AXEL HÄGERSTRÖM
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Introduction

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Axel Anders Theodor Hägerström (1868–1939) is one of the fairly few, if not the only, Swedish philosophers of international significance—yet, he remains in many ways unknown. A major contribution is his theory on the nature of norms and values, which came to be known as value-nihilism, celebrated by some and vehemently rejected by others: Hägerström was the first who formulated a noncognitivist moral theory and debate still continues about the exact significance, scope and implications of this theory. Together with Adolf Phalén, he was one of the two founders of the so-called Uppsala School. He was also the inspirational source of Scandinavian legal realism.

Hägerström can be said to be a significant thinker for three reasons: An extraordinary interpreter of his own time, he left his mark on his contemporaries; his thought continues to suggest interesting and contrasting readings, which is indicated by the fact that he is repeatedly re-read by new generations of scholars; finally, he developed general categories that we still use today to understand the world we now live in.

Originally educated in the nineteenth-century idealism, and later converting to early twentieth-century neo-Kantianism, Hägerström developed theories in parallel with—yet independently from—some
of the major philosophical currents in Europe. In his work, he was concerned with both practical and theoretical issues. Today, the most important part of his scholarship is considered to be his teachings in the social, moral and legal aspects of philosophy, and his quite controversial studies on the history of legal thought. His scholarship focuses on the nature of norms and value-judgements that are, in his words, "neither true, nor false". It is this approach that came to be labelled axiological nihilism or value-nihilism (værdenihilism)—a nutshell variant of which can be found in the closing sentence of his inaugural lecture, On the Truth of Moral Ideas from 1911, of which a new translation by Thomas Mautner can be found in this volume: "there can never be a scientific morals, but only a science of morals".

More generally, it is possible to claim that he developed a comprehensive philosophy, in the sense that he was involved with most fields in philosophy, with the exception perhaps of aesthetics and formal logic. He first directed his attention to theoretical philosophy, more specifically to the neo-Kantian movement quite popular at that time. Holding the chair of practical philosophy in Uppsala from 1911 until 1933, he focused more on the moral, political, and legal philosophy, thus the greater part of his later writings leaves in the background the theoretical problems he dealt with in the earlier stages of his scholarship. The thread of Ariadne in his philosophy is his criticism of what he calls metaphysics and its impact of the theory of norms. In his account of his own philosophy in Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen from 1929, he adopted as his motto a modified version of Cato's aphorism, praeterea censeo metaphysicam esse delendam. To him, metaphysics is nothing but a compilation of words which happen to be connected with emotions. What distinguishes this assumption from other antimetaphysical positions—quite recurrent in the history of ideas—is that the "superstitious" web of metaphysical beliefs spreads its mantle not only over the humanities, but over natural science as well; this is a position that has been gaining ground in contemporary debates, namely in those concerned with conditions enabling the production of science and knowledge management more generally.

Whereas some of his early theoretical writings received attention only in academic circles and for a limited time, his practical philosophy, especially his axiological nihilism became a matter of public debate
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and has been widely discussed and often harshly criticised. This is the specific point that many later jurists found attractive and which makes him the “father” of Scandinavian legal realism. However, he remains unknown, in two different, yet connected ways.

On the one hand, there is a problem concerning the sources and, on the other hand, there are issues concerning the interpretation of his philosophy. As far as his philosophical theories are concerned, many aspects remain open to debate: If norms are neither true nor false, how can they be adequately understood on the basis of Hägerström’s theory of knowledge? How can we understand the nature of judgement and propositional truth? Did the founder of the Uppsala school uphold emotivism in moral philosophy? What consequences does such a standpoint entail in practical philosophy? Is he really the inspiration behind a specifically Scandinavian way of approaching the problem of principled decision-making? Clearly, Hägerström is by no means the object of any simple interpretation. But, then again, which classic author is?

