Yulian Konstantinov

Conversations with Power

Soviet and post-Soviet developments in the reindeer husbandry part of the Kola Peninsula
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ABSTRACT
The book examines the way people talk with power – and power talks back to them – in the context of authoritarian state regimes, the Soviet/Russian one being the case in point. My claim is, in the first place, that there does exist such a conversation. I thus strongly resist the reading of recent Soviet history in terms of people’s mute and passive subordination to crushing imposition of power, or at best – of forms of indirect resistance or escapism. Instead, my claim is that multi-layered communication between the pinnacle and the broad base of the social pyramid was part and parcel of the identity of the Soviet period all along.

As it is argued in the book, grassroots-with-power communication in the Soviet and post-Soviet context reflects a will and corresponding practice for a continuously renegotiated arrangement with power. Its principal thrust is the establishing of a grassroots-to-power tensed compromise over such fundamentally critical issues like existential security and a degree of well-being. I argue for the presence of effective grassroots’ agentivity in the Soviet/post-Soviet context. To examine it I turn special attention to the period of enforced collectivisation of agriculture (1929-1934) in the context of the reindeer husbandry economy of what is today Murmansk Region of NW Russia. My specific ethnography takes a reindeer husbandry practice of mixing private and collective reindeer as a metaphorical expression of a risk-free socioeconomic arrangement I call ‘sovkhoizm’. My general conclusion is that a socioeconomic and political environment that has sovkhoizm as a principal worldview presents serious communicative obstacles as regards a generalized ‘western’ attempt, over the last two decades, for constructive dialogue on, particularly, the Sami indigeneity issue.

The ethnographic basis of the study comes from long-term fieldwork with Sami and Komi reindeer husbandry teams in Lovozero District, Murmansk Region.

Keywords: Kola Peninsula, Lovozero District, Sami people, reindeer husbandry, collectivisation, personal reindeer, grassroots-to-power discourse, mega-speech events

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Preface and Acknowledgements

This book has come into being after many years of fieldwork in the Lovozero District of Murmansk Region – since a memorable spring in 1994. It was then that Nikolay Lukin – the heart and engine of the Third Brigade of the Cooperative Tundra of Lovozero – agreed to let me pitch my tent at their camp. In the years that followed I lived in or near many such brigade camps. What I know of the tundra I owe to the people who worked in the vast sub-arctic space around them. The lives of many of those who had generously allowed me to share their knowledge were untimely cut short. Thus departed from us Lyudmila Lukina, Ivan Lukin, Anatoliy Zakharov, and Valeriy Yulin of Brigade 3, Aleksandr Sorvanov of Brigade 1, Andrey Khatanzyey, Sergey Volkov, and Aleksandr Zakharov of Brigade 8, Nikolay Kanev and Nikolay Viyucheskiy of Brigade 1 of Krasnoshchel’e’s Olenevod. They and many others went in the space of the last twenty years, taking away with them rich libraries of tundra knowledge. I was lucky to learn from them while they were still with us, but their loss is irretrievable.

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It is becoming progressively difficult to be accurate about life in socialist Bulgaria in the 1960s till the changes of 1989. I thank my class-mates, with whom we spent together our formative years at the English Language School in Plovdiv, in 1960–’65, for our regular meetings over the years and the rare chance of a whole class to correct each other’s so flexible ways of remembering.

For researchers going the way of longitudinal field work and for one or another reason being unable to be in the field with their families, the best they can hope for is to have the understanding and forgiveness of their dearest ones. I thank my wife Maria, daughters Lira and Nikolina, sons Nikola and Bogdan for giving me that.

Sofia-Tromsø-Lovozero, September 2015

² ‘Socioeconomic significance of developmental projects in Northwest Russia: The insiders’ point of view’ (2011–2015), NFR (FRISAM) Project No 209372; Tromsø Research Foundation (Tromsø Forskningsstiftelse).
General introduction

Dialogue between grassroots\(^4\) and power

This book attempts to examine the way people talk with power – and power talks back to them – in the context of authoritarian state regimes. My claim is, in the first place, that there does exist such a conversation. I thus strongly resist the reading of recent authoritarian history – of which I take the Soviet one as a principal example – in terms of people’s mute and passive subordination to crushing imposition of power, or at best – of forms of indirect resistance or escapism. Instead, my claim is that multi-layered communication between the pinnacle and the broad base of the social pyramid was part and parcel of the identity of the Soviet period all along.

In his perceptive study of an Evenki (Tungus) reindeer herding community in NE Siberia Nikolai Ssorin-Chaikov has convincingly shown that there existed a “two-way traffic of symbols and representations” between colonizer and colonized’ (2003:4; Bassin 2005:1183). In it an idea of Tungus cultural authenticity evolved in a mutually reinforced process of exchange.

The dialogic fabric of communication between state power and grassroots – as the two ultimate interlocutors – is captured by Michael Herzfeld’s concept of ‘cultural intimacy’ (2005; 1997). He specifically addresses the phenomenon of veiling over topics of embarrassment, shared between grassroots and power-holders, or entirely hiding them. As it shall be argued in what follows, grassroots-with-power communication in the Soviet and post-Soviet context reflects a will and corresponding practice for a continuously re-negotiated compromise arrangement with power. This arrangement is not primarily driven by a preoccupation with national unity and such concerns of the nation-state, involving ‘in-family’-like veil-

\(^4\) ‘Grassroots’ and ‘grassroot actors’ I shall be using throughout in its less usual, non-political sense, to mean ordinary people in contrast to elites.
ing over of potentially embarrassing intimate affairs. Its principal thrust is, rather, the establishing of a grassroots-to-power tense compromise over such fundamentally critical issues like existential security and a degree of well-being. ‘Cultural intimacy’ in the Soviet/post-Soviet context acquires therefore characteristically starker features. More importantly, it also reveals the presence of grassroots’ effective agency, which received wisdom would not habitually connect with a state like the Russian, and certainly not with the Soviet. In the chapters that follow, I attempt to explain this seeming paradox.

The dialogic fabric of the social life of the Soviet state, to extend Ssorin-Chaikov’s phrasing, was given attention in much older work in social history, focusing in various ways on the decades of Stalin’s rule. From this body of literature I turn special attention to the period of enforced collectivisation of agriculture (1929–1934). Total or ‘mass’ collectivisation (сплошная колхозизация) of the Russian village turned out to be one of the most violent impositions of state power on the people, and, together with the famine of 1932–33, it claimed millions of lives and more millions of maimed fates.

Against such a backdrop of terror, it is difficult to imagine collectivisation as part of a dialogic process. And yet, political historians like David Mitrany considered it from this side (1951). Mitrany put an emphasis on what he called a ‘compromise’ with the peasantry achieved in the process of collectivisation. In his opinion, the compromise resulted in allowing collective farm (колхоз) members to have the use of a small plot of land and stock for their own needs, but also, importantly, for selling surplus produce on a ‘free’ or non-state regulated market.

This arrangement was given attention quite early on, leading émigré historians like Maslov to call it the ‘kolhoz NEP’ (1937), or another more famous émigré like Trotsky to call it ‘The Soviet Thermidor’ (1936). The general position of such contemporary writers was that Soviet leadership and Stalin himself were forced to enter into a compromise with the peasantry. There was the fear that otherwise it would be impossible to feed the rapidly growing cities and towns, and maintain a fighting army under conditions of ‘imperialist encirclement’ and a pending war.\footnote{It is interesting to note that the thesis about Soviet power being forced to allow a degree of private property to kolkhoz members shows surprising longevity. In a recent paper on the Nenets reindeer husbandry community in Nenets Autonomous Okrug, it appears in the following way: ‘The Soviet government disapproved of owning private or personal property.'}

\footnote{All words and phrases marked by bold italics at first mention are to be found in the Glossary at the end of the book, where a longer explanation is given, accompanied by some of the relevant literary sources. They include books and articles in the usual manner, but also news items from paper or electronic media sources.}
The peasants had to be given something, in other words, in exchange for not only continuing to produce, but increasing production levels all the time ‘to meet the ever-growing needs of the labouring masses’, as the common adage of socialist propaganda had it. The question here is: how did it come about that the compromise was about the private plots of land in their literal and extended meaning?

The form the compromise took came through laborious communication between the actors at the base of the social pyramid, and all the intermediaries that assisted the message in travelling to the top. Such a look at the proposed communicative process strongly resists conceptualizations of the state as a clearly bounded and discrete institution, living, as it were, in a separate world of its own. In a critique levelled against ‘state-centrism’, Sharma and Gupta argue for conceptualizing “the state” within (and not automatically distinct from) other institutional forms through which social relations are lived, such as the family, civil society, and the economy.’ (2006:9)

I propose to examine such a position by looking into local realities across a heavily gendered divide between tundra and town in today’s reindeer husbandry part of the Kola Peninsula – Lovozero District. A central trope in indigenous discourse – as the latter came to the Kola in an imported version at the turn of the 1980s – has formed around an uncritically accepted thesis of a presumed destruction of Sami established land use practices and life-ways at the point of collectivisation (late 1920s and early 30s). I find it necessary to examine what exactly happened at that decisive historical moment. To do so it is imperative to look at how general and sweeping ideological decrees were made sense of at a grassroots level and how that sense found a way to reach back to the top of the power and ideological pyramid. A point I make is that such a communicative process was critically assisted by a lack of clear ideas on the part of those in power about how decrees should turn into day-to-day practice. The sense that travelled back and upwards, as I shall try to show, formed the basis of the ultimate compromise. In this way, I would claim, the proverbial ‘voice of the people’ was indeed heard.

Much of the difficulty in studying such a communicative process comes from the fact that it led to a compromise that undermined the state’s ideological legitimacy. What could be openly expressed related to the success of collectivisation accommodating, as Stalin put it: ‘personal, domestic interests (of kolkhoz members) with social interests, making it easier in

However, Soviet officials were forced (my emphasis) to allow herders to own a small number of personal reindeer (…)’ (Tuisku 2001:53).
this way to educate the private individual owners (edinolychniki) of yester-
day in the spirit of collectivism.’ (BSE II 1950, Vol. 3:125) What could
not be openly expressed however, was that from the accommodation of
personal with collective interests to ‘institutionalisation of theft’ (Creed
1998: 197–200) the step was but an easy one. The compromise, in other
words, consisted in the tacit acceptance of the inevitable making of this
step.

At the pinnacle of the power structure it was therefore found to be le-
gitimate – and legitimizing - to talk about such an accommodation, while
veiling over its morally flawed implications. This was done in the pro-
claimed conviction that catering for the ‘personal’ in a morally flawed way
was a temporary measure – in days to come Soviet people would, as it
were, ‘gradually forget’ about personal interests and be concerned only
with the social, i.e. the collective ones. The device can be seen as part of a
general ideological practice of putting off final resolution for a vague fu-
ture moment, leading to a remarkably stable syndrome of ‘unfinished
construction’ (Ssorin-Chaikov 2003:110f). Endless deferral till the com-
ing of the time when ‘the consciousness of the people would be higher’, as
one of the most common clichés of the time had it, was nevertheless seen
as an acceptable ideological tool. Not perhaps ideal for the legitimation of
power, but one that could be thought of as working.

What could not be found openly acceptable, however, was the actual
way in which personal interests combined with social ones. As investiga-
tion of ‘actually existing socialisms’ (Humphrey 2002:12) has shown,
‘combining personal with social interests’ did amount in the general case
to ‘institutionalised theft’. It is principally by such means, as Creed com-
pellingly proved, that the ‘revolution was domesticated’ (ibid.). Trotsky
said that it was ‘betrayed’ (1936) and other authors have called what hap-
pened by yet other names.

Using words like ‘theft’ to describe the private-public compromise
were thus awkward to be used in official Soviet discourse, particularly
when trying to legitimate policies, as, indeed, was the word ‘compromise’
itsel. I shall show further how such reticence in respect of the issue of
compromise, with its implied possibilities of calibrated material flows
from the public to the private, holds to this day. My examples shall be
from reindeer husbandry arrangements in the Far North of Russia, where
the issue of personal (‘private’) reindeer remains, to this day, among the
veiled presences in public discourse.

The word ‘theft’ besides being embarrassing when we have to use it
about actions of the majority of the population – indeed of the ‘people’
itself with its associated halo of a community of angels – needs to be re-
placed for another reason as well. As Caroline Humphrey rightly points out in this connection, members of the ‘Karl Marx’ Collective she studied talked about theft only when ‘(they were) stealing from one another’ (1998:136). Taking from the ‘public sphere’, in other words, was morally less of a transgression – if at all - in the context of authoritarian socialism.

Yet another reason comes from the intense sociality of the process of negotiating public-to-private material flows. This happens at the level of grassroots actors’ most direct contact with power in the form of local officials. In many cases these administrators would be kin, friends, or acquaintances. Negotiating public-to-private flows with them is, with rare exceptions, a matter of degree, not of principle. In other words, it is taken for granted that such flows exist and are to be condoned as otherwise the whole agricultural machinery will find it difficult to work. Save for extreme events – like, for instance, during the great famine of 1932–33 – the ‘deal’ (Millar 1988; Dunham 1976) would be seen as legitimate exchange for everybody concerned.

Cryptic adages of the times would capture this process of vernacular redistribution as a vital part of Soviet or Soviet-like socioeconomies. I am reminded here of the Bulgarian ‘ot naroda za naroda’, translatable as ‘(taken) from the people (to be given back) to the people’, and its innumerable variations.

The aesthetic of the deal emphasized its carnivalesque quality in the Bakhtinian sense of the term (Bakhtin 1990). It is an aesthetic of the laughter, the wink, the self-critical satire of being part of a morally ‘mildly flawed’ socioeconomic arrangement. This as-it-were innocent play with untruth attributed a carnivalesque quality of daily lived authoritarian socialism, sustaining on the whole a feeling of not living in a real world. Public-to-private ‘mildly immoral’ flows would trouble the consciousness, but be inwardly suppressed by the practice or pretence of containing transgression within continually renegotiated morally acceptable limits. In reindeer husbandry this personal, inner life of the state is revealed convincingly by the issue of personal (‘private’) deer ownership (Chapter 4).

If we replace, then, ‘institutionalised theft’ with morally mildly flawed ‘redistribution from below’ with an emphasis placed on the intensely social arrangements that assist the process, we may be nearer the reality of personally lived authoritarian socialism. Still, another aspect of the compromise remains in need of further attention.

That is the necessity to consider the tension the compromise caused by being ideologically unmentionable. The tension came from a resultant need for the Soviet citizen to communicate in a ‘double talk’, or even ‘double think’ mode (i.e. Chernyaev 1997). This side of Soviet and similar
societies brought appeals by prominent dissident writers of the time such as Solzhenitsyn and Havel that ‘one should not live in lies’. Both ‘theft’ and ‘lie’ would be laughed away in innumerable anecdotes of the day, and yet their presence in every fibre of life created a sense of an unreal, make-believe world.

The resulting deficit of a sense of reality in the domain of personal and public life created the necessity of sustaining an all-encompassing industry of ideological talk at the grassroots level – i.e. at the level at which power was supposedly talking to the ‘masses’. I strongly emphasize at the beginning of this work that this is not the dialogue I have in mind and, moreover, that ideological talk is not dialogic. The ‘real talk’ remained on the level of the personal and substantive, but, by this very reason had to operate in a veiled way, being ridden with unmentionables.

The monologic and the dialogic parts of Soviet life can be related to two distinct language uses, which I further call ‘poetic’ and ‘substantive’, borrowing from the terminology of linguistic pragmatics. The art and skills of the ‘poetic’, in their own turn, engaged practitioners at a grassroots level – a vast army doing ‘social work’ (obshchestvennaya rabota).

A task I set before myself in this book is to show how the substantive dialogue happens. For this purpose I take the case of a rather mixed community in the Kola Peninsula of NW Russia, and its travels in recent times. Central attention is given to the Sami people of this community and to reindeer husbandry as an occupation with foundational cultural value for them.

From a wide variety of reasons I take two that support my argument. The first is connected with the message carried up the multi-layered hierarchy of the Stalinist state, one which I claim is focused on a sense of a relatively secure existence. By security here I principally refer to human life relieved of risk-taking, or, in other words, the opposite of the risky life

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7 Community could be put in quotes here and henceforth, but I shall be satisfied by expressing my reservations, so they are known when I use the term further. Indeed, I have strong reasons to doubt the usefulness of such a term when describing the local situation. For historical reasons the local citizenry can hardly be reduced in dialogic terms to having a unitary ‘community voice’. On the one hand, this is due to the constant coming and going of labour migrants from the south, who, together with their descendants, have become by now the majority of the population of the district. On the other, it is to be connected with the absence of an ‘elders’ institution’ in pre-migrant Sami society, a fact certainly related to the present situation (for the Norwegian Sami as regards this point see Bjerklí 1996). A great deal of the problems besetting dialogic incongruity and failure in communication with outsiders is due to the illusion entertained by visitors, that by talking with a few local people one can hear the ‘community voice’, ‘the Sami voice’, ‘the herders’ voice’, or the voice of a select handful of old-age pensioners from herding who are imagined to be an institution of elders (Cf. on this last point Scheller 2013; 2010).
of an entrepreneur in the context of a capitalist liberal economy. In my chosen case, a reindeer herder is relieved of worrying about whether his ‘reindeer luck’ shall hold or not (Beach 1992).

I show in the text that follows how the idea of achieving such a riskless state was promoted by grass-roots actors at the very moment collectivisation began. It took some time before the pinnacle of power realized the implications of the suggested deal, but in the end it did and reciprocated. Security was exchanged for acceptance of collectivisation (Trotsky 1936:84).

The dialogue of grassroots actors interacting with power took many forms. Besides the tundra aspects of the situation, I turn attention to the public life of this process, which took place at urban centres amidst various social activities. The purpose of these last, as I shall try to show, has consistently been to conceal the deal and create a parallel ideological reality of higher aspirations. The trading of a riskless existence for curtailing of liberty has been found to be, by common understanding, ‘unmentionable’.

Fieldwork began in the spring of 1994 and is still going on. The first two years were described in a fieldwork diary (Konstantinov 2005a). That was an attempt to reflect the experience of the reindeer husbandry community as they were facing the end of the Soviet Union and the beginning of a period, which has not received a distinct popular name to this day. Concerning this last point, one could suggest that it might be the result of a popular perception of the current period as outside of normal time, not belonging to a sequence, but floating in an atemporal vacuum waiting for a return of the usual flow of time.

The approach of those first years – of looking at developments from the vantage point of reindeer herding camps – I have stuck to ever since. The time has come, however, when the course of events is better seen also from the perspective of the urban part of the local universe. The need for this has been prompted by major developments both on the larger canvas of Russian developments ‘twenty years after’, as well as by those that have been evolving during this time on the comparatively small horizons of Lovozero District (Lovozerskiy rayon).

The major developments, which have been taking place on a federal scale, are signalled by an increasingly palpable tension between competing ideological positions coming from the pinnacles of ruling power. On the one hand, an initiative had been launched in 2010 by then acting President Dmitriy Medvedev for propelling Russia ‘forward’ - this time ‘into the 21 century’ (Medvedev 18.06.2010). This was a doctrine of ‘modernisation and innovation’, proclaimed by Medvedev at the opening of the St.
Petersburg Economic Forum of that year. On the other hand, the ideological hallmark of presently acting President Vladimir Putin – a figure who has been perceived all along as the leading one in the Putin-Medvedev ruling tandem – has been of a more conservative or even oppositional character, namely one aspiring to the restoration of stability. This doctrine of stabilisation appears at present to be in the ascendant.

Returning to the now seemingly waning appeal of Medvedev for a leap forward – ‘Rossiya, vpered!’ (‘Russia, forward!’), many examples come to mind. They can be subsumed within a now traditional slogan along the lines of ‘catch up (with) and overtake (the ‘West’)’. In its latest edition of 2010 the project goes by the general name of ‘modernisation’ (modernisatsiya), implying that Russia is again lagging behind the ‘advanced countries’ in an intolerable manner. The project could be seen as belonging in a historical row of campaigns, which could start, for instance, with Emperor-Reformer Alexander II’s role in the abolition of serfdom, and Stolypin’s attempts to catch up with capitalism around the turn of the 19th century. If we take those reforms as the first in recent times, the present, Medvedev’s modernisation, would be the fourth such. Here I count as the second Stalin’s accelerated industrialisation and collectivisation of the early 1930s, and, as the third, Khrushchev’s reforms in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Those, we may remember, were aiming at ‘catching up with and overtaking’ the USA in agricultural production, with a parallel winning of the Cold War and space race. Some, however, may prefer to move the pointer further back, and take as a start Peter I’s modernisation of Russia around the turn of the 18th century. Other modernisations can also be included – like the opening up to France by Katherine the Great, or, at the beginning of 19th century by Alexander I; the borrowing of western evolutionary discourse through Marxism; as well as numerous other importations and simultaneous contestations of western influences and values. The argument shall not change in principle. Perceiving itself as forever ‘lagging behind’, and, at the same time as being better and bigger than anybody else, the multifaceted nation is periodically directed to ‘modernise’, this movement always involving a love-hate relationship with the West.

The ‘West’ well deserves its quotes, as the people who are concerned to one or other degree with the Sami of the Kola Peninsula truly represent a global community. Moreover, as in my own case, they may come from the ‘east’ in the sense of the former Cold War divide; in today’s terms: from the eastern – or southeastern periphery of the EU. What is more important here is not so much where they come from – be it Norway, the former West Germany, the former East Germany, or Bulgaria - but the fact that they usually work within a shared conceptual paradigm, and follow academic habits and codes, formed in the ‘West’. ‘East’ shall be used in the same reserved way.

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For the larger administrative entity, of which Lovozero District is a part, that is *Murmansk Region*, the starting point in a row of local ‘modernisations’ is easily found. This is the hurried construction of the Petrozavodsk-Kola railway line in 1915–16, which later came to be known as the *October Railway*. It connected the Kola Peninsula with the rest of the country in a ‘modern’ manner and quickly created the city of Murmansk (1916) as an expanded version of the last stop on the line.

Stalin’s industrialisation drive of the early 1930s left another lasting imprint on Murmansk Region through its ‘catch up and overtake’ ambitions. This time they were based on the extraction and processing of Kola mineral wealth. In the course of time the expansive project turned Murmansk Region into the most urbanised subarctic region in the world, and built up Murmansk as the biggest city beyond the Arctic Circle. It also created a number of one-mine towns (*monogoroda*), destined to create serious environmental and demographic problems in times to come. The mining-processing town of *Revda*, situated close to *Lovozero*, is one such.

Attention to both shall be given later on in the book (Chapter 4).

Industrialisation and urbanisation of Murmansk Region reached its culmination during Leonid Brezhnev’s years of power: from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s. This is a crucial period as regards the story of this book. The main reason comes from what I have abundantly observed during my fieldwork: memories of the period constitute the principal basis for evaluating the present. Popularly referred to as ‘Soviet times’ (*sovetskoe vremya*), or simply ‘before’ (*prezhdе, тогда*), Brezhnev’s fifteen years stand in popular memory as a time of stability and relative prosperity. The present tends to be experienced as a fall from such a state, with some signs of regaining it, under President Putin’s leadership.

In this context Medvedev’s bid for ‘modernisation and innovation’ did not seem to inspire much faith – in a way very similar to the ‘catch up and overtake’ slogans of previous periods. Insofar as Murmansk Region was concerned, a hope for modernisation based on off-shore energy resource extraction (pinned on the Shtokman gas field in the Barents Sea) never inspired conviction. The hope sounded loudly ‘from above’ however, and the spirit of the still apparently promising *Barents Euro Arctic Regional* (*BEAR*) cooperation was widely - and expensively - proclaimed at two successive *Murmansk Economic Fora* (2009 and 2010). When negotiations between *Gazprom* and Norwegian *Statoil* for cooperation in the Shtokman project eventually broke down and the project was shelved, hopes promoted ‘from above’ disappeared together with the acting Governor (Dmitriy Dmitrienko). Despite the re-signing of a BEAR agreement in June 2013, its hopeful lustre had gone. Instead, a martial-
sounding doctrine of Russia gaining supremacy in an opening up Arctic – the ‘Fight for the Arctic’ (Bor’ba za Arktiku) – appeared as the new strategic priority.

In the context of such dashed plans and new ambitions, and their occasionally neo-imperialist overtones⁹, Lovozero District stands as the poor, and highly problematic provincial relative, without any discernible chance to become an active part of the leap forward in whatever form that might be conceived. According to the current vision for the future of the district, as formulated in the regional centre, the district should develop economically in two directions: agriculture and tourism.

‘Agriculture’ has to be read as ‘reindeer husbandry’ however paradoxical this may sound, but here we bow before the all-powerful Soviet and Russian bureaucracy and its choice of terms. (This we shall have to do many more times in the course of reading the book). ‘Tourism’ is seen as resting on the beauty of still-virgin tundra lands, as well as the exoticism of Sami traditions, including ‘traditional Sami reindeer herding’. These are the ‘great riches’, in media discourse, that the District possesses, forgetting – for the time being at least – those characterising the aspirations of the previous period. These were the ‘underground treasures’ (klady pod zemley) in the form of various minerals (i.e. Ushakov and Dashchinskiy 1988:170–75). For the sake of preserving the tundra as it is, this sounds like very good news indeed, unless, of course, ambitions to extract minerals do not arise again.

In the overall context of the latest modernisation drive, it is important to gain perspective on current developments from an urban vantage point. One needs to look at decisions taken in town about the future of the proposed economic undertakings (development of agriculture and tourism), and how these decisions are put into effect. Moreover, in this territory the size of a small European country (54,000 sq. km.), there is hardly any part that does not live a half-urban, half-tundra life. The reindeer themselves, who are locally made into a symbol of a reindeer-based universe, live a migratory life in the tundra, but we can also occasionally meet them in the streets of Lovozero, or at the annual reindeer race at the Festival of the North (Prazdnik Severa) amid huge blocks of flats in Murmansk. They meet their end in Lovozero’s slaughter house, if they have not been killed before by herder, hunter, or predator.

The herders are principally urban residents. This is contrary to romantic images of tundra-dwellers, which occasionally appear in the regional

⁹ See particularly publications by the Institute of Dynamic Conservatism (Institut dinamicheskogo konservatizma, IDK) in Moscow (i.e. M.Kolerov 17.10.2010).
and district media, or tourist web-sites. The herders’ main residence is in the blocks of flats of Lovozero, or in log cabins in the three extant tundra villages: Krasnošechele, Kanevka, and Sosnovka. A significant part of the inhabitants of these villages own, at the same time, flats and auxiliary buildings in Lovozero, or other towns.

In town (Lovozero), or in village, herders live with their families or relatives on an on-and-off basis. At home or in camp they would spend a month or two, a couple of weeks, or just a few days. These spells happen over the year at various periods that are only roughly predictable. As a rhythm of life the herder’s resembles not a little that of an off-shore fisherman – a life of incessant commuting between two contexts: the sea (in this case the tundra), and the small fishing town or village – in our case the town of Lovozero, or a tundra village.

Another strong point of resemblance comes from the gender aspects of this situation. Like life at sea, tundra life has by now become almost totally male. The phenomenon in its various degrees has been noticed across the subarctic not only in its Russian part (Lyarskaya 2013, 2010; Povoroznyuk et al. 2010; Burykin 2002, 1999), but also beyond it, as in Fennoscandia (Eikjok 2007:112; Anderson 1987:11). In Murmansk Region this feature, as well as the absence of hard surface roads in the tundra, accentuates the elemental distinction between what I generalize as ‘town’ on the one hand and ‘tundra’, on the other.

Gender-marked positioning in this sharply divided space between town and tundra tends to turn upside down well established dichotomies in western social science discourse following the formula ‘female is to male as nature is to culture’ (Ortner 1974). In fact, as it shall become evident in the course of this study, Sami indigenous men tend to be disassociated both from the public and, particularly, from the ‘cultural’ domain.

Reflection on this two-sided reality, in which elemental differences have lent themselves to diverse symbolic manipulations, has led to the text in the pages that follow. My main objective has been, throughout, to help subvert received notions of a bounded community, romantically perceived through mystifying symbolical procedures as living in an Arcadian land of ‘Sami traditional land use’. A yearning for reconnecting with such a ‘lost world’, a ‘secret garden’ can be well understood. As a romantic sentiment the yearning seems to be shared by a large number of interested visitors both from home and abroad. In return, it is encouraged by local cultural activities, as well as various forms of ethnic and tundra-tourisms. (Cf. Yasong and Morais 2014) To see the Sami as inhabitants of a world before the snowmobile, lap-top and cell-phone is an easily understood dream and I cannot claim myself to be immune to it. At the same time,
the very grave state-of-affairs, as regards the life and health of reindeer herders, dictates that we confront reality in all its stark and problematic details.

This cannot be done, I claim, except by seeing the local subarctic situation as a microcosmic reflection of powerful processes, shaping ways of life not only in Russia and the Soviet Union before that, but also in countries stretching to the farthest extremes of that conglomerate formerly known as the Soviet Bloc. A few relics of that laboriously sustained space still exist, such as Belorussia, North Korea, and (in a way still) Cuba. But in the much greater space, over which the Soviet experiment had once sprawled, one discerns, time and time again, a unifying trend. It is evident to a greater or lesser degree in each specific case, and points to a groundswell tending towards reinterpretting the previous order, rather than breaking away from it and setting off on a new road. This search for continuities rather than disruptions has been noticed early in the research of postsocialisms, developing as a research sub-field of its own (Berdahl et. al. 2000:3–4). For those living and experiencing the dynamic, the suppression of the former teleological, easily legible paradigm, results in a surreal feeling around everyday action. Aware of their unsettled state, those involved in the process in its immediacy, would often comment on what they experience by ironies and wry remarks. They would position themselves as the butt of such ironies; presenting themselves as participants in a comic act: this time it is about ‘building capitalism’, as different from the ‘building of socialism’ of former times.

This book is a way of explaining why ‘building capitalism’ should sound so ironic. The small urban and tundra community in the Russian Far North, which is my study case, provides a good reading of the joke. The preference for a secure and predictable life in a most basic sense, at the expense of any other value – like freedom or entrepreneurial ambition – are hinted at by the joke’s layers of irony. Such dispositions can block any top-down drive for ‘acceleration’, ‘modernisation’, ‘innovation’, and the like. The personal and collective arrangement (‘the collective is a risk-free environment for the personal’), inherent in the local form of Soviet/Russian reindeer husbandry, provides a good illustration of why – for good or bad - Russia seems destined to be forever ‘catching up and overtaking’, but never attaining a final end. The Kola reindeer husbandry case is a good example of how small and peripheral cases may provide graphic enactments of otherwise elusive general issues.
Chapter 1
Introductory: main issues

The subject matter of this book concerns post-Soviet developments in the reindeer herding part of the Kola Peninsula. Administratively, this is Lovozero District, as the territorially largest part of Murmansk Region, comprising one-third of its size. I shall work on the assumption that the reader will be acquainted with the basic geographical and historical facts about the region; in case that may not be so, one is advised to consult the relevant section of the Glossary (p.306).

Problems of dialogue

The main intention of this book is to try and help achieve a clearer vision of the local situation, working to disperse – at least to some extent - the mists that have accumulated over the last two decades. These particularly concern the problematical existence of a presumed dialogue between a concerned outside community, on the one hand, and the people living in the reindeer herding part of the Kola Peninsula, on the other.

At a more general level, such a state of affairs may be said to have resulted from the perpetuation of a ‘discourse of need’ (Berg-Nordlie 2011a), as regards the tundra-dependent communities of the Kola Peninsula. The case of the Kola Sami people stands here in very high profile. In other words, it has become a nearly automatic reflex of Western concerned parties, most of all - various Sami and non-Sami institutions and individual writers or researchers of neighbouring Fennoscandia – that a principal way of communicating with Kola people, and most of all - Kola Sami people, is by discussing their needs for moral and material support. The image of the people presented in a recent documentary broadcast in Norway (Simma 2012) is very typical in this respect. It is of reindeer herders who are represented as helpless victims of Russian state authorities, the military, the police, poachers, and mineral extractive companies. In this ‘victimisation discourse’ the Kola Sami people are conceived, first
and foremost, as in dire need of Western help and support. Here we may see a transposition of postcolonial reflexes of ‘aidism’: a procedure that operates – this time - in the post-Soviet rather different and poorly understood environment in comparison to other more familiar non-Western contexts.

The main reason, as I see it, for inadequate conceptualisation of post-Soviet realities is connected to outside imaginaries of local actors during the Soviet era – especially those at the broad base of the social pyramid. Such ‘grassroots actors’ tend, by and large, to be imagined as emphatically passive victims of totalitarian power. In a manner similar to the one in postcolonial discourse, the tools of aid and general support are seen as setting people on the road of reforming themselves to a state of normalcy, once gross injustices have been overcome.

In the specific case of Kola Sami people, the ‘need’ has been seen to derive from cultural deprivation and destruction of traditional life-ways, seen to characterize Soviet times, as also from the sudden worsening of economic conditions, that came with the liberal economic reforms of the early 1990s.

The attitude was – and is – well-meaning enough. It seems, however, to rule out the possibility that significant parts of the targeted community, while welcoming the chance for support, may have rather different views of what the Soviet period meant for them. It tends also not to take into account, or simply to be unable to see that such people may strongly wish to sustain basic socioeconomic arrangements of the late Soviet order. Moreover: that they are actually successfully achieving such sustainability by flexibly adapting to the new conditions. Ignoring such possibilities has, in my view, brought about the blurring of vision as regards the local situation – a deficiency of Western ‘aidist’ discourse and its consequent (mis)applications. For me an image symbolic of such a deficiency shall stand always as crates of thick glossy textbooks of business management and NGO organisation that came in great abundance from the West in the early 1990s. I have seen them coming to postsocialist Bulgaria, have been unloading them from relief planes at Bucharest Otopeni Airport in December 1989, have seen them at the Open Society University in Budapest, and not so abundantly, but still - even in Murmansk of the 1990s. As time would prove later on, success in business came not to those reading the books (assuming there had been such). Those who eventually formed the super-rich or oligarchic business-cum-power elite tended to rely upon experience as Komsomol and Communist Party functionaries with good connections in relevant circles. This occurred in a striking number of cases. Perhaps not to the same degree, but skills from such walks of life also
led to the creation of many NGOs, opinion-poll agencies, and sociological or political science research organisations. What is more important for the purpose of this book, however, is that at the broad base of the social pyramid it was also realised quickly enough that Western manuals were not very useful because the system was not reforming, but reinterpreting itself. Clearly, the Soviet legacy was perceived in very different ways on the two sides of the former Cold War borders.

Focussing again on the region in question – Murmansk Region and specifically Lovozero District – many bells began ringing rather early, alerting to some radical mismatch between outside and inside opinion on matters of local concern. The loudest alarm has come from the dubious quality of results. To this troubling issue much of the attention of this book is turned (Chapters 5, 6). The question that should be asked here is: why is it that after two decades of enthusiastic support, the local state of affairs, particularly around critical problems of life in the target community, such as abnormally high mortality, has not improved and may, in fact, have become worse than before?

At the same time, revival and enhancement of cross-border communication on indigenous issues, so enthusiastically welcomed at the beginning of reforms, is now facing increasing constraints. The first decade of the 2000s has been marked by a tendency towards retrenchment into isolationism as a ‘post-Yel’tsinist’ political doctrine. In the light of recent developments of November 2012 – like legal action against Pomor activist Ivan Moseev (Pomor controversy), or the suspension, at the same time, of the Russian Association of the Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) – one may even find reason to perceive a regression to perestroikya, Cold War-like rhetoric, coming from the official and semi-official Russian side. The sad conclusion is that during the period of liberalized communication and eagerness for cooperation on both sides, a support agenda that was uncritically taken for granted by Westerners may have negated well-meant efforts. A task, which the book sets itself is to help create a better understanding of the local case that will be needed when, inevitably as I strongly believe, a new relaxation of cross-border constraints shall come.

I am certainly not the only one to be aware of the unsatisfactory aspects of the current situation. In one way or another, concerned researchers have been trying to draw attention to this developing state of affairs for over a decade by now. The earliest effort, specifically as it relates to the problem of inadequate political representation of grassroots actors by what has evolved as a Kola Sami ethnopolitical establishment, is to be credited to Indra Øverland, raising the problem in his dissertation of
1999. Regrettably, it took many years for this important contribution to be published in a book form\(^\text{10}\). That happened finally only in 2012 in co-authorship with Mikkel Berg-Nordlie (Øverland and Berg-Nordlie 2012), producing an amended text. In it many of the cases I argue for here have been well-treated from the personal vantage point of these two authors. I shall be referring to such points as this text grows, but may not be able to do that as thoroughly as I would have liked. This is a sign, on the other hand, of an evolving critical mass of opinion, characterised by considerable unity of concerns.

A similar situation developed concerning the work of Vladislava Vladimirova, leading up to her perceptive and insightful ‘Labour Ethic’ (2006). Many aspects of the problematic I am discussing here were extensively considered by Vladimirova in her book and subsequent writings. I may not be able always to credit her treatment as much has been discussed and thought together, over ten years of joint fieldwork in the reindeer herding part of the Kola Peninsula. In an early and very raw form, many of the issues of concern were also presented or hinted at in my own field notes, capturing key events of change on the reindeer husbandry scene in 1994–95 and later years (Konstantinov 2005a).

By the end of the 2010s to this body of critical opinion was added the voice of Elisabeth Scheller. Based on years of dedicated linguistic fieldwork with the Kola Sami people, Scheller pointed out critical rifts within the Sami community that place the majority of the Kola Sami in a weak position and keep them hidden from the gaze of those studying ethnopolitics. She likens them to an ‘invisible group’, a silent majority, whose interests and, indeed, language, remain vulnerable and fragile despite the great display of public ethnopolitical activity (Scheller 2013, 2010). Her phrasing ‘invisible group’, which she uses in respect of the dominant part of the Kola Sami people, I shall take the liberty to extend, in what follows, to large parts of the very mixed and variegated community of Lovozero District.

The opinion of Geir Hønneland as it concerns the broader picture of the state of east-west relations in the ambitious project of the Barents Euro Arctic Region (BEAR) is of importance. Expressed already by the beginning of the ‘stability decades’ of the 2000s, it suggested that vision-

\(^{10}\) This is far from the only case in which manuscripts have bided their time, for one reason or another, appearing as edited versions of the original much later. In relation to the Russian North West, such is the case with Finn Sivert Nielsen’s invaluable ‘Eye of the Whirlwind’ (1993), based on original and perceptive fieldwork in Leningrad at the height of the perestroika process. The manuscript appeared in a published form in a Russian translation only many years later (Nielsen 2004). This is fascinating reading especially for those interested in the immediately pre-reform - and still Soviet - period.
ary projects of the BEAR-type fail to take into account new cross-border realities, rendering futile much of what had been done over the previous decade (Hønneland 2003). These new realities can be seen as coming from an answered wish of a vast majority of people in the country to regain features of late Soviet order. In Murmansk Region such a wish has been particularly strong, but it was not taken into account in the optimistic thinking informing the BEAR project. In its second edition (Novoyu 28.05.2012), the project is looking distinctly out of touch with the times, and in strong need of adjustment to come to terms with them.

The pro-Kola Sami people’s original support agenda of the 1990s, concurrent with the heyday of the BEAR ideology, is also in danger of becoming anachronistic. The main danger has come from the worrying fact that Kola Sami ethnopolitical leadership and the grassroots actors supposedly represented by it have been all along living in parallel realities, which barely touch. The lack of real improvements related to issues of survival as mentioned above is a sad comment on this. Nonetheless, academic discourse has gone on discussing ‘problems’, while the people have been trying to improve their situation in ideologically and practically very different ways from those suggested by ethnopolitical rhetoric.

A great deal of this state-of-affairs may have come about not by some widespread myopia or inveterate romanticism, however the latter seem to inform at times the agenda of Sami supporters, but purely and simply for reasons of convenience. It is certainly easier to work with the same group of people, who have gradually professionalized themselves as ethnopolitical conference-room actors and more often than not would appear with basically the same speech at any international forum. Even prosaic details such as possession of an international passport, bank account, and travelling skills, let alone foreign language proficiency, are enough to weed out tundra-connected actors, especially reindeer herders, most of whom left school at the earliest opportunity and have not travelled on their own beyond Murmansk. Increasingly, computer skills, e-mail access and epistolary habits, as well as some knowledge of English, have also crept in to impose an invisible barrier between those who are conveniently included in conferences and projects, and those who are not. And thus in mainstream discourse it was not even noticed that only one viewpoint and, indeed, only a single genre of expression had come to prevail – that which Western audiences find ideologically and morally suitable. Ethnopolitical cross-border dialogue and applied programs thus exist in a ‘monolingual’ mode, to use the Bakhtinian term, referring to the literary arts before the
multi-vocality and polyglossia of the novel. In a paradoxical manner, a discourse premised on post-modernist values and sensibilities has insidiously acquired pre-modern habits.

It is, of course, natural and right that a broad grassroots base of no great proficiency in public debate and general disinclination to engage in such be represented by a spear-head of skilled and dedicated people. This point has been noted by Øverland and Berg-Nordlie (2012:107–9). These authors also note that the rapid emergence of such a body (an NGO) marked the beginning of what they call the ‘unipolar phase (1989–1 998)’ of Kola Sami ethnopolitical mobilization (ibid., p.3).

As found worldwide in other indigenous and marginalized contexts, leaders mostly came from among people skilled in fields such as education and public administration (Montoya et al. 2000; Anderson 1987). This has been the pattern in the Russian subarctic, with many administrators coming from regional and federal teaching colleges (Burykin 2002; 1999). Internationally, women have proved themselves to be able and dedicated ethnopolitical leaders, while in the Soviet Union and Russia this has been even more true. In the following chapter I discuss the gender history of Soviet ideological machinery in its links to humanitarian branches of education.

The swift appearance of an ethnopolitical elite cannot be explained, however, only by the recycling of ideological accents and skills. A factor which significantly facilitated the process was the ease with which one could move from the riddles and tensions of Soviet ideological work – especially in such a sensitive domain as education – to the unambiguous and straightforward mission of Western-inspired ethnopolitics. Soviet times demanded correct deciphering of often contradictory and opaque pronouncements and directions coming from the pinnacles of ideological power. Moving from this to the terrain of Western-inspired indigenous debate with its unambiguous moral prerogatives may be considered, by comparison, a child’s game. Not even engaging in debate was required: all one needed was to describe the graveness of problems and make appeals for support.

Whatever the pre-history of the formation of the first ethnopolitical leaders, and the exact circumstances in which it took place, its later life

11 Bakhtin (1981:11;1975 a,b), see also Dentith (1995:52f).
13 A detailed account is to be found in Øverland and Berg-Nordlie (2012: 92ff). See also Vinogradova (2012).
was characterized by internal splintering into factions, unrelenting hold on leadership, and a tendency to perpetuate its hold by passing it on, if possible, to children or close kin.

Such propensities are not alien to more effective governments, but merit more often decides: familial cultural capital certainly helps but is generally not primary. The more critical matter is elsewhere. While the circumstances of the quickly formed, but noticeably cliquish Kola Sami ethnopolitical elite changed generally for the better, the ‘silent majority’ remained beset with grave problems as if no age of ‘revival’ and ‘support’ had ever come. In the monoglossia of the conference room and related published texts, this fact remained unnoticed.

Residence, lifestyle, and gender

Another serious issue that also escaped attention in the clamour for support was that urban-dwellers were many times more numerous than those on the tundra. Urban Sami people faced a crucial identity problem shared with many other indigenous peoples around the globe: whether they could claim to be indigenous since they were ‘non-traditional’ and, specifically, not making a living by relying on traditional land use practices? Throughout this book I turn attention to gender dimensions of this situation. In the course of the Soviet decades women in local society gradually came to follow town-oriented courses of personal development (cf. Kotov 1985), dissociating themselves from the tundra to a much greater extent than in the case of local men. As a result, women in local society sought a multitude of ways to sustain their indigenous identity by symbolic, rather than actual relation to the tundra (Vladimirova 2012). This has led many into the ranks of the leaders of the ethnopolitical movement, which has caused serious complexities and tensions that mark critical fissures in local society. There is need to be concerned, therefore, with the gender and spatial aspects of local complexities, raising significant challenges to both analysis and application.¹⁴

My own experience with this and other local issues comes from attempting to get as close as possible to sharing the vantage point of what I call the ‘tundra-connected part of the community’. This laborious phrasing has to be used so that one remains faithful to local realities. The fact of the matter is that besides the reindeer herders, there are many other people sharing critical aspects of their lifestyle. A tundra-focused, equipped, and

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skilled community has formed over the decades, consisting of anglers, hunters, traders and, increasingly, *micro-safari* tourism operators. It is a largely male community, and like all the rest of local Lovozero District society, it is characterized by ethnic mixing. Several features thus intersect (Valentine 2007) to produce tundra-connected subjectivities. A pride of place among them holds tundra-merit, i.e. the complex of skills and experience that makes one capable of tapping renewable tundra resources. These latter may be central to what is referred to as ‘traditional land use’, but there are new resources also, like various tundra tourisms (*safari, ethnic tourism, extreme tourism*). Another salient feature is a predominantly male gender markedness, and still another one: the lower relevance of ethnic belonging – indigenous, *para-indigenous*, mixed – in comparison to the urban ethnopolitical scene. The distancing between urban-centred intersections of subjectivity-forming features, on the one hand, and tundra-centred ones, on the other, forming a town vs. tundra rift, can be illuminated by the beginning and unfolding of the process of Sami ethnopolitical assertion.

That happened as reappearance from isolation, well captured by the metaphor of the lifting of the Iron Curtain, or the fall of the Berlin Wall – the all-powerful images of a process of re-birth and re-union. In it, not only the Sami people, and not even only the peoples of the Soviet Union, but the peoples of the entirety of the former Soviet Bloc, or Socialist Camp – depending on which side of the Iron Curtain one stood – reappeared from their variously superimposed obscurities. At this decisive moment, when, from the Western perspective, nothing would have been more natural than for these peoples to rush to join with the rest of the world – meaning the West – internal rifts formed instantly, but were either ignored or explained away. The rifts were between intellectual elites, strongly pro-Western in their inclinations, and a mass of people, for whom the events spelled the end of normal, secure, and moderately prosperous life. The strange behaviour of this last and larger group of the ‘liberated’ would be usually explained away by the impact of prolonged indoctrination. They, as the phrase was quickly coined at the time, were the ‘die-hards’, ‘the reinforced-concrete heads’. In the Soviet Union and later in the new, post-Soviet Russia they would be referred to pejoratively as next to mentally deficient *Soviet beings* (*sovki*). Their political allegiance (communist/socialist) remained largely unchanged, if not as actual membership, certainly as regards sympathies. This was a fact of some pride among this larger part of post-Soviet society, establishing moral superiority over those of the join-the-West-aspiring intelligentsia. They would be attacked for having discarded their Communist Party tickets at the earliest
opportunity, and rushed to the fold of missionary-like Western advisors and patrons. What was seen as even more deplorable from the point of view of the ‘die-hards’, was that newly emerged upholders of democratic values had also come into various forms of Western pay. Knowing the fetish for Western currency in Soviet days, alongside such unreachables as Western goods, inseparably linked to travelling abroad, it is little wonder that the conservative grassroots feelings of envy mixed somewhat schizophrenically with moral opprobrium.

The Sami case was a tiny speck in all this change and rise of passions that spread from the Czech Republic in the west to the Russian Far East, and from Kola to Bulgaria. Smallness and distance notwithstanding, the larger scenario was enacted in the case of the Kola Sami as everywhere else along recognizable structural lines. The ‘turn-coat’ vs. ‘die-hard’ moral controversy developed, however, local specifics. These concerned not so much Communist Party or Komsomol affiliation in years past, for, indeed, the tundra-connected part of the community, from where accusations of opportunism came, was harbouring strongly nostalgic pro-Soviet feelings themselves. The controversy was connected with whether or not urban career ambitions led people to give in to the heavy-handed marginalizing measures devised by Soviet power and suppress their Sami identity. The principal moral anger against the newly sprung ethnopolitical elite fed from such sources. The conservatively pro-Soviet tundra community, most of all – the Sami reindeer-herders – protested that ‘those women-teachers, who would not even look at us (in former times), so they wouldn’t be recognized to be Sami, are now the greatest Sami of all’. When one speaks of the tense situation that urban indigenous women found themselves in after the onset of radical reforms in the early 1990s, the position of the new ethnopolitical elite certainly stands out. Such women faced the challenge of defending their indigenous identity in the face of criticism from tundra-connected and principally male actors, as well as facing a more general negative opinion, placing them in the position of foreign agents.

