and 1917, and then again from 1917 until 1920. The Tūmānī Muslim scholars, from Bukhara and surrounding areas, were represented by Abd al-Shukur (b. 1213/1798–1799), chief judge from 1296/1878–79 until his death in 1306/1888–89; Baqa Khvaja between 1908 and 1914; and Sharifj Makhduhm, son of Abd al-Shukur, for some months in 1917. For these networks, see Adeeb Khalid, “Society and Politics in Bukhara”, 367–396; Stéphane A. Dudoignon, “La question scolaire à Boukhara et au Turkestan, du ‘premier renouveau’ à la soviétization (fin du XVIIIe siècle–1937)”, Cahiers du Monde Russe 37 (1996): 133–210; See also earlier research, such as A.A. Semenov, Ocherk istoriistra tsentral’nogo administrativnogo upravleniya Bukharskogo khanstva pozdnishego vremeni (Dushanbe: AN TadzhSSR, 1954), 66; and Fitrat, Davrai hukmroni Amir Olimkhon (Dushanbe: Palatai Davlatii Kitobho, 1991), 30; and Wennberg, An Inquiry into Bukharan Qadimism, esp. 11–32.

204 Aynī, “Ta’riki inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhorī”, 122.
in the fiscal administration. There was thus a tendency even in Bukhara towards centralization, with some Muslim scholars being becoming state servants of their own will.205

3.4.2 Education

The madrasas prepared their students to transmit traditional knowledge, for work as a judge, teacher, etc. in a largely unreformed emirate, while the small group of adherents of the “new method” schools favoured subjects they argued would allow Bukhara to make progress, develop, and become like a European country or Japan.206 The new-method schools in Bukhara only provided primary education (maktabs). Some voices were heard about reforming the madrasa as well in terms of reducing the extensive use of glosses and commentaries, promoting the educational usage of Quran commentaries and Hadith,207 but, with probably only one exception,208 the madrasas in Bukhara remained unreformed.

One of the key features of the new-method schools was functional literacy. The teachers strove to teach the students how to read and write, but also to provide them with knowledge about the world as the teachers understood it through the modern disciplines of geography and history. The teachers were inspired by educational developments elsewhere, especially among the Tatars in Russia, in the Ottoman empire, in Iran, etc., and their educational materials were partly based on foreign publications.209 The calls for educational reform in Bukhara should, however, also be viewed against the backdrop of rapid reform of educational institutions on a global scale, because the technical and industrial developments that took place during the period of this study rested on science rather than being “guided by [a] coherent set of

205 In another context, see Arnold H. Green, The Tunisian Ulama, 1873–1915: Social Structure and Response to Ideological Currents (Leiden: Brill, 1978). The other side of the same coin was that under Emir Muzaffar, and increasingly so under Emir Abd al-Ahad, many Muslim scholars had to make annual payments to their patrons in order to keep their position, at least according to Aynī, who, admittedly, as always may have been quite biased. See S.M., “Taʾrikh-i amīrān-i manghītiya-yi Buhkārā”, SI 90 (28 Nov. 1921): 5.

206 A standard work on the new-method schools among the Muslim scholars in Turkistan is Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform, esp. 155-183. See also Jiří Bečka’s classical study of the education in Central Asia in Jiří Bečka, “Traditional schools in the works of Sadriddin Aynī and other writers of Central Asia”, Archiv Orientální 39 (1971): 284–321 and Jiří Bečka, “Traditional schools in the works of Sadriddin Aynī and other writers of Central Asia II”, Archiv Orientální 40 (1972): 130–163. These works are, however, all based on the accounts of those who were hostile to the traditional education. The differences between the traditional and the reformed education in Egypt is described in Gesink, Islamic Reform and Conservatism.


209 Most notably Bihbudi’s book on geography, Bihbūdī, Madkhal-i jughrāfiyā-yi ’umrānī.
accumulated understanding.” The most prominent advocates of the new-method schools had travelled frequently, been in contact with the rapid rate of innovation, and seen different educational needs than those prevailing in Bukhara at the time. The close link between educational reform and commercial needs was also present in Bukhara. Bukharan merchants that had spent much time trading in Russia frequently joined together when they returned to Bukhara and set up their own schools in the home for their children, frequently employing Tatars as teachers. Such schools existed in the private sphere; they kept a low profile and there are thus few accounts of them. Unlike the Muslim scholars, the merchants probably had a greater need for functional literacy, basic arithmetic, and accountancy when communicating with their suppliers and customers.

One of the first official accounts of a school for merchants (although it never opened) dates from 1891 when Bukharan merchants (Muslim and Jewish) invited a Russian teacher to teach Russian and arithmetic. It is noteworthy that they turned to the head of the fiscal administration on the advice of the Russian Political Agency, and that permission would only be granted if they also enrolled a learned person (mullah) who would teach no less than the Russian teacher. The head of the fiscal administration was thus involved in educational matters, and from the account it seems that he tried to placate the Muslim scholars by demanding the participation of a Muslim scholar in the project. It is unclear, however, whether another school for merchants, which opened in 1894 (and reopened in 1897) notably, with the permission of the emir, also demanded the presence of any Muslim scholars.

The opening of the first Bukharan new-method school is ascribed to another merchant, Mulla Jurabay, who enjoyed the support of the chief judge (Badr al-Din), whose nephew even studied at the school. Ayni writes that because of the support of the powerful chief judge, no one dared to protest against it. Still, Mulla Jurabay’s school closed shortly after it opened in 1900 due to lack of interest.

It seems that Mulla Jurabay was one of the first, if not the first, who “marketed” his school among the Muslim scholars as an indigenous school

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210 Smil, Creating the Twentieth Century, 13.
211 Among the advocates are Mulla Jura-bay, Fitrat, Mirza Siraj al-Din, Munzim, Bihbudi etc.
212 Umnyakov, “K istorii novometodnoi shkolyy v Bukhare”, 90.
215 For this school, see Khalid, “Society and Politics in Bukhara”, 375.
216 Mulla Jurabay was trading with Orenburg other provinces of Russia. During his travels he took examinations at new method-schools and became interested in these schools (Ayni, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikri dar Bukhoro”, 31).
that (unlike its predecessors) was not a part of the merchant community. Still, despite the support of the chief judge, Ayni writes that at the time he compared Mulla Jurabay with the “sly boots” (nayrangbāžāhā) who were cheating people, and assumed that Mulla Jurabay’s aim was to gather money and then travel to Russia for business. Mulla Jurabay’s school probably signified the beginning of the conflict among the Bukharan Muslim scholars in the realm of education that was a central theme of early 20th century Bukharan history.

The Russian authorities had already opened up Russian schools for Bukharans during the 19th century, but those schools were never particularly popular among the Bukharans. The Tatars, however, were not only involved as teachers in the semi-clandestine schools run by Bukharan merchants, but also ran their own schools where the language of instruction was Tatar, and it was in close contact with these schools that the first native Bukharan school employing Muslim scholars opened.

In 1908 the Bukharan Abd al-Vahid Munzim’s new-method school opened in his home in Bukhara, also financed at least in part by the merchants. The school attracted a lot of interest among the Muslim scholars, and employed several of them, most notably Ayni and Damla Ikram. After a holding of a public final examination at the school in September 1909, opposition to the school grew, and the oppositional Muslim scholars asked the head of the fiscal administration to close it. This is yet another sign of the influence of the servants in the fiscal administration over education, even though according to Ayni, the head of the fiscal administration also asked the chief judge for his opinion. Munzim’s school was formally banned that year, although this ban does not seem to have been enforced against all the other new-method schools.

The number of Bukharan students in Istanbul had been increasing for some time, and in 1910 there were at least ten Bukharans studying in Istanbul. When they returned, they became active in the new-method school movement, working as teachers or instructors. In 1912/13 there were thus several new-method schools in Bukhara that were opened or at least supported by Bukharan students returning from Istanbul. Some of the most prominent of these students, like Abd al-Rauf Fitrat and Usman Khvaja, came from merchant families. Yet at least some of the schools had financial difficulties, and in 1913 Damla Ikram asked the merchants to support them.

The factional politics among the Bukharan Muslim scholars led in 1914 to the return of Burhan al-Din as chief judge. He was the son of a former chief judge (Badr al-Din). Many Muslim scholars who were opposed to the new-

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218 The four above paragraphs are based on Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, esp. 32, 40–41, 66, 123, 131, 136 and 143.
219 TsGARUz, I. 3, op. 2, d. 215, no. 67.
method schools supported Burhan al-Din. This, and the outbreak of World War I, in which Russia, among others, fought against the Ottoman Empire, signalled the end of many of the new-method schools in Bukhara. On the 19 July 1914, the new-method schools were finally banned with the head of the fiscal administration citing a fatwa from 1909 to imply that the new-method schools technically had been banned since that date. Although this did not lead to the closure of all new method schools in the emirate, the merchants and the reformist Muslim scholars in the capital were forced to close down the schools they ran there and instead continue their educational activities in other spheres, where the dependency of the Muslim scholars upon the merchants frequently was obvious. Some other schools remained open, however, or opened later, such as one hosted and funded by the governor of Shahr-i Sabz from 1915 and onwards, yet another example of the role of the fiscal administration in the realm of reformed education. Yet another, even more telling example of the interference of the fiscal administration in the domain of the Muslim scholars is the case of what probably was the only reformed madrasa in Bukhara. It was opened by the head of the fiscal administration (Mirza Nasrulla) on the property of a religious endowment where a hammam founded by the chief judge Badr al-Din previously had been located. To make way for the madrasa, the hammam was demolished, which led to much resentment from Badr al-Din’s son, Burhan al-Din, and his faction.

3.5 Historiography

The interference of the fiscal administration in the domain of Muslim scholars was an aspect of centralization projects and polity expansions in many Muslim countries during the 19th and early 20th century. Another aspect was the increasing dependence of the Muslim scholars on the merchants. The calls for, and opposition to reforms thus took place in the context of a centralization/modernization project that was expressed in terms of a conflict between Jadīdī and Qadīmī, or between different solidarity networks (Khattlānī/Kūhistānī versus Tümānī) supporting or opposing reforms and progress. Bukharan historiographical accounts of the calls for progress describe to a large extent the history of different factions and social networks. These different groups were given names that reflected certain conceptions of historical time, such as “New” (Jadīdī) and “Old” (Qadīmī), or advocates of progress and reactionaries. These factions have also been dis-

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221 Khalid, “Society and Politics in Bukhara”, 381.
222 Tamkūn, MFMZ, fols. 420a–423a; Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 119.
223 See for example Gesink, Islamic Reform and Conservatism, and Green, The Tunisian Ulama.
tinguished according to their regional belonging, mainly as Khattlānī/Kūhistānī or Tūmānī. Among the Muslim scholars, the supporters of reforms came largely from the Tūmānī-faction, while the opponents of reform came from the Khattlānī/Kūhistānī faction.

The factional labels above are difficult to find before the opening of Munzim’s school in 1908 and the conflicts to which this event contributed. The rebellion against Emir Muzaffar was conducted in the name of Islam. Until the Shia head of the fiscal administration fell from grace in 1910, the majority of the Muslim scholars, and probably the Uzbek elite as well, seem to have been more united in terms of criticizing the Shia Muslims and their influence in the administration.\(^\text{225}\) This is especially easy to discern in the works of Muslim scholars born before 1870. The main accounts we have of conflicts in Bukhara before 1910 also concern relations between Shia and Sunni.\(^\text{226}\) Burhan al-Din’s dissatisfaction with the Shia Muslims was probably shared by many Bukharans, and had also been voiced by Ahmad Kalla before him. However, after the Sunni-Shia riots in 1909, the factional battles in the emirate have been labelled as being between the advocates of progress/Jadīdī and the Qadīmī, and Burhan al-Din was one of the most despised enemies of the advocates of progress.

After the opening of Munzim’s new-method school, the classifications Jadīd and Qadīm became increasingly common in Bukhara. If they initially signified only the supporters of the new-method schools (maktabhā-yi jadīda) and their opponents, they soon came to imply a great deal of other things, from persons who carried portfolios (jużvgīr), who were called Jadīdī,\(^\text{227}\) to Muslim scholars who believed that the end of the world was imminent,\(^\text{228}\) who were called Qadīmī. Still, all Qadīmī were certainly not narrow-minded reactionaries. Burhan al-Din is an illustrative example of someone who probably was very well informed about current affairs while also being politically shrewd. Russian reports on Burhan al-Din’s attitude to the new-method schools are, for example, contradictory; even in 1913 they were not sure whether or not he supported them.\(^\text{229}\) Ayni writes that Burhan al-Din was not opposed to the new-method schools where the language of instruction was Russian,\(^\text{230}\) a fairly tolerant position. Unlike some of his allies, who were against the opening of the first cinema in Bukhara,\(^\text{231}\) Burhan

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\(^\text{225}\) See also the report on Burhan al-Din and his family written by the Russian police in Old Bukhara, Ts. TsGARUz, I. 3, op. 2, d. 264, ll. 6–80b. Here not only the popularity of Badr al-Din is emphasized, but also that Abd al-Ahad relied on the chief judge in order to control the Shia.

\(^\text{226}\) For some notes of earlier clashes between the Shias and Sunnis in Bukhara, see Khalid, “Politics and Society in Bukhara 1869 – 1910”, 369.

\(^\text{227}\) Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobī fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 141.

\(^\text{228}\) See Fitrat, “Rohbari najot”, Sadoi sharq no. 9: 17.

\(^\text{229}\) Ts. TsGARUz, I. 3, op. 2, d. 264, l. 70b.


al-Din even made use of a cinema and a circus at a party to which many Bukharan dignitaries were invited, an event that generally is seen as having facilitated his appointment to the office of chief judge soon thereafter.232

Moreover, Burhan al-Din came from a prominent family of judges. His father, Badr al-Din, had been a supporter of new-method schools and used to read newspapers aloud for students together with the pro-reform Muslim scholar Damla Ikram. Badr al-Din was also influential in the foreign affairs of the emirate; for example he frequently carried out negotiations with the Russian Political Agency in Bukhara.233 Burhan al-Din’s links with the outside world, i.e. Turks from the Ottoman Empire, is also documented in contemporary Russian reports on him and dates back to the time when his father was chief judge.234

Burhan al-Din’s father, Badr al-Din, and his grandfather, Sadr al-Din were never criticized for opposing reforms in any of the primary sources on which this study is based. Badr al-Din is described as a powerful, intelligent and competent person who was popular among the people.235 Sadr al-Din was criticized for being too powerful and confiscating the religious endowments and books, etc.236 The latter can, however, be seen as an aspect of the centralization of power in the emirate in the wake of the Russian conquest. The Russian seizure of Samarkand, and the subsequent quelling of mainly Uzbek rebellions against emir Muzaffar the same year reconfigured the political arena. This not only affected the fiscal administration, but the Muslim scholars as well. This was not only because the emir relied on the Russians and the Shia Muslims in suppressing the rebellions, both these groups frequently being regarded as unbelievers by at least some of the Muslim scholars, but also because the chief judge, Sadr al-Din, remained loyal to the emir. He probably promoted Muslim scholars from his place of origin, Khatlan in south-eastern Bukhara. After the rebellion there was a substantial purge in the ranks of the Muslim scholars, but also in the ranks of the Uzbek elite.

The historiography on the factional conflicts in Bukhara with the Kūhistānī/Khatlānī, the Qadiymīs, and Burhan al-Din on one side, and the advocates of progress, the Jadīdī, on the other, dates from the period after

233 M.S. Yusupov, “Sud v Buhkare. Sudurostvo i sudoproizvodstvo v Bukharskom émirate v kontse xix i nachalе xx v.v.” Ts. AMIS, inv. no. 827, 37.
234 For the latter, see Ts. TsGARUz, I. 3, op. 2, d. 264, no. 7ob. For other reports about Burhan al-Din meeting with Turks from the Ottoman Empire, see TsGARUz, I. 3, op. 2, d. 150, no. 38, and TsGARUz, I. 3, op. 2, d. 150, I. 39.
235 G. Tsviling, “Bukharskaya smuta (9 ianv. 1920 g.)”, Srednaya Aziya 2 and 3 (1910). Even a Muslim scholar like Sadr al-Din Aynī wrote that Badr al-Din was educated, and familiar with the “new literature”. (Aynī, Ta rikh-i inqilobi Bukhoro, 45). An older generation of Bukharan Muslim scholars similarly did not show any hostile sentiments towards Badr al-Din. For example, Ahmad Kalla praised of Badr al-Din in writing as did Mirza Abd al-Azim Sami Bustani.
236 ‘Aynī, Ta rikh-i amīrān-i Manghiyati-yi Buxhārā, 76.
237 ‘Aynī, Ta rikh-i amīrān-i Manghiyati-yi Buxhārā, 76.
1917. It was probably coloured by the repression of the reformists after the calls for reforms in 1917 when the Russian Political Residency in Bukhara, supported by some of the Jadīdī, called for political reforms in the emirate (the so-called Miller’s manifest). A pro-reformist Tūmānī chief judge Sharifjan Makhdum was installed as new chief judge, and Burhan al-Din was dismissed. The polarization between the two factions was demonstrated when Sharifjan Makhdum was thrown off his horse and beaten up by a group of Khattānī/Kūhistānī students. The call for reforms thus backfired, and resulted only in new riots and the killing of people accused of being Jadīdī.

The situation worsened after the first Bolshevik attempt to invade the emirate in 1918 (the Kolesov incident), which was supported by at least one of the prominent pro-reformist merchants, Fayzulla Khvaja. A period of violent political cleansing erupted, with still more killings of people accused of being Jadīdī. Many fled to the Russian settlement Novaya Bukhara or to Russian Turkistan. A contemporary Russian observer well familiar with Bukhara wrote in 1918 that the Jadīdīs, whom he equated with the Young Bukharian party who were growing increasingly close to the Bolsheviks, consisted of no more than 30 persons and had already split into two factions. One faction was led by a former Tsarist secret police informer, who was now mainly interested in reinstalling the Shia Muslim head of the fiscal administration (Astanaquil bin Muhammad Sharif) who had been deposed during the Shia-Sunni riots in 1910; and the other was led by Fayzulla Khvaja, whom he accused of having been involved in receiving stolen goods. The Young Bukharans, he added, were very unpopular among the Bukharans.

These less than 30 Young Bukharans later joined forces with the Red Army and invaded the emirate in 1920. They subsequently served on the revolutionary tribunals in which their close associates, most notably Fayzulla Khvaja and Aynī, that have dominated the historical narrative of the conflict between the Jadīdī and the Qadīmī, between progressive reformers and reactionaries. They used a political terminology that to some degree

238 Sharifjan Makhdum thus dates the conflict between his family and the Kūhistānīs to a period well before Sadr al-Din was appointed chief judge around 1860. See Sharifjan Makhdum, Tarjuma-yi aḥvāl-i qāẓī ʿAbd al-Shukur, Ms. IVANRUz, no. 1304, fols. 100a–100b.

239 See Mīrzā Salīm-bik, Taʿrīkh-i Salīmī, Ms. IVANRUz, no. 2016, fol. 151b, and Akhmed Saīdigīrevich Subkhankulov, “Vospominanie”, Ts. AMBA, no. 20316/II-5, l.2 and 9.

240 Umnyakov, Shēṭiyya v Bukhāre, l. 2a. Aynī also writes that they were unpopular in Bukhara. See Aynī, “Taʿrīkhī inqilobi fikř dar Bukhorō”, 255. See also Genis, Vitse-konsul Vvedenskii, 112, 124–125, 128, and 190.

241 ‘Abd al-Qādir Mūḥīt al-Din, the son of one of the wealthiest merchants in the former emirate, served as public prosecutor, and Fayzulla Khvaja as a member of the court. See Akhmed Saīdigīrevich Subkhankulov, “Vospominanie”, Ts. AMBA, no. 20316/II–5, ll.31–32. See also Genis, Vitse-konsul Vvedenskii, 207.
was conceptually and lexematically alien to Bukhara before 1917, thus giving this political struggle a very modern teleology.\textsuperscript{242} This historical narrative was later modified to comply with Soviet ideology according to which, in general terms, the Wellspring of Progress was the Russian annexation (prisoedinenie) of Bukhara at a time when the medieval emirate was confronted by Russian financial capital, the advent of capitalism, and the progressive culture of the Russian proletariat. Human agency was easily put at the centre of this historical narrative. Divine agency was not only regarded as theoretically impossible, but mere belief in the possibility of divine intervention was regarded as a sign of backwardness.

3.6 Conclusion

During the fifty years this study covers, Bukhara experienced a phase of rapid globalization and industrialization. The social fabric changed and new technology and inventions reached Bukhara. The Russian subjugation of the emirate not only opened up the emirate for foreign trade and traders to a greater extent than before, it also increased demands, both internally and externally, for reforms of the emirate. Such calls for reform, partly in the name of progress, served to regulate the relations among Bukhars economically, legally, and morally. These relations were also transformed to serve new forms of spatial organization that came with the Russian conquest of Central Asia and the rivalry between the Russian and the British empires. Colonial policies effectively contributed to suppressing the previously so frequent Bukharan military ventures abroad. But the Bukharan Emir and the Russian authorities also probably had a mutual interest in developing a small standing army that could quell internal rebellions.

The Uzbek groups were largely pacified. Relatively loyal governors ruled the provinces, while the most prominent members of the Manghit elite, that used to rule the provinces, were kept in domestic exile in the capital of the emirate. It was also here, in the capital, that the most significant political battles were waged during the protectorate era. These were all signs of the centralization and transformation of the political life in the emirate.

The economic developments during the protectorate era allowed more people in the emirate to engage in trade, including the emirs, representatives of the fiscal administration, and the Muslim scholars. The Russian authorities were also keen to open up the Bukharan market to Russian merchants.

\textsuperscript{242} For an early Soviet account of the qadim\=n\=is being classified as “reactionaries” by using the recently coined irti\={o} ‘, see for example F. Kh\=u\={j}aev, “Bukhoro inqilobining tarikhiga material-
lar: yozuvchidan”, in Fayzulla Kh\=u\={j}aev hayoti va faoliyati haqida yangi mulohazalar, ed. D.A. Alimova (Tashkent: FAN, 1997), 63. On the ideological aspects of the early Soviet historiography of this conflcit, see Fedtke, “Jadids, Young Bukharans, Communists and the Bukharan Revolution”, 483–512.
and goods. Those groups had their own interest in protecting their economic ventures from the encroachments of Bukharan state servants who saw little benefit in fixed salaries, a state budget, and a codified law that would transform their rights and duties.

It is hardly surprising that the political conflicts during this period used traditional concepts as well as concepts that were coloured by the transformations that took place during the protectorate era. Those Bukharans who were most exposed to the colonial administration were also the ones most likely to transpose a modern conceptual system onto the Bukharan society. Calls for progress were made in order to promote specific reforms in the emirate.

The very labels Jadīdī (“the New”) and Qadīmī (“the Old) of the political factions in Bukhara during the last decade of this period can, in the light of the background presented above (especially as the Jadīdī also were called the advocates of progress) be interpreted as signs of the presence of certain concepts of historical time, and in some cases as indicating adherence to certain eschatological scenarios. That these labels also overlapped with other identities, some of which were regionally based, underscores the rhetorical dimension of temporal experience and manipulation. This suggests that all these temporal and spatial identity markers have a constitutive function that reinforces identities in times of intensifying political struggles and thus also serves to socially mobilize people.

The discussion above shows that it is difficult to merely extrapolate progress from a metahistorical shift caused by the technical and social changes during the protectorate era. The rhetorical dimension is certainly relevant, at least for the temporal boundaries and the direction of the concept in question. However, ideas of spatial organization, the role of modern cartography, and the relative confinement of the political arena to a specific space, give rise to the question if it is possible to extrapolate the spatial boundaries of progress from an increased emphasis on space-based rather than place-based geography.
4. Place and space

4.1 Cosmography

The pre-Mongol geographic tradition based on early Arabic translations and adaptations of Ptolemy probably inspired the most influential geographic treatises in Bukhara in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. In Bukhara, at least, this was a narrative geographical tradition that rarely, if ever, was accompanied by maps. Sometimes geographic diagrams, tables of coordinates, or illustrations accompanied it. Even in the second half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century and the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century prominent Bukharan Muslim scholars and calligraphers continued to produce works influenced by this geographic tradition. Ahmad Kalla’s “Deriving the Longitude and Latitude of Cities” (\textit{Istikhrāj-i ṭūl va ʿarz-i balad})\textsuperscript{243} is an example of this. Astronomy is used in order to calculate distances on earth. The emphasis here is more on place than space, and there are no modern conceptual boundaries between astronomy and geography.

Geographical knowledge in Bukhara was frequently blended with “the science of the stars” (\textit{īlm-i nujūm});\textsuperscript{244} with \textit{tavārīkh}, in this context perhaps best translated as “chronicles” or “annals”, but also able to mean “chronology” or “calendar”; and with “geometry” (\textit{handasa}) - disciplines which together provided the foundation of what today is called cosmography, although the term cosmography (like history and geography) translates badly into 19\textsuperscript{th} century Bukharan Persian, at least with as a single term. The worldview transmitted by this tradition can loosely be described as based on an assumption of the unity of creation, with all things in the universe having reciprocal relationships, and can be traced back as least as far as the widely read 12\textsuperscript{th} century “The Wonders of Creation and the Odities of Existence” (\textit{ʿAjāʾīb al-makhlūqāt va-gharāʾib al-mawjūdāt}) by Zakariya ibn Muhammad ibn Mahmud Abu Yahya al-Qazvini. This was also read in Bukhara, and Muhammad Sharifjan Makhdum, the 20\textsuperscript{th} century Bukharan reformist judge, had at least two copies, of which one was a lithograph.\textsuperscript{245} Two of the

\textsuperscript{243} [Ahmad Kalla,] \textit{Istikhrāj-i ṭūl va ʿarz-i balad}, Ms. IVANRUz, no. 2247/4, fols. 55a–74a. See description in \textit{SVR: Tochnyē i estestvennē nauki}, 181.

\textsuperscript{244} Astronomy and astrology were not separate disciplines. I thus adopt the same translation and arguments as Heinen, \textit{Islamic Cosmology}, 24.

most popular cosmographical treatises in 19th and early 20th century Bukhara, to judge from the number of manuscripts preserved today, were Sultan Muhammad b. Darvish Muhammad al-Mufti al-Balkhi’s 16th century “A Collection of Strange Things” (Majma’ al-gharāyib)\(^{246}\) and Muhammad-Tahir b. Abu al-Qasim Balkhi’s 17th century “Different Degrees of Wonders” (‘Ajāyib al-tabaqāt).\(^ {247}\)

During the 19th century, geographical treatises still reached Bukhara from other parts of the Muslim world. Many of those treatises probably still had less in common with modern geography than with cosmography. One of the more popular and influential Ottoman geographers, who was read in Bukhara during the 19th century, albeit probably to a limited extent, was the 17th century Katib Chelebi, about whose geographical works Victor Ménage has written: “these works also serve by their virtual triviality, as an index of ignorance of the world.”\(^{248}\) One of those Bukharans who read Katib Chelebi was Sadr-i Sarir (d.1303/1886-87), who was a well-known Muslim scholar during the rule of Emir Muzaffar. Sadr-i Sarir, among others, asked Mirza Muhammad Abd al-Azim Sami, also known under his pen name Bustani, to translate Katib Chelebi’s cosmographical work “Chronological Tables” (Taqvīm al-tavārikh) into Persian.\(^ {249}\)

Cosmography and its auxiliary disciplines were probably rarely taught in the madrasas in Bukhara,\(^ {250}\) as a student set on a legislative career had little use for such knowledge. Still, because a good cosmographer had to be well versed in a number of different disciplines, there were several ways he could support himself. The case of the Bukharan Muslim scholar Ahmad Kalla is

\(^{246}\) There are at least 36 copies of this work at the Oriental Institute in Tashkent. See Sultân Muḥammad b. Darvīš Muḥammad al-Muṭṭī al-Balkhī, Majma’ al-gharāyib in SVR: Tochnyē i estestvennē nauki, 161–167.

\(^{247}\) There are at least 16 copies of this work at the Oriental Institute in Tashkent, the majority copied during the 19th century. See Muhammad-Tāḥir b. Abū al-Qāsim Balkhī, ‘Ajāyib al-ṭabaqāt in SVR: Tochnyē i estestvennē nauki, 173–175.


\(^{249}\) Bustani’s translation, which included his own additions, was called ‘Ayn al-tavārikh (Ms. IVANRUz, no. 4216). See SVR, 11: 13–14.

\(^{250}\) There seems to be a disagreement about whether cosmology was taught in the madrasas in Bukhara or not. Still, considering the uninstitutionalized education in the madrasas, it seems plausible to assume that it was possible to find a teacher in cosmology and its auxiliary discipline. For cosmography being taught in the madrasas, see Jiří Bečka, “Traditional schools in the works of Sadriddin Ayṇī and other writers of Central Asia II”, Archiv Orientální 40 (1972): esp. 137 and Kanlidere, Reform within Islam, 82–84. At least in Egypt and Iraq, the vaqfs documents were usually very clear on what the income from the endowments could go to, and even included what kind of educational disciplines they could support. See Gesink, Islamic Reform and Conservatism, 61, 134–135, and 248 n. 7.
telling. He supported himself as a “calligrapher” (*naqqāsh*), “construction engineer” (*muhandis*), and “astrologer” (*munajjim*).251

Despite having been given a globe of the earth during one of his few visits to Russia,252 Ahmad Kalla did not pay much attention to this way of representing the surface of the earth, at least to judge by his literary production. That is to say, we do not have any evidence that this gift changed his conceptualization of geography. He never employed the modern term for “geography” (*jughrāfiyā*), despite the fact, as Hodizoda remarks, that the trip to Russia during which Ahmad Kalla was given a terrestrial and a celestial globe was the first time he came in contact with “European geography”.253 The two globes were given to him so that he could make a horoscope for a Russian lady.254

Ahmad Kalla should probably be contextualized in terms of cosmography, as he does not seem to have been familiar with the conceptual boundaries of modern geography or astronomy. Ahmad Kalla, who like Sadr-i Sarir saw the apex of his career during the reign of Emir Muzaffār, was compared by pre-soviet Bukharan Muslim scholars to scholars belonging to the pre-modern disciplines of cosmography. The Bukharan poet Shari compared him with the classical scholars Mahmud bin Muhammad b. Umar al-Chaghmīnī al-Khvarizmī (d. after 1221), Euclid (fl. 300 BC), Nasir al-Dīn Tusi (d. 1274), Ibn Farabī (d. c. 950), and Avicenna (d. 1037) and implicitly praised him for having the same skills as a good cosmographer, including astronomy and geometry.255 The Bukharan poet Muḥtārām especially praises him for his skills in geometry and in the science of the stars.256 Ḥashmat, brother of Emir Muzaffār, praised him for being the Ptolemy and Socrates of his time.257

From the beginning of the 19th century, Bukharan cosmography faced a fate similar to that of cosmography in early modern Europe. It dissolved into a number of disciplines, one of which was geography. The lexeme for geography used by the 20th century Bukharan intellectuals was *jughrāfiyā*, a loan word without a native equivalent, despite its presence in an arabized Greek tradition. *Jughrāfiyā* was now mainly used by young Muslim scholars who returned from journeys or stays abroad and needed a different type of

251 See Hodizoda, *Ahmadi Donish*, 22, 34. Ahmad Kalla was most likely also well versed in astronomy of a more recent date. See for example his copy of Sāvā’ī Jāy Sang’s *Zīj-i jādīd-i Muḥammad Shāhī*, Ms. IVANRUz, no. 438.


253 Hodizoda, *Ahmadi Donish*, 73.


spatial precision. Modern maps also required new narratives that broke the previous relationships between geography, astronomy, astrology, and history, at least among some Muslim scholars in Bukhara at the beginning of the 20th century.

4.2 Geography

During the second half of the 19th century, the Bukharans got hold of an increasing number of modern geographical treatises from other parts of the Muslim world, including the Ottoman Empire and British India. These works were considered by some Bukharans to represent “the science of geography” (‘ulūm-i jughrāfiyā), a discipline that had not existed in 19th century Bukhara, and thus fell into the category of the “new sciences” (‘ulūm-i jadīd).258 Their influence remained limited, but increasingly less so. Bihbudi’s geographical treatise was probably one of the most widely read and influential geographical works in early 20th century Bukhara.

Western geographical knowledge was also disseminated by newspapers that contained plenty of information about the world, its countries, topography, and climates, but also about boundaries between states in a way that reflected a different kind of geographical knowledge and degree of spatial precision, as it emphasized space-based geography. The dissemination of this kind of geographical knowledge in Bukhara coincided with the globalization of the idea of the nation state259 and the gradual disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, a process which was reflected in the Muslim newspapers of the time, including the first newspaper in Bukhara, The Noble Bukhara.260

The Bukharan reader of the first Central Asian newspapers, with their multitude of telegraph notices and analytical articles on international politics, was privy to a completely different understanding of the world and its accompanying terminology than that provided by the old cosmographical treaties mentioned above. This did not by default mean that the “new” knowledge replaced or even challenged the old knowledge; they could exist side by side, or, as we can see in a work by the Bukharan Muslim scholar Tamkin, also overlap.261 However, after the turn of the century, the old worldview and the cosmographical treatises that accompanied it were increasingly criticized by some of the younger generation who grew up during the prote-

258 Although in order to legitimate it, jughāfiyā would also be described as a very old science. For the latter, see for example Fitrat, “Rohbari najot”, Sadoi sharq, no. 7–8, 39.
259 For this use of “globalization”, see Robertson, Globalization, esp. 57–60.
260 Although the articles in this paper rarely would focus on border issues, isolate cases were analysed in the paper. See for example the articles on Russian and English influence on the Turkish-Iranian border question in: “Mubāḥaṣa-yi sarḥadd-i Turkiya va Irān”, BSh 28 (12 Apr. 1912 [25 Apr. 1912]): 1.
261 Tamkīn’s MFMZ is a good example. See discussion below.
torate era and who called for improved temporal and spatial precision. For example, Ahmad Kalla’s level of geographical knowledge varies depending on which work one looks at, obviously reflecting the changes that occurred in the world during his lifetime, especially during the second half of the 19th century. But in terms of geographical knowledge, Ahmad Kalla probably had nothing of interest to offer the younger generation born during the 1880s, who had read more about the contemporary world than he had.

A young Bukharan Muslim scholar, Fitrat, who returned from his studies in Istanbul in 1914, wrote in a letter to the editor of the newspaper The Noble Bukhara two years before his return home that:

Turkistan appears as another world from that of the Europeans. We lack knowledge not only about others, but also about ourselves. [...] [T]he westerners have knowledge not only about the whole world, i.e. about the surface of the world, but also about the celestial world, and the things beneath the surface of the earth, so that they have knowledge about their ancestors while we still have people who believe that China is the end of the world and fairies live in the Caucasus.²⁶²

Although such criticism of the belief in monsters and fantastic tales and such an emphasis on reason and observation were nothing new,²⁶³ Fitrat’s words above should probably be read as a criticism of the whole cosmographical genre and the worldview of many Bukharans in the early 20th century. Similar views, in a more ironic mode, were voiced by the editor of the paper, Mirza Jalal Yusufzada. He mocked the Bukharan Muslim scholars in a fictive travelogue where he let a Bukharan Muslim scholar claim that they had knowledge about all the countries on earth, and that many of their works had been translated into European languages, whereas another more educated person (from Jalal’s perspective) in the same travelogue claims that the Bukharans knew nothing about “the history and the map of Turkistan [Tūrān zamīn]”.²⁶⁴

The response from those who still adhered to the old worldview could be outright denial of the existence of places that were not recognized in the traditional geographic knowledge. For example, in one of his treatises Ahmad Kalla suggested that his 19th century contemporaries not only lacked knowledge about the world outside Bukhara, but also discussed to what extent it existed at all.

²⁶² ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf, letter, BSh 34 (19 Apr. 1912 [2 May 1912]): 3. The importance of extraction of raw materials is especially elaborated upon by Fitrat in his Guide to Salvation, see Fitrat, Rahbari najot, ed. Mamadaminov, esp. 284–287.
Hey hey, what do you say and why do you talk nonsense? And besides this earth, where we are, is there another world? And in addition to this heaven, which is our heaven, is there another heaven? What is Farang, where is China, and what is Khallukh; who is a Tatar and what is Mecca? Are these expressions like those that the Sufi poets are using as metaphors like a lock of hair, a mole, and the down on the cheek? Do these names and places have an external existence? And has anyone reached them and seen them? The “appearance” of new countries that had existed for a long time was perplexing even at the beginning of the 20th century. At the time of the Russo-Japanese war Tamkin wrote that:

It is […] strange that no one among the statesmen has mentioned the name of the state of Japan, and no one has reckoned Japan among the powerful states, and the name and place of that state has not been mentioned among states of this time and past times in any book or on any page.

4.3 Cartography

Unlike the Ottomans, who during the 16th century were increasingly exposed to European naval techniques, including cartography, the Bukharans had neither a vital cartographic tradition of their own, nor any greater number of translations of modern maps from other parts of the world. Although there had been a native cartographic tradition in pre-Mongol Central Asia, we have few testimonies of maps being drawn in 19th century Bukhara. During this time, visual representations of space had little in common with modern maps.

One of the few examples shows that the older cartographic tradition, as developed by Abu Rayhan al-Biruni (d. 1048), was alive even after the establishment of Soviet power in Bukhara. The map in question was drawn by the Bukharan calligrapher Abdu Fattoh Magdiev in the early 1930s. The map is circular, and is framed by the circular Bukharan city wall with the citadel in the centre. Despite the fact that the map was drawn in the Soviet period, when the emirate had ceased to exist and modern spatial concepts became increasingly current, the map does not represent any modern space-based geographical knowledge. The only “modern” feature of the map is the huge clock, which is given a prominent position in the middle. However the clock, which according to several sources rarely worked, was probably almost as far from being a modern temporal mediator as Magdiev’s map was a modern spatial mediator.

265 Donish, NV, 1:117.
266 Tamkin, Mullastān, fols. 147b–148a.
267 Rempel’, Dalēkoe i blizkoe, 32–33.
The claims that Ahmad Kalla drew a modern map of the capital of the emirate are very difficult to support. As mentioned above, his interest in geography seems to have been overshadowed by his interest in the firmament. There never seem to have existed any maps for urban development in Manghit Bukhara. Modern maps of the capital of the emirate were probably mainly drawn by foreigners. One of the most famous of these was Parfenov-Fenin’s map of Bukhara, which was first drawn 1872 and then revised several times until at least the 1930s.

Modern maps of larger territories, including the emirate, only appeared in Central Asia in large quantities after the railroad had been built. They attracted the interest of the Muslim reformers who saw them from primarily an educational point of view, as a way of becoming informed about the world. The maps were in the new-method schools, and many were imported from the Ottoman Empire. The novelty of modern maps is also evident in Bihbūdī’s introduction to his geographical work of 1905, in which he seems unsure what to call them, using three terms: kharīta, kārta, and naqsha.

A space-based cartographic genre sometimes encountered in Bukhara consisted of maps of pilgrimage routes. The pilgrim maps from the protectorate era that can be found in Bukhara today all originate from other countries than Bukhara. On these maps urban centres were marked, as were the routes pilgrims followed between these centres towards the final destination of the pilgrimage in question. Some natural boundaries were found, almost exclusively bodies of water, which involved a change in mode of transport. The “pilgrim travelogues” (ḥajjnāma) that were relatively commonly encountered in Bukhara, at least from the late 19th century and onwards, were rarely, if ever, accompanied by modern maps.

4.4 Administrative aspects

Cartography was not a necessary tool for administrating a state where the emphasis was on place-based geography and where the social basis of polity was defined by social status and kinship. Loyalties in Bukhara frequently emerged from face-to-face interaction, and were sworn between persons.

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269 Rempel’, Dal’koe i blizkoe, 132–133.
272 Bihbudī, Madkhal-i jughrāfī-yā-yi ‘umrānī, 2.
The person with the highest social status was usually regarded as the ruler of the state, with the state being nothing else than the state of this web of loyalties.273 There was thus no clear distinction between the office of the ruler and the person of the emir; when the ruler died, the state frequently disintegrated. Political sovereignty was defined by the personhood of the emir rather than in terms of territory. The custom of keeping the death of the emir secret until the successor had been sworn in, in order to avoid succession battles, was an aspect of this. Battles over succession were common in Bukhara until the Russian subjugation of the emirate, at which time a new dynastic order was established based on which of the Bukharan royal princes Russia decided to sanction.