Concerning the sources, there are issues concerning the primary literature, the correspondence, the biographical data, and the secondary literature. Therefore, there is also an overall problem with demonstrating systematically many aspects of his thought and investigating properly the impact of his theories, which calls for greater scholarly attention.

Axel Hägerström was a prolific writer and lecturer. He left a significant amount of manuscript material at his death. Yet the primary published material has not received the attention it deserves. In 1946 Rector Magnificus Nils von Hofsten and Gunnar Myrdal gathered to form a committee for the publication of the complete works, but the project was never implemented. Today some of his published writings are quite hard to come across. A catalogue of Hägerström’s manuscripts, which are kept in the Carolina Rediviva at the Uppsala University Library, was first made by Martin Fries, and later revised and improved by Thomas Mautner. The complete bibliography of Hägerström’s writings can be found in Mautner’s Vägledning till Hägerströmsstudiet (Guide to the study of Hägerström, 1994) which also includes listings of lectures, seminars, papers and correspondence; a systematic overview of Hägerström’s published work, based on a classification into genres of scientific writings, can be found in the Appendix in Patricia Mindus, A Real Mind (2009). Yet, no critical and complete edition of Hägerström’s
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published and unpublished works has so far been produced. Nor has much been done in order to provide a complete overview of his correspondence. There is a useful listing of letters in Mautner’s Vägledning till Hägerströmstudiet but, since its publication in 1994, more letters have come to light and have been included in the Uppsala University Library archive.

As far as biographical data is concerned, no critical biography has been published. His own autobiographical statement, his Selbstdarstellung (1929), details his intellectual development, especially his rejection of neo-Kantianism. The most detailed biographical description can be found in the biography written by his daughter Margit Waller, Människan som få kände (The human being few knew, 1961), which also includes family portraits and pictures. An account based on this book in English can be found in Jes Bjarup’s PhD thesis Reason, Emotion and the Law from 1982. Another source in English is C.B. Broad’s “Memoir of Axel Hägerström” in Philosophy and Religion (Sandin, ed. 1964). A chronology offering a brief synopsis of the major events in his life, both private and intellectual, is included in the Appendix in Mindus (Mindus: op. cit.). Most other sources in the secondary literature repeat information found in the aforementioned titles. There is thus a need to check biographical data against a broader set of historical sources so as to enable critical assessment before Hägerström’s life evaporates into the realm of myth.

In addition to this, the secondary literature on Hägerström is of extremely variable quality: It stretches from old-school literary analysis to short papers that require a wide range of technical skills; it includes voluminous and broadly circulating academic material of the regular kind and narrow biographical sketches, not to mention that the inexperienced reader is unlikely to stumble upon the best studies. Moreover, the secondary sources are written in a variety of languages, including Swedish, English, German, French, Italian, and Spanish, and cover many fields of inquiry from legal science to the history of physics.

In the same way we lack a critical edition of Hägerström’s work; the secondary literature offers no general outline or critical review of the studies made. In very general terms, as far as the status question is concerned, the different readings can be ordered into two major currents. On one hand, there are those who developed an interest in Hägerström
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primarily as the founder of the Uppsala school, and specifically as the
founder of modern noncognitivism in ethics; therefore these scholars
directed their attention to his role in the history of twentieth-century
philosophy, concerning foremost practical but also theoretical philo-

sophy. In this group, names such as Alfred Ayer, Charles L. Stevenson,
R.M. Hare, Steven Satris should be listed, along with the translators and
editors Robert Sandin, Martin Fries, C.D. Broad and Thomas Mautner;
and more broadly the Swedish intellectuals Ingmar Hedenius, Konrad
Marc-Wogau, Anders Wedberg, Herbert Tingle, Gunnar Myrdal,
Manfred Moritz, Svante Nordin, Sven Danielsson, Bo Petersson, and
Hans Ruin. Many of these authors were themselves philosophers and
focused on Hägerström because he was held to be the first thinker to
have developed an elaborate version of what was to become one of
the most important—and criticized—currents in contemporary meta-

ethical theory.