The Sami-related problematic of seeing the world of the early 1990s as ‘rebirth’, or, conversely, free fall down an abyss, echoed thus the passions of the post-Soviet and postsocialist systemic changes, adding a number of other important characteristic moments of its own. One is the problem noted above of the exclusiveness of indigenous ethnopolitics in the local case, created less by imposing constraints on membership for the larger

Sami community than by that community’s distancing itself from ethnopolitics.

The issue of representativeness was thus quick to arise: who indeed was representing whom on the newly opened ethnopolitical stage? From the point of view of the ‘invisible group’ and, especially what I further describe as its ‘herding core part’, the new elite was representing them only in name. Seen from the tundra, ethnopoliticians seemed to be engaged primarily in sustaining their hold on what tundra-connected actors considered a newly available and lucrative resource. The dismissive attitude of this silent majority has not changed over the last two decades, while, at the same time, the number of organisations created for representing it has considerably increased.

The problem of representativeness is indeed puzzling. Why does it appear with such force in respect of a people of only around 1700 according to recent censuses (Dvoretskaya 2012)? In many places this is the population of a village, in which, as in the Lovozero Sami case, people not only know each other, but are related by kin, neighbourhood, and friendship links of traditional standing. And yet, when one gets close enough one sees divisions and rifts of such proportions that the very use of the term ‘community’ becomes suspect.

In this book I discuss principally what I see as the greatest one of such divisions – that between an urban-based part of the local community on the one hand and a tundra-connected part on the other. Before I turn to this topic and its historical background, I return to the events of the first years after the lifting of the Iron Curtain. It is important to outline, at the very start, the discursive distribution of roles that evolved and the selection of actors that its practical outcomes brought about.

The main thrust of ethnopolitical discourse had always been, first and foremost, to give support to the tundra-connected part of the community – those who were supposedly engaged in ‘Sami reindeer husbandry’ (saamske olenevodstvo). At the same time, as has been pointed out above, such people chose not to be among the speakers on the ethnopolitical stage, neither did ethnopolitical activists make any great effort to involve them. As a result they have long tended to stand apart from the overall revival and support process that was enthusiastically launched at the turn of the 1990s. It was launched, as we know, in a spirit of dismantling the Soviet edifice and of introducing, after removal of the ruins, the institutions of civil society, democracy, and market economy.

The first sign of Kola Sami appearance on the regional ethnopolitical scene, and not long after – on the Nordic and global one, may be consid-
erected to be a short article by Lyubov Vatonena in Lovozerskaya pravda of 1988, subsequently translated into English (Vatonena 1997; 1989). For the first time in many decades, critical issues concerning the Sami community were publicly aired: the administrative liquidation of tundra villages in the 1960s was a prominent one among them. As a result of severing the reindeer herding community from the land by liquidating their villages and declaring them ‘unviable’ (bezperspektivnye, see Chapter 4), many ills arose, the author claimed. Alcoholism, separation of families, enforced bachelorship among reindeer-herders, suicidal behaviour, and high mortality were on this list (Gutsol et al. 2007).

This was shocking news for the overwhelmingly urban migrant population of the Region. The Nordic neighbours were similarly alarmed; particularly concerned were Nordic Sami activists and academics. Since border regulations became fairly relaxed as of the early 1990s, a lively exchange of visitors ensued in the context of emerging opportunities for providing Western (mainly Fennoscandic) support to the Kola Sami people.

More than twenty years now after the appearance of this eye-opening article, the circumstances of the forcibly resettled people, particularly those of the reindeer herders, have not changed. The torrents of words about their condition and the need to improve it have not perceptibly contributed to positive change.

There protrudes, in this way, a weakening of connections between much of the ethnopolitical elite, on the one hand, and a ‘silent majority’ of indigenous and para-indigenous people, on the other – a topic problematized as a crisis of representation for over a decade (Øverland 1999). In the much larger second group there tend to fall all manner of urban or tundra-connected inhabitants who for one reason or another feel unwilling or reticent to get involved in ethnopolitics and revivalism. Reasons may vary a great deal and it is problematic to generalize, but in the most common case they seem to be related to a sense of inability to engage competently in public discussions and presentations. These feelings seem prompted by fears of insufficient education and ‘cultural’ development, and of limited skills for public appearance at local cultural centres, of disconnection from indigenous political issues, especially among people dispersed and isolated far and wide over the territory of the Region and beyond. Factors such as heavy alcohol dependence may help sustain reticence about public involvements – both on the part of the person herself

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16 Another revealing article of this type appeared not long after in the national newspaper ‘Trud’ (Galenkin and Kovalenko 1989).
or himself, and disinterest of those who are publicly active to interact with them.

The following episode provides an illustration. Wishing to engage tundra-connected people in a conference in Lovozero, the organizers used the kinship links of ethnopolitical leaders to convince people to participate. In the particular case a prominent local leader phoned repeatedly and rather insistently a relative of hers who was the head of an indigenous clan community (obshchina). That particular obshchina was particularly important to the overall theme of the conference – ‘tourism in areas of traditional land use’ — as the community was one of the very few who actually practiced some reindeer husbandry. The head of the obshchina finally agreed to come and was included in the programme. The ethnopolitical leader, taught by experience, kept phoning her relative to the very last morning before the conference. Seeing that she had not arrived yet – maybe half an hour before the event was due to begin – the phone was picked up yet again, only for us to hear that due to magnetic storms, the person felt unwell and was unable to participate. The comment of the ethnopolitical leader was: ‘I knew from the start she wouldn’t come, but I wanted to give it a serious try’.

The high visibility of an otherwise much divided elite stands thus in contrast to the highly reticent, and hence – invisible group of the mass of grassroots actors. Here those in cooperative herding brigades, or otherwise connected with the tundra tend to assume an even more detached stance than the more urban-connected part.

The phenomenon of ‘super-visibility’ of ethnopolitical elites can be seen as a product of a synergy between mutually reinforcing, but nonetheless opposing currents. On the one hand, this is the presence of a well-educated part of the Sami community who are experienced and highly skilled in ‘social work’. As we shall see later on in the book, making ‘social work’ experience and skills that were formed and honed in a Soviet environment into skills useful in post-Soviet contexts presented only small problems. This ‘ideological capital’, to paraphrase Bourdieu, came to be of good use in the new realities – not the glossy manuals on NGO building, of which a mention was made earlier on.

What is more, it worked – and still does – in synergy with an opposing current. This is the creation of a non-competitive environment, in which a

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17 The event (17–18.11.2011, Lovozero) was the first of three events within a programme, supported by the Norwegian Barents Secretariat – ‘Developing Cross-Border Tourism in the Kola Peninsula: New Actors in Sami Reindeer-Herding Territories (2011–2013)’. The second conference took place at Reindeer Herding Base No 8 at Lake Kolm’yavr (21–23.06.2012), and the third – at the village of Krasnoshchel’e (24–27.01.2013).
person with ambitions for leadership could realise oneself on the ethnopolitical turf. The absence of serious competition and contestation over the legitimacy of political representation comes in part from the above mentioned reticence of the majority of actors who avoid the public stage. Disinclination to take part in publicly visible action is a source for both ‘super-visibility’ and its opposite. This suggests, in its turn, that disproportionate attention on the part of supportive agencies has been turned to the public urban stage, at the expense of the tundra one, where the majority of actors would feel themselves bearers of worthy knowledge and skills. This is especially true in respect of the reindeer husbandry part of the community – the herders and the wide periphery of other tundra-connected persons around them.

Proofs of relatively low attention turned to the ‘tundra stage’ – as different from that given to the urban one – are not difficult to find. It is enough to look, for instance, at the press materials announcing some indigenous event, to see the same eternally super-visible presences, and hardly a new face there, let alone that of a reindeer herder. In the latest publications of this type, connected with the coming celebration of the International Sami Day (6 February) in early 2014, the super-visibility of urban-connected presences was reinforced by the mainstream ‘cultural’ bias of the ceremonial proceedings. Not less than one hundred cultural events were scheduled to take place, while not even the word ‘reindeer herding’ was mentioned in the whole body of those and related texts (6 fevralya 04.02.2014; 100 meropriyatiy 04.02.2014; Predstaviteli 04.02.2014).

The feeling of ‘not belonging’ to the world of public limelight and ‘high culture’ – book-presentations, art exhibitions, choreographed singing and dancing – separates a good deal of the urban silent Sami majority from ethnopolitics. In the case of reindeer-herders and other tundra-connected people, overwhelmingly male, the separation easily transforms into bitter resentment about the fact that activities prompted by revivalist sentiments rarely reach out to the tundra. As we shall see further on (p.223) this is a serious setback from former Soviet days, when public events – be they agitprop lectures, accompanied by ‘cultural programmes’ – did get to tundra camps on a regular basis.18

At this far end from bustling city life stand most clearly the tundra users – reindeer herders in the first place. They spend a considerable part of the year at tundra bases or other camps, but do not migrate with the rein-

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deer herds. The great majority are men of secondary school education and sometimes even less. Their main employment is in the herding teams (brigades) of the two big reindeer husbandry cooperatives on the Peninsula – that is, Tundra of Lovozero, and Olenevod (‘Reindeer Herder’) of Krasnoschel’e. The herders can be considered to be the core part of what I call here ‘the tundra-connected community’, with many other people inhabiting concentric circles around them in a variety of ways (Chapter 5).

The gender, residential, representational, and occupational fissures thus formed can be discussed in relation to two divergent life-style trajectories: towards and away from a central position, that can be described as the principal support of the Sami indigenous culture and the community itself – that of ‘traditional land use’, meaning ‘traditional Sami reindeer husbandry’ in the first place. That the Sami ethnopolitical movement should be organized around this central position was the default tenet from the very start. To be Sami was taken to mean that one actually was, or was striving to be ‘traditional’.

Twentieth century history in its relation to local concerns tended to be seen through this prism. As in the rest of the post-Soviet space, the mission of the newly arrived era of post-Sovietism and post-command-socialism, was seen to be – by newly prominent dissident thought, and by its Western sympathisers – as principally one of redress of wrongs and resumption of the historic process from the point at which its normal course had been interrupted. This philosophy implied, by its inherent logic, that the period of aberration from the normal, that is the command-socialism period, could be treated as a tragic hiatus, a lapse into chaos and tyranny, and thus isolated within history as a foolhardy and bloody experiment, arrogantly striking out to achieve an utopia (Hayek 1988). Such a view of the historic process and possibilities for its regressive manipulation contains an utopianism of its own, a kind of ‘resurrective romanticism’. For in the nearly eight decades of Soviet power in Russia, and some forty-five years in the rest of the then ‘communist’ world, the historic process had rolled on, producing realities that persist and develop in continuous reinterpretations of their earlier forms.

In the Kola Sami case resurrective romanticism has produced its specific outlines, while sharing basic postsocialist utopianism with a myriad of other cases. In the particular instance, the focus has fallen on the establishment of Soviet power and its enforced campaigns of collectivisation (Chapter 3) and *resettlement* (Chapter 4).
Collectivisation and the problem of the traditional

Collectivisation, especially, has received centrality of place in the sense of having exercised a massive and ruthlessly destructive impact upon an imagined Sami traditionality\(^\text{19}\). Consequently, the mission of ethnopolitical activity was to seek support for repairing the damage done. Or, in other words, the ultimate aim was regaining the traditional as it was imagined to have been before collectivisation, and a continuation of a normalised state-of-being from the resurrected state onwards.

Gail Fondahl has recently referred to the consequences of developments, following such thinking, as falling into ‘the trap of the traditional’ (2012). There is good reason to talk about a trap here, both on general and particular grounds. In the general case, a way of life was established during the Soviet period, moving constantly from one inner form to another. In the turmoil of this dynamic movement the proverbial average citizen was holding on to a sense of stability, order, and a vision of the future, in which a radical systemic change had, in the overwhelming majority of cases, a decidedly improbable place. In other words, the ‘Soviet formation’ (sovetskiy stroy), was indeed thought to be ‘forever’ (Yurchak 2005). In such a scenario, reversal to a new beginning as a resumption of a past ‘traditional’ condition could not figure.

An important part of this process was the fact that, as Novikova points out:

\[(\ldots)\] the peoples of the North had already been living in the Russian state for centuries; during the 20th century many of them were brought up in *boarding schools* (internaty), received higher education and had come to live in towns, but despite this, many of them continued to observe the norms of their traditional society. (Novikova 2012: 96)

What she calls ‘traditional society’ seems to be inspired and sustained by a spatial and occupational locus of making a living in direct contact with nature and through the renewable resources she offers. Or, in other words, what Marx used to call ‘a simple work process’, i.e. one in which ‘there is an exchange between human beings and nature’ (after Bourgeot 1987:108).

Research on gender in indigenous communities suggests that spatial and occupational domains, definable as ‘range’ on the one hand and ‘camp/settlement/village’ on the other, tend to show progressive masculin-

\(^{19}\) Anderson (1983); Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983).
isation in the first, with a correspondingly marked female presence in the second (Kuokkanen 2007; Eikjok 2007; Dahl 1987). The character of the ‘range’ – if we use it as a blanket term of the place where the ‘simple work process’ happens – as a place ‘in nature’ and in direct exchange with her, does not, however, automatically make it ‘traditional’. That is, if we go on using the term as in Novikova above, and as in a great abundance of ethnopolitical, administrative, legal, ethnotouristic, etc. texts, reflecting belief in the reality behind it. One may say in an aside here, that despite the great bulk of critique levelled at the traditional since Hobsbawm and Ranger’s volume of 1983, and Benedict Anderson’s of the same year, the belief in the objectivity of the traditional seems to have remained intact in the larger world of talk and application. Which means, in its turn, that the imagined traditional, which can be marked in quotes to stress the difference (thus the ‘traditional’), should be discussed as an objectively existing phenomenon in its own right, not a little for the fact that beliefs in it construct a field of power in a very real sense. As part of such a field one can be the agent or patient of grant or punishment. In the case of clan communities (obshchiny), already mentioned, once members profess that they share the belief, they can be granted subsidies for being ‘traditional’, or, conversely, be fined or otherwise punished for not being ‘traditional’ enough. This is what Fondahl means when talking about the ‘trap of the traditional’. ‘Traditionalism’ can be treated thus as a metaphysic that has real power in the material world.

With this caveat in mind, we can proceed to use the term ‘traditionalism’ (with quotes indicating its existence as a belief) as part of the world of observable phenomena. From such a perspective the fact of the continuous modernisation of the ‘range’ should be accommodated and come to terms with. ‘Rangeness’, in other words, does not necessarily mean ‘traditional land use’ in the sense of what has been said above. This is despite well-entrenched and persistently promoted policies – in a mutually reinforcing dialogue between grassroots and state – that serve to cement the nexus.

The ‘traditional’ is usually thought of as existing in a pristine pre-industrial environment, and this certainly applies to thinking about reindeer husbandry. In real life, however, the occupation has been saturated with technology for about half a century by now. In most reindeer husbandry the introduction of the snowmobile, radio-telephone, all-terrain track vehicle and helicopter has been since the 1960s–70s. Soviet northern ‘simple work process’ occupations (or ‘traditional land use’) had their own ‘snowmobile revolution’ (Pelto 1973), and turned, in their own way,
'traditional land use’ into a technologically dependent exchange with nature (cf. Forbes et al. 2006).

The volatility of the ‘traditional’ – despite the foundational myths of stability and presumed innocence of technological ways that support it – is sometimes brought out in plain text by local actors. In a speech on the occasion of International Sami Day (6 February) a government official – actually the Deputy Governor of Murmansk Region, recently said:

(…) not only the Regional Government, but the Russian Federation as a whole (presumably its government – my gloss) introduces legislative changes in respect to the numerically small indigenous peoples of the North which aim to guarantee and sustain a decent living. Thus, for instance, obshchiny are given subsidies they need for acquiring technology to be able to lead their traditional way of life. (V Murmanskoy oblasti 06.02.2014)

The formulation ‘technology (tekhnika) for leading traditional way of life’ is not uncommon. Its use seems to reflect objective reality: to be out there on the ‘range’ one needs tekhnika. Sami researcher Jorunn Eikjok asked some young boys in Finmark (North Norway) ‘at what point they felt most “Sami”’. The answer she got was: ‘When I drive snowmobiles and I joik\(^20\) (2007:111). The response illustrates her point that motorized tundra vehicles are expressive of modern masculine Sami identity (ibid). The same would apply to Kola Sami masculinities, as also to those of other para-indigenous and variously tundra-connected persons.

A further specific feature of the Kola indigenous situation – as different from the Fennoscandic one – comes from the extreme urbanisation of the Region. Compared to other regions, with the presence of indigenous, numerically small peoples, in Murmansk Region indigenous urbanisation developed to a very significant extent. Genderwise, such developments are asymmetrical, as noted earlier. Urbanising tendencies have come to be more characteristic of the women’s part of the people. Most women have been more motivated than the majority of men in getting high grades at secondary school, in continuing into higher education if possible, and in pursuing urban professional careers. In terms of marriage-preferences, such propensities have been consistently pointing in the direction of exogamic marriages. Such a general preference for the urban, with a corresponding withdrawal from the tundra (‘the ‘range’) has placed many women – especially those who have chosen to engage in ethnopolitical

\(^{20}\) Improvised Sami folk-singing without words.
activities – in the crux of tensions between urbanism and ‘traditionalism’. This follows from the dominant ‘traditional range’ nexus, noted above.

Another aspect of the general situation is that the former dominant conviction in the immutability of the Soviet order has led nowadays to practical and very bothersome consequences, as is usual whenever a regime falls. Much anguish has ensued, leading to inner community friction and the already mentioned acrimonious accusations of lack of moral integrity. Individuals, belonging to the current ethnopolitical elite, would be accused, as already said, for suppressing their Sami identity in former times in pursuit of career ambitions. They would be reminded of having ascribed to a Russian and ‘socialist’ identity, both in respect of themselves and their children. Many Sami had preferred to marry outside of their own people and, moreover, to distance themselves socially from the reindeer-herding part of the community as much as possible. The tendency exists until today with the difference that children from mixed marriages now tend to be ascribed to a Sami, rather than to a Russian identity – a fact that is also a never-ending source of moral reproach and accusations of opportunism.

In the reindeer-herding part of the local universe, scenarios based on Soviet-era ideals of morality, order, and a desirable future along Soviet lines, prevailed with full force. Both the Soviet ethos of mechanised progressivity, and the particularities of the Soviet reindeer husbandry mode, produced an intensely mechanised form of husbandry, in which the ‘traditional’ was looked at as a quaint relic of a dark past. This was the time, it needs to be said at once, when in Nordic reindeer husbandry the ‘snowmobile revolution’, in Pertti Pelto’s felicitous formulation (1973), was slowly turning the profession into a highly technological land use form. Western sympathies for the Kola Sami regaining the ‘traditional’ in their post-Soviet husbandry (Oreskov 21.05.2012,1998; Kalstad 2009) may be seen, against such a background, as a conversation with their own past in the Western Sápmi lands, in which something was irrevocably lost, but a chance appeared that it could be regained across the border in the east. The resurrective romanticism of such intertextuality between historical narratives, motivated visions perhaps to be best seen in Kalstad’s posthumously published volume. I shall be returning to it in connection with the development of the obshchina movement later on (Chapter 6).

To the same genre of visionary salvaging one could also attribute Robinson and Kassam’s ‘Sami potatoes’ (2000). This idealistic and well-intentioned attempt to capture post-Soviet Sami reality through a quest for the ‘traditional’, with a focus on real or imaginary renewable resources, brought, nevertheless, much needed attention to the Western
part of the Kola reindeer herding territory. No attempt to expand and later resurrect herding came to be successful in that part, despite a number of initiatives of the 1950s and later (Rybkin 1999:19). There are many open questions about the Western lands and the reasons for lack of success in reviving reindeer husbandry there despite the richness of a grazing range left fallow for decades. Lacking experience in that area, I leave the floor to others.21

The crisis of representation can be said, thus, to relate crucially to perceptions and conceptualisations of the ‘traditional’. In more concrete terms the principal question that I ask in this respect is: how does the traditional appear to the two main groups of actors, positioned on both sides of the town/tundra divide?

From the point of view of the urban ethnopolitical leadership, office-based and for the most part disconnected from the tundra, understanding of the ‘traditional’ followed the well-beaten paths of imperial Russian/Soviet folkloristic ethnographies, as well as the later Soviet ones, which connected seamlessly with them. Ideas of the ‘traditional’ tended to be based on what could be called the ‘golden folkloristic period’ of the late 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, which had proved to be so convenient for Soviet folklorists and ethnographers (Slezkine 1994a; Tishkov 1992).

The convenience came from two main directions. On the one hand, Imperial Russian ethnographic writing burgeoned in the latter half of the 19th century, following, with some delay, major philosophical, ideological, and literary influences of a Europe moving along the path of high modernity. Reading Nemirovich-Danchenko (1875), for instance, one cannot but feel the folkloristic and heroic pathos of German Romanticism. In a similar way, the very popular at the time ‘A Year in the North’ of S.V. Maksimov (1984[1864]) brings strong associations with early modern ‘discovery of the people’ (Burke 1978) in a Russian Slavophile version. The turn of the 19th century ethnographic revival saw, moreover, the publication of the journal *Izvestiya Arkhangelskogo Obshestva Izucheniya Ruskogo Severa* (Newsletter of the Archangelsk Society for the Study of the Russian North), inspired by visions of ethnographic and folkloristic wealth of, principally, Pomor Russian origin. Together with much rarer references to the life and culture of the Kola Sami and other locally present northern peoples (*Komi, ‘Komified’ Nentsi, Karelians, Finns, Norwegians*), it was seen, in the same spirit, to have the mission of documenting, salvaging, and representing to the wider world.

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21 For historical background see Wheelersburg and Gutsol (2009).
In brief, when it came to the state of the traditional in respect of the Sami people, the main thrust of presentation relied on fairly idealized versions of age-long and next to mystical relationship with reindeer, the tundra, and the North in general. The lasting scarcity of fieldwork-based acquaintance with such matters – a state of affairs characteristic of the study of the central and biggest reindeer husbandry part of the Peninsula22 – helped much in the way of mystification. Thus, Kharuzin’s celebrated monograph of 1890 – Russkie Lopari (The Russian Lapps), was mostly based, as is well known, on Johannes Schefferus’ ‘History of Lapland’ of 1674. (Cf. Bodrova 2013: 286; Vize 1912b: 397) It was thanks to Kharuzin’s close collaboration with local Orthodox priests, who were sharing their lives with the Sami people, that contemporary knowledge of the Sami condition was gained. Kharuzin’s own stay in the town of Kola, albeit lasting only a couple of months or even less, together with some outings to Sami camps in the hinterland, provided, nevertheless, a reliable picture of the social ills besetting the Sami. He turned attention to the problem of the Sami falling into never-ending debt to Kola merchants (kabala), as also to the devastating consequences of the already ‘traditional’ problem with alcoholism.

Apart from the wealth of ethnographic and folkloristic literature produced between the latter half of 19c and the outbreak of WW1, a second moment of convenience is to be seen in the light of Stalinist and post-Stalinist constraints on historical and ethnographic treatment. This is a vast topic in itself and here I can afford to present it only in its sketchiest outlines.

At its most general, the historical positioning of the Sami ‘traditional’, which post-Soviet indigenous ethnopolitics came to adopt in a ‘received’ form, had been formed in a selective process, according to the constraints of what was to be foregrounded, and what suppressed. For a variety of reasons whole periods were removed from view, resulting in a kind of uneven hop-trot through the first half of the 20th century. It thus came to be the case that following the great ethnographic and folkloristic travelogue, research, journalistic and creative writing between the latter half of the 19th century and WWI (Bodrova 2013; Likhachev 2013c; Tret’yakova 2007), a hiatus was formed, lasting until the late 1920s. When it comes to tundra-related developments writing thins out considerably during the period between 1915 and 1928. Our main sources here remain the re-

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22 The central part of the Kola Peninsula was the object of early fieldwork-based studies by Arvid Genetz in the 1870s, which served for the making of his Sami Dictionary (1891); and of A. Kihlman in the late eighties (Kihlman 1889; Kihlman and Palmen 1890). See also Tret’yakova (2007).
ports of the *Murmansk Regional Lore Society*, which relate mainly to the latter third of the period. Bits and pieces can be found in the regional lore literature of the 1970–80s, but one needs to account for their heavy ideological bias. Articles in the recently published volumes of the Kola Encyclopedia (*KE*; *KE* 2009, 2008), the project Electronic Memory of the Arctic (*EP*) with its inbuilt Northern Encyclopedia (*SE*), the texts made available by the Museum of Contemporary Russian History (*SIR*), to mention some of the major sources, are helpful in filling in various gaps.

The patchy knowledge about what went on in the reindeer herding territories during the 1920s is to a great extent the result of the terror of the 1930s, reaching out to the Kola (Tumarkin 2003; 2002). The Great Terror took the life of the leader of the Murmansk Regional Lore Society V.K. *Alymov* in 1938, together with that of a significant number of Sami and Komi herders. The ethnographers who took part in long term fieldwork with the Sami people during the late 1920s were decimated. D.A. *Zolotarev*, the leader of these ‘Lapp expeditions’ perished in a GULAG camp in 1935, others – like V.V. *Charnoluskiy* – barely survived them. Along with the victims of the period – from the researchers’ community as well as from the people they were working with – information about the 1920s period disappeared for a long time (Kiselev 1967). Amid other blank spots, we know little of the pre-collectivisation *co-ops* (*kooperatsii*) which had been actively working during the *New Economic Policy* (*NEP*) period (1921–28). It could be added here in parenthesis that Lovozero District’s *Rybkooop* still exists today and can be seen as an inheritor of the co-op movement in Russia.

The 1920s hiatus has consequently formed a kind of thinking, especially in the West, that ‘cooperative’ (*kooperatsiya*) and ‘collective farm’ (*kol-khoz*) could be lumped together under the blanket term of *collectivisation*. This obscured a lot that had happened between 1917 and 1928/9, and seems to have led to a puzzling indifference about the history of the cooperative from its beginnings at the end of the 19th century to this day. A notable exception is Voronin’s study (1997), another is a newspaper article by Kiselev (1972).

How the ‘traditional’ lived through that period one may glean from Tat’yana *Luk’yanchenko*’s condensed but rich volume, titled ‘Material Culture of the Kola Saami (Lapps) at the end of 19–20 cc’(1971). The very title of the book reflects a hedging technique evidently necessary well after the end of Stalinism. For a great part of what is said in the book describes in accurate detail the state of local affairs more or less up to the time of writing. Still, it was felt safer to place the focus of the book on the politically innocuous turn-of-the 19th-century period.
Stressing the continuing impact of Komi presence in local reindeer husbandry affairs in the 1920s, Luk'yanchenko speaks of the gradual mixing of Komi/Nenets and Sami husbandry cultures. This process shaped not only the regional collectivised herding (ibid., p. 32), but had formative consequences for Soviet reindeer husbandry as a whole. Among them the Komi-imported focusing on meat production as a dominant priority worked for the promotion of ‘commodity reindeer husbandry’ (tovarnoe olenevodstvo) over its ‘backward’, and ‘primitive’ predecessor – ‘nomadic reindeer husbandry’ (kochevoe olenevodstvo).

It is thus the case that both in the writing of contemporary researchers like Alymov (1928a,b; 1927) and Charnoluskiy (1931; 1930 a,b), and later ones like Luk'yanchenko, a dynamism of change is stressed in respect of the pre-collectivisation period of the 1920s. Apart from the revolutionary and Civil War events, heavily scarring the region till 1921, the shift to NEP was critically connected with the important presence of trading and crediting co-ops in the reindeer herding parts. This went in parallel with the recovery of private reindeer husbandry – a process that the co-ops had the mission to assist. In this way, specifically Soviet developments intertwined with the converging modes of husbandry among Sami, Komi and Nentsi. It is thus difficult to imagine this period as some sort of a quiet ‘traditional’ past until the coming of collectivisation and its radical impact. And yet, this is largely the picture we get from much of today’s writing, following the conviction that the ‘traditional’ lived in some vaguely stable form until collectivisation.

Such a stable life of the Sami ‘traditional’ till the end of the 1920s is described in Kalstad’s short history of the Kola Sami people (2009). This is only one of numerous examples – another prominent one among them being Robinson and Kassam’s (2000) – presenting Sami history between late 19th century and the late 1920s as relatively unchanging. The tenor of such writing brings out the catastrophic quality of collectivisation and its devastating impact upon Sami ‘traditional’ life. In Kalstad’s words: ‘The Sami who were traditionally occupied in reindeer husbandry, hunting, and fishing, were forcefully imprisoned in cooperative farms (kolkhozy)’ (2009:34).

Going back to the ‘ethnographic historic present’ period of the latter half of the 19th century until the beginning of WWI, we face a very similar problem. The period was marked by change in the country as a whole as

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23 By this time the original Nentsi immigrants, as well as their children would identify as Komi, which is the situation to this day. For this reason I shall be referring to the whole group of late 19 – first third of 20 c. Komi and Nentsi immigrants as Komi. (cf. Konakov 1993; Konakov et al. 1984; Khomich 1977).
well as in the Kola Peninsula. Some of the empire-wide changes had less of an impact here, others were more strongly felt. **Peasant emancipation** in the 1860s–’70s, for instance, did not have direct impact. The Sami people were officially ‘peasants of the state’, *gosudarstvennye krestyane*, not belonging therefore to various landlords (*pomeshchiki*) as in the central and southern Russian parts.

The policy of settling the Murman Coast with people from the south – i.e. the colonisation campaigns of the turn-of-the-century – had, however, a secondary wave of influence on the Sami condition. The newcomers were predominantly destitute people, impoverished by the financial demands that emancipation had put on the peasantry. They constituted the main body of the unfinished colonisation of the Peninsula. Especially along the Murman Coast, the traditional resource base of the Sami was seriously encroached upon, causing many complaints and appeals for redress (Orekhova 2008; 2007). On the other hand, enhanced sea-fishing and coastal sea mammal-hunting increased opportunities for Sami people to augment domestic income by providing sled-transport along the **Kandalaksha-Kola Trakt** (*Kandalakshskiy trakt*) all the way up to the seasonal Pomor fishing camps along the Murman Coast. In this same way additional income was earned by providing transport and basic accommodation services for the quickly developing Kola tourism. Other opportunities were provided by Sami hiring themselves out as wardens for fishing camps during the winter periods – an occupation Orekhova calls ‘traditional’ and passed from generation to generation (2008).

The effect of the bid for ‘capitalist development’ of the country, realizing a degree of modernisation in the Russian North, and characterizing the measures of the Stolypin Government, did not however reach the core reindeer husbandry area of the Peninsula. On the other hand, the Komi and ‘Komified’ Nentsi reindeer husbandry immigration of 1884–7 provided such a strong and lasting impact that other influences became faint by comparison. The Izhma Komi had come to stay and their relationship with the host Sami population was to have significant bearing on all aspects of local life from then on. Attention shall be given to this aspect of the local condition throughout the book.

Thus to imagine a picture of undisturbed traditionality, either during the turn-of-the-century period, or the one between it and collectivisation, is illusory or can be regarded only as a construction. Evidence for the state of affairs before the 1850s is thin. Ushakov’s ambitious Marxist-Leninist version of Sami history based in regional lore (2001;1998a,b;1997) can-

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24 On this point see especially Ostrovskiy (1899).
not be taken as a reliable analysis, although he made meticulous and thorough use of available archival sources after the lifting of restrictions on them in the mid-1960s and later. Nevertheless, to see the Sami people as the oppressed serfs of the ‘feudal period’, and the proletariat of the ‘capitalist’ one (1997:169f, 305f), can be considered only as a view of the historical process resulting from ‘ideological poetic license’, informing a particular ideological disposition, rather than historical reality.

In much the same way one can consider the late Soviet writing of the other regional patriarch of *Murmansk regional lore studies (kraevedenie)* – A.A. Kiselev. It is well known that the two leading figures, having their academic base at what is now *Murmansk State Humanities University*, and enjoying access to a wealth of archival documents, put the stamp of archive-based scientific credibility on a post-Stalinist version of regional lore texts. The combination is especially characteristic of Kiselev and Kiseleva’s ‘Soviet Sami’ (1987[1979]), and *Usbakov* and *Dashchinskiy’s* ‘Lovozero’ (1988). In both of these condensed volumes there is a wealth of useful, archival source based and meticulously annotated information, while, at the same time, local reality is represented in accordance with the ideological clichés of the time. However, the picture of the ‘traditional’ presented by ‘Soviet Sami’ and ‘Lovozero’ had its ideological basis and historical positioning in the Soviet period, and not at either the turn of 19 century or in the pre-collectivisation NEP times of the 1920s. To this point I return again below.

The tundra view

For a full picture of the historical dynamics of the ideological – and hence, the traditional – we need to consider also what has been happening on the other side of the representational vs. substantive rift, or, in topographical terms: on the tundra side of local life.

The proposed opposition ‘tundra (as range) vs. town’ needs at this point some finer tuning. When applied, it shall bring out a much greater complexity that the initial spatial distinction may have suggested. The usefulness of the latter as an orienting device shall be preserved, nonetheless, in regard to the distinctive defining role played by Sami men, engaged in reindeer husbandry.

In the first place, ‘town’ and ‘urban’ in this text shall be used not only in reference to the biggest settlement in Lovozero District – the town of Revda, but to Lovozero as well. By official designation Lovozero is a village of 2,624 people. In terms of recent history, the urban status of
Revda came from the part of its population working in its **founding enterprise** – **Lovozero Mining-Processing Complex**. This industrial giant of the district, together with the **Umbozero** complex that came to join it later, had swelled the population of Revda to an all-time high of 12,000 people by 1988, with plans for the town to grow to as many as 28,000 inhabitants by 2010 (Dubrovskaya 2009).

In contrast to the industrial enterprises that were formative for Revda, Lovozero’s reindeer husbandry **Soviet farm** (sov khoz25) **Tundra** justified its status as a village. At present, however, both industrial and rural enterprises have shrunk beyond recognition compared to what they used to be during their apex in the seventies and early eighties. Revda is still big by district standards, housing 8,186 people. A few are still employed at what has remained of **Lovozerskiy GOK** at Mount Karnasurt. **Umbozerskiy GOK** was closed down in 2006 and its mines flooded. Another part – a fraction of previous numbers – are employed in the public sectors that regional coffers still manage to sustain. These comprise district administrative departments, police, schools, hospital, etc. In addition to this state budget economy there are also many private businesses. These – mainly in the form of grocery shops – have tended of late to form a recruitment base for leading local administrators.

In terms of employment sectors, the situation in Lovozero is very similar to that in Revda, despite the presence of a reindeer husbandry farm in the former, and the extant GOK in the latter. In general, however, the two places now exist in a linked form with most support coming from the state: regional subsidies make up over 90% of the district budget.

As in Revda, only a small part of the ‘Village of Lovozero’ is primarily employed in the formerly mighty founding enterprise – that of the reindeer herding Sovkhoz **Tundra**. At the height of its power in the 1970s and early 1980s, it included eight different departments, including a building and maintenance one, a much larger dairy farm than now, a plant cultivation shop, etc.26 Reindeer husbandry took place in only one de-

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25 I use the word ‘sov khoz’ to denote both the enterprise as it used to exist before 1992 (i.e. as a state farm with herders as salaried employees) as well as in its current life as an alleged ‘cooperative’. In this I follow local usage. This applies also to other terms like, for instance, ‘director’ (of the sovkhoz), now renamed to ‘chairperson’, but kept as ‘director’ in community speech. To distinguish between such terms in their ‘old’ and ‘new’ lives, I put the first in normal script, while the second is in italics. The same applies also to extended usage – like when sovkhoz is used metaphorically to denote any enterprise or institution that sustains a private-in-the-collective social economy.

partment: Reindeer Husbandry Department (Tsekh olenevodstva). It was critically supported for its activities by the Mechanical Shop (Tsekh Mekhanizatsii) – a descendant of the once autonomous Mashino-traktornie stantsii (MTS) (Machine and tractor stations). The sovkhoz used to have as many as ten herding and two fishing brigades. The Reindeer Husbandry Department has now shrunk to seven brigades, with hardly more than fifty people directly engaged in herding, the fishing brigades belong to memory. The ‘rurality’ of Lovozero has thus largely evaporated. In its stead has come the subsidy-supported public sector, aided, insofar as Lovozero’s Tundra is concerned, by annual subsidies per head of cooperative deer. This state subsidy has come to equal – if not surpass – what the cooperative gets from its primary product – reindeer meat. Urban jobs have come to dominate the employment scene – in administrative offices, education, culture, and urban infrastructural maintenance. Private businesses in trade and tourism provide some additional employment.

If we look at available statistics, this schematic description comes out in more nuanced categories, but in essence it is the same. Statistics give the district total for those employed in ‘agriculture, hunting, and forestry’ (sel’skoe khozyaystvo, okhota i lesnoe khozyaystvo) as 202 people by August 2012. (Struktura zanyatosti 08.2012) Most of them would be employed in reindeer herding, but they are not listed separately. On the other hand, there is a much bigger part employed in state administration and social services (683), education (555), health services (337), residential services (231), or a total of 1,806 jobs, funded through the state budget. Urban blue collar jobs in the remaining industrial enterprises and urban infrastructural maintenance, together with a tiny sector of formally registered (belye, ‘white’) entrepreneurs, total 1,406 jobs for the district. Since industrial jobs in Revda have been reduced to a minimum, the breakdown given above applies equally to Revda and Lovozero. There is little reason, therefore, looking at the present structure of employment, to consider Lovozero a village.

Despite such hard facts, the village status of Lovozero has lingered as a memory of the past, and no sign is being shown of plans to discard it. This conservative attitude may be seen to come from both poetic and instrumental reasons. The place is represented to the outside public as a Sami reindeer husbandry village – a representational formula acting as an attention and subsidy-drawing device. Behind this decorative front, to which the Sami people and shrinking reindeer husbandry critically contribute, Lovozero hosts – among its numerous state funded offices – two large administrative havens, giving much desired employment to a small army of local office-workers. These are the Administration of Lovozero
District\textsuperscript{27} and that of the Village of Lovozero\textsuperscript{28}. Revda has its own administration as well\textsuperscript{29}, and a set of other state funded offices, governmental, military, and law-enforcing departments, as well as the administration and other staff of its \textit{Corrective Colony No 23}.

Another clarification to be made is that the reindeer-herders are, in accordance with what has been said above, officially villagers while in reality they resemble much more urban residents. They are registered as living at permanent addresses in Lovozero and are housed in blocks of flats that make up the town. The huge five storey dwellings have as many as ten entrances each, and a single one of them can house an entire tundra village. These were much needed after the \textit{agglomeration} campaign of the 1950s–70s (Chapter 4). There are thirty-four blocks of flats altogether, providing a total residential space of over 60,000 sq. m. This is broken up into 1,300 separate flats (Zhivitsa 2013). Given the present size of Lovozero’s population (just above 2,600), that means that practically every family has the use of a flat, and some more than one. The log cabins that lie on the outer periphery of the village, but also often rub shoulders with blocks of flats, come as additions to the flats in the majority of cases, as do the \textit{garages}, and boat houses (\textit{lodochnye sarai}). Some new private houses have also been built and their number seems to be on the increase. All in all, the population of Lovozero can be said to be well-furnished with residential and auxiliary (storage and repair) space.

The graceless box-like shapes of reinforced concrete dominating the townscape shatter any notions of a reindeer herding village that a newly-arrived visitor may entertain. At the same time, the hastily built blocks do not reach beyond the strictly functional phase to acquire urban attributes. There is no town-centre as such, neither is there any kind of a pedestrian recreational area, park, promenade along the river, or other urban luxuries. Opportunities for getting together at a coffee shop or restaurant are minimal and hotel infrastructure is skeletal. A visitor needs a good deal of support by local friends, acquaintances, or best of all, family or kin to find a place to stay. Officials from the Tourist Information Centre at the National Cultural Centre have often complained that the lack of proper hotel infrastructure makes the place difficult to visit for longer than a day. Thus visitors to much publicized annual events, such as the winter or summer

\textsuperscript{27} Administratsiya munitsipal’nogo obrazovaniya Lovozerskogo Rayona (Administration of Municipal Formation Lovozero District). See \textit{Lovozero District}.

\textsuperscript{28} Administratsiya munitsipal’nogo obrazovaniya sel’skoe poselenie Lovozero (Administration of Municipal Formation village settlement of Lovozero). See \textit{Lovozero}.

\textsuperscript{29} Administratsiya munitsipal’nogo obrazovaniya gorodskoe poselenie Revda (Administration of Municipal Formation urban settlement Revda). See \textit{Revda}.
Sami festivals, find it necessary to arrive and leave on the same day. The place, in other words, does not have the look of an age-long Sami village (pogost), that latter being long buried under concrete as it is in towns all over Russia. On the other hand, it has not developed as a mature urban place. In many respects it is still a hurriedly built settlement – poselok – and, indeed, that’s the way local people refer to it.

The reindeer-herders of Olenevod are ‘true villagers’ by comparison, being permanent residents of Krasnoshchel’e (500) and then of tiny Kanevka (95), and even tinier Sosnovka (69). The three places indeed function as villages and look it: Krasnoshchel’e and Kanevka are entirely built in classical Komi log-houses; Pomor in the case of Sosnovka. In more substantive terms, the main employment here is still provided by reindeer herding, or, as in the case of Sosnovka – additionally by coastal and inland fishing. At the end of this account it is to be said that neither officially, nor as lived practice is there such a thing as someone ‘living in the tundra’.\(^{30}\) Life in the tundra is mostly a matter of reindeer herders commuting to reindeer herding camps or bases (bazi), and of staying there for various periods of time (Chapters 4, 5, 6).

In the third place it is to be pointed out that whether living in the twin urban complex of Lovozero/Revda, or in one of the remote villages, what has been termed a ‘town/tundra divide’ always remains as a distinctive feature. In the local context the oppositional pair distinguishes between preferences for an urban style of life, and seeking desirable employment opportunities primarily in the budget-sphere sectors, as different from one seeking them in the tundra and the various usage opportunities it provides. It is, however, only a tiny part of the whole population of the district that can be said to be uncompromisingly falling into the latter category. These are, first and foremost, the Sami reindeer herders, for the majority of whom moving to another employment is rarely considered. When such a position is opened, for one reason or another it usually tends to be for an unskilled worker, such as a night warden of a storehouse or office. There are also the Komi people, mostly from remote villages, for whom employment outside of herding is likely to be problematic. On the whole, however, Komi herders, especially from Lovozero, tend to be more successful in finding career tracks outside herding – mainly in the urban maintenance sectors, and in some cases, in the local administrations.

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\(^{30}\) The only exceptions I know of are the Terentievs – Lyubov Konstantinovna and her husband Vladimir – who have long been the only inhabitants of the otherwise deserted village of Chalmny-Varre (Ivanovka).
In this way, a core, nuclear part of local society can be singled out, whose life-style preferences are uncompromisingly connected with tundra land use: principally post-sovkhoz reindeer husbandry, combined with fresh-water fishing, seasonal berry picking, and occasional trapping and hunting. This nuclear group – from the local point of view in which tundra land use has a central position – is represented by active or pensioned off Sami and Komi herdsmen, invariably men, and in not a few cases – ‘enforced’ bachelors.

When we consider particularly the Sami people of this group, the contrast with the ethnopolitical establishment becomes especially sharp. At its most visible it is marked by the already mentioned gender difference, and by a marriage-preference profile of ethnopolitical activists pointing, as a rule, away from the herding core group. At a deeper level, the contrast is a matter of the divergent life-style preferences pointed out above: an uncompromising connection with the tundra for the latter group, and towards town for the former.31

In ‘emic’ tundra texts such preferences tend to forefront agency in the management of time. A frequent statement carrying the force of an adage is: ‘Here we do not follow a time-table’ (My zdes’ ne po razpisaniyu). Asking once about what we shall be doing on Sunday, a herder answered me thus: ‘Here there is no Sunday, no Monday. When we decide – we work.’ Questions about planning tend to be deflected by well-worn phrases like: ‘We shall not be seeing into the future’ (Ne budem v budushchee zaglyadyvat’), and the invariable ‘it depends on the weather’ (kak pogoda) as an answer to all questions about what shall be done next. These and similar responses, elicited by questions about planning even for the very short term, stress, in my view, those qualities of the range that are attractive and provide the motivation that plays a considerable role in keeping people on the range: the lack of regimentation of time by superior human agents or institutions.

The management of time at herding camps reflects the contrast Hobsbawm describes between pre-industrial and industrial states:

Industrial labour – and especially mechanized factory labour – imposes a regularity, routine and monotony quite unlike pre-industrial rhythms of work, which depend on the variation of the seasons or the weather, the multiplicity of tasks in occupations unaffected by the rational division of labour, the vagaries of other human beings or animals, or even a man’s own desire to play instead of working. (1968:85)

31 For a discussion of gender/occupational rifts of a similar kind in Nordic Sami society see Eikjok (2007).
With some adjustments, this describes accurately the range ethos of time management. The adjustments are that it is not factory, but mainly office labour that looks repulsive from the vantage point of the tundra camp. It is also that ‘play’ tragically often means ‘drink’. But the essentials are there: despite all the technological props there is a ‘pre-industrial’ experience and management of time out there on the range.

Once we move even a little way from the central tundra position that the nuclear herding group occupy, the picture quickly loses sharp contrasts. There are thus many Sami women, principally in blue-collar jobs or retired from them, who belong to the ‘silent majority’ in ethnopolitical terms, and, at the same time have little to do with the tundra. On the other hand, there are a great many local people who are employed in urban blue- and white-collar jobs, and are mostly urban residents of the Lovozero/Revda complex, but maintain connections with the tundra in a variety of ways. Here men tend to be a majority. Thus the sharp contrasts seen in the local situation when viewed from the perspective of the herding core, become less distinct once we leave it.

The reason for this state of affairs I connect with the series of radical changes that began in the late 1950s. To them belong, first and foremost, the administrative liquidation of tundra villages and the agglomeration campaigns of the late 1950s-early 1970s, which were mentioned at the beginning, and the ills from which were brought out in revealing articles by Vatonen (1989[1988]), and Galenkin and Kovalenko (1989), written in the spirit of ‘publicity’, so characteristic of late ‘restructuring’\(^{32}\). The enforced resettlement and dispersal of tundra villagers, contributed, over time, to their urbanisation and progressive severing of existing links with the tundra. Many Sami people have never known anything but an urban way of life, save for occasional outings to nearby tundra locations.

The highly complex situation at present, in relation to the town/tundra divide, has to be seen also in relation to a second and perhaps even more powerful factor of change. This is the massive in-migration from the south that swamped the region and the district in the post-war years and stopped only in late perestroyka times. Tundra village liquidation and the subsequent concentration of the tundra population in what came to be the Lovozero/Revda urban complex goes hand-in-hand with this inflow of southern labour migrants. By 1988–89, it had swelled the population of Lovozero to nearly 4,000 people. Revda, which had begun from a tent camp in 1948, had reached, as mentioned above, a population of 12,000 people. This trend followed that of the general Murmansk Region whose

\(^{32}\) On the revelatory texts of late restructuring and their reception see Yurchak (2005: 2–4).
total population peaked at an all-time high of close to 1.2 million people by 1989.33

The post-war labour in-migration to Lovozero District shall be further discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. For the moment it needs to be said that the combined force of liquidation of tundra villages, on the one hand, and labour in-migration – on the other, produced an impact – from the point of view of changes to the local situation – much exceeding that of the Komi/Nenets arrival of the 1880s, or the period of collectivisation. For while such events, despite all their lasting consequences, sustained and even enhanced a tundra-oriented pattern of local life, after-war urbanisation changed irrevocably the idea of the tundra as offering a desirable way of life. This was undoubtedly a far more radical shift than what had been experienced before.34 Its scope and ambitions aimed to elevate the social standing of the migrants from that of villagers to urban citizens. Significant improvements of economic circumstances, living standards, and a wide range of career opportunities gave substance to this process.