The lack of a clear concept of the physical size of the city of Bukhara274 can be interpreted in terms of space not necessarily having a value in itself. Bernard Lewis writes that “[a]t no time before the nineteenth century was any sovereignty defined in territorial claims. On the contrary, a territorial designation applied to a monarch was seen as belittling.”275 This was, however, not an apriori necessity, but rather a consequence of having a place-based conception of geography, rather than a space-based conception of geography. Area measures like square kilometres would first appear in Bukharan geographical treatises in the 20th century, and even then probably originated from non-Bukharan sources where space-based geography was emphasized.276

After the border agreement between Russia and Great Britain in 1895, Bukhara lost all her areas south of the river Panj, while she was given the relatively cultivated areas of western Pamir. Before that, however, there had been relatively little interest in the area, which is related by Ahmad Kalla in a dialogue in his Rare Events:

He said: “How far is it from you to Badakhshan?”
I said: “Approximately 680 kilometres.”277
He said: “To whom is it subjected?”
I said: “It rests upon its own authority, and sometimes it swears allegiance to us.”
He said: “Why do your kings not appropriate it?”
I said: “That which is land brings no harvest but stones. And in those societies live stupid and ignorant animals with human faces.”278

273 Meisami, Persian Historiography, 11, 50.
274 Rempel’, Dalëkoe i blizkoe, 133.
276 See, for example, Bihbudi’s remark on the size of the province of Syria in: Mahmūdkhvāja Bihbūdi, “Sayāhat khāṭiralarī”, Ayīna 47 (13 Sept. 1914 [26 Sept. 1914]): 1125.
277 Original “80 farsakh”. The length of a farsakh, or farsang, varied in Central Asia. During the 19th century, a farsakh measured approximately 8.5 km in Bukhara. See Ėntsiklopediyai Sovetti Tojik s.v. “Farsang”.

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Eastern Pamir was thus ruled by Russia as a part of the Ferghana province until after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917.

The new borders between Bukhara and Afghanistan were thus established in 1895, but the internal borders of the emirate were never demarcated. Russia never got any further than obtaining a list from Bukhara of what supposedly were all the administrative entities, from villages to provinces. It was thus not uncommon for different sources for taxation to overlap and individual villages to be forced to pay tribute to two different landholders (amläkdär). Saodat Olimova writes with regard to eastern Bukhara that:

[t]he bulk of the territory of the mountainous provinces was stable enough and consisted of mountain towns with attached agricultural communities, and neighbouring territories occupied by livestock breeders [...] As there were frequent raids and permanent disputes over plots of land, pastures, summer pastures, nomad routes, and water sources, the borders of the provinces were quite flexible and were defined, besides by war, by traditions and the choices of individual societies [...] The major change in the politico-administrative map of Central Asia came with the intrusion of the Russian empire. During this period the foreign borders of the region were delineated, borders which in many ways were a result of the geopolitical rivalry between the world powers.

For the Russian Empire, mapping was an administrative and military tool, effectively marking out the British sphere of influence, a sphere which would be further shielded off with the establishment of the Russian customs line along the Amu-Darya in 1894, which hampered the traditional trade with British India, and the Russian-British border agreement of 1895. This proved to be a very important political, economic, and cultural delimitation, and cartography was a very important device in the Great Game that surrounded it. No detailed maps of this remote part of the world existed until the turn of the century when several Russian expeditions sponsored by the Imperial Russian Geographical Society travelled here. Some areas, like

278 The dialogue continues and the proponent argues that Badakhshan is rich in gold and precious stones. Space however is not imbued with a value in itself; only the potential profits from the area are considered important for the Bukharans. See Donish, NV, 2:149–150.


281 Saodat Olimova, “Natsional’nye gosudarstva i étnicheskie territorii”, in Mnogomernye graniesty Tsentral’noi Azii, Marta Brill Olcott and Aleksey Malashenko (Moscow: Gendal’f, 2000), 18–19.

282 In 1910, a map published in 1903 by “Voенно-topograf. Otdel.” was referred to as the most recent one. (“Ocherki Gissarskago kraya”, TV 3653 (9 Mar. 1910 [22 Mar. 1910]). The Hissar expedition in 1896 was organized by the Imperial Russian Geographical Society. One of its tasks was to draw a map of the area. (V. I. Lipskii, “Gissarskaya ekspeditsiya 1896 goda
Hissar in eastern Bukhara, remained relatively unknown well after the turn of the century. Bukhara was only mapped towards the very end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Bukhara emerged very much as a product of negative space in the context of colonial expansion, with the creation of Russian Turkestan, the annexation and abolition of Kokand, and the delimitation of the Russian-British border along the Amu-Darya in 1885. Still, loyalties were probably more often expressed in terms of persons than states. Adrienne Lynn Edgar writes:

when two Turkmen pastoralists on horseback were stopped in the desert in 1925 and asked their citizenship, one replied that he was the subject of the Bukharan emir, and the other that he owed allegiance to Nicholas II, tsar of Russia.

In Bukhara before the Russian conquest, very few, if any, people emphasized a space-based form of geographical knowledge. For the central power in Bukhara, the most relevant spatial mediators were probably the larger settlements, especially those where provincial governors were residing.

After the Russian subjugation of the emirate and the Anglo-Russian border agreements in Iran and Central Asia, including Afghanistan, raid against rich shrines, such as Mashhad, or neighbouring khanates, as well as regional wars, ceased almost completely, allowing the rulers in some of these areas, with Russian assistance, to strengthen their control over rebellious tribes that had remained beyond their control before the Russian conquest. Bukharan control over Shahr-i Sabz and eastern Bukhara are examples of this. On the other side of Amu-Darya, the Afghan emir Abd al-Rahman, with some support from the British Empire, took control of the negative space of southern Turkistan, which soon was forgotten and became an integral part of modern Afghanistan. The increased theoretical emphasis on space-based geography thus also had a practical dimension.

4.5 Mediating a polity

National boundaries between countries were not a salient feature of pre-Russian Bukharan “geographical” treaties. A polity was spatially produced and mediated mainly by other concepts and mediators. Such mediators were

predvaritel’nyĭ otchet”, Izvestiya Imperatorskogo Russkogo geograficheskogo obschestva 33, no. 2 (1896): 196.


See also Olimova, “Natsional’nıyë gosudarstva”, 18–19.


cities, villages, monuments of the past, shrines, rulers, etc. Although pre-Russian geographical knowledge would be presented in different ways, with classic treatises like “The Regions of the World” (*Hudūd al-ʿālam*) being more systematic than many others, the geographical knowledge transmitted without maps was commonly very “fragmented”, as is typical of place-based geography.

The Bukharan Muslim scholar Tamkin, who probably had not seen much of the world outside the emirate, provides in one chapter of one of his works only numbers of cities, rivers, lakes and seas. Their spatial relationship is in terms of space mainly mediated by *iqlim*, a concept derived from Greek *clima* denoting a large geographical entity. *Iqlīm* should be contrasted with the concept of continent, as used in works that more strictly emphasize space-based geography. Tamkin accordingly writes that Bukhara is the “largest and most noble” city, and that Amu Darya (*Jayhūn*) is the “most beneficent and noble” river. Both are located in the fifth *iqlim*, where there are 3,534 cities, 30 large mountains, and 30 large rivers. Tamkin’s obsession with numbers rather than spatial relationships is also evident when he weighs the accounts of previous historians, such as Abu al-Faraj ibn al-Jawzi (fl. 12th century) and the latter’s grandson, Sibīt ibn al-Jawzi. According to one source cited by Tamkin, there are for example 4,530 large cities on Earth, but according to another sources there are only 2,100 “cities” (*shahr*) on the seven *iqlims*, etc.287

287 Tamkīn, *MFMZ*, fols. 81b–82b.

Tamkin’s emphasis on place-based geography made information about the physical area of *iqlims* and countries irrelevant. The spatial mediators that relativize countries, cities, etc. in his world were instead largely made up of agents, divine or human. In his historical narratives, genealogies served not only to propel forward the succession of events288 from the creation until the last day, but also to locate Bukhara, through her rulers, in a sacred Islamic universe in time as well as space. Genealogies, or genealogical lore, not only included family relationships, but also, as Franz Rosenthal puts it, “encompassed all the known population groups regardless of their size.” Genealogical chains thus stretched from one’s own close relatives to “large anonymous political entities”,289 and from the creation until the end of time (when that end was expected, or argued, to be near). That Tamkin provided a genealogy dating back to Adam of the present ruler of Bukhara, Emir Alim Khan, and at the same time gave voice to apocalyptic expectations,290 was a sign that Tamkin knew the extent of the world in both time and space, and Bukhara’s place in it. After all, all other dynasties and rulers were, in some way or another, Adam’s offspring.

288 For a general discussion of this, see Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History*, 160–161.


As genealogies have both temporal and spatial extension, they also serve as a channel for a place-based flow of time, a place-based kind of “progress”. This kind of progress originates in the achievements of humans, or more often supra-human agents, that are described as having brought humanity certain tools to improve their lives, like fire or a divine book, or having founded cities and cultivated lands. According to Tamkin, these agents acted on the imperative of the following verse in the Quran:

We created you as the most able of creations; you shall also create rivers, rivulets, blessed low-lying tracts of land, countries, cities and buildings in accordance with our commands.

Tamkin illustrates this imperative with an account of how the archangel Gabriel showed Adam the place where he later constructed the first building on earth, the Kaaba, with the help of the angels. Tamkin narrates how God later put the “heavenly prototype of the temple of Mecca” (al-Bait al-ma’mūr) on these stones, and Adam and his offspring settled in and around it. After this story follows a section entitled “The great prophets (īlū ‘l-‘azm) and their deputies/offspring (jānishīn) and the whereabouts of their buildings and constructions”. Here we learn that Adam and his 12 Deputies founded the city (shahr) of Ceylon (Sarandīb), the “country” (mamlakat) of Rey, the “city” (balda) of “Medina” (Ṭīb), etc. Idris, who also was among Adam’s 12 deputies, founded 100 cities and numerous mosques. The story that unfolds represents a highly fragmented world in which different cities are linked to each other through genealogies. After Adam, the five following messengers are enumerated, each having 12 deputies who generally settled in and cultivated different parts of the world. The second messenger is Noah, who also had 12 Deputies who settled in different places and founded cities and mosques. Abraham, Jesus, and Muhammad followed him. Here we also learn that the latter’s Deputy, Khalif Umar, during the 10 years, 6 months, and 19 days of his rule, built 36 000 mosques in many countries and cities. According to Tamkin, later kings and their deputies similarly built cities and established countries in accordance with the traditions of the Prophets and their Deputies. These cities and countries were named after those who founded them.291

Tamkin included no maps in his treatises, though a small geographical diagram did accompany his narrative on India. Maps were simply not relevant for locating Bukhara in Tamkin’s world. Bihbudi’s geographical work from 1905 was, however, reliant on maps. The latter’s work begins with a description of geographical terminology, which is largely an explanation of how to read a map, including the concept of scale and the orientation of a map according to the four cardinal points with north being “up,” (unlike the

291 Tamkîn, MFNZ, fols. 73a–78b.
Anatoliya
Near East

very different from Tamkin’s description of the qualities of objects on cardinal points. The emphasis on place names, and is divided into several large and small countries (mamlakat) as follows: British India (Hindustân-i İnglis), which has been conquered by the state of England and is the largest part. Its interior is named in several parts: [1.] The cities have names like Bengal, Bombay, Madras, Peshawar, Calcutta, Murshidabad, Ahmedabad, Kota, Chakrata. The city of Calcutta is the seat of government. Most of the inhabitants are “fire-worshippers” (majûsî) and 50 millions are Muslims. 2. The “country” (mamlakat) of Hyderabad. It includes 12 million inhabitants. Most of them are Muslims. Hyderabad is the seat of government. It has cities like Golconda and Aurangabad, and its Muslim king has a military rank. The inhabitants of this “country” (diyâr), who generally

Europe is the smallest continent and the most cultivated of all. It belongs to the Old World and is located in its northwestern part. Its western boundary is made up of the Atlantic Ocean and the many seas that have appeared from it. To the north-northeast are the Ural mountains and the Ural river, which separate it from Asia. In the south are the Caspian Sea and the Caucasian mountains, and the Black Sea, which separate it from Asia and Africa. Many small seas have appeared from them around Europe. […] It comprises 8 225 000 square kilometres of land and [has] 392 million inhabitants, and in this continent there are approximately 50 large and small governments, of which the most famous will be mentioned in this work.

Which countries (mamlakat) are located in South Asia? There is India, which comprises 3.5 million [square] kilometres of land and 300 million inhabitants, and is divided into several large and small countries (mamlakat) as follows: British India (Hindustân-i İnglis), which has been conquered by the state of England and is the largest part. Its interior is named in several parts: 1.] The cities have names like Bengal, Bombay, Madras, Peshawar, Calcutta, Murshidabad, Ahmedabad, Kota, Chakrata. The city of Calcutta is the seat of government. Most of the inhabitants are “fire-worshippers” (majûsî) and 50 millions are Muslims. 2. The “country” (mamlakat) of Hyderabad. It includes 12 million inhabitants. Most of them are Muslims. Hyderabad is the seat of government. It has cities like Golconda and Aurangabad, and its Muslim king has a military rank. The inhabitants of this “country” (diyâr), who generally

295 Originally “chaqrim”, corresponded to slightly more than one km, see Éntsiklopediyai Sovetii Tojik, s.v. “Chaqrîm”.

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have obtained knowledge of science and technology, have made progress. 3. Kashmir, which has “countries” (mamlakat) called Chapū, Sandiyā, Mysore, each of which is a self-governing raja, but is protected by the English. Most of them are fire-worshippers.

For Bihbudi, a map of a country does not only describe the physical boundaries and characteristics of a country, but also provides characteristics of the people living there. The Europeans are ascribed common characteristics, i.e. that they are very skilled, educated and powerful. He writes about Japan that “The people of Japan have made much progress in science and technology. […] The people and the government have acted like European states and made progress.”

Unlike Tamkin, Bihbudi’s description of other countries clearly assigns them to different temporal levels, different contemporaneities existing within the chronologically uniform time. The trajectory of progress is especially evident when discussing Iran and Bukhara. In Iran, we learn, “new sciences and forms of organization have recently begun to spread” unlike in Bukhara where “the way of governance is an independent administration, i.e. according to Sharia and the opinions of the emir and the traditions. New forms of organization and new sciences are still not in use.”296 That is, certain markers of progress convey a certain temporal level to which a whole geographical entity is assigned. This is indeed a discursive manipulation of temporal experience that also affected people’s perceptions.

In Europe, the border controls and delimitations implemented in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, and the increased discursive emphasis on space-based geography, including an increased availability of maps, made the imagined boundaries between the European states visible. It was now possible to “see” not only the borders of different states, but also their ethnic, religious, and temporal boundaries, i.e. the temporal differences between countries in terms of progress. This was increasingly visible in travelogues written in the second half of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century.

When crossing the border between Germany and Belgium, the Iranian shah Nasir al-Din made some observations about the differences between these two countries, differences that in this case were ascribed to divine rather than human agency:

They say that this river is the border between Belgium and Germany, but God almighty has separated peoples and countries such that one becomes stupefied. At this border he has changed the people, language, religion, soil, water, mountains, and land so that it has no similarity with Germany. The mountains are somewhat higher and forested, the air is colder, and everyone’s tongue is

296 For the references to Bihbudi above, see Bihbūdi, Madkhal-i jughrāfiyā-yi ‘umrānī, 19–20, 35, 37, 39, 41–42,
French. The people are more poor, their soldiers’ and ordinary people’s garments are substantially different. All people in Belgium speaks French; they also have their own distinct language. Most of them are Catholics. The people in this country are freer than in Germany.297

The Bukharan merchant Mirza Siraj also pays attention to the borders he crosses. It is possible to translate the borders he sees while travelling into the borders on maps. There are plenty of such examples in the travelogue of Mirza Siraj. For example: “The train carriage arrived in the morning at the Bulgarian border; it left the Ottoman lands.” These border crossings were even more visible due to all the state symbols, i.e.: “The border guards and the Ottoman state servants were also present at the border.” The introduction to Bulgaria is thus space-based. The focus is on the collective history of the space of the country, and not on its dynasties:

Bulgaria was in the past part of the Ottoman country. In the war with Persia and Poland it separated from the Turks and became independent. After the government of Russia had supported Bulgaria, and made her leave the Ottomans, Russia thought it could bring her under its own administration, but the European governments did not agree with this, and the Bulgarian nation did not accept dependency either. Currently it is an independent constitutional state. The Bulgarians are orthodox and Russian-Orthodox, and have the same religion as Russia. They have more than three million inhabitants. At present their administration is in good order.298

It is noteworthy that the creation of these boundaries is not explicitly ascribed to human agency; that is, the historicity of these boundaries is not interesting, but instead is taken for granted, and the nation, as an organic entity or geo-body, is projected through empty time.

In Central Asia the borders between the Russian Empire and her Bukharan protectorate were less visible. The most visible boundary was probably the one between the Russian Empire (including Bukhara) and Afghanistan. The border checkpoints between Bukhara and Afghanistan were, from the end of the 19th century, controlled by Russia, and passport controls seem to have been much stricter along this boundary than in the Turkmen domains between Khiva and Iran, where Russia exercised less control.299

4.6 Geographical terminology

The conceptual differences between space-based and place-based geography are also discernable in the geographical terminology. As maps facilitate the

297 Nāsir al-Dīn Shāh, Rūznāma-yi safar-i avval-i Farangistān-i Nāsīr al-Dīn Shāh (Teheran: Muhammad Hassan, 1874), 63.
298 Mīrzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuhaf-i Bukhārā, 99.
299 Mīrzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuhaf-i Bukhārā, 263.
imagination of modern states,\textsuperscript{300} “visible” spatial dividers, like \textit{sarhadd} (“boundary”), between various spatial entities, have a position in space. This stands in sharp contrast to the expression \textit{hadd} (“boundary”), which is used when the author subscribes to a place-based conception of geography. Here \textit{hadd} has no fixed geographical position, but is mainly seen as a vague “transition zone”.\textsuperscript{301} The concept \textit{hudūd} (“boundaries”, “borders”) is telling, signifying only an area or region, as in Vladimir Minorsky’s translation of the “Regions of the World” (\textit{Ḥudūd al-‘ālam}). Other concepts, like “country” (\textit{mamlakat}, \textit{diyār}), “province” (\textit{vilāyat}), etc. were similarly vague in terms of boundaries. When space-based geography was emphasized and imagined through a map, it became possible to see these boundaries and everything they signified, as we have seen in the examples above, but when geography was placed-based, such boundaries could not serve as spatial mediators. Without modern maps and the spatial boundaries they signify, settlements (cities and villages) and fortresses were the spatial mediators through which wider geographical areas could be imagined.

Because a polity was organized as a chain of settlements, with power emanating from the largest city, which hosted the residence of the emir, to the subordinated “settlements” or “dependencies” (\textit{tābi‘} or \textit{mahkūm}), the name of the largest city was frequently used as a metonym for all dependencies. The single most important spatial mediator for the emirate of Bukhara was thus not a map, but the emir and his residence in the city of Bukhara. This is probably one of the reasons why there is a lack of semantically precise distinctions between words that signify city and country. In Tamkin’s work, words for “city” and “country” (\textit{shahr}, \textit{miṣr}, \textit{mamlakat}, \textit{diyār}, \textit{balad} etc.) thus frequently overlapped. For example, \textit{mamlakat} denoted not only Africa, but also Ray, Syria/Damascus (\textit{Shām}), Samarkand, Bukhara, Herat, Turkey (\textit{Turkiya}), India (\textit{Hind}) and Baīza, “which is a town (\textit{shahr}) among the towns (\textit{shahr}) of the regions of \textit{Iṣṭakhr} (\textit{kūra-yi ʿistakhr})”. Tamkin calls Bukhara the Glorious Balda (\textit{balda-yi fākhira}) among the “countries and cities of the world” (\textit{bilād u ʿamsār-i ʿālam}). “There is no other like this city (\textit{barābar-i īn shahr}).”\textsuperscript{302}

Comparing Tamkin with Bihbudi reveals that the latter’s emphasis on space-based geography implied not only that his central spatial mediators were largely made up of elements of physical geography and their relations to each other in terms of their locations on a map, but also that he paid much more attention to terminological distinctions than Tamkin did. In Bihbudi’s work there was rarely any confusion between continents, countries, and cit-

\textsuperscript{300} Winichakul, \textit{Siam Mapped}.


\textsuperscript{302} Tamkīn, \textit{MFMZ}, fols. 64b, 75a–76b, 77b, 89a, 90a–90b, 404b.
ies. In his work we thus find “continents” (qiṭʿa-yi khushk), “countries” (mamlakat), “provinces” (vilāyat), “cities” (shahr or bilād), “islands” (jazāʿir), “lakes” (kūl), “mountain chains” (silsila-yi jibāl), “channels” (būghāz), etc. Moreover, each country’s population is usually given as well, and a map accompanies each section. At least in theory, modern maps were able to mediate many different aspects of physical geography and thus demanded a more precise terminology.

Tamkin’s claim that Africa (Afriqa) was a “city” (shahr) built in its entirety by the prophet Afrīq, and his other claim that Africa was one “of the 20 countries in the western quarter of the inhabited world” had a division of the world into 20 entities that probably derived from al-Istakhri (fl. 10th century) and Ibn Hawqal (fl. 10th century), who referred to these entities as iqlīms (pl. aqālīm), had no place in the new science of jughrāfiyā. The concept iqlīm, so frequently referred to by Tamkin, is completely absent in the work of Bihbudi, who does not even use it in the modern sense of continent. Instead he uses the word qiṭʿa, as in other parts of the Persianate world. Likewise, in the new sciences, to which the science of geography belonged, mamlakat signified a country imagined through a map. In Ayni’s work from 1918, Bukhara was most commonly referred to as a mamlakat. Some would also refer to previously independent states, now incorporated into the Russian empire, as mamlakat, for instance Mīrza Siraj, who referred to the country of Fergana because he saw it as a successor to the Khanate of Kokand.

Other spatial concepts, like province, had a more narrow semantic content in the new sciences. In a work dated 1918, Ayni consistently refers to vilāyat as a “province” (vilāyat) of a “country” (mamlakat): Shahr-i Sabz is one of the “provinces” (vilāyāt) of the “country of Bukhara” (mamlakat-i Būkhārā).

4.7 Home

The appearance of maps and new concepts for spatial boundaries transformed the concept of “home” (or “birthplace”) (vaṭan). By those who were well versed in the new sciences and emphasized space-based geography, vaṭan was relativized in a spatially extended present that, during the protectorate era, partly was characterized by a formal globalization of space-based states. In this field of experience, vaṭan had different temporal and spatial

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303 Bihbūdtī, Madkhal-i jughrāfiyā-yi ʿumrānī.
304 Tamkīn, MFMZ, fols. 64b, 78b.
306 Mīrāz Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuḥāf-i Būkhārā, 36.
boundaries than in “the old sciences” (‘ulūm-i qadīm) and operated according to a language of scale defined in terms of political entities. The emphasis was on space, for example a country, which was especially evident when Bukhara was referred to as vaṭan and placed in syntagmatic relationships with other countries, such as Iran or Afghanistan. Bihbudi claimed that the country of Mother Russia was his vaṭan, but vaṭan could also denote a continent; Mirza Siraj claimed that Asia was the vaṭan of the Bukhrans.

For someone like Tamkin, who was well versed in the old sciences and emphasized place-based geography, the boundaries in time and space were very different. Tamkin thus wrote his largest work because out of love for his vaṭan, and this love partially expresses itself as an imperative to find the founder of Bukhara. His vaṭan is relativized with diverse persons and phenomena that define the temporal and spatial boundaries of his vaṭan, with the prophet Idris as a possible founder of Bukhara, and the Japanese expansion in southeast Asia as a sign that the end of the world, and hence the end of Bukhara, is close. A chapter on the qualities of Bukhara is telling. It includes many examples of the temporal and spatial boundaries in early-modern Bukhara that were rarely, if ever, employed by the reform-minded Muslim scholars when defining their vaṭan. The chapter is largely a compilation of what other Muslim scholars have written about Bukhara, praising it from the perspective of a Muslim scholar for being noble, for the great knowledge of the Muslim scholars who are present there, and for the place it occupies within Islam. Genealogies play a substantial role through the work. The role of the prophets of Islam, especially Idris, is stressed. Both the temporal and spatial boundaries of the vaṭan of Bukhara are accordingly mediated by rulers and prophets, spatial and temporal mediators that in a general sense integrate Bukhara into a sacred Islamic universe through genealogies.

The increased emphasis on space-based geography in the definition of vaṭan also transformed the boundaries of unbelief in terms of a conceptual shift from heresy to treason. In the preface of his Debate, Fitrat wrote that the conflict between the new and old had gone on for some time in Bukhara. It had, he wrote, been created by “traitors to the nation” (khāynān-i millat) who had created two “factions” (firqa), “the new and the old” (jadīd u qadīm) in Bukhara. Denouncing his opponents as traitors to the nation also has eschatological implications and consequences for the spatial boundaries of the impending end.

308 An example of this is Mirzā Sirāj, Saṣfarnāma-yi tuhaf-i Buhkhārā, 57.
309 Bihbudi, Madkhal-i jughrāfiyā-yi ‘umrānī, 71.
310 Mirzā Sirāj, Saṣfarnāma-yi tuhaf-i Buhkhārā, 76
311 Tamkīn, MFMZ, fol. 90a.
312 Fitrat, Munāzara (Istanbul: Hikmat, 1327 [1909]), 2.
4.8 Conclusion

The appearance of maps and new conceptions of space transformed not only spatial, but also temporal boundaries. Accompanied by national histories, a map becomes a metasign of a nation and signifies a time of its own. Maps thus facilitate imagining blocks of space and groups of people, nations, as belonging to different temporal levels in terms of progress, and in this sense serve as a temporal-spatial nexus. When one claims, like Bihbūdī, that the people and the government of Japan have acted like European states and made progress, it is meant in a temporal sense, and implies that other countries are denied coeval status. It is in part through this conception of space that the struggle to become contemporary is articulated and progress formulated.

If the map is a temporal-spatial nexus of space-based geography, then agents – human, divine, or mythical – are the spatial-temporal nexus of place-based geography. Genealogies are thus not only central aspects of the historical consciousness, but also offer a relativization of spatial mediators. Not only are events described in time and space mediated by genealogies, genealogies also mediate relationships in time and space, and between time and space. This generates a divinely orchestrated place-based concept of progress channelled through genealogies and framed between the creation and the apocalypse, with the latter signifying the end of time in this world.

The modern geographical and cartographical knowledge that appeared after the Russian conquest was, as Winichakul writes in another context, “another kind of knowledge of space with its own classificatory systems, concepts, and mediating signs” and it became a part of a unified geographic, cartographic and political discourse with temporal implications. The genealogical construction of space in place-based geography was, however, fundamentally different from the construction of space by means of maps in space-based geography. In terms of jughrāfiyā as a part of the “new sciences” (‘ulūm-i jadīd), Jadīd denoted not only something new, but also something formally very different. It called for another kind of spatial precision that required a specific terminology. The lexemes in this terminology were not always new, but they received new significance in what became a general discourse on geography with an emphasis on space. With the appearance of this “New” science of geography, it was possible not only to dismiss those who favoured cosmography, but also to relegate them to the past. The new terminology of and emphasis on space-based geography paved the way for new metaphorical constructions of time that provided the concept of progress with new spatial boundaries.

313 Bihbūdī, Madkhal-i jughrāfiyā-yi ‘umrānī, 35.
314 Winichakul, Siam Mapped, 36.
5. A progressive perspective

5.1 Marvels and novelties

In 1914 the Bukharan Muslim scholar Fitrat wrote:

Some years ago we thought that the train was the latest way to travel; after some time, the power of human science brought forward the airplane [...] So it becomes clear that humanity will make progress, that is, it will continue to go forward just as it has made progress from the beginning of creation until our time.315

A central feature of this conceptualization of progress is that it is related to an interpretation of temporal difference between objects whereby innovations and novelties are not seen as signs of the end of the world, but as aspects of an (evolutionary) historical process. The cognitive dissonance such objects sometimes generate calls for an explanation of the temporal tension between a belief in terminal decay and an idea of progress in which old tropes and cosmographical categories, like marvels and wonders, as well as religiously unlawful innovations, are unsatisfactory.

Before the relatively widespread acceptance of the discourse of progress, with its teleology and ensuing metaphorical transformations, which is especially visible in the Muslim modernist press from the beginning of the 20th century and onwards, there ought to have been, from a metahistorical point of view, a transitional phase where the rhythm of temporal experience was altered. This ought in turn to have generated a cognitive dissonance that caused some of those exposed to the technological and social advancements of the second industrial revolution to question the idea of degeneration towards terminal decay without using the concept of progress, or at least without making extensive use of it. From a metahistorical perspective, people’s expectations should have begun to disengage from old prophetic visions and beliefs that the present was close to terminal decay. The belief in the imminent end of the world might accordingly have become increasingly implausible for a small but increasing number of Bukharans. From a rhetorical perspective, one can also argue that this period corresponds to a period before a

rhetor had introduced a concept of progress close to our ideal type above, and thus before the emergence of a discourse on space-based progress.

The temporal aspect of progress can in this context be compared with the categories employed in a genre called the marvels of creation. Manuscripts belonging to this genre had the purpose of inducing “wonder at God’s creation and its order”. They were products of a God-centred world in which wonders were associated with divine creation. Although the definition of wonder changed over time, and there was a shift towards man-made wonders in the late fourteenth century, and with it towards an idea “that humans can manipulate the order of the cosmos they inhabit[;] this shift was not a change that replaced the cosmic frame, but rather a shift within it.”

In the beginning of his influential 13th century cosmology “The wonders of creation and the oddities of existence”, Qazvini gives a definition of the categories of the marvels of creation:

- “wonder” (‘ajab) is “the sense of bewilderment a person feels because of his inability to understand the cause of a thing.”
- “an oddity” (pl. gharāʾīb) is “any wondrous matter which occurs rarely and is contrary to what is commonly known, witnessed, and written about.” In Qazvini’s definition, oddities were thus a subset of wonders.316

In Bukharan travelogues, as well as in other treatises dating especially from the 19th, but also from the early 20th century, essentially new objects are frequently mentioned, but when the narrator lacks a progressive perspective, such objects are frequently depicted in terms of cosmographic categories and described as being beyond comprehension, in line with Qazvini’s words above.

Words like strange, wonderful, and odd (gharīb, gharība, ‘ajāyib, ‘ajīb, and ‘ajība) are frequently used when mentioning phenomena and objects produced during the Second Industrial Revolution. These words often occur in a syntagmatic relationship with the new (jadīd), and thus frequently signify man-made wonders. More elaborate temporal reflections are, however, generally absent. Here, strange and wonderful objects cannot be described, as they are beyond description. The authors are uninterested in any temporal position of these objects detached from naturally formed chronologies; that is, they are not described in terms of progress, and abstract forms of historical periodization are absent.

The invocation of marvels and the strange can also be considered a strategy employed by the narrator in order to meet his audience’s expectations

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when describing new technology. This is reflected in some of Ahmad Kalla’s stories, in relation to the problems he encountered when telling his contemporaries about the travels he had made and when he tried to convince his audience that the world outside Bukhara existed. In one story he lets a young man, who has seen the world and visited many cities/countries in Russia and Europe (Farang) denounce the Bukharan scholars who are convinced that they possess all the sciences.

In a brackish ground (shūrabūm) where the inauspicious owls (būm-i shūm) do not live, the crows think that they are peacocks, and in a home where the wild animals are spending their time, the voice of a jackal becomes the gentle sound of a gong.

He also illustrates this narrow-mindedness in a poem:

A bird, which knows nothing of pure water,  
Has its beak in brackish water all year.

Ahmad Kalla possibly invoked marvels and the strange in order to be able to convey what he had seen and experienced in his travels, such as the Winter Garden in the Pavilion Hall in St. Petersburg,\(^\text{317}\) for an audience whose horizons of expectation were relatively far away in a 19th century Central Asia, where people had not yet begun to travel extensively or been exposed to newspapers and new sciences to the same degree as they would in the early 20th century.

For some Bukharan Muslim scholars after the turn of the 20th century, wonders became an aspect of progress, and the category marvels of creation lost its function as a mediator serving to make past and new experiences intelligible to an audience whose horizons of expectations had moved closer. The new was not only something more recently created, but something essentially different and usually considered as worth striving for. By appropriating a progressive perspective, the achievements of the developed world could be analysed and explained against a background of progress with the lexeme taraqqī, rather than described with cosmographical concepts as something that “confuses and causes astonishment”. If in the genre of marvels of creation wonders served to mediate the unity of creation and God’s providence – even when they signified man-made wonders, in the discourse of progress – man-made “wonders” served to mediate temporal and spatial disunity. Such wonders could, moreover, not be characterized as being beyond description, as that would have been a sign of backwardness. Instead, one should study the new sciences and thus be able to construct such wonders oneself.

\(^{317}\) These paragraphs and quotations are based on Donish, NV, 1:116–121, 129–130.
It is thanks to the present sciences and technologies that other nations have become possessors of the railway, the steamboat, and the car. Although these strange technologies (san’athā-yī gharība) cause us to become astonished (ta’ajub), the Westerners (Farangi) are neither jinns nor fairies, but humans like us.\(^{318}\)

The marvels of creation did not disappear completely in the emerging discourse on progress, but they were reduced to what could be explained by making reference to progress, rather than to what before had been explainable in the God-centred world in terms of wonders, with, in Qazvini’s words, “each wonder [being] a sign pointing towards the oneness of its Creator.”\(^{319}\)

It was thus possible for Mirza Siraj to claim that the streets of Paris were paved with marble and polished nutmeg wood,\(^{320}\) a man-made wonder that also was an aspect of progress, regardless whether or not it was true.

The strange and unexplainable was frequently retained in modernist aesthetics as a “literary device” and not as an “indication of astonishment of something new”.\(^{321}\) For example, when Mirza Siraj describes his arrival by steamer to Istanbul, it is described in terms of a wonderful and marvellous journey (vāqi’ an sivāḥat-i bisyār ‘ajib u gharībī dāšht). Similarly, a feast in honour of the Ottoman ruler Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876–1909) was described as follows:

\[\text{in truth, on the night of that good day they staged festivities, with lamps, and fireworks and strange performances that are beyond description and explanation, and one became stupefied (mahv u māt) by watching the lights of that night.}\]

Yet, the increased familiarity with the West probably made Qazvini’s categories more controversial, even among persons who did not use the concept of progress. A possible example of this is a major difference between two of Emir Abd al-Ahad’s travelogues; the one written about his travels to Russia in 1892 contained plenty of references to the unexplainable, while such references were completely absent from his travelogue of 1906. In the latter travelogue, things he saw were never described as being beyond reason. While some of Qazvini’s categories were retained as literary devices in modernist aesthetics, it became difficult to describe the man-made wonders as beyond reason in an increasingly anthropocentric world with its emphasis on science-driven developments.


\(^{319}\) Berlekamp, Wonder, Image, and Cosmos, 57.

\(^{320}\) Mīrzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuhaf-i Buhkārā, 125.

\(^{321}\) See Nagmeh Sohrabi’s discussion of wonders in Qajar Iran: Nagmeh Sohrabi, “Signs Taken for Wonder: Nineteenth Century Persian Travel Literature to Europe” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2005), 57–75.

\(^{322}\) Mīrzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuhaf-i Buhkārā, 72–73, 83.
5.2 Travel accounts

The role travel played for the emergence of modern Islamic reformers in Central Asia has been stressed by a number of researchers, in particular how the spread and exchange of ideas was facilitated by modern means of communication and transportation that developed during the late 19th and early 20th centuries and intensified the contacts between the Central Asian Muslims with Muslims in other areas of the Russian Empire and beyond.323

As in many other places, the economic and cultural impact of the expansion of the railroad network from the late 1860s until the outbreak of World War I was immense in Central Asia. Besides bringing an influx of traders and goods, it also facilitated travel. To a considerable extent it also led to a spatial reorientation, with travel to the north and west along the railway becoming more important for the Bukharans than travel and trade to the east and south. This was also a consequence of the division of Central Asia into British and Russian spheres of influence along the Panj River in 1873 and the inclusion of Bukhara in Russia’s customs frontier in 1894.324

Although the number of Central Asian pilgrims to Mecca increased, much due to the expansion of the railroad and regular steamship traffic to and from British India and ports in the Russian empire on the one hand, and Jeddah and Yanbu on the other, Bukharan travel accounts of Mecca and Medina were overshadowed by pilgrims’ accounts of their experiences travelling in the Western World and/or their encounters with European technical and social developments. While it may be an exaggeration to claim that many pilgrims towards the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century became less interested in the prophetic mission of Muhammad and more interested in progress, at least among some Central Asians at this time there was an increased focus on the achievements of the present-day developed countries. Pilgrims’ accounts of travelling to Mecca and Medina also described new inventions and technology. To some extent, the spatial reorientation thus coincided with a temporal reorientation away from the Muslim achievements of the past. But this was also accompanied by an increased temporal tension between Muslim achievements of the past and the present achievements of the westerners, a tension that also was described in terms of progress.

Mirza Khvaja Bihbudi’s Travel Memoires contains plenty of descriptions of traditional Islamic monuments, but there is also a substantial focus on the


324 Becker, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia, 175–176.
technical and social achievements of the developed countries, and on the
problems the Muslims face when confronting those developed countries. In
an equally, or even more popular travelogue, Mirza Siraj’s *Gifts to the Buk-
harans*, this temporal and spatial reorientation is even more evident:

For everyone who has been born and not seen Paris it is as if nothing has
been created in the world since non-existence. It can be called paradise on
earth. […] This educated nation (millat-i bātarbiyāt) [the French] exhibited
its diploma in progress (tarāqqīkhvāhī), patriotism (vaṭānaparvarī) and
awareness (būdārī) to all people in the inhabited quarter of the world; they
have informed all nationalities of the world of their good name.325

The change in the kind of knowledge that travelogues transmitted serves as
an indicator of a conceptual temporalization and of how a progressive per-
spective emerged in Bukhara in the second half of the 19th and the beginning
of the 20th century. This progressive perspective was related to discursive
change, modernist aesthetics, and cognitive dissonance. Mirza Siraj’s reloca-
tion of paradise to Paris, which can be reduced to a metaphor, was yet an-
other aspect of this progressive perspective, an aspect that here also could
signify an eschatological shift from catastrophic to transformational apoca-
lypticism, regardless whether one takes a metahistorical or rhetorical ap-
proach. Paradise is here on earth, though on a different temporal level.

5.2.1 Samarqandi

Pilgrims’ accounts of their travels to Mecca, some of which are called
Ḥājīnāma, seem to have belonged to a rather new literary genre in Central
Asia that became increasingly common as the number of pilgrims increased
after the Russian conquest. Some served a didactic purpose, aiming to help
the pilgrim on his pilgrimage by providing him with answers to questions he
might face along the way. They also provide the distances between various
cities and holy places and describe the situation in the countries they pass.326

326 Shovosil Žiyodov, “The Ḥajnāmas of the Manuscript Collection of the Oriental Institute
of Uzbekistan (Mid-19th–Early 20th Centuries)”, in *Central Asian Pilgrims: Hajj Routes and
Pious Visits between Central Asia and Hijaz*, ed. Alexandre Papas, Thomas Welsford, Thierry
Zarcone (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 2012), 224. There was thus a continuity between the travel-
ogues of Samarqandi and those of the modernists like Mirza Siraj and Bihbudi in the sense
that they all went on hajj, but the focus of their narratives differed greatly. But if Samar-
qandi’s and Vazīh’s travelogues were focused on orthopraxy for the individual believer,
Mirza Siraj and Bihbudi focused on the achievements of collectives. Also, their temporal
markers (besides what is described below) were very different. Mirza Siraj and Bihbudi
praised the old cities for their glorious past as shown by old Mosques and other buildings,
while new cities were praised for being contemporary as shown by trains and trams, etc. (For
the latter, see for example Bihbudi’s account of the old and new parts of Damascus. Even in
classical Islamic cities, like Damascus, Bihbudi devotes space to the architectural monuments
and shrines in the Muslim city. His description of the modern city contains, among other
One of the more popular travel accounts in Bukhara during the early protectorate era, at least to judge from the number of copies, was Haji Abd al-Rahman al-Samarqandi’s work on his pilgrimage to Mecca in the mid 19th century. It was didactical in the sense that it provided the reader with information on the distance between towns and various shrines in their vicinity as well as answers to theological questions, to prepare other pilgrims for religious discussions with non-Muslims and with Muslims belonging to other law schools.