On the other hand, there are those interpreters who discovered a
“third way” in Hägerström; a position different from both natural law
theories and legal positivism. This position of Hägerström naturally
led to criticisms as well as to further the interest for his controversial
insertion into the dichotomy of the two traditional schools of thought
in jurisprudence and philosophy of law. The alternative that he came
to represent as the spiritual father of Scandinavian legal realism, in
legal and political theory, may be mentioned as motivation behind the
interest of scholars such as Vilhelm Lundstedt, Karl Olvecrona, Alf
Ross, H.L.A. Hart, Silvana Castignone, Enrico Pattaro, Liborio Hierro,
Carla Faralli, Jes Bjarup, John Rawls, N.E. Simmonds, Åke Frändberg,
Dennis Lloyd, Jacob Sundberg, Stig Strömholm, and many more. This
reading has been particularly important outside Scandinavia and most
especially in the Romance-language speaking world. The idea was that if
Scandinavian realism represented a live option and was often called on
to offer new perspectives on some fundamental issues in philosophy of
law, Hägerström was seen as the key unlocking the door to an innova-
tive jurisprudential debate. Perhaps, another course to the mainstream
readings could be added: Special mention should be made of Ernst
Cassirer whose analysis differs from the abovementioned outlooks since
his interpretation is both a methodological criticism and a philosophical
dialogue against the background of his own thought.

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Thus, as far as the secondary literature is concerned, we still lack a general and critical outline of the studies previously conducted. Such a report would therefore constitute another key undertaking. Svante Nordin, an expert on the history of Scandinavian philosophy, once claimed that the scholar who wants to write on Hägerström has to struggle with a quite vast secondary literature; and that it varies in quality and leaves, notwithstanding its width, many problems unsolved. This remains true.

Besides investigating the reception of Hägerström’s ideas within and beyond the scientific community, another key undertaking that awaits future scholars is to map and understand the sources Hägerström himself used. Truly erudite, he drew on a broad range of sources—from Ancient Greek inscriptions to Einstein’s theories, from Roman public law to empirical psychology, and so forth. An avid reader with a keen sense for detail he did not always give clear indications of the sources of his ideas. He famously claimed “I have not been significantly influenced by contemporary philosophy, on account of what is, in my opinion, its uncritical point of departure” (1964: 38). Often depicted as the great pioneer whose sources and influences need not be mapped, scholarly work on Hägerström’s sources is rather scarce. Yet, he was well anchored both in the past and the present. For example, investigation should be made into his relationship to Hume and Bentham in his radical anti-natural law position; he is also clearly inspired by Austrian and German sources, such as Alexius Meinong and Franz Brentano; his relation to Nietzsche is controversial but better documented (Hans Ruin 2000, and in this volume); he seems to have been influenced also by French radicalism.

It is noteworthy that strands of thought similar to the one Hägerström developed appear roughly simultaneously and, moreover, to a large extent independently of each other. From the general viewpoint, according to which he is a forerunner of “scientific” approaches in ethics, a predecessor of Carnap, Ayer, Stevenson and contemporary meta-ethics, it seems that Hägerström gave expression to something that was really “in the air”. In point of fact, the rejection of Geisteswissenschaften in Dilthey’s sense and the plea for a more scientific philosophy were rather recurrent topics in those days; just to name a few cases, Henri Poincaré claimed that “there can be no scientific morals and no immoral science” (1913: 225); Émile Durkheim, at the international
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conference in philosophy in 1911, also distinguished between judgments of value and judgements of reality (Durkheim 1911); the Austrian legal scholar and sociologist Eugen Ehrlich, in his sociological theory on freie Rechtswissenschaft, emphasized that the legal norm relies on the intensity of the underlying emotion, in a way that seems reminiscent of Hägerström. In this wider sense, he certainly participated in the “breakthrough of modernism” along with many others in art, literature and science. This generic approach aside, what should be stressed is the development of his theory of value: Hägerström was the first to formulate the negative value-ontology in a systematic manner in his famous inaugural lecture from 1911.