It should be emphasized that incoming migrants’ put a high priority on the goal of exchanging village life for an urban one. It may sound strange that people wishing to escape from villages in the central and southern regions of the former Soviet Union would have chosen to migrate to a distant subarctic village like Lovozero, or to a place like Revda – which in its early years was little more than a makeshift workers’ camp. This paradox is resolved by the peculiar quality of Soviet industrial migration – its target was taken for granted to be some ‘empty space’ available for resource extraction and industrialisation, or ‘Developing the North’ (Osvoenie Severa) by building an industrial giant. The future town – providing not only residential space, but also a new urban identity – would come as an appendage to the plant, created by the migrants themselves.

This pioneer spirit disregarded local givens, as it was taken for granted that osvoenie began where local realities ended. This was part of an identity the new settlers were forging for themselves: that of people recreating ‘empty space’ into a new, heroic, and socially elevated territory. On the pragmatic side, such self-edifying myths of becoming ‘Northerners’ (severyane), were motivated by the state policy of providing material incentive in the form of considerably higher pay in the North. This solved

34 In a much less significant, but essentially similar way one could consider the colonisation policy of the Russian state of late 19-beginning of 20 c. While affecting traditional resource grounds of the Sami along the Murman coast, both its scope and duration was greatly surpassed by the in-coming migration waves of Soviet times.
successfully the most irksome problem of postwar efforts to industrialise the North, that of finding the labour force for the task. Of the economic stimulants that the state used – the *northern bonuses* (*polyarki*), or as people called them: the ‘long rouble’ (*dlinny rubl’*), much has been written, but hardly anything on the Kola migrants’ desire to escape from southern or Central Russian village life as a powerful motivational force – from their own point of view. If collectivisation is to be seen as a revival of serfdom in a new form (Gaydar and Chubays 2011:19) then, ever since the 1930s, the stimulus for escaping from the villages of the vast Russian countryside has been very great. As the same authors note, there were two major escape routes available: to the army and to ‘*shock-labour construction sites*’ (*udarnye stroyki*).

Murmansk Region rated high on both counts, but I shall be concerned mostly with the second one. It has to do with the industrialisation of the region that continued along the lines set by the five-year plans of the late 1920s and ‘30s, interrupted by the *Great Patriotic War* (1941–45) and resumed after it. The rationale for industrialisation of the region was to make use of its considerable mineral resources, its great potential for development in sea and railroad transport, as well as in coastal and deep sea-fishing. The ambitious programme was thus part of the state doctrine of *osvoenie* (Developing the North).

Returning to the district scene it is to be noted that at the height of postwar in-migration – from the 1970s until the late 1980s – the mostly young newcomers from the south quickly asserted themselves locally and mixed with the small host population. While changing profoundly their own lifestyle and that of their hosts towards urbanisation – already set on that track by the tundra-village resettlement and agglomeration campaign – in their turn they were quick to adopt many of the local tundra-related ways.

A gender difference is to be noted here from the start. The tundra can be said to have been in the motivational setup of the young men that came to the Kola in ways rather different from that of the young women. The fact of striving to get away from struggling home villages or provincial towns in Central or Southern Russian regions, the Ukraine, Belarusia, the Caucasuses, or the Central Asian republics, had markedly gender specifics. As the following years were quick to show, while the male part of the new settlers enthusiastically sought to connect with the tundra, or

35 As regards the official normative base and its application see particularly Ivanov (2002, 1999).

36 For illustrative texts: Sorokazher’d’ev (1985); Pyatovskiy (1974); Dmitriev (1959); Dvinin (1959).
with ‘the forest’ (les), as it is locally termed (perhaps generalizing the southern term), the same cannot be said about the women. Local women with whom I have discussed the issue are of the opinion that women-identified priorities have always pointed in the urban direction – in its refined, ‘cultured’, ‘civilized’ form. The attraction in going north was in the demand for teaching, medical, and office jobs, not for tundra-connected ones. This was at the pull end. For a great many women, at the push end stood the wish to get away from poorly paid rural jobs in the south. Judging by the words of a woman of sixty now who had migrated to Lovozero in 1973, leaving a village in the southern Kuban region behind, the desire to escape from village life must have been very great indeed:

Living in Lovozero – as I kept saying – for me was as if I was living in Sweden, while my relatives (in Kuban-my gloss) were living in Russia. Lovozero for me was more than a town – it was another country. (T.Sh., Jan.2013)

The latter part of this statement came in response to a question I have been asking local people all along. Namely: do they consider Lovozero a town or a village? As this characteristic answer indicates, it is in a way neither, being in fact ‘more’ than a mere town – it was like settling in a ‘cultured’ and ‘civilized’ foreign country, mythically symbolized in the above example as ‘Sweden’. Life in Lovozero was described by the same informant as ‘prazdnaya (zhizn)’, by which she meant ‘light’, ‘easy’ (legkaya, neobremenitel’naya). The comment accentuates the desire to escape from hard and poorly paid work in the fields of some struggling southern kolkhoz, and replacing that with urban employment and lifestyle, and, of course, much higher pay. The ‘easy, light’ motif in the above statement is connected also with the biographic fact that in this specific case the woman in question had spent much of her life in Lovozero as a paid Komsomol activist, and later, in post-Soviet years – as a librarian.

The lifestyle adopted by many such young women migrants – of becoming ‘custodians of office and flat’ – answers the search for an urban (‘civilized’, ‘cultured’) quality of this new life in the North. In the case of

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37 ‘Cultured’ and ‘civilized’ are used nearly synonymously in Russian popular speech, denoting the quality of being educated, well-mannered, and generally knowledgeable of literature, music, and the fine arts, i.e. of ‘high culture’.

38 A certain degree of irony is contained in the following anecdotal fact: there is indeed a Swedish person, the ex-manager of the former NorrFrys-Polarica slaughter facility in Lovozero, who has married and settled in Lovozero, exchanging thus Sweden for the tundra settlement.
women, the overwhelming choice for the urban tended to be unitary and uncompromising, a contrastive mirror-reflection of the uncompromising connection with the tundra, exhibited by the male herding group. The polarities accentuate the pervasive town/tundra rift within local reality.

The case of the migrant men tends to be different. Or at least, for the great majority of in-migrating southern villagers, who became factory and office workers. For them the classic Russian attractions of the outdoors as a kind of hunting and fishing (\textit{okhota-rybalka}) playground for boys, can be said to have been an integral part of a desired ‘bush-competent’ image, one, moreover, that went hand-in-hand with the newly acquired status of a ‘Northerner’, \textit{severyanin}. Acquiring tundra skills from the local herders, as well as gradually building up the personal infrastructure capable of sustaining an autonomous connection with the tundra\(^{39}\), became part and parcel of this new identity. Women will be taken for an outing to Lovozero Lake or sometimes deeper into the tundra, but as invited guests, as it were, while men remain custodians of the means needed for such outdoor access.

On a more general level it can be said that the appeal of tundra attractions to men were an integral part of the \textit{osvoenie} attitude, in which the tundra was to be developed as a playground for an urban population, to be used during weekends and holidays. This whole concept, including its days of rest and holiday part, differs substantially from the relation to the tundra as \textit{belonging} to it, which characterizes the local tundra-connected ethos\(^{40}\). As I noted above, the concept of ‘week-end’ makes little sense at the herding camps. The routine there follows a clock and calendar of season, weather, and whim. It is thus the case that behind the blurring of the contours of the town/tundra divide, which the influx of migrant men brought along, together with their personal agenda of escaping from the village, a fundamental difference remained between the herders and the migrants in relation to the tundra. This is the difference between relating to the tundra from the perspective of \textit{osvoenie}, on the hand, compared to that of \textit{belonging} to it, on the other, or, in other words, the difference between \textit{building} and \textit{dwelling}, as conceptualized by Tim Ingold (2000). In the first case the tundra is presumed empty and in need of mastering and ‘developing’, for factory work, urban residence, and recreation, while in the second it is a full and self-sufficient world, that does not need developing, let alone being turned into a recreational ‘park’. The notion that it is a playground, attached to a town and meant to satisfy weekend and

\(^{39}\) \textit{Garage}, boathouse, snowmobile, sleds, boat, hunting and fishing tackle, etc.(Chapter 4)

\(^{40}\) For a more detailed discussion of this difference Konstantinov (2009); for a recent critical reappraisal of the \textit{osvoenie} doctrine Matveev (2012).
holiday needs is inconceivable from the latter point of view, an alien con-
cept, brought by strangers ‘from Russia’41.

The blurring of contrasts that may puzzle one at a surface level gets
more distinct outlines when we move deeper. One can indeed spend
much of one’s spare time in the tundra, own the necessary infrastructure,
and acquire basic skills without changing the urban quality of this rela-
tionship. The town/tundra divide is thus a matter of how one relates to a
place, and only superficially a matter of how one inhabits or moves over a
given terrain. Or, in other words, it is a mental, identity-forming catego-
ry, not one of topographical positioning and movement.

The following conversation illustrates this point. It took place in the
boat-house of a friend from Lovozero, whom I will call Denis. He came
from a well-established Komi family of Krasnoshchel’e herders, but had
moved to Lovozero as a young man and had worked all his life in
*Vodokanal* – the water-mains and sewage maintenance plant. As it hap-
pened we got to discuss the qualities of his *Vykhr* outboard engine, a ma-
chine of 40 horse power. ‘Why such a big engine?’, I asked. ‘Well, one
needs it for the (Lovozero) Lake’, he said. ‘There are often quite rough
waves on it and then what would you do? You want to return to the set-
tlement (*poselok*, i.e. the Village of Lovozero – my gloss) after fishing over
the week-end, because next morning you have to be at work – at 8 sharp.
With a weak motor you may not make the crossing.’

A tundra-connected person who works in town thus worries not a little
about being able to get back, because he has to be at work the next day.
Most herders would say *Kogda budet pogoda* (When the weather allows)
and leave such worries aside.

On the whole, however, the *osvoenie* drive of the afterwar decades,
which developed most fully in the long years of Leonid Brezhnev’s rule
(1964–1982), brought the herding and migrants’ worlds very close to-
gether. The two increasingly intermixed parts of local society came not
only to live in the same blocks-of-flats and meet in public and private
urban spaces and have their children go to the same crèches and schools,
but also share the same economic and ideological stimulants that sus-
tained *osvoenie*. For those working in industry – that is, the Revda mining-
processing complexes – salaries were at least double what they received in
the places they came from and in many cases more than that. But the

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41 A common local way of identifying migrants as different from long-time locals is to define
them, or self-define oneself, as having come ‘from Russia’. This applies to people who came
to Lovozero District as labour migrants, usually in the period 1950s–70s. The children of
such people, born on district soil would self-refer and be referred to by others as ‘from
Lovozero’ (*lovozerskiy*), or ‘from Revda’ (*revdentskiy*).
same was true also for those working in the reindeer husbandry sovkhozy. In the words of a herder:

We were among those with the highest salaries in the entire Soviet Union. We, and the sailors. But the sailor is out there in the sea, while we could get back home to our families as we wished. (A.Kh., Reindeer herding base No 8, January 2001)  

Gradually people – locals and new settlers – moved into new flats in Lovozero and Revda. Over time many families acquired several of those – which explains the over-furnishing with residential property, mentioned earlier. The rise of living standards that characterized Brezhnev’s fifteen years in power brought a degree of domestic comfort unseen and undreamt of before. More about this rise in the quality of life shall be said later (Chapter 4). For the moment it is important to note that the presently much discussed ‘golden age’ of Brezhnev’s rule (Dubin 2011:50f; 245; 264–272), stands out as the peak of prosperity for migrant and host population alike. At present the overall district population nostalgically mythologizes Brezhnev’s times, as do the people in the rest of Murmansk Region and the country as a whole. Positive evaluation of the Brezhnev period was given by 47% of respondents in a 2003 survey by the authoritative Levada Centre (ibid. 267, note 1), and this level of approval was sustained in subsequent years. Although I do not have statistical data about this for Lovozero District, the percentage of positive appraisal might well be higher. In nearly twenty years of fieldwork with local people, I have noted only two cases of negative attitude to Brezhnev’s era. An overwhelming majority of local people and migrants alike refer to the period in very positive terms and remember it for rising living standards. The herders were no exception – if anything, their material circumstances rose together with those of the rest and had been on a par with the incomes of people employed in mining and ore-processing.

The problem of the ‘traditional’ when it comes to seeing it from the tundra part of the local divide cannot be dissociated from the period which the local majority of people regard as their primary reference, which coincides with the Brezhnev era. It is thus the case that the chronotopos of ‘tradition’, to use the Bakhtinian term, differ from ethnopolitical positions. From the point of view of the majority of local people the ‘tra-

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42 This memorable statement was recorded by Vladi Vladimirova and myself – she conducting the interview which reached for over an hour, as I was video-documenting. It thus appears quoted both in her book (2006) and in joint work (Konstantinov and Vladimirova 2006a).
dition'-relevant temporal horizon is very near – in the 1970s and ‘80s. This contrasts with what is expressed in indigenous ethnopolitical discourse which moves the ‘traditional’ pointer to before the catastrophic process of collectivisation. In the former case, therefore, the ‘tradition’-relevant chronotope is set within a ‘little tradition’\(^{43}\) of short duration and closer in time; in the former it occupies a vague ‘big tradition’ that stretches from times immemorial till collectivisation.

For the herders the overall positive evaluation of ‘traditional times’ is importantly qualified by specific attributes, connected with the technical sides of herding. The usual way of talking about how things ‘used to be’, that is, when they were still ‘traditional’ compared to the present, is by stressing the tameness of the herds, the ease with which one could control them. The way ‘traditional times’ are described is usually by saying that then ‘the herd was in (our) hands’ (stado bylo v rukakh). This, as it were, ‘golden era’ of herding, is temporally situated within the lifetime of the fathers and grandfathers of the present generation of herders, that is, again, in the period from the 1960s to late 1980s. Perestroyka and the ‘collapse’ (razval) of the 1990s had brought that period to a sudden and harsh end, in the opinion of all concerned, destroying the positive and ‘traditional way’ that things used to be.

There is thus a difference not only between the time frames of principal reference, but, in a parallel fashion – in the positioning of catastrophic change that had destroyed ‘tradition’. If we compare ‘urban ethnopolitical’ with ‘tundra herding’ discourse, for the former, as said above, the borderline of catastrophic change would be placed in the late 1920s-beginning of 1930s (onset of collectivisation), while for the latter it tends to be marked by perestroyka (1985–89) and, most of all by the radical pro-market reforms of the early 1990s. Many local people, it should be added here, conflate these two latter periods calling them by the general term ‘perestroyka’. In this local version of history, therefore, perestroyka is what destroyed the ‘traditional way of life’. In a telling comment, which I have mentioned in an earlier text (Konstantinov 2005a), a herder exclaimed in anger: ‘When this damned perestroyka came, even the herds got wild!’ (S etoy prokliatoy perestroyki dashe stada odichali!).

In this way, the majority of local people, like the majority in the country as a whole, saw themselves to be victims of the changes of the late 1980s and 1990s. In ethnopolitical discourse such a position would be generally shared – the rising prices and withheld salaries are not easy to forget, as also the loss of savings (Afanas’yeva and Rantala 1993). At the

\(^{43}\) Cf. Dubin (2011:15)
same time, a much greater prominence would be given to disasters happen-  
ing longer ago: the collectivisation campaigns of the late 1920s–30s,  
and the resettlement of the 1950s–60s. Accordingly, for the overwel-  
moving majority – in district and national terms – redress was seen as bringing  
a period of ‘well-being’ and ‘stability’ as in the Brezhnev era. The consist-  
tently high opinion poll ratings of Vladimir Putin, after being in power for  
over a decade (since late 1999), with a further term likely to stretch till  
2018, reflect this. Clearly, for Western-inspired ethnopolitical discourse  
such harking back to the apex of Sovietism would be uninspiring. For the  
great majority of grassroots actors this period is nostalgically coloured in  
positive terms, while a return to some pre-collectivisation tradition would  
be seen as unviable or even absurd.

Private-in-the-collective ownership

This latter point leads into the final issue I want to raise in this introduc-  
tion, namely the persistence and ingenuity with which grassroots actors in  
herding stick to a mode of socio-economic existence which is an integral  
product of collectivisation. This is the ‘hybrid’ institution of the private-  
in-the-collective, which I have discussed in much of my previous work. In  
reference to herding it means that a herder may keep a contingent of their  
own deer, officially called ‘personal’ (lichnye oleni) which are grazed inter-  
mixed with the ‘collective’ ones of the former kolkhozy and, later, two big  
reindeer husbandry sovkhozy of the Peninsula. Outside herding, the institu-  
tion may be seen in the form of a ‘personal auxiliary farm’ (lichnoe  
podsobnoe khoziaistvo) of a kolkhoz or sovkhoz member, adopted as a legal  
and normative part of rural organisation during the second and decisive  
collectivisation wave of 1930–39. The matter shall be discussed in detail  
in Chapter 3. For the moment it needs to be said that beyond the very  
specific form of the institution of the ‘private-in-the-collective’ as exhibit-  
ed in reindeer husbandry, and the more general one of the villager’s ‘per-  
sonal auxiliary farm’, it can be extended to any economic activity of Soviet  
life. Whether a reindeer herder, a worker, an engineer, an academic, a  
military officer, an administrator, or any other employed individual, any-  
one in the Soviet arrangement of roles considered part of their formal  
office as a ‘personal plot’ and exploited it in that manner. The following  
anecdote – this time from socialist Bulgaria – shall illustrate the point. A  
worker of the Forestry Department goes to his boss and complains that

his salary is too small. ‘Idiot!’, the boss retorts, ‘the salary is small, but the forest is big!’ In case the pronouncement may sound cryptic, I explain: what the forester could not take in salary, he could take from the forest.

This ‘personalisation of employment’ – or ‘substantive’ relationship with one’s job, to use Polanyi’s term\textsuperscript{45} explains the ineradicable corruption against which epic struggle has been waged in Russia for centuries by now. The tradition is strong, in other words, but Brezhnevism certainly marked a high point in it. Judging by current rhetoric against corruption, the present period has also brought a high tide of corruption hand-in-hand with its popularly acclaimed ‘stability’.

When the coming of collectivisation to reindeer husbandry is examined in detail there appear strong signs that what came to be the foundation of the social contract between the masses and those in power was effected as much from below as from above. Following in the steps of social historians like Mitrany (1951), Dunham (1990), Fitzpatrick (1994; 1988) and others (who shall be mentioned below), I suggest that the catastrophic changes of the 1930s and later contain elements of a compromise or deal, rather than being the sole product of ruthless imposition from above. Inspiration for this position also comes in part from studies of political scientists addressing informal politics and state/society relations in non-Western contexts (i.e. Bakken 1996; Bockman 1996). I thus depart from a well-established position of seeing Russian post-Soviet social dynamic exclusively in terms of ‘all-pervasive adaptation as the tactic of the weak’ (Dubin 2011:253–64).

Despite the ruthlessness of Stalin’s regime, it formed a fundamental compromise with the will of the grassroots, and that compromise I see in the large leeway given for personalized use of the resources derived from one’s place of work. The high mark of this compromise, reached during the post-Stalinist period, has the added value of removal from the social scene of routine acts of violence and threat to life. The ‘soft political regime’ (ibid., p.155), characterizing Putin’s Russia of today may be seen as a further, and more benevolent continuation of this condition.

The question that intrigues me, and that has suggested the title of this book, is about the way grassroots actors’ will is communicated to those in power. Here I do not have in mind established and institutionalized ‘feedback’ channels, allegedly informing power of grassroots’ dispositions, like, first and foremost – electoral behaviour. I am much more interested in less explicit public movements that do not belong to usually discussed state-society interactions. My reason for this is that ‘deals’ between those

\textsuperscript{45} Polanyi (1957:243f); Dalton (1968).
in power and the grassroots, to use Vera Dunham’s term, which have put their indelible stamp on whole epochs, have not been arrived at by communicative procedures of the usual kind. The will of the grassroots in the highly charged context of collectivisation, for instance, can be said to have been communicated effectively to power by implementing particular ad hoc solutions to problems posed by abstract and universalist decrees. An illustrative example of this mechanism is the implementing and further institutionalizing of ‘personal-private’ reindeer ownership at the very beginning of collectivisation (Chapter 3).

Two aspects of the Russian situation make the question interesting from a communicative point of view and both of them relate to grave deficiencies in the channels of communication. Such deficiencies are exhibited either by total absence of the possibility for uncensored speech from below, characterizing the Soviet condition, or restrictions on such speech in various ways, such as control of the mass media, as in the current situation. An equally valid reason for deficient channels of communication between ‘the masses’ and ‘power’ is the self-censoring applied at both ends.

Self-censoring itself seems to be made necessary by the very nature of the tacit pact between the two sides: it rests on a compromise, considered not to bear the light of official proclamations. The nature of this compromise has been briefly touched upon above, but it can be generalized to an agreement for mutual absolution from responsibility. So long as the rule of those in power is not challenged, the ‘masses’ can enjoy a private-in-the-collective regime of socio-economic existence. In many ways this regime of mutual disengagement resembles relations between the two ends of the social pyramid, characteristic of medieval socio-political arrangements (Shlapentokh 2007).

The question nevertheless remains as to how this very peculiar channel of communication works in this day and age. How ‘masses’ talk with ‘power’ in authoritarian or ‘mildly authoritarian’ regimes? The specific case of Kola reindeer husbandry gives some suggestions about how this might be happening, as I shall try to show in the following text. I shall be arguing that the success of communication is ensured by the transmission of shared ethical values offered ‘from below’ and responded to in various ways ‘from above’. The shared ethical preference for security as the ultimate value stands in some contrast to democracy and freedom. The anecdote about the forester and his boss captures the point. So long as the forester is allowed to make informal use of a vast resource, governed by the state, he should not worry about his well-being because he is given social security of the ultimate order. By well-understood implication, he
shall not even think of subverting such a generous arrangement. A further implication is that by accepting such an arrangement, one becomes socially, economically, and legally vulnerable. Should such a person displease those with power over him or her, punishment is easy because everyone is a transgressor.

In more specific terms the various features of this form of people-to-power communication, or ‘conversing with power’, can throw light on the other problems posed at the beginning. Thus, the impasse of cross-border communication in the enthusiastically proclaimed project of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, particularly as regards indigenous matters, I see rooted in the essentially differing communicational cultures that characterize the two sides. The ‘hiddenness’ of substantial communicated meanings in the Russian case requires that communication be formulated through expertise in the poetic strategies that will be described in the following chapter.
Chapter 2
Ideological production and Soviet social work

Seeing Soviet and Russian realities as explainable through totalitarian/authoritarian models of social governance is a problematic legacy of the Cold War period. Lack of nuanced penetration into how the Soviet system really worked, especially at lower and middle-range social levels, can lead to sweeping generalizations and schematizations of a starkly black-and-white character. As more time passes since the changes of the late 1980s, there is an increasing risk that popular perceptions of the Soviet past will take such black-and-white images as accurate. This public by now, it should be noted, represents not only a loosely defined ‘Western’ popular opinion, but also the younger generations of the post-Soviet world. As the gap with lived experience widens, the image of the ‘masses’ as passive, downtrodden victims of ruthless power seems to spread. This tendency lives side by side with a nostalgic version of a lost arcadia, noted in the previous part and most strongly associated with the Brezhnev era. The principal holders of this latter reading of recent history are represented mainly by the senior generation who lived through that period.

The contradictions in perceptions of the now past Soviet times find interesting representation and discursive life in relation to indigeneity. Discussing the Kola Sami situation, as it is seen from the Western (in this case, Norwegian) side of the border, Berg-Nordlie states:

(... there is too little information and debate on the specifics of Kola Sámi politics, and Russian indigenous politics in general. One may get the idea that Russia is somehow a ‘tabula rasa’ when it comes to indigenous policy, a vacuum that needs to be filled by the import of Nordic institutions – whereas, in fact, Russia does have a complex field of indigenous laws, institutions and organisations, containing both obstacles and possibilities, and constituting a very real political landscape for the Kola Sámi to navigate. The general lack of information about precisely what organisations and actors are active in the field of Kola Sámi politics also makes it difficult for Nordic Sámi consumers to put the news from Russia into context. (2011a:33, see also Scheller 2013; 2010)
The *tabula rasa* point is well made, and I think it describes the state of affairs not only about the regard to Nordic countries. In spite of the extensive literature on Russian, Soviet, and post-Soviet indigenous policies, which exploded in the last two decades, the point remains valid, at least as regards the Kola, but I would think much further afield also. Two aspects of the situation require special attention.

The first concerns the assertion made above that the filling in of the presumed vacuum of indigenous policies in Russia. During the ‘heady ‘90s’ (‘lykhie devyanostie’) an almost taken-for-granted solution to the problem with the ‘vacuum’ concerned parties on both sides of the border imagined to rest in the simple transfer of institutions from West to East. Below I shall try to argue for a different case: that if there was a problem, it was rather in the case with which imported messages and structures were swiftly reinterpreted in Soviet institutional terms into ideological and social work. The resulting situation, which I consider problematic, is that such a reinterpretation sets a presumed West-to-East dialogue in a dysfunctional condition.

The second is that the reinterpretation has reproduced social fault-lines of the Soviet period, most relevantly the rift between those that have been skilled or professionalized in matters ideological, on the one hand, and ‘the masses’ who it was their mission to enlighten and lead, on the other. In the current reproduction of such rifts a certain isomorphism also persists, taken over from the previous period. It concerns residential and gender issues. In the Lovozero District case they are very pronounced in the sense that reinterpreted social work tends to have its centre of gravity in the urban part of Lovozero District and Murmansk Region. The gender dynamics of the situation also recall earlier phases. In the lower and midlevel tiers the actors are almost exclusively women. This is in sharp contrast with tundra land users, who, with very rare exceptions, are exclusively men.

The problem then, I see as what may be called ‘dialogic discrepancy’ or ‘dialogic incongruity’, that is, a state of discursive affairs in which dialogue between interlocutors is compromised due to their employing language in divergent or even conflicting ways. The principal protagonists, or ‘speakers’ in this dialogue, for my argument are Western institutions, on the one hand, wishing to solve the ‘tabula rasa’ problem, in Berg-Nordlie’s phrasing, and generally to redress past wrongs. The other main protagonist is represented by the current local ethnopolitical elite. There is a third party also, and it is a silent one – that of the presumed beneficiaries of the dialogue, the proverbial common people (cf. Scheller 2013:26). Their voice can be heard only in private talk, which is generally dismissive.
of what is perceived to be happening on the ethnopolitical scene. In private talk opinion tends to be rather blunt and uncompromising. Disparaging remarks regarding ethnopolitical activism are common and, especially at reindeer herding camps, are likely to lapse into statements like “It’s all sham” (odna vidimost’). To be able to reveal how this situation emerged, I now need to introduce some analytical tools. To this end I propose that the linguistic discussion of language functions may be helpful.

Language functions: ‘substantive’ and ‘poetic’

The disruptive discursive phenomenon I have sketched out above, may be described as the failure of initial assumptions – on one or both sides – that a cross-border dialogue shall involve a shared code.

This part of the analytical work, following in the steps of Bakhtin46 (1981, 1979, 1975a, b), the speech act theorists of the 1950s and 60s (Austin 1962; Searle 1969), and language function theorists (principally Jakobson 1960), is concerned mostly with the rules of speech acts that the two generalized interlocutors are seen to follow.47 My suggestion is that they are following different rules for speech games because they hold differing perspectives on the dialogic process.

Yurchak, similarly employing linguistic pragmatics, turns his attention to the performative function of language, and Austin’s discussions of performatives (Yurchak 2005:20–25ff; Austin 1962). His principal thesis is based on the possibility that a performative utterance may have a constative meaning, i.e. one that is truth-value sensitive. He develops an example from Soviet-era electoral behaviour. I take that example and elaborate on it.

The act of voting – as at a Party meeting for instance – may be broken into two parts, as Yurchak suggests. There is the performative one: by the raising of the hand one, generally speaking, contributes to the cementing of the established power arrangement. From the point of view of an outsider, however, the act may be seen to follow a conscious decision in favour or disfavour of whatever is put to the vote. Alternatively, the act may be seen as a consequence of some form of power-pressure: the actor is afraid not to vote, as sanctions may ensue against him/her. At this point there appears the question of legitimacy of the performative and it is in

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47 For the current state of the debate Wierzbicka (1991); Sbisà (2006); Östman and Verschueren (2009).
this way that a foundational statement can be judged to be true or false. This, in turn, suggests that the foundational statement, be it verbal or not, is using the channel of communication in its informative, and thereby truth-value susceptible capacity. In other words, it is a constative (‘substantive’) statement.48

The performative statement is a two-step movement. There is the confirmation of consciousness and freedom of choice needed to legitimize the performance and then the performance itself. From the point of view of an insider in the Soviet environment, however, the situation differs completely. It includes the possibility that one may act out a consciously made choice, but in practice this was rare. In the common case, the foundational statement preceding the act would not be substantive at all, but one expressing a modal meaning: ‘I don’t care (for what I am voting since it’s all fake)’. This means, in its turn, that the substantive (in Yurchak: constative) meaning of such a performative is modally removed from a truth-value susceptible (‘serious’) status. The easiest way to imagine this situation is to catch the person raising his hand in voting and simultaneously winking at someone by his side. This sets the performative event in what may be called ‘winking mood’, that is, as marked by a category, expressive of a specific attitude of the speaker in respect of a speech-event in which she or he is participating: one of ironic self-absolution from responsibility.

Employing winking mood thus subverts the event’s performativity by a collapse of ‘seriousness’. The well-known example of a performative statement: ‘I name this ship “Queen Elisabeth”’, can be used to illustrate the case. If in an imagined scenario the person who utters the statement simultaneously winks at the watching public, a collapse of the performative shall be experienced and together with it – of the whole ceremony.

It can be said in parenthesis here that the pervading emphasis on ‘seriousness’ and ponderous verbosity, characterising so much of Soviet ideological and ceremonial production, may be understood as a way of resisting this type of subversion. The anecdote, the wink, and the grin were relegated to private settings, discussed in the literature as ‘kitchen table talk’ (Caldwell 2004; Ries 1997). The end result is what we have seen: the sudden collapse of a system in which every act – from top to bottom – had been performed in winking mood.

48 In lists of language functions the informative, truth-value susceptible one, is variously called: nominative, constative, substantive, etc. In what follows I shall use ‘substantive’, following the Jakobsonian tradition.
False dialogues

When a cross-border dialogic climate became a real possibility after the collapse of the Soviet system, the discursive environment experienced profound change. The demand for ‘seriousness’ tended to evaporate together with the system. Outer signs of this could be seen in a carnivalisation of the political process, in which the figure of the ‘Jester’ appeared (as in the case of Zhirinovski, or in Bulgaria: Ganchev, Pasi); a former president would be caught dead drunk on state visits, another would be televised as part of a continuous masquerade in which a variety of macho-costumes are donned. The ironizing of the serious, which celebrates frivolity in post-Soviet times, brings, in its turn, the opportunity to use linguistic pragmatics to help explain a whole range of new phenomena.

Such is the case of false dialogues. We need to recall here that grassroots participants in Soviet ritual could wink and grin as much as they wished, while performing ritual acts (and thereby subverting them from within), but ritualized behaviour was inspired and produced, nonetheless, by well-known agents – principally the commanders of the ideological. They produced ponderous, boring, and familiar messages, in continuous servicing of a referential monolith (the object of winking). In other words, any act could be referenced to a single orienting centre, which, on the other hand, did not preclude a variety of modalized stances – like ‘winking’ – at both ends of this communicative chain.

I return to the specifics of the region in case – Murmansk Region – using the analytical tools offered above. In the new cross-border situation that came after Gorbachev’s visit to Murmansk in 1989, and specifically in view of the opportunities for cross-border communication, which opened up, ritual allegiance had already disappeared as a priority and, together with it – the monolithic orientation of a unitary ideological line. A former sovkhoz director, featuring in a video-documentary by Petia Mankova (2004), describes all the misfortunes that poured down on his village after the demise of the Union, and exclaims in ultimate desperation: ‘And we don’t even have an ideology anymore!’. The absence of a referential pillar, which could be carnivalized at both ends of the communicative chain (as the former sovkhoz director must have done innumerable times himself) is a real loss, nevertheless, experienced as collapse into a referential void.

It is in this vacuum that a new ideology stepped in from across the Western border, one premised on democratic and pro-market values. For those that chose to engage with it one option was to adjust skills acquired in the previous period to the demands of the new one. The outcome of such predispositions and consequent communicative action has been the
emergence of discursive situations in which the interlocutors on both sides of the border would be likely to follow differing rules of the discursive game.

The simplest way to explain this would be to imagine a dialogue, in which an interlocutor says: ‘Nice day, isn’t it?’ and the other responds with ‘No, it isn’t’. The reader may recognize the first part as the well-known example of the *phatic* use of language, as defined by Jakobson (1960), and earlier by Malinowski (1930). When language is used in this way, its function is to signal the existence of a channel of communication and the sharing of the same code, rather than to pass on or ask for information. The proper response is then affirmative, which stabilizes the communicative act by indicating that the speakers indeed share the same code and its attendant pragmatic conventions. An answer like ‘No, it isn’t’, however, destabilizes the act and introduces tension into it. To resolve such a tension a new, mutually agreeable regime should be constructed (i.e., this is a joke), or else a blockage appears and one or both of the interlocutors decide that communication has been compromised. This state can be called a dialogic impasse.

In the Kola, and, more specifically, in the Sami people’s case, the reaching of such an impasse I see as motivated by perceivable dialogic regimes, each related to a specific historical past and its moral order. We are again reminded here of Bakhtin’s concept of chronotope – the experiencing of the world and the dialogue itself from a unique point in space and time (1975a). I argue that the generalized interlocutors in an ongoing dialogue between different identity groups are *chronotopically* divergent. At the extreme ends of such a divergence stand the two generalized interlocutors sketched above in general outlines. Below I sharpen the focus on them.

On the one hand, at the risk of schematizing and essentializing, this argument explores the voices of local indigenous and *para-indigenous* representation, as they are institutionalized in the work of a number of NGOs, indigenous land use enterprises (clan communities, *obshchiny*), and a variety of administrative and cultural institutions. I have good reasons to think that this generalized speaker participates in current dialogues in ways that reinterpret grassroots-to-power communication along lines characteristic of the Soviet period. I defend this position later in this chapter, principally by recalling Soviet principles and practices of ideological education and production.

At the other extreme is found the concerned outsider from the ‘West’, whose participation is motivated by postmodern values concerning indigeneity, cultural survival, gender issues, and environmental concerns. An
important detail to be added here is, however, that an outsider rarely avoids seeing the local situation in terms of conceptual residues from the Cold War period, and its clichés and crudities. At their centre stands the image of an all-powerful totalitarian state victimising ‘the weak’\(^49\). Clear-sighted analysis thus requires additional effort to deflect the emotional and ideological burden of terms like ‘Soviet’ and ‘Cold War’. Without such effort our vision shall be blurred – an all too common state of affairs contributing to the dialogic impasse I am describing.

This latter point – about Cold War residues and the ‘totalitarian paradigm’ that informs them – is important as it draws attention to the inevitable fact that both generalized interlocutors are significantly influenced by an era which is presumably past for them. This should be a reason for the unity of a shared code (Jameson 1981:163f), rather than for the presence of a difference.

The reason for the non-existence of such unity, however, stems from disunity in the ways the language of the dialogue is used. In the case of the generalized ‘concerned outsider’, the interlocutor predominantly uses the language of communication in its information-bearing and truth-value susceptible substantive function. The generalized representative of the ‘insiders who are subjects of concern’, on the other hand, may tend to employ the language of communication in a non-substantive fashion. This is to say that some or all of it may be used for purposes other than conveying information in ways that can be assessed for truth-value. In other words, language use here may all too often slide into modal forms. The resulting categorical discrepancy takes the presumed dialogue to the stage of impasse.

The following example from Soviet times may serve to illustrate this point. It is taken from the local weekly *Lovozerskaya pravda* of 1958 and presents the ‘voice’ of the Sami community in an article titled ‘For a happy life of the Sami’:

> Our small Sami people live a happy life in the Soviet country. How we lived till the revolution one does not even wish to remember. A smoke-filled tent, a dirt-filled turf-hut, incessant migrations with the herd – such were the conditions in which a whole life passed. The tundra inhabitants were illiterate to the last person.
> The picture is entirely different nowadays. The Sami live in light-filled and spacious houses, where *Il‘ich’s lamps* are burning, there are radios. Newspapers and magazines have become necessities for every family. Our village has also changed. New buildings have risen everywhere, how many are

\(^49\) For the term: Scott (1985); as an illustrative example: Madslien (21.12.2006).
under construction it is impossible to tell (....) .E.Kirillova, Kolkhoz member of Kolkhoz “Tundra”. (Grishin 1958a)

It may be the case that a generalized concerned outsider takes this fairly standard for the times oration, published in the organ of the District CPSU Committee (Lovozerskiy raykom) at its face value, that is, as a truth-value susceptible proposition. The listener or reader may surmise that the speaker states what she believes to be true. Or, in other words, that the speaker follows Grice’s ‘cooperative principle’ and his ‘maxim of quality’ (‘Do not say what you believe to be false’)\textsuperscript{50}. The listener or reader may also surmise that the speaker presents a genuine belief of the majority of local people, and, in this sense, that she/he hears a true assessment of their past and present condition, coming as a ‘community voice’, or ‘voice of the people’.

A possible reading of this type has found its way in Kiselev and Kiseleva’s ‘Soviet Saami’ (1987[1979]). A representative of the Danish Communist Party, after a visit to Lovozero in August 1975, and a stay with the family of a Sami reindeer herder, states his conclusions:

Only the socialist order is capable of providing the small peoples with all the necessary conditions for their development and prosperity. (1987:184)

It is impossible to say with certainty to what an extent the type of communication presented above is symmetrical in language functional terms. Or, in other words, to what an extent one or both participants in such a speech event are using language in its information-bearing and truth-susceptible (substantive) function, abiding by ‘sincerity of speech act requirements’ (Note 49).

There are various indicators, nevertheless, which tilt the scales towards shades of non-substantive intentionalities: when one or both interlocutors may be expressing wishes, doubts, ironies, hints, or any other of a myriad nuances of modal meanings, through which a stated proposition is commented upon. Of such modal meanings one of particular interest can be called ‘acknowledgement of fictionalisation’ (cf. Yurchak 2005: 77f; Zaslavsky 1980:396; Utechin 1963). A possible transcription of such a modal meaning, based on Kirillova’s statement, quoted above, may run like this: ‘I do not (fully) believe in what I am saying, but I believe this is what should be said in such a context.’

\textsuperscript{50} Grice 1975:45–46; Davies 2000:2; see also Austin on ‘sincerity of speech act requirements’ (1962).
Evidence to the possibility of such a reading comes from its following an indigenous genre trope of the times, one that Slezkine calls ‘The Long Journey of the small peoples’ (1994a:292–96). The formulation captures the convention of presenting the history of the numerically small indigenous peoples of the Russian North (in our case: the Sami people) as a journey from suffering during a dark past to bliss in Soviet times. It may be also the case that the reporting journalist (Grishin 1958a) has led the speaker to the employing of the trope, or may have even transcribed the original statement in this way. In all events, grassroots actors of the period had a stable hold on the conventions, governing public expression, particularly statements made before visiting foreigners – as in the second case, when a foreigner stays with a reindeer herding family.

A further modalization can also be expected: that of the speaker indicating by linguistic or para-linguistic means that she is being self-critical or even ironic about having to abide by the said conventions. It could be the case that in a more private setting she could report the speech-event as set in ‘winking mood’.

Yet another indicator can be pointed out in regard of possibilities for the presence – to a greater or lesser extent – of non-substantive modalized employment of language in cases of the type illustrated above. Such is the abandoning of the ‘Long Journey’ trope immediately after the changes of the early 1990s, and its swift replacement with a diametrically opposite one, which could be called ‘Back to Nature’. Such a replacement may be considered as an expression of the ‘resurrective romanticism’, discussed earlier (p.40). The following excerpt from a statement by a Sami clan community (obshchina) leader, dating from the early 2000s, illustrates the point:

Now we want to be engaged in what our souls desire. Namely, to engage in reindeer breeding, hunting, fresh water fishing, wild berry and mushroom gathering, and the production of objects of decorative and applied art. We want to be in unity with nature. (From Kalstad 2009: 64)


It is also to be noted, in this regard, that the political identity of the listener/reader had also changed by this time. I am not aware of visits to Lovozero by representatives of foreign Communist parties after the changes of the late 1980s-early 1990s. It is beyond my present purpose to
Language function typologies

In linguistic pragmatics, the discussion of language functions dates back to the 1930s. It was prompted by the realization that language was not used solely for the exchange of factual information (Lyons 1977:50f). Bühler (1965[1934]) in particular, and Jakobson (1960), who expanded and sophisticated Bühler’s typology, have been especially influential as regards the substantive/non-substantive distinction, mentioned above. In what follows, Jakobson’s analysis of language functions shall be the foundation.

As already stated, the substantive function of language refers to its informative (descriptive) use. This is when the content of the utterance produced is compatible with truth-value judgements, or, in other words, the contained proposition can be judged to be true or false. Besides such substantive use of language, however, there is a clear need to consider a number of non-substantive uses, whose function departs in one way or another from the intention of providing factual information. For the purposes of the argument presented here, and in terms of Jakobson’s typology, the conative, phatic, and especially poetic functions are of principal importance. I subsume the three of them under the blanket term non-substantive functions of language.

*Conative* is substituted for Bühler’s ‘Appell’, or in other typologies – vocative function of language. As Lyons explains (1977:52), it is closely linked with what is commonly called instrumental function, i.e. when language is being used in order to achieve some practical effect.

Phatic, as regards language use, is a term originally introduced by Malinowski (1930), who speaks of ‘phatic communion’ when ‘ties of union are created by the mere exchange of words’. ‘Nice day, isn’t it?’, which is common illustration of such use, opens up or probes into the existence of
such ties of union and into whether the interlocutors share a mutually-agreeable and comprehensible code.

The poetic use of language is the most critical to my argument. ‘Poetic’ is used by Jakobson in a broad sense and should not be confused with the language of poetry. It rather attempts to capture that use of language when the speaker is employing imaginatively its qualities as a medium of communication.

The excerpt from *Lovozerksya Pravda* of 1958, quoted above, can serve to clarify this point. The speaker (Kolkhoz member Kirillova) follows an established genre of presenting Sami people’s history – one that follows Slezkine’s ‘Long Journey’ trope. It can thus be considered a literary device: a way of creative use of language, of employing its capacity to construct narratives not bound by rules of factual (i.e. substantive) description. Rather be concerned about whether such a narrative is true to fact or not, the author’s intent is to present captivating and convincing fiction. Further than that, the author may indicate a modal stance in respect of such a narrative: as, for instance, one marked by ‘winking mood’ and thus oriented to conveying a particular impression to the audience by adding self-reflexive comment. The poetic use of language in its orientation to fiction (and not fact) may or may not include, however, such additional modalizations and shifting positionalities. In this sense, it should be considered a broader pragmatic category, subsuming – in an optional way – self-commenting finer modal meanings. Poetic use of language can be defined therefore as using language in its potential of creating convincing fictions, with a wide potential for modalization, rather than describing what the author/speaker believes to be facts. In this latter case we can say that language is being used in its substantive function.

**Ideological talk**

The above definition of the poetic function should be now specified in reference to a presumed dialogue between a new set of generalized interlocutors. They are to be seen in a context which precedes the problematic cross-border dialogue that was revived in the late 1980s and has continued, although decreasingly, until the present. In other words, to understand the communicational predicament of the present period, it is necessary to position the ‘ethno-elite’ interlocutors in the chronotope that has a critical relevance for them. This presupposes a new dialogic disposition in which communication used to be carried out between the ‘ethno-elite’
The question as to who these figures were in the previous period is easily answered. In a strongly centralised state such as the Soviet Union, the actors concerned with all matters, big and small, including the indigenous ones, were the power-holding elite, with the General Secretary of CPSU at the apex. The pinnacle of power spoke through its subordinate ideological structures, which carried the word down to ‘the masses’.

This kind of general setting, against the background of which, the ‘elite-to-masses’ speech event is to be discussed, temporally spans the whole of the Soviet period. I consider it more useful, however, to address specifically the period beginning in the late 1920s till the disbanding of the Union in the early 1990s. The beginning, associated principally with the stabilisation of Stalin’s hold on power, the First Five Year Plan (1928–32), and enforced collectivisation, is known by various names, from which ‘revolution from above’ is perhaps the most apt (Zelenin 2006; Tucker 1977). The setting, then, can be narrowed down to the decades from this second, Stalinist, ‘revolution from above’ in Russia, until the perestroika reforms of the mid- and late-1980s.

My claim in what follows shall be that the current perception of the cross-border dialogue of the last twenty years, looked at from the eastern side of the border, has been predominantly formed as a reinterpretation of the dialogic dispositions in Soviet society during the above-mentioned period. Although highly uneven in its shifting accents, the period shows clear continuities between its various inner phases, allowing a stable overall pattern to emerge.

This pattern is most clearly seen when power-to-grassroots communication (‘conversations with power’) used to be conducted in the genre of ‘ideological talk’. By such talk I mean the never-ending pronouncements of the ideological power elite which had to be absorbed and communicatively engaged with by grassroots respondents. In a Rabelaisian avalanche of nouns, Bulgarian writer Stefan Tsanev satirizes this stream of ‘ideological talk’ texts, which the office of Bulgarian dictator Todor Zhivkov kept churning out:

There were innumerable considerations, decisions, suggestions, conclusions, impressions, judgements, opinions, accusations, commissions, deposits, positions, initiatives, projects, plans, programmes, strategies, advic-

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51 The phrase was used by Stalin in reference of the mass collectivisation campaign (сплошная коллективизация), which was paraded as being ‘comparable to the Great October socialist revolution’ (Aleksandrov et al. 1950: 115; Zelenin 2006: 3).
es, decrees, arguments, comprehensions, proofs, directives, orders, modernisations, multiplications, memos, theses, geneses, conceptualisations, ideas, platforms, experiments, visions, previsions, analyses, assessments, reassessments, approaches, directions, expositions, reports, instructions, initiations and reformations… (Tsanev 2010: 388)

This barrage of ideological talk continuously descended from the corresponding departments of Central Committees in the countries of the Soviet Bloc jumping at grassroots respondents from the pages of newspapers, magazines, radio and (later) TV programmes, explanatory brochures, film documentaries (before the main feature), street slogans, pictorial art, oral presentations at open and closed Party (CPSU) meetings, trade union meetings, Komsomol meetings, sports events, festivals, official holiday celebrations, and every other form of public gathering. The reader who has not experienced this directly, least of all for over four decades, as in the case of my generation, may try to imagine what it would be like if all of a sudden all the commercial advertisements pouring out upon us today were replaced by ideological talk.