Samarqandi’s travelogue was written before the Second Industrial Revolution and the ensuing acceleration of temporal experience, and is devoid of a progressive mode of observation. The latter is evident in both its form and content. It is relatively short and thus easy to copy, keep, and pass on to others. It is devoid of observations of temporal tensions between the new and the old or between the developed countries and the Muslim world. There are no descriptions of visits to museums or of modern weaponry or technology. One of the few examples of his temporal reflections is when he mentions the age of a minaret in Urfa: “in that town there is an old minaret; six thousand years have passed since it was built.” This piece of information can hardly be seen as an example of a progressive perspective, and conveys instead in the context a genealogically mediated time in terms of a place-based emphasis on geography.

5.2.2 Vazih

One work written in Bukhara before the 20th century, in which reflections are made on a present that is increasingly disengaged from prophetic visions of degeneration, is a very popular travelogue written in 1304/1886–87. It is called “Strange information about the wonders [encountered during] a journey” (Gharāyib al-khabar fī ʾajāyib al-safar) and was written after a pil-

things, descriptions of the tram and railroad, how much time they take and what they cost, etc. Maḥmūdīyā Bihbūdī, “Sayāhat khāṭīrālari”, Ayīna 47 [13 Sep. 1914 [26 Sep. 1914]]: 1120–1121.)


328 Hājjī ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Samarqandi, Tariqa-yi ziyārat-i Makka u Madina, Ms. IVANRUz, no. 12805, fol. 110a.

329 The Ms exists in several copies with small differences. One of them might even be written by the hand of the author in 1886 or 1887, i.e. Qārī Rahmatullāh b. ʿAshūr Muhammad al-Bukhārī (henceforth Vāzih), Gharāyib al-khabar fī ʾajāyib al-safar, Ms. IVANRUz, no. 2106. The others are IVANRUz, no. 2336/II and no. 100.
grimage to Mecca through Transcaspia and Iran by Qari Rahmatullah b. Ashur Muhammad al-Bukhari, better known by his pen-name, Vazih.\(^{330}\)

Vazih’s travelogue was written some 30 years after that of Samarqandi, during a period of intense industrial and technical development in the last two decades of the 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century. An altered rhythm of temporal experience is discernable in the work, on a perceptual and metaphorical level, as least in so far as he, despite the work’s title, surpasses the marvels of creation. As such, his work also signals the beginning of a discursive divide that is difficult to discern in Samarqandi’s work. When allegedly in Alexandria, Vazih made the following reflection:

> When the Christians conquered this province they burned and destroyed most of the buildings in the town. Because of this, for several years the people in this town have been engaged in construction, and they have not finished yet, and some more time is required so that it will come to its original state.

> The Westerners (farangiyân) have put many strange constructions (ašār-i šanāyî-i gharîba guzâshta) here and have invented wonderful skills. And in truth, the “creation is progressing” (kawn dar taraqqî ast) and shows its multifaceted capacities bestowed by divine grace and sublime favour.

> And the author of the book Maṭla‘ al-‘ulûm\(^{331}\) said a good word and pierced the pearl of meaning when he said that, indeed, the Greek wise men sowed the seed of wisdom in the field of practice and did not see the fruits of it. The Westerners have reaped and brought in the harvest of those seeds and derived profit, and the things and techniques like the telegraph, railway, steamships, and similar things which the Western (Farangī) Christians in London, France, Germany, and other Christians have produced, have not been produced or imagined by previous wise men.

> If someone argues that the absence of science does not imply the absence of occurrence, [and] that it is possible that such things have been produced by them (i.e. the scientists), and that they (those things) have not remained in these times, the answer (to this argument) is that if they had appeared, then there must have remained some traces of them, and they would not have been eradicated and obliterated completely, because they were not among the works of the law school (mażhabi) or the religion (millātī) which disappeared according to the religious laws (sharāyi‘) and religions (adyān), but it is the work of the state (dawlatī) and the kingdom (sulṭānī), and to the benefit of the sultans and the welfare of the people. And on the supposition of [religious] corruption (naskh u fashkh), they must reasonably have been mentioned in learned men’s books and treatises, because books that oppose the praise of

\(^{330}\) Vazih was born in Bukhara in 1818, where he also received his education and spent most of his life, which lasted until 1893. Several works have been written about Vazih, among them: R. Khadi-zade, Istochniki k izucheniyu tadzhikskoi literatury vtoroi poloviny xix veka, 17–43. A.A. Semenov claims that Vazih was a Shia whose ancestors had been deported from Merv by Shah Murad at the end of the 18\(^{\text{th}}\) century. (A.A. Semenov, “Bukharskii istorik poslednego feodal’nogo perioda khanstva [Mirza Mukhammed Salim-bek ‘parvonachi’]”, Ts. Arkhiv Akademii nauk Respubliki Tadzhikistan [Dushanbe], f. A.A. Semenova, op. 21, ex. 24, l. 43.)

\(^{331}\) Possibly Ḥakīm Vajīd ‘Alī Khān’s Maṭla‘ al-‘ulûm va majma‘ al-funūn.
the wonders and marvels of the world have mentioned them, and there are no strange things similar to them.

This is completely clear, and the above-mentioned affairs are the most worthy and the most proper for writing down. So, it has been refuted that these thoughts have not appeared in the minds of the ancients. So much praise from the ancients to the moderns (li ’l-ākharīn)\(^{332}\)

By making a distinction between different courses of developments, e.g. the realm of religion (religious laws and religion) and the realm of the state (state and kingdom), Vazīh avoided denouncing all novelties as religiously unlawful innovations. He also shows that he is not satisfied with merely classifying these objects as wonders, and that he is searching for new explanations.

Despite his cosmic notion of taraqqī, a lexeme that in his usage also lacks a horizontal metaphorical structure, he uses the lexeme taraqqī in his description of the technological advances he observes in Alexandria. His concept of evolutionary development, evident in his historicity of science, in which he stresses the European scientific continuity with the ancient Greeks, also shows a long-term development that materializes in the present, a concept of development also expressed by the Bukharan reformers after the turn of the century. Moreover, by identifying the telegraph, the railway, and the steamship as historically unique, as not having existed before, Vazīh pre-conceptualizes the contemporary era by identifying the uniqueness of the present, a specific temporality with its own historical experiences. This pre-conceptualization of a contemporary era is also evident in the writings of Ahmad Kalla, who also stressed the changes in the created world (‘ālam-i kawn) and human agency, making reference to:

the superfluity of wonders and the abundance of strange things that have appeared on the surface of the created world (dar ‘arşā-yi ‘ālam-i kawn) in our time (fī zamāninā)

and:

the strange things (‘umūr-i ‘ajiba) and wonderful technologies (sanā’ī-‘i gharība) that recently have become common in the West (Farangistān), Turkey (Rūm), and Russia: the railway, steamships and steam cars, the telegraph [in order to obtain news], new cannons and guns, the park of artillery, carrying out wonders in the lights of the night, ballrooms, and travelling 100 far-sakh in 20 hours [approximately 42.5 km/h], and large armies and unlimited amounts of cannons and bombs (ghanbura)\(^{333}\)

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\(^{332}\) Vāzīh, Gharāyib al-khabar, no. 2336, fols. 198b–199b; no. 110, fols. 62b–63b; no. 2106, fols. 47a–48a.

\(^{333}\) Donish, NV, 1:120, 132.
5.3 The polarization of the new and the old

The Iranian Shah Nasir al-Din’s accounts of his travels to Europe in 1873 serves as an interesting point of departure or reference point for how an altered rhythm of temporal experience can be reflected in travelogues produced by a ruler and/or his scribe. The travelogue was published around the time when Bukhara was given a protectorate status. By comparing it with the travelogues written by the Bukharan Emir Abd al-Ahad we may also be able to get some ideas about the difference between the Iranian and Bukharan elite, and about when a progressive perspective emerged, or did not emerge, in the writing of the ruling circles in Bukhara.

The shah’s travelogue, which was lithographed in Teheran in 1874 with the title “Nasir al-Din Shah’s diary of the first trip to Farangistan” (Rūznāma-yi safar-i avval-i Farangistān-i Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh) soon gained popularity in the entire Persian-speaking world, and is usually considered to be the first prose work of its kind in the Persianate world. The elite of the Persian-speaking Bukharians were familiar with it. The brother of Emir Abd al-Ahad, Muhammad Mir Siddiq Khan (“Hashmat”), who belonged to the literary elite in the emirate, with documented links to Ahmad Kalla334 as well as to reform-minded Muslim scholars, copied almost the entire work for himself in the latter part of the 19th century.335

During 1892 and 1893, some 20 years after Nasir al-Din Shah visited Europe for the first time, Emir Abd al-Ahad visited St Petersburg, a trip which later was narrated in his travelogue called “A diary about a blessed journey to St Petersburg” (Rūznāma-yi safar-i khayriyat-āsār-i vilāyat-i Fiṭīrburkh). This was probably Emir Abd al-Ahad’s first travelogue, and it was published and translated into Russian.336 In 1906 he made his fourth visit to Russia. This trip resulted in another travelogue that also was published and translated into Russian.337

Nasir al-Din Shah’s travelogue cannot be considered an example of the discourse on progress, with its horizontal metaphorical constructions.338 The lexeme taraqqī only occurs once in his text, and then in relation to a zool-

334 For example, Mi ʿyar al-tadayyun (Ms. IVANRUz, no. 2187) was written by Ahmad al-Nāṣir Ḥanafi al-Šīdfīqī al-Bukhārī [henceforth Ahmad Kalla] for Hashmat [see Hodizoda, Ahmadī Donish, 85]. Ahmad Kalla also wrote a copy of his NV, which he gave to Hashmat (Hodizoda, Ahmadī Donish, 147).
335 Hashmat’s copy (Ms. IVANRUz, no. 54) covers the 1874 edition of Nasir al-Din Shah’s travelogue until page 175.
337 ʿAbd al-Aḥad, Rūznāma-yi safar-i khayriyat-āsār-i chārum-i janāb-i ʿālf-yi amīr-i Bukhārā-i sharīf ba-Dār saltanat-i Fiṭīrburkh, Ms. IVANRUz, no. 4316. This work was published in Kagan in 1906
338 For the general absence of reflections on markers of progress in the Shah’s travelogues, see Sohrabi, “Signs Taken for Wonder”, 142.
ogical garden: “the Europeans”, he wrote, “have strived a lot and spent lots of money in order to gather animals from all around the world for the advancement of science (barā-yi taraqqī-yi ‘ilm).”339 The syntagmatic relationship between human agency and financial investment and taraqqī is noteworthy; this usage of taraqqī was an integral part of the discourse on progress in Bukhara after the first Russian Revolution.340

Another sign of an emerging progressive perspective in the Shah’s travelogue is the increased polarization between the new (jadīd) and the old (qādim), especially compared to Central Asian travelogues from this time. But the polarization does not give rise to any substantial temporal reflections. There are neither any reflections on temporal discontinuity nor are there any reflections on the present as being a unique historical era. Objects observed by the shah are described as old and new and frequently are ascribed to the reigns of certain rulers. Abstract forms of historical periods are absent.

Two of the most widely read early 20th century travelogues in Bukhara were written by the Bukharan merchant Mirza Siraj341 and the Muslim scholar Bihbudi.342 Their two works are both situated squarely within the discourse on progress, and reflect a temporalization that is absent in the emir’s travelogues referred to above.

Immediately after the introductory panegyrical to God, Mirza Siraj reveals his adherence to new categories of time and space, thus revealing that he had a progressive perspective from the outset that makes his work differ from those referred to above that were written before the turn of the 19th century. This is what he wrote:

As it is a custom in the West [Farangistān] and in Russia for travellers to spend many years in great struggle and hardship by walking from country to country and from town to town with the only purpose to gather information about the whereabouts of the nationalities of the world and to collect information about various groups of the inhabited quarter of the world and to know all the water and land of the earth, and to see the prosperity and destruction of the world, and to understand the science, technology, livelihood, and progress of every nation and group, and to become familiar with their customs in the fields of science and art, and study the power of every state on land and at sea, and upon returning to their place of birth with the only purpose of educating their nation to share all the experience and information

339 Nāsir al-Dīn Shāh, Rūznāma-yi safar-i avval-i Farangistān, 131.
340 See Reichmuth, “Muslimische Öffentlichkeit in Buchara”.
341 Mirzā Sirāj’s travelogue, Safarnāma-yi tuhaf-i Buhkārā, was written after he returned from his travels in Europe, Iran, and Afghanistan. His early notes were destroyed when he was imprisoned in Afghanistan.
342 After being advised by his doctor to leave his work as a judge and publisher, Bihbudi left on a pilgrimage that led him to several countries in the Middle East on his way to Mecca. Bihbudi published his accounts of his travels in a series of articles in his widely read journal Āyina. Shimada, An Index of Āyina, 5.
from their travels in writing with their fellow believers and compatriots so that all people can benefit from the journey and become informed about the situation of the world. [...] this servant of the nation also follows them [i.e. the Europeans who travel for the benefit of their nations] and after all these journeys and year-long trips, I share with my nation an abridged version of my travels, which I have written down, including all the experiences I have gained, and included in this book.343

Both Bihbudi and Mirza Siraj made little mention of the modern war industry in their travelogues, although the latter provides plenty of description of modern light weaponry he encounters. In their travelogues both of them do show, however, an interest in museums, architecture, and modern cities. Moreover, for Bihbudi, and especially for the merchant Mirza Siraj, the accelerated rhythm of temporal experience was highly visible in the realm of trade; it is here that progress (taraqqī) figures most often, at least in Mīrzā Sirāj’s travelogue.

In what follows, we will discuss the temporal polarizations in three realms:

• In the compartmentalization of time and space (manifestations of temporal difference) in museums;
• In the technological developments in the war industry;
• In architecture and city planning.

5.3.1 Museums

Modern museums, as they developed during 19th century in Europe, attracted a great deal of interest from foreign visitors. Many were historical institutions in which the past was displayed in the present and thus offered an excellent opportunity to make comparisons between the old and the new. Tony Bennet notes that “[t]he evolutionary principles of classification and exhibition developed in the new museums of natural history, ethnology and geology”, referring to the museums that flourished during the last decades of the 19th century. These museums developed “in and of modernity, belonging to and helping to shape its organization of the relations between past and present and, moreover, functioning within these to initiate and regulate a ‘progressive’ movement between past and present.”344 The evolutionary museums filled the space between objects with time in order to portray a temporal succession, a new concept of genealogy.

The increased interest in museums also corresponded with an increased interest in old objects. The Russian orientalist Alexander Semenov wrote

343 Mīrzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuhaf-i Bukhārā, 58.
that before the Russian conquest, the local population in Central Asia “was not infected by treasure hunting, and the recently arrived had not yet touched the monuments of the past.” The situation changed with the Russian conquest, when Central Asia was not only opened up for large-scale immigration from other parts of the Russian Empire, but also for western researchers. Soon after the Transcaspian railroad reached Samarkand in 1888, the city became the site of the largest market for old objects in Central Asia. The increased demand for antiquities and the commerce that followed after the Russian conquest, had even before 1888, led to the emergence of counterfeits, and a Russian guidebook from 1909 warned tourists of the abundance of faked antiquities in old Bukhara. Some counterfeits, like Egyptomania and Hellenistic motives, were even brought from Europe to Turkistan and sold to the Russian community.

Although the newly arrived stood for the main interest shown in old objects, native collectors also appeared, such as Akram-Palvan Askarov and Mirza Abdulla Bukhari, with a recently discovered interest in antiquities. As the acquisition of old objects was an expensive venture even for the Central Asians, such local collectors were usually traders with links to both Russian merchants and Russian intellectuals. Mirza Abdulla Bukhari was a merchant who was on familiar terms with various Russian scholars and had contact with the Archaeological Commission in St. Petersburg. He was a friend of the Russian archaeologist Nikolay Veselovskiy, and visited the latter’s excavations at Afrasiyab and Ulughbek’s famous observatory outside Samarkand.

Mirza Abdulla Bukhari was very interested in museums and donated several objects to the Tashkent Museum. During his trip to Russia in the late 1880s he visited several museums and wrote about his impressions in a newspaper article. Although the first museums had already opened in Turkistan during the 19th century, it was also quite common for private (Russian) collectors to exhibit their objects at home.

Nasir al-Din Shah’s travelogue shows that its author was interested in museums. However, there is no discussion about the museum objects he saw, and dates are linked to genealogies rather than to more abstract historical periods, such as the Middle Ages. When visiting the Kremlin, Nasir al-Din Shah thus wrote that the treasure in the Kremlin included jewellery and crowns of kings from the distant past to Peter the Great, but also clothing from “old” and “new” kings. One object in the Hermitage is described as...

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345 B. V. Lunin “Samarkandskii lyubitel’ starin i sobiratel’ drevnosti Mirza Bukhari” Obshchestvennye nauki v Uzbekistane, no. 6 (1963): 32.
346 Becker, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia, 153.
coming from ancient Egypt, and some paintings as coming from old England, Italy, and Spain. During a visit to the home of a princess, the Iranian Shah viewed objects from ancient Egypt, Syria (Shām), Nineveh, and Mosul.\footnote{Nāsir al-Dīn Shāh, Rūznāma-yi safar-i avval-i Farangistān-i Nāsir al-Dīn Shāh, 21, 26.}

Compared with the Iranian Shah’s travelogue, Emir Abd al-Ahad’s travelogue shows considerably less interest in museums and the dates of the objects there. The trope of the marvels of creation is prevalent: the museum objects are a strange mixture of old and new things.\footnote{‘Abd al-Ahad, Rūznāma-yi safar-i khayriyat-asar-i vilāyat-i Fiṭīrburkh, fol. 14a.} But even in the writings of someone like Mirza Siraj, who subscribed to the discourse on progress, there are few temporal polarizations between the new and the old in his descriptions of museums. We can, however, note an increased interest in antiquities and the market for them that is absent in the emir’s travelogues. When in the bazaar in Bursa, Mirza Siraj notes that there are exchange offices and antiquity stores. Mirza Siraj also mentions visiting museums (he called them mūzakkhāna or antikkhāna.) While Mirza Siraj could describe buildings as being beyond reason, the museum objects in them were not described as such. In Vienna, for example, his focus was partly on the sheer multitude of objects and the fact that they were so clean. The objects were “from the time of Adam until 200 years ago.” He also writes that he visited several museums in Berlin, and here also focusing on the large number of objects rather than on the temporal dimension of the objects themselves. Similarly, in Paris, he visited several museums and was most struck by the large number of objects:

In the museums of Paris I saw so many old things that I was stupefied (‘aql-am māt shud). Those museums contained every kind of thing from every period (dawra) from every people on the earth, from the first days of Adam until these days.\footnote{The quotation and the paragraph above are based on Mīrzā Sīrāj, Sāfarnāma-yi tuḥaf-i Būkhārā, 97, 109, 118, 129.}

This may serve as an example that the museum exhibit was not arranged according to any evolutionary principle that would be easily discernable for Mirza Siraj. He, like the emir above, was thus unable to explicitly place the objects in a context of progress.

5.3.2 War Industry

Nasir al-Din Shah appears to have been well informed about and able to distinguish between the new and old military equipment he saw during his travels. He visited arms production factories and military installations such as Krupp and Woolwich in the countries he travelled through. It is in this
realm that a progressive perspective is most salient in the Shah’s travelogue. The old cannons that are standing outside the Woolwich factory are out of use, but also, implicitly, today mainly serve the purpose of ornamentation. In other places it even more evident that the new is not only of a more recent date, but also essentially different. For example, when describing two-edged swords he talks about the old style. He does the same when observing weapons of the old style at Windsor Castle. He also comments on the fortifications at the Dardanelles, one of the castles built “in the new European way” (ba tarz-i jadīd-i farangistān). It is contrasted with the old way of building fortifications, though without specifying any geographical origins. The old fort, dating from the time of the Caesars, is no longer in use and therefore has not been renovated. Another aspect of the technological developments of the second industrial revolution that the Bukharan modernists reflected upon in the early 20th century was the increase in steamships. Nasir al-Din Shah reflected upon this as early as 1873, writing that 40 years ago all ships were sailing ships.353

Comparing the shah’s travelogue with those of the Bukharan emir shows, unlike the former, that the latter never reflected upon the military achievements of the west, in his case of Russia. Probably the only instance where some kind of progressive perspective is discernable comes from his observations of a Turkmen cavalry unit trained by Russia. Although the emir praised the Turkmens for their skills, he remarked that “the inhabitants of Bukhara are so much more able than the Turks and the desert dwellers, that they [the inhabitants of Bukhara] would soon be able to reach the border of perfection (ba sarḥadd-i kamāl) of this very art.”354

5.3.3 Architecture and city planning

In the early 20th century the Bukharan reformists frequently discussed western developments in the realm of architecture and city planning, and in 1917 some of them put forward their demands for developing the capital in Miller’s manifest.355 After the Red Army invasion in 1920, a reconstruction of the city of Bukhara did indeed begin.356 It should also be noted, however, that even though there was a call to modernize the capital, there was also a strong desire to repair the old monuments that had been damaged during the fight-

353 Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh, Rūznāma-yi safar-i avval-i Farangistān-i Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh, 78, 79, 80, 102, 177, 180.
354 ‘Abd al-Ahād, Rūznāma-yi safar-i khayriyat-āsār-i vilāyat-i Fīṭīrburkh, fol. 64b.
355 They wanted to form an elected assembly of intellectuals (šāhib-i shūrat u munāvvar al-aflākū) for developing the capital (barā-yi islāḥāt u taraqqiyāt u tanẓīm u hifz-i al-ṣīḥāt-i pīvītaḵht), see Ms. SOA, f. 1762, op. 1, d. 76, l. 9.
356 For an indigenous account of the reparation and reconstruction of Bukhara after the invasion, see Muḥammad ‘Alī b. Muḥammad Sayyid Baljuvānī, Ta’rīḵ-i Nāfa’ī (Dushanbe: Irfaq, 1994), 80–82.
ing, thus increasing the polarization between the new and the old in terms of architecture.

In Bukhara, Russian or western architecture dominated the Russian settlements. Even Emir Abd al-Ahad’s palace in Novaya Bukhara was built in Russian style and by Russians. There were, however, a small but increasing number of buildings influenced by Russian architecture in Bukhara proper. Emir Abd al-Ahad employed Russian engineers in the construction of several buildings designed in Russian style outside the Russian settlements. Those buildings included the buildings that hosted the post and telegraph office, the “out-patient department” (ambulatoriya), the women’s hospital, banks, etc. However, buildings in Russian style were absent from the old quarters, and western influence in this sphere was limited to the facades and interiors of the houses of wealthy merchants. Similarly, the facades and/or interiors of some of the “palaces” (sarays) were influenced by western architecture. Still, before the turn of the 20th century, the descriptions of new architecture and new cities were not a part of any discourse on progress.

The Iranian shah made many remarks about the age of buildings during his travels in Europe. Many of those classified as “old” (qadim/kuhna) are given a quantitative age and/or are described as having been constructed during the reign of a certain king. Some of the buildings mentioned are the Kremlin, the Peter Paul Fortress, “built during the days of Peter the Great”, Windsor Castle, the Tower of London, Notre Dame, and Aya Sofia, with the latter also described historically as having been a pagan temple, then a church, and finally a mosque. Like the shah’s other observations, observations in this realm were generally connected to naturally formed chronologies.

Emir Abd al-Ahad’s observations of the developments in architecture and city planning did not reflect any progressive perspective. The emir’s observations are instead expressed in terms of the marvellous and the strange, in line with Qazvini’s words that marvels confuse man and the strange causes astonishment. For example, when the emir visited a telegraph office he described it as follows: “there we saw its technology and strange things” (sanā ‘yi va ‘ajāyib-i ānā dīd.) A visit to a mint is described with the same words. Similarly, the machinery used on the oil fields of Baku to extract oil from the ground is described as “strange” (‘ajība and gharība), and an eleva-
tor in a castle arouses little other feeling than nervousness.\textsuperscript{362} When the emir visited the Kremlin in Moscow, he wrote that “no one in the inhabited quarter of the world has seen anything similar”,\textsuperscript{363} but its construction is not ascribed to a particular ruler, as by the Iranian shah.

The centrality of marvels and wonders in the travelogues above contrasts with travelogues written by reformists after the turn of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century where temporal polarizations are frequent. In the realm of architecture and city planning, most of Mirza Siraj’s observations are about new and old towns and buildings, and about “new towns” (shahr-i tāza) built according to “new city plans” (plān-i jadīd or az rū-yi naqsha u plān sākhta and) which not rarely were associated with the European style. Such new towns are typical examples of modern city planning and thus of space-based geography, and for Mirza Siraj, they stand in sharp contrast with old towns, like Kokand, that were built in the eastern style.\textsuperscript{364} In Tashkent, the “new town” (shahr-i tāza or shahr-i naw) is thus contrasted with the “old town” (shahr-i kuhna) where the buildings are in the old style. Mirza Siraj’s description of Baku is similarly full of temporal polarizations between the new and the old city, and comes close to providing a definition of a modern city, as opposed to an old city:

The old city remains. A very solid wall built of stone surrounds it. The Muslims have houses outside the fortress. Among the Muslim monuments there are some new and old mosques, Sufi-convents, and bathhouses. The streets of the old town are unordered, narrow, and dark, just like the “cities of Persia” (shahrhā-yi ‘ajamistān). The new city built by the Russians is connected with the old city. The Russians have built this city “in accordance with a plan and geometrically” (muhandasī). The streets are wide and all have stone pavement. It has several magnificent buildings, good hotels, large shops, and very good palaces and trading houses. On its streets there are horse-tramways and trams. All the markets and houses are illuminated with electric lights at night. There is also very extensive trade there.

The ethic and spatial dimensions of the polarization between the new and the old are even more visible when Mirza Siraj describes Istanbul:

This strait [the Golden Horn] separates these two continents from each other. This side has been built completely in the style of Europe according to a plan

\textsuperscript{362} ‘Abd al-Ahad, Rūznāma-yi safar-i khayriyat-asār-i vilāyat-i Fiṭīburkh, fols. 15a, 37b, 61b, 21a. To be contrasted with Bihbud’s travel accounts from 1914: When Bihbud visits Baku again, 15 years since he was last there, the main difference he observes is the construction going on and the new high buildings. I.e. there is no place for wonder in Bihbud’s travelogue. Mahmūdḵāja Bihbūdi, “Sayāhāt khatīralari 2”, Āyina 35 (21 June 1914 [4 July 1914]): 833. Also, when observing that many buildings have elevators (āsānsār mashīnlalar) in Kislavodsk there is no sign of either nervousness or wonder. Mahmūdḵāja Bihbūdi, “Sayāhāt khatīralari 3”, Āyina 37 (5 July 1914 [18 July 1914]): 881.

\textsuperscript{363} ‘Abd al-Ahad, Rūznāma-yi safar-i khayriyat-asār-i vilāyat-i Fiṭīburkh, fol. 19a

\textsuperscript{364} Mirzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuhaf-i Buxhārā, 36, 38, 253.
and mathematics. The seat of the government, which they call the Yulduz palace, is situated on this side. The embassies and consulates of European governments are also on this side. Most of the inhabitants of this side are Europeans and Christian merchants. All the bazaars and shops here are in the style of the “West” [Farangistān]; there are excellent buildings here. There are horse-tramways and trams on the streets. There are clean hotels. But all the old monuments and large mosques, and “strange and wonderful buildings” [‘amārat-i ‘ajīb u ḡarīb] are on the side of Istanbul. It has many inhabitants and among the ambassadors only the ambassador of the government of Iran is on that side. Aya Sofia, old minarets and other large mosques are all located on the side of the old town, i.e. Istanbul. The railroad to “Europe” [Farangistān] is also on that side.

Compared with Beyoğlu, Istanbul was built a long time ago. It is also much dirtier. Most of its streets are narrow and dark, as in the old order, but it also has some wide roads and clean bazaars.365

5.4 Conclusion

An increased polarization of the new and the old seems to have been a logical outcome of the rapid rate of technical and industrial innovation from the late 1860s and onwards. It is in this context that Mirza Siraj and Bihbudi appear as disseminators of a message of the arrival of a new era whose technological and social achievements the Bukharans need to appropriate. This signified a belief in the primacy of human agency and an emphasis on space-based geography. And it is perhaps not surprising that, of our examples above, the polarization between the new and the old is most evident, or most strongly emphasized, in architecture and city planning, a man-made new order.

In Vazih’s account of his travels, we can see that his experiences of new technology in Alexandria are not expressed in terms of marvels. The emphasis on human activity, as represented by Western (Farangī) innovations, skills and technology, can be seen as an indicator of an increasingly anthropocentric world. Similarly, while marvels manifest the glory of God and the unity of creation, the proselytizers of temporal difference had a message of historical discontinuity related to the accelerated rhythm of temporal experience of the new world in the making. In the discourse on progress, which was established during the first two decades of the 20th century, marvels were therefore generally retained only as an aesthetic category that signified something man-made, and were not referred to with the main purpose of causing the reader to admire the power and providence of God.

Vazih’s description of Alexandria also reveals a long-term conception of historical time dating back to the Greeks and stretching into a present that

365 Mirzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuhaf-i Bukhārā, 41, 44, 63–64, 74, 79.
has its own temporal markers made up of new innovations and western technology. The localization of these temporal markers of the present to a specific space can be seen as the embryo of a conceptualization of contemporaneities existing at the same uniform chronological time and thus the beginning of a struggle to become contemporary. In the same account we can also see reflections on the close link between scientific development and technological innovation, something typical of this period. In the historization of development and innovation, human agency was brought to the fore through a link with the Greeks. Science became temporalized and was made an aspect of progress.

Mirza Siraj’s and Bihbudi’s accounts focus strongly on temporal differences. The temporal orientation of their works might be an aspect of modernist aesthetics, but because their works are written in the name of progress, this focus can also be interpreted as reflecting an eschatological shift. It is tempting to describe them as travellers not only from the Middle Ages to the Contemporary Era, but also as travellers coming from a pre-apocalyptic Bukhara, a Bukhara awaiting transformation, and arriving in a post-apocalyptic, developed and transformed world. It is thus also tempting to compare the Sattelzeit with the apocalypse, while imagining the cognitive dissonance likely to have been experienced by a Bukharan traveller to a post-Sattelzeit, developed world, at least if we give credence to the narrow-mindedness ascribed to the Bukharans by Ahmad Kalla.
6. The signs of discontinuity

6.1 Chronology and history

Prior to the 20th century, Bukharan Muslim scholars seem to have mapped historical time by means of genealogies and naturally formed chronologies; that is, their epochs and eras were marked by events, like the ascendance of a king, a natural disaster, or a celestial conjunction. Abstract historical periodizations tied to specific historical experiences embedded in concepts such as the Middle Ages, the Contemporary Era, etc, were thus absent. In a European context, Koselleck writes: “Up until the eighteenth century, the course and calculation of historical events was underwritten by two natural categories of time: the cycle of stars and planets, and the natural succession of rulers and dynasties.”

Another difference between naturally formed chronologies and abstract historical periodization is the latter’s relative emphasis on human agency.

One early and influential Muslim scholar who wrote about various chronologies was Biruni (d. 1048). In his major treatise on various ways of reckoning time, The Chronology of Ancient Nations, he wrote as follows:

Era means a definite space of time, reckoned from the beginning of some past year, in which either a prophet, with signs and wonders, and with a proof of his divine mission, was sent, or a great and powerful king arose, or in which a nation perished by a universal destructive deluge, or by a violent earthquake and sinking of the earth, or a sweeping pestilence, or by intense drought, or in which a change of dynasty or religion took place, or any grand event of the celestial and the famous tellurian miraculous occurrences, which did not happen save at long intervals and at times far distant from each other. By such events the fixed moments of time (the epochs) are recognized. Now, such an era cannot be dispensed with in all secular and religious affairs. Each of the nations scattered over the different parts of the world has a special era, which they count from the times of their kings or prophets, or dynasties, or some of those events which we have just mentioned. And thence they derive the dates, which they want in social intercourse, in chronology, and in every institute (i.e. festivals) which is exclusively peculiar to them.

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366 Koselleck, Futures Past, 37.
Biruni’s definition of eras was highly valid, at least until the end of the 19th century when more abstract forms of historical periodization became common. But until then, and probably also thereafter, traditional works on chronology were still copied in Bukhara. An example of such a work is “Explaining the Beginning of the Hijrī Calendar and the Calendar of the Persians and the Circumstances of the Foundation of Calendars” (Dar bayān-i ibtidā-yi ta’rīkh-i hijrī va ta’rīkh-i fārsīyān va kayfiyat-i vaż’-i ta’rīkh), which was copied in Bukhara in 1297/1879–1880.

As the title says, the author explains that the “Muslim lunar calendar” (ta’rīkh-i hijrī) begins with Muhammad’s move from Mecca to Medina, and the “Persian (Muslim) calendar” (ta’rīkh-i fārs va fārsīyān) with the dethronement of Yazdagird son of Shahryar (d. 651). This type of calendar is called “explicit time-reckoning” (ta’rīkh-i šarīḥ). However, the author devotes most of the pages of his work to “obscure time-reckoning” (ta’rīkh-i ta’miyā), and shows a great interest in and fascination for chronograms in the forms of riddles, including the use of geometry to componse them using the numerical values of the Arabic letters (abjad).

A person skilled in obscure time-reckoning is, according to the author of the work, called a “decipherer of chronograms” (ta’rīkhgūy), while a person who “has seen ‘books on history’ (kutub-i ta’rīkh) or written books about ‘past kingdoms and nobles’ is called ‘ Chronicler’ (Muvarrīkh)”. The conceptual boundaries between chroniclers and chronologists (experts on chronology) were probably very fuzzy. In Bukhara, chroniclers and chronologists were probably referred to as ahl-i tavārīkh, ašhāb-i tavārīkh, and ‘ulamā-yi tavārīkh.

Ta’rīkh thus means not only “date” and “chronogram”, but also “histrorography”. More rarely it signified a “book on history”. Ta’rīkh (pl. tavārīkh) could thus signify an annalistic piece of writing that was something more than a mere chronology. Neither ta’rīkh nor tavārīkh, however, means history as a process independent of human narratives, in Bukhara before the advent of the 20th century. The temporal-spatial nexus of place-based geography, its set of temporal-spatial mediators, thus conforms very well to the science of tavārīkh as an aggregation of dates, and very poorly to history as a process independent of human narratives.

It was only during the first two decades of the 20th century that the modern discipline of history, with its emphasis on space-based geography, appeared in Bukhara as a distinct discipline, different from the chronicles and

368 Rahmat Lilah, Dar bayān-i ibtidā-yi ta’rīkh-i hijrī va ta’rīkh-i fārsīyān va kayfiyat-i vaż’-i ta’rīkh, Ms. IVANRÚz, no. 504, esp. fols. 580b–581a, 586a.
369 Tamkīn, MFMZ, fol. 74a.
370 For a discussion of the semantic range and concept of ta’rīkh, see Rosenthal, A History of Muslim Historiography, 8–17. See also von Kügelgen, Die Legitimierung der mittelasiatischen Mangitendynastie, 190–191.
their focus on genealogy. In his “History of Islam” (Ta’rīkh-i Islām) from 1915, Fitrat explains what “history” (ta’rīkh) is:

[History is] a science that teaches the circumstances of past nations and the reasons for their progress and decline.

Fitrat discusses two different kinds of history: “general history” (ta’rīkh-i ‘umūtim) and “special history” (ta’rīkh-i khusūsī). His definition of the former is the history of all “nations” (sg. millat) and “societies” (sg. jamā’at), while his definition of the latter is the history of one specific nation and society. In his Guide to Salvation, Fitrat calls “general history” and “special history” subdivisions of “political history” (ta’rīkh-i siyāsī) which, together with the “history of science and literature” (ta’rīkh-i ‘ulūm va adabīyāt) and “natural history” (ta’rīkh-i tabī‘), is a subdivision of the “history of civilization” (ta’rīkh-i tamaddun). The main branches of history are the history of civilization and sacred history (ta’rīkh-i muqaddas). Special history is here described as something that tells us about “the situation of a ‘state’ (dawlat) and a ‘nation’ (millat) and the causes of their formation and disappearance.”

From Fitrat’s description of what history is and from the syntagmatic relationship between history, nation, state, society, and progress and decline in his works, it is clear that history has found a causality (in the form of progress and decline) that it did not have for the chroniclers. “History” (ta’rīkh) now signifies a process, a development through time and history, as well as a description of that process. It has a new teleology, with the nation being expected to make progress and become contemporary, or decline and perish. This teleology is the essence of the historical dimension of some of Fitrat’s works, such as his Guide to Salvation, History of Islam and Debate. Fitrat explains this teleology by making contemporary comparisons between the situations of the Muslims in Russian Turkistan and Muslims in other colonial empires. He also makes historical comparisons with the rise and fall of Muslim Spain. In the Guide to Salvation we thus read that “we have to make progress like other nations or renounce our national home.”

Unlike Tamkin, who seems to have preferred “chroniclers” (‘ulamā-yi tavārīkh) to “historians” (‘ulamā-yi ta’rīkh), Fitrat preferred ta’rīkh in the singular form, which signified “history” rather than “histories” or “dates”.

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371 For a general discussion of the appearance of a modern concept of history in Turkistan and Bukhara, see Khalid, “Nation into History”, 127–145.
372 ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf Fitrat, Ta’rīkh-i Islām (Samarkand: Gāzārūf, 1333/1915), 2.
373 Fitrat, Ta’rīkh-i Islām, 2.
375 For the latter, see for example Fitrat, Munāzara, 27–29.
376 Fitrat, “Rohbari najot”, Sadoi sharq, no. 7–8: 44.
377 Tamkīn, MFMZ, fol. 74a. Ahmad Kalla also preferred tavārīkh when referring to historiography, at least in his Risola.
Most probably a distinction arose in some circles between *ta‘rikh* and *tavārikh* in Bukhara in the 1910s, with the latter meaning chronicles as a genre belonging to the old sciences and *ta‘rikh* meaning history as a process and as a new scientific discipline belonging to the new sciences. Another possible example of this is Mirza Siraj who wrote that as a boy he studied “chronicles” (*tavārikh*) at home, before the modern discipline of “history” (*ta‘rikh*) reached Bukhara.

*Ta‘rikh* became what Koselleck calls a *Kollektivsingular*, a concept that earlier had been used in a plural sense (*tavārikh*) to denote a fairly concrete object (a number of dates, stories, etc), that now became a singular denoting a far more abstract object with a much broader range of use. The collective singular history (*ta‘rikh* in our case) “gained a new dimension which deprived accounts of their coherence; history was always ‘more’ than any account made of it.”\(^{379}\) For Fitrat, *ta‘rikh* had become both an object and a subject. The new concept of history should be contrasted with cosmography; it signified a paradigmatic shift in the universal relations of events. Although the present became temporally shorter, the increased availability of historical works, many of which were influenced by the modern western concept of history, widened the range of experience in a historical sense.\(^{380}\)

As a collective singular, history became more abstract, and *ta‘rikh* came to imply the natural unity of a general history with shared experiences. The latter is also evident in what Aynī wrote in 1918 when looking back at the outbreak of the First World War:

> During Ramadan 1332 [1913/14] the general war broke out; the world took on a different colour; in the “book of the history of the world” (*kitāb-i ta‘rikh-i dunyā*) a new chapter was opened.\(^{381}\)

### 6.2 Discontinuity in the paradigm of progress

In the Western world, it was not until the 18\(^{\text{th}}\) century that the new notion of historical eras begun to spread. This notion of eras had different markers of discontinuity than Biruni’s conception of an era as described above, because the former’s high velocity of change and accelerated rhythm of temporal experience made it unique. This is what Koselleck’s concept of *Sattelzeit* falls back upon: a concept of discontinuity formed by the historical circum-

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\(^{378}\) Mirzā Sirāj, *Safarnāma-yi tuhaf-i Bukhārā*, 34.


\(^{380}\) This not only included translations of works on history produced in the West, but also traditional works such as Ibn Khaldun’s *Muqaddima*. To judge from the small number of copies preserved in Central Asia, the latter seems to have arrived during the 19\(^{\text{th}}\) or early 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century.

\(^{381}\) Aynī, “Ta‘rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 144.
stances of the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution in German-speaking Europe.