All these reasons concerning the source material, in combination with the fact that a great part of Hägerström’s production is in Swedish, converge with the effect that Hägerström has not really obtained the attention he would deserve. Of course, mention should be made of the fact that his core texts are available in two edited volumes in English (Hägerström 1953 and 1964) as well as his two large volumes on Der Römische Obligationsbegriff in German—the latter are books so demanding from the technical point of view that it is safe to say that they remain more famous than actually read, even though they were received with a certain interest at the time of publication (Faralli 1982).

As Sven Eliaeson has pointed out, the suboptimal state in which this voluminous Hägerström material currently lingers is something of a “national scandal”, since Hägerström is the only Swedish philosopher of international stature and significance from this very important time in history, who still recurrently provokes rejoinders, including those of the weight of Ernst Cassirer, Theodor Geiger, and John Rawls. From the point of view of scholars working in Sweden, many questions are left open by the observation that while the Finns are proud of Edvard Westermarck and the Danes of Sören Kierkegaard, Hägerström’s legacy in Sweden is not celebrated.

Migrants to Sweden during World War II contributed to the diffusion of Hägerström. We have mentioned Ernst Cassirer. Cassirer only spent a short time in Uppsala soon after his arrival to Sweden and then transferred to Gothenburg in 1935 where the provincial governor, also a philosopher (Malte Jacobsson), arranged a personal chair for him. Cassirer learned Swedish in amazingly short time. He left for the USA
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in 1941. Sweden was then unsafe for a Jew; after the German invasion of Norway and Denmark, Sweden was militarily “hiding out” behind the German lines, under constant threat of a German invasion. When Cassirer died in New York in April 1945, it was as a Swedish citizen.

Theodore Geiger was a refugee in Denmark and Sweden and a founder of Acta Sociologica. His controversy with the Uppsala school has a certain affinity with Ingemar Hedenius’s “refinement”: trying to improve on the basic approach; in reality not adding much and paradoxically promoting “backdoor-normativism” (Eliaeson 1993). Geiger explicitly adheres to value nihilism and anti-metaphysics but finds several flaws in Hägerström, regarding semantics and sociology.

There are several reasons that can explain the under-estimation of Hägerström’s work. Let us start by the contextual and historical reasons. The first and second decades of the twentieth-century witnessed the formation of a new “philosophical” school in Sweden: The so-called School of Uppsala, which should be kept separate from Scandinavian legal realism. It not only had a significant influence on the intellectual life of Scandinavia in the twentieth century; it also presented original features in the history of thought: since some claim that the modern analytical movement, in Europe at least, arose independently in three places: Cambridge, Uppsala, and Vienna, the stake in the fatherhood debate, is largely a question of claiming merit to the European history of ideas.

The Uppsala school was consumed by a dispute over “paternity” between Axel Hägerström and his younger colleague Adolf Phalen and their respective followers (Nordin 1984). They both criticised what they held to be the prevailing and incorrect epistemological paradigm, i.e., “subjectivism”. Hägerström was the initiator, its most prestigious figure and the most important promoter in the field of practical philosophy; Phalen was its advocate in the field of theoretical philosophy. The paternity quarrel was already an issue when Hägerström was alive. Afterwards, the animosity came to be expressed in other ways. Anders Karitz from Lund who became appointed to the chair in practical philosophy had a hard time, a victim of what today might be labelled mobbing, by younger philosophers, involving some amazing incidents. Many young theoreticians who felt close to Phalen, who died prematurely in 1931, were not especially interested in emphasizing Hägerström’s legacy. For instance, Hedenius’ memories of Hägerström, published in
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1980, were characteristically published under the title "Minnen av Adolf Phalén" (Memories of Adolf Phalén).