There is an abundance of various roles and voices in this mega-communicative process52, some of which shall be specified in greater detail below. What should be done first is recognize the two-track nature of power-to-grassroots discourse, characteristic of the Soviet period. Most schematically put, we need to differentiate between ideological textual production, intended for the ‘masses’, and such that was intended for exclusively Party circulation, being, in this way, classified to varying extent. Kurt Marco, an early ‘developed socialism’ analyst of Soviet ideological production, distinguishes between popular ideology, cadre ideology (in the broadest sense, including the official publicity of the regime), and ideologists’ ideology. Popular ideology develops mainly the patriotic and moral aspects. Cadre ideology envelops these elements in the routine scholastic of Party jargon – the part which is frequently taken in the West to be ideology. Ideologists’ or academic ideology is a matter of internal controversy (…) and a technical language of specialists (…). (Marco 1968: 477)

In my treatment, the poetic texts of ideological talk span a spectrum of genres in the area between ‘public’ and ‘cadre’ talk, with the finer ideological points left for public discussion at various ideologically-focussed fora.

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These used to be, for instance, the evening schools for all Party and non-Party members, where the basics of Marxist-Leninist doctrine were taught, the open or closed Communist Party, and Komsomol meetings, etc.

When using ideological poetics (Yurchak 2005:77f), the empowered speaker’s intention is, as a rule, not to communicate truth-value sensitive information. The purpose of the act is rather to create an ornate textual veil, behind which stands the information-laden substance of ‘ideological talk’.53

This state of discursive affairs has led some analysts to employ the term ‘fictionalisation’ for Soviet ideology, particularly for the period discussed, in its hereditary links with the preceding Stalinist decades. As Utechin (1963) observed:

Stalin resorted to a large scale application of fictions (which led) to the divorce between private conviction and public utterance. (After Zaslavsky 1980:396)

This state of affairs consolidated during the period we associate with Brezhnev’s stay in power, namely between the second half of the sixties and the first of the eighties. Later dubbed ‘period of stagnation’ by the perestroika advocates, it is treated in this book as the period of ‘mature sovkhoizm’, characterized by the full flowering of the ‘private-in-the-collective’ social economy – critical concepts that shall be fully presented and discussed further on in Chapter 6. Concerning ‘ideological talk’, the period of ‘mature sovkhoizm’ marked a new stage of ‘fictionalisation of ideology’, to use Utechin’s phrasing. In this new stage, the core ideological doctrine of Marxism-Leninism had been progressively turned into a schematized symbolic backdrop with little if any meaning in a shared power-to-grassroots understanding. Most simply put, ‘communism’ had become by this time an empty term, or even a joke. The rhetoric of Marxism-Leninism was nevertheless persistently supported as a recognized fiction serving as a referential icon. The orations creating this fiction illustrate the poetic use of language in Jakobson’s sense.

Extending the Jakobsonian model further, a mystifying or obfuscating function of language can be singled out, as a sub-category of the poetic, and situated along the borderline between the poetic and conative functions. The link with the latter is the instrumental use of a text to mystify,

53 In terms of Kivinen’s model (2002), describing political action as the outcome of sacred-profane tension, this is the pole of the ‘sacred’ (Chernysh 2011: 170), and hence unburdened by truth-value concerns.
by veiling the substantive meaning while, at the same time, hinting at its presence.

Here it is important to note a two-stage movement in the dialogic process between the speaker of mystifying ideological talk and his/her audience. The audience would normally recognise and be adequate to the conventions of the genre. There was always the possibility, however, that someone might choose to take mystifying textual production as substantive use of language. In the climate of the day, an interlocutor participating in the dialogue in such a way, would have been generally considered as next to an idiot or venerated as a sort of saint who is still faithful to revolutionary ideals.

The following example may illustrate this point. It comes from my own experience of attending evening Marxist-Leninist school at the University of Sofia.

The system required that all staff should hear a semester of lectures, ‘improving their knowledge of scientific Communism and Marxism-Leninism’, as it was demanded by superimposed Party administrations. At the end of the day, the University Party organisation had to report to the chaperoning Sofia Urban Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) that so many members of University staff had been included in the system of Marxist-Leninist education, so many lectures were read, presences registered, non-attendance lowered (due to excusable, as well as non-excusable reasons), etc. In short, the University BCP Committee with its staff of paid secretaries, tried to show good performance on this ideological front, and, ambitiously, get into a leading position in the Socialist Competition within the system of Higher Education. The classes would be held in the evenings, once a week, and presence vigilantly monitored.

And so were we sitting in a big lecture-hall, full of junior assistants from all departments. A lecturer from the Department of Philosophy was reading in a droning voice something about the transition of quantitative change into qualitative, looking from time to time at his watch. Of the audience some were reading, other telling each other anecdotes, playing various games, most often ‘naval chess’, where you had to sink the opponents submarines, or individually doing cross-word puzzles. The more diligent were correcting quite openly students’ papers, others were reading books. Side by side with me were two colleagues, whose favourite pastime at such occasions was to make long lists of Bulgarian verbs, nouns, idiomatic expressions, proverbs, etc., denoting or associating with copulation.
It was at that moment that a hand was raised and someone asked the following question: ‘Can we consider that the transition from Mature Socialism to Communism shall be smooth, or sudden?’

At the raising of this finer point of quantitative changes becoming qualitative everybody stood aghast for a moment, then general laughter and mirth ensued. The lecturer also smiled, gave some sort of an answer, and announced the end of the lecture. A point was scored in regard of listeners’ participation, so there was little point of staying longer. Besides, the question had provoked such euphorically joyful mood that there was a danger of scoring badly on the index of discipline.

The unfortunate conscientious inquirer became subsequently the butt of innumerable jokes, and earned himself a nickname, roughly translatable as Dumbo Jim (Zhora Tupoto). He had broken the convention and caused dialogic impasse. He, in other words had not done what was thought adequate when listening to mystifying text (doing cross-word puzzles, etc.), but had asked a question, suggesting that language in the dialogue was used substantively. He had committed the error of being earnest.

One may also note that assuming such a position in a dialogue with power can be a weapon of effective resistance. This could have been a nuance the lecturer caught – hence the hurried ending of the lecture. The case is nowhere better shown than in Jaroslav Hašek’s immortal satire ‘The Adventures of the Brave Soldier Švejk’ (2005 [1923]). Švejk’s persistent transposition of the poetics of Austro-Hungarian ‘ideological talk’ into substantive language, is satirically used by Hašek to portray how unpunishable subversion is effected, shaking the very edifice of imperial ideology.54 One of the memorable episodes in the book, illustrating this tactic, is when Švejk’s mental condition is examined by a team of forensic psychiatrists:

(…) noticing the portrait of the Austrian ruler on the wall, Švejk exclaimed: ‘Gentlemen, Long live His Majesty Emperor Franz Josef the First!’ (…) In their conclusion the experts unanimously wrote: ‘The patient uses expressions like ‘Long live the Emperor Franz Josef the First’ which is quite sufficient to define the mental condition of Josef Švejk as manifest idiocy. (Hašek 2005: 55–56)

54 In analysing discursive behaviour of the anti-Putin opposition on the eve of the 2012 presidential elections, M.Yamol’skiy notes something very similar to what I would call ‘the Švejk discursive tactic’. About opposition leader Aleksey Naval’niy he says: ‘He (Naval’niy) shrewdly suggested (…) that outer appearances (vidimost’), paraded by Putin’s circle of powerholders, should be taken at their face value.’ (Yamol’skiy 1.02.2012)
By acting out ceremonial poetics literally, Švejk had, in other words, provoked an open recognition of the inherent instability of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The non-observance of conventions in language use can be, thus, an agentive force. It provokes a recognition of reality which mystifying – or more generally – poetic use of language, attempts to replace by fiction.

In the overwhelming majority of cases, however, such transpositions – for whatever reason – were not made. The distinctions between the nuances of mystifying poetics, on the one hand, and substantive textual production, on the other, were well registered, and had become routinized with time to the status of stable conventions. In this way discursive competence was developed in Soviet, and Soviet-like societies (such as in Bulgaria), which, borrowing from Goldner et al. (1977), may be called ‘competence of cynical knowledge’. The possessor of such competence was able to automatically distinguish between mystifying ideological talk and substantive ideological talk with the same ease that a competent speaker of English will distinguish when ‘Nice day, isn’t it?’ is used phatically from the unusual case when it is a question requiring a substantive answer.

The reader of any newspaper in the decades of Soviet power would be competent in such hermeneutic exercises to a degree of sophistication, considered normative for the period. The same was professionally acquired by Western ‘watchers’ who had to resurrect the substantive message from underneath mountains of mystifying and ‘serious’ talk. The following example, taken almost at random, will illustrate the situation.

At the XXV Congress of CPSU (Febr.-March 1976), Leonid Brezhnev stressed in his report that:

‘the further raising of the well-being of the people, the improvement of the conditions of their labour and daily life’ shall be a goal to reach, while, at the same time, the ‘core’ of the Party’s economic strategy targeted ‘the further accumulation of the economic might of the country, the broadening and fundamental renewal of productive capital, and the obtaining of a stable, balanced growth of heavy industry – the foundation of the economy’.

(after Evans 1986:5)

Deciphering the statement by comparing its stressed points with those of the previous congress in 1971, Evans concludes:

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55 In the same connection see Yurchak (2005:16) and his discussion of Sloterdijk (1993) and Žižek (1991:29).
That statement seemed to imply that improvements in living standards were still of great importance in principle, but that major progress toward that end would come about only gradually. (Evans 1986:5)

For an uninitiated reader the link between the veiled message of the first text and its revealed substantive content in the gloss of the analyst might be, perhaps, difficult to make. A well-trained ear would, on the contrary, immediately catch the nuances and uncover the meaning. This task would be performed at every level along the ‘vertical axis of power’. The one I shall be most concerned with here is the level of the agitation and propaganda department of the District CPSU Committee (Raykom) – the Agit-prop.

Agitprop and the production of cynical competence

In the unitary structure of the Soviet state edifice the agitprop department was reproduced at every level from top to bottom – from Politburo to the District CPSU Committee.

This lowest level – in the local case – was Lovozero District CPSU Committee (Lovozerskiy raykom). The business of the agitprop at the raykom was to decipher correctly descending from above ideological texts and take them further down to ‘the masses’. This highly responsible work required trained professionals. To decipher a message ‘correctly’ was different from what one gets by applying competence of ‘cynical knowledge’. The ideologically intended substantive gloss of the excerpt from Brezhnev’s speech above is close to the gloss of the analyst. The popular version of the cynically competent transcript, on the other hand, would be much more radical and pessimistic in its conclusions. It may summarize the content by saying something like: ‘We shall have to stand in line for everything till doomsday – but who expected anything different?’ The gist of such conclusions would be popularly circulated by the art of the anecdote, which flourished during the Soviet period. A well liked one was the following. ‘The pessimist said: “It couldn’t get any worse than this.” The optimist replied: “It could.”’

The task at hand for the agitprop department was, therefore, to decipher ideological poetic or mystifying texts into ideologically substantively intended texts without lapsing into the cynical quips of the anecdote. The edifice of seriousness separated the two extremes, and the very poetics of ideological mystification can be seen as a product of this imposed separa-
tion. This, in its turn, fed into the already mentioned aesthetics of ‘seriousness’ that was such an important aspect of official communication during the Soviet period. Despite the current presence of an incomparably freer media, which is now saturated with texts of ‘cynical knowledge’, the aesthetics and pragmatics of official ‘poetic seriousness’ remains.

The correct deciphering was the task of the agitprop department, as part of the citadel of officialdom. An important infrastructural detail here is that it had a relatively small staff of paid officials. At the same time, the agitprop department was responsible for ideological work not only as regarded the Party organisations at every district level, but also in the state administrative offices, and the social organisations (obshchestvennye organizatsii). It should be said in passing that these organisations – which included nominally the Communist Party and Komsomol, but also the Trade Unions, Cooperative organisations, Voluntary youth organisations, etc. – would be the nearest to the idea of an NGO that came with the reforms of the late 1980s–90s.

The message should also be adapted to the purposes of Communist upbringing at all levels of primary, secondary, and higher education. Thus, far from entering an empty space in the liberal atmosphere of the 1990, the new ‘Western’ structures entered a terrain ploughed diligently by generations of agitprop workers.

Clearly the few staff members at the raykom agitprop department were far from sufficient to carry the ideological message to every corner of local life, including the herding camps out on the tundra. As Remington (1983) explains:

> From the standpoint of the Party’s success in maintaining political control over communications, it is notable that no one Party committee must exercise direct control over an impossibly broad range of communication channels: the span of control at each level is kept manageable through extensive delegation of power to unpaid activists, who serve as agitators, propagandists, political information specialists, lecturers, etc. (Remington 1983: 2f)

The final picture is, as the same author argues, of a raykom agitprop department consisting of a small paid staff of instructors, as the hub of spokes that radiate out to reach every single corner of district life (1983:3). The ‘spokes’ role was performed by unpaid activists and officials as part of their ‘social work’ (obshchestvennaya rabota).

At this level of ‘social work’ an ordinary office worker would be constantly performing the hermeneutic exercise, an example of which was given by Evans’ analysis (1986: 5), quoted above. This would be neces-
sary, for instance, for presenting a summary of the main points of the General Secretary’s speech, at a Party, Komsomol, trade-union, or non-Party members (‘open’) meetings. The activist would be aided by ‘materials’ and ‘instructions’ sent down from superior agitprop levels at the Regional Party Committee (Obkom, Oblkom). They would also be collected when the activist took part in agitprop meetings (sobraniya) and discussions (soveshchaniya) – present day seminars or conferences of regional, trans-regional, or even international (within the Soviet Bloc) format. An example of how this worked at the level of primary school education is given below.

Antonova and ‘The Red Trackers’

Lidiya Dmitrievna Antonova (née Torovina) (1927–2011) was a supervisor of the younger pupils at the Nationalities Boarding School (shkola-internat) in Lovozero between the 1950s and the late 1980s. Those in her care, mostly Sami children, whose parents had been relocated from tundra villages to Lovozero, remember her now as a stern and exacting supervisor (vospitatelnitsa).

Lidiya Antonova passed away in November 2011 and her extensive archive was bequeathed to Lovozero Municipal Library. Delving into it, I was struck by the diligence with which this supervisor of the first forms at the village boarding school had kept carefully written descriptions of every presentation to the children – either as some formal talk in class, or when organising the pupils’ ‘leisure time’ (dosug). In a similar fashion, Antonova had written down in her beautiful, unfaltering calligraphic handwriting, all the lectures she had heard over decades of going to regional conferences, seminars, and meetings on ‘the problems of Communist upbringing’ (kommunisticheskoe vospitanie). Her own presentations to what looks like innumerable meetings, seminars, and teachers’ conferences in Murmansk, Apatiti, Leningrad, etc., are also written down in these schoolchildren’s exercise books. Antonova, in other words, was one of the many

56 As there was no room in the Municipal Library for Antonova’s archive, Vladi Vladimirova and I were asked to keep it, and, when possible, transfer it to an electronic form. I am grateful to Librarian Tat’yana Sherstyuk for organising the whole operation and for her personal help in trying to preserve this valuable body of documents for future use.
57 The archive contains also a rich collection of picture post-cards, photographs and 8mm films connected with all the places Antonova had visited in the course of her extensive conference-going life. The collection gives an idea also of the large network of contacts with other agitprop volunteers she had built up. The network spreads to many parts of the Soviet
thousands of voluntary agitprop activists, who devotedly brought down to ‘the masses’ – in her case, the Sami children of Lovozero – the ideological poetic texts emerging from the centre of the Soviet agitprop universe. From Antonova’s exercise books recording her activities, as well as from the way her grown-up pupils remember her today, it seems that she became a regional celebrity in matters of Communist upbringing mainly due to the circle (kruzhok) she had organised at school. The circle was called Krasnye sledopyty (‘The Red Trackers’), and she kept it going through the 1970s and till the end of her supervising career by the end of the eighties. From the carefully written down agendas of each weekly meeting it can be seen that the Red Trackers were principally engaged in tracing participants in the heroic episodes of Soviet history. They initiated correspondence with them, and sent them greeting cards and letters on the occasions of national holidays such as 7 November (Day of the Great October Socialist Revolution), New Year, 8 March (Women’s Day), 1 May (Labour Day), 9 May (Day of Victory in the Great Patriotic War), etc. Those to whom the children wrote had participated in historical events such as the October Revolution, the Civil War (1919–21), and the Great Patriotic War. A prominent place was occupied by people who had seen or even talked to Lenin. In cases when veterans had passed away, students traced some connection with their family, kin, or people who had known them. The increasing prominence of the cult of the Great Patriotic War (1941–45) and its veterans can be connected with the shift in Soviet ideology from according the Great October Socialist Revolution (1917) the status of founding event of Soviet history to a substituting emphasis on the role of the Patriotic War. The shift is characteristic of the ideological accents of the Brezhnev era, seamlessly continuing into those of today’s ideological machinery (Dubin 2011: 47–55).

In accordance with such ideological accents, an agenda of the weekly gathering of the Red Trackers would typically run like this:

24.1.1979. Protocol of meeting: 1. S. T. had been elected Head Girl of the Red Trackers; 2. T. V. had been elected to be responsible for recruiting newly admitted students to the Society for Protecting Monuments of History and Culture; 3. In connection with preparations for the 35th anniversary of the defeat of the German Fascist aggressors in the Kola Arctic, all members of the Red Trackers have been given the task to collect materials about the defenders of the Arctic and to renew tracing work; 4. (We) studied materials collected by T.S. about the history of the Village of Kanevka, Union as well as to some other countries of the ‘socialist camp’ (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia), and even to some ‘capitalist’ ones (Finland).
and about veterans of the Great Patriotic War, living in Kanevka’. (Antonova’s Archive 1971–2005)

Gender aspects

It is significant that all Red Trackers were girls. In conversations with former members of the Circle I raised this point on a number of occasions. I myself received secondary education at a Bulgarian boarding school from 1960 till 1965. In strongly Soviet-like Bulgaria there were a variety of clubs at the school such as the Red Trackers. Thus their activities rang a familiar bell. As in Lovozero, active participation in such clubs belonged to the category of extracurricular ‘social work’ (Bulg. obshtestvena rabota) and brought attention for political zeal to both students and teachers.

The girls in our class were far more active in such clubs than boys, just as they were also the more diligent students. The so-called ‘conduct rating’ reflected one’s degree of obedience to school rules and enthusiasm in participating in out-of-class social activities. For a girl to have ‘conduct rating’ below 6 (‘excellent’) was almost unheard of.58 With rare exceptions, the boys were all the time being caught in various escapades such as running away from school, smoking in the lavatory, stealing food from the school canteen’s pantry, listening to Radio Luxemburg’s ‘Top Twenty’ pop-song chart after midnight59 and similar pranks and transgressions, while the great majority of girls showed exemplary behaviour in classwork and out-of-school activities. A few boys also worked towards exemplary ‘conduct ratings’ and subsequently attained successful Party and managerial careers. One of the most exemplary became Prime Minister for a time after the reforms of 1989, while another, the top Komsomol Leader of the school, is now an MP in the European Council. Alas, my own conduct rating was a consistently ‘unsatisfactory 3’ and even risking a ‘poor 2’, upon which expulsion from the system of secondary education was possible. This is salient because a similar behaviour record made many Sami

58 Perhaps the most tragic case in recent Bulgarian history - when a young female student put an end to her life due to a reduced ‘conduct rating’ mark at school - was the suicide of promising young poetess Petya Dyubarova in 1979. The circumstances around her premature death never became quite clear, but the specific reason leading her to the fatal decision seems to have been a heavy-handed lowering of her conduct rating by school authorities, and, especially the school Komsomol organisation.

59 Emissions of ‘Top Twenty’ by Radio Luxemburg, as also by illegal British off-shore pirate stations like Radio Caroline, would be caught on short-wave bands after midnight while lights-out time was 22 hrs.
boys drop out of school, which led, in the best of cases, to admission as a ‘trainee’ (*uchenik, petushnik*) to a reindeer herding team (*brigada*). ‘Why wasn’t there a single boy in the Circle?’, I asked the former Red Trackers, now ‘budget sphere’-cum-Sami activist career women in their early fifties.

The response showed that it was for much the same reason as in my own Bulgarian school, with gender differences contributing to outcomes in mixed schools all over the world (cf. Willis 1977). Here, however, there was a factor which made at once the situation in Lovozero considerable grimmer or even tragic. The majority of children were of uprooted Sami families, relocated to Lovozero, and crowded into the log-cabins of relatives (Afanas’yeva 2013; Gutsol et al. 2007; Vatonena 1989). Many children were orphans, or had parents who had been deprived of parental rights. That particular administrative act – ‘*lishenie roditel’skikh prav*’ (deprivation of parental rights) – was applied in cases of alcoholism that led to neglect of parental duties in the eyes of the authorities.

Persistently alcohol dependent parents (principally fathers) were often interned at the so-called *Lechebno-trudovoy profilaktoriy (LTP)*, (*Therapeutic-labour preventive clinic*) on the outskirts of Apatiti (cf. Allemann 09.12.2013). In the 1970s–80s people with drinking problems would be sent for shorter or longer stretches to such corrective colonies. Around the table at herders’ tundra camps many a wry joke would be cracked about these places of corrective labour, the acronym *LTP* being ironically deciphered as ‘*letno-trenirovchyi polk*’ (*pilot training regiment*). A Sami woman, who had lived and studied at the Internat school in the mid-seventies, remembered:

Such therapeutic-labour units existed in the 1970s and ‘80s. They do not exist today, although not a few among the medical authorities are inclined to have them back. My father was an inmate of such a unit twice. A rumour circulated that upon release a certain document was issued to them to the effect that afterwards they would be refused employment anywhere they asked except for in reindeer herding.60 They had to to work there as they had been classified as *tuneyadtsi* (*social parasites*). In other words, they would be put together with those that did not have permanent employment, although as alleged alcoholics they were there for medical treatment. Incidentally, when inmates were released they came back with some money: not much, but they had managed to make some savings from their wages. I definitely remember there was such a unit in

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60 Reindeer herders would refer to that mythical document as ‘*volchyi bilet*’ (*wolf’s ticket*), i.e. a document allegedly proving that one was blacklisted.
Apatiti. I was a little girl then. I remember how with my mother we would cross railway tracks and be admitted past a sentry box with a sentry inside. The whole perimeter was encircled by a barbed-wire fence. (V.S. 20.03.2013)

Children of the Internat of those years also remember the practice of having the portraits of such people publicly displayed, with descriptions of their alcoholic history. For parents and children alike, especially in families where parental rights had been curtailed by the authorities, both the sending to LTP colonies and the public displays of the alcoholic behaviour of parents are remembered as being extremely traumatic. Especially for girls, who were, by and large, good students with conspicuous participation in social activities – Oktyabryata, Pioneer and Komsomol work – such public exposure of their parents is remembered as having caused much pain and feelings of guilt. This suggests the greater vulnerability on the part of socially active students. Since in Soviet and now in post-Soviet society social activism is heavily dominated by women at the lower and middle-echelon levels, tensions in this local social sphere tend to affect women – especially those in leading positions – to a much greater degree than the ‘silent majority’ of Sami or Komi people and the exclusively male, publicity-avoiding reindeer herders. Social tensions have followed a shifting pattern over time, but the issue of these vulnerabilities linked to women’s positions remains. Work on this highly relevant topic may be said to be only beginning (e.g. Vladimirova 2012).

Antonova’s notebooks and reports to conferences show that a major problem for the school was that such children continued to see their parents. This breach of administrative discipline could not be eradicated. It appears that school and other local authorities alike did everything possible for Internat children to stay ‘this side’, as it were, of the town-tundra rift. Tundra being equated – in substantive, but not poetic terms – with alcoholism and general absence from social life and ‘culture’.

Boys from such ‘dysfunctional families’ were ‘very undisciplined’, contemporaries remember, and such things as ‘social work’ could not be expected from them. This indicates a gendered response to the traumas of resettlement. Girls proved to be more resilient under the circumstances. For many, adversity had motivated diligence at school and ambitions for attaining higher education and following professional careers. For the majority of boys, on the other hand, showing merit at school in matters of study and discipline was not ‘interesting’, as the reindeer herders would say today. ‘Our eyes were turned to the tundra (my smotreli v les)’. Such gender-specific disinclination to follow the norms of mainstream Soviet
society may have much to do with a much diminished resilience on the part of Sami men to get integrated into an exclusively urban way of life. The most troubling indicator in this respect can be seen in the observed higher incidence of Sami men-marked suicidal behaviour in early youth and later (Kozlov and Bogoyavlenskiy 2008; Bogoyavlenskiy 1985).

All one could hope for the boys was to keep them at school somehow. The boarding school stretched from the first till the 11th form, in other words, from age 7 to 18. In many respects, therefore, the school resembled an orphanage, taking children from childhood across their eleven formative years to youth.

Literary production: the palimpsest

Antonova’s archive includes a special kind of literary product: the ‘self-made book’ (samodel’naya kniga). The usual substrate for such ‘books’ were old copies of Agitator, the journal of the Central Committee of CPSU, which took as its mission to help hundreds of thousands of voluntary agitprop activists like Antonova in their work.

The self-made book was made by gluing newspaper clippings to the pages of the periodical that provided a ready-made binding as a substrate. The clippings followed one of the obligatory rubrics on life presented in the system of education and Communist upbringing – such as education itself, science and technology, history, ‘brotherly people’s democracies’ (where Bulgaria featured very prominently), culture, etc. The final result was a new book on the chosen rubric constructed as a palimpsest. According to some of the former Red Trackers, the making of the book was collective effort under Antonova’s supervision.

In front of me I have a self-made book from the archive, called ‘Culture of the USSR’ (Kul’turа SSSR). The title was written in ink on a page from the popular journal ‘Ogonek’ (Little Flame), which served as a cover. It was sewn to the main body of pages with a white thread, carefully knotted together in the middle fold of the volume. The original journal providing the substrate was ‘Agitator’ of February 1971.

The clippings covered a wide range of topics: famous theatre and film actors and directors, artists, the world chess champion Tigran Petrosyan, Maxim Gor’k’iy’s short story about the town of Kola61, Maxim Gor’k’iy and Makarenko, Turgenev, Krylov, a Koryak folk ensemble, Mayakovski, Chuvash educator I. Ya. Yakovlev, People’s Actor of the USSR Boris

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61 ‘Na krayu zemli’ (At the end of the Earth), 1930.
Andreev with the Chukchi-Eskimo\textsuperscript{62} ensemble of Magadan Region, sculptors, conductors, famous musicians, children’s writer Sergey Mikhalkov, the Soviet Circus, the performance of the Mári Folkloric Ensemble ‘Mári sem’ in Lovozero, and Honoured Actor of Yakut ASSR Kola Bel’dy. On the clipping about Kola Bel’dy’s performance in Murmansk on 2 April 1972, there was a later handwritten note: ‘He came to Lovozero in August 1987’. The self-made book thus also served as a diary.

The clippings follow, in this way, the usual ‘cultured’ topics of Soviet life, with their strong emphasis on theatre, ballet, opera, music, films, and books. There is a parallel thread, connected with the ‘national’ character of the school – a Soviet euphemism for ‘indigenous’. This, as can be seen from the examples above, tends to be folkloristic, after the well-known Soviet formula for multi-nationality that one could be ‘national in (folkloristic) form’ while ‘socialist in content’. As evident from the list above, special attention was given to visits of various ‘national’ ensembles to Murmansk and even to Lovozero itself.

Towards the end of the eighties the clippings became less numerous. There was one about ‘Mári sem’ when it came to Lovozero on 30 Aug. 1987 and one of unknown date about Pierre Degeyter (1848–1932) who composed the music for the socialist hymn ‘L’Internationale’. The next one was already from 5 Jan. 2003 about Academician Zhores Alferov, Nobel Prize winner, who described the ‘collapse and ruination of the country’ in the 1990s and said to the interviewing journalist that he absolutely refused to call Leningrad by its new-old name Saint Petersburg.

After this clipping we jump to 1 July 2005 when Norwegian Sami singer Mari Boine Persen\textsuperscript{63} visited Lovozero and sang for the opening of the new Sami Radio broadcasting station at the renovated Nationalities Cultural Centre (NKTs). From this point on there are a few more clippings on the Sami indigenous theme and then the self-made book ends. The final twenty pages of ‘Agitator’ had not been pasted over with clippings. Antonova was in her eighties by that time and the trackers themselves in their forties. Some of them had turned to new forms of social work.

Antonova’s self-made book ‘Culture of the USSR’ illustrates well how the indigenous theme was treated before and after the changes of the early 1990s. Those that carried out the transition between the two periods as regards that theme are, by and large, those skilled in the ‘social work’ activities of agitprop times. In accordance with the gendered professional

\textsuperscript{62} I use the ethnonyms as they are given in the texts of the clippings.

\textsuperscript{63} Now known as Mari Boine. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mari_Boine; http://www.mariboine.no/biography.html
divisions of Soviet (and post-Soviet) society, the so-called ‘ideological sphere’ has a strongly female profile in its lower and middle level tiers where there is direct contact with ‘the masses’. Following the general pattern in Soviet Union and now in Russia, men tend to saturate the upper levels, i.e. where ideological messages are produced and sent ‘downwards’ for application. Statistically the Russian Federation has the largest proportion of women in employment in the world and currently ‘73% of the workforce in health, education, social security, science and research, culture, the arts, and physical culture are women.’ (Koval 1995: 20-21).

Much of this happened in the late Soviet era: ‘from 1979 to 1989 there was a 22 percent increase of women employed in fields of primarily intellectual labour’ (ibid).

In the two towns and three villages of Lovozero District participation in what Koval calls ‘fields of intellectual labour’ may have been even higher. Leaving aside the overwhelming presence of women at the lower and middle tiers of administrative work64, in the ‘cultural institutions’ and education the percentage of women is close to one hundred. This includes schools of all levels, crèches, libraries, museums, and cultural centres (‘houses of culture’).

These are the ‘fields’ or ‘spheres’ in which people acquired and honed social work skills in the Soviet period: in classificatory jargon these are the ‘ideological spheres’. As seen in the meeting agendas of the Red Trackers, recruitment into social ideological work began from the youngest grades: the children’s stage of Communist education – that of Oktyabryata, ‘Children of October’. That first stage of Communist upbringing took children from the ages of seven until ten, after which they would become Pioneers, then Komsomol members, and finally – some of them – members of the Communist Party (CPSU). School activities in relation to this political career from oktyabryonok to kommunist, ran in parallel with participation in clubs like The Red Trackers, various amateur art clubs, and sport. Girls would dominate in ideological and cultural activities while boys tended to dominate in sports, especially the activities organised by DOSAAF – the Voluntary Organisation for Assistance of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. In the case of the Lovozero Internat as well as the other local schools, boys’ interests would also be markedly in the direction of tundra activities65. Now, in their fifties and sixties, the onetime boys say of

64 A segment of the workforce pejoratively referred to in current Russian journalism as ‘office plankton’ (ofisnyy plankton). Cf. “pink collar” jobs as used in an Alaskan Inupiat community (Bodenhorn 1990:61).
65 A circle of particular attraction to boys was ‘Yunyy olenevod’ (‘Young Reindeer Herder’) which gave rise to the Professional School in Lovozero – see National Northern Lyceum.
those years: ‘They (the teachers) had a hard time keeping us from running
to the woods (v les)’. ‘Les’, as it was mentioned earlier, is a local way of
referring to the forest-tundra and tundra alike. In an extended meaning it
encompasses all activities at the other end from education and culture –
ﬁshing, reindeer herding, hunting, being expert in tundra skills and ma-
chinery – in short, being an accomplished ‘bush’ ranger.

With the advent of glasnost (publicity) and perestroika (restructuring)
in the mid-1980s, and especially after the disbanding of CPSU and the
Union itself at the end of 1991, ideological and social work sharply
changed scope and direction. From the all-encompassing project that
relied on the volunteer contribution of hundreds of thousands of agitprop
activists, ideological and social work was reduced to activities of various
newly-founded NGOs, the Russian Orthodox Church, a number of other
churches, missions, sects, patriotic and sport organisations.

In the local Lovozero District case the shift to new varieties of ideolog-
ical and social work was most prominent with the sudden appearance of
the Sami people on the public scene. From a muted, if not totally sub-
merged presence during the previous period, Sami indigenous revival
became now an ofﬁcially promoted cause. Lovozero itself was put into the
limelight as the place where the greatest number of Kola Sami lived, a
kind of Kola Sami capital. The mining town of Revda – formerly the
great pride of the District – was pushed back from centre stage, which
coincided with the gradual downward slide of the district’s mining indus-
try.

The ‘Sami revival’ required its own social workers and they naturally
did not come from the ranks of those who had been running ‘to the
woods’ in their school days. For the ﬁrst ten years, Sami ethnopolitical
activism was led and practised exclusively by professional career women
from the ‘ﬁelds of intellectual labour’, in Valentina Koval’s terminology.
More speciﬁcally, the new ethnopolitical elite came from the ﬁelds of
education, culture, and middle level administrative work.66

These career patterns are readily recognized in a place the size of
Lovozero. The topic is sensitive and I shall refrain from using even ﬁcti-
tious names here. A comparison of the texts from the preceding and the
following period indicate how the discursive production emerging from
earlier skills in professional or volunteer ‘ideological work’ were adjusted
to the new times.

For instance, in Antonova’s ‘Culture of the USSR’, there appears a
clipping from March 1969 from an unidentified newspaper, describing a

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66 For a detailed analysis see Øverland and Berg-Nordlie (2012).
concert of ‘people from far corners’ in ‘picturesque national costumes’. The style is stereotypically adorned with ‘ethno-ideological’ clichés:

Yakuts such as reindeer herder S. A. Zverev and veterinary doctor T. I. Doydukov know lots of ancient songs. And they themselves compose new ones. Life on the banks of Vilyuya River has changed – this was what Doydukov sang about, accompanying himself on a home-made violin. Reindeer herder Zverev performed his epic improvisation, glorifying Lenin.

Let us compare this text with what came to be produced when the ideological line changed. The performance in Lovozero of Swedish Sami singer Mari Boine in 2005 was reflected by a local journalist in the following way:

On the stage, accompanied by four musicians, a little woman sang Sami songs for two hours. The songs sounded like sad crying. Enchanting music carried listeners to the skies. Mari Boine, spreading her arms as wings, waves them delicately, and one gets the feeling that one is flying over Lapland... over the tundra where reindeer roam, over rivers and lakes rich in fish, over blossoming glades. (clipping from ‘Lovozerskaya pravda’, unknown date)

It can be seen how the ideological accents have changed. The emphasis on evolutionary progress (‘Life on the banks of Vilyuya River has changed’) under Party leadership (‘... glorifying Lenin’), in its post-Soviet version is replaced by an emphasis on reuniting with the tundra, where ‘reindeer roam’, etc. In other words, the ‘Long Journey’ trope is replaced by the ‘Back to Nature’ one. In all other respects, the texts are similar in the sense of a heightened poetic elation – especially in the second text. The poetic key employed creates an Arcadian image of Lapland, from which all ‘substantive’ information is pruned. The ‘negative sides of life’ in Soviet ideological jargon, the ‘little truth’ of the Brezhnevian one, are cut out. Neither on the banks of the Vilyuya River, nor over Lapland there are such ‘sides of life’ as enforced bachelorship, alcoholism, suicidal behaviour, medieval life-spans, etc. The poetic rendering removes them from view, accentuating an Arcadian fairy-tale life of reindeer happily roaming over blossoming glades. The technique of rendering life ‘poetically’, ‘enchanting’ the listeners/readers, so they felt like ‘flying in the skies’, can be applied to any situation, it is a universally applicable genre, in which only the material objects change. Thus utterly graceless blocks-of-flats, towering in painful dissonance with the surrounding tundra, become ‘many-storied handsome men’ (mnogoetazhny krasavtsy), or ‘(Russian folkloric)
heroes’ (bogatyry). Whether it is about polluting smelters, or nuclear submarines, ‘beautiful words’ are always at hand from a rich repertoire of glamorizing clichés.

The indigenous theme follows these well-trod paths of ideological and social work conventions as ‘mass culture work’ (kul’turno-massovaya rabota) of the previous period. Such canons of conventional discourse would be internalized through ‘social work’ activities, as we have seen, from a very young age. Coloured by intense emotionality, as in the quotation above, they would be considered a naturally female – not to say feminine – domain of expression. The Sami theme thus came to inhabit what was felt to be its natural ‘cultural’ settings – the public venues known as ‘houses of culture’, museums, libraries, amateur art clubs, centres for childrens’ creativity (Doma tvorchestva), childrens’ art schools (Detskie shkoly iskustv), etc.

The men’s stage was different and nowadays I connect it principally with Tsekh Mekhanizatsii (Mekhtsekh), the Mechanical Shop of the Reindeer Herding Farm, as well as the private garages and boat houses (Konstantinov 2009). These are places far removed from ‘cultural’, ideological, or new indigenous talk. ‘Poetic’ uses of language are here considered inappropriate and dangerously effeminate. The Mekhtsekh and garage are about ‘delo’, i.e. ‘substance’, they are discussed in terms of ‘substantive’, not ‘ideological’ talk.

To get into that, however, one needs to go back to the moment when the particular ‘substantive message’ – dominant since the beginning of collectivisation in the late 1920s and till the present day – was born. The principal trope of that message is about personal (private) deer ownership as the keystone of a private-in-the-collective socio-economy, or sovkhoizm. To this I turn in the following chapter.
Chapter 3
Sovkhoizm: The Beginnings

The first period (First Wave) of mass collectivisation can be situated between Stalin’s leading article in Pravda: ‘Year of the Great Breakthrough’ (God velikogo pereloma) of 7 November 1929 (Stalin 1929), and his equally famous ‘Dizzy with success’ (Golovokruzhenie ot uspekhov) of March 1930, again in Pravda (Stalin 1930). The first article set forward the initial phase of mass collectivisation; while the second announced its cessation, criticizing those activists at local levels who had overstepped the mark in terms of excessive haste, coercion, violence, and total collectivisation of property. (Cf. Fitzpatrick 1994; Lewin 2005: 66–73, 1985, 1968; Mitrany 1951)

Those sins of the overeager local collectivisers were dubbed ‘overflexings’ (peregibi), and the ‘overflexers’ (peregibshchiki) were accused of the cardinal sin of ‘left opportunism’. Political historians are unanimous in reading these events as part of Stalin’s effort to remove Trotsky from the political scene, along with members of the ‘left opposition’ at all levels. These events, following an earlier victory over the ‘right opposition’ in 1928, led to a chain reaction of changing administrative leadership and other staff at all levels. As I shall illustrate below, collectivisation in the reindeer herding part of the Kola Peninsula, happened in the context of successive reshufflings of leadership and ‘cadres’ in Murmanskii Okrug 67, and in the corresponding Party structures in Murmansk.

The administrative reshufflings resulting from Stalin’s campaigns to defeat the ‘right opposition’, headed by Bukharin, and the ‘left’ one by Trotsky, undermined local level knowledge about clear courses of action. The situation was left to local ‘cadres’ to figure out to the best of their abilities. The soul-searching, flights of fancy, and unbridled violence, can perhaps best be understood now through reading Andrey Platonov’s novels of the late 1920s (Platonov 2004, 1987). The fanaticism of many local activists and the cruelty of their methods, reminiscent of the excesses of Military Communism in the early 1920s, fed on the chaos amidst which they were

67 See Administrative designations.
sent to perform the mission decreed from above. An epithet often used for states of mind of that period is *sumburnyy*, confused.  

It is in such an atmosphere that early collectivisation was being carried out, and the newly created *collective farms* (*kolkhozy*) were beginning to grapple with the practicalities of agricultural production. In the Kola case, activists were sent to tundra settlements by departments at the *apparat* (Party administration) of *Murmanskiy Okrug*, or their superiors in that of Leningrad Region (*Leningradskaya Oblast*). As a rule, they had little or no idea about local realities, let alone the intricacies of reindeer husbandry. Thus, at the end of the day, they had to consider the option of accepting to a greater or lesser extent what the new kolkhoz members were suggesting as practical courses of action. In the grain producing areas in the central and southern parts of the country tensions escalated more, accompanied by violence on both sides, especially when the activists would stick obstinately to outrageously deficient orders. In the Kola Peninsula more peaceful solutions seem to have been found.

Although eyewitness accounts are scarce when it comes to Kola reindeer husbandry, the following pattern emerges from the available material. The area of greatest tension between grassroots actors, on the one hand, and collectivisation activists, on the other, concerned the degree of *socialisation of property* (*obobshchestvenienie*). That is, whether everything was to be made kolkhoz property, down to harnesses and sleds, along with the deer and other stock, or if there was to be a limit. For the middle and southern regions of the USSR, this story has been subject to extensive discussion (Fitzpatrick 1994; Lewin 1968). What has drawn much less attention is the fact that *compromise solutions* were eventually reached even in those cases when, as Stalin castigated the zealots later, the activists had been overeager to collectivise and had thus ‘run beyond the development of the masses’ (see below). I shall further argue the case that such compromise solutions, as a parallel and less visible line of the process, had been principally initiated by the new kolkhoz members, and – grudgingly or not – accepted by the urban emissaries. The compromises thus revealed the local ‘emic’ understanding of the situation from the point of view of grassroots actors, and how their most critical concerns could be accommodated by it. This becomes vividly clear in the case of Kola reindeer

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68 Cf. Caroline Humphrey's analysis of the situation at a Buryat sovkhoz nearly half a century later: 'because the relations between 'laws' (as ideological interpretations of Marx's political economy-[my gloss], explanations and statutes are confused, and because collective farms themselves in practice extend beyond the rules and in ways unforeseen by them, the kolkhoz in reality only partly makes sense in the terms given for understanding it.' (1998:74)
husbandry. Kola collectivisation, notwithstanding, has been omitted from mainstream collectivisation debate, with the latter’s ‘grain-producing’ bias.

The brief break between the first and second collectivisation phases in the spring months of 1930 appears to be a time of intense hermeneutic activity. Stalin, with his ‘Dizzy with success’ speech of March 1930, had turned against those who had taken too literally his ‘Year of the Great Breakthrough’ programmatic article of the previous November. Castigating the zealots he accused them of ‘departing from Lenin’s principle not to overtake the development of the masses, not to break away from them, but to move together with them and to move them forward, leading them to our slogans, and to help them get convinced by their own experience in the rightness of our slogans.’

It is in this mystifying language that the word from above came and had to be deciphered and translated into concrete action. Cadres along the power chain who made mistakes in this hermeneutic process could face unpleasantly life-changing consequences. The art of correctly reading texts from above, as well as the art of talking in correct Party language when handing them down to ‘the masses’, were highly perfected in the course of the Soviet decades. Jumping ahead to the present, the quest for the correct meaning of a message and its corresponding implications, can be seen as ending up as an ‘ideologically poetic’ use of language – differing from the substantive one – in all communication with superordinate agents, including both home and foreign institutions. In more specific terms, the art lives on, among other domains, in the genre of project proposals to funding agencies. Hitting the ‘right slogan’, in Stalin’s phrasing, the correct reading of the latest twist of the Party line, was a life-saving exercise, and reflexes of the art we may see to this day.

Returning to the dynamics of the first collectivisation years, it has to be said that after ‘Dizzy with success’ and some severe measures against the zealots not a few of them finding themselves in labour camps, the second collectivisation campaign began only a few months after the first. This time it lasted uninterruptedly until completion by 1937–39, when the reduction of the ‘private sector’ in agriculture to a miniscule percentage was finally announced as a great victory.69

Campaigns were thus announced from the pinnacle of political power and handed down in texts of what amounted to God speaking to Moses from a cloud (I would call it ‘cloudspeak’), and were meant for instant implementation. For the entirety of the Soviet period (1917–91), but

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69 By 1937, 93% of rural households had been collectivised, according to official statistics, comprising 99.1% of the total arable land. (BSE II 1953, Vol. 21: 616); Collectivisation.
especially during the Stalinist phase (1928–53), the voice of the empowered was coming in this way down to ‘the masses’ largely through the principal Communist Party newspaper *Pravda*. This voice of power carried awesome authority. The pronouncements, which meant life or death for hundreds of thousands of people, were subsequently interpreted at a succession of descending levels, under the management of the appropriate committees of each administrative or enterprise Party structure. In theory, the exegesis would be fully divulged to each and every man or woman, whether reindeer herders in the tundra, or airmen in stratospheric balloons. In practice, the hermeneutic exercise would face serious difficulties when the channel of communication was obstructed – as, for instance, by the absence of paved roads in much of the reindeer herding part of the Kola Peninsula.

As said above, ‘Dizzy with success’ of March 1930 announced backtracking on the course unleashed the previous autumn. It allowed reorganisation or disbanding of the hastily and brutally rounded up collective farms (*kolkhozy, arteli*). In the central and southern grain-producing regions ‘mass collectivisation’ was resumed the very same year. Kola collectivisers followed suit to the best of their abilities.

Central authorities had officially decreed a slower tempo of collectivisation for the subarctic regions than was prescribed for more southern parts of the Union. Describing this state of affairs, Mayorov notes:

The Party directive, voiced in the decisions of the Decembre (1930) Plenum of the Central Committee of the All Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (*VKP (b)*), was that “not less than half of all peasant households should be collectivised by the end of 1931”. By 10 May 1931 50.4% of peasant households had been collectivised, which was far ahead of time (1931: 22).

The over-eagerness to fulfil directives ahead of time, characterizing local Party and administrative leadership readings of the directives, affected, inevitably, the collectivisation pace in the reindeer herding part of the Kola Peninsula. This was true for both the first and the second phase of the process. Over-eagerness combined with a host of other factors to produce a rather chaotic development. Problems arose from the sharp about turn in the Party line, incompetence, lack of clear operational instructions, and the remoteness and roadlessness which meant stable transport and communication links were lacking during much of the year. All of this led to a confused state of affairs in which kolkhozy were founded, then almost immediately disbanded, and then founded again. The difficulty of presenting a precise account of what happened and when, is evident in the avail-
able regional literature, and reflects this chaotic atmosphere. As we see below, even dating the beginnings is still, more than eighty years after the events, a rather uncertain matter.

Contemporary sources, such as Budovnits (1931) and Bunakov (1934), differ about the exact beginning of the first collectivisation campaign in Murmansk Okrug, or, for short, the ‘first wave’. Budovnits places the beginning of ‘collectivising the households of hired labourers and poor villagers, as well as of middle-income owners’, launched by the ‘Murmansk organisations’, in the spring of 1930 (1931:78–79). Bunakov (1934), on the other hand, talks about first wave kolkhozy in the Kola appearing as early as the spring of 1929. Authoritative regional historians Kiselev and Kiseleva write about the setting up of a reindeer husbandry kolkhoz in the village of Voron’e even earlier, in 1928 (Kiselev and Kiseleva 1987: 68; Kiselev 1972). Some later authors, like Robinson and Kassam, as well as others, follow that dating (2000:14; Gutsol et al. 2007).

Whatever the case, establishing exact dates is far from easy, as the first collectives were short lived. Recent official historiography places the creation of a Sami collective in Lovozero (Lopar*), and a Komi one (Olenevod, subsequently Krasnaya Tundra) – in Kamenka70, subsequently in Krasnaya Shchelya (today’s Krasnoshchel’e), in March 1929. These are said to have lasted ‘only till the spring grazing of the herds’, i.e. till April-May.71 Kiselev and Kiseleva divide early collectivisation into three periods: the first one in 1928–29; the second from late 1929 till the publishing of ‘Dizzy with success’ in March 1930, and then a third one beginning in late 1930 till completion by the end of the decade.72 What is commonly referred to as ‘First Wave’ was thus sub-divided by these authors into two successive winter-long phases – in 1928–29 and 1929–30, respectively, the decisive collectivisation phase beginning with the setting in of the following winter.73

The pace of collectivisation attempts and the order in which events occurred as parts of a top-bottom dialogue is what I find of greater imp-

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70 Other sources mention the peasants of Ivanovka (Chal’mne Varre), Kamenka, and Krasnaya Shchelya as setting up the kolkhoz together (Kiselev and Kiseleva (1987:110); a published undated archival document mentions only Ivanovka (Fedorova 1992). See also Filipchenko (2011).
73 Today’s local institutions have decided to take 8 Feb. 1930 as the official beginning of the collective farm in Lovozero (i.e. Mikhnyak 1990), while the founding of Krasnoshchel’e’s collective is placed in 1929 (Filipchenko 2011: 4).
portance for this discussion. Looking at them from such a vantage point, we need to note that according to central directives, the region of the Kola Peninsula was placed in the Third Collectivisation Zone. Collectivisation there was expected to be accomplished almost a full year later than in the main grain-producing areas – that is, by the end of 1932.