Against the backdrop of growing knowledge about technological advances and innovations, partly transmitted through first-hand travel experiences and partly through telegraph notices in newspapers, a small group of Bukharans began to discuss why the world was so different now, and what was different about it. This difference was frequently conceptualized as a difference in speed. This gave rise to the new concept of contemporary awareness and a different sense of discontinuity.

6.2.1 Speed and discontinuity

Despite the visibility of western technological advances and inventions, which contributed to making the present unique (although, as can be seen in Vazih’s travelogue mentioned above, there was some discussion about whether or not all those new things already had existed once and then disappeared), the most frequently mentioned indicator of the uniqueness of the present was not the objects per se, but speed, mainly the speed of transport, but also the speed of communication in general. Given the reconceptualization of time and space that was taking place, it is not very odd that speed, being as it is a function of these two philosophical categories, became the prime indicator of the uniqueness of the present. In this discourse on speed, the present was also called the “period of stopping” (dawra-yi tavaqquf). Fitrat thus wrote in 1916 that “this period of stopping became very long in our country [i.e. Bukhara]” and that “the Islamic World is several farsakh behind on the battlefield of life and behind the rest of the people of the world.”

In retrospect it appears as if the hostility towards the railroad and the telegraph in late 19th century Bukhara was well founded; if only the “reactionary” Muslim scholars had known what a severe blow these two inventions were to deal to the prophetic paradigm in the emirate because of their ability to question the end of time through their multitude of potential temporal extensions they offered and the knowledge they brought with them. However, the railroad and the telegraph broke not only the old boundaries in time, but also the boundaries in space. Among the innovations frequently mentioned by the Bukharian reformers in order to stress the imperative of human agency were those innovations that directly contributed to the increased integration of Bukhara within the global political and economic system.

382 Fitrat, “Rohbari najot”, Sadoi sharq, no. 7–8: 16. See also page 43. During the 19th century in Bukhara, one farsakh measured approximately 8.5 km. See Entsiklopediyai Sovetii Tojik, s.v. “Farsang”.

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6.2.1.1 Trains

Before the construction of the Tashkent-Orenburg railroad (1899–1906), it took some 60 days by caravan to reach Orenburg from Tashkent. One could also travel with the Transcaspian Railroad via Krasnovodsk on the Caspian coast, and then continue by steamer across the Caspian Sea to one of the ports on the other side, usually Baku.

The construction of the Transcaspian Railroad began soon after the Russian conquest. In 1885 and 1886, shortly after the Russian conquest of Merv, which marked the end of the Russian conquest of Turkistan, railway stations opened in Ashgabat, Merv, and Charjou. Towards the end of 1888 the railroad reached Samarkand via the Russian settlement of New Bukhara, some nine miles from the capital of the emirate. In 1898 Tashkent was connected to the railroad, and in 1901 the capital of the emirate of Bukhara was finally connected to the railway. The emir, who initially had been very reluctant to accept the construction of the railroad, paid for this last connection. Obvously many Bukharans had changed their negative stance towards the railroad, the “devil’s car”, as it at least initially was called.

Soon it was cheaper to transport goods from Bukhara to the port of Odessa than via Afghanistan to the port of Bombay. Nevertheless, the overland caravan trade through Afghanistan continued. Most pilgrims preferred this route. It took 45 days to reach Mecca; first on horse from Samarkand through Bukhara and Afghanistan to Peshawar, and then by train to Bombay or Surat, and finally by steamer to Jiddah. For twice the price but more quickly, one could reach Mecca from Samarkand in only 25 days by traveling overland to Bukhara, taking the Transcaspian railroad to Krasnovodsk, continuing by steamer to Baku, overland to Batumi or Constantinople, and then again by steamer to Port Said.

Unlike later air travel, the world’s 100 000 railway locomotives, which drew almost three million carriages in the 19th century, had been unimagined during the 18th century. In 1882 some two billion people in the world travelled by train. In Russia (including Poland but excluding Finland) between 1866 and 1900, “the length of the common carrier rail network increased from 5,000 km to 53,200 km.” Many of the first Bukharans to travel by train must have been fascinated by this new mode of transport, and espe-

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386 Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire*, 41–42.
cially by its speed, because they wrote down their observations, some in more detail than others. Ahmad Kalla noted that it took him 14 hours to travel the 782 kilometres (92 farsang) (∼56 km/h)) between St Petersburg and Moscow.\footnote{Donish, \textit{NV}, 1:184. In the 1880s the average speed between Moscow and St Peters burg was 42 km/h, up from 32 km/h in the 1860s. In 1905 the first-class-only train averaged up to 56 km/h. See Westwood, \textit{A History of Russian Railways}, 57, 89–90, 150.} Vazih, who made his pilgrimage in 1886, was not as brief, writing:

\[E\]ach train consists of 16 to 28 wagons, and each of its wagons has 60 \textit{pud} [983 kg] of people and other goods, and the weight of the locomotive of each train is 24 000 \textit{pud} [393 metric tonnes], and the locomotive] puts the aggregate of this heavy load into motion through the power of steam which appears from the heat of the fire. It goes as fast as a dazzling flash of lightning, or in more credible terms, the average distance it travels per hour is 6 \textit{farsakh} [51 km], and if they heat up the locomotive more, it travels between 12 and 14 \textit{farsakh} per hour [102 and 119 km/h].

It was not only the speed of the railway that was new, but the relative smoothness of train travel compared to the caravan, including the disappearance of the previously obligatory overnight stops, the \textit{manzil},\footnote{For a discussion of measurement of distance in early Arabic geographies, see discussion in Silverstein, \textit{The Medieval Islamic Worldview}, 277–278.} when travelling by caravan (“the iron car proceeds all the time, night and day”\footnote{For Vazih’s reflections in these two paragraphs, see Vāżiḥ, \textit{Gharāyib al-khabar}, no. 2336, fols. 265b–266a, 197a.}390), which provided the traveller with a greater awareness of inactivity and a new sensitivity to idleness that was expressed in the numerous descriptions of relatively short stops (sg. \textit{tavaqquf}), measured in minutes, that the trains made along the road.

6.2.1.1.1 Clocks and minutes
Towards the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} and at the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, there were several watchmakers in Bukhara. One of the more famous seems to have been a certain Ali Muhammad Karataev, who was called Usta-Ali. Karataev came to Bukhara in 1854, worked there as a translator and as a commander of the artillery, and later became the court watchmaker.\footnote{M.U. “Russkie lyudi v Bukhare”, \textit{St. Peterburgskie Vedomosti} 183 (1875), see also Becker, \textit{Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia}, 114–116.}

The most prominent clock in Bukhara was situated above the entrance of the citadel in Bukhara. It probably served the same purpose as many early European clocks, that is, to provide ornamentation and decoration. As mentioned by many Bukharans, it probably was a rare thing in the emirate, and as such was a source of pride and perhaps also a state symbol. Magdiev even
Thus were afraid of it, and the people there had never seen a clock with a bell and believed it was magic, and a clock with a bell. Harlam Chekovich, perhaps era unlike anything that had existed before. The technological advances in the latter's works. Where clock measurements in the latter's works. Sir Ahmad Kalla writes that after having seen Vienna, they came to the train station at eight o'clock farangi time (sā‘at-i hasht al-farang). In Bihbudi’s travelogue about his journey to Europe there are also plenty of references to when he arrived at a certain station and when he left, measured down to the minute, like in the 20th century travelogue of Mirza Siraj. This also contributed to a feeling that time was moving all the time, that there was no place to rest. Contrasting this with some of the 19th century writings of Ahmad Kalla reveals fewer instances of small temporal measurements in the latter’s works. When describing his visit in Russia, however, where clock time was more common than in Bukhara, Ahmad Kalla frequently referred to events taking place at certain hours, while minutes were rarely referred to.

6.2.1.2 War
The technological advances in the war industry were another phenomenon that contributed to the conceptualization of the present as a unique historical era unlike anything that had existed before. The changing speed of war was perhaps more visible in the development of air warfare than in any other military field. The Bukharan newspaper The Noble Bukhara was published.

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392 Rempel', Dalēkoe i blizkoe, 32. For a description of the clock, see M.S. Andreev and O.D. Chekovich, Ark [Kreml'] Bukhārī v kontse xix – nachale xx vv. (Dushanbe: Donish, 1972), 28. It is difficult not to compare this clock with the one Fitrat mentions in his History of Islam, where he writes that that during the time of Harun al-Rashid the Muslims invented a clock with a bell. Harun al-Rashid sent one of these clocks to a “European” (Farangistān) king, and the people there had never seen a clock with a bell and believed it was magic, and thus were afraid of it, see Fitrat, Ta‘rikh-i Islām, 33.
393 For a general discussion on this, see Danius, The Senses of Modernism, 140.
394 Mirzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuhafi-Bukhārā, 100.
395 See for example Mirzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuhafi-Bukhārā, 88.
396 Mirzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuhafi-Bukhārā, 105.
397 See for example Donish, NV, 1:165–191.
during the years when large-scale production of military aircraft in particular had just begun. For example, one article described the French Air Force and outlined the increase in the number of airplanes, and the paper gives a quite accurate description of the rearmament at the time. “These days”, we read, “the whole world and all nations are establishing aerial fleets in order not to fall behind.” In this article, we not only see the uniqueness of the present era, but also the public time of the nation-state as seen through a map. Due to aerial warfare, war will not be limited to part of a country, but risks affecting the whole country. The article continues by pointing out the difference between the “present time” ( zamān-i ḥālīya ) and the “old time” ( zamān-i qadīm ), as wars in the present era are far more destructive and faster. However, the author also notices that these qualities of present-day warfare have reduced the number of wars, because wars can destroy whole countries or “prevent a country from making progress for several years”.

Fitrat offers a more general discussion of the developments within warfare in his work The Debate, in which the Westerner argues against the teacher who cannot see that this time is different (“the time of progress” [ zamān-i taraqqī ]) from the “previous time” ( zamān-i sābiq ) because Tamerlane (d. 1405), Mahmud of Ghazni (d. 1030), and Nader Shah (d. 1747) managed to conquer large parts of the world without new science. Fitrat, through the Westerner, remarks that now news from Bukhara can reach India overnight. At the time of Tamerlane it took a year to move troops from Bukhara to India; “now it takes twenty days”.

Do not put the time of progress of the Islamic kings on a par with this time. At that time, if your weapons were scimitars and bows and arrows then Christians did not even have this. Your soldiers were disorganized; the Christians were even less organized. Your scope of education was limited; your methods of education were complicated; the Christians did not even have this. Because of this, your kings won over the Christian states, and they were successful thanks to the inspiration of the divine words. But gradually the pagans began refusing to content themselves with this subjugation; they went the way of struggle and effort. They collected the books of the Islamic scholars of Baghdad and Andalusia. They devoted themselves to studying the secrets of these books; they put their kingdom on the foundations of your Quran […] The pagans acquired science and government. They changed their weapons; that is, they turned their swords and bows and arrows into cannons, guns and bombs. They put their soldiers in order; they embarked on trains and steamships.

400 Fīṭrāt, Munāẓara, 62–63.
6.3 Chronological markers

Chronological markers (such as ‘ahd, ‘aṣr, qarn, qurūn, vaqt, and zamān) gradually ceased to be mere dividers. Rather than being syntagmatically related to rulers and dynasties, and at the most marking historical experiences related to their deeds and expressions of piety, these markers were now related to collective achievements of various nations during ideologically defined, abstract periods of time. For Mirza Siraj, this was an “era of progress and civilization” (‘aṣr-i taraqqī va tamaddun). This was a sign that historical eras had become detached from naturally formed chronologies. Mirza Siraj wrote of Khiva that:

When this nation has received a little bit of science and information about the “present period of renewal” (dawra-yi tajaddud-i ḥāliya), which is the era of progress and civilization, Europe will envy Khiva.

Because a multitude of simultaneous experiences were being transmitted by new means of communication throughout an extended present, this present was conceptualized as a contemporary era with a specific set of historical experiences. As a novel conceptual loan, the concept of a contemporary era was not initially embedded in a lexeme or phrasal lexeme of its own, was but referred to with various phrasal lexemes, such as the “current time” (zamān-i ḥāzira) as opposed to the “old time” (zamān-i qadīm).

Tripartite abstract divisions of historical time were rare. One of the Bukharan authors who echoed this, however, names the divisions “the first age”, “the middle age”, and “the last age” (qurūn-i avvalī, qurūn-i vustā, and qurūn-i ākharī), with the present obviously being seen as the last or most recent age. These labels correspond quite well with those of the first Ottoman historian who introduced the concept of the “Middle Age”, Hayrullah Efendi (d. 213.) At least in Bukhara, “the last age” was also referred to as the “new era” (‘aṣr-i jādīd or ‘ahd-i jādīd), something that made it clear that the end of time was not expected to come anytime soon:

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402 Mirzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuḥaf-i Būkhārā, 259.
403 A signifier of this present time would be matbuotu adabiyoti hozīra, i.e. probably lithographs and newspapers. ‘Āynī writes in 1918 that before 1908 he had been unaware of matbuotu adabiyoti hozīra. See ‘Āynī, “Ta’rikhī inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 35.
The first issue of the precious newspaper that is the cause of the life and progress of this nation, and that recently has stepped onto the stage of education of the new age.\textsuperscript{408}

The retrospective sense of discontinuity is thus evident in this periodization, a periodization that was as alien to Islamic historiography as was the concept of the Middle Ages.\textsuperscript{409}

The Bukharan adoption of a western tripartite division of historical time, or concepts like the Middle Ages, also transposed a certain set of (western) historical experiences onto Bukhara. If the Middle Ages were situated between Antiquity and the Modern period, a backward Bukhara could be ascribed to the Middle Ages. This transposition of historical experiences in combination with a space-based emphasis on geography introduced a new synchronic order in the temporal structure of chronological markers.

The concept of century also says something about the temporal and spatial reorientation during this time. In the west, the lexeme \textit{century} became rather late an independent chronological marker of a specific set of historical experiences separate from naturally formed chronologies, which might be seen as a paradox. The first centennial celebrations were not held until the last two decades of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century,\textsuperscript{410} but after the turn of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the concept was already employed in Central Asia, where it also marked an extended range of experiences separate from naturally formed chronologies.\textsuperscript{411} Due to the non-Bukharan origin of its historical experiences, the 20\textsuperscript{th} century was frequently referred to according to the Christian calendar.

Our “current century” (\textit{qarn-i ḥāliya}) which they called the 20\textsuperscript{th} century; a nation which has opened its eyes in this century makes progress, otherwise, it will remain 1 000 \textit{parsang} behind.\textsuperscript{412}

The century is the “20\textsuperscript{th} century” (\textit{qarn-i bistum}) and the “century of inventions” (\textit{qarn-i ikhtirāʻāt}). At the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century “new inventions” emerged (\textit{ikhtirāʻāt-i jadīda}) and in truth strange and uncommon things were invented. Like the invention of the railroad, steamships, the telegraph, etc. And in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century the inventions reached perfection and made much progress so that the inventions of this century are impossible to understand. Like the radiotelegraph, airships, and submarines. These inventions and per-

\textsuperscript{409} For the latter, see Strauss, “Kurūn-i vustā”, 207.
\textsuperscript{410} Hobsbawm, \textit{The Age of Empire}, 26.
\textsuperscript{411} Rosenthal writes that in Muslim Arabic historiography “[q]arn is no abstract numerical unit like m‘ah ‘century’ but has always been felt to be connected with the length of the life of individuals or groups.” In Muslim Arabic historiography \textit{qarn} has thus been given various lengths, but apparently never much longer than a potential human lifespan and has thus not really separateed from naturally formed chronologies. See Rosenthal, \textit{A History of Muslim Historiography}, 85–86.
\textsuperscript{412} Sirāj, “Har qūlīrā fa’lī lāzim ast”, BSh 43 (30 Apr. 1912 [13 May 1912]): 3.
Infections were not limited to “technology” (ṣanāyī’), but “science” (‘ulūm u fīqūn) has also turned to progress and perfection.\footnote{M. ‘Abd al-Ḥussayn Hāshimzāda, “Tarvīj-i zabān-i bayn al-milalī lázim ast”, SI 16 (9 Aug. 1919): 6.}

It must have been increasingly problematic to call this period for the new era in Bukhara during the 1910s, as jadīd could easily signify a new time full of religiously unlawful innovations. A large number of religiously unlawful innovations could also be regarded as a sign of the end of time. Calling it the century of inventions, with century being a conceptual loan, and “inventions” (ikhtīrā‘āt), like “new” (jadīd), also easily denounced as uninslamic, probably made it even more problematic. For a Muslim scholar who believed in the eschatological scenario of an imminent catastrophic apocalypse, this time, or era, might well have been the era of inventions, or the new era, or the last era – but this signified the end of time. As an example of someone who adhered to an apocalyptic rhetoric, Tamkin referred to his time as the “old era” (‘ahd-i pīr). For him, the old era was synonymous with an era of “deviations from what was religiously permissible” (‘ahd-i nāhanjār).\footnote{Tamkīn, MFMẒ, fols. 420b, 421b.} He thus did not ascribe any specific historical experiences to it that could not easily fit within the revelation. Most often Tamkin used “era” (‘ahd) and “time” (zamān) in syntagmatic relationships with rulers and dynasties; that is, chronological markers were not separated from naturally formed chronologies in his works.

6.4 Divination

While the accelerated rhythm of temporal experience during the protectorate era was interpreted by many Bukharan reformers in terms of a discontinuity that signified the arrival of a new time, the same period was described in terms of “disorder” (bīzabṭī)\footnote{Donish, NV, 1:116.} and interpreted as a sign that the “age was old” by Tamkin. This implied very different expectations of the future and a different eschatological scenario, which is also evident in the predictions that the advocates of progress were making. Their predictions involved juxtaposing the Bukharan present with the western present in order to create a Bukharan future, and disseminating a message about the technological and social developments in the west, because they to a considerable degree conceptualized the western present as the Bukharan future. As the most manifest signs of this sense of discontinuity were localized in the west, the advocates of progress, by travelling and consuming of newspapers and the new sciences, were able to “communicate” with this future created by human agency. This should be contrasted with the kind of predictions made by a person like
Tamkin, who did not stress a future created by human agency, and hence relied more on communication with the divine.

Although various forms of divination always had been controversial practices, the new conceptual boundaries that appeared after the turn of the 20th century served to make these practices technically impossible. Attempts were made for example to conceptually distinguish astronomy from astrology; at that time both disciplines were embedded in the science of the stars. Articles describing astronomy as a separate discipline thus appeared in the reformist press, and divination was generally denounced as “superstition” (khurāfāt) by the Muslim reformists. This should be compared with the 19th century denunciation of divination as practised by Ahmad Kalla as heresy. The latter signified that the practice took place in the realm of religion, and was impermissible, though not necessarily impossible.

[When Ahmad Kalla passed the mullas on his way to the madrasa he said that:] – tonight at such and such an hour there will be an eclipse of the moon that will last for so and so many minutes, and everyone who climbs to the roof of the madrasa at that time will observe this natural event.

Until that time I [Ayni] had been told that the moon eclipses due to vile sins. If indeed what he said came true tonight, then it is obvious that he is a great scientist (‘ālim). The people define him as a munajjim (i.e. a fālbīn [fortune-teller]), if what he said came true, then it is obvious that he was a munajjim (i.e. sitārashinās [astronomer]), not a fālbīn [fortune-teller]. (Sadriddin Aynī, “Yoddoshtho”, Kulliyot ed. A. Dehoti et al. [Dushanbe: Nashriyoti Davlatii Tojikiston, 1966], vol. 6:265–266.)

Moreover, Ayni’s account from 1921 contradicts the arguments above.


416 See for example an article on the sun: “Āftāb”, Āyīnā 49 (27 Sep. 1914 [10 Oct. 1914]): 1174–1178. During the Soviet era Ayni attempted to portray Ahmad Kalla as an astronomer and not an astrologist. For example, one of Aynī’s first accounts of Ahmad Kalla, which took place in Ayni’s youth, is a description of how Ahmad Kalla foretells an eclipse of the moon. Altogether Ayni does his best to portray Ahmad Kalla’s astronomical observations in diametric opposition to the superstitions of Bukharans in general.

417 S.M., “Ta’rīkh-i amīrān-i Manghītiya-yi Būkhārā”, SI 86 (22 Sep. 1921): 3. There was, however, also an Islamic astrology based on revelation rather than non-Muslim sources. The most famous of these works was probably Suyūṭī’s Kitāb al-Hay’a as-Sanīya fī l-Hay’a as-Sunnya (Anton M. Heinen, Islamic Cosmology: A Study of as-Suyūṭī’s al-Hay’a as-sanīya fī l-hay’a as-sunnya with a Critical Edition, Translation, and Commentary [Beirut: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1982], 11.) For a discussion of early Islam and astrology, see Heinen, Islamic Cosmology, 83–85. For a comparison between al-Hay’a and prophetical medicine as a medical science based on revelation, see Heinen, Islamic cosmology, 35.
Divination demanded skills in the most diverse disciplines. “Practitioner of the science of the stars” (munajjim) could, for example, signify someone who was well versed in mathematical astronomy just as well as someone who was skilled in astrology. Despite possibly involving skills and knowledge from the precise sciences, the predictive services offered by a practitioner of the science of the stars are hence similar to the services offered by the “soothsayer” (kāhin), the “geomancer” (rammāl), and the “fortune-teller” (jālbīn). As mathematical astronomy demanded good skills in geometry to predict the movement of the celestial bodies, a practitioner of the science of the stars could also be called a “geometrician” (muhandis), a term that, if translated as “engineer”, could be very misleading about the actual services provided by a geometrician. Moreover, belief in divination as a way to communicate directly with the divine probably also involved believing in several different practices of divination. Although Ahmad Kalla probably did not consider himself to belong to the guessers, to those who calculate people’s destinies or practise unveiling (ahl-i ḥads u hisāb u mukāshafā), he was a practitioner of the science of the stars, but also of “bibliomancy” using the Quran.419

Belief in divination was not a sign of a lack of knowledge of the world, or of a lack of knowledge of the precise sciences, or of the shunning of modern technology. Two collections of adages, the Šālnāma and Nawrūznāma, both ascribed to Hakim al-Tirmizi (d. 936–938), were published for example by Mirza Salim-bik,420 and Ahmad Kalla was one of the most prominent practitioners of the science of the stars in 19th century Bukhara, at least in the opinion of his contemporaries.421 Despite the latter’s interest in newspapers and travels to Russia, he believed in divine agency and practised divination. Ahmad Kalla’s skill in the science of the stars is supported not only by the number of treatises he wrote on the subject422 and the number of copies of those treatises,423 but also by some stories about his making horoscopes for various persons. Each year Ahmad Kalla was summoned by Emir Muzaffār

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418 This argument is exemplified by a story about Ahmad Kalla in Tamkīn, Mullastān, fols. 45b–46a. Similarly, “hisāb in astrology specifically denotes the action of calculating one’s destiny”, See Dozy’s Supplément aux Dictionnaires Arabes as cited in Heinen, Islamic cosmology, 30.

419 Donish, Risola, 139, 130.

420 Wennberg, An Inquiry into Bukharan qadīmism, 42. The popularity of these works is also evident in the sheer number of manuscripts listed in SVR: Tochnyē i estestvennye nauki, 135–140.

421 ‘Abdī praised his knowledge of the science of the stars (Ṭagkīrat al-shu’ārā-yi muta‘ akhkhirīn, Ms. IVANRUz, no. 64, fol. 67a); Hashmat praises him for his knowledge of the science of the stars (Ṭadhkīra al-shu’ārā, Ms. IVANRUz, no. 2729, fols. 130b–131a), as does Shar’ī (Ṭagkīra-yi shar’ī, Ms. IVANRUz, no. 3396/III, fols. 70b–71b), and Muḥtaram who also praises him for his knowledge of geometry (Ṭagkīra-yi shu’ārā, fols. 105ab.)

422 See for example Mss. IVANRUz, nos. 2362, 5095, 459/II, and 2247/IV.

to cast his horoscope. On one of Ahmad Kalla’s trips to Russia, he even cast a horoscope for a Russian lady, and received in return two globes, one of the earth and one of the firmament.

6.5 Predicting the end of time

The expansion of the field of experience provided numerous signs of discontinuity that, by means of divination, reference to Hadith-collections, and other traditions, were interpreted as predicting the end of the world. For those who believed in this coming end, the expansion of the present provided numerous new signs, although we do not have enough empirical evidence to claim that the protectorate era was characterized by “semiotic arousal”, in which a meaning and a pattern are read into the most diverse events.

The increased news coverage of Japan seems to have attracted a great deal of interest even among more traditional Bukharans, and at least some of them interpreted the war between Japan and Russia as a sign of the approaching end of the world. In a work written at the time of the war, Tamkin claimed that the Japanese were none else than the “bloodythirsty” Mongols. He thus equated the Japanese expansion during the early 20th century with the Mongol expansion during the 13th century. In another work by Tamkin written the same year, he interpreted the war between Russia and Japan as a sign of the return of the Rightly Guided and the end of the world:

soon the army of Japan must take the world because it is the forerunner of sins, not to say the hands and arms of sins. And after these Japanese events, the Rightly Guided will come.

The Bukharan Muslim scholar Sami made reference to several traditions and interpreted the Japanese victory over Russia as a sign that the end of the world was close. According to Sami’s interpretation, however, the Japanese were not the Mongols, but “probably” the semi-legendary people of Qaḥṭan who, according to some traditions, would come from the East at the end of time. According to Sami, the Japanese emperor had converted to Islam, and Japan was therefore supported by God. Hence, through Japan, God had punished Russia for her sins. Sami writes that the rise of the “war” (fitna) in the East was a sign of the resurrection, and the war would not stop before the

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425 Hodizoda, Ahmadi Donish, 72–74. The treatise he wrote on its usage is the Risāla fi īmāl al-kura, Ms. IVANRUz, no. 2247/1 fols. 1b–4a.
426 See also Landes, “Roosters Crow, Owls Hoot”, 21.
427 Tamkīn, Jarāʾid, fols. 2a, 6b.
428 Tamkīn, Mullastān, fol. 166b.
“extinction” (fānā) of the world, which is typical of the eschatological scenario of catastrophic apocalypticism.

In order to “prove” that the Japanese were the people of Qaḥṭan or blood-thirsty Mongols, and that the end of time was close, the Bukharans referred to the most diverse traditions and divinatory practices, with the aim of ascertaining the date of the arrival of a Renewer or the Rightly Guided and determining when things were expected to get better. It is noteworthy, however, that none of the Bukharans referred to here referred to the new sciences, like geography and history, in seeking to find this date, something which also testifies to the conceptual differences between the new and old sciences, with the latter being used to support apocalyptic expectations in a God-centred world, and the former to support calls for progress in an anthropocentric world.

The necessity of using diverse sources and divinatory practices in order to make forecasts about the end of the world was emphasized by Tamkin who argued that one could not claim that the end of the world was drawing nigh by only referring to one authority. He thus stressed the role of the geometers, “logical estimations” (takhmīn-i ʿaqīlī), the “chroniclers/chronologists” (ʿahl-i tavārīkh) and practitioners of the science of the stars. Tamkin also made extensive reference to Sad al-Din al-Hamui (fl. 13th century).

Tamkin’s calculations were based on the assumption that the “world is getting old” (ʿumr-i zamāna pīr gardīda) and that it soon will return to “oblivion” (fānā). The present state of world was thus characterized by “war” (fitna), misdeeds and sin. The world would reach a state of terminal decay in 1450 [2028/29] or 1500 [2076–77]; that is, approximately 120–150 years remained from the time Tamkin wrote this (1323 [1905/06]). Tamkin thus considered the rise of the Japanese to be the 89th of the 100 signs of the resurrection, which also is the first sign that the Rightly Guided has returned. Tamkin then divides the remaining 127 or 177 years into three periods, with the sortie of the Rightly Guided occurring during the first period, complete destruction occurring during the second, and the transformation of the “land of oppression” into the “light of Islam” being accomplished during the third.

Writing at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, Sami came to the conclusion that the world would not last longer than until 1500 [2076/77]. Unlike Tamkin, however, Sami seems to have been an adherent of a different Sufi-brotherhood, and thus made reference to the Naqshbandi tradition that the “leadership of the deceased prophet Muhammad” (imāmat-i marḥūma-yi

430 On the popularity of these disciplines, see SVR: Tochnyě i estestvennyě nauki, 135–156.
431 Al-Hamui was a disciple of Najm al-Din Kubra who founded the Kubraviyya sufī-order. Al-Hamui was also a practitioner of onomatomanity. See EI’, s.v. “Sa’d al-Dīn al-Ḥamūṭī”.
432 Tamkīn, Mullastān, fols.167b–169b.
muḥammadī) would not last more than 1500 years in order to support his argument that the end of the world was close.\footnote{Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Sāmī, Ta’rīkh-i salāfīn-i Manghīṭīyā, fols. 114a–115b. For this tradition, see Friedmann, Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindī, 13–21 and Buehler, Revealed Grace, 24–25.}

In 1920, some 15 years after Tamkīn wrote the lines referred to above, Salīm-bik wrote a story (qīṣṣa) in which he discussed the end of the world. Salīm-bik’s story was thus written in the aftermath of the First World War and during the Russian Civil War, the collapse of the Central Asian economy, and the destruction of parts of the city of Bukhara. Unlike Tamkīn, Salīm-bik’s point of departure was the Renewer-Hadith, which said that a Renewer would arrive every century. Salīm-bik’s main concern was the consequences of World War I, which had caused inflation and famine. This, he wrote, was a sign of the 18th degree of mendacity, a sign that also implied that the power of the Renewer was “insufficient to restore (īslāḥ) the Sharia”. Moreover, as the Renewer of the 14th century still had not appeared, it was possible that the Rightly Guided had already come. Towards the end of his story, Salīm-bik refers to the preface of his copy of the famous Quran commentary Mīrāt al-ṣaqālim, where it is written that the fulfilment of the Rightly Guided will occur in 1363 [1943/44].\footnote{Salīm-bik, Ta’rīkh-i Salīmī, fols. 191b–193a.}

The eschatological dimensions of all these wars and conflicts, including those referred to in Chapter 2.1, are nothing new. Many great battles have been described in an eschatological context since the early days of Islam.\footnote{See EI², s.v. “Sā’āa”.} Great conflicts and wars are easily ascribed to the turbulent period that will accompany the end of time in the eschatological scenario of catastrophic apocalypticism.

6.6 Conclusion

The Sattelzeit, or the period of transition, was seen by Koselleck as belonging to the modern period. The very concept of Sattelzeit “relies on the distinction between contemporary awareness and retrospective consciousness”. Gabriel Motzkin calls this a retrospective sense of discontinuity: “[a] retrospective sense of discontinuity is the only one in which it is possible for a transition to belong to that which is on the side of the vanishing point of retrospection, i.e. the age of transition is viewed continuously from the point of view of the observer.”\footnote{Motzkin, “On the Notion of Historical (Dis)continuity”, 146.}

Those Bukharans who advocated societal progress, including those who believed in transformational apocalypticism, shared a retrospective sense of discontinuity. They sensed a historical discontinuity that was the beginning
of a “new time” ( zamān-i jadīd). However, those who believed in or advocated cataclysmic apocalypticism shared a sense of discontinuity in which the transition period belonged to the preceding period, i.e. as the end of the temporal world. For them the period of transition relied on a distinction between contemporary awareness and prospective consciousness. They can thus be characterized by their “prospective” sense of discontinuity.

It is interesting to observe that the shift from prospective to retrospective consciousness is also observable in millennial movements when prophecy fails and a shift in eschatological scenario occurs, as for example in the transition from Millerism to Seventh-Day Adventism.\textsuperscript{437} The direction of discontinuity of a transition period is thus not only a question of historiography and ideology,\textsuperscript{438} but also of religious beliefs in terms of eschatological scenarios.

Both those who had a prospective sense of discontinuity and those who had a retrospective sense of discontinuity show a high degree of “contemporary awareness” with regard to “transition”. Both “groups” conceived this “period” ( vaqt, zamān) as different from other periods, but differed on the question of the direction in which it was discontinuous. It can be argued that any historical period is bidirectionally discontinuous and that the question of direction is only a matter of perspective, as is evident in the labels for this time: “new time” ( zamān-i jadīd) and “old age” ( ‘ahd-i pīr). However, we have argued elsewhere that by taking into account the structural transformations that took place during the protectorate era, this time can be described as a Bukharan Sattelzeit. Motzkin writes that such transition periods, or “epochs”, “show both a change in the meaning of key concepts and the lack of any settled consensus about their meanings, since it could turn out that they mean different things.”\textsuperscript{439} New, as in the “new time” ( zamān-i jadīd), shows for example, that even one of the most basic concepts, such as the concept of new, could have completely different meanings depending on the direction of discontinuity.

\textsuperscript{437} O’Leary, “When Prophecy Fails and when it Succeeds”, esp. 360–361
\textsuperscript{438} See Motzkin, “On the Notion of Historical (Dis)continuity”, 146.
\textsuperscript{439} Motzkin, “On the Notion of Historical (Dis)continuity”, 148.
7. The temporalization of knowledge

7.1 Imitation

The prospective sense of discontinuity implied a concept of continuity and imitation that was oriented towards the past in the sense that it generally strove to transmit the experiences of the community, rather than to explicitly integrate knowledge considered new. The retrospective as well as prospective senses of discontinuity were both evident in the transformation of the concepts of “imitation” and *ijtihād*.

These two central Islamic juridical concepts were increasingly discussed in modernist circles in the Muslim world during the 19th and 20th centuries. Many Muslim modernists argued that the focus on imitation had hindered the Muslim world from making progress, because “the gates to *ijtihād*” had already closed during the time of classical Islam. For them, imitation became a scapegoat for the backwardness of many Muslim societies. With regard to al-Tahtawi at al-Azhar, Gesink writes that imitation, as a societal concept, signified a “worldview fundamentally opposed to progress, the foundation of a decaying civilization.” This not only fits well with modernist aesthetics, but also translates nicely into an increased emphasis on space-based geography. “[T]he Age of Empire”, notes Hobsbawm, “was essentially an age of state rivalry.” It was characterized by colonial expansion and a historically unique space-based repartitioning of the world. There were also, as mentioned earlier, rapidly increasing inequalities between the “developed world” and the “third world”. In an Islamic context of progress, the unfavourable position of the Muslim world in this competition between “blocks of space” was frequently blamed on imitation, a concept that served to explain societal backwardness. Yet, another criticism of imitation was voiced by those who did not possess a concept of progress or advocate progress. Edward J. Lazzerini writes:

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442 Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire*, 69.
That while it seems to suggest an openness to change for the sake of a different future, *ijtiḥād* in fact has been the prime instrument for eliminating inadmissible accretions, undermining the authority (*taqlīd*) of generations of ulama, and restoring what once was and should be again. Change yes, but with an unequivocal orientation to the past that is deliberately, if very selectively, preservationist.\(^{444}\)

After the turn of the century, *ijtiḥād* was appropriated by laymen, or at least by relatively junior Islamic scholars, who in Bukhara expressed their views through the newspaper The Noble Bukhara and in lithographs, etc., a development that had occurred elsewhere in the Muslim world before this debate reached Bukhara.\(^{445}\) Hence, as with *ijtiḥād*, the increasingly wide operational environment of imitation had implications far beyond the traditional juridical conceptual system.

The criticism of imitation was thus nothing new. Al-Ghazzali for example had denounced imitation, in terms of blind religious imitation, because it could “become a veil between man and religious truth.”\(^{446}\) Yet, this concept of imitation was individual and not something which explicitly impeded societal progress. The temporalization of imitation and its transformation into a concept opposed to societal progress in Bukhara seems rather to have been coloured by a juxtaposition of Bukharan with western knowledge, as already experienced during the Age of Synergy in the 19th century. Vāzīḥ, for example, denounced uncritical imitation in the travelogue he wrote in 1886/87 at the age of 70. In this work he denounced “imitation without verification” (*taqlīd* *bidūn-i* *tahqīq*) when something is against “comprehension and knowledge” (*fahm* *u* *dānish*),\(^{447}\) a statement that also signalled an individualistic view of imitation not dependent upon senior Muslim scholars.

The juxtaposition of Bukhara with western knowledge paved the way for a distinction between spiritual and societal progress that made imitation bidirectional. That is, in the context of spiritual progress, imitation could be oriented backwards in time, for imitating practices regarded as religiously correct, while in the realm of societal progress, it could signify the imitation of practices in the contemporary western world that were regarded as religiously correct. “Truth” (*haqq*) was thus in this sense not a purely Islamic concept. Already in the 19th century, Ahmad Kalla wrote that the Europeans were pursuing a quest for the truth.\(^{448}\)

In the more politicized reformist environment of the early 20th century, imitation became an aspect of a conflict between on the one hand an increas-


\(^{445}\) See also Gesink, *Islamic Reform and Conservatism*, 66–74.

\(^{446}\) Lazarus-Yafeh, *Studies*, 489.

\(^{447}\) Vāzīḥ, *Gharāʾīb al-khabar*, no. 2106, fol. 4a–4b, and no. 2336, fol. 158b.

ing number of laymen and junior Muslim scholars, many of whom were relatively young, and on the other hand senior authoritative Muslim scholars. The former challenged the latter, among other things by placing the concept of imitation within the realm of the individual (like Vazih had implied) rather than relying upon the judgement of those senior authorities. As an eschatological implication of this conflict in Bukhara, imitation frequently was regarded as being a concept opposed to progress by Bukharan reformers. Fitrat wrote for example:

According to the natural laws, humans must make progress (i.e. go forward); the decease of taqlīd takes its victims backward and because of this they are annihilated.

However, the increased emphasis on individual reason, societal progress, and new conceptual boundaries also led to attempts to frame imitation in different realms. Jalal, like Vazih, stressed that imitation could not be practised “without evidence” (dalīl u bīmī), and that it was necessary to cease to believe in imitation in the sense that “the foundation of our religious tenets and beliefs (banā-yi ‘aqāyid va imān) cannot be based on that kind of imitation”. Instead Jalal limited the practice of imitation to the four pillars of Islam: the ritual prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, and alms giving.

The temporalized dichotomy between imitation and ijtihād can be compared with the emerging temporal differentiation between imitation and “renewal” (tajdīd). Despite taqlīd commonly being translated today as “imitation” and tajdīd as “renewal”, in the political terminology of 19th century Bukhara, taqlīd and tajdīd both signified a just transmission of power; that is, the concepts both had the same temporal structure emphasizing continuity rather than change, which compares favourably with Lazzerini’s words above. Renewal, for example, was used in syntagmatic relationship with “allegiance” (bay’at); the subordinate of a deceased ruler would renew his loyalty to the ruler’s son by “renewing the allegiance” (tajdīd-i bay’at), or “renewing the oath” (tajdīd-i payvand), signifying that the subjects to the new ruler swore allegiance to him as they had done to his predecessor. A situation where a king has regained his power would be described as “renewal of the authority of the king” (tajdīd-i mulk). Similarly, the son of Tsar Alexander would renew the pillars of governance after the turbulent years of the Crimean war, and we would have a “new” (jadīd) government, which signified a restoration rather than something essentially new. “Imitation” (taqlīd), is similarly used as exemplified in the constructions “investing the

449 For this “revolution in Islam”, see also Stéphane A. Dudoignon, “Echoes to al-Manār among the Muslims of the Russian Empire”.
450 Fitrat, “Rohbari najor”, Sadoi sharq, no. 7–8: 51.
451 Jalāl, “Tadayyun u tamaddun”, BSh 50 (9 May 1912 [22 May 1912]): 1.
government with authority” (taqlīd-i ḥukūmat), “investing the right way with authority” (taqlīd-i niẓām), and “investing the vizier with authority” (taqal-lud-i vazārat) all of which signify a just seizure of power or a smooth transition of power and continuity with the past.

The emerging temporal differentiation between imitation and “renewal” (tajdīd) can be further illustrated by juxtaposing imitation with the temporalization of renewal. As seen in the article referred to above, Jalal considered imitation unidirectional, permissible as a spiritual concept in the realm allocated by Jalal, but unacceptable if practised as a societal concept opposed to progress. In the few examples given on the usage of renewal above, it also appears to be unidirectional. In Jalal’s 20th-century usage of renewal in the article referred to below, it was still unidirectional but it was reoriented, implicitly in the same direction as progress. This can be contrasted with Jalal’s conception of “reform” (īslāḥ), which was bidirectional and signifying that reforms were religiously permissible but also new.