A second reason for the underestimation of Hägerström’s work is closely linked to his controversial impact on Swedish culture. There was a time when journalists as well as public opinion made use both of the fame and the notoriety of his name. Paul Britten Austin, Ingmar Bergman’s brother-in-law, once observed that “...moral judgments, every educated Swede knows, ‘lack descriptive status’” (1968: 40). This was the claim introduced on the occasion of Hägerström’s inaugural lecture as the professor of practical philosophy at Uppsala on 18th March 1911: The hall was full of prominent people, including theologians, jurists and the two philosophers who had nominated Hägerström, Burman, and Sahlin. Rector Magnificus Henrik Schück presented the new member of the faculty and underlined the academic tradition of the chair, the importance of the legacy of Christopher Jacob Boström.

Many left the room in an altered mood, contributing to making this inaugural lecture both celebrated and controversial. In time, Hägerström’s name became associated with the label “value nihilism”. The formula was coined by the Swedish scholar John Landquist, a legendary adversary of Hägerström, at that time responsible for the political and cultural section of the daily newspaper Aftonbladet and only later re-adopted by scholars following Ingmar Hedenius’ attempt to rescue it by taking away its negative connotations (Om rätt och moral [On law and morality], 1941). This appellation, however, did not make Hägerström’s ideas more palatable to conventional opinion.

During the period of social-democratic hegemony from the mid-century, his critics associated Hägerström’s views with “state absolutism”, “social engineering” and the teleological interpretation of statute law. In time, Hägerström’s axiological nihilism as well as his account of the metaphysical character of rights and duties even became associated with the infamous slogan that goes back to Thrasyvoulos of Chalcedon, “might is right”. During “The crisis of democracy” in the period between the wars, it was often suggested that axiological nihilism, such as that of Hägerström, was to blame for the collapse of European culture in general and for the rise of totalitarian regimes and antidemocratic movements in particular. It was suggested that axiological nihilism had left people in a spiritual void, which was easily exploited by anti-democratic,
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populist and power-focused political movements. This reading fuelled later claims that Hägerström's philosophy was responsible for the rejection of principled decision-making in Swedish courts and more specifically that the fact that Scandinavian legal realism dismissed the possibility of normative arguments about values would ultimately lead to abandonment of normative debate, impoverishing the public sphere.

Yet this popularized version of Hägerström’s value nihilism has never ceased to be contested, not only in its meaning and implications but also in relation to the historical evidence of his own political views. Hägerström was a political radical himself and a specialist on Marx, but not Marxist by any measure. But leading social democrats were inspired by Hägerström, such as Arthur Engberg, Vilhelm Lundstedt, and Gunnar Myrdal. Yet this was not the only strand of influence. Among the group of people he inspired were leading conservative politicians and entrepreneurs, such as his disciple Harald Nordenson. The UN secretary general Dag Hammarskjöld and Gunnar Hägglöf both engaged in a dialogue with Hägerström and discussed his theories during walks in Uppsala as young students. Hägglöf, who later became a Catholic, opposed to Hägerström's negative value-ontology, recalled in his memoirs that he once dreamed that Uppsala castle took the shape of Hägerström's head. Many other influential names that were inspired by Hägerström could be enumerated, but this influence often seems to have been rather generic from the contemporary scholar’s perspective. What was in common with those who wrestled with his ideas was this: they used him to overcome the limitations of conventional moral orientations, and the dangers of what Popper called moral futurism, the failure to take personal responsibility that follows from acquiescence to what is supposed to be historically inevitable.

Among the philosophical reasons for the relatively low level of interest in Hägerström's work, is the fact that Hägerström's influence has been obliterated through incorporation in later movements of thought. His legal thinking was basic to Scandinavian legal realism, as developed by Karl Olivecrona, Vilhelm Lundstedt, and Alf Ross, and it was assimilated to other movements, such as the sociological jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound, and the legal positivism of H.L.A. Hart, who cited Hägerström extensively in his The Concept of Law. A parallel process has occurred in social science, e.g., through Gunnar Myrdal's
methodological writings on values. In politics, Hägerström's legacy is said to reappear in "functional socialism", gradually dismantling property rights, and still inspires debate in Swedish dailies.