Secondly, despite this general directive, allowing for the Kola a later date of accomplishing collectivisation, the Murmansk Okrug Executive Committee (Murmanskii okruzhnyy ispolnitel’nyy komitet, MOIK) decided not to lag behind other regions, but to begin collectivising at the earliest possible moment. According to the Kola Encyclopedia, on 20 April 1929 the first step was made with MOIK adopting a decree ‘On scheduling measures for organising kolkhozy in the okrug’ (KE, Kollektivizatsiya na Murmane). Whether the 1928 setting up of a short-lived kolkhoz in Voron’e was some sort of a local Voron’e initiative, even ahead of MOIK, I have not been able to establish. In any event, the zeal for fulfilling directives ahead of time in the agricultural sector followed closely the spirit of the breakneck sprint to carry out the First Five Year Plan ahead of time. As we know, that latter was fulfilled in four years and three months, in the period 1929–1932. The ambition of collectivising activists at the local level was, in a similar way, to beat the clock.

The critical consequence of this scramble to be the first in the collectivisation marathon was that local Party and Komsomol activists were trying to ‘get the masses to move’ with very little idea of the day-to-day intricacies of running a reindeer herding farm. As it has been noted in the regional literature, the other main branch of food production in the Kola, indeed the primary one – sea fishing – was following better trodden paths in the sense that fishing had always been done on a collective, that is artel’ basis (Pyatovskiy 1965). In reindeer herding the transformation eventually consisted in a shift from a minimal collective on a household basis to a reindeer herding brigade (Konstantinov 1997; Mayorov 1931: 25–29). As regards the management of an overall collective herd of over a thousand head, the available experience was that of big Komi owners, practicing controlled year-round herding. As we shall see further on, Komi-Nenets methods of reindeer husbandry would have a central role to play from the very beginnings to this day.

Thus the attempt of activists at various local levels to be the first in the collectivisation race led to great confusion, resulting from the lack of clear instructions from higher authorities. Activists sent to the tundra villages did not know what to do about critical issues that immediately sprang up – the extent to which property should be collectivised, whether to have
separate Sami and Komi kolkhozy, or to have them mixed, what to do with the big owners, who wanted to join, and how to distribute earnings.

The Budovnits Report

More about how matters stood on the ground can be learned from Budovnits’ valuable first-hand report ‘The Reindeer Husbandry Collective Farms of the Kola Peninsula’ (1931).

Before turning to this illustrative document, it should be said that Isaak Urilevich Budovnits (1897–1963) was a correspondent of the central press at the time. In his capacity as a journalist sent by leading newspapers, he covered developments on various First Five Year Plan and collectivisation themes on the Kola Peninsula. He covered the emergence and progress of the industrial site of Khibinogorsk (today’s Kirovsk-Apatiti), and the creation of fishing and reindeer husbandry kolkhozy (Cherepnin 1966: 5, 11) It is in connection with such journalistic activities that he came to report on events in Lovozero and Ivanovka (Sami: Chal’mne Varre). Such texts were subsequently put together in the brochure, which I am using here. By the time it was published in 1931, Budovnits had already returned to Moscow, where he continued working at the leading newspapers ‘Krasnaya gazeta’, ‘Pravda’, and ‘Izvestiya’. Budovnits had at one time or another, positions as vice-head of the Leningrad edition of ‘Pravda’, and a similar position in the Moscow department of ‘Krasnaya gazeta’ (ibid.)

Budovnits’ journalistic career illustrates one of the ways in which the dialogue between leadership and grassroot actors was maintained, through correspondents sent to distant localities on fact-finding missions. This career path contained possibilities for journalists to rise to central and highly responsible positions in the mass media, as in this case.

But before that happened, we find Budovnits still fact-finding deep in the roadless Kola tundra, more specifically in the reindeer herding village of Ivanovka (Chal’mne Varre). There, the leaders of the newly founded Kolkhoz Krasnaya Tundra (‘Red Tundra’) had decided to divide the collective income ‘in a manner which played into the hands of the class enemy’ (Budovnits 1931: 62).

What was this manner? The leaders of the young kolkhoz had adopted the practice of paying out sixty per cent of proceeds from the annual meat harvest as salaries to kolkhoz members, while the other forty per cent were relegated to the ‘indivisible kolkhoz fund’, and were thus put into the coffers of the kolkhoz book-keeping department. The ‘class enemy’,
that is, the bigger owners, dubbed by now kulaks, as well as their ‘underlings’ (*podkulachniki*), allegedly used this manner of dealing with profits in order to spread the word that the kolkhoz was nothing more than a way of turning herders into wage labourers, paying out to them only a fraction of what they had really earned. For this reason, the inspection team from MOIK (of whom Budovnits was part) found the decision of the kolkhoz leadership detrimental to the morale of the members of the young collective. They tried to establish how the decision had been taken.

When we turned to the kolkhoz leaders and asked them from where they had arrived at the 60 and 40 per cent division, the representative of the Ivanovka Village Soviet, Comrade Pen’kov, a *25-thousander* and a most active participant in the affairs of the kolkhoz, said that as a basis for distributing the income of the kolkhoz, they had borrowed from the experience of the Commune ‘Kudrov’ of Leningrad Region. … Comrade Pen’kov had read about that in some booklet, which he had been given in Murmansk, before being sent out on his tundra mission. He had not received any other materials or directives about distributing the income of the kolkhoz (Budovnits 1931: 62–63).

Budovnits goes on to define the error committed by Comrade Pen’kov:

Comrade Pen’kov’s error consists in the fact that in respect of such a most critical issue he had relied on fragmentary information found in some booklet and had not been interested enough to learn about the relevant directives of the superior kolkhoz organisations, about the position, in respect of this question of the Party and of the Government. But, on the other hand, this case with Comrade Pen’kov proves that the former leadership of Murmansk Okrug had paid minimal attention to the kolkhoz movement (p.63). 74

We note that in this second part of the guilt-establishing pronouncement, a stone is hurled at the members of the ‘right opposition’ in Murmansk District Executive Committee (*Rayonnyy Ispolnitel’nyy Komitet, RIK*), who had been removed for not being enthusiastic enough about launching the First Collectivisation Wave. Thus Comrade Pen’kov, like many of those who had been sent out to distant localities to implement Stalin’s decree of the autumn of 1929, came to pay for the sins of both the right and left opposition at the Murmansk Okrug level. Lack of enthusiasm by the right oppositionists had left him instructionless, while too much enthusiasm by the left had lured him to the sins of zealotry. Needless to say,

Pen'kov was removed from his post, alongside a number of other members of both Murmansk and Lovozero district leadership, and his further fate is unknown. (*KE, Kollektivizatsiya na Murmane*)

Bunakov (1934:126), as also *Volkov* (1996 [1946], 1940) later, suggest a protracted period of disbanding of the *kolkhozy* of the First Wave, and a belated formation of Second Wave ones. In the central grain-producing regions of the country, the cycle took place between the autumn of 1929 and the following spring, while the disbanding of the First Wave kolkhozy in the Kola was a fact already by the spring of 1929. There followed, according to these authors, a period of ‘slow growth of the socialist sector’ during 1932, a process continuing into 1933. As Bunakov writes, that was due to

> having to rectify during that period [both] the ‘leftist extremes’ and ‘dizziness with success’ which had taken place during the autumn of 1931 and the spring of 1932. These exaggerations consisted principally in complete collectivisation of reindeer, cows, and auxiliary buildings, as well as choosing to set up exclusively kolkhozy while disregarding the option of creating *Companies for Joint Reindeer Herding* (Bunakov 1934: 126).

What Bunakov is saying here raises some doubts about the reliability of Kiselev and Kiseleva’s dating of the First and the Second Wave, quoted earlier on. One may wonder whether 8 Feb. 1930 had not really been only the date of a meeting during which some proclamations for accelerating the pace of collectivisation were made. All one could say with some certainty would be that the ‘rectifying of exaggerations’ may have well gone till 1934, with the time till then being marked by various attempts to adapt to the new system.

The possibility of having longer time for adaptation is to be attributed, as suggested earlier, to the focussed attention of the leadership on solving the question of grain-production in the medium belt and southern regions, that being, after all, the main motive behind collectivisation itself. Since Murmansk Okrug was irrelevant to the grain production problem, the lesser attention given to it translated into more room for devising local implementations, evident in what looks like an uneven unfolding of the collectivisation process.

Against this background we can begin to see how substantive issues concerned the local collectivities, in distinction from the barrage of ideological poetics and the obscure, and often contradictory messages that kept descending from above. This is the juncture, in other words, where we approach the question about how agency from below travelled upwards. To this end it is useful to trace the genealogy of what could be
called the *public-private compromise*. This social arrangement, which is at the heart of much that happened and is still happening in Russia, in the reindeer husbandry case attains visibility which offers considerable insights.

The vivid clarity of the public-private mix in reindeer husbandry can be said to come, in the first place, from the large and often dominant presence reindeer husbandry had for local people. Secondly, it comes from the fact that the essence of the mix – numbers of personal and collective deer, and the manner these two groups were managed – yields easily to numerical representation.

Both qualities were exploited extensively during the Soviet period, revealing the preoccupation of the system with reducing every aspect of human existence to calculable components. In this way the conceptual apparatus with which reindeer husbandry was conceived in the local context, down to the present day, came to be fragmented into easily ‘visible’, calculable units – numbers, yields, degrees of performance of various key operations in percentages and absolute figures. Here are found sizes of meat harvests, percentages of preserved calves, percentages of productive vs. unproductive parts of herds, kilometres of constructed fences, numbers of camps, percentages of their repairs, etc. This is well illustrated in contemporary writings on ‘organisation of labour’ (i.e. Mayorov 1931). It also finds abundant expression in the various forms of the system of *socialist competition* (*sotsialisticheskoe sorevnovanie*), possibly the longest and most extensive project to overcome the inherent economic weaknesses of the Soviet enterprise.

When reflecting on the calculations underpinning the machinery of socialist competition, it is difficult not to see the representation of every aspect of reality in figures and percentages as if it were some board game in which reindeer and humans are shuffled about like pegs. The game is highly selective, and the more embarrassing bits, such as the pronounced alcohol dependence among herders, the enforced bachelorship, the high mortality, etc., are not part of it. We do not hear of Brigade X winning the competition with other brigades by reducing alcohol consumption to Y bottles of vodka per herder/month. Nevertheless, the specific nature of

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75 Such topics used to be publicly discussed in other official contexts, such as, for instance, closed (Party), and open (general) meetings, articles in the local press, *Comrades’ Courts* sessions, etc. Consider the following article in the local newspaper of June 1958: ‘The drinking and idleness of the Head of the Kolhoz, Comrade Kanev, is having a detrimental effect on all branches of the economy. Seeing what the Head is doing, other kolhoz members lapse into drinking too (…). Comrade Kanev has already been seriously reprimanded by the Party (organisation) for drinking and debauchery, but he hasn’t drawn the necessary conclusions. Comrade Kanev is sinking deeper and deeper into the bog of alcoholism. From 11 till
the human-\textit{Rangifer} relationship, as well as the Soviet ethos of calculability, provide a good spring-board for tracing the working of agentive power from the grassroots level upwards. I argue, therefore, that the case of reindeer husbandry holds, in this respect, much greater empirical advantages than more complex, and consequently more difficult to unravel, land use systems.

To get to the heart of the public-private mix, which is the security generating solution I find promoted through local grassroots agency, I need to examine the origins of the phenomenon of private-in-the-collective management in reindeer husbandry. This can be done by looking closely at the events of the initial collectivisation years discussed above, and the way they unfold during subsequent phases, continuing down to the present day.

First divisions: ‘state’ and ‘personal’ deer

A basic division of property in terms of ‘public’ and ‘private’, and the evaluation of these terms in ethical and economic terms, are foundational in Soviet ideology. At the extreme, this ideology called for the total eradication of the ‘private’ as a hindrance to progress – both on ethical and economic grounds.

The denunciation of the ‘private’ was likewise a foundational element of collectivisation at least on a rhetorical level. In actual practice, uncompromising annihilation of the ‘private’ may be connected only with what happened during the short-lived First Wave, and was subsequently the matter of an intense process of negotiation during the interim period till 1934. The following account suggests how things happened:

There was a lot of confusion and uncertainty in the first years of collectivisation. For example, neither in “\textit{Olenvod}”, nor in the region, did anyone know clearly how to account for kolkhoz property. For this reason the poor peasants who entered the kolkhoz decided to divide the reindeer into ‘own’ (\textit{svoikh}), and ‘(belonging to the) state’ (\textit{kazennykh}). These latter, confiscated from local rich owners, they had received as credit. After sale, profits from ‘own’ deer went entirely to the owners, while that from ‘state stock’ was distributed equally among the families of the kolkhoz members (Smalyarchuk 1989).

\begin{flushright}
18 of June he drank nonstop. In connection with all of this, Comrade Kanev’s behavior has been discussed at a Party and at a general meeting of the Kolkhoz’ (Ozerov 1958).
\end{flushright}
What is particularly noteworthy in this account is the fact that directions came from above, but without clear instructions about details of implementation, as was the case for the ill-fated organisational efforts of Comrade Pen’kov. In the confusion and uncertainty the author describes, *ad hoc* decisions had to be made. The division into ‘own’ and ‘state’ deer was, evidently, the first solution to come to mind. Its application, when it came to dividing up proceeds, establishes the formula which in later socialist days acquired axiomatic status. In its Bulgarian variant, as an example of a widespread popular Soviet ethos, it is: ‘Mine is my own, but that of the others is common (property)’ (Bulg. *Moeto si e moe, chuzhoto e obshto*).\(^7^6\)

As we see from the excerpt above, proceeds were divided exactly in this way. This may explain the indignation that welled up in neighbouring Ivanovka where, following the instructions of Comrade Pen’kov’s brochure, proceeds were divided up according to an entirely different set of principles – those of a commune. It is beyond the task of this book to trace the development and eventual liquidation of the commune as a form of pre-Stalinist collectivisation. (But see e.g. Konstantinov 2007; Siegelbaum 1986; Bukharin 1990 [1918]). I shall only note that communes were not established in the reindeer herding part of the Kola Peninsula.

Similar information is contained in the manner in which property was returned after the failure of the First Wave. Again pronouncements came from the skies as ‘cloudspeak’ (‘Dizzy with success’), while a clear plan of implementation was left to local genius. In other words, the implementers sent from town had to formulate some sort of immediate policy and apply it through tense negotiation with the herders. As we have seen, inspection teams, like that of Budovnits, performed the tasks of placing the process on a footing more consistent with what Stalin called ‘our slogans’, and of reprimanding or removing commune-inspired zealots – like Pen’kov. It seems reasonable to surmise that the visiting teams praised the good, according to latest definitions of this category, and punished the bad. Having done this, they must have started the long trek back to Murmansk at the first opportunity reindeer draft transport and weather allowed. Jumping ahead I would add here that this is the practice to this day. Administrators and inspecting teams would not spend more than a day or two in tundra villages. When it comes to visiting herding camps they may only stay a few hours.

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\(^7^6\) In its post-Soviet variant and in reference to the ‘private-public’ formula in a present-day reinterpretation as ‘state-private partnership’ (*gosudarstvennoe-chastnoe partnerstvo*), the following ‘cynical knowledge’ quip is heard: ‘(this is) nationalisation of losses and privatization of profits’ (Bulg. *natsionalizatsiya na zagubata, privatizatsiya na pechalbata*).
Bunakov (1934) provides valuable information about how hastily put together sovkhoz and kolkhoz property was treated in the new situation, arising from the publication of ‘Dizzy with success’. Turning to the events of 1932, Bunakov describes how the heads of deer that had gone into the making of sovkhozy were returned to private owners (edinolichnye khozyaystva, edinolichnyki) and to those of the kolkhozy that remained in operation. He also describes the appearance of the category of personal (private) deer ownership, which was destined to become the lynchpin of the future sovkhoz system:

(…) starting from May 1932 and till the end of that year sovkhozy returned to private owners and to kolkhozy around 2,000 head (of reindeer). Reindeer allotted for private use of kolkhoz members (v chastnoe pol’zovanie kolkhoznikov) came to number around 4,300 head, not taking into account the increase of this herd from the stock of the private sector. (p.126)

The types of property, referred to here are (a) collective (sovkhоз and kolkhoз); (b) private; and (c) private-in-the-collective property, which is here called ‘(property for) private use of kolkhoz members’. The private sector, whose fate was sealed, but continued to exist in a rapidly diminishing form till the end of the decade, had thus produced an offshoot of private ownership within the kolkhoz. That happened in 1930–34, a period marked by intense negotiating about the emerging form of property, leading ultimately to the construction of a public-private compromise.

The new form of private-in-the-collective ownership did not have a single name as yet. In the document referred to above we see it called in at least two ways, reflecting the terminological instability of an emerging category. It is called ‘(property for) private use (of kolkhoz members), chastnoe/edinolichnoe pol’zovanie (kolkhoznikov)’, and also ‘(property for) personal use (of kolkhoz members), lichnoe pol’zovanie (kolkhoznikov)’.

Later the terminology stabilised with the advancing process of collectivisation. By the end of the decade, on the strength of Volkov’s data from his prolonged fieldwork in Lovozero District, it can be said that the term personal use (lichnoe pol’zovanie), and hence personal reindeer (lichnye oleni), were the normal terms (Volkov 1996). Writing about the state of affairs as they were in 1938–40, Volkov says that the upper limit or ‘quota’ (kvota) for personal use was thirty head, but there were herders who had 50, 100, or even 300 head. (ibid.:127) It can be mentioned in pass-

77 The creation of the first reindeer herding sovkhoz – Reindeer Sovkhoz (Olensovkhоз) “Lengostorg” - is dated by Kiselev and Kiseleva to have taken place in the winter of 1929–30 (1987:73). The short-lived existence of this farm was due to poor management and great losses (pp. 73–4; Fedorova 1992).
ing here, that if the quota was surpassed to such an extent in those years, which are now associated with draconian totalitarian control\textsuperscript{78}, one should not be surprised by what is happening today, with the number of reindeer in some private-in-the-collective herds creeping towards the one thousand mark (Chapter 5).

Bunakov (1934) provides evidence about how the category of ‘personal deer’ evolved. According to him, decisions about formulations of ‘personal use’ differed from place to place in the reindeer husbandry part of the okrug and thus a variety of formulations emerged. About Lovozero District he says:

In Lovozero District the following main principle came to be implemented, \textit{formulated by the kolkhoz members themselves} [my italics]. Households \textit{(khozyaystva)} of up to 5 members were allotted 15 head of reindeer. Households above 5 members, got additionally 2 head for each member above 5, etc. (1934: 126)

The same principle of determining the size of the personal stock of reindeer is noted by Kiselev and Kiseleva. According to them the average number of personal reindeer per family was twelve head for the whole Murmansk okrug (1987: 72–3).

The logic behind the whole operation is perhaps best suggested by Budovnits. I have already presented him as an active participant in the collectivisation process, particularly the period after ‘Dizzy With Success’ and the resumption of the collectivisation drive. In his report Budovnits puts a great emphasis on kulaks spreading ‘malicious propaganda’ intended to lure wavering herders to their side. One of the arguments the kulaks had allegedly been using was that poor members of the community, when hired to herd for a kulak, would gradually amass small herds of 80–100 head and thus eventually become well-to-do owners (p.83).

This system was known throughout the reindeer herding ‘universe’ – from Fennoscandia to Chukotka. Its pragmatic rationale is that attaching oneself to a big herd can eventually pull one out of a reindeer-less state, and set him on the road to developing a small new herd. The arrangement usually consisted of attaching oneself to the herd of a prosperous herder, ideally a relative. Receiving heads of deer as payment for work done, gradually allowed one to grow a herd of one’s own. The presence of an

\textsuperscript{78} The short-lived relaxation of the two years before the war (i.e. Lewin 2005:108-9) may have had some influence, but there must have been a previous history. A herd of 300 head gets built up over time, and thus the years of the ‘Great Terror’ which did not bypass reindeer herding Kola (Kiselev 2008a: 96–106; V.K. Alymov 2004; Delo Alymova 1938), must have been also years of accumulation of private-in-the-collective stock.
The second critical element – the advantage of attaching oneself to a herd which is loosely controlled, or not controlled at all – is also presented in Budovnits’ report. Describing a case of wholesale poaching from private herds by kolkhoz members, Budovnits summarizes the moral emerging from the court proceedings. Not surprisingly, the main appeal was for ‘the leadership of the kolkhoz to raise labour discipline among the kolkhoz members’ (p.96). This theme was destined to last till this day, and is revitalized with every poaching scandal. The latest – but by no means the last such appeal, for somehow raising the level of control in the tundra, is dated in my notes from April 2011. In a conference report a local ethnic activist made an appeal for the creation of ‘reindeer police’ which was badly needed for containing poaching on the collective herd (Artieva 2011). It could be said in an aside, that if we take Budovnits’ (1931) presentation of a private-in-the-collective poaching incident as a start, 2011 would mark the 80th anniversary of this rhetorical exercise. The following paragraph gives a good reason for such dating:

The second lesson to be learned from the court proceedings, is to strengthen control over the herds. The proceedings had revealed that the herd grazed somewhere out there (*na otshibe*), totally neglected by the kolkhoz. The herd was thus at the full disposal of the herders and they could do with it what they liked: slaughter, sell, make presents (of deer)... No representatives of the kolkhoz came to the herd, the senior herder did not get any directions from Lovozero. He was left totally to his own devices (Budovnits 1931:96)

Another contemporary, standing again on what may be called the substantive side of discourse, is the Deputy Prosecutor of the Okrug, a person remembered only by his family name – Gorshkov (Fedorova 1992). Describing the state of affairs in Kola First Wave kolkhozy, he says:

> For grazing one of the herds there was appointed a team (*komanda*) of 6 people. (…) A leader of the team had been appointed but nonetheless discipline was low, herders left the herd at will, and deer would run away unattended (how many it was impossible to establish). The herders were busy selling or giving away kolkhoz deer and those deer that had been slaughtered for providing meat to the kolkhoz were poorly stored and dogs damaged the meat, etc. (ibid.)
Such practices were destined to have a long future, reaching down to the present day. Poaching by outsiders (*external poaching*) would be a way to deflect blame for mismanagement and insiders’ taking from the herd (*internal poaching*). The emerging kolkhozy would thus appear to the general public and superordinate institutions as victims of external poaching. The theme would be repeated countless times over the following eight decades. The central points to make, which the herders, ‘left to their own devices’ certainly did, was that under the kolkhoz arrangement one could get attached to a big herd, whose owner was not a private owner, but the state itself. Secondly, very much unlike the typical large-scale private owner (‘kulak’), the state would not guard jealously its herd: there was every reason to believe, as already existing kolkhoz and sovkhoz practice had shown, that it would be very much at the discretion of the herders themselves. That, as Budovnits and Gorshkov pointed out, created previously unimagined opportunities for satisfying private interests.

The court proceedings related by Budovnits told also another, this time unspoken lesson, which the community must have been quick to grasp probably much earlier than did the inspectors sent from Murmansk. The appropriation of over one hundred private head by kolkhoz members had triggered off investigation and eventually sentences of up to ten months of enforced labour (Budovnits 1931). This extreme case and other misdeeds of herders must have provoked the moral indignation of an alarmed community. There were, however, other less-outrageous ways of making use of the ‘state-as-kulak’ herd. This was the ‘private-in-the-collective’ reindeer husbandry arrangement. This construct, stabilizing eventually as ‘deer for personal use’, we have seen emerging by the initiative of grassroots actors. There is no indication in the literature and in the archival documents I have been able to consult, that personal use of deer had arrived as some instruction from okrug or other authorities. The nearest guide must have been analogies to policies on personal ownership in other regions of the Union.

The more specific rubric, under which personal ownership or use of reindeer could fit, seems to be ‘the kolkhoz member’s domestic farm (*kolkhoznii dvor*) in regions of nomadic animal husbandry (*kochevoe*)

79 The theme promises to be never-ending. While a degree of poaching is indeed present, ‘poacher-bashing’ is serving to obscure the nature of the private-in-the-collective, or sovkhoist system very effectively. The fact remains persistently unregistered in public discourse, particularly on the western side of the border. A good example of entirely missing the significance of internal poaching can be found in recent reporting in BarentsObserver (Staalesen 27.03.2013).

zhivotnovodstvo)’ (Ostrovityanov et al. 1954: 360). Such domestic farms in regions

where agriculture is of minimal importance, and animal husbandry is the predominant farming activity, can have for personal ownership (emphasis mine) from 8 to 10 cows, and besides them their young, 100–150 sheep and goats altogether, an unlimited number of poultry, up to 10 horses, from 5 to 8 camels. (ibid.)

We should note here that instead of the politically more correct ‘use’ the authors write ‘ownership’. This may have been a slip of the tongue, or a premonition of a changing Party line, but it seems to me more likely that it reflects the influence of an already stable synonymic usage of the two terms, following established and officially condoned practices.

The system was, thus, quickly gaining stable implementation. Under it, a kolkhoz member had the right to enjoy the use of a herd of personal deer with some upper limit on the number of head. With a kolkhoz herd ‘out there’ and no controlling mechanism applied, while predators and outside (external) poachers were always available as culprits, personal herds could be built up on the analogy with poor hired hands building up a herd within a kulak’s herd, although in the qualitatively different Soviet environment. In the kolkhoz arrangement on the tundra, regulation was extremely liberal because controlling organs rarely reached the tundra, and when they did they were not there long. This allowed the ‘private-in-the-collective’ system to develop in a way that constituted an effective response to the power exercised from above.

The system can thus be seen as founded on providing social security. The mechanism, as shown above, was much enhanced by the an environment of lax control that collectivisation created. Unless under extreme pressure – as for instance in Ukraine during the famine of 1932–33 – the system allowed much leeway in syphoning public resources into the private. This is the reason some call it ‘institutionalised theft’ (Creed 1995: 197f). ‘Theft’ is much resisted in community talk, as is ‘poaching’. As mentioned earlier on, such words are applicable only to cases ‘when people are stealing from one another.’ (Humphrey 1998:136) When it comes to taking from collective property and subsequently selling on the local informal meat market, or using for subsistence, such practices would be generally perceived as acts of sustaining social fairness, provided certain limits are observed. To this point I return further on (p.197f).
Ethnic asymmetries

In the story of collectivisation of Kola reindeer husbandry there exists a certain ethnically marked asymmetry. When Kolkhoz Tundra was being created in the village of Lovozero in the early 1930s, from among fifty-eight households that joined, only three were Sami. (Budovnits 1931:100) The inspection team from Murmansk, of whom the quoted author was part, wondered not a little at this fact, not being able to understand why the most numerous part of the population, and the poorest at that, had chosen to stay away from the kolkhoz. The assumption by collectivisers was that the ‘poor peasant’ (bednyak) would be the great enthusiast in the process, the ‘rich peasant’ (kulak) - its deadly enemy, while the ‘middle-income peasant’ (serednyak) was seen as wavering between these two poles. A fourth role, that of the ‘rich peasant’s underling’ (podkulachnik) was also part of the official categorization. It applied to poor peasants who had let themselves be beguiled by the kulaks and take their side. The victory of collectivisation was felt to be achieved when the wavering middle-income peasants and underlings became convinced that the kolkhoz was the sole correct way forward and applied for kolkhoz membership together with the main mass of poor peasants. The rich peasants, kulaki, were proclaimed incorrigible, declared class enemies, and sentenced to physical liquidation, labour camp, exile, or, in the most lenient cases, as heavily taxed households, stripped of voting rights.

The Komi-Sami disposition in the north-eastern part of the Kola Peninsula turned the neatness of this ideological classification upside down. The Komi of the herding community were, in their majority, its ‘middle’ and well-to-do (kulak) part, but, at the same time, a great part of them eagerly joined the newly established kolkhozy of the First Wave. These were Tundra in the predominantly Sami village of Lovozero, and Olenevod (Krasnaya Shchelya) in the predominantly Komi village of Krasnshchel’e, as well as Krasnaya Tundra in Chal’mne Varre (Ivanovka). (Filipchenko 2011; Mikhnyak 1990) By contrast, the main mass of poor Sami herders showed little enthusiasm for becoming kolkhoz members.

The Murmansk inspecting team came to the conclusion, after talking with Sami people from the village, that the Sami ‘were afraid of the Komi’, ‘had not forgotten wrongs done to them (by the Komi) in the past’81,

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81 This concerns the manner Komi immigrants settled in ancient Sami land, and, especially, the alien mode of husbandry they brought in. It conflicted with existing Sami practices and placed them in an unfavourable position on their own land. See Orekhova (2008); Konakov (1993); Kiselev and Kiseleva (1987); Konakov, Kotov, Rochev (1984); Luk’yanchenko (1971).
and in short, that if there was an opportunity for a separate Sami kolkhoz they would gladly join, but not under the existing circumstances, in which they feared to be put together with Komi households.

The inspectors found such a solution impossible ‘due to political, as well as economic considerations’ (Budovnits 1931: 103). The political considerations were clear. Party directives placed a special insistence on eradicating interethic conflict (in Soviet terms: ‘national enmity’, natsional’nye vrazhdi) throughout the Union. The chapter in which Budovnits discusses this point is called ‘The Kolkhoz shall do away with national enmity’ (Kolkhoz pokonchit s natsional’noi vrazhdoi). The instructions of the inspecting group’s report were, accordingly, in unison with such an agenda. As reported by Budovnits, the Party and Komsomol organisations in Lovozero, as well as the District Executive Committee (RIK), were reprimanded ‘for the absence of any (ideological) work with the most backward and economically the weakest nationality (narodnost’) – the Lapps’ (Budovnits 1931: 100). The recommendations given, before the visitors packed up and went back to Murmansk, were that instead of thinking about nationality-marked attempts for creating a separate ‘Lapp kolkhoz’, local leadership should undertake ‘persistent and systematic ‘explanatory work, razyasnitel’naya rabota’ among the ‘Lapp herders’ (p.103), praising the virtues of ending national enmity. On the strength of this recommendation, the team confidently stated, as expressed in the title, that such enmity would be terminated.

The economic reasons were also highlighted, with the author pointing out the weak state of Sami households in comparison to those of the Komi. A Sami-only kolkhoz was seen as an economically poor proposition. In earlier sections of the booklet, Budovnits points out the contribution of the Izhma Komi, along with the smaller group of Komified Nentsi (he uses the then-common ethnonym samoedi or Samoyed), with whom they had settled on the Peninsula ‘in 1887’82, for the expansive development of reindeer husbandry in pre-revolutionary times. He stresses the influence of the Komi-Nentsi immigrants for the rapid increase of the overall herd in the north-eastern part of the Peninsula, quoting the highest all-time figure of 81,000 head in 1914, just before Russia entered the war.

A similar line was taken by the second author, Bunakov (1934), who was present during the early years of collectivisation of reindeer husband-

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82 For a detailed discussion of this immigration see Konakov (1993); Konakov, Kotov, Rochev (1984); Khomich (1977). There is some disagreement about the year of arrival of the Komi to the Kola Peninsula. Konakov (1993) places it as early as the spring of 1884, while other authors date it in the late 1880s (e.g. Luk’yanchenko (1971: 10–11). Cf. KE (Komi-izhentsy).
ry in the Kola. Talking about the role of the Izhma Komi (his term: *izhentsi*) in pre-revolutionary developments, he stressed the fact that ‘the greatest number of households of a market-capitalist type (*tovarnokapitalisticheskogo tipa*) were to be met among the Komi (*izhentsi*), while the least was among the Sami, formerly *lopari* (Lapps).’ (1934: 123)

According to Soviet Marxist-Leninist evolutionary canon, market-capitalist reindeer husbandry (*tovarnoe olenevodstvo*) was considered a more ‘progressive’ form of economic – and hence social – development than the earlier subsistence-oriented forms (Slezkine 1994a), or what would be called today ‘traditional methods of Sami land use’. Thus, in stressing the market-capitalist orientation of the Komi-Nentsi herders, a strict follower of the Party line such as Bunakov, followed pre-revolutionary authors, a number of whom had been part of the provincial imperial administration. In praising the initiative and economic sense of the ‘more progressive Komi’ in contrast to the ‘backward Lapps’, both Bunakov and Budovnits repeated almost word for word the praise of the Komi immigrating herd- ers given by the Governor of Archangel’sk Province, Engelhardt, who had conducted another inspecting mission from Kandalaksha to the town of Kola some thirty years earlier (Engelhardt 1899). Bunakov and Budovnits join, in this way, a thread of historical opinion favouring the ‘progressive influence of the Komi’, prevalent at the turn of the century. Bunakov’s authority is particularly Rozonov (1903), whose views about Sami reindeer husbandry were that, in fact, the Sami should not be called reindeer herders at all, as first and foremost they were freshwater fishermen. In presenting a summary of the available Sami-related literature of his time, he says, ‘The primary occupation of the Lapps, providing for them means of existence and determining their whole way of life, is fishing, and above all, salmon fishing.’ (1903: 38). And further:

(....) natural conditions in Lapland do not favour the development of reindeer husbandry. To the question whether in the past the Lapps were only reindeer herders and only afterwards had moved to fishing, one has to answer in the negative rather than in the positive. In any case, to call the Lapp a reindeer herder at present is wrong. (1903: 81)

Rozonov thus reflects the general tone of 19th century presentation of Kola resource use. It was primarily thought of as connected with sea fishing and sea-mammal hunting, and only secondarily, mainly among the Sami, Kola resource use included fresh-water fishing. A good idea of how the outside gaze saw Kola land and water use in the period till WWI is given by the issues of the Arkhangel’sk regional journal *Izvestiya Arkhangelskogo Obshchestva izucheniya Russkogo Severa* (*Newsletter of the Arkhan-
gel’sk Society for the Study of the Russian North). Issue after issue is almost totally devoted to fishing along the Murman Coast, with fresh-water fishing and, particularly, reindeer herding, being mentioned only very rarely.⁸³

For this analysis it is important to note the continuity in the literature on Kola reindeer husbandry that connects imperial Russian with Soviet Russian scholarship. In this respect, the influential authority on early Soviet reindeer husbandry, Kertselli, is topical, as his work and writing span across the period in question. (Konstantinov 2007; 2005b) Kertselli was of the opinion, as early as 1919, that Soviet reindeer husbandry in the whole of the Russian reindeer husbandry territory, that is, from the Kola to Chukotka and Kamchatka, should follow along the expansive, suede leather (zamsha), and meat producing husbandry of the Komi-Nenets model, as different from ‘backward’, subsistence land use. In 1919, in a speech before The First Oblast Congress of Animal Husbandry he said:

Of particular importance is Zyrian [Komi] reindeer herding of Arkhangel’sk Province. I am saying Zyrian, because the Zyrians have been the first to give it a pointedly industrial direction by developing in their settlements on the Izhma and Pechora [rivers] extensive production of suede from reindeer hides. (…) Thanks to this production of suede leather, the reindeer herders have acquired an unlimited market for their [reindeer] hides, meat still being a side product, which so far has been realized only on a local level, but in the future canning factories will undoubtedly appear, which will create the possibility for a more effective use of the autumn slaughtering of calves, giving hundreds of thousands of puds⁸⁴ of reindeer meat.’ (Kertselli 1919: 5)

The same author reiterates this position in a 1923 overview of Kola reindeer husbandry (Kertselli 1923).

As Kertselli – and Engel’hardt before him – had asserted, in their opinion Kola reindeer husbandry had been beneficially influenced by Komi-Nenets husbandry methods from the very start, i.e. as soon as they had set foot in the Kola tundra in the 1880’s. By the beginning of the collectivisation decade only a few Sami pogosti (settlements) were still practicing husbandry according to ‘ancient Sami forms’ (Charnoluskiy 1930a: 75). The ethos of collectivisation stressed the expansive, the ‘productive’, the industrial, which had been dominant in Komi husbandry from the very start. Eventually and inevitably, given Soviet preoccupations with large-scale

⁸³ For the ‘fishing vs. reindeer husbandry’ debate see also Øverland and Berg-Nordlie (2012: 40).

⁸⁴ Pud – pood, avoirdupois = 16,38 kg. or 36 lb.
industrial expansion and industrialized agriculture, the Komi-Nentsi system asserted itself as the matrix for Soviet husbandry on the Kola Peninsula. (Luk'yanenko 1971: 32).

For the present analysis it is important to note this synchrony between a reindeer husbandry system brought and practiced in the Kola by the Komi-Nentsi immigrants, and the course Soviet reindeer husbandry eventually took. While, as noted above, the influence in developing an expansive, meat-producing husbandry has been widely mentioned in the literature, the emergence of the private-in-the-collective method – as an integral and most critical part of the historical process – has been ignored. As we have seen, the Komi-Nentsi formed a most active part of early kolkhoz membership. Accounts about the creation of Kolkhoz Tundra in the mainly Sami village of Lovozero reveal a picture in which the members of the foundational meetings in January-February 1930 (Mikhnyak 1990), had been mainly Komi people, who subsequently constituted the leadership of the kolkhoz. The changing of the first name of the kolkhoz Lopar’ (‘Lapp’) to Tundra should be seen in this context as well.

The Komi-Nentsi influence ‘from below’ was evident in a number of aspects of reindeer husbandry methods and techniques, but most of all in their year-round control of the herd, in contrast to Sami summer free-grazing methods. This point is repeated in every presentation on Kola reindeer husbandry in recent historical perspective. There is however much more at stake when we discuss Komi-Sami contrasts. The meat-suede market focus of Komi herding, was attributed by turn-of-the-century historians, as we have seen, to the enterprising spirit of the Komi herders. Later authorities explain this meat-suede leather focus of the Komi system as an importation of practices dictated by the conditions of Bolshezemel’skaya tundra. It positioned reindeer meat and suede production as more or less a single available option for profitable land use. Luk’yanenko, particularly, stresses that the Komi system, originally adopted from Nenets reindeer husbandry and subsequently adapted to the Komi’s own concerns, was ill-suited to the conditions of the Kola Peninsula. (Luk’yanenko 1971:33–4) This is certainly worth considering as the development of the sovkhoz – and especially that of postsovkhоз systems of husbandry – have shown a progressive movement away from tightly-controlled herding and back to a loosely controlled form.

As we shall see below (Chapters 4, 5), both the Sami and the Komi system underwent serious changes over the Soviet and post-Soviet decades, until attaining the present stage where the salient features are entirely different. While it can be said that Sami pre-Komi methods can be still identified, albeit in a highly exaggerated form, the critical distinctive fea-
ture has changed its paradigm. It is no longer determined by some ‘ethno-regional’ characteristic (like ‘Sami’, ‘Komi’, ‘Nentsi’ husbandry), but on the relative degree to which a given regional system applies a private-in-the-collective technological and socioeconomic regime. The Sami pre-Komi seasonally uncontrolled methods of herding (‘free grazing’ in summer months) have now developed to an extreme, encompassing practically the entire year. Dependence on reindeer fences during winter, another of the Sami husbandry distinctive features, has received a new prominence, after a setback during the 1990s. A state of ‘over-extensivity’ (Beach 1981:503), or ‘hyper-extensivity’ (Whitaker 1955: 27) has come to characterise today’s Kola reindeer husbandry (Konstantinov 2010b; 2009). Thus not only have methods come a full circle over the course of, roughly, the last hundred years, but the original Sami methods of uncontrolled (‘free’) grazing have been expanded to a qualitatively new degree of freedom for the reindeer. At this point husbandry gives way to hunting. This, as suggested above, is connected with a paradigmatic shift from ethnic specifics of land use to the much more global socio-economic and political distinctive features of sovkhoizm. In consequence, to discuss characteristics of Kola husbandry in ethnic terms, as some authors would have it (i.e. Gutsol et al. 2007; Jernsletten and Klokov 2002), has become progressively inadequate, with the beginning of collectivisation as a start.

The primary meat- and suede-producing focus which Komi-Nentsi herders brought to the Kola in the 1880s, and which, in its meat part, subsequently went into the making of Soviet reindeer husbandry, has been, as said above, well noted. It, nevertheless, does not enjoy the same popularity as the ‘controlled grazing vs. free summer grazing’ ‘ethnic’ refrain as a principal distinctive feature between ‘Komi-Nentsi’ and ‘Sami’ land use forms. The meat-producing focus tends thus to escape its deserved visibility. The controlled-free contrast, although making a valid distinction up until the early collectivisation years, has served, nevertheless, to disorient analysis of current events. Choosing to take it as a distinctive feature, relevant to the present state of affairs, obscures much more important characteristics, besides its above-noted anachronism after the mid-1930.85 Hence my claim that with the emergence of the private-in-the-collective mode during the first collectivisation years, systems in the entire Russian reindeer husbandry area should be more profitably discussed in terms of a greater or lesser adherence to a private-in-the-collective, or sovkhoist mode, than in ‘traditional’ ethno-regional terms. (Konstantinov 2004) Further down I examine the events around the le-

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85 For a similarly critical view on ‘ethnic’ typologies Vladimirova (2011)
gitimisation of the sovkhoist worldview and the practices through which it came to be instituted.

Ethnicity vs. personal deer ownership

Sami wavering during the first collectivisation years – wavering prompted, among other factors, by fears of finding themselves in a subordinate position to the Komi under the new system, was disregarded by rayon and okrug authorities. The second wave of collectivisation saw, nevertheless, the emergence of ‘Sami-only’ kolkhozy, like, particularly, Dobrovolets (‘Volunteer’) of Voron’e, and Chud’ziavr of the eponymous village. With the liquidation of the Sami tundra villages in the agglomeration campaign of the 1950s–70s (Arkhivnyy otdel 1995: 96–7; Vatonena 1989) these small Sami kolkhozy were transformed into reindeer herding teams (brigadi) of the emerging big Soviet farm Tundra of Lovozero. Resulting from this are the continuing Sami character of the brigades situated to the northwest of Lovozero, or the so-called ‘left side’ (levaya storona) of the grazing range of Tundra; and the predominantly Komi character of the brigades to the northeast of the village. The second reindeer husbandry sovkhoz – (till 1998 Pamyati Lenina (‘In Memory of Lenin’) of Krasnoshchel’e) incorporated the kolkhozy of the liquidated Ivanovka, Ponoy, Varzino, Lumbovka, Gremikha (Ostrovnoy), as well as those of the two other villages that survived agglomeration – Kanevka and Sosnovka. Olenevod came thus to be marked by a dominating Komi presence.

Such reflections on the ‘ethnic’ side of the collectivisation process, as well as on who benefited the most from sovkhoizm, belong to a muted discourse in the overall loosely interrelated collective of the Kola tundra-dependent population. The voices of the reindeer herding Sami and their families tend to be muted by the much louder ideologically poetic ‘Sami talk’. Such muted voices can be heard only in private domestic circles, as local versions of ‘kitchen table talk’ (Caldwell 2004; Ries 1997). They are voices of a ‘silent Sami majority’, forming an ‘invisible group’ in Scheller’s apt phrasing that can be meaningfully extended to include all of the tundra-connected part of the local community.

This is also true for a large part of the Komi as well, and for the many people of mixed origin. While current cooperative leaders and larger-scale owners of personal or private reindeer tend to be Komi, those Komi, as well as people of mixed ethnicity, who do not belong to the leadership and ownership elite, are, in a sense, an even more silent majority than the lower status Sami herders and their families. The outside public may hear
of the unprivileged Sami – mainly by inference from the public Sami-focussed debate – whereas the unprivileged Komi, Nentsi, Pomor, or, as is very common, people of mixed Sami/Komi or Sami/Komi/Ukrainian, or other mixed local-cum-labour migrant origin, tend to fall out of the picture entirely. This suggests, in the first instance, that in the local ethnic composition, characterised by a high degree of arbitrariness and mixing, ethnically based categorial distinctions have to be approached with extreme care. The factor of much greater relevance on the tundra-connected side of local affairs is how one stands in respect of personal (‘private’) deer ownership. This, in its turn, requires a careful look at the way this category of ownership emerged and formed subsequent hierarchies of brigade-rank-cum-personal deer ownership. This takes us back to very first steps of the newly-created reindeer herding kolkhozy.

A feature of salience in respect of the tense ‘conversation with power’ during the first collectivisation years was that the allotting of ‘deer for personal use’ to kolkhoz members came as an initiative promoted ‘from below’. The initiative, spontaneously born – and as I tried to show earlier, a reinterpretation of existing ‘big herd/small herd’ relationships – was assisted in reaching fruition by the lack of clear guidelines in the first years of collectivisation. That lack, amid the chaos of the First Wave sprint, led to the only possible remedy: reinterpreting and enhancing existing social and economic security strategies.

The kolkhoz offered opportunities of this kind, but under a more extensive (in terms of herd size), and liberal regime. With a much bigger resource base, virtually extending to that of the state itself, the kolkhoz (and later the sovkhoz) exercised lax administrative control over what happened in the tundra, and the way the collective herd was being used. This new arrangement thus offered possibilities qualitatively much greater than those of the old.

Embedding the private into the collective

By 1934, when nation-wide collectivisation entered into its decisive phase, its Second Wave, the operation of embedding the private into the collective received its official inauguration. Two aspects of the situation are of special importance: (i) the temporality of the full ‘down-up-down’ dialogic cycle between empowered and powerless, and (ii) the metonymical relation between a generalized private-in-the-collective social order, and
its local ‘exotic’ representation, such as the private-in-the-collective reindeer herd. These two aspects shall be briefly discussed below.86

(i) By temporal dynamic of the full down-up-down dialogic cycle I mean the overall ‘conversation-with-power’ mega-event. In other words, this involves the full realisation of the speech event. The two generalised interlocutors are grassroots actors, at the one end, and the pinnacle of the power pyramid, at the other. The period includes the first collectivisation years of Kola reindeer husbandry.

This context gives us a rare chance to follow the discursive process in minute detail. As we have already seen from the texts of direct participants in the collectivisation drives, namely Budovnits (1931) and Bunakov (1934), supported also by accounts like that of Fedorova (1992), and Smalyarchuk (1989), the private-in-the-collective idea took shape from the very start – as early as the creation of the first short-lived reindeer husbandry kolkhozy in March 1929.

At the other chronological end of the discursive channel pronouncements were made some five to six years later. The prelude to the official inauguration of the private-in-the-collective arrangement, in its reference to agriculture, may be considered to have been Stalin’s speech at the 17th Party Congress in January-February 1934 (Aleksandrov et al. 1950: 143). The more specific implementation of the private-in-the-collective follows decisions of the Second Congress of Outstanding Kolkhoz Members in February 1935, announcing that kolkhoz members would be allowed to make use of personal property (personal plots and stock) for subsistence and trading needs. (Fitzpatrick 1994:117–27; Mitrany 1951:76f) In this way the ‘private-in-the-collective’ dialogue, between grassroots actors and the pinnacle of the power pyramid took some six years to accomplish, if we take as a beginning the decisions and practices of early kolkhoz members in the spring of 1929.

When discussing such ‘mega-speech events’, or ‘mega dialogues’ it is important to note that the disempowered did not speak directly to the ultimate interlocutor, i.e. Stalin himself, members of the Central Committee, or other high standing officials. Such approaches can be found in the long tradition of petitioning directly to the Tsar (chelobit’e, lit. brow beating), or, in Soviet propaganda broadcasts or films about Stalin talking with Stakhanovites, dairy-maids, or Polar airmen. What I am interested in is another, much more critical, but publicly invisible dialogue, in which interlocutors in power seek the most substantial pieces of information.

86 The topic has been introduced in previous publications (i.e. Konstantinov 2004).
coming ‘from below’, straining thus to hear the proverbial ‘voice of the people’.