In the article in question, Jalal calls for the creation of “new madrasas” (madāris-i jadīda) that are based on the introduction of subjects that meet the demands of the present time. This is expressed in the following terms: “renewal and change of the classes so that they accord with the syllabus of the present time” (tajdīd u taghayyur-i darshā muvāfiq-i fihris-i zamān-i ḥāzir). The existing madrasas, however, shall gradually be reformed, but “without changing the sciences and technologies” (bidūn-i taghayyur-i ‘ulūm u funūn) that are taught there. Jalal clarifies this latter reform by stating that it implies “reform without renewal” (īslāḥ bidūn-i tajdīd). The new madrasas shall have both new subjects and examinations, and thus shall be reformed and renewed.

Ella Landau-Tasseron argues that tajdīd (“renewal”) etymologically can signify both renovation and innovation (in terms of religiously unlawful innovations) despite their having a history of being “diametrically opposed concepts in Islamic terms.” The above suggests, however, that concepts such as renovation and innovation are subject to redirection in a polarized political situation, or when there is a shift in eschatological scenario. It can thus be problematic to describe a certain temporal direction as more Islamic than another direction. Also, at least in this context, etymology is not a determining factor in setting the temporal direction of a central concept.

453 Danish, Risola, 51, 60–61, 77, 106, 76.
7.2 New and old science

One aspect of the prospective sense of discontinuity was that it stressed the preservation and integrity of knowledge from the time of the early Muslim community until the end of time. This was especially important in the transmission of Hadiths that were traced through a chain of transmission back to the time of the prophet, or at least as close as possible to the time of the prophet. Similarly, at the core of the traditional education also lay the chains of transmission based on a personal relationship between student and lecturer, a system that strove to guarantee the preservation and integrity of knowledge that corresponded with Islamic beliefs.\(^\text{457}\)

In September 1909, after the final exams at Munzim’s primary new-method school in Bukhara, a Muslim scholar is supposed to have said “we saw at the recent examination how a five-year-old child ... freely discussed matters that even we do not understand completely.”\(^\text{458}\) This can be compared with what Eickelman wrote about a Quran school in Morocco:

> “Understanding” (fāhm) was not measured by the ability explicitly to “explain” particular verses. Explanation was considered a science in itself to be acquired only through years in the advanced study of exegetical literature (tafsīr). Any informal attempt to explain meaning was considered blasphemy and simply did not occur. Instead, the measure of understanding was implicit and consisted in the ability to use particular Quranic verses in appropriate contexts.\(^\text{459}\)

The Muslim scholar’s statement above can hence be interpreted as a sign that the Muslim scholar considered the traditional secondary education in Bukhara to be inferior to the new-method (primary) schools. If time is important, the statement can also be interpreted as indicating that the secondary education in Bukhara was a waste of time. If, however, we consider it from the perspective of a prospective sense of discontinuity and an emphasis on protecting the chain of transmission from corruption, as well as the social dimension of knowledge, then a five-year-old child discussing a topic worthy of a senior Muslim scholar might be viewed as a wonder, but a whole class of five-year-old graduates from new-method primary school is a completely different matter, and may indeed be seen as a threat, both to the chain of transmission and to the status of the traditional lecturers. Moreover, from the latter’s point of view it must have been perfectly clear that the five-year-old...


\(^{459}\) Eickelman, *Knowledge and Power in Morocco*, 64.
old child did not have the same kind of “understanding” (fahm) as a senior lecturer.

The instruction in the new-method schools also eschewed the traditional emphasis on continuity in terms of a chain of transmission through personal relationships between pupils and teachers. The pupils in the new-method schools were not always seated in circles around the teacher, but sat in lines, facing the teacher who eventually checked their knowledge through a common examination system, rather than on an individual and daily basis. Tamkīn describes a new madrasa in Bukhara where the entrance was guarded by soldiers who prevented the students from coming and going at will, a description which reflects a different discipline and a novel form of education, though this was a madrasa, not a maktab.

The pupils in the new-method schools were also more dependent upon textbooks (sometimes based on western models), and relatively less dependent upon the teacher and the teacher’s role as an authoritative mediator of a text. This does not mean that people had not learned from the books before, only that it had not been systematic. Earlier Muslim scholars, like Suyuti, had also been criticized for being overly reliant on books: “[w]e preceded you in studying under scholars, while you take knowledge from books by the power of your mind!”

When alternative education (with alternative sources of funding) appeared in Bukhara during the protectorate era, education that called for a different method of applying knowledge, a small number of students begun to question the authority and status of teachers and lecturers in the traditional educational system. Senior lecturers, including those who wanted to close the new-method schools, were denounced as “ignorant” (jāhil) by some Bukharan reformists. For the latter, being ignorant implied lacking knowledge about the contemporary era and the new sciences, and showing an inability or unwillingness to understand the imperative of making progress in order to become contemporary. The Bukharan reformists were in turn accused of being ignorant and working against the preservation of Islamic knowledge:

Because of ignorance and not knowing and not having read the truth of Islam, most people of this time consider science and wisdom to belong to the Europeans and the Christians. They consider the Muslims to be deprived of science and knowledge; they invent lies, and tell everyone about the knowledge possessed by the Europeans and the Russians, making the faith of the young Muslim weak, and increasing their doubts day by day. I know so many peo-

460 Tamkīn, *MFMZ*, fol. 422b.
461 Gesink, *Islamic Reform and Conservatism*, 22–23. The relationships between the teacher and the student did not, however, always change with the introduction of ʿūsūl-i sūṭiya, see Stéphane A. Dudoignon, “Echoes to al-Manār among the Muslims of the Russian Empire”.
people who do not hear a single advantageous word about the Prophet or the Great Companions or the Saints when they are told a tradition or story. They leave the meeting one by one, and complain loudly about the false ideas of the speaker, but if they hear nonsensical stories from Russian and European books, then they listen carefully.\(^{464}\)

The Bukharan reformers stressed the importance of learning new disciplines, such as geography and astronomy (as opposed to the science of the stars), and history (as opposed to chronicles). These disciplines had new conceptual boundaries and were referred to as “the new sciences” (‘ulūm-i tāza, ‘ulūm-i jādīda), “the new sciences of the Westerners” (‘ulūm-i jādīda-yi farang\(^{465}\)), “the sciences of the time” (i.e. the contemporary era) (‘ilmhā-yi zamānī) “or the present sciences and technologies” (‘ulūm u funūn-i ḥāzira).\(^{466}\) They represented new scientific disciplines that were borrowed from the West and had little if anything to do with the traditional curriculum of the primary and secondary education.\(^{467}\)

The Bukharan reformers’ division of science into categories can be compared with al-Ghazzali’s supra-division of science into “sciences relating to the world to come”, i.e. the “hereafter” (‘ulūm al-akhirā), and “sciences concerning this world” (‘ulūm al-dunyaviyyat). The former included “religious sciences”, while the latter included arithmetic, geometry, the science of the stars, “grammar” (ḥarf), and technology.\(^{468}\) Al-Ghazzali’s labels did not denote that some of these sciences were new, which was deliberate, because from an Islamic point of view, sciences were judged acceptable not in terms of their subject matter, but of whether they “had a place among the practices of the early Muslim community.”\(^{469}\) Calls for the introduction of “the new sciences” (‘ulūm-i jādīd), or the sciences of a “new time,” or “the time” (‘ulūm-i zamānī), in the curriculum could thus be interpreted as indicating disbelief in Muhammad as the seal of the prophets.\(^{470}\)


\(^{465}\) Mīrzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuḥāf-i Bukhārā, 57, 373.


\(^{467}\) Mīrzā Sirāj provides an interesting account of not only the multitude of subjects taught in the schools in Germany, but also of the number of different schools teaching different disciplines. See Mīrzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuḥāf-i Bukhārā, 118–121. For how this debate ran at al-Azhar and the discussion concerning the universalist notion of “new sciences”, see Gesink, Islamic Reform and Conservatism, 135.


\(^{469}\) For a general discussion of acceptable sciences, see Heinen, Islamic Cosmology, 14.

\(^{470}\) For a discussion of the difference between the non-Sharia ‘ilm of the time of classical Islam, the ‘ulūm al-awa’il, and the sciences advocated by Tahtawi, and how he came to advocate them, see John W. Livingston, “Western Science and Educational Reform in the Thought of Shaykh Rifāa al-Tahtawi”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 28, no. 4 (Nov. 1996): 543–564.
The retrospective sense of discontinuity in the educational realm is evident in a 1912 article in The Noble Bukhara where Jalal calls for reform of the madrasas in Bukhara, a call made in the name of “the progress of sciences”. Here Jalal argues that the obligations and duties of each time, such as the time of Noah, of Adam, the old times, and the present time, are different. Jalal wants a gradual reform of the existing secondary education, but also calls for the creation of “new madrasas” (madāris-i jadīda) where the sciences that meet the demands of the present time will be taught.471 These new sciences were obviously situated outside the realm of the chains of transmission and were beyond imitation.472

7.3 Preservation

The traditional chain of transmission that served to preserve knowledge and protect it from corruption was now also challenged in a completely new way by one of the prime vehicles for disseminating knowledge about the present and the new sciences: the newspapers. The newspapers belonged to a new genre, the “press” (maṭbūʿāt),473 and represented something essentially different and new in Bukhara,474 both in the prophetic paradigm and in the paradigm on progress, and both in form and content.

Newspapers had begun to appear in Bukhara during the second half of the 19th century and the number of newspapers that reached the emirate increased rapidly, culminating at the time of the outbreak of the First World War.475 Although they soon had found readers among many prominent Bukharans, including the Emir, Astanaqul kull-i qushbigi, Ahmad Kalla, and the chief judge Badr al-Dīn (he and Damla Ikram even read newspapers aloud for students),476 during the 1910s, newspapers still represented something new for the majority of the Bukharans. This is something that is visible in a number of letters sent to the editor of The Noble Bukhara and the debates concerning newspapers in the emirate.

472 Polarization between “Islamic” sciences and foreign sciences has been very common, with adherents of the former at least periodically emphasizing an unbroken isnād in such diverse disciplines as science of the stars, medicine, and cosmology (Heinen, Islamic cosmology, 23–26). However, the Bukharan reformers did not emphasize the necessity of isnāds in the new sciences they advocated.
473 Aynī writes in 1918 that before 1326/1908–1909 he had been unaware of newspapers and the new literature. Aynī, “Taʾrīḵī inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhor”, 35.
474 One of the newspapers which reached Bukhara in the beginning of the century was al-Jadīd (“The New”), which was published in Tabriz.
475 Aynī, “Taʾrīḵī inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhor”, 159.
476 For the latter, see Aynī, “Taʾrīḵī inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhor”, 30, 33.
The newspapers opened up a public space where laymen could disseminate their ideas about Islamic knowledge, a space that in its transient nature was the opposite of the concept of imitation. The editor of The Noble Bukhara could thus juxtapose imitation with the newspaper, which also implied a reconceptualization of imitation as described above. One should thus not uncritically imitate one’s ancestors, and “it is clear that the ‘content’ (vaz’) of a newspaper must change according to the everyday state of affairs”.

One of the novel features of many newspapers, including The Noble Bukhara was the format. The Noble Bukhara measured 32.5 x 50.5 cm, one of the most cost-efficient formats when using modern printing facilities. The size of the paper and the overriding imperative to make it cost-effective to print was obviously something new for the Bukharans; traditional handwritten manuscripts and handmade paper were relatively expensive, though still affordable, and also accessible for those who could not buy them through the numerous libraries in Bukhara supported by religious endowments. It was only when factory-made paper came to dominate Bukhara in the second half of the 19th century, and with the growth of the lithography industry that books and newspaper became affordable for a larger group of people, and they achieved a larger circulation than at any previous time in history.

The paper industry, including the newspaper industry, produced a surplus of paper to an extent never experienced by the Bukharans before. The basic principle, like with all modern newspapers, was to read, get up-to-date, and throw away. The small number of copies of The Noble Bukhara that remain today testifies to their indeed sooner or later having been thrown away. This stands in sharp contrast to traditional manuscripts and other publications of the time, publications that could have more or less the same content, but were published in a traditional format, like Bihbudi’s journal The Mirror. These were usually bound, and could thus be kept in good condition for a very long time. If damaged, they could be repaired or copied.

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478 Jalāl, “Tadayyun u tamaddun”, *BSh* 50 (9 May 1912 [22 May 1912]): 2.
482 It indeed difficult to find any complete collection of The Noble Bukhara. The most complete ones are probably the one kept at the State Library in Tashkent, and the one kept in the Museum of the citadel in Bukhara. The latter was bound together with Ismail-bey Gasprinskii’s *Terjuman*.
483 The Noble Bukhara was not the only newspaper with this format in Central Asia; there were many more, all of them in Russian Central Asia. Other newspapers, frequently called journals, like Bihbudis’s The Mirror, all had the old format, and were usually bound.
and the contents would be preserved for several hundred years or more. The Noble Bukhara, on the other hand, was one of the first, if not the first, modern “use and throw away” product in the emirate. The larger format of The Noble Bukhara made it difficult to bind and thus to preserve. It was also difficult to read in a traditional manner like a scroll, or a book, i.e. resting on a bookstand. The readers of the newspapers did want to preserve the paper for the future; quite a few people sent letters to the editor asking him to publish the newspaper in a format more suitable for binding. The response from the editor was that once one had begun to publish a newspaper in a particular format, one should continue to publish it in that very format, but also that if one were to bind The Noble Bukhara, a single volume would exceed 2000 pages, which was too much. This response implied that newspapers, or at least The Noble Bukhara, were not intended for preservation.

Although some of the contents of newspapers would appear in other more traditional manuscripts or publications (traditional in a formalistic sense), we have no evidence of anyone ever trying to copy a whole newspaper and in such a way preserve its contents. This was a difference between newspapers and lithographed books. The production processes of manuscripts and lithographs were more similar than for manuscripts and newspapers. Manuscripts were lithographed, and lithographs, although first lithographed, were frequently copied by hand. Newspapers, on the other hand, were outside the traditional production and transmission cycle of knowledge, and were difficult both to reproduce and to memorize.

The very look of newspapers symbolized a spatially expanding and temporally contracting present that signified a break with the past and the beginning of a new era. The Noble Bukhara and other newspapers thus repeatedly voiced the need for the Bukharans to adopt the social modes of organization and technology of this new era in order to become contemporary, which was an aspect of the reformulated meaning of existence. The eschatological implications of this made it hardly surprising that early readers of newspapers in Bukhara were accused of “Babism” (bāhgarī) and “idolatry” (badmazhabī).

7.4 Relevance

Reform-minded Bukharans valued knowledge of not only the new sciences, but also the “present situation”, or the extended present (aḥvāl-i

484 See “Lawḥ-i akhbār”, BSh 61 (22 May 1912[4 June 1912]): 4. Although much more familiar with newspapers than the Bukharans in general, this compares with the Qajar courtier Ilchi’s remark concerning newspapers that “today’s news is no good tomorrow such that today’s news is only useful as toilet paper the next day.” Quoted and translated by Sohrabi, “Signs Taken for Wonder”, 72.

zamān/ahvāl-i ‘ālam). Jalal, editor of The Noble Bukhara, was thus praised by Aynī for his good knowledge of his time alongside his knowledge of Islam: “he was aware of the roots and branches of the Islamic sciences as they deserve, and he was well informed about the conditions of his time.”

Similarly, when Sharifjan Makhdum was made chief judge it was partly because of his awareness of time. This *time* was a normative present – a contemporary era spatially situated in the developed world. This contemporary era was a spatial extension of the field of experience, which at least in some cases was created not so much by travel, as by the telegraph and newspapers. Sharifjan Makhdum left the emirate once, and then only for medical treatment in Osh in the neighbouring Fergana valley.

A letter to The Noble Bukhara explained very clearly the role of newspapers in expanding the field of experience of the readers. The newspapers, the author wrote, is a mirror showing the world to all the peoples of the world. The author continued:

The newspaper is something that informs societies about each other’s situation. If we read newspapers today, then we will understand what the life is like in Europe and what ours is like for them, and how other “nations” (sg. *millat*) are striving for science. How comes it that we, like so many others, have fallen into the sleep of ignorance and complete slumber? We have slept so much that we have no information about the events of the world, either from our own homeland and our own cities, or from the situation of others. We are also deprived of being informed. Today there is not a place or city in the world that does not have a publication, there is not a people that does not read newspapers, except Bukhara and the people of Bukhara.

Bukhara was thus not a part of the contemporary era. This is also reflected in the reporting in the newspaper. The paper contained almost no news about Bukhara, i.e. what was going on in the emirate. The absence of local re-

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486 Aynī, “Ta’rikhī inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 125.
488 Interview with Muḥammadjān Shukūrov, Dushanbe, May 1999.
489 The conceptualization of newspapers as “mirrors of the world” seems to have been quite common, see also Biḥbūdī, *Madkhali-yi jughrāfīyā-yi ‘umrānī, 84*
491 Despite this, some claimed that by reading newspapers one could become informed about every event taking place in Sherabad and Hissar in the remote eastern Bukhara. See for example: Al-Sayid Zafar Madani, “Muṣāhaba-yi khayāliyaḥ”, *BSh* 50 (9 May 1912 [22 May 1912]): 3. This was, however, hardly the case. The coverage of internal affairs in Bukhara was very bad in newspapers in general, and in The Noble Bukhara in particular. The structure of The Noble Bukhara was not unique. Many a newspaper in Turkistan and beyond had the same structure. A typical issue of The Noble Bukhara consisted of four pages. The first contained a leader, the second and a part of the third of telegraphed notices. A part of page two frequently contained a feuilleton, i.e. a serial, almost always of European origin. The third page consisted
porters and journalists made Bukharan news rare. The Noble Bukhara also suffered from censorship and possibly from a lack of interest in reporting on what was going on in the emirate. Its main purpose was to instruct the readers about the extended present with a focus on developed countries, those who had reached the contemporary era. Bukhara was not a part of that. The present, as it was reflected in The Noble Bukhara, was extended and non-Bukharan, and although the paper provided readers with a multitude of simultaneous experiences, due to the recent arrival of the telegraph, the origin of the absolute majority of those experiences was outside Bukhara.

In 1873, only eight years after the conquest of Tashkent, the Russian telegraph network had reached the city. Some 10 years later Bukhara was connected through Kattaqurghon. The impact of the telegraph on the field of experience of the newspaper readers was immense. In all Turkestan, telegraph notices made up a large part of the content of the newspapers, and some 50 percent of The Noble Bukhara consisted of telegraph notices. The telegraph not only widened the field of experience in terms of spatial extension, however, but also decreased the time it took to learn about events occurring far away. Due to the telegraph, one could almost overnight be informed about what was going on in other parts of the world. For example, already by 17th April 1912, the readers of The Noble Bukhara were informed about the sinking of Titanic two days earlier. This should be compared to the period before the railroad and the telegraph, when it took several weeks to travel from Bukhara to city of Orenburg in southern Ural. The Bukharans themselves were also conscious of the increased speed by which information spread. After the invention and widespread use of wireless telegraphy around the turn of the century, Aynī’s statement that the news of the Russian Revolution in February 1917 spread with the speed of electricity over the whole world should not be read in a metaphorical sense. It was now also possible to reflect on the “good old days”, before telegraph, as was done in 1910 with regard to the spreading of news about the Sunni-Shia disturbances in Bukhara in 1909–1910.

Without the telegraph, without the post, like in the good old days, the rumours flew fast a distance of almost 300 *verst* [approximately 320 kilometres] and became the property of the whole population.

The good old days were situated less than 30 years ago. The increased rhythm of temporal experience contracted the temporal dimension of the

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492 Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia*, 162.
493 See for example Salimān Khvāja Qarākūlī, “Maktūb az Qarākūl”, *BSh* 48 (7 May 1912 [20 May 1912]): 3.
494 Aynī, “Ta’rīkhī inqilobi fiqri dar Bukhoro”, 156.
495 B.L-v, “Otvuki sobytiy v Bukhare”, *TV* 3666 (25 Mar. 1910 [7 Apr. 1910]).
spatially extended present that was perceived by the Bukharan reformers as an intensification of human activity. For them, development and advancement were perceived as a struggle to become contemporary, a spatialized contemporality that was located in the west, a west that Bukhara had to challenge in order not to be left behind, not to cease to exist as a nation, and to be able to preserve Islam. This all took place against a background of increased dissemination of knowledge about the expanding colonial powers in Africa, Asia, and Europe, and the decline of the Ottoman Empire:

The whole of Europe is making progress from one day to the next. The Ottoman government, which was the first of kings and the most powerful government in Europe and Asia, is on the brink of catastrophe and is about to become a plaything in the hands of the European governments.\(^{497}\)

The Bukharans’ experience of Russian expansion and colonization was now relativized with the experiences of Muslims in the Ottoman, British and French empires. Time came to be seen as a limited resource, something that was possible to waste. Jalal, the editor of The Noble Bukhara, exemplifies the contracting present in a series of articles entitled “Time is dear” and “The Moment/An Opportunity (furṣat)”. Time is seen by him as our “soul and life”, and “intelligent people” should not “play with their souls”. He mentions periods when we cannot use our capacity to the utmost, like at night and in childhood, in order to stress that there is not much left to waste and therefore it is necessary to comprehend the value of life.\(^{498}\) In the article about “the moment”, Jalal claims that “the opportunity” is the most valuable of “materials” (matā’). In this article he also writes that “if we do not seize the moment, then the past time will come to us and totally destroy science and knowledge.” But as we still have an opportunity, he urges his compatriots to value this opportunity, as it is possible that things “we can acquire today will be impossible to acquire tomorrow.”\(^{499}\) The same urge can be seen in many other articles: “one must act today and not postpone what could be done today to tomorrow”.\(^{500}\) Mirza Siraj continues in the same vein:

In these days and in this time we can sleep no longer, because others are awake and they will surely make use of things you can not use. I repeat again, now is the beginning, and it will not be too late if you begin to act today, but if you do not begin now, then it will not be possible to act later, even if you want to.\(^{501}\)

\(^{496}\) This is for example very clear in M.R., “Ahamiyat-i zirā‘at”, BSh 21 (14 Apr. 1912 [27 Apr. 1912]): 1-2.
\(^{497}\) Mirzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuhaf-i Bukhārā, 77
\(^{499}\) Btd, “Furṣat”, BSh 14 (27 March 1912 [9 Apr. 1912]): 3.
7.4.1 Speed in education

The increased emphasis on the new sciences, including the label “new sciences”, that belonged to the new era, was another aspect of an eschatological shift away from catastrophic apocalypticism, and of the shift from a prospective to a retrospective sense of discontinuity that was advocated by the Bukharan reformers. The latter’s emphasis on space-based geography, and the transformed boundaries of the millat (“nation”) in a contracting present, also transformed the temporal boundaries of science. If it was possible to study the old sciences until the apocalypse, which could be postponed through ethical discipline, then the social and educational paradigm of the contemporary era introduced a factor of speed in education. It became imperative to study the new sciences in order to withstand foreign aggression and secure the interests of the nation and of Islam. The old threat of temporal finality in the form of a cataclysmic cosmic apocalypse was thus transformed into a threat of the end of the nation. As an aspect of the urge to learn new sciences the speed of information was juxtaposed with the ongoing threat of foreign conquest.502 Fitrat was one of the first Bukharans to voice these concerns:

there is no more time for ignorance; it is clear to every one of you that the Christians are attacking Islam from all sides; every hour they are struggling to find a reason, they are struggling to eradicate us, to obliterate our religion.503

Speed was thus not only a sign of discontinuity, as discussed above, but became a central feature of the Bukharan reformers’ promotion of the new-method schools and the new sciences. In this discourse on speed, the old educational system was described as a waste of time. Fitrat was one of the first Bukharans to voice this opinion. His Debate deals to a very large extent with the benefits of the new education; in his view time is a very important factor, the new education is faster, and there is no time to lose. The scientific and military superiority of the westerners is a threat to the Muslim world. The call for new-method schools and a faster form of education clearly reflects a sense of urgency.

Speed was a central issue for Fitrat. He compared the speed of new and old ways of transport – steamships and trains are faster than horses, donkeys and sailing ships – with the speed of the new-method schools. The fact that it is permissible to use new methods of transport to go on pilgrimage should make the new-method schools permissible from an Islamic point of view:

503 Fitrat, Munāzara, 66.
it took the Bukharans one year to reach Mecca, or three years to go both ways. Today it takes 25 days, and they do not lose their faith while using the modes of transportation that the “pagans” (kuffār) have invented.\(^{504}\)

For the advocates of the new-method schools, speed was one of their most important qualities. Mulla Jura Pirmasti (Jurabay), who after a trip to Istanbul opened up the first native new-method school in Bukhara at the beginning of the 20\(^{th}\) century, marketed his school on the basis of its speed, claiming that he would teach his students to read and write in four to five months.\(^{505}\) In the late 1910s, Mirza Salim-bik wrote about Mulla Jura’s return from Istanbul and his school, and claimed that its speed caused resentment among other Muslim scholars, who feared that their students would abandon their schools, which used traditional methods of instruction.\(^{506}\) Fitrat wrote in his \textit{Debate}:

\begin{quote}
 everywhere that the “new education” (\textit{taḥṣīl-i jadīd}) lasts for 10 years, the old education disappears, however this does not damage Islam, but benefits Islam.\(^{507}\)
\end{quote}

Aynī wrote in 1918 that the appearance of new-method schools provided many benefits in a very short time.\(^{508}\)

Pupils who had not been to school at all learned to read and write in six months at Mirza Abd al-Vahid’s school.\(^{509}\) Speed is also a central aspect of education in Bihbudi’s travelogue from 1914. Here he writes about a Jewish woman who, after having studied Hebrew for two years, could write articles in Hebrew in newspapers. Bihbudi comments: “We study Arabic for 20 years but can neither speak nor write in Arabic.” Similarly, when he was talking with Jews from Palestine, one of them told him: “I studied Hebrew two hours a week for a year. Now I speak, read, and write Hebrew.”\(^{510}\) This serves as another example to encourage rapid education, but it also exhibits a temporal precision that differs from the traditional education, and could easily be read as implying that the traditional educational system lacked specific times for studying, which certainly was not the case.

\(^{504}\) Fitrat, \textit{Munāzara}, 52.

\(^{505}\) Umnyakov, “K istorii novometodnoi shkoliy v Bukhare”, 83; Aynī, \textit{Ta’rikhi ingilobi Bukhoro}, 29. In his “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro” Aynī writes that Mullā Jurābāy would teach them to read and write in two months. Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 32.

\(^{506}\) Salīm-bik, \textit{Tārīkh-i Salīmī}, fols. 178a–178b.

\(^{507}\) Fitrat, \textit{Munāzara}, 51.

\(^{508}\) Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 44.

\(^{509}\) Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 48.

\(^{510}\) Maḥmūdḵvāja Bihbūdi, “Sayāḥat khāṭīrālari 5”, \textit{Āyina} 39 (19 July 1914 [1 Aug. 1914]): 930. It should be noted that Bihbudi’s statement is biased. The manuscript collections in Uzbekistan reveal that a substantial number of persons in Bukhara had a very good command of Arabic.
Speed was also an aspect of the social transformation that Bukharan reformists said they wanted to achieve, based on new premises, such as functional literacy, which they claimed the old educational system failed to provide. This is evident in Fitrat’s criticism of the old schools. In the debate between a lecturer and a westerner in Fitrat’s *Debate*, the westerner says that the students spend one year reading a single sentence, and the lecturer explains that the students are not only studying the sentence, but also the commentaries on the sentence. This is part of the explanation why they spent 39 years studying. To this the westerner responds: “What kind of futile waste of time have the people of Bukhara got involved in?” While comparing the new and old way of education, the westerner remarks that the old educational system lasted for 30 years, while the new one lasts only 13 years. Later on Fitrat lets the lecturer use the question of time as an argument against female education: if women study as long as the men, it will “break the genealogical chain”, because by the time they have finished their studies they will be too old to give birth. This argument is flawed as well, because the madrasa students had other duties beside their studies. Yet, the point here is the emphasis on time, and the waste of time is central to Fitrat’s criticism of the traditional education in Bukhara. The westerner continues:

> our sons study three years in the primary school, and besides knowing how to read and write, they know two or three other languages well and have elementary knowledge in religion, philosophy, history, and arithmetic. You, who have studied Arabic for 20 years, are still unable to speak it!

According to at least some Bukharan reformers, the functional literacy attained in the new-method schools, a literacy that was tried and proven in exams, unlike in the traditional education, provided the graduate a status which even challenged the traditional and longer secondary education. Ayni tells a story about how Abd al-Rahman, the son of the pro-new-method school mufti Damla Ikram, began to study in a new-method school with much younger students in order to become functionally literate. According to Ayni, Abd al-Rahman was 32 years old when he, against his will, began these studies. Before that he had spent 18 years in a traditional school. In this way of arguing, the new-method schools could be used by older students, who were considered less successful by the Bukharan reformers, in order to “catch up”. Ayni’s story serves to discredit the traditional education, because Abd al-Rahman’s transfer must have caused him a great loss of

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511 Fitrat, *Munāzara*, 16–19. This is not only interesting from a temporal point of view, but also because Fitrat does not let the lecturer say the end of the “nation” (*millat*); he lets the lecturer speak without an emphasis on space-based geography.


social prestige, prestige traditionally gained through a lengthy stay in one or several secondary schools.

Traditional schools were thus seen by the small group of Bukharan reformers as wasters of time and generators of decay. Interestingly, the opposite seems not to have been the case of their proponents; they did not explicitly criticize the new-method schools for being too fast, but instead depicted their speed as leading to a superficial knowledge of Islam, which was a violation of the order of things rather than a waste of time. Mirza Salim-bik, who opposed the Bukharan reformers, claimed that everyone who had studied in the old [well] established primary schools came out “learned” (mullās), while the new-method schools caused “discord” (fiṭna) and “mischief” (fāsād).514 Fitrat expressed similar sentiments, albeit with speed as a parameter, by letting the lecturer in his Debate claim that one of the reasons for the closure of the new-method schools was that “in a few years they made our sons infidels.”515 Aynī writes in 1918 that after 1910 the hope of opening new-method schools in Bukhara vanished again, and that their opponents now also linked the new-method schools to the political upheavals in other parts of the Muslim world. Aynī lets the opponents of the new method schools say:

if the new schools begin to spread, in a short time the people will demand reforms of the administration of the countries and inflict damage on the independence of the government. They will want a constitution, will open a representative assembly like in Istanbul, etc.516

The argument of speed was obviously not the only argument used in order to promote the new method schools. They also had to be Islamic, which corresponded to the ethical dimension of progress and the reconceptualized boundaries of the millat (“nation”). By the time of the final exams at Munzim’s new-method school in 1909, Damla Ikram, who then served as mufti, is supposed to have said:

I have found these schools to be in complete accordance with the teachings of Islam. The religious education in this school turned out to be much better than the old schools.517

This religious dimension of reformed education was based on progress as a spiritual concept. This spiritual concept of progress was, however, not an exclusively personal concept of progress, but also a societal progress characterized by an emphasis on space-based geography. This also reflects the bidi-

515 Fitrat, Munāzara, 32.
516 Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 100–101, 162.
rectional nature of progress. Fitrat, like Jalal, stressed the importance of acquiring science and knowledge so that one can improve the situation of the people, which together with subordinating oneself to the Quran is the meaning of creation.\(^{518}\) In the madrasas, the Bukharan reformers thus advocated a focus on the Quran, Quran commentaries, and Hadith rather than “commentaries and glosses”, and one of the central arguments they put forward in this context was also related to speed:

If your Turkistani way is this, that you spend 37 years of your dear precious life studying parts of idle tales and deprive yourselves of the glory of useful sciences, within some more years there will remain no more of Islam in Turkistan than a name which will be in the pages of history [...] time has not run out yet; struggle to study, teach and learn Quran commentaries and Hadith.\(^{519}\)

7.5 Conclusion

The temporalization of knowledge, as reflected among other things in central concepts pertaining to its transmission, translates quite well into an eschatological shift. This shift transformed concepts such as innovation, renewal and reform, and their temporal direction was reoriented and hence disputed. The latter is especially evident in Jalal’s articles cited above, articles that leave us with the impression that his attempts to define the direction of some of these concepts were attempts to instil new meanings into them. The new schools and the new subjects were thus not only temporalized and projected into the future, they were also projected towards the contemporary world. The chain of transmission, so important in the traditional madrasa-education, belonged to a different realm, and could not be applied to the conceptual boundaries of the new sciences.

Those who advocated new knowledge and sciences did so not only in the name of Islam, but also in the name of space-based geography. This is especially evident in the context of newspapers. The Noble Bukhara was to a considerable degree used in order to position Bukhara in the contemporary world by informing the readers about the outside world. It reflected an anthropocentric world typical of the Age of Synergy, in which human agency was brought to the forefront. Humans were duty-bound to develop their nations, not only before their fellow people, but also, according to the Bukharan reformers, before God.

The emphasis on human agency easily translates into a question of speed. As was discussed in the previous chapter, speed, as a function of time and space, was an indicator of the uniqueness of the present, and was discussed

\(^{519}\) Fitrat, Munāzara, 23.
in the context of prime movers, most notably the train. As seen above, however, speed was also discussed in the realm of education and knowledge. But there the time/space-function was very different, because the sense of urgency was related not only to the threat of losing “our Islam”, but also to the risk that the nation (largely expressed in terms of space-based geography) would cease to exist. This also suggested that wasting time threatened to make it impossible to save the nation, as it would be “too late”. The remedy was to quickly obtain new knowledge so that human agency could make the nation progress and ward off the threat that loomed with the expansion of the western colonial powers in the Muslim world. A discourse of speed thus seems to fit well in a discourse of progress with an emphasis on human agency and a retrospective sense of discontinuity, and fit less well in an eschatological scenario of cataclysmic apocalypticism with an emphasis on divine agency. The emphasis on space-based geography also opened up a field for spatially organized competition, of which education was one element.

Finally, the new-method schools, with their emphasis on space-based geography and the pupil’s role in the creation of the future of the nation (as a society of educated citizens) also signified the creation of a more demotic society and a reaction not only against genealogical constructions of space by means of a place-based geographical emphasis, but also against the hierarchical structures in the realm of the Bukharan Muslim scholars. To a certain degree, the political battle in Bukhara during the 1910s seems to have been expressed in terms of a vision of a more demotic society versus hierarchical apocalypticism, with the former stressing reform and structural transformation, and the latter emphasizing preservation and continuity.
8. Progress and decline

8.1 Before *taraqqī*

The juxtaposition of the technological and educational levels of Bukhara and the West led Ahmad Kalla to pose the following question:

What is the reason that all knowledge and culture have come to belong to the western scientists? And what is the cause of all our sages being stupid and ignorant?²⁵²

Before the relatively widespread use of *taraqqī* as a term for societal progress through human agency in the early 20th century, answers to Ahmad Kalla’s question were sought in the most diverse places. Ahmad Kalla’s narratives of progress and decline, some of which will be discussed below, were influenced for example by the works of al-Ghazzali and Ahmad Sirhindi, but also by more contemporary accounts. These narratives represented various diachronic orders that sometimes were synchronized, sometimes not, sometimes emphasized space-based geography, sometimes did not. The various answers to the question above were sometimes inconsistent, reflecting Ahmad Kalla’s extensive learning and perhaps changes of opinion during the course of writing, but also reflecting an eschatological shift and a problematic relationship between ideas of terminal decay and some kind of meliorism. It also shows that some kind of progress was conceptualized through cosmographical concepts.

8.1.1 The interregnum

One of Ahmad Kalla’s narratives is centred on the concept of the *fatrat* (“slackening” or “interregnum”). The concept of the *fatrat* seems historically to have been applied to the interval period between two divine agencies (prophets or messengers) but later also to “periods of political interregnum”.²⁵¹ *Fatrat* thus signified a “weakening of authority, which leads to discord, violence and injustice”, and “political weakness, [an] inability to maintain order, administrative incompetence and official corruption” etc.

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²⁵² Donish, *NV*, 1:123.
²⁵¹ *EF*, s.v. “Fatra”.

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such, the concept is related to the concept of *fitna* (“communal fragmentation/disintegration/dissolution”).

The eschatological implications of *fitna* served to voice expectations of the arrival of a divine agency that would restore, or at least improve, the Muslims’ adherence to the Sharia. According to Ahmad Kalla, the reigns of Emir Muzaffar and Emir Abd al-Ahad were the end of a “rare interval period between two divine agencies” (*turfa-yi fatratī*) that “no one had indicated before or ever written in the chronicles”.

Ahmad Kalla’s diachronic order of the interregnum is temporally founded on a synchronization of the science of the stars, the prophetic tradition of the return of the Renewer, and natural time, although the latter is negative in so far as its trajectory follows the downward-leaning axis of prophecy. It also entails a dialectical relationship between progress and decline, also expressed in terms of prosperity and destruction. Ahmad Kalla writes that if only prosperity existed, the world would become over-populated, and if only destruction existed, there would be no prosperity at all. Prosperity is caused by life, water, and justice, while destruction is caused by death, lack of water, and oppression. These factors are the instruments of the “sublime world of the six planets”. Depending on the configurations of these planets, the world will prosper for 100 or 500 years, or suffer from destruction for 100 or 500 years. This temporal framework corresponds very well with Ahmad Kalla’s conception of the renewer, as will be discussed below.

Ahmad Kalla’s description of decline in Bukhara as reflected in his *Treatise on the Manghit Dynasty* begins with the period of Emir Daniyal (r. 1758–1785), the last ruler of an interregnum that came to an end with Emir Shahmurad (r. 1785–1800). Ahmad Kalla thus writes that Emir Daniyal was old and could not rule the kingdom anymore. He had given his power to his sons, paternal uncles, and the heads of the tribes and the fiscal administration, and himself did not know about “the descent and ascent of justice and oppression”. The boundaries of the Sharia were neglected. Daniyal’s sons thus spread religious disobedience and corruption. Power was held by the head of the fiscal administration, who was “fearless of God, a sinner, and a shedder of blood”, and the chief judge, who was “a drunkard who smoked tobacco”.

Ahmad Kalla compared the situation at the end of the previous interregnum, which came to an end with Emir Shahmurad, with his own time. We recall that Ahmad Kalla wrote this after the Russian conquest when the aging Emir Muzaffar had withdrawn to Kermine outside Bukhara. Shahmurad killed the head of the fiscal administration and the chief judge, actions that

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523 This paragraph and the two above it are based on Donish, *Risola*, 4–6, 13–14, 92.
Ahmad Kalla did not criticize, most likely because he despised the contemporary Shia head of the fiscal administration. Ahmad Kalla thus compared Shahmurad’s treatment of the highest servants in his administration with Emir Muzaffar’s lax treatment of the Shia head of the fiscal administration in particular. The latter’s reign was also criticized for the disorder in the administration, where appanages were handed out to more people than they could support, positions for the Muslim scholars were handed out more generously than their allotted salaries allowed, prayers were not read in the Mosques, lessons not taught in the schools, and persons that had not even studied in the primary school reached high positions in the administration. Taxes were raised, incomes from religious foundations confiscated, and money stolen from the people, etc. Ahmad Kalla characterizes Emir Muzaffar’s time as full of “excess” (zavāyi) and religiously unlawful innovations, like the public celebration of the “New Year” (nawrūz), etc., while Emir Shahmurad was the Renewer who had appointed many Muslim scholars to various positions, e.g. as lecturers, muezzins, sheikhs, etc., and restored many religious endowments.

Just as Emir Shahmurad had ended the preceding interregnum that had culminated in the beginning of his rule, Ahmad Kalla hoped that someone would come and put an end to the present interregnum, an interregnum that perhaps had culminated during emir Muzaffar. This period thus provided plenty of potential signs of decline and discontinuity, signs that included cholera epidemics and increased prices for food, and could be interpreted as the end of an interregnum, or even as the end of time.

8.1.2 The science of the stars

The cyclical nature of the interregnum was synchronized with the science of the stars. Ahmad Kalla reflects on this in a work completed in 1302 [1884/85], well after his return from his last trip to Russia. Here Ahmad Kalla expresses his belief that the science of the stars is a science able to foretell the rise and fall of dynasties and religions, which change according to the revolving motions of the celestial bodies.

May it not be hidden that the present scientists believe that the change of states (tabaddul va taghayyur-i dawlahā) is due to the projection of the conjunction of the planets. Once in every twenty years of the kingdom this conjunction takes place in the triplicity of the ecliptic of the twelve zodiac signs.