As with any major thinker, returning to the texts in the light of changes in the scholarly atmosphere is necessary, because new issues reveal features of their thought that had been ignored or misunderstood in the past. Hägerström requires this, especially with respect to the problem of normativity. Over the last twenty years—i.e., since Saul Kripke’s discussion of the problem of rule-following in Wittgenstein, the publication of McDowell’s Mind and World and Brandom’s Making It Explicit—the idea that puzzles about the nature of inference, rationality, and mathematics can be solved by appealing to their normative character has become central. The common idea is that naturalism is inadequate to account for how we are bound by reason, or by the normativity of linguistic or mathematical rule-following, and that what is required is a recognition of the irreducibly normative character of these concepts. What has varied among these writers is the notion of the normative itself and the extent to which the relevant notion of the normative character of reason is universal or local. As commentators have noted, this discussion recapitulates the situation and intractable difficulties over “values” of neo-Kantianism at the beginning of the twentieth century (Beiser 2009). Hägerström was a product of this same ambience.

The nature of this challenge may be understood by comparing Hägerström to Hans Kelsen. For Kelsen, the problem of the philosophy of law began with the recognition of the cognitively specific character of the law as a valid form of thought. The problem of philosophical analysis in the face of this form of thought was to identify its constitutive presuppositions that enabled its reasoning to be valid and thus binding. Legal positivism, in Kelsen’s hands, began with the fact of legal validity and asked what the conditions of legal validity were. His answer was that legal validity required a basic validating Grundnorm. Hart later produced a variant on this reasoning, preserving its starting point, the fact of legal validity, and the idea that this fact was established by a norm-producing constitutive act, which Hart understood on the model of performative utterances. Hägerström was more radical. He rejected the starting point itself, i.e., the fact of legal validity, or, the binding character of the law; traditional explanations of this binding
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character were circular and uninformative. And in his other writings (e.g., 1911) he extended this basic approach to values and normative reasoning generally. The implication of this was clear enough: a radical anti-metaphysical philosophy. Yet the meaning of the argument has been contested ever since.

One reason for this is historical. Häägerström’s argument was constructed at an early stage of a confusing period in neo-Kantianism, before the linguistic turn of Logical Positivism and the Ontological Turn of the 1920s in Continental Philosophy. So there is a metaphilosophical question of what kind of theory he is advancing. Is it, as Thomas Mautner took it to be, a species of noncognitivism in ethics, like that of the Logical Positivists, i.e., a claim that values are not objects of knowledge, but something else? One alternative to treating Häägerström as an analytic philosopher is to focus on his anti-metaphysical stance. There is a problem of consistency: does the argument depend on normative usages of the kind he claims to reject, or is it a selective rejection of normative usages, and if so on what is the selection based? Does it amount to its own metaphysics, a kind of naturalism which excludes values?

The central issue here is this: does Häägerström commit the error of producing a metaphysical rejection of metaphysics, or a value against values? If so, it seems to contradict his anti-metaphysical metaphilosophy. To interpret Häägerström as a consistent thinker seems to require making his negative value metaphysics into a different kind of claim, which would require constructing a more complete consideration of his implicit metaphilosophy. There are good grounds for thinking this can be done. Häägerström’s treatment of values does not reduce them to social facts so much as show that there are no evaluative facts and thus no facts in the relevant domain other than the social facts about which participants form expectations. That they also form folk theories about these facts that appeal to what for Häägerström are quasi-magical notions such as duty does not make these theories true, and therefore the existence of these theories or this language does not mean that we must supply a truth-preserving analysis of it. We can simply treat these terms as erroneous. An approach to Häägerström along these lines is implied by Stephen Turner’s use of Häägerström (2002), based to a large extent upon Häägerström’s investigations into legal history. This approach parallels similar naturalistic arguments in present philosophy, such as eliminative
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materialism in the philosophy of mind, which might form a model for the reconstruction of Hägerström’s meta-philosophy as well.