David Mitrany’s (1951) careful analysis of the situation suggests that Stalin took the position ‘that personal domestic interests of the peasants had to be reconciled with the collective, social interests’: Mitrany did not feel this was a matter of choice by those in power. The risk of putting all land under state management, without leaving a small part for personal use, was deemed too great by the leadership, and Stalin himself, after the disasters of the famine of 1932–33, and amid fears of being surrounded, invaded and drawn into a war for which the Soviet Union was not ready (1951: 64–87). Moreover, Mitrany speaks of the increasing importance for power holders of maintaining a long-term dialogue, in which the voice of the disempowered interlocutor is becoming progressively louder. In his words: ‘whatever field of Soviet policy you examine, the specific weight of the peasant interest, since the collectivisation, has increased.’ (1951: 85)

In his speech at the 17th Congress Stalin was very explicit about the necessity to combine personal with collective interests in the making of the kolkhoz as a viable agricultural enterprise. Indeed, his proclamation of the victory of collectivisation claimed that it had derived directly from achieving a personal-collective arrangement, as the only ‘correct’ form under the ‘current conditions’:

Now all agree that the artel87 is under the current conditions the only right form for the kolkhoz movement. And this is quite understandable: (a) the artel’ rightly combines personal, domestic interests (bytovye interesy) of the kolkhoz members with their social interests (obshchestvennye interesy), and (b) the artel’ successfully adapts personal, domestic interests to social interests, making it easier to educate the private individual owners (edinolychniki) of yesterday in the spirit of collectivism.’ (BSE II 1950, Vol. 3: 125)

(ii) The plot-herd relation In national terms, the private-in-the-collective as a permanent characteristic of Soviet society since the ‘revolution from above’ of the late 1920s, was most widely established in the metonymic form of the ‘personal plot’ under its various designations: lichnoe podsobnoe khozyaystvo (personal auxiliary farm); priusadbeny uchastok (farm-house adjoining plot); kolkhoznyy dvor (kolkhoz member’s garden plot).88 The ceremonial inauguration of the personal plot was made, as said, at the Second Congress of Outstanding Kolkhoz Members in February 1935. An integral part of the arrangement was the right to

87 Artel’ and kolkhoz are used synonymously in this context, see Artel’.
sell surplus produce from the personal plot on a ‘free’ or so-called ‘kolkhoz market’.

This ‘free trading’ had been already institutionalized into the system of Soviet trade, becoming legitimate in the USSR from 1932 onwards. The system allowed three highly asymmetrical in size forms of trade. The overwhelming part was state trade (gosudarstvennaya torgovlya), rigidly centrally administered. At a lower, but still centrally managed position stood co-op trade (kooperativnaya torgovlya), while a small part of the trade sector was allotted to kolkhoz-market trade (kolkhozno-bazarnaya, or kolkhozno-rynochnaya torgovlya). This latter was realized on the so-called ‘unorganised market’ (neorganizovannyy rynok), which, as different from the ‘organised’, i.e. the state managed one, ‘was not directly subjected to the system of centralised state planning’, and in it ‘the prices of goods were determined in accordance with supply and demand’ (BSE II 1954, Vol.29: 433–4). This latter market was to play a decisive role during the Patriotic War (1941–45). Of necessity, this important topic, as well as the significant role the ‘free market’ played before the demise of the Union89, will have to be left out of this discussion.

The existence of such a free market in the overall economic and ideological structure created by mass collectivisation was, on the surface of things, ideologically incongruous. As mentioned before (p.16), it led some contemporary analysts to call the overall compromise ‘the kolkhoz NEP’ (Maslov 1937). Trotsky proclaimed the compromise as part of the ‘betrayal of the revolution’ by Stalin. Writing in exile, he described the situation by 1936 in the following way:

(... the state has found itself forced [my emphasis] to revive individual peasant farms on special minute plots with their cows, pigs, sheep, poultry, etc. In return for impeding socialisation and for limiting collectivisation, the peasant has agreed peacefully, albeit not very industriously, to work in the kolkhozy, which offer him the opportunity to perform his duties to the state, while enjoying a share for his own use.’ (Trotsky 1936: 84)

Trotsky emphasises the fact that the state was forced to compromise, thus suggesting that Stalin had to heed to the opinion of the powerless and their suggestions for a mutually acceptable arrangement. This is an opinion that unites Trotsky with other social historians of the time, representing a variety of views, such as the mentioned Maslov (1937), and Mitrany (1951), as also Schlesinger (1950), to note the more prominent names. Secondly, the same opinion runs like a red line through the work of im-

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89 For a rare account of a Soviet time trader on the free market see Panikin (2000).
portant analysts, who have discussed the urban side of this development. Vera Dunham called it ‘Stalin’s Big Deal’ with the Soviet ‘middle class’ (Dunham 1990: 3ff; cf. also Fitzpatrick 1988, 1979). In an earlier metaphor it was discussed by Timasheff (1946) as ‘The Great Retreat’\footnote{On Timasheff’s ‘The Great Retreat’ see Lenoe (2004).}. It is to be noted also that in subsequent work Fitzpatrick makes the connection between the ‘urban’ and the ‘rural’ parts of the compromise (1994: 117–27). Thirdly, the red line extends to Brezhnev’s ‘mature socialism’, as in Millar’s ‘Little Deal’ analysis (1988), and can be traced to contemporary Russian analysts such as Dubin (2011).

As subsequent events have proved, the Stalinist political line exhibited uncanny pragmatic genius by adopting the private-in-the-collective line as a permanent direction. It can be read against the background of the backlash against early Bolshevism, and the restoration of middle-class values in Stalinist Soviet society. The strategy was ideologically explained away as answering the exigencies of the moment, but eventually, when ‘consciousness would be higher’, as a recurrent cliché of the period claimed, only the collective dimension of the private-in-the-collective would remain. Such a day never came, however, and the \textit{modus operandi} remained ‘remarkably constant’, as Caroline Humphrey rightly observes (1983: 1).\footnote{See also Ssorin-Chaikov’s treatment of the same topic as ‘Poetics of Unfinished Construction’ (2003:110–140).} Moreover, I claim in this book that it has remained remarkably constant to this day, that is, in post-Soviet conditions as well, when ‘private’ and ‘collective’ were to have been sharply separated by applying market-based economic principles, and when collective forms of property should have become independent cooperatives. The longevity and persistence of the private-in-the-collective arrangement bespeak deeper mechanisms at work beneath what we observe as surface technologies: the manoeuvrings of Soviet and post-Soviet elites in their search for power and legitimacy. I try to provide glimpses of these mechanisms in this text by examining the up-down-up ‘conversation’ in which the compromise was born.

\section*{Deferral of risk: freedom for security}

At its most general, the substantive content of the conversation can be defined as a consensual arrangement for deferral of risk. Or, as Hugh Beach puts it: ‘The sovkhoz organisational structure provides herders with a basic income \textit{security} [emphasis mine] independent of their personal “reindeer luck”’. (Beach 1992:141)
In other words, whatever personal losses could occur – as a result of predator attacks, disease, and increasingly in later times – of poaching, one had a big cooperative herd to provide compensation, and thus a herder could be relatively immune to the vagaries of fate. In exchange for this acquired sense of security, one paid with individual freedom: one was no longer a private owner, but a worker in a cooperative, an employee. Extending the reindeer husbandry example to the entire Soviet social experiment, one can argue that the formula ‘freedom for security’ was fundamental program and carries a strong legacy to this day. It captures also the essence of the compromise between power and grassroots actors.

From the point of view of the disempowered, security was seen in terms of modest well-being and existence; for the empowered it was seen as an indefinite prolongation of the status quo. The security generated by the compromise, from the vantage point of its grassroots application, was based on private ownership existing in parasitic relationship to the collective, and the arrangement was paid for by the state economy, which is to say, by the people as a whole.

Looked at from this angle, the system begins to resemble the generation of security in the sel’skiy mir (village community) arrangement through the institutions of shared responsibility (krugovaya poruka), and the method of rotating landholdings. (Kingston-Mann and Mixter 1991) In the latter scheme, a family did not have a plot of land of their own, for each spring the village elders could give them a different plot, but they could always rely on having one for a year-long term of personal use. The arrangement functioned as a communal security shield, in which there was a guarantee against hunger. Security was paid, under this arrangement, by low economic efficiency. Not knowing what plot of land one would cultivate the following year, there was no incentive for improving the quality of the current plot. In the Soviet reinterpretation of the arrangement, central agencies at the top of the power pyramid can be seen as the institute of ‘elders’ moving about plots and people on a country-wide scale. The economic efficiency of the system is low, but basic security is ensured. Without overstraining the analogy, and heeding voices of caution (Dallin 1988), the world-view is still shared by the toilers of the land that security is the ultimate virtue and any measures applied in its name, even the most violent, would be accepted.

Much of the difficulty penetrating the mists surrounding collectivisation and subsequent periods is that surface expressions of the power-powerless dialogue, accompanied by violent coercion, tend to hide from view the existence of such a dialogue or suggest the impossibility of such a dialogue. Especially in the Far North and among the numerically small


indigenous peoples like the Kola Sami, it is easy to accept as self-evident that there was extreme victimisation of a small, defenceless population by a powerful state force, driven by an extreme and uncompromising ideology and a paranoid dictator. The reading of the local Kola scene is then one in which the reindeer husbandry community, seen primarily as Sami, had only the role of passive victims (i.e. Robinson and Kassam 2000).

Such impoverished readings of collectivisation and later events cannot explain the stubborn dominance sovkhoizm enjoys to this day. The picture of an ‘all-powerful state inexorably imposing its harsh will on its subjects’, rightly ridiculed by Katherine Verdery (1996:20), informs an understanding of events with grassroots and power holders occupying different planets with no possibility of meaningful communication. What such an understanding of past and current events misses, therefore, is the essentially dialogic nature of the process, in which voices from below did and do matter. This part of the discursive process tends to be largely ignored, in the worst case – not even considered as a valid proposition. Certain constraints of the mega-speech event help in this.

For one thing the interlocutors at the extreme ends are not directly connected in any kind of a face-to-face exchange. They are instead separated by a long chain of mediators skilled in the art of producing ideological poetic texts. As I have argued in the previous chapter, in reference to Lovozero District this kind of production performed an almost seamless transition from an agitprop version of presenting ‘reality’ to one premised on borrowed revivalism of indigenous ‘traditions’.

Insofar as substantive texts are concerned, I have tried to show in this chapter that beginning with Stalin’s ‘revolution from above’ in the late 1920s, they have stabilized around the centrality of a ‘private-in-the-collective’ formula. The realization of this formula as a social security generating mechanism has been part of a traumatic, tragic process, in which, nonetheless, a prolonged speech event took place. In it pronouncement and practices at grassroots level were mediated through a long chain of responsible officials, apparatchiki, or, as in the case of Budovnits, responsible journalists as well, which was virtually the same thing. Dictatorial genius consisted in capturing a dominant grassroots wish with a subsequent translation of it into directives for implementation. This did not mean, however, that commands from above would be unreservedly welcomed. Perceptions of what is wanted and how it is granted may vary even to the point that a beneficial arrangement may turn into violence and death. The case of mass collectivisation fully exhibited this feature of the mega-speech event.
At the same time mass collectivisation displays how at a grassroots level, the essence of the dialogue could be grasped with impressive speed. This can be understood as finding behind the veils of descending slogans the potential for a novel and enhanced security-building arrangement with power. In the case of Kola reindeer husbandry, there is evidence for the establishment of a very quick understanding of this meaning before its essentials had been proclaimed as adopted into the Party line. This reflects points of contact between the local husbandry ethos and crucial aspects of Stalin’s ‘revolution from above’. It explains also why the tragedies of mass collectivisation consistently hold a relatively low profile in community memory. The crucial point, which leads to durability in memory, can be argued to be the wish to wipe out insecurity through what was quickly perceived to be a likely arrangement. With time, and especially with the removal of terror as part of the way power spoke to the ‘masses’, the ‘mature kolkhoz/sovkhoz’ period became what stands out now as ‘(the) prime reference point’ (Humphrey 2002:13). From the present perspective, community memory holds as images of the ‘good life’ the relaxed, non-violent state of the system, i.e. its existence from the late 1950s on. In the next chapter I describe the basic features of that period.
Chapter 4
Mature Sovkhoizm

Industrialisation and ‘de-ruralisation’

An important clue to the dominant poetic trope of the ‘developed socialism’ period is given in Ushakov and Dashchinskiy’s ‘Lovozero’ (1988). It basically derives from the Marxian concept of the leading mission of the working class in social progress that informed the general doctrine of the Soviet state (Anthony 1977: 192).

According to this doctrinal position, the transformation of Lovozero District economy from ‘agricultural’ (i.e. predominantly a reindeer husbandry one) to industrial, was celebrated as a glorious leap up the evolutionary ladder. Inspired by the opening vistas of new development, Ushakov and Dashchinskiy describe with pride the increasing presence of industrial and construction workers in the demography of the district. By the late 1980s this blue-collar population, together with those employed in urban administrative and infrastructural services, had come to dominate over the thinning part of employees in reindeer husbandry and the more strictly agricultural sectors: dairy farming and cultivation of fodder crops. The main formative factor in the local economy had become the industrial might of the mining-processing complexes in Revda. Their economic weight was announced to have risen many times over that of income coming from ‘agricultural activities’ (Ushakov and Dashchinskiy 1988: 170-175).

The same emphasis on industrialisation and urbanisation as a great leap forward for the district was present in the other paean of Soviet times – that of Kiselev and Kiseleva (1987 [1979]), mentioned before.

The two books: Kiselev and Kiseleva’s ‘The Soviet Sami’, and Ushakov and Dashchinskiy’s ‘Lovozero’ deserve thus special attention. For a long time they remained the standard regional texts acquainting outsiders with the local situation according to the canons of Soviet agitprop poetics. A
central trope in both volumes is evolutionary progress from rural backwardness to industrial might, or Slezkine’s ‘Long Journey’, mentioned before. Both ‘The Soviet Sami’ and ‘Lovozero’ describe the ‘Long Journey’ to progress as one beginning from a dark and primitive tundra turf-hut and leading through many adventures, tragedies, and heroic feats to the blocks of flats of Lovozero and Revda, and their mining and processing complexes – these pinnacles of evolutionary success.

To get the full flavour of this movement from a ‘tundra-past’ chronotope – through the 1917 October revolution, the Civil War, collectivisation, the Patriotic War, to the ‘town-present’ of the 1980s – I turn attention further down to the chapter headings of the two agitprop classics.

This I find instructive for a second and very important reason. As it has been shown in Chapter 2, in connection with Antonova’s palimpsest ‘Culture of the USSR’, the ideological poetics of the 1970s–80s was almost seamlessly succeeded by the indigenous revivalist discourse that came with the leadership of the Boris Yeltsin-led ‘westernisers’ of the early 1990s (Tsygankov 2010). As a replacement of one master trope by another, it imposed an interval of bewilderment, as suggested by the break in Antonova’s text, separating the article on L’Internationale (5.01.2003), from Norwegian Sami singer Mari Boine’s performance in Lovozero (1.07.2005). The interval encompasses the entirety of the Yeltsin period in this particular case, and even exceeds it. A reason for this can be seen in the radical quality of the shift for the former leader of the Red Trackers. For many of those, whose whole active working life had passed in promotion of Communist ideals as a matter of conviction (as contemporaries claim that Antonova’s case had been), the step from an old to new ideology was like jumping over abyss. I know a case of a former military officer in Bulgaria, a Communist Party Vice-Commander92 of an army regiment. After the changes of November 1989, in which long-serving Party leader Todor Zhivkov was removed from his post as the country’s ruler (1956–1989) and ‘democracy’ came, that political officer lost his faculty of reading and writing. With immense effort – he was over fifty at the time – he learned the alphabet and literacy anew, and, simultaneously, became a fervent member of the newly emerged Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) – the new party of democratic and ‘capitalist’ ideology. The case highlights also the fact that if one has learned to live ‘in ideology’, with the stable referential pillar it provides, life ‘without ideology’ is unbearable

92 The post was officially known as Vice-Commander of Political Affairs (Bulg. zamestnik komandir po politicheskata chast, abbr. ZKPCb).
and a replacement has to be found in case former convictions have been smashed.

At the same time, the jumping over the chasm between ‘socialist’ and ‘capitalist’ ideologies presented little difficulty for many of those, well trained in former creation and application of the poetic, and not much troubled with substantive contents. The case of swift recycling of former Komsomol leaders to current business ones is by now a by-word in the literature (Dubin 2011). I mentioned above a case of a transition from Komsomol to European Council (p.86), by far not the only one in recent Bulgarian history. Less is known, however, about the post-Soviet trajectories of former agitprop workers. Assuming that such trajectories may have also formed a pattern, the Kola case points in the direction of assuming leadership in the new ‘social work’ – that of NGO activities.

In the indigenous sector of such activities, the swift and sharp change of ideological direction raised a serious problem: the perception of the tundra as a desirable destination had become, by the 1990s, a poor choice in substantive terms. There was a painful search for a new set of optimistic clichés, but revivalist discourse could only offer vague suggestions about taking the road to the tundra and private reindeer husbandry. The neat stereotypes of the agitprop version of a historical progression from despondency to bliss presented difficulties when a new ideological poetics had to be translated convincingly in a way that made everyday sense. I have shown above how, in Soviet times, the substantive message ‘security for freedom’ was poetically rendered as ‘from darkness to light’ (the ‘Long Journey trope). Under the new conditions ‘security for freedom’ remained as a dominant substantive core. A new one, to fit ‘Back to Nature (and indegeneity)’ poetics, refused to appear.

I now turn to the ‘Long Journey’ phraseology in the regional lore classics of the Soviet period, devoted to the Lovozero District and the indigenous theme. In Kiselev and Kiseleva’s ‘The Soviet Sami’ (1987), the chapter headings mark evolutionary progress in the following manner:


In the other classic – Ushakov and Dashchinskiy’s ‘Lovozero’ (1988) the chapters are twice as many, so I cite below the titles of only the last six: ‘13. Towards knowledge, towards light; 14. On the front and in the rear;

It is interesting to note the versatility of the cliché: ‘Towards knowledge and light’ (with the variant ‘Towards knowledge, towards light, K znaniyam, k svetu’). In ‘The Soviet Sami’ the phrase heads the chapter describing the period of postwar industrialisation and urbanisation in Lovozero District, i.e. the 1960s–80s. In ‘Lovozero’, however, it refers to a period some thirty years before that: the Cultural Revolution of the late 1920s–30s. This attaching of a set phrase to a variety of contents illustrates how the generalized clichés of this poetic canon had acquired the quality of multifunctional rubber stamps. This would be achieved after filing away and sandpapering even the tiniest protrusions of the substance below, so that any jarring note to the sensitive – oversensitive – ideological ear would be deleted. The ideological products received smooth or ‘streamlined’ forms, ‘obtekaemye formy’, in current Russian journalistic jargon. The operation of streamlining made the texts suitable for public presentations such as those quoted above, as well as for popular journalism, literature, films, Party meeting reports, etc.

The exact way of streamlining texts may be illustrated by comparing chapter headings between the 1979 and 1987 editions of ‘The Soviet Sami’. The 1979 edition had nine chapters, the 1987 – ten. From one set to the other all headings had remained the same, until we get to Chapter 7. In the earlier edition it had been ‘Problems of reindeer husbandry’, eight years later it became ‘Reindeer husbandry in the postwar years (1946–1970)’. In other words, substantive protrusions (‘problems’) had been filed away. Another change was that a new chapter had been added – ‘New vistas’ – covering the period from 1970 till the mid-1980s. The growth of industrialisation during that period of the last three five-year plans in Soviet history had thus received greater prominence. By 1987 the final chapter – ‘The Sami abroad’ of the older edition – had acquired a more innocuous and generalized form: ‘For peace and friendship’. It had thus avoided the overmuch use of the ethnonym ‘Sami’ (an ideologically jarring note as it signals too much ‘national form’ and not enough ‘socialist content’), as well as the word ‘abroad’ with its irritating mention of the capitalist west in other than negative light.

As noted above, the two thin volumes remained the principal Soviet propaganda texts about Lovozero District for several decades. They can be considered the official agitprop versions on the theme. The contents of

both books deserve an analysis in their own right – one can learn a lot about the art of streamlining and glamorizing as part and parcel of Soviet agitprop tradition. The lives of the leading authors are no less interesting as they came to be the two venerated patriarchs of Murmansk regional studies (kraevedenie) with its seat at the former Murmansk Pedagogical Institute (present day Murmansk State Humanities University). This part of the story has to be left, however, for another study.

I turn instead to the poetic glorification of reindeer husbandry as it sank under the growing weight of the district industrial sector, which was the most significant development of the postwar period. The following paragraph from ‘The Soviet Sami’ illustrates the pathos of the time:

The rich world of our times has entered the lives of the Sami – with its problems, impetuosity, speed, automatization, mechanization, and urbanisation. In Lovozero District there appeared a local working class – miners, ore-processors, builders, road constructors. Hundreds of people are employed in residential maintenance services, at the shops of the industrial complex, in road building and maintenance. Suffice it to say that in the space of only three years (1976-1978) the citizens of Lovozero District had acquired 182 [private] cars. (Kiselev and Kiseleva 1979: 126)

Today’s readers may be surprised somewhat at this last mention of 182 cars in three years, unless, of course, they be aware of what it meant to acquire a private car in those days. The price was the lesser concern; the principal one was that the prospective owner had to wait for years. In some cases – for instance when one was put on the waiting list for the prestigious ‘Volga’ limousine – one could wait for over ten years after paying the initial instalment. An average of sixty private cars a year for far flung Lovozero District signified that its urban part had become a really bustling place, with some importance in the overstretched regional supply system. The authors justifiably assumed that the contemporary reader would be awed by the figure mentioned, bespeaking the heights of urbanisation the Sami people had reached.

The more general meaning underlying this poetic passage was that thanks to Revda and its mining and processing complexes, Lovozero had emerged from its tundra-bound existence to become part of a modern urban Lovozero/Revda complex, whose main source of income was industry.

The name of the industrial giant: ‘Lovozerskiy GOK’ (Lovozero Mining-Processing Complex) – deserves a brief pause here. The idea behind the name was that it was an outstanding feature of the district, hence translating as ‘Lovozero (District) MPC’. It promoted, in this way, an association
with Lovozero itself, rather than the District. This little naming trick ele-
vated the district centre from a ‘rural-reindeer herding’ to an ‘urban-
industrial’ status, while Revda was discreetly left in the background.

There are numerous such foregroundings and maskings in local sym-
bolism. The one noted above foregrounds Lovozero and veils Revda. The
ideological poetic logic of the operation was to make Lovozero emblemat-
ic of the evolutionary success of an ethnic minority which Party and Gov-
ernment had propelled from a backward place to the pinnacle of industrial
modernity.

Foregrounding the leap from primitiveness to industrial might which
presumably only Soviet power was able to perform is also reflected in the
clichés used in chapter titles by the two kraevedenie patriarchs and their
co-authors. In ‘The Soviet Sami’ we find forward and upward movement:
‘From the depth of centuries’ – ‘Towards knowledge and light’. In
‘Lovozero’ it is from ‘Lovozero in the depth of antiquity’ to ‘Sun over the
tundra’. Two main propellants are responsible for these leaps: the advent
of Soviet power, portrayed as the greatest blessing for the people of the
tundra, followed, after a tense but glorious period, by industrialisation
bringing the sun to shine on them.

Other veiled presences: bureaucracies

The logic of the narrative, in which the main protagonists are the soldier
and the worker, has the bureaucrat either as a figure discreetly removed
from a centre-stage position, or vilified for obstructing progress. The
poetic use of vilification falls outside the scope of the present discussion
(but see Fitzpatrick 2005). What is of immediate relevance concerns the
currently all-important ‘budget-sphere’: all the offices and services, which
depend on the state budget for their existence. This aspect of the local
situation, leading by now to the almost fully subsidized status of the dis-
trict, deserves attention.

The ‘budget sphere’ includes a great variety of social services. Some –
such as education, health, child care, cultural, recreational, sports, and
maintenance services – have traditionally occupied much more front stage
positions than office bureaucracies. In the agitprop texts, discussed above,
the urban maintenance services were mentioned in their role of increasing
the working class population of the district. That meant the upkeep of the
central heating system (TEKOS), the electricity network (Kolenergo), the
water mains and sewage (Vodokanal), the post office and telephone net-
work, the maintenance and repair of the blocks of flats, garbage collec-
tion, road building and upkeep, as well as a host of other necessary urban services. The expansion of the local administrative constellation had been, however, discreetly left out of the picture. The nearest to the budget sector we can get from this or other agitprop texts, are the educational, medical, cultural, sports, and urban maintenance departments, mentioned above.

The local bureaucracies, by contrast, exhibit reticence and shun the agitprop lime-light. Their sprawling archipelago cannot be even perceived in its entirety, given the fact that it is almost equally divided between the twin towns, and absent from mention in statistical reports for popular consumption. Local top bureaucrats – the district administrative leaders - are made prominent in interviews and the almost daily greetings they address on the occasion of festive days of this or that enterprise, educational, health, military, police, or administrative branch. On such occasions, the middle to lower office personnel, represented overwhelmingly by women, surface briefly in local homage production.

The ‘enterprise festive days’, ведомственые праздники, follow one after the other throughout the year. Each such occasion calls for an official address by the district leadership and a picture on the first page of the district weekly Ловозерская правда. Apart from those employed in industry, or in the ‘power structures’ (силиво стрukturi), i.e. the military and police, administrative festive days involve mostly women. This illustrates the strong division in town-tundra gender distribution, in which the majority of working women populate the urban budget-sphere and service sectors, while the tundra has gradually become a men-only place. On a more general level, it points out the markedly gendered distribution of occupational roles in Soviet/Russian society, with the unabashedly sexist appellation ‘office plankton’ being generally understood (and accepted) to imply women.

Among other ‘reticent’ local presences, one can list the fact of labour migrants from the south gradually forming the majority of the district population. In homages like ‘The Soviet Sami’ and ‘Lovozero’ the local growth of the ‘working class’ is celebrated (minus that of the bureaucracies), while there is reticence about the simple question: where had all these people come from, and why?

In the personal history of a labour migrant the point of departure is usually a struggling Ukranian, Russian, Belorussian, or Central Asian village or small town. The principal stimulus for taking the road to Lovozero/Revda in such a scenario, would be the significantly larger salaries one could get in the North. The ‘polar salary bonus’, or полиарки, as well as the ‘regional salary bonus’, районnyy koefitsient, used to raise sala-
ries to twice what one could get at the place of departure, or even higher (see *Northern bonuses*). This part of the story, known as ‘the chasing of the long rouble’ (*pogonya za dlinnym rubl’om*), in the jargon of several generations of Soviet labour migrants, could not, of course, have been presented in official poetic production. According to its canons, people taking the adventurous road to far-away construction sites, were driven by higher sentiments, like increasing the industrial might of the country and creating new towns (like Revda) with their own hands. This heroic spirit, the ‘romanticism of impetuous regional development’ was supposed to forge a new identity – that of the Northerner, *severianin*. The heterogeneous collection of migrants, in which practically all the nationalities of the Soviet Union were represented, would thus be united into something like a new people, passionately attached to the industrial towns in which they lived and worked, and to the region as a whole. 94

It is to be noted again, however, that only the place of arrival would be foregrounded in the regional identity narrative, not the starting point of the migrant’s journey north. We only know that a rather brave and adventurous leap was made from some southern village or small town. Through it a natal identity of a faraway southern ‘little birthland’ (*malaya rodina*) from where the migrants, or their parents came, was exchanged for a new urban existence of high wages, urban comforts, and much increased educational and ‘cultural’ opportunities. The first part of this journey from say, Ukrainian peasanthood to Northern urbanism, became masked within the complex veiled realities of the region, one of its many subdued presences, big and small. The ‘long rouble chase’, motivating a flight from a struggling southern place, as well as the attractions of acquiring an urban, ‘cultured’ status by going North, called for new myths of origin. Some facts had to be disguised, others foregrounded through imaginative and selective textual work. The local regional studies movement, which had resumed its work after the end of the Patriotic War, and, especially with the advent of post-Stalinist liberalization in the late 1950s–60s – Khrushchev’s ‘ottepel’ (“Thaw”), significantly expanded them. Against the background of wave after wave of labour migrants coming in from the South, regional studies, as well as mainstream literary and artistic production, formulated and experimented with the main accents of Northern mythmaking. An idea about that kind of production can be found in an abundance of texts of the post-Stalinist period, like in the above-mentioned two texts, as well as in earlier ones: Sorokazherd’yev (1985),

Pyatovskiy (1974; 1964), Dmitriev (1959), Dvinin (1959). Below I shall give two very recent examples to illustrate the point. In a recent children’s book by Yadrintseva (2013), the history of the region is presented to the very young, with the labour migrants’ part of the story given prominent attention. The text is in a verse form and thus ‘poetical’ in the literal sense of the word. Below I translate the verses about the appearance of the metal-processing city of Monchegorsk:

‘Look at the many-coloured alloys:
the pride and glory of the local people,
as it is for the old-timers,
those who many years ago
created here the mining-processing complex.
They thought, and then decided:
there shall be a town in the “beautiful” tundra!
At first they built a small settlement,
but its days proved not long.
To ten thousand people it gave a home,
and there they worked and lived.
And lo! From Moscow it was decreed,
that the workers would no longer be settlers,
but metal-workers and urbanites!’
(Yadrintseva 2013: 60–61)

The text is eloquent and hardly needs much commenting. Still, the puzzling quotes in “beautiful” tundra’ seem to suggest that the tundra before the industrial town came into being had not been so beautiful, its real beauty must have come only with the production of ‘many-coloured alloys’ (raduzhmye splavy). Anyone who has seen the industrial desert around Monchegorsk and Olenegorsk – including the children reading the book – would feel this poetic masking of the industrial devastation and pollution in Murmansk Region as overstepping the limit.

At the same time, this excerpt from the poeticized history of the Region illustrates the ‘emergent’ character of settling. People, as if with no previous history, emerge from somewhere, think a little, and then decide to build industrial towns. A decree then comes from Moscow, turning them into urbanites.

Another recent text, illustrative of the general turning back to the Soviet poetics of industrialisation, appears in newspaper coverage of the creation of a ‘fellow-citizens’ club in the industrial town of Olenegorsk. In it,
The emergence of the urban population is described as prompted by a desire to offer oneself as a sacrifice to the North. To quote in full:

The northern cities which grew around industrial giants are different from their brethren in the middle belt [Central Russia], let alone from those in the south. People used to come here for the new construction (na novostroyku), which for some became destiny and life-long home. Others gave to the North their strength, youth, and mature years, but then returned to their historical homelands. However, their grown-up children stayed on in the Subarctic (Zapolyar’e). (Kto proshloe 18.02.2014)

This text sustains an established representational formula that I have referred to as ‘emergence’: people appear from vaguely southern destinations, which are characterized as categorically ‘different’. There is a stress on these people coming from another world, which is implied to be less attractive than the one offering the chance for participation in new heroic construction, and of living in the North.

The text is transparent in its pathos. Other texts may require considerable sophistication in discerning between substantive and poetic uses of language, when relating local facts. Native bearers of such competence would have acquired it already in their childhood and school years, but it could prove challenging to outsiders. To gain proficiency in discerning different shades of local substantive and poetic expression, it may be helpful to begin with aspects of local life which tend to be avoided in public mention. Below I present some such topics and the ways they are treated.

The ‘unmentionables’

A list could begin anywhere. Thus, among shaded presences in local life one could mention that of Corrective Colony No 23 on the outskirts of Revda, referred to locally as zona, or koloniya. Some sources suggest that the Colony is a legacy of the late 1940s, when the mines of the future Lovozerskiy GOK were dug and worked by GULAG inmates. (Took 2004: 257)

The Colony’s history thus belongs to the darker side of the industrialisation story of Murmansk Region. When such bits surface, they stand in stark contrast to all regional poetic texts about the romance of building up industry. Pyatovskiy’s ‘Preobrazhennyy Sever’ (1974), presenting the industrialisation of the region as a glorious fulfilment of Lenin’s program for modernising Russia, is an outstanding example. As we have seen above, recent texts revive the pathos of such encomiums.
An antipode to enduring agitprop poetics one may find in Shashkov’s books (2004, 2000, 1993), in Kiselev’s ‘Gulag na Murmane’ (2008c), or in this summary in Kola Encyclopedia: ‘By 1957 the number of corrective labour camps (ITL) had grown to 20, with an inmate population reaching 40,000 people. The prisoners (osuzhdennye) were, in fact, creating the regional industry.’ (KE 2008: 192)

This part of the industrialisation and migrants’ story of the region, especially as it connects with inevitable present-day legacies, is part of a muted regional discourse. A former inmate of the Revda camp, released after serving a twenty-year sentence, told me in 1995 that it held prisoners with long and maximum-term sentences. The camp appears very rarely in local or regional news\(^95\), and is usually not mentioned in conversations with outsiders.

For reasons unexplained, the criminological situation in the Region as a whole would be described as ‘special’. In the words of an anonymous journalist in Murmanskii vestnik, possibly with the Revda colony in mind: ‘the inmate population of colonies in the Subarctic [Zapolyar’e, here: Murmansk Region] is special. A considerable part of them have been sentenced for committing heavy crimes.’ (“Grinpis” 20.02.2014)

The same source states that the total population of colony inmates was 5,531 at the end of 2013. Over one and a half thousand of these people were sentenced for homicide or for inflicting violent injuries, another approximately 900 people – for burglary and theft. Because of this ‘special’ rate of serious criminality, the Region runs three ‘strict regime’ colonies, and a ‘special regime’ one – which is the Revda colony. All in all, there are seven corrective colonies in the Region, a number of corrective settlements (kolonii-poseleniya), as well as detention centres (sledstvennye izolyatorii, SIZO).

On a par with the veiled existence of the Revda corrective colony, there is the once dreaded Therapeutic-Labour Preventive Clinic (Lechebno-trudovoy profilaktorium, LTP) at Apatiti, mentioned above. It is possible that present corrective settlements, as the one at Olenegorsk, reproduce many features of the former LTPs. (Poselen’e-khutorok 14.02.2014)

The colony at Revda, as well as the various other corrective institutions and the state reformatory campaigns they carried out, belong to a repertoire of subdued presences and memories. They form a list of officially avoided or unmentionable topics, but are also subdued in private conversations with strangers. This is consonant with Herzfeld’s concept of ‘cultural intimacy’, as suggested earlier, departing from it as regards a contin-

\(^95\) I.e. Sluzhba (10.10.2013); V Revde (18.11.2008).
uously re-negotiated compromise arrangement with power in the Soviet/Russian case. In everyday life the tensions of the compromise fragment into a broad and multi-layered range of troubling issues, veiled over for the outside gaze, or entirely hidden from it.

In the local case such issues include radioactive and other environmental hazards in the district. Such are reflected, for instance, by fears of radioactive pollution, allegedly caused in the past by underground blasts for mining purposes. A more general complaint is about the poor state of the water-supply infrastructure, leading citizens of both Revda and Lovozero to draw water from public wells and fountains at every opportunity. ‘Is that spring water?’ (родниковая вода?) one asks when given a drink of water. This is done in the firm conviction that tap water is not good for drinking. In Revda, particularly, one may come across hints that the preoccupation and the daily chore of lugging bottles and plastic canisters from the public fountain is because of ‘радиации’ (radioactive pollution). Such fears might be fed by the fact that the principal product that the Mining-Processing Complex (Lovozero MPC) near Revda turns out is Loparite concentrate – a cocktail of rare metals, some of them radioactive (Thorium) (KE, Лопаритовый концентрат). Till 1991 Lovozero MPC used to turn out as much as 23,000 tons of concentrate a year, with the radioactive part separated and dumped into a pit (хвостохранилище) at the foot of the Karnasurt Ridge, a few kilometres out of town. There are pervasive rumours that sand and gravel from that pit had been used when paving the streets in Revda, as also in the construction of the town’s apartment buildings. Such rumours have a way of feeding fears of polluted water.

Every settlement, including the city of Murmansk itself, has public fountains on the outskirts, where long queues of people form, patiently waiting for their turn to fill from a spout an assortment of plastic containers. Hopes for improvement are slim, however. Recent official estimates quote the astronomical figure of 10 billion roubles needed for improving the tap-water situation in the Region and the same source indicates that it is unlikely that such money shall be found (10 миллиардов 21.02.2014; V Gadzhievo 26.08.2014). The bad taste of tap-water and a lurking fear of a polluted environment, connects with the grim topic of high district mortality – a most troubling issue, of which more shall be said further on.

The repertoire of subdued presences in district life ranges from the not readily shared to the unmentionable. Traditionally, and as befits the conversational norms in a highly militarised region, the military topic tends

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to fall into the latter category. In a rare article about military units positioned in the vicinity of Lovozero/Revda, a veteran journalist from Lovozerskaya pravda writes in a post-Soviet version of agitprop poetics:

How impetuously, after all, is time flying! With what cosmic speed during the last decades have whole epochs changed one after the other, within the span of a human life. It is hardly ten or fifteen years that have passed from the time when simply for mentioning the number of a military unit in the newspaper I would have had serious trouble. It is true – it is true, I remember: in the safe in my office there were several booklets with instructions and lists about what should not be mentioned under any circumstances in mass media sources, to avoid unwittingly disclosing a state secret. (Shirmer 2006: 2)

The military unit in that case was Revda-3, Base for Technical Armament, Unit No 98662, as the article said, and the occasion was its thirtieth anniversary. There are a number of such bases around Revda and Lovozero, referred to locally as voinskie chasti, army units. Reindeer herders, especially from the now extinct Brigade 3 of Tundra – the ‘Sami brigade’ of days now past97, had strong reasons to be almost daily discussing the doings of the personnel of Tsar’ Gorodok – a small military settlement, some thirty kilometres to the northeast of Olengorsk. Military poaching on its herd had become legendary for the brigade, as was the almost institutionalized poaching on the far-flung Brigade 9, coming from Gremikha. Thus, the military form a substantial part of the local lore of poaching – a vast topic to which I turn further on.

At the same time, close relations with the military, and, especially, informal trading with them, are common outside of town in the tundra. Hardware and fuel traded from the military form a critical part of what herders and other tundra-connected people – hunters and fishermen – need for their tundra activities. There is a long list of items, beginning with the all-important tank-like vezdekhodi (all-purpose track vehicles, ATVs), and continuing with fuel, lubricants, and all sorts of spare parts for vehicles. During the age of mature sovkhoizm, discussed here, the supply departments of both Tundra and ‘In Memory of Lenin’ (today’s Olenevod) vitally depended on barter exchange with the military – from whom the vezdekhod fleet of the two sovkhozy had come in the first place. A vezdekhod is not an item one can buy in a shop.

97 The Brigade was disbanded in 2012 due to poor organisation and consequent inability to fulfil reindeer herding duties. In an ideologically poetic version of this story, meant for the western neighbours, a video-documentary represented the event as a destructive act by state authorities (Simma 2012). For a critical review of the film Scheller et al. (2013).
In post-Soviet decades, close links with the military gradually created a fleet of private vezdekhodi, which is now larger and in much better condition than the ageing and battered collection of sovkhoz vehicles. This has led to the recent practice of the cooperatives to be hiring private vezdekhodi for tundra operations, rather than using their own. Service and maintenance of these private vehicles is still dependent, however, on sustaining an informal life-line with the military units.

Shirmer’s reportage on Revda–3 military unit and its 30th anniversary provides historical links to the cluster of decisive developments that made mature sovkhoizm what it was. The appearance of Revda-3 alongside other locally deployed units marks a period of expansion of the Military-Industrial Complex (VPK) from the late sixties to the late eighties. That happened in parallel with civilian industrial expansion, and demographic agglomeration. The latter, as shall be shown below, administratively liquidated tundra villages, concentrated their population in the bigger settlements and shifted ancestral coastal and some inland territories to the exclusive use of the Northern Fleet and Border Guard Troops.

In the secretive climate of the Cold War decades, expansion of military presence in the district would naturally belong to the list of classified and hence publicly unmentionable topics. The instructions that the veteran local journalist remembered keeping in her safe carefully discriminated between what could be talked about publicly and what could not. The instructions were themselves a piece of classified information – for that reason their place was in the safe, under lock and key, and the personal responsibility of the respective official.

There is no evidence, on the other hand, that there was a list of instructions about what could or should be talked about – that part one learned as one grew up and sophisticated one’s competence of discernment. If we take military presence as the extreme point of unmentionables, at the opposite – the ‘mentionables end’ – stood constantly extolled developments like industrialisation and urbanisation, successes in reindeer husbandry, dairy farming and fishing, rising material and cultural well-being of citizens, and, in brief, any sign of progress under the leadership of the Party and Government. Between the glorified on the one hand, and the ‘classified unmentionables’ on the other, stood all the complexities of life. The lexicon, grammar, and pragmatic of the mentionable – of what could be said, where, and how – was a critical part of the road to maturity. Such a vital matter like the rapid growth of local bureaucracies, for instance, seems to have belonged – as it still does – to the grey zone of indeterminacies, where poetisation was absent, save on the already mentioned enterprise festive days, vedomstvenie prazdniki. During the rest of the year
bureaucracies were a rather dreary topic, not infrequently featuring in satirical writing and caricature. An able bearer of ideological competence would, on the basis of personal involvement and daily practice, be aware of the three parallel substantive developments, – industrial, administrative, and military – that formed the principal characteristic features of the district. The various names for the period in Soviet texts and after reveal ideological shifts from acclaim to criticism. Community memory, on the other hand, remained faithful – nostalgically so – to an idealized perception and poetic representation of mature sovkhoizm as the antipode of a harsh present.

The coming in of mature sovkhoizm

The late fifties and, especially the first half of the sixties saw the gradual ushering in of what I call here ‘mature sovkhoizm’. In purely technical terms, this was still the time of the kolkhozy: with their small size, and annual payment by workdays, mostly in kind, rather than in cash. The big consolidated sovkhozy were still a development for the future. Nevertheless, the sovkhoist view-of-the-world and its socioeconomic implications were firmly there, as they had been from the beginning of collectivisation. The fact of the matter was that the kolkhoz, apart from certain technical features, like those mentioned above, for all intents and purposes functioned as a centrally commanded state farm. The sovkhoz, when it came, introduced improvements in matters of pay (monthly salaries in cash), old-age pension allowances, paid holidays, allotted residential property as flats and the right to build a number of auxiliary premises, facilitated private-plot use, etc., but in its essence – as a centrally governed agricultural enterprise – the transition from kolkhoz to sovkhoz was one in form, rather than in essence. This latter, as previously explained, realized in operational terms a security building compromise with power.

The main developments, giving shape to the period of mature sovkhoizm (as I ‘etically’ call it), took their form in the late 1950s, that is after Stalin’s death in 1953, and the beginning of Nikita Khrushchev’s leadership of the Union (1956–1964). The full flowering of sovkhoizm came, however, later – after Khrushchev’s ousting and the emergence of Leonid Brezhnev as his successor (1964–1982). The 1964 change of power is relevant because of Khrushchev’s negative attitude to the private sector in agriculture. After his removal from office in October 1964 and the barrage of criticism against his ‘voluntaristic’ and ‘adventurous’ agricultural policies and experiments that was launched soon after, one of the main points of
the indictment against him was that he ‘had mounted a wholly unjustifiable campaign against fallows and the private plots of collective farmers [my emphasis].’(Lewin 2005: 156; cf. also McCauley 1995: 124; Medvedev 1983: 237–44; Khrushchev 1994)

The campaign against collective farmers having the right to use private plots was a side-line in Khrushchev’s emphasis on agglomeration – the merging of a number of small kolkhozy into one big sovkhoz, integrating also the formerly autonomous machine-tractor stations (MTS) into the new structure. During the following period of Brezhnev’s rule, collective farm agglomeration, reminiscent of the gigantomania of the first collectivisation wave, was not, however, removed from the agricultural agenda, together with the ousted leader. On the contrary, farm agglomeration was further followed by a demographic one. Small village kolkhozy had already been reformed into brigades in the new big sovkhoz, or expanded existing ones. The smaller villages themselves were emptied of their population and moved into bigger central ones, where administrative, Party, and sovkhoz leadership had their offices, and a nascent public, urban-like infrastructure already existed.

On the other hand, Khrushchev’s campaign against private plots of farmers was discontinued under Brezhnev, and the dismantling of the foundational feature of the collectivisation compromise – the private plot allowance – was stopped. The beginning of mature sovkhoizm can thus be temporally situated in the second half of the 1960s, when these two developments – agglomeration and private plot consolidation – occurred in parallel.

Official, or ‘cadre ideology’98, first and foremost represented by Brezhnev as the new Party and State leader, dubbed the period one of ‘mature’ or ‘developed socialism’99. As has been shown, in the subarctic application of agitprop poetic convention, these appellations were rendered by clichés like ‘New Vistas’, ‘Sun Over the Tundra’, and the like. After the end of Brezhnev’s rule and with the onset of perestroyka, the barrage of criticism against the deceased former leader dubbed the period ‘stagnation time’ (zastoynoe vremya), calling for a radical (but not too radical) restructuring of Soviet society.

When it came to agriculture and the private plot issue, radical suggestions for restructuring were, however, not made during the perestroyka years, beyond general revelations about the overall inefficiency of sovkhoz agriculture. The closest thing to reform was the appeal for increasing the

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98 In the sense of Marco (1968).
99 On the concept of ‘developed socialism’ see Thompson (1988); Evans (1986).
economic efficiency of sovkhozy by running sovkhoz brigades on the principle of \textit{economic self-accounting} or \textit{khozraschet}. The system, which had already been experimented with during the previous period, and had been linked with the economic reforms of Alexey Kosygin, as the Head of the Council of Ministers (1964–80), never bore much fruit and towards the end of the Union was quietly removed from the agenda. Khozraschet, nevertheless, was based on the assumption that uniting central planning with private initiative was a viable solution to the mounting economic problems – a kind of thinking that bears resemblance to today’s centralized management of regional budgets and the promotion of state/private partnerships.

Seen from the vantage point of reindeer herding brigade organisation in Lovozero District, the attempted hybrid between central planning and private initiative that was khozraschet did have some real influence. Brigade leaders could raise efficiency of labour through the instrument of a salary-increasing or decreasing co-efficient, and, in this way, their power in matters of pay, appointing, firing, ranking, assigning to tasks, etc., increased significantly. Given the fact that in each brigade the core composition of the team ran along family and kinship lines, increasing power in the hands of the brigade leader meant also increased possibilities of enhancing one’s private-in-the-collective herd status, as well as those of loyal subordinates who were at the same time brothers or relatives. In sum, it can be said that after Khrushchev’s attempted dismantling of the private-in-the collective dimensions of sovkhoizm, no further such attempt was contemplated. What is more, later reform attempts contributed to further strengthening the sovkhoist system.

\section*{Naming}

Against the background of such a dynamic it is worth looking at concepts and naming behaviour from a rank-and-file perspective. The way mature sovkhoizm is retrospectively regarded from the vantage point of the present is informative.

The first thing to be noticed here is the lack of any single term, except a general reference to ‘Soviet times’ (\textit{sovetskoe vremya}), or the global ‘before’ (\textit{prezhde}). In camp-fire or kitchen-table talk alike the period is remembered as a time of prosperity and is mostly situated somewhere in the 1970s and 80s. Agglomeration of kolkhozy into sovkhozy, as well as the liquidation of tundra villages and resettling of their population, comes out in the details of personal life-stories, but, as a rule, these major events
remain low-profiled. The ones that tend to be foregrounded and receive prominence are connected with the better management of reindeer herds ‘before’, i.e. ‘when the herd was under control’, *kogda stado bylo v rukakh*, with the good pay (‘we used to be among the best-paid in the Union’), cheap prices, regular bus and aircraft transportation, general security, lack of criminality, holidays at rest-homes, travelling to socialist countries, etc. Ultimately, the period is set as one of higher ethical existence, contrasting it sharply with the ‘lawlessness’ (*bespredel*) of post-Soviet times. In temporal terms, the beginning of the period can be moved back to the recovery from the devastation of war by the mid- to late fifties, and said to end with the onset of what is described as an even greater devastation – that of the years of economic reforms, 1991–1992.