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524 Donish, Risola, 16–17. For another account praising Shahmurad, see Sāmī, Taʾrīkh-i salāṭīn-i Manghītiya, fol. 62b.
525 Muhammad Shah, the head of the fiscal administration, is called “stupid”, “uneducated”, and “unintelligent,” and is blamed for the decline. Donish, Risola, 37. In another place Ahmad Kalla writes that “all this decline and destruction in the state is because of the lack of intelligence and authority of the head of the fiscal administration, Donish, Risola, 82.
526 These two paragraphs are based on Donish, Risola, 20, 88–89, 92, 122, 156.
They [the scientists] consider 20 years of events to be dependent on the forms of this conjunction.⁵²⁷

According to Ahmad Kalla, human agency was dependent upon a suprahuman agency. God had created the celestial bodies and established the laws governing their movements and their terrestrial implications.⁵²⁸ When, according to Ahmad Kalla, the Bukharan ambassador wanted to return from Russia to Bukhara during the winter and expected God to protect him from cold weather, Ahmad Kalla argued that God would not make the cold weather warm for his sake, because cold weather during winter is good for agriculture. Divine providence was thus limited, according to Ahmad Kalla.⁵²⁹ Even if this can be considered a departure from a possible common belief in incalculable divine intervention, it was not a deviation from degeneration towards terminal decay.⁵³⁰ From a temporal point of view, the movement of the celestial bodies rotated around the downward leaning axis of prophetic time.

The science of the stars represented a diachronic order that supported beliefs in terminal decay, and through the movements of the celestial bodies this order also supported narratives of vertical progress and decline. This becomes especially evident when the practitioner of the science of the stars practised astrological history and explained past events by the position of the celestial bodies. Ahmad Kalla, who also was well versed in “chronology” (‘ulūm-i tāvārīkh), thus made substantial use of the science of the stars in his history of the Manghit dynasty, a work also written well after his last trip to Russia. For example, with regard to the hardships in Bukhara during the 1870s, Ahmad Kalla wrote:

So the registry of order and affairs of all peoples of this city disappeared from the subjects and the “military” (sipāḥ). Everyone was seeking remedy from each other and they did not find a way out. There was no tranquillity for the military and no security for the subjects, no repose for the rich, and everyone was looking for “renewal” (tajdīd) of the “state” (dawlat) and the “nation” (millat), but there was no sign of it, even though the third century after the first millennium was approaching [1882/83].

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⁵²⁷ Ahmad Kalla, Risāla dar tabaddul va taghayyur-i dawlāthā az qirān-i ‘ulviyān, Ms IVANRUz, no. 2247/V, fol. 74b. For the date it was written, see fol. 78a. The work is described in SVR: Tochnyje i estestvennyje nauki, 112.

⁵²⁸ al-Ghazzali’s influence is probably present here as well. For a description of al-Ghazzali’s cosmology, see Richard M. Frank, Creation and the Cosmic System: al-Ghazzālī & Avicenna (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1992).

⁵²⁹ See for example Donish, Risola, 69–70.

⁵³⁰ To argue like Rasul Hodizoda that Ahmad Kalla during his younger authorship, i.e. when he in 1865 finished one of his treatises on the science of the stars, the Manāzur al-kawākib, did not consider human agency to be able to “change the political situation”, and that he in his later works favoured human agency, is thus problematic (Hodizoda, Ahmadi Donish, 71).
Ahmad Kalla here implies that everyone was waiting for the Renener of the 13th century. Emir Muzaffar died in 1885 [1302/03], but the Renener did not appear. Ahmad Kalla explains this with reference to the science of the stars, which also reflects a belief in cataclysmic apocalypticism.

Shortly before the year 98 after the millennium [1686/87] a “sublime conjunction” (qirān-i ʿulūd) occurred in Taurus with ascendant in Capricorn. And 302 [years] after the first millennium, a conjunction of Saturn and Capricorn occurred in Cancer with ascendant in Cancer. And these two were “indicators of vicissitudes” (inqilābāt), changes, and the appearance of calamities. And a number of these two conjunctions still remain [(to continue occurring until 50 years after 300 [1931/32]). In the end a calamity will occur every year, or once every fifth or tenth year. The last of these two calamities will probably occur 50 (years) after 300 but after a great battle…]531

8.1.3 The Shia

The narratives of decline that were based on the diachronic orders of the interregnum and the science of the stars explained the situation in Bukhara as an aspect of a cosmic order that eventually would lead to a more just world at the end of the interregnum or a restoration of a just world with the return of the Rightly Guided. These narratives thus expressed hope, a hope that was situated in the realm of divine agency. Yet, by comparing the situation towards the end of the last interregnum with the current situation, this explanation of decline could also be seen as a guide to what a new ruler, perhaps a Renener, should do when he comes to power, which, as we have seen above, could include killing the head of the fiscal administration, who was a Shia.

If Ahmad Kalla’s Treatise on the Manghit Dynasty was written as a general guide for an eventual new ruler, his Criteria of Religiosity, which was written when the Shia had gained substantial power in the Bukharan administration in the 1880s, served, among other things, to denounce the Shia. Copies of the work were given to a few persons among the elite of the emirate, including the chief judge of the time (Badr al-Din) and the brother of emir Muzaffar (Hashmat), persons who, like Ahmad Kalla, were dissatisfied with the Shias’ power.

In the Criteria of Religiosity, which also was written after Ahmad Kalla’s last trip to Russia, he explains the Bukharan decline in terms of discord, calamity, baseness, and hypocrisy, which were caused by the Shias’ ascen-

531 Donish, Risola, 137–138. Although the latter part of this quotation belongs to another manuscript copied in 1935 (Donish, Risola, II-III, 138), a manuscript that might be considered less reliable, this quotation as a whole represents cataclysmic apocalypticism.

532 For this work as a guide, see Hodizoda, Ahmadi Donish: Tarjimai hol, 250, 264.

533 Ahmad Kalla’s work Mi’yār al-tadāyyun was written on the order of the chief judge Badr al-Din in 1311/1894, see Ms. IVANRuz, no. 553, fol. 6a. and SVR, 6: 471. Another copy was made for Hashmat, see Ms IVANRuz, no. 2187, fol. 154a.

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sion to power. The Russian conquest of Transoxiana is thus explained as a consequence of the promotion of the Shia in Bukhara. Moreover, as is typical of Ahmad Kalla, a sense of urgency is present, this time expressed in terms of a threat posed by the Shia and their secret promotion of Shiism and their claim that paradise is only for Shias. According to Ahmad Kalla, their successful proselytizing had thus resulted in half of the Bukharans having become Shias.534

The Bukharan experiences of calamities and the rise of the Shia are compared with the rise of the Shia in other times and places, which is done with an emphasis on space-based geography. Ahmad Kalla thus argues that the Shia have never conquered a kingdom or “territory” (navaḥḥi) from the infidels, but after the Shia have taken the control of the administrations of territories like Egypt and “Damascus” (Shām) they have sold the religion to the world and turned the house of Islam into the house of disbelief. The rise of Chingiz Khan who massacred Muslims in all Muslim countries is also explained as a consequence of the victories of Qarmatians and the Ismailis, and the spreading of the “heretics” (rafziya); the British conquest of India is similarly a consequence of the preceding conquest of India by the Shia.

Ahmad Kalla’s denunciation of the Shia also had eschatological implications that can be read in terms of an eschatological polarization and a dispute about the direction of discontinuity. According to Ahmad Kalla, the Shia believed in “transmigration of the souls” (tanāsukh), which led him to denounce them as “absolute infidels” (kāfar-i muṭlaq). He further denounces them by arguing in support of “the punishment in the tomb” (‘azāḥ-i qabr), which he considered “religiously correct” (haqq). The punishment in the tomb had traditionally been denounced by certain Shia groups.535 Ahmad Kalla supported his belief in the resurrection with reference to the return of the Rightly Guided, Jesus, and the fight against the Antichrist. Yet, in what must be seen as an openness to knowledge from the developed world, he also supported his beliefs with a newspaper article. According to Ahmad Kalla, the Freemasons (farāmūshī) had brought a dead merchant back to life to tell his heir where he had hidden his money so that he could pay his debts.536

Although there is no information about the reaction to the Shaykhis and the Babis among the Shia in Bukhara during the second half of the 19th century, these issues must have been discussed widely in the Persianate world. The Bab’s disbelief in the bodily resurrection, his belief that there was only this world, and that hell is only the torment of disbelief and paradise the rewards of faith,537 represented the eschatological scenario of progressive

534 Ahmad Kalla, Mi’yār al-tadayyun, fols. 7b–8b.
535 EI, s.v. “Adhāb al-Ḳabr”.
536 Ahmad Kalla, Mi’yār al-tadayyun, fols. 7b–8a, 36b, 38a–38b, 40a.
537 For a discussion on this, see Bayat, Mysticism and Dissent, 103.
millenarianism, while Ahmad Kalla advocated the scenario of cataclysmic apocalypticism.

8.1.4 Confining progress

Yet another narrative of decline is Ahmad Kalla’s explanation of western scientific endeavours, a narrative that can be read in terms of a distinction between technical progress (and by extension, societal progress) and spiritual progress. This narrative relies on different diachronic orders that have different directions, orders that are aspects of a spiritual “vertical progress”, a kind of melioristic beliefs, and a belief in the downward-leaning axis leading to terminal decay. It possibly reflects attempts to reduce cognitive dissonance by confining progress, but possibly also attempts to confine progress, as it represented the rivalling eschatological scenario of the Shia in the Bukharan political arena.

According to Ahmad Kalla, every land had its own peculiarities, and its inhabitants their own capacities. He thus wrote that Bukhara never would have any need of railways, as the country was small and full of mountains, and would never have any steam ships because it had no access to the sea. Ahmad Kalla rhetorically asks why the knowledge of constructing railroads and steamships would be necessary in Bukhara. Ahmad Kalla’s emphasis on space-based geography is clear in these arguments.

Science, according to Ahmad Kalla, is not only dependent on geographic peculiarities, but also on human agency and on the amount of time spent contemplating the meaning of things. These activities, Ahmad Kalla argues, take time from worshipping God. From this follows that the technological developments among the “Westerners” (farangīs) are also aspects of unbelief rather than belief.

Like Vazīh, Ahmad Kalla traced western knowledge back to pre-Islamic Greek knowledge. According to Ahmad Kalla, the Westerners had been able to “to obtain, perfect, and manifest these sciences”, “sciences” (‘ilm u ḥikmat) that were not dependent upon the “religious sciences” (‘ilm-i avvalīn u ākharīn). In this process the Westerners had been very successful, relying among other things, on experiments. This is an explanation that emphasizes human agency in terms of labour and seeking – “they laboured and searched and found it (the science), we did not and did not reach it.” The Muslims had been occupied with worshipping God, instead of “breaking (cracking) the riddles of the substances of the land and the sea.”

Vazīh’s statement that “the creation is progressing”, as quoted above, indicates a cosmic concept of progress which, dating back to the Greeks, must be considered as having a long-term trend diametrically opposed to the downward-leaning axis of prophecy. His use of taraqqī cannot, however, be

538 The paragraphs above are based on Donish, NV, 1:123–124, 127, 129–133.
reduced to an exclusively spiritual progress. This new diachronic order was configured by long-term human agency and a conception of Westerners as technologically more sophisticated. This is evident in another story narrated by Ahmad Kalla, a story told through the voice of a Bukharan pilgrim who, on his way back to Bukhara, spends some time in Peshawar and talks with the British governor there. The pilgrim makes some inquiries about the efforts to fill a part of the sea with stones so that shops and other buildings can be constructed there, and about the governor’s interest in having Islamic books translated. The British governor responds to the pilgrim as follows:

You are an Uzbek. Your reason does not suffice to understand the secret of these endeavours, and even if I explain it, you will not be able to comprehend it. They brought me here in order to make the world prosper, to open the oceans and the mines, to make manifest the wonders of the “world of elements” (‘ālam-i ʿarkān), and it is necessary for us to research the nations of the earth, and to distinguish the good from the bad; and everyone who claims purity and cleanliness of his “law school” (maḏhab) has to be scrutinized. When truth has been found, then we will follow it. Many people have benefitted from the world, but they did not care about [the world] so the world has almost become barren and difficult to live in. You see, if you do not take care of your grapevine, then it gives less and less grapes each year until it gets dry. You eat the grapes from the tendril, but do not become sad if its roots are worm-eaten and its head is damaged by frost.

To sum up, the “old and pure possessor of the world” (jahāndār-i qadīm u quddūs) gave us power to empty the garden of ignorant gardeners and to clear the soil of rubbish, sticks, and straw that prevented us from tilling the ground, so that it could be useful.539

With its emphasis on human agency, long-term progress, a return to the origins of religion in order to find the truth, an openness to other religions, and reflection on colonial expansion, the quotation above looks like it could have come from the Bukharan reformers of the 20th century. Yet, the reference to “the world of elements” (‘ālam-i ʿarkān) is a cosmographical category that the 20th century Bukharan reformers did not use.

The world of elements is, in cosmographical terms, similar to “the created world” (‘ālam-i kawn or ‘ālam-i ʿalqā), or in the terminology subscribed to by al-Ghazzali, “the world of kingship” (‘ālam al-mulk). By relying on al-Ghazzali’s cosmographical categories of “the world of kingship” (‘ālam al-mulk) and “the world of angels” (‘ālam al-malakūt), where the former is a reflection of the latter,540 Ahmad Kalla ascribed Muslim worship to the world of angels and technological development to the world of kingship. This is similar to Vazih who ascribed the technical achievements of the developed

540 EI², s.v. “‘Ālam”.

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world to “the created world” (‘ālam-i kawn). Technical achievements on earth are thus ascribed to the latter, while spiritual progress is ascribed to the former, at least by Ahmad Kalla.

By locating western technical progress to a “world” of its own, Ahmad Kalla perhaps reduces the cognitive dissonance caused by the increased rhythm of temporal experience, or contains the eschatological scenario of the Shia. This might have made it easier for Ahmad Kalla to continue to voice beliefs, if only rhetorically, in cataclysmic apocalypticism and the impending end of the world, beliefs he considered religiously correct, but at the same time to voice a belief in long-term Western technical development. Ahmad Kalla hence perceives the colonial expansion that took place in his time as an expansion of infidelity, which he expresses in terms of the spreading of the “Westerners” (farangīs) in the world of kingship. He writes, for example, that the Westerners intend to populate the whole world and are striving to go to the stars. The spatial expansion of the Westerners and the infidels makes it even more urgent to carry out reforms in the emirate. Unlike the reformers of the 20th century, the apocalyptic expectations, or at least discourse, and cosmographical inclinations of Ahmad Kalla and his audience made him voice this urge in terms of the end of the world that would follow unless the reforms were carried out. When infidelity prevails in the world of kingship, the resurrection will come.

Ahmad Kalla contrasted the physical spread of the westerners and their technology with a narrative of moral decline, human agency, and responsibility, a narrative that also echoed the increased centralization of power in 19th century Bukhara. The Muslim kings thus spread the “divine words” during the glorious two or three centuries following the death of Muhammad, but when there “was no country of pagans left which could rebel and claim independence[, they turned] to lust and occupied themselves with excessive pleasure”. The Muslim scholars became subservient to the central power and “closed their eyes to commanding the lawful and prohibiting the unlawful.” The “westerners”’ success is expressed in terms of a determination to take revenge for the losses they suffered during the early centuries of Islam, a determination that is contrasted with Muslim negligence:

And those [Muslim kings] who exists, they are all diluted and mixed with the infidels, and are all paying tax to the infidels and are very subservient, and do not dare to rebel. And now all that which is unlawful and prohibited is visible in the bazaars, and of the Islamic attributes, the turbans are on the heads and the muezzins on the minarets. There is an enormous difference between

541 See Chap. 5.2.2. ‘Ālam-i kawn shall probably be related to the Aristotelian concept of the world of origin and decline (‘alam al-kawn va al-fasād) as opposed to the world of the heavenly spheres, see EI², s.v. “‘Ālam”.

542 Donish, NV, 1:124–125, 129–133.
deeds and words, [a difference] which is unheard of in other “nations” (sg. millat).

The Muslims’ achievements are thus explained by their negligence of Islam, while the achievements of the westerners are explained largely in terms of human agency, but also as amoral, that is, in terms of “hidden hatred”, “revenge”, “malice”, “deception”, “vengeance”, and “pride”. Their physical expansion, i.e. that “they have reached all inhabited places” is also “a sign of the resurrection”.

Among the believers there remains no hope to spread Islam, unless a strong Renewer appears during this century. Perhaps the empowerment of Islam and its people can never be expected, the time of the Rightly Guided aside. But according to heavenly indications and the appearance of heavenly signs, the “renewal” (tajdid) of the millat is possible and it is possible that before the year of 1313 [1895/96] there will occur major changes (taghyīr u tabdīl) in the affairs of the world.543

One of the answers to the question why all Bukharan “sages are stupid and ignorant” can thus be that they have been busy worshipping God and do not need the knowledge that the Westerners have obtained. Yet, the manifest technological difference of the Westerners brings up the question if the knowledge the Bukharans possesses is relevant, and if Bukharans need western knowledge.

Whereas, in one work, Ahmad Kalla described western knowledge as infidelity, in another work he expresses a wish that Bukhara will obtain new technology. This can also be attributed to the Sattelzeit and its tension between a God-centred and an increasingly anthropocentric world. The former can thus probably at least in part be attributed to influence from Sirhindi, who in one of his letters wrote:

Oh son! Don’t you know what the world is? It is what keeps you from God almighty. Therefore, women, children, wealth, status, power, amusements, and being occupied with worthless pursuits are all aspects of the world. Any knowledge not applicable to the Hereafter is also an aspect of the world. If learning astronomy, logic, engineering, mathematics, and other useless knowledge were worthwhile, the philosophers would be saved in the next world. Muhammad said, “The sign of God turning away from the servant is the servant’s occupying himself with what does not pertain to God.” (As Rumi says), Everything except God’s love, even if it is sugar-coated, is painfully bitter.544

543 Donish, NV, 1:133–134.
544 Letter 173 as translated by Buehler, Revealed Grace, 173.
In Ahmad Kalla’s “Treatise on Reforms” (*Risāla-yi nizāmiya*), on the other hand, which was written after his trips to Russia, Ahmad Kalla called for reforms in terms of the “order” (*niẓām*) of the emirate “to put the affairs of the state in order, like in foreign states.” In this work he also calls for Russian support in the construction of fruit and fur factories in the emirate.

This mention of the Renewer and the Rightly Guided had, to a considerable extent a rhetorical aspect; that is, it served as a warning of what would happen if the Muslims did not improve their morals and adopt modern technology. This is also consistent with Ahmad Kalla’s use of the concept of interregnum above, i.e. as a guide to how the two last 19th century Bukharan Emirs should battle the influence of amoral elements, particularly the Shia. Progress was, however, not a part of Aḥmad Kalla’s discourse on technological development, as such developments largely were confined to a realm of their own: to the westerners and the “created world” and the “world of kingship”. In the sources referred to here, Ahmad Kalla never called his time a new time; his calls for reform and ethical improvement are frequently accompanied with a statement that the end of the world is near.

The Bukharan reformers of the 20th century did not try to reduce cognitive dissonance or to contain an eschatological scenario of progressive millenarianism by confining technical progress to a “world” of its own, but instead propagated for the arrival of a new time when the adoption of western technology would be regarded as an Islamic imperative expressed through a concept of societal *and* spiritual progress embedded in the lexeme *taraqqī*.

### 8.2 *Taraqqī*

According to Koselleck “[p]rogress became a modern concept when it shed or forgot its natural background meaning of stepping through space”, which happened around 1800 in Europe. In 19th century Bukhara, however, *taraqqī* did not mean “stepping through space”. But when the modern concept of progress became embedded in the lexeme *taraqqī* at the beginning of the 20th century, *taraqqī* did indeed appear in syntagmatic relationships with the recently coined “going forward” (*pīshraft*) and “left behind” (*‘aqībmandā*), a metaphorical shift that possibly can be paraphrased as *taraqqī* became a concept of societal progress in Bukhara when it appeared in syntagmatic relations with going forward and being left behind. Such a

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546 Here he also calls for the nomination of an inheritor to the throne, a *valī‘ahd*, Donish, *Risola*, 154.
548 Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History*, 221.
conceptualization of progress became almost synonymous with evolution, as is evident in two articles published by Fitrat when he was in Istanbul in 1914.

Have humans gone forward or backward from the beginning of creation until today? Without doubt, they have gone forward; that is, they have made progress! And until our time, they have never stopped at any point [and they will continue to make progress].

Although the metaphoric structure of the lexeme taraqqī was transformed, taraqqī lost neither its previous metaphorical structure nor its signified even as a new central political and social concept. But when taraqqī was adopted by the 20th century Bukharan reformers, a new dimension was added, both metaphorically, as a horizontal movement, and temporally, as being directed toward a “future” (āyanda) on earth in the sense of a modern concept of progress that frequently signified optimization, although the old conceptual content was retained as well. By signifying optimization, the concept could also be seen as representing transformational apocalypticism.

In 19th century Bukhara, taraqqī had an exclusively vertical metaphorical structure in which it had a positive or negative value depending on the context. That is, it signified an upward movement, ascension, such as in the construction “all ascended to glorious positions”, which in this context was something bad because Ahmad Kalla considered the promoted state servants to be incompetent. This meaning of taraqqī was also retained by the Bukharan reformers, such as Ayni, who writes that the governor of Karategin was promoted to governor of Shahr-i Sabz, despite that his shortcomings: “the following year this oppressor advanced to a high position (dar martaba-yi balandī taraqqī karda), and was appointed governor of Shahr-i Sabz, which was one of the cultivated provinces of the country of Bukhara.\textsuperscript{555} The context-dependent value of the vertical metaphorical structure of taraqqī is also evident in the realm of economics, such as the increasing price of cotton (taraqqī kardan-i qaymat-i pakhta.),\textsuperscript{552} higher prices for food (synonymous with narkh bālá raftan),\textsuperscript{553} or a higher salary.\textsuperscript{554} Here too, the antonym of taraqqī was tanazzul (“decline”).\textsuperscript{555}

\textsuperscript{549} ‘Abd al-Ra‘ūf Fitrat, “Hayāt u ghāya-yi hayāt”, Āyina 9 (21 Dec. 1913 [3 Jan. 1914]): 220. For this quotation, see also Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform, 108. See also Fitrat, “Rohbari najot”, Sādoi sharq, no. 7–8: 22.
\textsuperscript{550} Donish, Risola, 122.
\textsuperscript{551} Ayni, Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro, 112.
\textsuperscript{552} “Girānī-yi pakhta”, BSh 19 (2 Apr. 1912 [15 Apr. 1912]): 2.
\textsuperscript{554} “Fāyida-yi inqilāb”, SI 5 (8 May 1919): 2, 3.
\textsuperscript{555} As, for example, in the increase and decrease in the extraction of charcoal between 1823 and 1907 in “Akhbār-i maḥallī: Angusht-i sang u namak”, BSh 21 (4 Apr. 1912 [17 Apr. 1912]): 2.
Unlike the exclusively vertical metaphorical structure of *taraqqī* in 19th century Bukhara, in the 20th century discourse of the Bukharan reformers, *taraqqī* could be structured by both horizontal and vertical metaphors. *Taraqqī* thus figures in constructions such as “the exaltation and improvement of one’s native country” (*ta‘ālā u taraqqī-yi vaṭān*), 556 or “the exaltation and improvement of one’s society” (*taraqqī u ta‘ālī-yi jamā‘at*). 557 The main difference here was that when a vertically structured *taraqqī* could be exchanged with a horizontally structured *taraqqī*, as in the examples above in this paragraph, the value of *taraqqī* was always positive and thus not context dependent. This concept of *taraqqī* also signified a collective achievement, and thus human rather than divine agency.

As used by Ahmad Kalla, *taraqqī* is associated with divine agency in accordance with his concepts of the interregnum and the Renewer. The reign of Emir Haydar, who represented the first ruler of a new interregnum and was the son of a Renewer (Emir Shahmurad), is thus described in terms of *taraqqī*, though well in a passive sense, e.g. “never has this kind of progress (*īnchuṇīn taraqqī*) occurred among the Muslim scholars (*ba ahl-i ‘ilm u ‘ulmā vāqa’ nashuda bāshad*)”. 558 This passive sense of *taraqqī* is also evident in Ahmad Kalla’s general description of the *taraqqī* and “decline” (*tanazzul*) that follows a Renewer, “after the appearance of a millennium Renewer: there will be up to 500 years of progress in the development of that nation (*millat*)”. 559 This concept of *taraqqī* signifies first and foremost spiritual progress, but with an increased emphasis on space-based geography, *taraqqī* came to signify societal progress tied to a “nation” (*millat*).

8.3 Space-based progress and decline

With the arrival of the modern concepts of history and geography, the horizontal-metaphorically structured *taraqqī* appeared more frequently in syntagmatic relationships with “blocks of space”, blocks that also could be projected backwards: “Russia was founded in 862 in the Christian era and has remained until today, and in recent eras it has made a lot of progress.” 560

The relationship between space-based geography and history generated a new spatial-temporal nexus that made way for a modern concept of societal progress. Jalal exemplifies this in a dialogue between a “learned writer” and a child, in which the child criticizes the Bukharans for their lack of knowledge of history and geography.

558 Donish, Risāla, 28.
559 Donish, Risāla, 11.
560 Bihhudī, Madkhal-i jughrāfiyā-yī ‘umrānī, 80.
Do you know the history and the map of the land of Tūrān [Turkistan]? I said, of course. He said. As much as I asked among the Bukharans, no one knew. A person who is an inhabitant of a country, and considers that country his “fatherland” (vaṭān) and the place of his ancestors’ graves, if he does not know anything about the history and geography of that country, what kind of person is he? I said: You have met the uneducated and the commoners among them! The Muslim scholars among them know, not only their own history and geography, but all the surface of the earth. Most of the Muslim scholars, teachers, and historians of Asia are residing in this land of Tūrān.\

In this dialogue, the geography of scale (city, country, homeland, Asia, the land of Tūrān [“Turkistan”]) is evident, as are the links between cartography, history and science. In Bihbudi’s geographical treatise An Introduction to General Geography, taraqqī appeared in syntagmatic relationships with elements of a space-based geography of scale, from homeland to continent. Taraqqī signified a collective achievement by educated individuals for the sake of their country, homeland, or even continent. A “block of space” can now make progress. This is also evident in the syntagmatic relationships between taraqqī, homeland, and nation in Fitrat’s Debate: “science is the reason for the cultivation of the Kingdom, the cause of the progress of the nation”. It is also evident in the syntagmatic relationships between taraqqī, decline, and city in the writings of Mirza Siraj: “[Bistam] has declined because Sharud has made progress.”

The increased emphasis on the role of human agency in creating the future contributed to an idea that humans needed certain tools in order to make progress, such as science. Such tools were thus used by humans organized in terms of a space-based conception of geography in order cause their “blocks of space” to make progress. This is well illustrated by Bihbudi in his “A Sample of the Particularities of Russia” (Namīn-yi ḫālāt-i dawlat-i Rūsīya), which is divided into five sections, each of which is named after typical features of a state and country, including various tools for making progress: population, science, newspaper, and a capital city.

8.3.1 Taraqqī and economic growth

Trade was another human tool for making progress. It is extensively reflected upon by the merchant Mirza Siraj whose concept of taraqqī to a large extent probably was shaped by his impressions of flourishing trade in Russia.

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562 Fitrat, Munāzara, 22.
563 Mirzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tūḥaf-i Bukhārā, 281.
565 Bihbūdī, Madkhal-i jughrāfiyā-yi ‘umrānī, 80–85.
566 For another of the many statements emphasizing the role of newspapers in making progress, see B.Kh., “Imārāt-i Bukhārā”, BSh 15 (28 Mars 1912 [10 Apr. 1912]): 3.
and Europe. *Taraqqī* is thus related to investments and improvements in trade and agriculture, not to say industrialization and the increasing wealth of the population. For the editor of the largely mercantilist newspaper The Noble Bukhara, the solution to the decline in traditional Bukharan economic sectors is thus expressed through the concepts of novelties and inventions. Because of recently invented machinery, traditional crafts, such as sericulture, can survive through increased production.

The technology for promoting progress comes from the western world. This was also evident in several articles in The Noble Bukhara, for instance an article about cotton, in which Egypt is described as having made much progress during the last 20 years under the British administration, and in an article that emphasizes the role of banks in the advancement of the country’s agriculture and trade. It was also evident in how a Bolshevik newspaper accused the British of duping other countries by claiming “we want to cause your country to make progress through trade and economics.”

As used by the merchants, the concept of *taraqqī* signified economic growth in a wider sense. Societal progress was characterized by human agency, and economic progress, as an aspect of this, also signified an *intensification* of human agency, a thickening of the present, something that explains why progress appeared in syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships with *rivāj*. *Rivāj* signified not only “improvement”, but also “increase”, a meaning that *taraqqī* also had, for instance an increase in the area under cotton cultivation (*taraqqī-yi pakhta*), but also an intensification of human activity in terms of “selling well”, “current”, and “fashionable”. When in Trabzon Mirza Siraj, for example, illustrated the syntagmatic relationship between *rivāj* and *taraqqī*, which implied human agency, an intensification of human activity, and economic growth:

The trade there is making much progress and improvement. Every day all kinds of merchandise were exported to Iran. The customs revenues there are said to be considerable.

This expression is also used when he writes about Rasht: “the trade there is also making great progress” (*tižārat-ash ham dar kamāl-i taraqqī ast*). Despite the fact that the construction is impersonal, it is clear that human agency is implied.

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572 See for example M.B., ”Panbakārī: baqiya”, *BSh* 44 (1 May. 1912 [14 May 1912]): 3.
573 “Akḥbār-i Dākhila”, *BSh* 18 (1 Apr. 1912 [14 Apr. 1912]): 3.
Many Europeans, like the Londoners, are described by Mirza Siraj as hard-working, which, in effect, means that they are contributing to their own future, although this is not stated outright. Instead Mirza Siraj writes that they have achieved their great progress by means of hard work, science, and trade.

In Mirza Siraj’s travelogue, trade is frequently depicted as a collective achievement of a “nation” (millat). It is a nation, country, or city that is making progress, not an individual person, and it is not explicitly the creation that is making progress, as in Vazih’s usage of taraqqi as mentioned above. Vazih’s expression the “creation is progressing” is never encountered in the Bihbudi’s and Mirza Siraj’s travelogues. In the latter’s progressive perspective, trade and collective human agency are central features:

[The trade and agriculture of the “province of Fergana” (mamlakat-i Farghānā) are making progress from one day to the next. No other cities in Turkistan have the trade of this land (i.e. Kokand). It is making progress from year to year.]

On the seventh of June we reached Odessa. This is the third largest Russian city, but because of the trade on the coast of the Black Sea, it is making great progress.

Taraqqi is tied not only to space, but also to history. The province of Fergana, as mentioned above, is projected back to the Kokand khanate, but also given a potentially glorious future that is dependent on collective human agency:

If they unite and establish companies and use banks and trading houses like other nations, then the wealth and trade of the country will not leave their hands.

For Bihbudi, as well as for Mirza Siraj, recently settled nomads, who were conceived as being left behind in a half wild and miserable state, were the opposite of the idealized cognitive model of economic growth. Bihbudi writes that compared with the Russians and Armenians, “our poor relatives (qarandāsh), the Turkmens in the vicinities [of Ashgabat], are still living in a half-wild state of misery”. Mirza Siraj also writes about the Kazakh around Auliyata:

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575 Mirzā Siraj, Safarnāma-yi tuhaf-i Bukhārā, 137, 36, 37.
577 Mirzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuhaf-i Bukhārā, 38.
It is 252 verst [approximately 268 kilometres] from Tashkent to Auliyata by road. Seven verst are one farsakh. Most of this road goes over the steppe. The land between is inhabited by Kazakh nomads. The nomads are all owners of cattle and cattle breeders. Their way of life lies completely outside civilisation and humanity. They are not different from animals. They grow barley, wheat, millet, and other things. But they have not drawn any benefits from education and agricultural inventions. The Russian state has also left them in their original state and only collects one annual poll tax in kind from them.

But along the road several prosperous places and villages were seen where Russian peasants, Molokans, were cultivating [the earth] with machinery and recently invented tools. They had created a lot of prosperity and all of them had become possessors of wealth. After the conquest of Turkistan, the Russian state moved them from Russia to settlements in these places. They are very happy about their exile. Most of them are Molokans.

In reality, this group has great skills in the art of agriculture. They diverted water for irrigation from mountains and wells by making channels. This kind of prosperity was visible along the road, and all this prosperity was created by Russian peasants. The Kazakh remain behind in laziness and lack of knowledge. They are engaged in agriculture, but use the same tools as thousands years ago. They do not use the recently invented tools that enable increased sown areas and larger areas of ploughed cultivated land. They say that these are the infidels’ inventions and that it is not permissible to use these tools for agriculture. But they themselves are only Muslims in name.579

Yet another aspect of economic growth is the “progressing demands” of mankind. In the chapter on “wealth” (ṣarvat) in his Guide to Salvation, Fitrat hence wrote that the needs of humanity progress over time and reach a new level for every age.

Some years ago we had no need of the train. Today the train has become one of the necessities of humanity. Today humanity does not need the airplane so much, but without doubt, after some years the airplane will become one of the necessities of humanity.580

According to Fitrat, the means to meet one’s needs are what progress and change, and they depend upon reason and science. These means are also related to the growth of the developed world and the empires, and are not only conditioned by technological development, but also by the increased importance of raw materials for supporting technological growth, and thus colonial expansion.

It is clear that the world is a general battlefield, it is a battlefield of life. Everyone who wins on this field, calls others their day labourers and carriers of burdens. For example, because of the power of their reason, humans have been victorious over other animals, and because of this they have made a group of them their captives, and they are always using them for various ser-

579 Mirzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuhaf-i Bukhārā, 48–49.
580 Fitrat, “Rohbari najot”, Sadoi sharq, no. 9: 30.
vices. Similarly, it is the natural right of a “people” (qawm) and “nation” (millat) that has emerged victorious on the general battlefield to turn other peoples into their carriers of burdens.

Every nation that is faster and better at successfully acquiring wealth, and faster and better at overcoming their shortcomings, is victorious on the battlefield of life.

Here again we find a polarization between progress and being left behind. And in this quest for wealth, which is formulated in terms of “progress or perish” in the realm of human agency, Fitrat completely denounces withdrawal from worldly affairs, which he sees as contrary to Islam. This duty of activism is thus contrary to at least some of the ideas discussed by Ahmad Kalla above.

8.3.2 Educational progress

In the 20th century, Bukharan reformists were increasingly convinced that the Muslim world had to learn from the “developed” world. Hence, during the second decade of the 20th century, taraqqī began to appear in syntagmatic relations with “science” (‘ilm) as a human tool for causing a nation to progress, often based on impressions from the developed world: “the state of Germany has made much progress in science.” It was science and wealth that had contributed to the progress in Europe, as opposed to the laziness and lack of wealth of the Asians:

Which nation did the glorious Hadith “purity is a necessary part of Faith” concern? And who said “search for knowledge even in China”? Jalal writes that neither during “the time of happiness” (‘aṣr-i saʿādat) nor today was knowledge to be found in China. China had been replaced by the west, and the Hadith referred to above should obviously be interpreted in the sense that the Muslims had to adopt the scientific disciplines found in the west, because, as another author argues:

The progress of every nation is dependent upon science. First one should learn how to read and write (i.e. achieve functional literacy), and then one should learn Arabic, arithmetic, geography, Russian (because of its significance for trade), French, and German.

This educational program included both the old and the new sciences. It was, however, because of the new sciences, or the present sciences and technolo-
gies, that other nations had became possessors of the railway, steamships and cars – markers of progress and the contemporary era.

[If] foreigners previously had learned from our books without turning away from their religion, why should we consider studying “the contemporary sciences” (‘ilmā-yī zamānī) to be a sin? 584

For some Bukharan reformers, the concept of educational/scientific progress was not only projected onto the developed world, a world that had brought development and prosperity to the Muslim world, but was also based on the assumption that a long-term perspective on progress had been absent in the Muslim world. Fitrat’s conception of progress also reveals that the technological developments during the Age of Synergy, or the Second Industrial Revolution, were science driven.

Russia made all this progress [in the province of Fergana] after coming and conquering. Previously, even if it was the same water and land, no one among their rulers thought of the prosperity of this land. They neither had science nor information. […] it is not their own fault, but the fault of their ignorance. 585

[The progress made during the reigns of Tamerlane, Mahmud of Ghazni, and Nader Shah] was temporary and restricted to their own lives. The progress of the European states is permanent because, while the dominion of the Islamic Kings at that time was dependent on their own knowledge/wisdom. Today the knowledge/wisdom of the European dominions are dependent on this science [i.e. the new science which is partly transmitted in the new-method schools]. 586

As has been argued above, educational progress could be traced back to the Greeks, but by referring to the sciences necessary for this educational progress as “the new sciences” (‘ulūm-i jadīd) or as “the contemporary sciences” (‘ulūm-i zamānī), the origin of these sciences was instead relocated to the contemporary era. As most of the markers of that era were located in the west, these sciences did not easily qualify as having an Islamic origin. Yet, by making progress into Islamic imperative, and claiming a gradual revelation of the Sharia, and thereby possibly giving rise to a distant echo of an esoteric tradition reminiscent of the Shaykhis and Nabulusi’s belief in revelation as a metahistorical source, Jalal merges the spiritual and societal conceptions of progress with a concept of educational progress that included the new sciences. Al-Ghazzali’s distinction between “the world of kingship” and “the world of angels” was blurred, because progress in this world signified

585 Mīrzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yī tuhaf-i Bukhārā, 37.
586 Fitrat, Munāzara, 62.
both spiritual and worldly progress achieved through human agency and with an emphasis on obtaining knowledge.

The holy Sharia, which God has sent to humanity during centuries and over time, is a foundation for gradual instruction. First he sent some explicit commandments, then, little by little, according to growing human capacity, he sent down real and essential commandments. The last Sharia is the holy Islamic Sharia, which is the most comprehensive and complete Sharia and explains all the necessities of humanity. This holy Sharia has tried so much to perfect humanity that there is none higher. However much the humans strive for perfection, for spiritual capacity, they will not be able to progress higher than the commandments of the Islamic Sharia. That is, there is no higher level that humans can reach that has not been explained in the Sharia. I.e., no matter how perfect the humans become in science, technology, and culture, they will not pass the boundaries of the Islamic Sharia.

This evolutionary view of science also includes a criticism of imitation expressed in the format of a criticism of those who are still under the “explicit commandments” and have not yet begun to ponder the “truth of things”, like the westerners who stopped imitating their ancestors and were “blessed with miracles and technologies that astonish the intellect.”

But we, who call ourselves Muslims and followers of the Quran, and consider ourselves believers and worthy of Paradise have imitated others’ fathers and have been content with explicit commandments! We have considered Islam to be limited to a few imitative issues, and learned prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, and almsgiving, and thought that the remaining commandments of the Quran are someone else’s problem. That is why we have spent most of our time in vain. And in this, the explicit commandments have become an expression of our laziness and carelessness.

But Jalal also discusses the old concerns about the integration of knowledge and science that did not exist at the time of the prophet. Progress was thus to be achieved by adopting what was recognized as “new science”, while justifying it with the claim that, in some form or other, it had been current, or accepted, at the time of the prophet.

We have to hurry and satisfy ourselves with the fact that the holy Sharia of Islam neither fears nor worries about any contemporary science and technology. As the humans become more perfect in the contemporary technologies, their share of insight into the creator and truth of this luminous law will increase. So we have to be the imitators of the Quran and spend our precious time studying technology, and not merely imitate our pre-Islamic fathers and content ourselves with external acts. 587

The opposite of progress was embedded in the lexeme tanazzul (“decline”). Tanazzul signified a new configuration of ignorance that included both a lack of knowledge of “the contemporary sciences” (‘ulūm-i ḥāzira) and a lack of knowledge of Quran commentaries and Hadiths: “only the name of the Sharia is left among the Bukharans, and that is the reason for their decline.”