The current philosophical discussion of normativity focuses on versions of these kinds of questions, so it is a resource for understanding Hägerström’s own difficulties in formulating his position, and our difficulties in interpreting him. The potential significance of Hägerström for these current debates is in the possibility that he does provide an alternative to the normativity problematic itself, and thus to the Kantian tradition of understanding the world within the space of reason, understood normatively (Rickert). Even understanding Hägerström as a failed attempt at escaping this problematic would reveal something novel about both Hägerström and the problem itself. This is one possible answer to the question of the meaning of Hägerström’s argument, which would show its relevance to present issues in philosophy, with the virtue of allowing for a discussion of such neglected issues as Hägerström’s epistemology, which might be discussed in terms of such current notions as “direct realism”.

This approach would place Hägerström and the interpretation of his thought at the centre of contemporary philosophy. Values and normativity are also issues in social science, and Hägerström’s legal philosophy is often said to be akin to a form of sociological research, both because it presents an account of the nature of law as a social phenomenon and because it has usually been interpreted to imply that the point of law is social utility rather than the fulfilment of explicitly normative concepts, such as the preservation of rights. As an account of the sociology or anthropology of law, Hägerström’s position is similar to accounts, such as Weber’s, which treat normative ideas as originating in magical beliefs.

In the standard account, Hägerström and some of his followers, such as Vilhelm Lundstedt, rejected the concept of rights and duties tout court. This might be taken as a form of sociological reductionism, especially as this led to the suggestion that social utility was the purpose of legal arrangements and could be used as a standard for legal reform. “Sociological reductionism” would be an answer to the question of the meaning of Hägerström’s argument, but one which would place it into a problematic category of naturalism. There are, however, good reasons for thinking that Hägerström’s position avoids this result: treating moral
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theories as false folk theories is not reductionism in the problematic
sense of a claim that the original moral ideas are explained in non-moral
terms. It is an account of these terms as themselves erroneous.

Any discussion of Hägerström’s “sociology” would raise questions
about what sort of social science is consistent with Hägerström’s views.
Talcott Parsons, for example, advanced a theory of the irreducibility
of the normative that conflicts with Hägerström’s view of the norma-
tive as mythical. Does Hägerström provide us with a serious start-
ing point for a conception of social science? Or does it depend on a
deeply problematic social theory of values? In this case, the textual
and analytic problems need to be approached in a different way, since
Hägerström himself made no attempt to answer them directly. Gunnar
Myrdal’s uses of Hägerström provide a natural point of departure for
a discussion of these questions; same with Theodor Geiger. Among
Hägerström’s followers were the earliest Swedish sociologists, includ-
ing Torgny Segerstedt Jr, and their thought provides another source
of relevant textual material. Moreover, Hägerström’s variation of value
incommensurability (Bleyvad 1991), which can be said to be more rad-
cal than Kelsen’s legal positivism, Max Weber’s scientific value relativ-
ism (Arnold Brecht 1959) and Edvard Westermarck’s anthropological
relativism, also indicates a significant rupture in the development of
social thought, when the methodological consequences of the radical
is/ought-distinction was being institutionalized into research praxis.

The conclusion is that what is needed today is a scholarly reassess-
ment of Hägerström in terms of present issues. Hägerström needs to be
rescued as a distinctive voice. This requires a reassessment and recon-
struction of his views in current terms. This edited volume, based on a
symposium organized at Uppsala University September 23–24, 2011 on
the occasion of the centennial of Axel Hägerström’s inaugural lecture, is
a step in that direction—making a case for a revival of interest.

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