It can be thus claimed that the period between the late fifties and the late eighties of the last century has a real-life existence in people’s memories today and is remembered as a period of security, economic prosperity, and a general climate of ethical superiority by comparison with what ‘perestroyka’ and ‘democracy’ have brought about. The great expanse of textual behaviour without strict rules, between agitprop encomiums, on the one hand, and classified unmentionables, on the other, surfaces in such more or less set tropes of security, material and ethical well-being. They structure the poetics of nostalgia.

Freedom, repressions, enforced collectivisation, GULAG camps, resettlements, and the like, tend not to form such tropes. From the point of view of the silent majority of actors, and especially of the tundra-related ones, such topics tend to belong to an ethically suspect discursive arena – one associated with ethnopolitical conferences and other public fora, or in conversations with sympathizing foreigners. Such occasions would trigger remembrance of the tragic events, listed above, and thus the parallel discourses of ‘prosperity’, on the one hand, and ‘victimization’, on the other, may alternate according to context, or even rub shoulders in one and the same conversation. In general, however, a good part of the silent majority would prefer to shun both appearance at public fora and participation in what they would perceive as ‘political’ discussions. Ethnopolitical elites thus tend to stand separate in this respect from the ‘silent’ majority, and especially from its tundra-related, reindeer herding part. Moreover, while the discursive, public fora domain, built around a generalized trope of ‘reassertion and revival’, has a very pronounced Sami indigenous profile, the one of ‘security’, around which discursive behavior of the ‘silent’, tundra-related community revolves, bears strong cross-ethnic features, or is entirely immune to ethnic differentiation.
This is a striking feature of what may be called ideological dispositions on both sides of the town-tundra divide. A ruthless campaign like agglomeration, for instance, hit not only the Sami people, but the tundra-settled and coastal people in their totality – Sami, Komi, Nentsi, Pomor, the ‘Russified Sami’ of the Village of Ponoy (Anokhin 1963: 258) – not to mention those from ethnically mixed marriages between such people and labour migrants or their descendants. A closer look at the agglomeration campaign, ushering in the period of enhanced security, which I call ‘mature sovkhoizm’ becomes necessary at this point.

Agglomeration (okrupnenie)

Liquidation of remote villages, and the subsequent concentration of their population into district centres is a process that radically reshaped life for many northern peoples in the post-Stalinist decades. In the specific case of Lovozero District two such centres had emerged: the regional administrative and industrial complex Lovozero/Revda, and, in the second place, the tundra Komi village of Krasnoshchel’e.

Gail Fondahl’s term ‘agro-centre’ (1998: 64–72; cf. also Habeck 2005:39f) can be borrowed in referring to such places, but it needs to be put in quotes. I see two principal reasons for this. In the first place, the quotes are necessary as a reminder of the fact that in Soviet/Russian administrative usage sel’skoe khozyaystvo (agriculture) is a blanket term including reindeer husbandry, among many other non-strictly agricultural land uses. In the second place, the administrative-industrial complex of Lovozero/Revda can hardly be called an ‘agro-centre’, even if we take into account the above extension of the ‘agricultural’ meaning. I have shown in the previous paragraphs how the expansion of mining-processing in Revda used to be proudly announced as successful transition from a rural to a primarily industrial district economy. The reindeer husbandry sovkhozy – Tundra of Lovozero, and ‘In Memory of Lenin’ of Krasnoshchel’e – continued to function alongside some strictly agricultural, dairy-, pig-, and fur-farming activities, but their economic input had come to occupy little more than a symbolic part in the overall district economy. Reindeer meat, produced with the fanfare of plan-fulfillment, was later left to blacken in regional store-houses, ending up as low-quality meat for sausage production. Apart from the local population of the district itself, Murmansk Region urbanites never created a serious market for reindeer meat – a situation continuing to this day. In brief, the economic input that counted in real terms was the production of the above-mentioned
Loparite concentrate by the Lovozoero MPC. Added to it, and growing in significance with time, were centrally redistributed budgets, sustaining the rapidly expanding administrative and infrastructural sectors of the twin-city complex. We shall see in the following chapter, how at present this last source of income – the budget-sphere one – has remained, in practice, the principal means of district sustenance.

‘Agro-centre’ in the sense of a reindeer husbandry centre is a term applicable to Krasnoshchel’e. Here indeed the reindeer husbandry sovkhoz used to be the all-important carrying platform for the whole village, as well as for its two subsidiaries: the Komi village of Kanevka, and the tiny Russian Pomor/Komi/Sami village of Sosnovka on the White Sea Coast. To the relative significance of reindeer husbandry in the economy of the remote villages, one has to add that of sea- and fresh-water fishing, and – increasingly – of informal tourist activities. This recent, but rapidly expanding branch of the overall district economy is discussed further in Chapter 6.

The principal rationale of agglomeration, in the local application of this programme, can be likened to the macabre adage, attributed to Stalin: ‘No person – no problem’ (Net cheloveka, net problemy). In other words: ‘No village – no problem’. What was the problem?

In the first place, it came from the factor of roadlessness and consequent difficulties in providing for remote villages – not only in the Kola, but over the whole vast Russian countryside. It was far easier to declare villages ‘blesperspektivnye’ (unviable), than ensure regular airborne transport or build roads leading to them, supply consumer goods, fuel for electric generators, and connections to the regional electric supply grid, as well as maintain educational, health, telephone, postal, and other services.

Officially, the push to centralization was rationalized with arguments about the economic health of the kolkhozy of the small villages. In the chapter ‘A new village’, the ‘Lovozoero’ agitprop text provides the following explanation:

Experience from collective reindeer husbandry has proved that bigger farms are more stable and efficient, and, for that reason, by the end of the 1950s-beginning of ‘60s, the small kolkhozy (of 15–20 households), merged with the neighbouring and more powerful ones (Ushakov and Dashchinskiy 1988: 156)

The resulting procedure of administrative liquidation of a small tundra village and the relocation of its population into just one entrance of a block-of-flats in a bigger central village or town do not deviate from these bland lines. The very same year when ‘Lovozoero’ was published, Vatonena
unveiled the grim sides of the campaign: that until those blocks-of-flats were built, relocated people from the tundra villages had to live for many years in overcrowded log cabins of relatives (see also: Afanas’yeva 2013; Allemann 2012; Gutsol et al. 2007). Antonova’s notebooks, discussed in Chapter 2, uncover another grim aspect of relocation: despondency and degradation in resettled families. This led to increased levels of alcoholism and suicide among relocated parents (Kozlov and Bogoyavlenskiy 2008; Galenkin and Kovalenko 1989; Vatonena 1989; Bogoyavlenskiy 1985; Dobrov et al. 1985). In its turn there followed administrative separation of children from such families. Then came the consequent need for their upbringing to take place at the village boarding school (shkola-internat) from the age of seven till eighteen. The boarding school in Lovozero, as a home for principally Sami children of relocated families, was created in 1960, i.e., at the beginning of the relocation of Sami villages and the approximately simultaneous consolidation of the kolkhozy (Antonova 1990).

A witness to these events, born in 1964 in Lovozero, where her family had settled after the liquidation of Varzino, tells of extremely traumatic experiences. In the space of some ten years after resettlement, her big Sami family was decimated, leaving only her and a half-brother as survivors. Alcoholism, as in many such families, had hit both her mother and father to the extent that they lost their parental rights. Her father died soon after, then her mother. Two of her brothers committed suicide in the space of several years. The remaining half-brother gradually sank into destitution.

Masha herself (fictitious name) was brought up at the boarding school, and was active in Antonova’s ‘Red Trackers’ circle. An excellent student at the Internat, she acquired a higher education, enrolling as an extra-mural student at the Pedagogical Institute in Murmansk (now Murmansk State Humanities University). After graduation she worked as a primary school teacher for some years, and then turned to NGO ethnopolitical activism as a full-time occupation.

This is a brief summary of a long personal narrative, in which every ill that befell the family, and the long eleven years as an officially parentless Sami child at the Internat, had its roots, as Masha sees it, in the liquidation of her home village and the immense stress of resettlement. How she managed to survive that and, moreover, acquire a respectable position in local life, attests to an impressive strength of character, dedication to her people, and constructive will. Masha’s story is typical for quite a few women making up the current ethnopolitical Sami elite. It is atypical, however, among the male, tundra-connected part of the community. Here
despondency reigns unrestrained, and rampant alcoholism seems to be the only way to deal with it.

This grim side of the local history of the mature sovkhoist period surfaces in kitchen-table talk and camp-fire gatherings as stories of fatal alcoholism, high mortality, suicidal behaviour, enforced bachelorship, revocations of parental rights, houses burning down in mysterious circumstances, and people disappearing in the tundra never to be found. The topic tends to be subdued in local society and not shared with strangers. A curious feature of the situation is that people do not associate it with mature sovkhoizm in spite of the fact that agglomeration and its resultant ills marked this period. When it comes to generalized evaluations of the period, the tone is rather one of nostalgia for a good time which shall never return – a time of security and well-being. This manner of representation can be called the poetics of nostalgia.

The paradox of this state of discursive affairs, straddling the town-tundra gender and occupational line of differences, can only be resolved by the same moral procedure that has been offered to explain the subduing of the tragedies of collectivisation, namely, that security tends to dominate as the ultimately critical value. Looked at in this way, it becomes easier to understand why foregrounding of ‘resettlement narratives’ tends to be perceived by the silent, tundra-related part of the community as a form of new agitprop ‘talk’, servicing the interests of publicly vocal urban activists, or those who the ‘silent majority’ would dub ‘scandal-prone’ (skandalisti).

Such emerging prejudices, particularly against democratic reformers, opposition bloggers and ethnopolitical elites, may explain also the indifference to the sincerity of texts created while ‘mature sovkhoizm’ was still established. Towards the very end of that period such texts began to appear and Lyubov Vatonena’s article of 1988, or that of Galenkin and Kovalenko of the following year, were not the only ones in the region to dare mention unmentionables. Vatonena has told me that immediately after the publication of her article in Lovozerskaya pravda – a stunning fact in itself for the tightly controlled District Party Committee paper – she was summoned to the Raykom and given a thorough grilling on account of deliberately disclosing negative aspects of local life and thus misrepresenting the ‘big truth’ of the ‘ever-increasing prosperity for the working people of the district’, and especially the Sami people.

100 In reference to other parts of the Russian subarctic regions (Yakutia) some researchers use the term ‘ultramortality’ (Vinokurova 2010:149). For Soviet Union/Russia Gessen (02.09.2014).
The time for harsher measures against her had, however, passed, and official slogans were for ‘publicity’ and ‘restructuring’. In this new climate, a veteran regional journalist, Andrey Nikitin, published a polemical book in 1990 – ‘Stopover in Chapoma’, revealing a state of administrative and economic helplessness, unbridled corruption, and abuse of power, characteristic of much of Brezhnev’s ‘developed socialism’. It was this side of reality that had been so painstakingly painted over by agitprop textual production of the ‘Lovozero’ or ‘Soviet Sami’ type. Nikitin’s book is of great interest. The wealth of factual information he presents reveals a reality very different from the nostalgic texts about the times of security and well-being that were described in the previous paragraph. This, in its turn, bears out the proposition that the town-tundra divide engenders at least two types of poeticisation: that related to the opposition between values of human rights and freedom on the one hand, and that related to security on the other. But let’s look at Nikitin’s text first.

From the whole book, which spans the greater part of the mature sovkhoist period – from 1969 till the early ‘90s, I take Nikitin’s description of how the liquidation of ancient villages occurred in cold reality. In the particular case, Nikitin describes the fate of Por’ya Guba – a tiny Pomor village on the Ter’ Coast. He writes:

The villagers tried in vain to defend their rights to live on the land of their fathers and forefathers. It did not help to plead their innocence before Soviet power, nor to point out that the road to their village went over swamps and marshland, that electricity came only from an electric generator, while on the other hand, they caught a lot of fish, had good yields of hay, and produced milk that had won numerous diplomas and medals at the Exhibition of National Economic Achievement (VDNKh) in Moscow. Nothing helped. The village was doomed. After the kolkhoz, the village shop was closed down, then the medical station, and the post office. Those who had consented to be resettled were transported together with their cattle to the village of Belokamenka. Others, who had refused to settle around Murmansk, dispersed to other regional towns, depending on where the family had kin (Nikitin 1990:14).


Such phrasing, announcing the death of a village, abounds in the reference book. In its part for Lovozero District, one after another, like the chiming of a church bell, come the lines announcing the death of a Sami settlement: ‘Chudz’yavr’, village. 29.06.1962 – excluded from data regis-
tration’ (p.262); ‘Voron’e, village – 30.04.1970 – excluded from data registration’ (p.162); ‘Varzino, village – 30.04.1970 – excluded from data registration’ (p.159); ‘Ponoy, village – 09.02.1977 – excluded from data registration’ (p.162); ‘Chal’mne-Varre (Ivanovka), village – 31.08.1971 – excluded from data registration’ (p.261); etc., etc. – the list is long.

Talking to the District Party Secretary of Ter’ District in 1969, Nikitin notes:

His dream was to resettle all people to Umba. (…) From his words it followed that all the ‘damned’ problems of public welfare for people and villages would be solved in that way. The problems with providing cultural activities, medical service, schooling – all of them would be solved once and for all. It would not be necessary to fret over roads, electric supply grids, transporting food stuffs and consumer goods, building materials, fuel; one would get rid of the problem of passenger travel, but the main thing was – the district centre would instantly acquire a much needed work force. (Nikitin 1990: 15–16)

That last point now tends to be overlooked. With chronic recruitment problems in ‘agriculture’, concentration of work force in ‘consolidated’ sovkhozy certainly eased the work of sovkhoz and district managers. In respect of Lovozero District reindeer husbandry, it was easier to administer the formerly far flung kolkhozy when they were transformed into sovkhoz herding teams, and the people themselves – bunched together into the apartment blocks of Lovozero/Revda. As noted before, a smaller and a more ‘agricultural’ variant of a main settlement of concentration was developed also in the case of Krasnoshchel’e.

Nikitin’s first-hand observation of the process in the fishing villages along the White Sea Coast, made in 1969, lead him to a scathing conclusion:

I began to realize that behind the enforced resettlement, behind the desertion of the Coast, there stood no will or reason, but helplessness and confusion in the face of a crumbling economy. All of a sudden I was horrified to discover that such plans were deeply immoral, since people were simply being rounded up, shuffled and moved about like wooden figurines, as if they were lacking reason, will, and feelings.’ (Nikitin 1990: 16)

I can add little to Nikitin’s conclusions about these same events in Lovozero District. He describes fully and feelingly the essence of the process. Still, some additional aspects should be mentioned for the Lovozero District case.
One relates to the fate of the Sami village of *Chudz’yavr*. Before the relocation of its population to Lovozero, there had been earlier instances when, to paraphrase Nikitin’s bitter words, people were uprooted from ancient habitations and moved about at will. The celebrated regional scholar Alymov, quoted by visiting writer Paustovskiy in 1932, tells of a past that ended in 1914, when the Sami were still grazing their deer where Murmansk stands today: ‘In the Murmansk chronicles, compiled by regional scholar Alymov, it is said: “1914. Where Murmansk stands today the Kil’din Lapp Yakovlev is grazing his reindeer for the last time”’ (Paustovskiy 1985: 353). This final grazing date marked the beginning of a long road which has reached its end today. The building of the Petrozavodsk-Murman Coast railway line started that year[101] and the Kil’din Sami had to move. That particular stretch of the village life-line ended in 1934 by Lake Chudz’yavr’, some sixty kilometres to the NW of Lovozero. As Kiselev and Kiseleva write in ‘Lovozero’, the early 1930s were a time when: ‘in connection with kolkhoz building and sedentarisation a number of Sami settlements (*pogosti*) were liquidated.’ (1987: 31). The authors of ‘Soviet Sami’ describe this ‘first wave’ of liquidation of Sami settlements as a voluntary quest on the part of the Kil’din Sami for a new place of habitation:

The first Sami resettlement on the Kola Peninsula became necessary when the Kil’din pogost was being relocated and this is how it happened. Before anything else, the issue of moving the Kil’din Sami to a new place was put to a most careful discussion at an open pogost meeting on 13 August 1934. 22 households stated their wish to move. On 18 January 1935 the matter was put to a second discussion and the decision was confirmed – to move to a new habitation in the vicinity of Lake Chudz’yavr’ where houses were already being built. By the autumn of 1935 all the Sami of the Kil’din Pogost had moved to live along the banks of the lake, rich in fish, with good lichen pastures all around. 14 new houses were built at the new location, with house building going on until 1938 (1987: 32; see also Gutsol et al. 2007).

One of these houses I remember well. It used to be the village shop in Chudz’yavr’, but when the Kil’din Sami were relocated for a second time in 1959, and the village – liquidated (‘excluded from data registration as of 29.06.1962’) – the log cabin was dismantled and moved to the base camp of Brigade No 3 of Lovozero Kolkhoz Tundra. This transition marked the transformation of the *Odd-syyt* (‘New Village’), later *Vpered*

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[101] On the building of the railway line: Nielsen (2002; 1994-95); *Proizvoditel’nye sily* (1923); Rippas (1895).
('Forward') Kolkhoz of Chudž’yavr’, into a reindeer herding brigade of the consolidated kolkhoz *Tundra* of Lovozero, subsequently the biggest reindeer herding sovkhoz on the Peninsula. When I pitched my tent close by Base No 3, the log-cabin, where the village shop used to be was called ‘the old house’. It had a large store room, a small bakery, living quarters, and a vast attic in which the herders dried swamp grass (*osoka*) – still used at that time in lieu of socks inside reindeer hide boots (*toburki*). Hugh Beach and Tat’yana Luk’yanchenko had been interviewing the members of the brigade in the early nineties (Beach 1992), and I continued in their steps in 1994–1996 (Konstantinov 2005a).

As of last year (2012) the brigade is no more – its few deer and much diminished crew of herders have been moved to join Brigade No 7. Thus ends a trajectory of a hundred years almost to the day, beginning with Yakovlev’s last grazing of 1914, on the land that is now covered with the apartment blocks of Murmansk, passing through the alleged ‘voluntary resettlement’ to the banks of Lake Chudž’yavr’ in 1934–37, and the second relocation to Lovozero in 1959–62. From what I managed to learn in November 2011, the grazing range of the former Brigade 3, was recently rented by an enterprising Sami obshchina – ‘Sam’ syyt’ (Sami Village) of Lovozero, specializing in ethnic tourism (*etnoturizm*).

The death bell for the ancient Sami village of Voron’e had tolled as a side event of the building of the vast *Serebryanskoe Reservoir* and its system of hydroelectric stations – Murmansk and other towns needed electricity, especially, the towns of the rapidly growing Military-Industrial Complex. Another motive for the liquidation of tundra villages was resettling the population and transforming kolkhozy into brigades. In Ushakov and Dashchinskiy’s description of the events, on 26 February 1963 the village kolkhoz *Dobrovolets* (‘Volunteer’) ‘joined’ *Tundra* of Lovozero. Similarly to the other kolkhozy, the farm was transformed into a brigade, with a grazing range near the new reservoir.

In the previous chapter I mentioned the Voron’e kolkhoz as one of the very first collective farms on the Peninsula and moreover, an all-Sami one. By now the brigade, succeeding that early-bird kolkhoz of 1929 (or perhaps even 1928) is heavily ethnically mixed, like all others. The village is no more, but plans are being made for developing ethnic tourism in the vicinity of its historical location.

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102 Voron’e’s fate brings strong associations with the Alta Reservoir flooding of ancient Sami grazing range in North Norway (Finmark) and the wave of protests that followed. See esp. Thuen (1995).

103 On pre-collectivisation land use practiced by the Voron’e Sami see Rikkinen (1983, 1981); Kihlman (1889); Kihlman and Palmen (1890).
The militarisation of the Barents Sea coast is yet another aspect of the resettlement process. The case is perhaps best represented by the ancient Yokanga Pogost at the estuary of Yokanga – the second biggest river on the Peninsula, from which the settlement took its name. A rare publication – ‘My address is Gremikha’ (Babich 1991)\textsuperscript{104} – offers a glimpse of how the ancient Sami coastal settlement of Yokanga was eventually transformed into one of the most awesome military installations of the Cold War decades. During its heyday in the mid-1980s its population reached 20,000 people. It merited visits by Khrushchev (July 1962), and Brezhnev (June 1967).

The building of the mighty naval base began at the start of the Patriotic War (\textit{Na Pskovshchine} 14.10.2013) and it has much expanded since its end, although the location had already seen military use during the First World War. Babich’s text suggests that in the first postwar decades the lives of the military were closely interconnected with those of the Sami population and their Kolkhoz ‘Iskra’ (‘Spark’) (1991: 73f).

Gremikha (renamed from Yokanga in 1938), for a period of time (1936–1963) became a centre of its own district – that of \textit{Saamskiy Rayon} (Sami District) (\textit{Arkhimyy Otdel} 1995:111). Babich writes about festivals of the North, in which the whole population of the district took part, including the members of Kolkhoz ‘Iskra’ of Gremikha; of Kolkhoz ‘Bolshevik’ of Varzino, and of Kolkhoz ‘Sever’ (‘North’) of the village of Ponoy. (1991: 73–4) The rise in administrative status and the consolidation of ‘Iskra’ – to which ‘Prosvet’ (‘Ray of Light’) of the village of Lumbovka had been added was, however, short lived. (Luk’yanchenko 1971: 23) The creation of a big naval base at Gremikha was planned for the needs of an expanding Northern Fleet, with a connected closed town for the personnel and their families. All these plans required the removal of the Sami villages from the coastal area which was now under the administrative jurisdiction of the Northern Fleet, and, ultimately, of the Ministry of Defence.

Ancient or not the villages had to go and they did. In the early 1970s ‘both the village and the kolkhoz were liquidated’ (Muzhikov 1996: 49). The population, as that of the other villages – Varzino, Lumbovka, Ponoy – were dispersed throughout the region, while the kolkhoz itself was consolidated with ‘In Memory of Lenin’ of Krasnoshchel’e.

In 1981 both the administrative status and the name of the settlement again changed. From \textit{rabochiy poselok} (workers’ settlement) the place be-

\textsuperscript{104}I am grateful to Leif Rantala for turning my attention to this rare publication and helping me gain access to it.
came a closed town (ZATO). The name was changed to Ostrovnoy, but for rare public uses the designation Murmansk-140 had some limited currency. After 1992, the settlement began ‘openly’ to be referred to as ZATO Ostrovnoy.

The numerous changes of administrative, collective farm, and topographic status that ancient Yokanga saw between the 1930s and 1990s is a phenomenon common in the whole region if not the whole country. This constant reshuffling of administrative, employment, and demographic organisation, and total disregard for the effects of this cavalier treatment on the inhabitants reveals important aspects of elite attitudes. These can be summarized by saying that small-scale habitations, with or without a long history behind them, can be renamed, moved, liquidated, resurrected, moved again, again renamed, etc., if they stand in the way of ideological, administrative, engineering, or military plans. Even today, the populations of the miraculously preserved tundra villages – Krasnoshchel’ë, Kanevka, and Sosnovka, cannot be sure that the difficulties created by their remoteness and small size, may not, in the end, prove fatal for them. Each closing down of a public service – such as school or a medical point – is watched with apprehension and fear, lest it be the first signal of a coming liquidation.105 More generally, the highly dynamic nature of administrative changes – including those of renaming – can be read as expressions of how power converses with people.

Gender aspects of agglomeration

In Chapter 2 (‘Antonova and the “Red Trackers”’) I turned attention to the fact that all members of Antonova’s patriotic circle ‘The Red Trackers’ were girls. Many of them came from resettled families, and their heavily traumatized childhood was very similar to what we learn from Masha’s story (p.145), and from that of innumerable children of northern families, whose formative years passed in ‘national’ boarding schools (Lyarskaya 2013; Vitebsky 2005: 186–93f; Ssorin-Chaikov 2003: 75ff; Kasten 1998; Slezkine 1994a: 219–46).

The available evidence from Lovozero District – both from memories of town-employed former inmates, and that of herders – offer good reasons to claim that, unlike girls, most Internat boys would not join in cul-

105 Consider for instance a recent decision of the Lovozero District Municipal Administration to close down as of 1 August 2011 the primary school in Sosnovka ‘in connection with the absence of a contingent of pupils on the territory of the village of Sosnovka’ (Lovozerskaya pravda No 24 of 3 June 2011, p. 4). See also Artieva (2013; 2011).
tural and ideological circles of ‘The Red Trackers’ type. As I pointed out in Chapter 2, they tended to be the poorer students, and by common memory of schoolmates, it was, in fact, difficult to keep them in school at all. In keeping with the very pronounced gender divisions in ‘grown up’ society, boys’ interests would be in ‘technical’ and ‘appropriative’, as opposed to ‘cultural’ and ‘ideological’ directions. Sergey’s story is a good illustration of this gender-related division.

Sergey (56, fictional name) was born, as he put it ‘in the open (tundra)’ (na ulitse)\(^{106}\). His mother worked as a female camp worker (chum- rabotnitsa) in Gremikha’s kolkhoz ‘Iskra’, and after its liquidation, both his mother and father moved to work in Krasnoshchel’e’s ‘In Memory of Lenin’ and its Brigade No 1. When the time for his birth came, his mother was transported by reindeer draft team to Krasnoshchel’e and its medical unit (FAP)\(^{107}\). Before reaching the village – some seventy kilometres from the tundra camp – his mother gave birth on the sled.

Sergey and his younger brother Kolya studied in Lovozero’s national boarding school. Unlike some of the other children from tundra-related families, the two brothers were not separated from their parents. By this time their father was working as a tractor-driver, subsequently all-purpose track-vehicle driver – vezdekhodchik. Eventually both brothers inherited this profession and spent all of their working lives transporting people and goods from the village to the tundra camps. By the time of the interview in the autumn of 2010 both were pensioners from reindeer herding.

The conversation with Sergey was carried out in his garage in Lovozero. The significance of this auxiliary building in a local – and generally Russian man’s life has already been pointed out earlier (p.94). In essence, the garage is the place where a local man would spend much of his life, get together with friends and garage-neighbours, and build up his prestige in local male society by the state of the garage itself, the machinery in possession, and, above all else – by his mechanical skills.

Sergey’s garage could boast many items answering to these critical parameters. The garage was located close to the centre of town – a safeguard against garage theft, unlike garages and boat houses on the periphery of the village, or as it is disparagingly spoken of lesser and remoter locations – ‘na oshibe’ (‘on the outskirts’, by extension: ‘lonely’, ‘unprotected’ garages). The garage was built of solid grey brick – a one-storied box-like structure in a row of similar ones, some five by ten metres in size. As in the better garages, an electric radiator was installed along one of the walls,
so that a temperature a little above the zero point could be maintained during the winter. A great asset in Sergey’s garage was a repair pit in the centre, as well as a winch with a block-and-tackle hanging from a steel rail in the ceiling – all necessary contraptions for removing an engine from its housing. The garage gave protection to Sergey’s car, as well as to his ‘foreign brand’ (inomarka) snowmobile: a four-stroke, three cylinder ‘Yamaha Pro’ – one of Sergey’s prized possessions. Apart from these two machines, there was still room for a joiner’s bench, a great assortment of tools and instruments, tarpaulins for sleds, numerous lengths of ropes, petrol and oil canisters of all sorts and sizes, skis and rubber boots, tundra clothing, and dried reindeer hides. Other, more water-related items were kept in Sergey’s boat house along the river – another ‘man’s house’, where women rarely if ever set foot.

By the electric radiator in Sergey’s garage, as was the general rule, there was a small table with rough stools by it and a smaller fan radiator. This was the place for conversations, drinking tea and vodka, and the next-to-obligatory chain-smoking. As in herding camps and other ‘men’s houses’ the table was rarely cleared. On its rough and stained surface stood chipped mugs and glasses, overflowing cans in lieu of ashtrays, the ubiquitous plastic electric kettle, and remains from past snacks. Lack of order and cleanliness can be seen as a gender-political statement in garages, celebrating the exclusivity of male space through distance from the spotless order of the women-dominated flats with their gleaming kitchen surfaces, rubber plants in drawing rooms, and cabinets holding crystal ware (Buchli 1999; Boym 1994; Dunham 1990:52f; Fitzpatrick 1988).

The occasion for my talk with Sergey had to do with a repair of a Soviet-era ‘Buran’ snowmobile, which I had damaged during a tundra trip. This required some lecturing about how to deal with the machine, which in turn elicited reminiscences of childhood zeal in mastering the skills I evidently badly needed.

‘The first time I repaired a snowmobile’, Sergey proudly said, ‘I was twelve and at the boarding school. There was one of the first Soviet makes in my father’s garage, one of the very first, those – with the two skis in front. My father said: “Well, here is the base (of the machine), over there the engine (dvizhok), you’ll find the other parts here and there.” And I put it together and set it going.’ (Lovozero, Nov. 2010)

The age of twelve might raise an eyebrow here and there, but I stand by the veracity of Sergey’s words. I well remember a day in April 2010 and a stopover from Krasnoshchel’e to Lovozero at Corral Base ‘Belaya Golovka’ – a camp huddled among the hills of the Keyvi Ridge, some 60 km south-
east of Lovozero. It is the usual stop-over place for snowmobile riders, travelling the 150 km winter road between the two villages.

In the space between the three cabins of the camp was a young boy, not more than thirteen years of age by his looks, who had taken apart a very battered looking ‘Buran’ snowmobile down to its flat-iron shaped platform base. While Vladi Vladimirova and I were drinking a hurried cup of tea and chatting with some friends who happened to be there, the boy – from Krasnoshchel’e as it turned out – put the snowmobile back together and sped off to his home village all by himself. None of the herd-ers seemed very impressed, they just grinned, as if to say: ‘They think they know everything there is to know about the tundra, these boys.’

Boys learn avidly masculine skills at a very young age. When driving a snowmobile in the streets of Lovozero I would be often waylaid by young boys of pre-school age – some not more than five – who would ask me to take them for a ride on the sled behind. Sometimes a whole group of them would take advantage of me slowing down to jump on the sled without me seeing them, and after a time suddenly jump off with shrieks of laughter. In front of the apartment blocks’ entrances, while I prepared the machine for a ride, a group of boys would gather around. They would make grave observations about the state of the machine and offer suggestions about improvements and repairs.

The separation of gender roles from early childhood points to the tundra as a principally male domain – a situation to be understood as much influenced by the rapid urban growth of the regional population in the sovkhoist decades. Education in the family, in which young boys play with mechanical toys, and girls with dolls, characteristic of mainstream Russian society, has tended to influence both indigenous Sami family educational practices and those of related para-indigenous communities. One has to recall the relatively late origins of such education, in some cases beginning only in the 1920s (see further below). Sami women’s traditional ability to move about on their own in the tundra much impressed Charnolusski during his fieldwork in the late 1920. He writes:

About (Sami) endurance in matters of walking one can judge by the fact that an old woman from Lumbovka, who is in the habit of making annual walking trips to (the village of) Yokanga covers a distance of 60 kms in less than 24 hours. (Charnoluskiy 1930a:122)

Volkov notes the importance of sheep-breeding for Sami families and the fact that it had been principally in the hands of women. (Volkov 1946/1996:48–9) Tending sheep in tundra conditions certainly requires
the ability to walk distances on the range. The last time I saw women taking care of sheep was when visiting in November 1995 the still extant Brigade 5 of Tundra.

The symmetrical participation of Sami women and men in inland fishing is well-known (e.g., Charnoluskiy 1930a: 90). Ongoing tendencies related to this can still be observed. I well remember a bright sunny day at the summer Sami festival at Lake Popovskoe near Lovozero in 1998, when Sami women successfully participated in a rowing contest and took the first prizes. We also should remember the role Sami, Komi, and other tundra-connected women played during the Patriotic War years and the decade of recovery after its end. Old women in Krasnoshchel’e described to me how in those difficult years, when they were only fifteen or sixteen, they had cared for the herds under the guidance of some old men. All able-bodied herders, as well as the draft-deer of the collective farms had been mobilized for the war effort (‘Reindeer Army’).

Women’s connectedness with the tundra seems to have gradually diminished after the liquidation of tundra villages and the ensuing resettlement of their inhabitants. Elisabeth Scheller’s observations are particularly valuable in this respect:

Many Sami women with whom I have been working in Lovozero over the years and who are by now over 75, had worked and moved freely about the tundra in their youth. That is true, in the first instance, of women who had been working in reindeer husbandry brigades, but it applied also to many others. Many such women, who had later moved to urban jobs, had as young girls grown up in the tundra and had acquired the skills of reindeer herding and inland as well as coastal fishing. After adopting the ‘modern’ lifestyle of urban residence their link with the outdoors had continued. However, the younger generations (of women) had already grown up in the towns and various settlements after the liquidation of tundra villages and had been thus deprived of acquiring tundra skills. Their formative years passed at boarding school, they had not been trained in tundra ways and skills, they became distanced from nature. 108 When one communicates with them this is very noticeable. When there are sisters, for instance, elder sisters have completely different lifestyle preferences and worldviews compared to the younger. (Personal communication, February 2014)

By 1994–95 when I began working with herders, only a very few women still worked in the camps, principally as chumrabotnitsy or female camp

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108 Here a gender difference protrudes as students had the chance of joining the Circle ‘Young Reindeer Herder’ (see: National Northern Lyceum) at least as of 1974. It seems, however, that only boys did that. Conversely, boys did not join a prominent ‘ideological’ circle as ‘Red Trackers’.
workers (see below). Their daily chores rarely led them to leave the huts and go beyond the immediate vicinity. The routine would be broken only at berry-picking time, towards the latter half of July and then August. Late August would be the time to go back to the village because the school year would soon begin.

The palpable diminishing of tundra distances for women evidently stabilized during the postwar sovkhoist period, with the radical urbanizing influences brought by wave after wave of migrant workers. This also led to a pattern of Sami women who married labour migrants and would head southwards during holiday times. There would be family and kin on the husband’s side to visit in the ‘malaya rodina’ (‘Little Birthland’) of the husband, which involved long journeys across the vast country. I know of many cases when grandparents in some Ukrainian small town or village, or elsewhere – five, six thousand kilometres away – would be waiting for years to get the chance of seeing grandchildren born in Murmansk Region. This factor leads people to leave the tundra during the holiday season. It applies also to the much less frequent situation of reindeer herders with relatives on the wife’s side who live far away. I remember an occasion when a brigade leader from a neighbouring brigade had to be ferried across Ked'kyavr – where my camp had stood since 2000 – because his mother-in-law from a village near Novosibirsk had fallen ill. By boat, ATV and finally train the long journey had been accomplished by the herder and his wife to care for the old woman. With cross-border travel and employment opportunities expanding in recent years, many people prefer to visit children working in Norway or Finland, or have married there, rather than spend holiday time – which is two months in the Far North – at tundra camp. Enforced celibacy among Sami and other reindeer herders is quite frequent, so long-distance travel during holidays, by contrast, is rarely a concern.

Due to such late Soviet and postsoviet processes drawing people away from the tundra, it is now rare to see women ‘trespassing’ on what has come over the last decades to be perceived as exclusively male tundra territory. When it does happen it becomes sensational news. Consider the following story a young woman who is a foreign researcher, shared with me:

In 2007 I made a trip by boat from Krasnoshchel’e to Chal’mne Varre with a friend, a Sami/Komi young woman from Krasnoshchel’e – a local Sami political activist as it happened. We rowed down with the current (of the River Ponoy) to Chal’mne Varre [80 km], lived there for a few days in an old cabin and then made it back all by ourselves to Krasnoshchel’e on the same boat. After our journey was over it became THE story that peo-
people told about us in both Krasnoshchel’e and Lovozero, and even in Murmansk. Especially in male conversation the story came out as shocking news, that is, that we – young women, girls – had accomplished such an incredible feat. They were shocked about the fact that we had rowed the boat all on our own, but the most shocking for the men was the surprising fact that we had managed to start the engine. I don’t remember the brand, what I remember is that it was a Russian make and it was quite a job to get it going, but we finally succeeded. During my first visit to Krasnoshchel’e in the winter of 2006, there went round another piece of sensational news in the village, namely that a local young girl was seen driving around on a snowmobile all by herself, both in the village and out of it – in the tundra. (E.S. Jan. 2014)

These are rare occasions indeed and it is no wonder that they turn into sensational news, widely circulated, as my informant describes. The ‘shocking’ exploits stand in good relief against a background of present separations. For the majority of urban and tundra village women the tundra that opens up from their windows is a place rarely visited and when it is, that happens under male guidance and protection. Some lively interest awakens when the berry- and mushroom-gathering season comes, as mentioned above. Still, not only in Lovozero, but also in Krasnoshchel’e and other remote villages, women rarely go on a trip that reaches more than a few kilometres beyond the village.¹⁰⁹

When it comes to connecting with the land, women’s leading role is in cultivating the potato-patch. Although it may be on the outskirts of town in the worst case, it is ideally in the yard of an old house, inherited from parents with roots in town (i.e., Lovozero) from before the period of labour-migration and agglomeration.

Ethnographic writing suggests that the tundra-town gender asymmetries (Lyarskaya 2013, 2010; Povoroznyuk et al. 2010; Burykin 2002, 1999), found in the district towns and even in remote villages, seems to have first appeared in the 1920s. Ethnographic research at that time shows tundra-town gender divisions were already emerging. In field-notes from 1927, Charnoluskiy notes that Sami men from the Yokanga and Lumbovka pogosts were joking about their women turning to ‘Russian ways’ (‘oni obruseli’), and no longer being ‘fit for tundra life’ (1930a:138). From this he concluded that ‘it is not to be doubted that the Lapp women of the mentioned pogosts are losing touch with life in turf-huts, or tundra camps’ (ibid.; see also Kertselli 1923:89–90).

¹⁰⁹ For a similar situation at the eastern end of the Russian Subarctic (Yakutia) see Willerslev (2010).
Going along with the official ideological efforts to sedentarise nomadic peoples, Charnoluskiy saw this woman-led trend as a positive phenomenon. What he was saying was meant to assist the state policy of sedentarisation, as was suggested in the subtitle of his book: ‘An attempt to describe the nomadic state of the Lapps of the eastern part of the Kola Peninsula’. Charnoluskiy’s main point throughout the book was that ethnographic evidence pointed to sedentarising tendencies already present among the tundra-dependent population of the Kola Peninsula. The state authorities had only to encourage and support such trends to bring sedentarisation to a successful conclusion, without having to impose sedentarisation as a new and alien practice. His point about women forming the spearhead of the trend is emphatically directed at this argument.

Charnoluskiy’s observations and recommendations for further sedentarising measures by the state, suggest, yet again, that top-down campaigns often succeeded rather than preceded spontaneous grass-roots trends. This supports the argument I make above about the ways that grass-root agency tends to be overlooked especially in relation to the campaigns during the Stalinist ‘second revolution’. Agglomeration, despite its devastating consequences, should be examined critically from this vantage point also. The strongly gendered town-tundra fault-line that I have illustrated above placed ambitious young women on career tracks undreamt of in the context of pre-agglomeration semi-nomadism. The highest career prospect for a woman in the far-flung kolkhoz and later sovkhoz reindeer herding brigades was that of *chumrabotnitsa*, a camp cook and caretaker. Beyond this, the impossibility of leading a normal family life at reindeer-herding camps was also a critical factor. For all its attention to children’s health and upbringing, Soviet power pointedly neglected such matters when it came to family life and children’s upbringing at tundra camps. During more than two decades I have witnessed numerous attempts by families to carve out a normal life at tundra camps, but they generally have failed. In the absence of basic sanitary conditions (no running water, primitive toilet facilities, etc.), and lacking a separate hut for the family or a minimal degree of privacy, young women tend to leave after a year, or at most two, of bravely attempting to stay at camps. There are exceptions of course. In one case the wife of a person with a high tundra position accompanies him whenever he is at his respective brigade camp, for which purpose a separate hut has been built for them. Due to the much diminished crew of another brigade, a formerly full hut was left for the use

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110 The case occurs as an episode in a recent TV documentary (http://murman.tv/vesti/vesti-24/1742-programma-vremya-saami-ot-21 yanvarya.html)
of two middle-aged couples. The general trend, however, is that family life in the tundra has become a rare thing.

The indifference to the issue of tundra family life on the part of Soviet power can only be understood as part of the overall sedentarisation policy. That, in its turn, undoubtedly motivated already present tendencies for ‘turning to Russian ways’ by former tundra dwellers in the sense of seeking life-ways beyond the tundra, as the herdsmen with whom Charnoluskiy worked joked back in the late 1920s.

G. I. Anokhin, in his work on the contemporary state of the Sami family (1963), based on fieldwork done in 1957–58 (ibid. 258), joins in the opinion stated by Charnoluskiy (1930a:103). Anokhin claims that by the late 1920s there was already a well-established pattern of women marked exogamous marriage preferences present in Sami society. He writes:

The young men would choose (as a marriage partner) ‘a real Lapp girl’ (nastovashchuyu lopku), (who had to be) ‘a skilful master of sewing clothes and boots’, ‘would follow traditions’ (obryadnymu), ‘would keep the house clean’ (chisotku), and ‘would know about all ways of Lapp life’. The young women, on the other hand, would begin to experience nomadic life as burdensome after their seventeenth year of age, would not as a rule aspire to stick to that kind of (everyday) life. In that respect their aspirations differed: they would prefer to have as marriage partners young men from among the Russians, the Finns, the Norwegians, or the Russified sedentarized Sami of the village of Ponoy. That revealed their inclination for a sedentary way of life, and their apprehensions as regarded the burdens of nomadic treks and the prospect of bearing them till the end of their lives. (Anokhin 1963: 258; Charnoluskiy 1930a: 103)

Women’s marriage preferences, as both Charnoluskiy’s work from the late 1920s, and Anokhin’s from the late 1950s stress, point away from the tundra – a centrifugal movement preceding agglomeration itself. Agglomeration, in this way, shows features similar to that of the private-in-the-collective: there is evidence that a pre-disposition for the course of events unleashed by both campaigns already existed\(^{111}\), while the way in which they actually unfolded was far from what could have been imagined. One may say that conversing with power is a rather dangerous game in which a wish may get fulfilled in the end, but in a way and at a price never bargained for.\(^{112}\)

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\(^{111}\) Consider spontaneous collective appropriation of private property and land already in the first months after the February Revolution of 1917 (Polyakov 1985: 276–313).

\(^{112}\) Bulgarian folk wisdom captures this by the rhetorical adage: ‘Have I prayed to you wrongly, My God, or you have wrongly understood me?’
When agglomeration did happen it was at the price of liquidation of tundra villages and the development of huge housing problems at the hosting central villages. Marriage opportunities in the new urbanising context increased very considerably the choice of marriage partners. The more central places were offering a rapidly expanding marriage pool from the growing contingent of incoming labour migrants from the south. Gradually, the names that Sami women acquired after marriage became more and more pronouncedly Russian, Ukrainian, or Belorussian. Less and less young Sami women married into their own people. Such an exogamous tendency became especially noticeable as regarded marriages with Sami reindeer herders. This explains why Sami demography in the 1980s and later shows enforced celibacy among Sami men reaching alarming proportions – according to Vatonena of as much as 70% – paralleled by serious alcohol dependence, low life-expectancy, and frequent suicides. (Bogoyavlenskiy 2008, 1985; Gutsol et al. 2007; Dobrov et al. 1985; Vatonena 1989) What Sami men joked about in the twenties thus led to a rather bitter result.

One lasting effect of agglomeration is the firm positioning of a significant part of Sami women in the ‘budget sphere’: the state-funded administrative, educational, cultural, health, social service, and other offices, which came to abound in Lovozero/Revda. Formerly tundra-residing women of Komi, Nenets, or mixed origins, also followed this trajectory away from the tundra – that is, away from the few jobs available for women in reindeer herding, and towards urban offices – which were much more attractive than remaining in the tundra as chumrabotnitsy. But even those women – herders’ wives or partners – who were willing to stay on in the camps, were discouraged from doing so after a change in sovkhoz regulations implemented with the coming of perestroyka.

The reason for this unwise administrative move is to be sought in the attempts for introducing the system of khozraschet, already mentioned in connection of Kosygin’s reforms of the late 1960s (p.141). In reindeer herding, as in every other economic sphere, it was part of an effort to increase economic efficiency in brigades by balancing operational costs and salaries against production results.

The system may be considered the last attempt that came ‘from above’ with the ambition to improve the economic health of command socialism. Khozraschet in Kola reindeer herding, however, served to restrict even further family life at tundra camps. Only one chumrabotnitsa position, with a paid monthly salary and attendant social security provisions, came
to be allowed per brigade. At the time I am talking about, that is until the onset of perestroyka in the mid-eighties, Sovkhoz Tundra of Lovozoero used to have as many as ten brigades plus two fresh water fishing brigades. In Pamyati Lenina of Krasnoshchel’e there were another seven herding teams – four in the central village itself, two in Kanevka, one in Sosnovka, with the addition of two sea-fishing brigades in that village. With an average brigade complement of eight men, it meant that only one of them could have his wife with him on a salaried chumrabotnitsa job. Usually this person would be the brigade leader’s wife.

When I was working with Brigade 3 of Tundra in 1995–96, this was indeed the case: only Lyudmila, the brigade leader’s wife, had a paid position. At one point there were three other women in the camp, but all of them were unpaid. When I moved to the Sosnovka Brigade later on, there was no woman in the herding camp at the Tuzhnye Rvi Brigade Base. Dima, a boy of sixteen, used to work as chumrabotnik (male camp-worker/cook) in the brigade, the latter consisting of five people altogether. In Krasnoshchel’e’s Brigade 1, where I was between 1997 and 1999, the situation was the same: the traditionally female role was performed by a man, this time – a pensioned-off herder. Such is the situation there until today. In Brigades 1 and 8 of Tundra at lakes Porosozero and Kolm’yavr respectively, there were three women between the two brigades in 2000 when I began working with them. Today, twelve years later, there is only the wife of the brigade leader who has recently joined him in a temporary position. The wife of the Head Veterinary Technician also accompanies him during corralling sessions. The only brigade with women in the ‘right wing’ of Tundra has remained to be Brigade 2 at Lake Lyavozero. There are two women there – both herders’ partners – but, to my knowledge, only one of them has a salaried job. It is thus the case that as of today, from Krasnoshchel’e in the southeast to Lake Lovozoero in the northwest, on a herding territory stretching over two hundred kilometres as the crow flies, there are no more than five or six women commuting to herding camps in connection with various seasonal herding activities. The summer period from June to September is usually

114 Rasmussen gives a map with 10 brigade routes for Tundra as late as the mid-1990s; 5 for Pamyati Lenina/Olenevod, as also the herding personnel of MOOS at Loparskoe (1995: 53). However Digurov mentiones 9 brigades with a total crew of 101 employees by 1987 (1987: 4).
115 In the late fifties the number of fishing brigades in Tundra used to be two with as many as five links (zvenya) altogether with some thirty people working in them, and a harvesting plan of 57 tons of fish (Morozov 1958).
the time of unbroken residence at camp for at least one herder, to whom relatives or friends with their family may come for short periods of time.

The tendency for Sami women ‘to take to Russian ways’, recorded by Charnoluskiy from the jokes of Sami men in 1927, and confirmed by Anokhin in 1963, fits with global tendencies in peripheral locations. Such harsh measures as depriving parents of parental rights and bringing up children in state institutions, which became common with the onset of agglomeration, also motivated young people to seek ways out of a deprived and stigmatized status and look for opportunities through education and the urban centres created through labour migration. Especially for women, the gate to the tundra was firmly shut in career terms, and would only be symbolically opened on ‘poeticizing’ occasions.

Urbanisation

The gender fault lines between town and tundra, and, especially, between the domains of ‘budget sphere’ vs. tundra land use activities reflect tendencies that were accelerated by kolkhoz consolidation and demographic resettlement. Did these latter two processes, along with the industrial, administrative, and military expansion in the district, mark the decisive turning point?