The remedy for this decline was to make Bukhara a contemporary country and to restore the moral and educational standards of the time of the “pious forefathers” (zamān-i salaf) or the “time of happiness” (‘aṣr-i saʿādat). In this sense, progress was bidirectional, as the time of the pious forefathers and the time of happiness were regarded as models of piety and learning. Ayni thus stressed classical Islamic treatises, including Hadith-collections, books on the life of the prophet and on the history of Islam, and in particular al-Ghazzali’s The Revival of the Religious Sciences and The Alchemy of Happiness. Ayni too believed that there had been a generous acceptance of improvement and tolerance in the past, but also thought that many of the teachings that his opponents considered Islamic were later additions. The much-criticized prevailing method of instruction was thus denounced as a Persian invention, the books current in the schools of Bukhara as being of a later date, and the script as having changed over time. Ayni also wrote that the companions of the prophet had lived by their own labour, rather than being dependent on the religious endowments. This could be read as an expression of support for new merchants, and for new sources of revenue for the Muslim scholars. It can, of course, also be explained by Ayni’s close links with the Manurovs and the cotton industry.

In summary, if the students of Bukhara had been interested in studying, rare old compositions would not have been scattered from the libraries in Bukhara (most of which now are places of merry-making for the state servants) and lost to libraries in the West [Farangistān] or stored in boxes by those who do not read the table of contents of these books, or cannot read, and thereby depriving the students of their use.

When then did the educational decline begin in Bukhara? Ayni dates the beginning of educational decline to the arrival in Bukhara of a certain Mawlawi Mirzajan Shirazi in 996 (1558–59) and his appointment as a teacher at the Abdullahkhan madrasa. The appointment of Shirazi was followed by a steady decline of the scientific situation in Bukhara, also expressed as a decline and disappearance of science in Bukhara. Ayni’s explanation, which obviously also translates into his present (1918), reads:

[T]here is no need to explain how uninformed his party and those who followed him were of the history of the world, of the politics of the world, of household economy, of upbringing, and of the civilization of Islam and Eu-

rope. At the time of the arrival of Russian soldiers in Turkistan, during the rule of Emir Muzaffar, this lack of information gave rise to many disasters and caused the destruction of everything and the fall of Samarkand.\footnote{Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 53, 54, 56, 95–98.}

\section*{8.4 An all-Muslim order of decline}

While Shirazi’s role in the decline had been purely a Bukharan matter (perhaps even only Ayni’s own), the idea of a societal decline since the pious forefathers was a sign that a common Muslim historical consciousness was emerging as an aspect of an expanding field of experience. The concept of decline that now became a part of the Bukharan reformists’ own historical experiences probably included some narratives of decline and progress that until recently had been irrelevant to the Bukharans. Such historical markers of decline and progress included the role of the Muslims in transmitting the Greek heritage, the fall of Muslim Spain,\footnote{For the “rediscovery” of Muslim Spain by Ottoman historians, see Strauss, “Kurûn-i vustā”, 238–239.} and the significance of the Muslim advance on Vienna.

The emergence of a common Muslim historical consciousness and a re-invented history of Bukharan decline was also coloured by a greater emphasis on space-based geography in the colonial era. This decline had its own spatial mediators, mediators that played an important role in constructing the “sacred universe” of the Muslim reformers. This is illustrated by Mirza Siraj, writing in what for him was a very symbolic Vienna about the past greatness of the Muslim world and its present ruins:

\begin{quote}
At that time we had hardness; now we have misery; at that time we were informed; now we have become ruined. What is the cause and what is the reason? The cause and reason of this is that at that time we were in concord, but now we are hypocrites. At that time we had religious zeal and care; now we are pleased with worldly issues. Then we cared about religion; now we care about the world. Then we exercised justice; now we exercise injustice. Then we were the most educated in the world; now we are the most ignorant of peoples. The whole eastern and western world needed us and they learned from us; now we must be the people in the world who are most in need and most helpless.\footnote{Mīrzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuhaf-i Bukhārā, 104.}
\end{quote}

When applied to universal Muslim history as above, decline (\textit{tanazzul} or \textit{inqirāz}) was largely conceived in linear terms, was seen as less dependent upon divine intervention than on human agency, was frequently juxtaposed with a concept of progress, and was coloured by an increased emphasis on space-based geography. The diachronic order of the \textit{fatrat} was replaced by a
synchronous order of progress and decline that was expressed in terms of relationships between different contemporaneities embedded in blocks of space on various geographical scales.

The progress and elevation of the Europeans was founded on the day of the disappearance of the state of Andalusia.\footnote{Muḥammad Adīb, “Hamdarāt-i bañt nū”, \textit{SI} 19 (11 Sept. 1919): 1–2.}

The onset of decline was also related to a Golden Age. Although the latter concept is not novel, the notion of a Golden Age of Islam as a temporality in its own right (‘āsr-i sa’ādat and zamān-i khulafā-yi rāshidin),\footnote{Jalāl, “Tajdīd-i tażakkur”, \textit{BSh} 44 (1 May 1912 [14 May 1912]): 1; Jalāl, “Vazayīf”, \textit{BSh} 65 (27 May 1912 [9 June 1912]: 1; Aynī also makes references to the ‘āsr-i sa’ādat. (Aynī, “Ta’rikh inqilobi fikri dar Bukhoro”, 97).} became a part of the gap-theory that was juxtaposed with the present of the developed world as well as the past of the Islamic world. An article in The Noble Bukhara, claims for example, that western medical research is now discovering that which was postulated by Islam over 1000 years ago.\footnote{Jalāl, “Vazayīf”, \textit{BSh} 65 (27 May 1912 [9 June 1912]: 1; Aynī also makes references to the ‘āsr-i sa’ādat. (Aynī, “Ta’rikh inqilobi fikri dar Bukhoro”, 97).} This synchronic order is further exemplified by the notion of the Middle Ages, which in the case of Bukhara could both be a backward present and an advanced past.\footnote{S., “Mastī”, \textit{BSh} 17 (30 Mar. 1912 [12 Apr. 1912]): 2.}

### 8.5 The Renewer and the Advocates of Progress

The various diachronic orders of progress and decline can also be seen as representing different eschatological scenarios with different end-states and agencies, orders that also differed in their degree of emphasis on place or space-based geography. The ideal type of the Rightly Guided, for example, seems difficult to reconcile with an anthropocentric world and the ideal type of progress.

An eschatological shift from catastrophic to transformational apocalypticism or to a modern concept of progress implied a shift in agency that did not necessarily have to be embedded in a new lexeme but instead could lead to a spatial and temporal transformation of an older agency, though with lexemic preservation. A brief and selective conceptual history of two of the most prominent agencies illustrates this conceptual transformation quite well.

\footnote{For the latter, see M.S., “Maktūb az Bukhārā-yi sharīf: Luzūm-i qara’atkhāna va kitābkhāna”, \textit{BSh} 21 (4 Apr. 1912 [17 Apr. 1912]): 3.}
8.5.1 The Renewer

Around the 1880s, the time was ripe for the arrival of the Renewer of the 14th century (1300 hijra corresponded with 1882/83). According to Ahmad Kalla, many expected the successor to the old Emir Muzaffar, who eventually died in 1885, to be the centenary Renewer. When Ahmad Kalla discusses the interregnum between the 13th century Renewer (Shahmurad) and the 14th Renewer century (who never appears), he repeatedly returns to the configurations of the stars and planets in order to support his arguments. All this emphasizes divine agency; the Renewer is sent by God in accordance with the cosmological system he has created, including the positions of the celestial bodies and the Islamic traditions.

Ahmad Kalla was well acquainted with Sirhindi’s ideas about the Renewer and he relies on Sirhindi’s different Renewers: i.e. the millennial and the centenary. The millennial Renewer is followed by 500 years of “progress” (taraqqi) and then 500 years of “decline” (tanazzul), while the centenary Renewer is followed by 50 years of taraqqi and then 50 years of “return” (taraju). The first 500 years are always better than the following 500 years, which suggests that Ahmad Kalla adhered to Sirhindi’s belief that the second millennium was the last stage of Islam. Ahmad Kalla’s conception of the Renewer hence has a cyclical temporal structure, spiralling around the downward-leaning axis towards terminal decay. A succeeding interregnum is always worse than the preceding one. The appearance of the Renewer, however, is also structured by metaphors of natural time. He is compared with the peasant watering his fields, and just as the peasant takes away stubble, the Muslim Renewer calibrates the divine injunctions and abolishes defects and religiously unlawful innovations within the “Nation” (millat) of the “Hanafi school” (hanafiyya) during periods of disorder. Such a time was the time of Emir Muzaffar and Abd al-Ahad, which Ahmad Kalla claimed was characterized by many religiously unlawful innovations and superfluities.

Ahmad Kalla’s notion of the Renewer is, however, not only different from both Sirhindi’s and Suyut’s ideas, but also from those of other earlier Islamic traditions. One of these differences is its emphasis on space-based geography. The Renewer who would come after Muzaffar would give splendour and beauty to religion and the state, and then renew the “order of the country” (nizām-i mamlakat). The latter is of considerable interest, because elsewhere in his work Ahmad Kalla argues in favour of nizām, a con-

596 Donish, Risola, 8, 139.
597 References to the Renewer are made in both the NV and in his so-called history of the Manghit dynasty. Sirhindi’s Maktūbāt is cited on page 95 in the first volume of Rasul Hodizoda’s edition of NV (Dushanbe: Donish, 1988).
598 Donish, Risola, 6.
599 Donish, Risola, 8, 10, 11, 92, 139.
cept that for him signified a reformed army as well as the appointment of a successor to the throne. His concept of nizām was clearly inspired by sources outside Bukhara.600

Besides the idea that the Renewer will restore order to the country, the emphasis on space-based geography is also evident when Ahmad Kalla lists previous Renewers and the characteristics of a Renewer. Unlike Sirhind and Suyuti, Ahmad Kalla does not regard the Renewer as an exclusively Islamic phenomenon because, as he writes, such an opinion would “contradict observation” (mukhālif-i mushāhid). Renewers thus also appear among the Christians, the Zoroastrians (majūs), and the Shia.601 Moreover, the Renewer can arise from among the Muslim scholars as well as from among the Kings,602 and he appears in every “nation” (millat) as long as he is “firm in religion” (mutadaiyin) and pious. The definition of his renewal in terms of “revival of the nation” (ihvā’-yi millat)603 also implies in this context that there could be several Renewers reviving different nations at the same time. This is evident when Ahmad Kalla lists previous Renewers. According to him, Tamerlane (1336–1405) was the Renewer of the 8th century, Hussayn Mirza Bayqara (r. 1438–1506) was the Renewer of the 9th century, Emir Abdulla Khan (1533–1598) was the Renewer of the 10th century, Sayid Subhanquilikhan (r. 1680–1702) was the Renewer of the 11th century, and Emir Shahmurad (r. 1785–1800) was the Renewer of the 12th century. These Renewers are thus ascribed to Transoxiana, while India has two Renewers: Aurangzib (1658–1797) and Shahjahan (1592–1666).604

The title of Renewer was also used in modernist circles during the 19th and early 20th century. Some of the 19th and early 20th century Tatar reformists for example considered the 19th century Tatar Muslim scholar Shihabetdin Merjani to be a reformer comparable to Martin Luther. Luther was seen as a great Renewer who had reinstated Christianity and “returned it to its original foundation”, as Ahmet Kanlidere puts it. This had led to European progress.605 An article in the Samarkandi journal The Mirror also calls the Tatar reformer Gasprinskii a Renewer “in thought and heart”, a use of the title of Renewer that Ingeborg Baldauf calls “metaphorical”.606 At least in this latter context, it can be argued that the title of the Renewer had lost its eschatological implications of cataclysmic apocalypticism, through the Re-

601 Donish, Risola, 6–7.
602 For other examples of Renewers among kings, see von Kügelgen, Die Legitimierung der mittelasiatischen Mangitendynastie, 309–312. For the Mujaddid as originating among the Muslim scholars, see Landau-Tasseron, “The ‘Cyclical Reform’”, esp. 82–83.
603 Donish, Risola, 6.
604 Donish, Risola, 11. Of the Manghit emirs, only Shahmurad was referred to as Renewer. See von Kügelgen, Die Legitimierung der mittelasiatischen Mangitendynastie, 303, 312–317.
605 See Kanlidere, Reform within Islam, 58–60
606 Baldauf, “Jadidism in Central Asia”, 74 including n. 8.
newer’s ability to temporarily reverse the prophetic decline, and became a mere title of honour again. And, like in Ahmad Kalla’s conception of the Renewer, it was no longer a purely Islamic concept. The article in The Mirror also signifies an eschatological shift away from cataclysmic apocalypticism.

The history of the Renewers and the emphasis on space-based geography seem to indicate that Ahmad Kalla first and foremost regards the Renewer as a component of a nativist revitalization. This, as well as his idea that numerous Renewers exists simultaneously, seems to define the spatial boundaries of a possible failure to reform the emirate in terms of a space-based conception of apocalypticism rather than a cosmic one. This argument is also supported by Ahmad Kalla’s fear of Russian control over Syr-Darya, from which Bukhara got her water. He writes that on several occasions Russia has discussed inflicting many deaths on Bukhara, and that if the end of the world is coming then there will be no Renewer of the 13th century, but if there is a “renewal” (tajdīd) of the “nation” (millat) and the “state” (dawlat) in this century, then a possible decision by the Russians to cause many deaths will be ineffective.607 That is, the end of the world is related to the Russian control over Syr-Darya, which, all other things being equal, signified the end of Bukhara.

Another argument in support of Ahmad Kalla having a non-cosmic conception of apocalypticism is that the whole purpose of his historical treatise is to describe the interregnum between the 12th century Renewer (Shahmurad) and the 13th century Renewer608 in order to instil reforms in the emirate. The interregnum is limited to Bukhara, and does not have the same cosmic implications as the interregnums between pre-Islamic prophets. Ahmad Kalla’s concept of the interregnum is hence related to an increased emphasis on space-based geography, the Russian conquest of Turkistan and colonial expansion elsewhere, of which Ahmad Kalla was well informed, and the threat this implied for the survival of Bukhara as a state.

The increased focus on a return to the works of the pious forefathers, the Quran, the Sunna, and human agency served to de-emphasize expectations among the reformers of the appearance of a Renewer who sometimes was equated with a supreme lawmaker or interpreter, a mujtahid, whose authoritarianism was contrary to the demotic visions of the reformers. This is perhaps nowhere more discernable than in an article in the Tashkent journal al-Iṣlāḥ in 1915, in which the author stressed the necessity of a return to authoritative Islamic books, and in relation to this wrote: “we do not need a Renewer”609. Although here situated in a polemical context that was not focused on the Renewer per se, the decision whether or not humanity needs a Re-

607 Donish, Risola, 132.
608 See the purpose of the Risola as stated on page 12, Donish, Risola, 12.
newer had, historically, not been expressed in terms of a decision taken by human beings as he was sent by God. This article reveals an increased emphasis on human agency as opposed to divine agency, the need for individual verification (tahqiq and tadjiq), and by extension, less emphasis on hierarchical cataclysmic apocalypticism and the arrival of the Rightly Guided.

The relocation of the Renewer in the paradigm on progress is similar to al-Afghani’s relocation of the Rightly Guided in this paradigm, although in al-Afghani’s relocation the emphasis on space-based geography is even more pronounced. According to Nikkie Keddie, al-Afghani implied in one of his articles that “mahdism is primarily a tool, useful for getting Muslim believers to rally around a leader in order to build a political empire.” This not only implies that al-Afghani instrumentalized “messianic appeals”, which according to Keddie was unusual, but also is yet another sign that there existed different eschatological scenarios during the same period of chronologically uniform time.

Despite the transformed temporal and spatial boundaries of the Renewer in some circles, and the instrumentalization of “mahdism” elsewhere, the traditional eschatological significations of the Renewer made the reformists, at least in Bukhara, prone to avoid it altogether. Instead they subscribed to the concept of the Advocates of Progress, a concept that put more emphasis on human agency, and had features in common with transformational apocalypticism. It signified a different eschatological scenario than the Renewer historically had represented.

During the increased disagreement over the direction of discontinuity in Bukhara at the beginning of the 20th century, at least for some Bukharan reformers, “Renewal” (tajdid) was largely seen as a unidirectional concept signifying a struggle to become contemporary. Yet, the same Bukharans also seem to have considered the “Renewer” (Mujaddid) to represent a unidirectional call for reforms, but in a diametrically opposite direction than renewal. During the second decade of the 20th century, it was thus not a Renewer who carried out renewal in Bukhara, but the Advocates of Progress. It is somewhat ironic that “the mujaddid hadīth originated in an attempt to legitimize something new, i.e. al-Shafi‘ī’s teaching. Only later did it play a part (although marginal) in the defence of the Sunna against innovation and heresy.”

The Bukharan reformers, under the name of Jadīdī, similarly aspired

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to introduce something new, though within the context of a different eschatological scenario, a renewal and restoration they advocated with words derived from the same Arabic root, jdd, as in tajdid (“Renewal”).

8.5.2 The Advocates of Progress

As seen above, the lexeme taraqqī, in which the concept of progress was embedded, became a catchword in reformist circles in Bukhara at the beginning of the 20th century. Similarly, those who adhered to the paradigm of progress and thus viewed themselves as advocating progress in Bukhara, called themselves “advocates of progress” (sg. taraqqīparvar), “those who want progress” (taraqqīkhvāhān), “advocates of education” (sg. maʿārifparvar)615, and “those who want schools” (maktabkhvāhān).616 While their use of the expression Advocates of Progress did not greatly differ from how some of the contemporary reformers used the concept of the Renewer, it differed from Suyuti’s and Sirhindi’s use of “Renewer” in so far as the Bukharan reformers emphasized human agency and deemphasized cataclysmic apocalypticism. For the Advocates of Progress, education was of prime importance. Education would facilitate the emergence of a modern citizenry who would transcend their current social paradigm617 and adapt it to the demands of the new time. The concept of Advocates of Progress, like that of “revolutionary” in Europe,618 denoted a duty of activism. The Advocates of Progress should make their nation progress by means of tools of progress, tools that were the markers of progress seen in the developed world. In a section about Berlin, Mirza Siraj writes in his travelogue that:

The tools of progress and education, which were seen in the towns of Germany, were also widespread and present in the villages and country districts. Each village had an excellent primary school, a well-organized secondary school, a hospital, a theatre, a hotel, and a recreational park, and the expenses are covered by the German constitutional government.619

Needless to say, the pre-modern Renewers, traditionally sent by God, had no similar tools. The Advocates of Progress, like some of the 19th and early 20th century modernist versions of the Renewer, were space-based and bidirectional in the sense that they mainly sought an ethical model in the past, while engaging in a struggle to make their nations contemporary. The ideal type of the contemporaneity they sought was largely situated in the developed world.

616 Aynī, “Ṭaʿrikhī inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 100.
617 For transformational apocalyptic scenarios, see Landes, “Roosters Crow, Owls Hoot”, 28.
618 For the latter, see Koselleck, Futures Past, 52.
619 Mirzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuhaf-i Bukhārā, 115.
8.6 Conclusion

The works of Ahmad Kalla, and also Vazih’s travelogue, reveal different narratives of progress and decline prior to the appearance of a discourse of progress centred on a horizontally structured taragqī. Instead of the latter, they used cosmographical categories, categories that were intelligible to their fellow Bukharan Muslim scholars, in order not only to explain and contextualize the technological and industrial development that took place during the second half of the 19th century, but also to convince them that the stories they told them about the outside world were true. Vazih, like Ahmad Kalla, also emphasized human agency, something which at least partly can be explained by the increasingly anthropocentric world of the 19th century.

The above also suggests that as contacts with the outside world became more common in the early 20th century, a more standardized narrative of decline and progress was established among the Advocates of Progress and Muslim reformers elsewhere. This process was also related to increased economic growth on a global scale. Taragqī was thus also an economic concept, sometimes difficult to distinguish from rivāj. Similarly, the links between development, innovation, economic growth and knowledge, made education an important aspect of progress. However, the translation of ethics into spacial terms, in which citizens with lofty morals should help their country to make progress, was not followed by a temporal reorientation, in so far as it was still the classical Islamic works of the past (even if they belonged to a more distant past) that were emphasized. However, the increased emphasis on space-based geography certainly did spatially transform taragqī into what probably should be considered a new spatial framework.

Can we then discuss this in terms of cognitive dissonance, with the technological developments during the Age of Synergy undermining the plausibility of the dominating eschatological scenario with its cataclysmic apocalypticism and emphasis on divine agency? During the 20th century, that was at least what some Bukharan Advocates of Progress argued, and their arguments were voiced from the point of view of a retrospective sense of discontinuity. However, considering how vigorously these points were argued, the antagonists of the Advocates of Progress do not seem to have been easily convinced. They still adhered to the eschatological scenario of cataclysmic apocalypticism, which in the 1910s contributed to an increased discursive polarization between the eschatological scenario of divine-led cataclysmic apocalypticism and progress, with the latter sometimes resembling the eschatological scenario of human led-transformational apocalypticism.

This dichotomy is also evident in the conceptualization of the traditional key eschatological agents, the Renewer and the Rightly Guided. The eschatological shift, including a shift in agency, affects the Renewer, who becomes spatialized and ceases to be an exclusively Islamic agent. The Renewer is also affected by an increased emphasis on human agency at the
expense of divine agency, as it is up to humans to accept him. This Renewer is thus difficult to distinguish from the Advocate of Progress. However, in Bukhara during the protectorate era, there are no examples of Advocates of Progress who called themselves Renewers. In Bukhara, the polarization of eschatological scenarios thus seems to have compromised the Renewer in the eyes of the Advocates of Progress as the former was too closely associated with the eschatological scenario of cataclysmic apocalypticism and divine agency.

Although one key argument here is that there was an increased eschatological polarization during the 1910s between human-led transformational apocalypticism and a concept of progress on the one hand, and cataclysmic apocalypticism on the other, Ahmad Kalla’s *Criteria of Religiosity* reveals an eschatological polarization between these two scenarios during the 1880s. Ahmad Kalla’s denunciation of the Shias was probably motivated by the high positions some Shia held in the Bukharan administration. Furthermore, as he was a Muslim scholar, well versed in Islamic history and eschatology, his denunciation of the Shia also had an eschatological dimension. But as someone who in Russia had experienced the accelerated rhythm of temporal experience, he had to defend the eschatological scenario of cataclysmic apocalypticism while accommodating some kind of progress. Ahmad Kalla’s various theories of progress and decline, despite his repeatedly voicing a belief in the end of the world, can thus be seen as reflecting various attempts to confine progress within the paradigm of prophecy. This is very different from the Bukharan reformers of the 20th century, who tried to confine the apocalyptic within a paradigm of progress. This suggests that from an eschatological perspective, the Bukharan reformers of the 20th century were much closer to the Shias and the Babis than to Ahmad Kalla. Analogously, the Qadīmī, denounced by the Bukharan reformers of the 20th century, seem thus to have been the eschatological inheritors of Ahmad Kalla and, as we will see in the next chapter, these eschatological implications contributed to the 20th century Bukharan reformers, the Advocates of Progress, being denounced as Shia and Bahai (the spiritual successors of the Babi).
9. An apocalyptic time

9.1 A happy future

The “future” the Bukharan reformers wished to attain was not only new in terms of its yet-to-come historical content, but also to some extent its very name. The Bukharan reformers frequently labelled it with the previously rare lexeme āyanda, an āyanda that offered a new set of temporal extensions emanating from a belief in the possibility to create and control the future through human agency guided by the Advocates of Progress, and not merely to ethically postpone a cosmic catastrophic apocalypse by means of a Renower sent by God. The Bukharan reformers thus tried to contain the future, which also required that they contain the apocalyptic. In his Guide to Salvation, Fitrat shifts the focus from a discussion about what he seems to have considered a common belief, that the resurrection is imminent, to a struggle for happiness in this world and in the world to come.\(^{620}\)

In the 20\(^{th}\) century paradigm of progress, the Advocates of Progress and the Renewers were both located squarely within the realm of human agency. In the discursive landscape of the time, this paradigm closely resembles the eschatological scenario of progressive millennialism and transformational apocalypticism. This scenario was also temporally truncated, but whereas the possibility to postpone (through ethical cultivation) the cosmic apocalypse in the paradigm of prophecy did not completely eradicate the fears of an imminent cosmic end, in the paradigm of progress this cosmic end, including the doctrine of a bodily-resurrection, was still believed in, yet rarely discussed, and was thus indefinitely postponed. It was referred to for example in the Bukharan reformists’ booklet “The Necessities of Religion” (Ẓarūriyyāt-i dīniyya) as the belief in the “end of the world” (ākharī-i zamān-i duniyā) when the whole of creation, except paradise and hell, will be destroyed, and a “bodily resurrection” (ba’s-i ba’d az mawt) will occur.\(^{621}\) Although postponed, the resurrection still marked the endpoint of progress as a human achievement before God inherits the earth. The resurrection hence signified the end of the future in the paradigm of progress as well, although this was rarely emphasized. It was kept largely as a dogma in an era where progress

\(^{620}\) Fitrat, ”Rohbari najot”, Sadoi sharq, no. 7–8: esp. 20.

had become more of a mainstream Sunni Islamic reformist creed, though still a controversial one. And unlike in the work of Ahmad Kalla referred to above, the early 20th century Bukharan reformers seem not to have referred to the resurrection in order to denounce the Shia.

The beginning of the future was the new time. A new era that was already here, an era to which one had to adapt. This future was structured by Jalāl in terms of “striving” (kūshish), “effort” (ijtihād), and “verification” (taḥqīq),622 concepts that emphasized human agency and had both social implications, as they would help the nation to make progress, and a spiritual dimension, as progress was seen as a religious imperative. Fitrat writes:

Progress is what makes humans the noblest of creation: they can make progress and decline.623

And the aim of progress (and elevation) was to reach “happiness” (saʿādat).624

Praiseworthy morals are also a cause of spiritual progress and happiness. Spiritual happiness consists of the endeavour to please the peerless God. If someone achieves spiritual happiness, he will obtain eternal life in the “two mansions” (dū surā).625

The popularity of al-Ghazzali’s Alchemy of Happiness probably contributed to the Bukharan reformers’ focus on “happiness” (saʿādat), a central concept in Islamic philosophy. However, in the works of al-Ghazzali happiness seems to have had different spatial and temporal boundaries. It was a spiritual and individual concept, of which the acquisition of “science” (ʿilm) was an important aspect. But this happiness was directed to the world to come, and al-Ghazzali’s Alchemy of Happiness was “a manual, a guidebook, for the wayfarer’s progress toward that goal.”626 Yet, happiness had also societal implications as in practice it was an aspect of good governance, and as such also was a political concept.627

622 This paragraph is based on Jalāl, “Vaqt ʿazīz ast”, BSh 42 (29 Apr. 1912 [12 May 1912]): 1.
623 Fitrat, Munāzara, 67.
627 For a brief discussion on Saʿādat in the political treaties of al-Fārābī, see Miriam Galston, “The Theoretical and Practical Dimensions of Happiness as Portrayed in the Political Treatises of al-Fārābī”, in The Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Muḥsin S. Mahdi, ed. Charles E. Butterworth (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992), esp. 148–151. This can also be compared with the concept of happiness in Mir Sayyid
During the second decade of the 20th century, happiness was temporalized and became related to the progress and decline of nations. The increased emphasis on space-based geography and the eschatological shift from cataclysmic apocalypticism to progress served to transform the concept of happiness. To a considerable extent, happiness was relocated from the “hereafter” (ākhirat) to the “new time” (zamān-i jadīd) and was cast in a form of a new social contract. The above is evident in an article by Jalal that begins “happiness is a word that recently has become common”, thereby stating the reason why Jalal’s has to “explain” what happiness is.

Jalal writes that there are two kinds of happiness. The first relates to the individual and includes “joy”, “pleasure”, and “delight”. The second kind of happiness is related to the “nation” and “people” (millat and qawm) and includes consensus, which is based on education; the ability to tell right from wrong, which is related to the acquisition of science; agreement on the causes of joy; and the support of nobles.

As happiness was temporalized, the tools for promoting progress and happiness partially overlapped. Science, for example, was to be found among the tools for reaching happiness, and these “sciences” are not limited to the Islamic sciences. Jalal further stresses that it is a “holy duty” of the Muslim scholars never to obstruct the “progress and elevation of their society”, but instead to encourage the acquisition of sciences. This primacy of science and the new spatial boundaries of happiness also make happiness an aspect of educational reform in Bukhara. Jalal argues that the focus on commentaries and glosses is a hindrance to reaching happiness, because other sciences have been neglected. The acquisition of the latter sciences will help the Bukharsans to reach happiness in this new time, a new time that is present elsewhere, as these sciences are already studied and taught in the developed world.

9.3 A normative present

The conceptualization of the contemporary era as a unique and new time, as a historical discontinuity opening towards the future, made it imperative that its believers adapt to its demands. The arguments put forward in favour of reforms were thus based both on the idea of a spiritual and ethical restoration

Ali Hamadani’s Zakhirat al-mulūk, which like Kimiyā al-sa’ādat influenced Ahmad Kalla. For this influence, see Hodizoda, Ahmadi Donish, 238–243.


of the society that existed at the time of the prophet, as well as on making societal progress by adapting to the demands of the new time and to a social and technological order that already existed in the contemporary world of which Bukhara was not yet a part.

In the tense political environment of Bukharan in the 1910s, the heated political debate over the normativity of the extended present could be reduced to a disagreement over the direction of discontinuity. Those who had a prospective sense of discontinuity were denounced as uninformed about the demands of the contemporary era as transmitted through the extended present. In his post-revolutionary accounts, Sharifjan Makhdum thus denounced the opponents of reform for their lack of knowledge of the extended present:

Because Bukhara had old bonds of friendship with Russia, they [the Bukharan reformers] requested that the state of Bukhara should take the path of unity, friendship, and harmony, and exchange the “despotic government” (hukūmat-i istildād) for republicanism and freedom. Emir Alim Khan gathered the “ministers” (vuzarā), Muslim scholars, and “nobles” (‘uzamā) and presented this for discussion. They discussed, and none of the inhabitants of Bukhara accepted this “idea” (amr). They were essentially and absolutely dissatisfied. Because they completely neglected the political situation, and were completely ignorant of the existing circumstances, opposed to reality, and ignorant of the affairs of foreign states.633

The demands of the time were even more evident in Ayni’s account of a discussion between the merchant Mirza Muhiddin and the head of the fiscal administration, Mirza Nasrullah, in 1917:

because this is a time of revolutions and upheavals it is difficult to preserve the government without carrying out reforms.634

As an opponent of the Bukharan reformers, Mirza Salim-bik, regardless of how he conceptualized the present, could not, at least for political reasons, argue in terms of a normative present to which the Bukharans had to adapt. Salim-bik thus gives a conceptually very different account of the events narrated by Sharifjan Makhdum above. For Mirza Salim-bik, the reforms that had been carried out in Russia and Turkey in no way reflected a normative way of governance in the contemporary era; he did not refer to the extended present, and in his view, progress did not legitimate demands for reform. According to Salim-bik, Sharia was the central concept used by the opponents of the Bukharan reformers in the citadel of Bukhara when they denounced the calls for reforms in the emirate.

633 Sharifjān Makhdūm, Žikr-i sultānat, fol. 52a.
[Mirza Nasrullah said:] in the “province” (vilāyat) of Russia “liberty” (hurri-yat) has been implemented. In order to ease the situation of the people, there will be liberty here too, and our work will be done with advantage. The representatives said: all your efforts will bring nothing but mischief. [Mirza Nasrullah then left the room and came back with the Emir who said:] Accept liberty for my sake. I am also a human being. All my effort are for the sake of your welfare and ease. Everyone spoke out in a loud voice: as long as we remain alive we will absolutely not accept “this kind of liberty” (īn ṭariqa hurriyat). Liberty is the “foundation” (aṣl) of our Sharia. We will not transgress the authority of the Sharia.635

The arguments put forward by the two sides were thus fundamentally different. The lack of knowledge of the extended present could not become an issue in these discussions, as the opponents of reform took their recourse to Sharia. But, as has been argued above, this does not imply that the opponents of reform were uninformed about the world outside Bukhara, only that they did not invoke the specific demands of the contemporary era in order to support their opposition to reform.

The opponents of reform did, of course, put the experiences of other Muslim communities in relationship to their own. The Bukharan reformer Ayni writes, for example, that one opponent of reform argued against the new-method school on the basis of the Turkish experience where the reason for Sultan Abd al-Hamid’s dethronement was his support of the new-method schools.636 This can be compared with the Bukharan reformer Fitrat, who wrote in 1909 that the new-method schools were good because they were widespread in other parts of the Muslim world,637 and in early 1918 Ayni would compare foreign schools with new-method schools in Russia.638 This kind of comparison with the outside world seems, however, not to have been common among the opponents of reforms beyond sometimes serving as a warning of what not to do. Like these arguments in favour of the new-method schools, the calls for a form of liberty modelled on experiences drawn from the extended present also represented something new and thus unislamic.

The disputed direction of discontinuity was clearly reflected in the coefficient of change in the concept of reform. The idea of reform proposed by some Bukharans who adhered to the paradigm of progress did not fit into Voll’s definition of the concept as a “process of restoration and renewal”. In their view, reform was instead a process of “self-conscious innovation”. That is, in Voll’s conception of “renewal” (tajdid) and “reform” (iṣlāḥ), they point in the same direction; i.e. they are experience-based concepts:

635 Mirzā Salīm-bīk, Ta’rikh-i Salīmī, fols. 132a–132b.
636 Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 162.
637 Fitrat, Munāzara, 41–42.
638 Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 45.
[I]slah and tajdid are modes of reform that do not depend upon a concept of “progress” for their validity. The perfect model is already available in the revelation. The purpose of the mujaddid or the muslihun is not to perfect the model, it is to implement an already existing ideal.639

However, the temporalization that took place during the early 20th century in Bukhara not only polarized the Renewer and the Advocates of Progress, but also reform and renewal. Algar writes:

[T]he essence of tajdid is the revival of Sunna and the eradication of bid’ā; it is not a part of the responsibility of the mujaddid to bring about comprehensive change on the political plane. […] It is […] a strictly modern (not to say modernist) expansion of the concept tajdid to have it include political activism as a defining element.640

If we can call Algar’s definition of the “essence of tajdid” (“renewal”) an ideal type, then, analogously, Voll’s definition of reform does not cover the whole semantic range of reform, a concept that in the early 20th century had entered the realm of societal progress and thus was oriented toward adopting the order of the contemporary era. That is, contrary to Voll’s conception, both reform and renewal were, in the paradigm of progress, dependent upon a concept of progress for their validity. Those who strove for this kind of reform hence argued that it was not only compatible with, but also favoured by Islam. Still, their ideas about reforming education as well as the administration were easily denounced as originating in the more developed countries. The reforms that Russia called for in Bukhara in 1914 included fixed salaries and specified duties for state employees, i.e. an administrative order and, by extension, a social contract never before seen in Bukhara. The calls for reforms that were made after 1917 were similarly based on western ideas about modern administration. For their opponents it was obvious that this reform did not mean “repair and restoration, the exchanging of rotten elements for solid and healthy ones in order to re-establish the previous sound condition”,641 but rather the adoption of, or conversion to something new and unislamic.642 When reform thus became a central, politically charged concept, it could not remain unchallenged.

As result of the political conflicts that raged in 1917, the reformers were deprived of the lexeme “reform” (iṣlāḥ), and their calls for reforms were instead described in terms of liberty. “Liberty” (hurriyat) was a word rarely encountered in pre-revolutionary Bukharan political terminology. For the opponents of reform it was close to signifying what is unislamic and foreign,

639 Voll, “Renewal and Reform in Islamic History”, 34.
641 Baldauf claims that this is an “autochthonous” Central Asian definition of iṣlāḥ derived from the Tashkent journal al-Iṣlāḥ, see Baldauf, “Jadidism in Central Asia”, 74.
and it had no temporal connotations beyond being yet another catchword signifying that the end of the world was approaching. It was associated with the calls for constitutionalism, and even republicanism,⁶⁴³ and thus drew from the experiences of not only the events in Russia after February 1917, but also other Muslim countries, like Turkey and Iran. The Bukharan merchant Mirza Siraj’s impressions from the discussions on constitutionalism in Iran serve as an indicator of this:

During the few days that we spent in Isfahan we went to public and private gatherings. People were talking about constitutionalism and liberty. Most of the people were perplexed, because until then they had heard nothing about constitutionalism. Teachers were explaining in speeches to them that constitutionalism makes the country prosper. Constitutionalism is the construction of justice. Constitutionalism is the honour of the state and progress of the nation. Constitutionalism is freedom from oppression for the “people” (fuqarā).⁶⁴⁴

In 1917 the Bukharans knew as little or even less about constitutionalism and liberty as the Iranians knew more than 10 years earlier. But whereas the calls for reforms and a constitution succeeded in Iran, they were a complete failure in Bukhara, and in the end the reformists were deprived even of the very word reform:

[T]he word reform disappeared, and in its place the word liberty appeared, and rumours appeared that the Advocates of Progress wanted Bukhara to become [a country] without a king and have liberty like Russia. And the meaning of Liberty is that everyone does want they want and no one can stop them, the women are left to their own free will, and the women will shed their veils, etc. And now are they stirring up the people against reforms with this kind of groundless ideas.⁶⁴⁵

These “groundless ideas” were in effect nothing other than a traditional denunciation on the grounds of heresy. The opponents of reform seem thus to have striven to keep reform a unidirectional concept rather, than a bidirectional concept belonging to both the realm of societal progress, based on the order of the contemporary era, and to the realm of spiritual progress, directed towards the pious forefathers. For the opponents of reform, liberty signified the unislamic disorder at the end of time. The increased polarization in Bukhara during the 1910s seems, however, to have made it increasingly difficult to use bidirectional concepts, because a central aspect of the

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⁶⁴³ According to one account, one group of demonstrators that supported the calls for reform, carried red flags where it was written “Liberty” (hurriyat) and “Republic” (jumhuriyat). See Genis, Vitse-konsul Vvedenskii, 89–90.
⁶⁴⁴ Mīrzā Sirāj, Safarnāma-yi tuhaf-i Bukhārā, 305.
political struggle was expressed in terms of disagreement over the direction of discontinuity.

9.4 Kufr, jadīd, and bida‘

In the 19th century the word jadīd ("new") was not so frequently used in Central Asian Persian. Other words for new, like nav or tāza, were more common. The new-method schools in Bukhara were thus also referred to as "new schools" (maktab-i nav\(^{646}\) or maktab-i tāza\(^{647}\)) where one could study the "new sciences" ('ulūm-i jadīd, also referred to as 'ulūm-i tāza).\(^{548}\) The main difference between jadīd, tāza and nav was that jadīd became much more politically loaded during the 1910s, when it was associated not only with new-method schools, but also with a group of people that in effect advocated a different eschatological scenario and thus easily could be denounced as unislamic. As a group identity marker, jadīd was also used in the construction Jadīd al-Islām ("new Islam/Muslims"), short form Jadīdi, which signified Jews from Mashhad that formally had converted to Shia Islam and were involved in extensive trade with Bukhara. Jadīd al-Islām was thus comparable to the classification Challa used for Jewish converts to Islam in Bukhara. Such converts tended to maintain their customs and traditions. As recent converts, they were frequently viewed with suspicion by other Muslims.\(^{649}\)

The similarities between the eschatological scenarios of the Bahais and the Bukharan reformers, as well as the role Bahais in the new-method schools in Iran, their presence in Russian Turkistan, including their school (and temple) in the important trading town of Ashgabat,\(^{650}\) and their presence in Bukhara, also made the adherents of the new-method schools in Bukhara look suspicious. Moreover, like the Bukharan reformers, the Bahais were not only proselytizing their beliefs, but to a large extent consisted of merchants and traders.\(^{651}\) Like elsewhere, the conceptual boundaries between the calls

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646 Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 64.
647 See for example Fitrat, Munāzara, 40.
648 Fitrat Bukhārāyī, Munāzara, 31.
650 G.M. Dzhazani, Iz istorii vzaimootnoshenii mezhdyu dorevolyutsionným Turkistanom i Iransom (konets xix – nachalo xx v.). Avtoreferat dissertatsii na soiskanie uchenoi stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk (Tashkent: Akademii nauk Uzbekskoi SSR, 1963), esp. 22.
for reforms among Muslim reformers and among the Bahais where probably far from clear, and the Bukharan reformers were frequently denounced as Babis (bābīgī, bābgaryāyī),652 which in this context is equivalent to Bahai.653 Mirza Siraj was probably not the only one in the emirate who was aware that many of those in favour of the constitutional revolution in Iran were denounced as Bahais.654

The risk of being denounced as unislamic probably made the Bukharan reformers reluctant to refer to themselves as Jadīdī,655 a name they got from the new-method schools (maktābā-yī jadīd).656 Nevertheless, the Bukharan reformers referred to themselves as “the new” (jadīdān), and also as “those who want reforms” (islāhātkhāhān),657 “advocates of progress” (taraqqīparvarān/taraqqīparvarlar), “reformers” (arbāb-i īslāh),658 “the young” (javānān, yāshān/yāshlar), and “the enlightened” (ziyālīlar and munavvarlar).659 Many of these labels are temporalized and projected into the future. The labels the Russian authorities applied to the Bukharan reformers also reflect a temporalization. The Russian Political Agency in Bukhara divided in 1911 the Bukharans into two parties, i.e. “the young Bukharans” (mladobukharskaya) and “the conservatives” (konservativnaya).660 Similarly the Russian authorities in old Bukhara called the opponents of the reformer Damla Ikram “conservatives” in 1913.661 The opponents of the “conservatives” were called “representatives of the progressive part of the religious establishment” (predstavitelei progressivnŏi chastĭ dukhovnenstva).662 In 1911 another Russian report said that that in Bukhara there were two main “political parties”, the young Bukharans and the conservatives.663

While admiration for western technology and social structures was a factor in the emergence of the concept of progress in Bukhara, the whole temporalized discourse in 19th and early 20th century Bukhara seems to have been alien to Bukharan society, and thus also very controversial. For the reformers it was thus also imperative to portray the novelties of the present

652 As in “They closed your schools and newspapers and accused you for being Jaḍīdī and Bahais”, Sitamdīda, “Türkistân vaṭan-i māst!”, Sİ 7 (22 May 1919): 2.
653 Bihbudi for example, equalizes Babi with Bahai, see Mahmūd Khvāja, “Sayyāḥat khāṭīralar-i 1”, Āyina 34 (14 June 1914 [27 June 1914]): 811.
654 Mirzā Sirāj, Ṣafarāmā-yī tuḥaf-i Bukhārā, 352.
655 See also Fedtke, “Jadīds, Young Bukharans, Communists and the Bukharan Revolution”, 486; and Khotamov, Sverzhenie āmrskogo rezhima v Bukhore, 78.
656 Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform, 89. See also Fiṭrāt, Munāẓara, 31.
657 Ayni calls those who did not content themselves with gradual reforms in the emirate, people that like unlike himself were not focused on education and newspapers, “extremist reformers” (islōhītkhōhōnī mufritī Bukhoro). Ayni, “Ta’rikhī inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 162.
658 Fiṭrāt, Munāẓara, 34.
660 TsGARUz, I. 3, op. 2, d. 150, l. 10a.
661 TsGARUz, I. 3, op. 2, d. 215, l. 66.
662 TsGARUz, I. 3, op. 2, d. 150, l. 35.
663 TsGARUz, I. 3, op. 2, d. 150, l. 10a.
as Islamic and as originating in the past, in order to prevent the “new”/“novelties” (jadīd) from being equated with “religiously unlawful innovations” (bīda’). Bihbudi hence claimed that the Bukharan reformers were actually the true adherents of the old order.

If we look closely, for five or six centuries the Islamic world has predominantly been in decline, and according to the words and complaints of Ḥazrat-i Mawlawī [Jami], the cause of the corruption of the Islamic world was [...] the Muslim scholars [among others]. If someone utters these words at this time, they say that he is an innovator of a new method or an unbeliever. But it is namely so that almost 400 years ago he [Jami] complained about the Muslim scholars, “mystics” (rūḥāniyin), sheikhs, and “chieftains” (ru’asā), and said that they were the cause of the weakness of Islam. So today the advocates of progress and reforms are not “new” (jadīd), but “adherents of the old” (Qadīmchī), and belong among the followers of the pious forefathers.664

Bihbudi illustrates the complicated classification Jadīd in yet another article in Āyina in 1914:

Qadīmī: Brother! You, who they call Jadīdī, have you invented a new religion?
Jadīdī: God forbid! We have never done this and we will not do it, praised be God. Our religion is Islam and the Quran is our model.
Qadīmī: So why do they call you Jadīdī?
Jadīdī: They call us Jadīdī for two reasons. The first reason is that during the last three or four centuries, the Qadīmī have gradually deviated from some of the commandments of the Quran, so that at this time these commandments are nearly forgotten. Even if you recite a verse from the word of God and say its meaning, they call you an unbeliever, such out of fear of [being accused of] disbelief, you cannot help but become silent, and in your own heart you think that the Quran might belong to the Qadīmī. But it is actually the case that the Qadīmī read neither Quran commentaries nor Hadiths in the madrasas. So if they themselves are like this, why do they call others, who speak a word from the Quran, unbelievers? Because of this, the Jadīdī want to put the Quran, from the beginning to the end, into practice again, and turn Islam and the Muslims a way from “baseness” (raẓālat), and make them [Islam and the Muslims] “advanced” (mutaraqqū) and “civilized” (mutamad-dīn) like in “their original condition” (ḥālat-i avvaliyash). The second reason is that the Jadīdī, according to the commandments of the Quran and the demands of the time, want to learn all kinds of “new sciences and technologies” (‘ulūm u funūn-i jadīda), like philosophy, geography, arithmetic, geometry, medicine, history, Russian, French, English, etc. These are the reasons that they call us Jadīdī.
Qadīmī: We have understood that you appear to be a very knowledgeable person.
Jadīdī: Please, respected senior scholar [Dāmlā].
Qadīmī: Well, I will not say anything about those sciences now, but anyone who learns the Russian language will gradually have his morals cor-

rupted and his belief weakened. Because of this, it is absolutely not correct to learn the Russian language.

Jadīdī: With respect, so far no one’s belief has become weak and no one has become an unbeliever for the reason that he has learned the Russian language, and it will not happen. Similarly, in previous times, Muslims settled in the same cities as Greeks and others, and learned their languages. They neither became Greeks nor unbelievers. Today, too we learn Russian out of necessity, and we will neither become Russians nor unbelievers. Now that the ruler of our country is Russian, it is necessary to learn not only his language, but also his writings and laws.

Qadīmī: You said that the Qadīmī read neither Quran commentaries nor hadith, but the Jadīdī are reading [them]. Well, come on, show me. Is there a person among the Jadīdī in Turkistan who has written a Quran commentary [tafsīrdān]?

Jadīdī: At this time, there has not appeared a person who has written a Quran commentary among the Jadīdī in Turkistan. But in Egypt, Istanbul, Caucasus, Tataristan there are many Muslim scholars who have written Quran commentaries and who apart from the religious sciences are informed about contemporary science and technology. They always prove to the Europeans that Islam is a perfect civilization and protect Islam from their arguments and attacks. We Jadīdī are loyal to such very learned Muslim scholars. Our aim is to send students to the madrasas of those countries, and afterwads to produce such religious Muslim scholars.

Qadīmī: Brother! Give me a one-hour break so that I can go and study and not keep my friends waiting. Now, collect your wits in your head because you have not managed to convince me with these words. I still have much to discuss.

Jadīdī: Well, read your lessons and come back. We will talk again.665

The denunciation of the Bukharan reformers and their ideas as religiously unlawful innovations was a central feature of the debate that surrounded the closure of the new-method schools in Bukhara. According to Ayni’s account from 1918 of the discussions that led to the closure of Munzim’s new-method school, the person who held the position just beneath the chief judge, Burhan al-Din, called it a religiously unlawful innovation. The refusal of the Shia head of the fiscal administration to close the new-method schools also made the schools appear to be Shia. The Sunni Burhan al-Din thus told the Shia head of the fiscal administration (Astanaqul):

This school is an religiously unlawful innovation and haram. Because I [Burhan al-Din] am the executor of the Sharia, it is necessary that the banning of this school should rest on my shoulders, but as you [Astanaqul] are the supreme governor and are appointed by the King, I beg you, Your Excellency, to write me an official letter for the closing of the school, so that by presenting that letter I can close the school and eradicate this religiously unlawful innovation.

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When Burhan al-Din arrived back home after this meeting, he summoned the Muslim scholars and called for the closure of the school. The reasons for the closure were that it was a religiously unlawful innovation and that it was supported by the Shia head of the fiscal administration.

The head of the fiscal administration always renders assistance to the school. Because the head of the fiscal administration is a Shia and the school is a religiously unlawful innovation, he is naturally rendering assistance to this religiously unlawful innovation. If the head of the fiscal administration does not give the order to close the school, it is necessary that we, protectors of the Sunna, move against the head of the fiscal administration.666

Similarly, the discussions between the reformer Damlak Ikrak and his opponent Ghiyas Makhdumi Alam also centred on whether these schools were in accordance with the Sharia:

Even if these schools accord with the Sharia now, gradually, they will end up opposed to the Sharia [...] and even now they have some new inventions and deficiencies that you are unaware of.667

After 1917, when the political tensions escalated again, being called Jadid was enough to get one killed in Bukhara.668 In the work of a Jadid-hostile Muslim scholar, there were syntagmatic relationships between the Bukharan reformers, religiously unlawful innovations, and the Shia.669 In 1918 a Russian observer, well versed in Bukharan affairs, wrote that “the word ‘Dzhe-did’, that is, Young Bukharan, is used as a swear word.”670 Salim-bik supported the killing of them with reference to a Hadith:

At the end of time there will appear a group of men who are young and foolishly stupid, and have just reached maturity, and they speak the words of the great imam and other dignities. They mention a lot of things and speak an infinite numbers of words, and they fly from Islam like the arrow from the bow. Their faith does not pass their throats. Wherever you might encounter them, kill them! It is indeed so, as killing them brings many benefits on the resurrection day. They are the group of which the prophet (God’s peace be upon him) has said, most among them are boys who recently have reached maturity.671

666 Ayni, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 64.
668 For an early contemporary (and partisan) account of this, see Sitamid, “Bamunāsabat-i khabarhā-yi Buhkārā”, S/8 (29 May 1919), 1.
669 Mullā Ghaybullā Khvāja-yi Mirkhūrdī, Du‘ānāma-yi shāhī ki mutaţammin jangnāma-yi khāqānī ast, Ms. IVANRUz., no. 2166/1.
The value of *jadīd* was thus dependent on the direction of discontinuity. The disagreement about the direction of discontinuity became even clearer in 1918 when Aynī wrote that the Muslim scholars who favoured the closure of Munzim’s school back in 1909 were “against the movement” (*aksulhara-kat*), a movement that was the trajectory of progress. Attempts to portray the opponents of the Bukharan reformers as advocating religiously unlawful innovations seem to have been much less successful. The novelty of the Bukharan reformers’ ideas partly explains this, but also the fact that they, as some of the labels put on them show, were young, not only in terms of age, but also in terms of religious education. A gerontocracy, like the world of the Bukharan Muslim scholars, was difficult for a new and young generation with little support to challenge. They were thus easily denounced as young, foolish, and lacking religious credentials. There were, however, exceptions, perhaps most notably Damla Ikram, who accused the opponents of reforms of supporting religiously unlawful innovations. This was probably quite rare, and made Damla Ikram their prime enemy. It was probably more difficult to dismiss a senior Muslim scholar than the “young” and “foolish”.

9.5 A new Sharia and a new religion

A traditional historical marker of the beginning of a new era was the introduction of a new law by a new prophet. According to what in Bukhara was a very living tradition, pre-Islamic prophets had arrived in dark times and established “new Sharias” (*shariyat-i jadīda*) which marked new eras. Yet, since all these God-given laws are essentially identical, “new” (*jadīda*), in Tamkin’s untemporalized discourse, signified restoration rather than innovation. It was the restoration of a Sharia bestowed by a previous prophet, rather than recently created or invented Sharia. According to a story narrated by Tamkin, Adam abolished the Sharia of the jinns and fairies and ruled according to a new Sharia.

[A]ccording to the chroniclers, the prophet Adam was master of the new Sharia and the destroyer of the old order.

Other pre-Islamic prophets would then introduce “new” Sharias until Muhammad arrived. With Muhammad, the seal of the prophets, the cycle of the prophets came to an end, and the introduction of “new” Sharias was replaced by legal restoration, a duty that according to some traditions was performed

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673 See for example Tamkīn, *MFMZ*, fols. 73a–78b.
674 Tamkīn, *MFMZ*, fol. 75a.
by the Renewer who restores Muhammad’s Sharia.\textsuperscript{675} According to these traditions, the cycle of the renewers began after the death of Muhammad. The arrival of Muhammad thus marked a new era that according to some traditions was divided into a number of interregnums that followed the arrival, or at least demise, of a Renewer. In the paradigm of progress, as represented by the Bukharan reformer Fitrat, the prophets prior to Muhammad were instead placed in an evolutionary framework of progress which would lead to happiness in this world and in the world to come, i.e. to happiness in the two worlds.\textsuperscript{676}

The debate on the introduction of a new system of law in 20\textsuperscript{th} century Bukhara took place against the backdrop described above, but also the introduction of Russian law in Turkistan and legal reforms elsewhere in the Muslim world, such as the constitutional revolution in Iran. Some Bukharans thus voiced criticism of legal innovations in the same breath as they criticized new technical innovations and the power of the Shia in the emirate. The Bukharan Muslim scholar Sami accused the alliance between the Russians and the Shia in Bukhara of hating facilitated the spread of the zakūn, i.e. Russian law, and new inventions like the telegraph and the railroad.\textsuperscript{677}

As we have seen above, the close link between the Shia head of the fiscal administration, Astanaqul, and the Muslim reformers, and the latter’s support for constitutional reform, compromised the Bukharan reformers and lent credence to accusations that they wanted to replace the Sharia with a new legal system. In an article from 1912, Jalal thus denied that the Bukhara reformers wanted to replace the “Islamic Sharia” (\textit{Shariat-i islāmiya}) with “a new law” (qānūn-i jadīdī).\textsuperscript{678}

Another compromising factor was the belief that reforms in the emirate were dependent upon support from Russia. The Bukharan reformers sent a congratulatory telegram to the temporary government, and in March 1917 two Bukharan reformers (Fitrat and Musa Yuldashev) sent a letter to the Russian government calling for reforms of the emirate.\textsuperscript{679} The fact that such reforms were dependent upon new legislation also fuelled the accusations that the Bukharan reformers wanted to introduce a new Sharia, despite the latter arguing that their reforms did not contravene the present Sharia. This is especially evident in a discussion that allegedly took place in 1917 in which the merchant Mirza Muhiddin argued that the government would be stronger if “reforms that accord with the glorious Sharia would be implemented.”\textsuperscript{680}


\textsuperscript{676} Fitrat uses the word \textit{dīn} instead of Sharia, see ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf Fitrat, “Ḥayāt u ghāya-yi ḥayāt”, \textit{Āyina} 9 (21 Dec. 1913 [3 Jan. 1914]): 220–222.

\textsuperscript{677} Mīrzá ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Sāmī, \textit{Tārīkh-i salātīn-i manghītīyā}, fol. 108b.

\textsuperscript{678} Jalāl, “Vazāyīf”, \textit{BS}h 65 (27 May 1912 [9 June 1912]): 1.

\textsuperscript{679} Khotamov, \textit{Sverzhenie āmirskogo rezhima v Bukhare}, 101–102.

\textsuperscript{680} Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 167.
According to the same account, Mirza Muhiddin argued that in order to carry out reforms of the administration of the emirate, Bukhara needed the support of Russia.\textsuperscript{681} That is, a Muslim state needed the support of a non-Muslim country to carry out reforms, something that could imply that the Muslim reformers considered the order prevalent in Russia more “religiously correct” (ḥaqq) than the order prevalent in Bukhara. Jalal, for example, earlier claimed that only in name does the Sharia "remain among us" and that this is the reason for “our decline”\textsuperscript{682}

The conviction that Bukhara needed the support of Russia in order to carry out reforms was held by more people than just Mirza Muhiddin, and the general dependency on Russia made Russia less of a target of criticism, at least officially. Two prominent opponents of the Bukharan reformers (Burhan al-Din and Nizam al-Din Urganchi) thus associated the proposed reforms not primarily with Russia, but with persons or groups that were either non-Islamic, or had very questionable Islamic credentials, like Mirza Nasrulla, who at the time was serving as the head of the fiscal administration:

Some Bukharan reformers and advocates of progress, Shia and Jews, together with the head of the fiscal administration, want to destroy the government of his Excellency.\textsuperscript{683}

These sentiments, with eschatological implications, were echoed by Mirza Salim-bik in a 1920 work in which he accused the former head of the fiscal administration (Mirza Nasrulla) of having usurped the power of the emir to such an extent that “the king remained only in name”. He also accused him of introducing a new Sharia by inventing a new religion:

The king remained only in name. That ungrateful traitor [Mîrza Nasrulla], ignorant of God, was not satisfied with all this God-given power and preferred the claim of primacy, like Pharaoh, saying “I am your great God”, turning away from the Muslim religion, becoming an apostate, inventing a new religion in accordance with his own shortcomings, and later gradually inviting people among the Muslim scholars, the servants in the fiscal administration, and merchants to this “apostasy of the Jadīdīs’” (irtidād-i jadīdī).\textsuperscript{684}

\textsuperscript{681} Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 165. For a Russian perspective on this, see Genis, Vitse-konsul Vvedenskiï, 104.

\textsuperscript{682} Jalāl, “Vazāyi"f”, BS\textit{h} 65 (27 May 1912 [9 June 1912]): 1.

\textsuperscript{683} Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 158.

9.6 Revolution

The modern concept of revolution is another marker of the beginning of a new era. As a political concept, even in 17th century Europe “revolution” was limited by previous experience and usually signified little more than a minor political upheaval. It was only at the time of the French Revolution that it signified a political project that was dependent upon human action in the form of revolutionaries.685

The common Greek heritage has probably contributed to the similarities between “revolution” in Europe and “revolution” (inqilāb) in Bukhara, the latter lexeme signifying both a “revolution in the celestial spheres” (inqilāb-i charkh-i dauwār) and minor upheavals, “the vicissitudes of time” (inqilābātī-i zamāna),686 but outside the realm of astronomy always implying something negative, a situation that needed to be restored to the natural order.

Before the October Revolution in 1917, the Bukharans’ experience of seeking structural revolution through violent political subversion was limited. Although the events in Iran, Russia and Turkey in the early 20th century moved the horizons of expectation closer to some Bukharans, the Bukharans did not subscribe to the concept of “revolutionaries” (inqilābiyūn). For some of them, revolution took on a processual character, reminiscent of a feature of transformational apocalypticism, that they thought would lead Bukhara to the contemporary era, but not through political cataclysms. Revolution thus took on a positive connotation for some Bukharans who did not contemplate possible revolutionary upheavals, but rather saw it as a way to save the nation.

One of the first echoes of this conceptualization of revolution is found in a letter written by Fitrat to the editor of The Noble Bukhara in 1912, in which he calls for a “social revolution” (inqilāb-i ijtīmāʾī) in order to cure the “social disease of the nation” so that it can enter the “highway of progress”. Although this social revolution is regarded as a gradual process, with science as the cure,687 it nevertheless presupposes a completely different Bukharian society after a large-scale campaign of education.

The gradual notion of revolution that focused on the realm of education was not limited to the author of the letter above, but was also central in Ayni’s reasoning in 1918, which can be read as a justification of his activities during the 1910s, but also as a way to distance himself from Faizulla Khvaja after the “Kolesov incident”, from the Bolsheviks, and from the cata-

686 Donish, Risola, 165. See also Sharʿī, Taḵkira-yi sharʿī, Ms. IVANRUz, no. 3396/III, fols. 71a–71b.
clysmic consequences of the political upheavals in Bukhara and Turkistan after the Russian February Revolution of 1917.

My approach to a nation and government’s political and social revolution was gradual. I did not consider a beneficial revolution to be possible without the consent and enlightened thinking of the public.688

[The newspapers] The Noble Bukhara and Tūron had a good influence in Bukhara. In summary, there was an intellectual and educational revolution. Among the students of the old madrasas there was a discussion on reforming the schools and the madrasas, and there were discussions about the present curricula being disadvantageous.689

As the Bolsheviks strengthened their control over Russian Turkistan, the conceptualization of revolution as a gradual process was suppressed, as were rivalling eschatological scenarios. Ayni’s History of the Intellectual Revolution in Bukhara of 1918 was only published in 1926 in a revised form under the name “Material on the History of the Bukharan Revolution” (Bukhārā inqilābī tārīkhi uchun materiallar).690 These two works stressed human agency at the expense of divine intervention, and thus followed in the tradition of the Bukharan reformers, but the publication of the latter work also indicated that the eschatology of the Jadādīs had been replaced by a (human led) sudden and cataclysmic apocalypticism. This shift of eschatological scenarios was also emphasized in several articles in the revolutionary journal The Flame of the Revolution. Since the summer of 1920, the journal had an increased focus on Bukhara and echoed several calls for a Bukharan revolution.691 With some exceptions, revolution here signifies a violent break with the past and the creation of something new.

What is revolution? Revolution is the destroyer of all previous ugly practices; revolution is the demolisher of all rotten old things; revolution is the inverter of old and difficult situations… Why? Because in their place – new and good things will be made; in their place, better and more rewarding practices will be established.692

The revolution was a human achievement that induced the apocalypse with an outright denial of divine intervention, or, at least according to Marxism-Leninism, a denial of the divine.

688 Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 158.
689 Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 131. In another place he claimed that he always had a long perspective (durbinivu durandeshi) and thus always had argued that reforms in the emirate had to be gradual and focus on schools and newspapers. Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 161.
690 Ṣadr al-Dīn ‘Aynī, Bukhārā inqilābī tārīkhi uchun materiallar (Moscow: Tsentral’no izdatel’stvo narodov SSR, 1926).
691 For this media campaign, see also Genis, “S Bukharoi nado konchat…”, 23.
This is the new world. This is the sovereignty of work. This is the true resurrection.693

In an article some months before the Red Army’s invasion of Bukhara, the Bukharans were encouraged to make a revolution with the following words:

Be happy that the morning of the resurrection has appeared and the day of judgement has arrived. The banner of the revolution is hoisted in a [new] city every day, the call for freedom appears in a [new] place every day. [...] [T]his is the day of the worldly resurrection and the happiness of the helpless!694

The Bolshevik appropriation of the resurrection is yet another sign of an eschatological shift that also was evident in the concept of agency and the end-state of progress. The view of happiness as the goal of progress in both worlds, that Fitrat had expressed in his Guide to Salvation some years earlier was echoed in an article in The Flame of the Revolution after the Red Army had abolished the Kokand Autonomy, but now with a very different human agency, and not in the two worlds, but only in the present one.

Now the Muslims have correctly understood that only the communist party and the Soviet government are the cause of their happiness and salvation.695

The new time was here, and by converting to the revolutionary order, the Bukharans could also reach happiness, just as the Khivans had done after the Red Army invaded the neighbouring Khanate:

Essentially, the revolution in Khiva clearly shows that the Soviet Government is the key to the happiness of humankind [...] The time for the Bukharan revolution has come. Essentially, the time and place is ready for the Bukharan revolution. The carrying out of a surgical operation is all that is necessary to cut off this rotten and sick limb from the body of Turkistan.696

This surgical operation would be carried out by the creators of the future and of happiness, i.e. the revolutionaries, the oppressed, and the proletariat unified in the communist party, which was the only liberator of the oppressed. The communist party would bring about a social revolution697 that in eschatological terms was very different from the social revolution described by Fitrat above. From now on there was less focus on the Advocates of Progress

and more on the revolutionaries and the proletariat. In The Flame of the Revolution, the term Jadidi, as a group identity, is generally absent. In one article the revolutionaries even transgressed the boundaries between the Jadidi and the Qadimii: “the revolutionaries, regardless of whether they are Jadidi or Qadimii, are no unbelievers.”698

As later events would show, very few Muslim reformers, Muslim scholars or merchants had a future in Soviet Central Asia. Liberation and freedom were increasingly articulated in terms of a class struggle.699 In this rhetoric, the wealthy were seen as the enemies. The fact that in 1918 Aydi described those who came to power after the February Revolution in Russia as the advocates of progress and liberty,700 but omitted this from a later revision of the same manuscript,701 is a clear sign of the increased focus on class struggle, with the advocates of progress and liberty being seen as bourgeois. Stressing both the new agency and the global character of the revolution, one author writes that the workers can never be oppressed by the rich again.702 This was the social revolution that the Bolsheviks envisioned, a vision that also undermined the Bukharan reformers with their mercantilistic social background, but also induced a class struggle in the Bukharan reformers’ concept of progress, that at times had been close to transformational, but never cataclysmic apocalypticism.

9.6.1 The revolutionary present

Although the calls for a revolution in Bukhara were framed in terms of the tranquillity and happiness of the Bukharan nation,703 the global character of the revolution, as mediated through depictions of the extended present as a time of revolution, was invoked in order not only to legitimate a “revolution” in Bukhara, but also to make it unavoidable. In revolutionary Turkistan, the number of possible temporal extensions was reduced by the October Revolution’s appropriation of the future. This archetypical future was universal, common to all peoples and nations, and situated in post-October 1917 Russia and the countries where the revolution was victorious.

Yes, Bukhara is a small country reckoned as a part of Turkistan. In view of this, the Bukharian revolution, like the Khivan revolution, appears to be an

700 Aydi, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikri dar Bukhoro”, 156.
701 Ṣadr al-Dīn ‘Aynī, Bukhārā inqilābīnīng Ta’rikhi (Tokyo: Department of Islamic Area Studies, Centre for Evolving Humanities, Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology, The University of Tokyo; 1992), 169.
702 For the latter, see for example Sitamdiy, “Šarvatdārān nūmīd mīshavad”, SI 2 (17 Apr. 1919): 1–2.
This revolutionary present and the necessity of the revolution were propagated in numerous articles in The Flame of the Revolution, the staging of new festivities in Turkistan, including the celebration of the first of May, and demonstrations against the British, etc.

The contraction of the temporal dimension of this present was caused by the historicity of the sense of urgency to act now, something that is evident in an article from spring 1919, during Great Britain’s intervention in the area around Ashgabat. Not only does the author encourage the Muslims of Turkistan to defend “their holy motherland” and unite for the sake of the “liberty of the whole of humanity”, but he also makes reference to signs of the end of the world, according to the eschatological scenario of cataclysmic apocalypticism. These signs, however, are now translated into the temporal and spatial boundaries of the Bolshevik eschatological scenario. The English are thus described as the worst offenders of Islam, the destroyers of Mecca and Medina, and of Mosques, and the burners of the Quran.

If the Muslims of Turkistan want to preserve their religious life and show their protection of Islam, now is the time.

9.6.2 Revolutionary restoration

Not only was the “new era” (‘āsr-i jadīd) introduced by the revolution different from the future imagined by the Muslim reformers but the division of time into a pre-revolutionary era and a revolutionary present increased the polarization between the past and the present. Just as liberation and freedom were ascribed to the contemporaneity of the revolution, the “oppressive government of Bukhara” was ascribed to the past.

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The whole world became new and young, and was renewed, and made progress except you who still remained in the old time of emperor Decius [...] your country has still not thrown of the shackles of slavery from your neck. Your country is administered according to the rotten foundations of 1000 years ago.\(^{714}\)

Shortly before the invasion of Bukhara, an agreement between the recently created Soviet Turkistan Republic and the Emirate of Bukhara was criticized by the “workers” of Bukhara because the emirate of Bukhara belonged to the past:

All agreements that have been established between the government of the Bukharan Emir and our neighbours, we, the inhabitants of Bukhara, are dissatisfied with such letters of agreement because we consider the government of the Bukharan Emir to be a temporary government of an usurper.\(^{715}\)

Less than six months after the invasion of the emirate, the former administration of the emir was consigned to the Middle Ages.\(^{716}\) Hence no attention was given to the reforms and educational developments that actually had taken place in Bukhara or in Turkistan during the Russian era. In the early-Soviet, very anti-colonial historiography of Central Asia, the period of pre-revolutionary Russian rule was described as “the fifty years of Russia’s despotic governance.” And during this period “we Turkistanis had destroyed our old schools and madrasas and were unable to open new schools and were totally deprived of science and education”.\(^{717}\) In this reinvention of decline, the Russian authorities are blamed for the relative backwardness of the Muslims of Turkistan compared to other Muslims.\(^{718}\) This decline ceased because of the Russian revolution. It was the Russian workers that had liberated the Turkistanis from the shackles of the oppressive government of the last 50 years.\(^{719}\)

In the Bolshevik reinvention of the Bukharan past, there was no room for either the pious forefathers or a Golden Age situated in the classical time of Islam, as the Bolsheviks had a very different conceptualization of restoration, one that was expressed in terms of communism. Although situated in a discourse of oppression, Ayni’s belief in just emirs who followed the Sharia was increasingly controversial in revolutionary Central Asia.


\(^{715}\) “I’tirāznāma-yi ranjbarān-i Buhkhārā”, SI 46 (12 Aug. 1920): 7. For some background to this, see Khotamov, Sveržhenie émirskogo rezhima v Buhkharı, 231–238.


Despite the fact that the administration of the government of Bukhara was absolute during previous times, it was founded on Sharia and the direct opinion of righteous Muslim scholars, and just emirs protected the rights of mankind as far as possible from powerful state servants. Gradually the Muslim scholars became encomiasts, and the servants in the fiscal administration also began to rule in the name of Sharia according to their own pleasure. During the time of Abd al-Ahad the judges and governors became very self-willed.\footnote{Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 153.}

Statements such as the above were omitted in later editions of the same work\footnote{For example, cf. Aynī, “Ta’rikhi inqilobi fikrī dar Bukhoro”, 153–154 with ‘Aynī, \textit{Bukhārā inqilābīning ta’rikhī}, 149.} in order to make room for a conception of the past that allowed a restoration conforming to Bolshevik ideas of communism and the primacy of class struggle. In early revolutionary Turkistan, however, the nature of Bolshevik restoration was far from clear. A glorious past was therefore sometimes stressed, but references to a restoration of the Sharia were probably omitted, as in the quotation below.

Bukhara, which in previous times was the cradle of culture and civilization, has, as a result of the oppression and despotism that the emirs and mullas has exercised against the people, become the most destroyed place on the surface of the world. The inhabitants of Bukhara became the most ignoble and ignorant people of the world.\footnote{S. Q.,“Qarār-i ta’rikhī yak ījitimā’-yi fūqal’āda (dāyir-i ba Bukhārā)”, \textit{SI} 47 (26 Aug. 1920): 5.}

The mainstream Bolshevik concept of a structural revolution in terms of sudden cataclysmic change, as echoed in The Flame of the Revolution, was not only disputed by the continuing belief in other eschatological scenarios, even in the “revolutionary” journal The Flame of the Revolution, an old cyclical notion of revolution, very similar to Ahmad Kalla’s conception of revolution mentioned above, and thus associated with naturally formed chronologies, made inroads during the spring of 1919. But this revolution was positive, not like the traditional conception of “the vicissitudes of time”. However, the natural age metaphor is a testimony of cosmic recycling inherent in any restoration of perfection. This also shows that this metaphor was not outdated in revolutionary Central Asia.

Every tree blossoms in the spring, but if they do not accept the spring revolution, they rot. Every youth becomes old. If he does not accept the renewal revolution, he dies. Just as all buildings become dilapidated if they are not repaired, countries and nations are declining. If there is no revolution, they are obliterated. Revolution is a cure that cause the old things to become new and the broken to blossom. Countries that have made revolutions become prosperous and make progress.\footnote{“Fāyida-yi inqilāb”, \textit{SI} 1 (15 Apr. 1919): 3.}
9.7 Conclusion

Any attempt to contain the future implies by default a containment of the apocalyptic, and sometimes also the imposition of a specific trajectory on progress. The latter, however, was not politically contested in Bukhara during the rule of the later Manghits before the advent of Bolshevism with its eschatological scenario of cataclysmic apocalypticism directed by human agency. Before that, divinely led cataclysmic apocalypticism was mainly challenged by the eschatological scenario of transformational apocalypticism or by a more modern concept of progress as advocated by the Bukharan reformers. The trajectory of any space-based progress was thus not disputed or even discussed at that time, the key issue being instead the direction of discontinuity.

An eschatological shift from cataclysmic to transformational apocalypticism or to a more modern concept of progress often calls for additive chronology and the inauguration of a new time, and threatens the legitimacy not only of old dating systems but also older prophecies and divine laws. At least from a discursive point of view, Koselleck’s statement that “well into the seventeenth century, it was theoretically and generally assumed that nothing fundamentally new could occur until the end of the world” thus appears doubtful in the Bukharan context. The question here is if “could occur” should be replaced with “was allowed to occur”. That is, the struggle was about containing the apocalyptic and the future, a strategy employed by all key actors in this study, regardless of whether it was expressed in terms of an aim to protect the chain of transmission of correct knowledge, or to secure the survival of the emirate in a colonial time.

The temporalization that took place and the eschatological shift to some kind of transformational apocalypticism or to a more modern concept of progress did indeed transform key social and political concepts. The dependence upon the concept of progress became a key aspect of the temporal structure of many central political and social concepts used by the 20th century Bukharan reformers. That did not, however, make them less Islamic for their proponents, but it certainly did do so for their antagonists; at least that was how it was expressed in many of the sources referred to here. The concept of reform as described above is but one example of this. This also compares with the concept of happiness, which likewise was temporally and spatially transformed through an increased emphasis on space-based geography in a world of space-based states that formed a normative present in terms of spatial and temporal organization. These concepts were then instilled into the Bukharan future, which not only was called the contemporary era, but also was labelled with a lexeme of its own (āyanda).

The trajectory of progress was increasingly contested after the first Russian Revolution in 1917, a revolution that also signified a historical discontinuity and was directed by human agency. If the Advocates of Progress had been adherents of an eschatological scenario that shared many features with human-directed transformational apocalypticism, then the revolutionaries were adherents of the eschatological scenario of human-directed cataclysmic apocalypticism. The increased power of the Bolsheviks meant that the Advocates of Progress were suppressed and that progress (taraqqī) was not the central catchword in this contest. Progress had been a central catchword by which the Advocates of Progress had reformulated the meaning of existence. In the eschatological scenario of human-directed cataclysmic apocalypticism as expressed in The Flame of the Revolution, however, the meaning of existence was reformulated by the word revolution.
10. The operative environment of progress

The operative environment of the concept of progress in Bukhara was formed and transformed through increased contacts with the science-driven developments of the increasingly anthropocentric world of the late 19th and early 20th century. Even a basic comparison between the (for natural reasons) obligatory overnight stops (manzil) of the Bukharan pilgrim Samarqandi, while travelling by caravan in the mid 19th century, with the stops (tavaqquf) measured in minutes of those who travelled by train some 30 years later indicates a difference in speed and an increasingly anthropocentric world. But Fitrat’s epithet for the Bukharan present (or the Turkistani present), “the period of stopping”, also indicates how progress, partly facilitated by the railway, had entered history as a process independent of human narratives. Bukhara was lagging behind. The shift from a vertical to a horizontal metaphorical structure of taraqqī was thus also an indicator of an increased emphasis on human agency. With an emphasis on space-based geography, the period of stopping indicated Bukhara’s relative position in an extended present made up of space-based states whose struggle to become contemporary was dependent upon the efforts of their citizens. And it is somewhere here, during the second decade of the 20th century, that this modern concept of progress appears in Bukhara, and many other concepts are transformed, including history and the apocalypse in the sense of the end that looms if progress is not made.

An equally important formative factor of this operative environment of progress was the discursive landscape. The discursive landscape of progress in Bukhara at this time overlapped with the discursive landscape of the apocalypse. The shift in emphasis from place-based to space-based geography transformed the spatial boundaries of the apocalypse from being cosmic to signifying states with territories that could be imagined through maps. A space-based sense of urgency, in a colonial time, made it imperative to withstand colonial expansion by making progress, a concept that in Bukharan reformist circles signified a human-directed science-based socio-technological process with an ethical dimension rooted in the Islamic past. For at least some people in those circles, it was a question of making progress or perishing. This sense of urgency was thus different, in terms of its discourse of speed, from the sense of urgency advocated by those who adhered to an eschatological scenario of cataclysmic apocalypticism in a God-centred world in which spiritual and “vertical” progress was stressed, and the
end of time would come unless the Bukharans became more pious. Still, in
the primary sources referred to in this study invoking progress and the
apocalypse both served the same function when used in calls for change;
both concepts stressed limited time.

This study shows that there was no Sattelzeit in a holistic sense in Buk-
harra. The majority of the Bukharans probably still adhered to apocalyptic
thinking, and at times believed in an imminent end of the world. It is thus
difficult to empirically argue that they all experienced a metahistorical and
eschatological shift. Nevertheless, the Bukharans were exposed to hitherto
unprecedented social and technological changes during this period. Numer-
ous people ought to have experienced cognitive dissonance as a result of the
accelerated rhythm of temporal experience, which could be interpreted as
indicating that the end of the world was not as close as previously imagined,
or at least could give rise to new problems in apocalyptic thinking. The
works of Ahmad Kalla illustrate that various diachronic orders, discontinui-
ties, and narratives of decline and progress continued to exist and coexist and
were invoked in different contexts. At least some of his different narratives
of progress and decline probably served as attempts to contain progress in
the eschatological scenario of cataclysmic apocalypticism. The purpose
of this was in part to sustain an older form of apocalyptic thinking that, among
other things, could have an important place in political rhetoric. Ahmad
Kalla’s “vertical” Sattelzeit concept of technological and ethical progress
and its cosmographical categories can also be described as relatively more
indigenous than the horizontal structure of societal progress of the 20th cen-
tury Bukharan reformers. Its disappearance can probably be ascribed to a
“conceptual” globalization of progress (and decline).

The transformation of time and space during the 19th and early 20th cen-
tury thus also transforms the political rhetoric on there being limited time for
political change. The transformation of the key agents who will carry out
change illustrates this. A modified version of Landes’ figure of apocalyptic
and millennial varieties illustrates the relative positions of the Rightly
Guided, the Renewer, the Advocates of Progress, and the Revolutionaries.
This modified version also illustrates some features of the discursive land-
scape of progress and the Advocates of Progress.
The Advocates of Progress emphasized human agency and a space-based concept of geography. As we have seen above, they conceived of progress as gradual, not cataclysmic, and in their calls for Bukhara to become contemporary, there was no wish to destroy the old order, merely to reform it. Their struggle was aimed at making Bukhara contemporary through progress in order to prevent Bukhara from ceasing to exist as a state. This is not to say that they believed in transformational apocalypticism, merely that their discourse shows some common features, most notably the direction of discontinuity, with this eschatological scenario, and that they employed a concept of progress that sometimes signified optimizing rather than emphasizing an unlimited number of temporal extensions projected into an unknown future.

The Rightly Guided, on the other hand, belonged to the scenario of divinely led cataclysmic apocalypticism. He would come at the end of time and defeat evil and establish universal peace before ascending to heaven. As such, the Rightly Guided also represented a place-based concept of geography; he would affect a whole sacred universe rather than any specific state or nation. The Renewer also fits in this scenario as well as someone who would come and postpone the apocalypse. His deeds were gradual; there would be no total destruction of the old order. Historically, as seen in the works of early Muslim thinkers, the Renewer was also an aspect of place-based geography. Yet, as we have seen above, during the rule of the later Manghits, the Renewer was mobile in so far as he moved between human and divine agency, although during the eschatological polarization in Bukhara in the 1910s, the role of the Renewer was marginal in the realm of the modern
concept of progress. Before the eschatological polarization of the 1910s, even in Bukhara the Renewer was marked by an increased emphasis on space-based geography, as seen in the works of Ahmad Kalla, and thus underwent a spatial transformation.

The revolutionaries were the sole representatives of cataclysmic apocalypticism led by human agency during the period studied. Human agency, in form of the revolutionaries or the party, was considered crucial to the destruction of the old order. Their actions would lead to a happy new world. Although the revolution was global in scope, the revolutionaries’ discourse was space-based. They recruited by calling on the Bukharans, the Khivans, etc. to support them, but ultimately they called for a class-based social cohesion.

While the revolutionaries’ post-apocalyptic transnational state building project is beyond the scope of this work, the eschatological shift away from the probably common 19th century place-based apocalyptic thinking in Bukhara suggests a similarity between the Bukharan advocates of progress and other communities that, after a shift in eschatological scenario, engage more fervently in proselytizing and “denomination” building, with rhetoric and beliefs having a crucial constitutive function.725 The vision of the Bukharan reformers, which also was transmitted in their schools, was a new polity with a new social basis that shared a uniform public time spatially mediated through an emphasis on space-based geography. This was a vision that strove to contain the apocalyptic through an appropriation of the future that was to be achieved by means of a concept of progress.

725 For the latter, see O’Leary, “When Prophecy Fails and when it Succeeds”, 343.
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