Nikolay Kharuzin, in his famous work of the late 1880s (‘The Russian Lapps’), describes an absence of exogamous marriages. He declares categorically: ‘Lapp women (…) marry exclusively Lapp men and only in exceptional cases would they take for husbands representatives of the neighbouring nations’ (Kharuzin 1890: 261). Taking into account Kharuzin’s heavy reliance on the extensive experience of Father Shche-
koldin116, an Orthodox priest who had devoted his life to the Sami people of the eastern part of the Peninsula, there is good reason to believe what he says. The beginning of erosion of this pattern are thus not earlier than the changes on the Peninsula that eventually turned it, over the course of the twentieth century, into the most urbanised region of the subarctic world. The process can be seen as stretching back to the ‘first industrialisation’ of the Peninsula, that is, the building of the Petrozavodsk-Murman Coast railway line (1915–16), and the founding of Murmansk itself.

116 Apart from data provided by local priests among the Sami, Kharuzin based his book mostly on half-fictional stories taken from Schefferus (1971[1674]), and supported by a visit to the town of Kola of a month and a half in the summer of 1887. Serious health reasons had made it impossible for him to carry out more extensive fieldwork or visit the main herding areas.
(1916) as a railway junction and port. In a much more decisive and protracted way it continued with what may be termed a ‘second industrialisation’: one beginning with a determined mineral resource exploration in the 1920s, the First Five-Year Plan (1929–32), resumption of industrialisation after the war, and its culmination by the mid-1980s.

For the Sami people and for the tundra-dependent population in general, all of this spelled contraction of traditionally used territories, as well as a heavily traumatic succession of resettlements. It eventually led to concentration in the apartment blocks of Lovozero and other regional towns. Seen from another perspective, however, this was also a process of increasing access to new career paths, as well as marriage possibilities offered by the rapidly emerging towns. A similar tundra-town gender shift has been widely noted among other groups of Sami and other subarctic peoples as well (Hamilton et al. 1996; Hamilton and Seyfrit 1994, 1993; Fogel-Chance 1993) The one we read about, for instance, in Tim Ingold’s detailed study of the Skolt Sami people (1976) is highly relevant. It is therefore against the background of global urbanising tendencies that the ‘defeminisation’ of the tundra is to be understood. Similar processes took place in the Fennoscandic part of Sami land (Sapmi), as pointed out earlier (p.41f). Concerning particularly pastoralist peoples worldwide, the tendency can be said to be global (Dahl 1987). In the case of Murmansk Region, however, as well as in the world of indigenous Russia as a whole, the trend was critically amplified by heavy-handed state-run sedentarising campaigns.

A question to be asked at this point is: what has kept men, albeit a small number of them, still working in the tundra?\footnote{For a discussion of the same issue among Sami men in the Nordic region see Eikjok (2007:110–112); for Yamal see Lyarskaya (2010).} Below I discuss the phenomenon in the context of the full flowering of sovkhoism.

‘Poetic’ and ‘substantive’ texts in reindeer husbandry

Like many aspects of Soviet life, reindeer husbandry distinguished between substantive and non-substantive uses of language when creating texts about itself. The distinction originates in the very nature of Soviet talk, discussed in Chapter 1, in which ideological text-producing machinery veils, in a ‘culturally intimate’ (Herzfeld 2005) dialogic arrangement
with power, problematic or sensitive aspects of reality. These poetics are rarely publicly addressed, being typically circulated only in exclusive and secretive contexts.

In a specification of this general arrangement, the substantive/non-substantive textual production as regards reindeer husbandry is rooted in the general compromise that provided the foundation of the second and decisive collectivisation wave (Chapter 3). The compromise, as discussed in that chapter, concerns the vital matter of the private plot allowed to a kolkhoz or sovkhoz member, with its limited stock of domestic animals and poultry, and, very importantly, the possibility to sell surplus produce on the unregulated or ‘kolkhoz market’.

Taken at its face value, the compromise does not give any obvious reason for being veiled by texts, hiding its essence by some ornate ideological wording, or what I have been referring to as agitprop poeticisations. And yet, there was a serious reason. If one speaks plainly, one would have to say that a kolkhoz member being allowed to have a private plot led to the development of what Creed was earlier mentioned to call ‘institutionalised theft’ (p.17f), that is, the closing of the administrative eye to wide-spread practices of pilfering from state property. This is where the veiling over of an uncomfortable reality becomes necessary.

As it was shown in the previous chapter, the private plot arrangement in Kola reindeer husbandry was principally realized by allowing households to keep a certain number of reindeer that were grazed together with the ‘collective’ herd, for ‘private use’. In the official idiom this stock was called ‘lichnye oleni’ (personal deer), while in everyday informal speech they would be called ‘chastnye’ (private). We remember the original reason for such an allowance: a reindeer herding family needed a number of draft bucks to assist them in domestic tasks, such as transporting firewood and other loads, providing transport for family members, etc. Bunakov’s evidence (1934) led, at the very start of collectivisation in the Kola, to personal (‘private’) deer allowances being determined according to the size of the household. During the following decades this developed into a ‘flat’ allowance that changed over time, but generally numbered thirty to fifty head per active herder, not per household. A household, consequently, could come to have the use of (in practice: own) much above that num-

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118 Rosenthal (2002: 293f) positions the decisive beginning of this process at the time of the creation of the Union of Soviet Writers (1932) and the adoption of Socialist Realism (1934) as the only acceptable manner of writing – in my terms here, of poeticising life. His stressing of the close – supervising – link between managing art through a single, uniform mode of expression, and work in the system of cultural enlightenment (kul’turno-prosvetitel’skaya rabota) (ibid.), is also to be noted.
ber. More than one family member could work in a brigade, for instance, a herder’s wife could have a number of personal deer inherited from her parents, etc.

It is unclear when exactly this change from household to herder deer quota was introduced, but it added a crucial concern to herders’ lives: what would happen with their personal (‘private’) deer when they got pensioned off? In a similar manner, the fate of personal-private deer became a matter of critical importance to the herder’s heirs, his wife and children. At the extreme and most tense end of this long chain of concerns stood those heirs who were not employed in reindeer herding, had no relatives in reindeer herding (or had severed their links with them), and had moved out of the district altogether. Such people would either give up their attempts to identify their deer and benefit from them, or would seek to shorten the distance between themselves and their deer somehow, like appearing at corralling sessions whenever possible.

The institution of personal-private deer possession was destined to create lasting tensions between kolkhoz/sovkhoz managements and herders. The wish to control and see some benefit from one’s personal-private deer is only a small part of a complex web of tensed relationships. Whichever aspect of sovkhoist reindeer husbandry one chooses to consider, such as unravelling the complexities of brigade and ‘wing’ hierarchies, the issue of poaching and its varieties, and, ultimately, the very system of reindeer husbandry that has come to dominate, at the heart of the matter stands the issue of personal/private deer.

Ideological veils during early post-war sovkhoism (1950s–60s)

One looks in vain for even the tiniest mention of the institution of personal-private deer in official popular texts that describe the state of affairs after the war – still a time of kolkhoz reindeer husbandry The following publications dating back to that period reflect this: Fedotov’s brochures about agriculture in Murmansk Region (1955a); of Kolkhoz Tundra in the 1950s-early 1960s (1955b; 1961), and another brochure of his from 1955, about the reindeer husbandry kolkhoz in Krasnoshchel’e (1955c). To this list of brochures, belonging to the exotic genre of agricultural and

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119 Kolkhoz (later sovkhoz) members used to receive old-age pensions, paid out by the respective collective farm. In 1964 a law ‘On pensions and allowances for kolkhoz members’ came into force whereupon pensions became the exclusive responsibility of the state. (cf. Guseynov 1999)
reindeer herding agitprop poetics, Goldstein and Kambulin’s “The best reindeer herding brigade of Kolkhoz “Tundra”” of 1956 is also to be added. On the academic side of the genre one should mention Gudzenko’s dissertation of 1954 and that of Kiselev – of 1967. One may add here also the great body of reindeer herding reportage in Lovozerskaya pravda, covering this period of early postwar ‘kolkhoism’ (literally, not yet sovkhoism), as well as similar stereotypical publications in the regional press.

In the standard reindeer herding literature of the 1950s–60s, represented by the short list above, the private deer issue is conspicuous, as the expression goes, by its complete absence. The closest thing to a mention is not about reindeer, but about other domestic stock. In an example from Krasnoshchel’e, readers are told about the higher standard of living that the villagers had come to enjoy by the mid-1950s: ‘The kolkhoz members of Kolkhoz ‘Krasnoshchel’e’ live now in a cultured and prosperous way (zhit v kul’turno i zazhitochno). Almost all of them have in their personal possession cows and sheep.’ (Fedotov 1955c: 46)

Possession of reindeer for personal use is not mentioned as proof of increased levels of culture and prosperity. This is in accord with the fact that the issue of personal-private deer had disappeared from public textual production since about the mid-1930s. As it was noted in the previous chapter, the matter was openly discussed at the very beginning of collectivisation (Budovnits 1931), and then again towards the conclusion of its second wave (Bunakov 1934:126f). The next important mention is that of Volkov (1996 [1948]:127).

Volkov’s mention of the matter was destined to remain, to my knowledge, the only case till as late as 1979, when the first edition of ‘The Soviet Sami’ (Kiselev and Kiseleva 1987 [1979]) was published. This will be discussed below.

About a decade later – in 1988 – the topic of personal-private deer surfaced again. There appeared a publication in the Murmansk newspaper Polyarnaya pravda in which a leading figure of Sovkhoz Tundra – the Head Vet – was exposed for getting bribes from herders in the form of reindeer, which subsequently became his personal property in exchange for overlooking the herders shirking their duties (Makhaev 1988). This revelation can be attributed to the general climate of the ‘high perestroyka’ years.

The total silence enveloping the personal-private deer issue for most of the sovkhoist period, bespeaks the extreme sensitivity of the topic, placing it firmly and for several decades in the long list of district ‘unmentionables’.
Reindeer-herding ‘mentionables’

Fedotov’s brochures mentioned above (1961; 1956; 1955a, b, c), as also those by Goldstein and Kambulin (1956), are good examples of the characteristic style of the reindeer husbandry agitprop genre. By analysing it one can see more clearly the making of texts fit for general circulation at home, as well as for the rare foreign reader.

The texts are structured as a conventionalized narrative of the ‘long journey’ type (Slezkine 1994: 292ff). The beginning of the long journey would be described by a paragraph stressing the abject conditions of life for the reindeer herding community before the advent of soviet power. From brochure to brochure, such a ‘beginning-of-the-journey’ paragraph would be reproduced with only minor changes. Taken at random from Fedotov’s ‘A Kolkhoz Deep in the Tundra’ (1955c), it runs like this:

Life was hard and plagued by illiteracy (bezprosvetnaya) for the Komi and the Sami in the old, pre-revolutionary days. They dragged out a miserable, half-hungry existence, wandering from place to place in the search of a crust of bread. The Great October Socialist Revolution freed the Komi and the Sami from their age-long state of deprivation. (Fedotov 1955c:7)

After a succession of tragic events and heroic deeds, culminating in the sacrifice and heroism of the Patriotic War, the journey continues with ever greater success. In reindeer husbandry, such success would be measured in the rigidly categorical jargon, introduced by the institution of socialist competition (sotsialisticheskoe sorevnovanie). There is no space here to fully describe this part of Soviet life: I mention only some of its central tropes as used in reindeer husbandry.

These are mostly poetic in the sense I have been exploring. I am not saying that tropes entirely departed from ‘substantive’ reality – socialist competition indexes may have been – at times – more or less close to the facts. What I consider far more important, however, is that the overall emphasis on the ever greater production of meat was completely ‘poetic’ in a language-functional sense. It imaginatively exploited the possibilities that the jargon provided, presenting a performance of rhetorical skills on the theme of reindeer husbandry. The sober fact of the matter was, as mentioned above, that when reindeer meat was produced it was often poorly stored after slaughtering\(^\text{120}\), and would quickly lose its value. The

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\(^{120}\) Slaughtering itself was done in a primitive manner at an equally primitive slaughtering site (zaboyniy punkt) on the outskirts of Lovozero and the three tundra villages. A change of the situation was introduced only in 1992 when in the newly opened facility of the Swedish
whole exercise – as in much of the Soviet economy – was less a concern with profit and usable material production than with ideological production of symbolic forms that legitimated Soviet power through supposed success of its economic and social policies.

Looked at from such a vantage point, quantifying was the message. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, the specific tropes of reindeer herding poetics are thus tropes of success-attributing quantification of salient aspects of husbandry. Such are the numbers of reindeer by the end of the year as (a) planned, and (b) fulfilled, which allows to measure a brigade’s annual achievement in respect of the particular index in absolute and percentage terms. Likewise, there are percentages given for preservation of adult deer, production of calves per hundred mothers, preservation of calves, meat production in metric centners per hundred ‘January’ (i.e. after slaughter) head, etc. Other tables reported veterinary activities, building of fences, anti-mosquito sheds (tenevye navesi) and intermediary camps, supplying brigades with mechanical vehicles, two-way radios, electric generators, as well as other technical improvements. Further data would describe herding activities like calving, labour force and time spent on herding itself, guarding against wolves and other predators, fattening, division of the herds for more effective breeding, and provision of sufficient winter grazing.

Emphases that followed high-level political changes would be instantly reflected in quantification tables. Nikita Khrushchev’s agricultural policies, for instance, required diversified economic development in agriculture (mnogootraslovost’), which introduced a new measure of socialist competition stating how much economic gain came from reindeer husbandry in comparison to other – ‘diversifying’ – activities. These included dairy- and pig-farming, sheep breeding, fur farming, and crop raising. It was only thanks to the exigencies of the subarctic climate that Khrushchev’s favourite crop, maize, did not reach the Kola.

Socialist competition campaigns would respond with alacrity to all twists of the Party line and state policy – those two being actually one. Local texts would follow suit and proclaim to higher authorities that tasks decreed ‘above’ have mobilized action ‘below’. The following excerpt illustrates the point:

(We shall) do away with formalism in social competition. The agricultural labourers of the District have actively joined in fulfilling the national task – to catch up with the United States of America in per capita produc-

Company ‘NorrFrys-Polarica’ in Lovozero the methods of slaughtering, processing, and storing became fully compatible with EU standards.
tion of meat, milk, and butter. The first results appeared already in the past
year. The majority of kolkhoz members overfulfilled the plan for produc-
tion of reindeer meat. Productivity has grown in public [i.e. kolkhoz] cat-
tle-breeding as well. Compared to the previous year, milk yields for every
milking cow have risen by 513 litres (...). (Nikolaev 1958)

In terms of personal well-being, success would be quantified according to
two key parameters: material prosperity (zazhitochnost’), and cultural life
(kul’turnost’). During the early postwar decades, material prosperity
would be quantified in terms of work-days (trudodni) and the proceeds
from them. A typical text throughout the genre would run like this: ‘The
leader of Reindeer Herding Brigade No 2 Dem’yan Grigor’evich Teren-
tiev earned 967 work-days by himself in 1954 and received for them:
11,600 roubles, 242 kg. of meat, 261 litres of milk, as well as a lot of fish,
potatoes, and cabbage.’(Fedotov 1955c: 45)

Material prosperity would also be highlighted by the presence of radios
in every home, the extent of electrification, the owning of sewing ma-
chines, and nice furniture. Such new technical achievements and comforts
in village life would be contrasted with the time when herders’ families
lived in turf-huts or log-cabins without radio, electricity, and sewing ma-
chines, and, presumably, without nice furniture.

Cultural prosperity was measured by numbers of cultural events and, if
applicable, the size of the audience: ‘In 1954 in the (cultural) club of Kol-
khoz ‘Krasnoshchel’e’ 45 lectures and reports on various topics were read,
attended by 1693 inhabitants of the village of Krasnoshchel’e. For the
same period over 100 films were shown and 13 evenings of amateur art
arranged.’ (Fedotov 1955c: 46). Personal cultural achievements would be
measured in books, newspapers, and journals subscribed to and read. In
counting books, a certain emphasis on fiction (khudozhestvennaya litera-
tura) can be noticed – possibly in view of its ‘more cultural’ quality in
comparison to non-fiction. Thus: ‘The kolkhoz member A. A. Matrekhina
read 90 different books in 1954, predominantly fiction. Many books were
read by the kolkhoz member M. F. Terentieva, reindeer herder P. A. Anu-
friev and many others.’ (ibid.)

The device of quantification as a legitimising agitprop technique sug-
ests that reality was felt to be grasped through the foregoing parameters
describing material and spiritual ‘progress’. Quantifiable aspects of life not
included in herding poetics – such as numbers of private deer – suggest,
by the same logic, that they were perceived as subversive of progress and
therefore unfit for legitimation, and even that they were considered sub-
versive to legitimation itself.
Looked at from this vantage point, agitprop poetic production about this particular ‘agricultural’ sector, bespeaks a deeply felt need to oppose chaos – and ultimately, evil – by the device of ordering. It can be likened, in this sense, to mediaeval ordering of night as an effort of subverting its fearsome power (Boyadzhiev 2011). In socialist reindeer husbandry poetics, the state of beatific order created by socialist competition would be protected from the demons of chaos, bred by the volatilities and indeterminacies of the private deer compromise – and private ownership in general – by the simple device of poetic removal, that is – by ‘unmentioning’. By this simple device power – as standing ‘above’, but also as integrated ‘from below’ – symbolically negates what de Certeau calls ‘the ethic of stubbornness’ (2013:97). Such ‘stubbornness’ sustained the muted compromise of the private-in-the-collective as a desirable moral and economic order. The act of ‘socially competitive’ artistic production, veiled over, in its ideologically poetic way, the reality of a stubborn ‘people’s culture’ (ibid.).

‘High sovkhoism’

The period from the early 1970s till the eve of reforms at the end of the 1980s may be called ‘high sovkhoism’. By this I mean the reaching of the highest local developments in economic, demographic, and social service terms, forming a general picture referred to nostalgically at present as ‘Soviet times’ (sovetskoe vremya), or the ‘best times’ (luchshee vremena). In emic reference to near history, the two phrases tend to be used synonymously.

The beginning of high sovkhoism was marked, as noted earlier, by consolidation of existing kolkhozy, and a simultaneous concentration of tundra villagers in the district centre of Lovozero, and in the biggest of the remaining tundra villages – Krasnoshchel’e.

The consolidation of numerous small collective farms (kolkhozy) into two big soviet farms (sovkhozy) is a development, as mentioned in previous paragraphs, which often preceded liquidation of villages and resettling their population to the two new sovkhoz centres. Kolkhoz Tundra of Lovozero, after engulfing a number of other neighbouring kolkhozy, became the biggest sovkhoz on the Peninsula in January 1971. In a parallel manner Kolkhoz ‘Pamyati Lenina’ (‘In Memory of Lenin’) of Krasnoshchel’e (formerly Kolkhoz ‘Krasnoshchel’e’) became the second biggest reindeer herding state farm. All the former kolkhozy in the northwest part of the herding territories went to the consolidated Tundra, those of
the southeast part – to ‘In Memory of Lenin’. The kolkhozy of the villages that miraculously survived administrative liquidation – Kanevka and Sosnovka – became ‘departments’ (otdeleniya) of the central sovkhoz in Krasnoshchel’e.

In this way Krasnoshchel’e – as the biggest of the three remaining remote villages, and in the new capacity of a consolidated sovkhoz centre – became the smaller analogue of Lovozero. There were, however, numerous serious differences between the two. Krasnoshchel’e had not acquired an industrial appendage like Revda, and for this and other reasons, remained in a state of roadlessness. It did not attract, in consequence, waves of labour migrants from the south. There was no pressure for housing a rapidly growing population and thus the log cabins of the village did not have to give way to blocks-of-flats. For all these reasons Krasnoshchel’e offers nowadays a much greater opportunity of experiencing the ‘traditional’ atmosphere of a reindeer husbandry village – as it existed in the Sami-Komi thick web of interrelatedness and shared influences of former kolkhoz days. Lovozero, despite its being constantly paraded as a ‘Sami village’ has lost this quality.

The boundary between the two new sovkhozy was established as a boundary between Brigade 8 and 9 of Tundra on the northwest side of the divide, and 1 and 3 of ‘In Memory of Lenin’ to the southeast, i.e. generally taking the Yokanga-Varzino river basins as a line of separation.

The heyday of sovkhoist developments was also marked by a demographic boom for the district, principally due labour-migrants’ influx into Lovozero/Revda. Lovozero itself reached a peak in 1987 with its population growing to 3,700 people. Krasnoshchel’e, Kanevka, and Sosnovka also showed increases in their population, despite the obstacle of roadlessness.

Reindeer husbandry registered impressive growth too, especially when compared to its present condition. The herd growth in high sovkhoist years explains a lot as regards the period’s being looked back on with nostalgia. By great luck there exists a fairly reliable document of the period, namely Digurov’s college dissertation of 1987. The author submitted it for defence to the Agricultural Institute for Extramural Studies (SIZO) at Balashikha near Moscow. At the time he was a young specialist in the Reindeer Husbandry Department (tekhn olenyodstva) of Sovkhoz Tundra. The paper – in some forty handwritten pages – describes the contemporary state of affairs in the state farm from the point of view of an insider.

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121 Industrialisation nearly missed the reindeer herding part of the Peninsula, leaving it almost intact till the present day. See: GULAG na Murmane, Corrective labour camp 509.
122 Sel’skokhozyaystvenniy institut zaocchnogo obucheniya.
To my knowledge, the document has never been published and exists only in its original manuscript form (Digurov 1987).

According to Digurov, by 1985 the sovkhoz was herding a total of 33,087 head over a grazing range of 3,153,287 hectares, i.e. a territory approximately the size of Belgium. Together with the range of the Krasnoshchel’e sovkhoz, that was equivalent to thirty percent of the entire territory of the Kola Peninsula. A secondary branch raised cattle and had 863 head, four hundred of which were milking cows. To sustain this secondary branch, the sovkhoz cultivated four hundred and twenty hectares of hay and mowed an additional uncultivated range of fifty three hectares (1987:3).

At the time Digurov was describing – that is the period 1981–1985 – the sovkhoz had nine reindeer herding brigades with a total of a hundred and one employees (ibid.:4). This meant an average of eleven per brigade, or an average complement of seven to eight herders, two chumrabotnitsi, and one or two workers as auxiliary personnel shared between two or more brigades. In addition there were the Veterinary Technicians (zootekhniki). Four of them were ordinary veterinarians, as also a Head Veterinary Doctor (glavnyy vetvrach), a game keeper (eger’), and the Head of the Reindeer Husbandry Department (nachal’nik tsekha olenevodstva).

The list describes the tundra, i.e. reindeer herding personnel of the sovkhoz – in Otto Habeck’s apt phrasing – its brigada part, as different from kontora, or administration (2005: 47f). The kontora, however, was discreetly left out of Digurov’s introductory description of the sovkhoz. Here we may see again the foregrounding of ‘workers’ at the expense of ‘bureaucrats’, as noted earlier (p.131f). From my own experience with the administrations of both Lovozero and Krasnoshchel’e’s reindeer husbandry farms, I would estimate the office population at the time being not less than a third of the total sovkhoz personnel.

Another feature, characteristic of the state of sovkhozy in the decades of mature (‘high’) sovkhoism, which cannot be discerned even from insiders’ factual descriptions, such as Digurov’s, is the widening division of the town and tundra based parts of the consolidated farms. This was largely a product of the agricultural policy of diversification coming from central authorities and dictating that reindeer husbandry should be the primary, but not the only productive branch of the sovkhoz. Consequently, a great effort was put in sustaining and expanding the above mentioned dairy farming (molochnoe zhivotnovodstvo), although in subarctic conditions it could not be but an economically losing branch. In the course of time, however, it acquired such an importance in local politics, that even in todays presumably market economy, no district or reindeer farming au-
authority would dare close down the dairy farm. The community is very sensitive about milk trading – a shop assistant will always tell you with pride that the milk they offer is from the ‘sovkhоз’ (sovkhозное молоко) in distinction to despised brands from elsewhere. The preserving of ‘sovkhоз milk’ to this day, apart from its undeniably better quality than other brands, shows that the sovkhoz, although much battered by the reforms, lives on in some form.

Connected with dairy farming was the cultivation and gathering of hay and a limited quantity of fodder crops, taken care of by the Cultivation Shop, or Тsekh rastenievodstva. The maintenance and repair of all the vehicles and other machinery was in the care of the Mechanical Shop (Тsekh механизации, or Мехтsekh), standing at the heart of all sovkhoz activities over the decades, and to this day (Konstantinov 2009). The Sewing Shop (Пшевоchniy tsekh) used to be vital for producing necessary clothing and other equipment for reindeer herders, but this activity has reduced to almost nothing at present. This shop, in addition, used to provide employment for herders’ wives who would not stay on at the tundra camps in the capacity of unpaid female camp workers.

Another branch of the sovkhoz had great prominence during high sovkhozism, but has declined today: the Construction Shop (Stroitel’niy tsekh). It built the reinforced concrete apartment blocks that characterize the ‘village’ of Lovozero today. It also provided employment opportunities for herders’ wives and other women of the district. Of the numerous activities of the Construction Shop in the former days of sovkhoist glory, only milling lumber at a sawmill (пилорама) continues today, along with gravel and sand excavation from a pit near town for construction needs.

A branch that was created in 1952 – fur farming (звероводство) – was expected to bring great prosperity to the farms both in Lovozero and in Krasnoshchel’e (Fedotov 1955c:29). However, it had quietly receded from reports and agitprop texts by the late 1980s and eventually closed down. The fishing brigades that used to operate in Lake Lovozero, and the farms for breeding sheep, pigs and chickens all similarly disappeared from mention. By the end of the perestroyka period the Revda sovkhoz, which used to boast a big dairy farm, with pig- and chicken-farming in addition, had also wound down its production. Thus Digurov’s paper reflects the reduction of all the numerous sovkhoz activities to only reindeer husbandry, dairy farming, and some limited hay and fodder growing by 1981–85 (1987: 5).

A look at the period, inviting comparison with the present-day state-of-affairs, shows clearly that apart from reindeer husbandry itself, all non-reindeer related activities of the sovkhozy were firmly based in the sov-
khoz centres. The tundra part of sovkhoz activities had come to be progressively taken care of by male crews (brigadi) who commuted to permanent tundra-camps (bazi) during key reindeer herding activities. The pattern is well-known over the entirety of the Soviet/Russian subarctic. In the Kola case, however, extensive reindeer husbandry, paralleled by pronounced town/tundra gender asymmetry are features that seem to have developed to a maximum extent. It thus stands in marked contrast to migrating with herds on a family basis, which characterizes, in the exemplary case, reindeer husbandry in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug (Lyarskaya 2013; Jernsletten and Klokov 2002; Golovnev and Osheenko 1999).

In the Lovozero District case, the totality of sovkhoz administrative offices (kontora), plus all the town-based sovkhoz shops and auxiliary services, like slaughter points and related corralling facilities, refrigeration, meat-processing, and storage and food supply for brigades, gradually caught up with and even took over the tundra herding part (brigada). At the same time, the closer to the town and kontora we get the larger the proportion of jobs done by women. In this trend, it is to be emphasized that the gender division does not necessarily match the ‘white vs. blue collar’ one. Many ‘blue collar’ jobs would be performed by women, so long as they are available at town-based facilities. This includes the jobs in the above mentioned Dairy Farm (molochnaya ferma), the Sewing Shop, and many of the jobs in the Construction Shop and at storing, refrigerating, and meat-processing points. At the same time, in the administration of both sovkhozy, the middle and lower ranks have always been – ‘traditionally’ – the territory of women clerks.

Masculinisation of the tundra and the corresponding feminization of, most pronouncedly, the middle ranks of white-collar (in a Russian context: ‘budget- and social-sphere’) urban jobs, has been noticed all over the subarctic board. Concerned analysts turn attention to the consequent ‘significantly reduced quality of life, particularly for men, in many Indigenous societies in the Arctic.’ (Williamson 2004:126–176, following Eikjok 2007:112) Eikjok, in the same relation suggests that such divisions, concerning both men and women on both sides of what may be called the ‘traditional divide’, ‘can be conceptualized (...) as class differences’ (ibid.). The dynamic of representational activities in a recent historical perspective add ethnographic depth to such observations.

The poetic representation of reindeer husbandry foregrounds certain developments, while gradually or abruptly moving others to backstage positions, and ultimately, to oblivion. Some of these manipulations are easily noticed and understood, like those reflecting decisions about direc-
tions of economic development, announced at CPSU congresses, ple-
nums, and meetings. This includes, for instance, the drive for diversifica-
tion of agricultural activities, noted above, the cyclical attempts for linking
production results to remuneration as part of ‘economic planning’ (hoz-
raschet), as well as many other campaigns and initiatives that appeared and
disappeared throughout the Soviet period.

Those that obscure vision are, however, developments, which for one
reason or another, have tended to be put beyond the pale of public discus-
sion. Two of them are central to this discussion: the critical salience of
personal-private deer possession, and the growing town/tundra rift. These
topics are absent from agitprop poetic texts and obligatory rites – such as
tying up social competition slogans with latest top-down ‘cloudspeak’
pronouncements. Likewise they do not figure in factual descriptions for
limited circulation.

Although the ‘spirit of publicity’ of perestroyka shed light on other
previously ‘unmentionable’ topics – such as the trauma of resettlement
and its resultant ills – the ‘ultimate unmentionables’ of private deer and
gender, and the town/tundra divide were exposed only rarely. Such are
the unique cases of Kiselev and Kiseleva’s agitprop mention for regional
and foreign consumption (1987: 134; 1979: 123), and Makhaev’s critical
article of 1988. The persistent suppression of key substantive issues calls
for explanation. Why was it that perestroyka ‘publicity’ did not engage
decisively with these themes?

Searching for a possible answer, one could consider the personal histo-
ries of the bearers of the new, anti-urbanisation and industrialisation mes-
sage of late perestroyka years, as well as the indigenous-liberatory texts of
the following first postsoviet decade. In biographical terms, it is not diffi-
cult to find that the practitioners of the new message, or the latest set of
‘new words’\textsuperscript{123} came from professional spheres closely connected with
‘ideological enlightenment work’ in the educational and cultural sectors.

Many of these people became, in the postsoviet years, initiators of local
ethnopolitical action and, subsequently, long-serving members of indige-
nous leadership. Overwhelmingly these were well-educated urban profes-
sionals in branches of the budget sphere, rarely crossing paths with rein-
deer husbandry.

‘Removal’ of the sensitive topics of private deer/budget sphere con-
cerns thus suggests the presence of a stable tradition of community self-
censoring, applied by its leading elite, and shared by grass-roots actors.

\textsuperscript{123} Todorov’s analysis of ‘translating the Party line to the masses’, relate to this period.
(p.77).
The tradition was not eroded by the newly arrived substantial changes in the political climate of late perestroika and early post-Soviet years – if anything, it was enhanced by these developments. It is therefore necessary to focus on the substantive life of the unmentionables. Below I turn to those in reindeer husbandry, as I find them to be defining the local variety of high sovkhoism, and the form it acquired after the radical changes of the early 1990s.

Sovkhoism after the sovkhoz

Light on persistence of ‘unmentionables’ and the reality they kept hiding or discreetly veiling over provides a pointer as to how sovkhoism lived on in the new post-Soviet conditions. Here the essence of the private-in-the-collective principle which undergirds the sovkhoist system needs to be looked at again. My claim has been, all along, that the members of the all critical ‘private deer/budget sphere pair’ are interrelated under a more general ‘private-in-the-collective’ principle of political and socioeconomic arrangement. They can be considered, thus, eloquent evidence of how ‘grassroots-to-empowered elites’ agency was and is being exercised.

In the first place, the ‘private deer/ budget sphere’ issues are to be seen as the two sides of a single coin – that of a strong grassroots predisposition for seeking security generating patterns in a conducive political and socio-economic order. Such dispositions can be seen as resting on a ‘shared responsibility’ principle, the age-old krugovaya poruka, harking back to the socioeconomic arrangements of the mir in the Russian pre-revolutionary village (Kingston-Mann and Mixter 1991; Grant 1976).

The personal-private deer innovation in Soviet and Russian reindeer husbandry precisely creates such an arrangement; it gives basic security by removing risk (Beach 1992:141). This conclusion emerged from Beach’s brief but impressively fruitful encounter with Brigade 3 of Tundra, mentioned earlier in this chapter. My own long-term experience with this and many other brigades of the two Kola reindeer husbandry farms, prove the accuracy of his judgement. It is also borne out by other major developments in connection with Kola reindeer husbandry: the postsoviet resistance to move from a sovkhoist to a private husbandry economy, the failure of foreign support initiatives to revive an imagined ‘traditional Sami’ private husbandry, the similar failure of both home and foreign support for obshchiny to develop along the same imagined road, as well as the more technical expedient of sustaining private-in-the-collective sovkhoism by maximising herding extensiveness (Konstantinov 2010b).
In mature sovkhoism, as pointed out previously, a herder (not a household) could enjoy the use of thirty to fifty head of private reindeer. The system was originally meant to recognize the needs of herders’ families to use deer for helping in heavy domestic chores and for subsistence. But by the 1970s draft power had long been provided by mechanical vehicles such as snowmobiles, track vehicles (tractors and ATVs, vezdekhodi), as well as fixed-wing and helicopter aircraft. Hardly anyone in the community even remembers today that personal/private deer had been originally introduced to provide for subsistence and transportation. What seems to have firmly remained on the level of only intimately shared conviction (Herzfeld 2005) is the pivotal role of personal-private deer for sustaining sovkhoism as a private-in-the-collective socioeconomic order.

Its origin appeared as an official pronouncement that ‘collectivisation was a success’, since the kolkhoz (artel’) had managed ‘to rightly combine personal, domestic interests of the kolkhoz members with their social interests (obschestvennye interesy’). (Stalin in Aleksandrov et al. 1950:143) The compromise implied the weakness of the state at the time of collectivisation, and secondly, that grassroots actors accepted the deal in exchange for the state’s controlled liberalization of public-to-private material flows. These truths have remained among the unmentionables till this day.

By the time of writing (2014) the arrangement had worked for some eighty years and had turned into a habitual (‘traditional’) state of affairs. By now the community have come to be convinced that without it to be engaged in reindeer husbandry can be considered next to pointless. The following instance from my fieldwork experience illustrates the point.

I was not a little surprised when a small delegation of Sami and Komi herders from old herding families came to me in November 2011 to ask whether reindeer herding could be a profitable activity. My surprise came not only because a foreign researcher – a southerner at that – could be asked such a question by people for whom reindeer husbandry had been a hereditary occupation for centuries. It came more of the fact that a foundational profitability of reindeer husbandry I had taken all along as an immutable given. I was caught in a state of realizing that I had never even asked myself that question. But in the conversation with the herders it gradually transpired that what they meant was whether reindeer herding could be profitable if they left the ‘sovkhoz’ (i.e. the current SKhPK) to become fully private herders – not the private-in-the-collective variety they were at the moment. My answer to that was, of course, something they knew only too well: that one could hope to become a profitable private herder only on the condition that he is constantly with his herd, ideally – with his whole family. Or, in other words, that one lives ‘out there’ in the
tundra. We parted on the agreement that under current conditions the sovkhoz still remained the better option. Besides providing for basic security it also spelled commuting to the tundra, thus not having to live there permanently around the herd. Very few people in the community were prepared to leave town, and of those that did – albeit seasonally – most were old-age pensioners.

There has been over the years an abundance of indications from various parts of the tundra-connected reindeer husbandry community that, indeed, life beyond sovkhoism is a risky option, better dismissed. When I asked a herder back in 1995 why he didn’t go private, he curtly replied: ‘What, do you think me crazy [to do so]?’ (*Ty, chego, menya za sumashchedshego prinaessh?*).

My claim is therefore that for a clear-sighted appraisal of the entirety of parallel and mutually reinforcing developments, encompassing late Soviet husbandry– agglomeration, urbanisation, and industrialisation, in their gendered and generational aspects – the management of the personal-private deer contingent should be taken as a point of departure. This calls for a brief description of a number of operations that most active herders had the possibility to perform to considerable private advantage by employing a ‘softly controlled access’ to the collective herd. It thus explains the rhetorical question of the herder, mentioned above, as well as the equally rhetorical question about whether private reindeer-husbandry could be profitable.

1. Quota overstepping

The reason for setting quotas of 30–50 head is to be seen in the first place as following from kolkhoz/sovkhоз and district leadership’s understanding that unless some control was exercised and limits decreed, herders left in the tundra on their own could increase their private herds at the expense of the collective herd. Running ahead, I have to say that this view of the situation was correct, because when quotas were abolished in 1992, inordinate – or as it was dubbed by opponents – ‘unnatural’ increase of some private herds indeed occurred. (*Otkrytoe pis’mo* 2003) To this point I return in the following chapter.

During mature sovkhoism a small proportion of private deer were used for tundra transport and family subsistence needs, while the larger part would be sold by the carcass (*tusha*) on the informal town market. The transaction would take place in town or village, using a herder’s network of kin, neighbours, friends, acquaintances, relatives in other towns and their own networks. These were open-ended and virtually endless net-
works, capable of absorbing the entirety of private carcass meat that was offered for sale. The proof of that is that the market in private reindeer meat – by the carcass or half carcass – has always been a sellers’ market. There is no bargaining about the price as a rule, and, despite the money paid, the general atmosphere around the transaction is such that the seller is doing a favour to the buyer, not the other way round.

Considerable numbers of carcasses have always been sold at corralling sessions, with the transactions taking place directly at tundra corrals. Slaughtering for the communal pot at herding camps (обшепит) was and is still being done right outside the corral fence, where private deer are also slaughtered – to be transported and sold as carcasses in town, or for selling or bartering on the spot. Each corralling session gathers a considerable number of small-time local meat traders (коммерсанты), who, aided by liberal amounts of vodka, traditionally buy meat at very advantageous prices. Before the radical market reforms of 1991–92, when vodka was not easy to get, a carcass of an average weight of forty kilograms or so could be acquired for as low as a litre of vodka, or even for a half-litre (ноль пяти).

2. Replaceability or ‘immortality’ of private deer

There are many jokes on the subject of private deer, exchanged at herders’ camps, or in intimate town milieus – at kitchen table and garage talks. They capture the essence of the matter, namely, that with ‘soft herd control’, characteristic of the kolkhoz/sovkhoz system, any loss, injury, barter, or sale of private deer, can be easily compensated for by taking from the cooperative herd. The joke, quoted as travelling from one end of the Soviet and Russian reindeer husbandry universe to the other, runs like this: ‘Our bears (wolves, wolverines, etc.) are very clever – they never eat private deer.’ Another well-worn universal joke has provided the title for an article: ‘The best reindeer is the personal one, the worst – that of the sovkhoz’ (Savirskiy 2000).

The possibility of adding to ‘the private’ by taking or replacing from ‘the collective’ can be considered to be at the very core of sovkhoism as a private-in-the-collective socioeconomic and political ‘order’. In reindeer husbandry the arrangement is effected with, as it were, physical clarity: an animal is taken from one contingent (the collective one), and by earmarking or direct slaughtering is transferred to another (the personal-private one). On more complex and varied rural scenes, and from there on – in
industry and the ‘budget sphere’ – institutionalized routes of taking or replacing become less easily perceivable, but in essence remain the same. A token salary in budget sphere jobs used to be compensated – as it still is – by using the resources of the office for private ends, whether bartering a service for another, or accepting a present or bribe for providing a service quickly and in a manner agreeable to the client. Pressures to raise salaries are thus reduced. This is a crucial source of the institution of corruption, the fight against which shall soon reach its 300th anniversary, if we take relevant decrees of Peter I as a beginning. Proclamations from above – in a current version of ideological poetics – constantly assert, nevertheless, that the fight shall finally reach a successful completion.

Returning to the Kola reindeer husbandry case, several additional – indeed critical – aspects of the private-in-the-collective order need to be mentioned as necessary for sustaining the regime of ‘soft herd control’ as the carrying platform of sovkhoism.

3. The private-in-the-collective ‘mix’

Replaceability of private deer and increase of private herds are sustained by institutionalizing the private-in-the-collective ‘mix’. This means that from the very beginning of collectivised husbandry the division of the herds of different owners was transformed into a new arrangement. As I pointed out earlier, a big owner with a large herd always functioned as a potential security provider for small struggling herders. In one sense, this principle was transferred to the new collectivised arrangement with the institutionalized provision that the originally small number of head for personal use grazed together with those of the collective herd. At corral-lining sessions the two contingents would be registered by processing in the rabochaya kamera (working chamber, churn) of the corral enclosure. After examining the ear-mark of each individual animal passing through the churn, those belonging to the collective farm would be registered to the brigade whose ear-mark they were bearing. The head with personal-private ear-marks would be registered against the name of the owner of the ear-mark in a separate register. The latter is a plywood board on

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125 At a closer reading, the issue of corruption remains discussed on the level of generalities and sweeping statements to the effect that Russia is now ‘stepping into a new phase of national development’ (Katerinchev 2012) and the like. The first presidential decrees of the new/old President include, among numerous other measures for such a development, a suggestion for a closer look at state administrative positions that contain ‘corruption risks’ - and that is all said on the theme. (Ukaz 2012) See also Dubin (2011: 340–44); Tsyrenshchikov (2011: 289f); Diskin (2011: 18f); Shlapentokh (2007).
which all names of personal-private deer owners are entered. It is called ‘pentium’ by the herders: a joke based on the worn-out from long use and primitive-looking plywood board, and its comical likening unto a computer hardware part.

The mixing of herds with subsequent separation by ear-mark is an age-long practice, known in the reindeer husbandry universe from one end to the other. There are various ways in which herd owners insure themselves – to a greater or lesser extent – against loss (cf. Beach 2007). In the new situation created by collectivised herding, mechanisms of protecting the biggest owners against loss – that is, the collective farm itself, and, ultimately, the state – were being progressively eroded. Mixing of personal-private with collective deer facilitated such erosion in two important ways.

In the first place, in contrast to other systems, such as those of pre-collectivised husbandry or private husbandry practiced nowadays in the Nordics, there is permanent mixing throughout the year. In non-sovkhoist systems, for a part of the year – usually the winter one – the private herd which has been separated from other herds in the autumn, would be herded by the owner and thus would be physically seen as a separate unit. In collectivised herding such private herd discreteness was transformed into a brigade one. According to the latter, each brigade would take care of its herd after autumn separation, seeking for favourable winter grazing grounds on its assigned brigade territory. The brigade herd would be composed, at the same time, of both collective and private animals and thus mixing would be seasonally transposed onto a brigade level.

The feature of ‘permanent mixing’ in a brigade format – in contrast to the pre-collectivisation ‘summer-winter’ of the classical Sami system – is reflected, in a way, by the statistics of head-counts for particular kolkhoz/sovkhoz, or the district as a whole. When we read in the quoted description of Digurov that the head count (pogolov’e) of Sovkhoz Tundra was 33,087 for 1985 (1987:3), we do not know how many head of that figure were collective or private. As said before the issue of ‘private head’ remains ‘veiled’ in Soviet reindeer husbandry texts. It can be, nevertheless, ‘unveiled’ for specific purposes and demands.

Such is the case, for instance, of the agitprop classic of Kiselev and Kiseleva’s ‘The Soviet Sami’ (1987). The reason for ‘unveiling’, as given by the authors, was that ‘the issue usually ‘surfaces’ (vsplyvaet) in conversations with foreign (i.e. Nordic) Sami herders.’ (ibid.:134) For some reason the authors call personal-private deer ‘individual deer’. (This usage, I have to say in passing, I have not registered anywhere else. I can only surmise that it must have been coined as a euphemism for ‘private’.) To
the question of the foreign Sami: ‘And what is the situation with individual [emphasis mine] reindeer? Do the Kola Sami have any such?’, the authors answer:

Yes, they do have such: by 1 January 1968 kolkhoz members and sovkhoz workers in the region had in their personal ownership 4,117 head. The average number per kolkhoz member or sovkhoz worker (for those that had reindeer) was 10–15 head. In 1972 there were 5,100 head in personal domestic farms (lichnykh podсобных хозяйств) of kolkhoz members, sovkhoz workers, and office workers (служных). (Kiselev and Kiseleva 1987:134)

Apart from mentioning the issue at all, there are two details to note here. There is the explicit equating of a herder’s personal-private deer with possession of a ‘personal domestic farm’ – a point made in the previous chapter. Another is that legitimate personal-private ownership is mentioned in reference to office workers, that is reindeer cooperative kontora staff, alongside that of the herders themselves. This is an important mention. An official from the administration of the kolkhoz, and later the sovkhoz, had a good chance of his herd growing through privileged treatment of the brigade tending his or her animals. As noted before, bribes in reindeer taken by the Head Veterinarian led to a rare lifting of the veil over the personal-private deer issue (Makhaev 1988).

The mixing of deer does not by itself ensure that they can be replaced, even when the mixing is virtually permanent throughout the seasons and year after year. What does make a significant difference involves two further factors that loosen control over herds: eroded discreteness of brigade herds, and the increase in extensive grazing. These two critical parameters are briefly discussed below.

4. Discreteness of brigade herds and grazing range

From the very beginning of collectivisation work brigades were adopted in Soviet agriculture and lasted until this day. In northern reindeer husbandry, the exact directions about how this was to be done appeared in a large body of specialized publications, brochures, and a host of other texts. A good early example is Mayorov (1931), who presents the rationale for introducing the organisation of work by brigades, as it had been explicated in top-down directives already during the first collectivisation wave. The title of this particular section of the article is ‘The brigade as the basic productive unit’.
For achieving specialization in the work of kolkhoz members, raising efficiency, and avoiding unnecessary confusion and work interruptions, the basic kolkhoz work unit adopted is the brigade, with the provision that whenever necessary, the brigade should be subdivided into smaller teams (zvenya, ‘links’). (ibid., p.25)

During the decades of mature sovkhoism each one of the brigades of the two Kola sovkhozy plus that of the experimental station (MOOS) – nearly twenty all in all – was assigned its own grazing range, with a detailed map of pasture, sovkhoz and brigade boundaries, and other relevant data, published as a classified document and made available to sovkoz directors (Rosgiprozem 1962).

According to what the present generation of herders remember, until the mid-seventies each brigade used to have control over their herd during all seasons. Head-count corralling sessions would be conducted every three months (kvartal’nyy proschet) and the state of the brigade herd would be known with a fair degree of accuracy. At some point, and for reasons not quite clear, control relaxed – at first during the summer, followed by a gradual abandonment of a number of reindeer herding activities or ‘campaigns’. Among them were late summer-early autumn fattening (nagul) of the part of the herd ear-marked for harvesting, harvesting calf-pelts to produce high-quality hides for herders’ clothing (malichnyy zaboy), separation of the most productive males and females from the rest to maximize rut results, close control over the herd, and its driving to available winter grazing spots, separation of pregnant females from the rest and ensuring early spring grazing for them at available pastures, close guard for them, assistance at birth, ear-marking newborn calves ‘by the mother’ (biological ear-marking), vaccinating the herd against blood-sucking insects, providing licking salt over the range, building mosquito-shelters, building and maintaining reindeer fences, etc. All of these activities, although salient categories for socialist competition, had been gradually relaxed or entirely abandoned, except for preserving some control over the herd during the winter, a renewal of active fence building, and sporadic corral enclosure and brigade base renovation.

It should be borne in mind, however, that the picture of intensive care and herd control conveyed by the list of activities given above, before they were abandoned, may in fact have been a somewhat poetic representation of reality. Reports from the 1950s, published in the district newspaper, and presented at various party or administrative meetings, suggest that an erosion of intensive production had already begun. The following report from 1958 about the state of affairs in Brigade No 7 of the then Kolkhoz Tundra is typical in this respect. A herder from that brigade relates:
Difficulties in our brigade became additionally graver due to the fact that not everything was right concerning the organisation of labour. Some herders wouldn’t leave the village. By 15 May there were only three herders with the herd, and it became necessary to work without any relief of shifts. Not only that, but at the very peak of mass calving a supply reindeer-drawn caravan (rayda) was sent to take food products to the intermediary tundra camp. That could have been done earlier, so that the herders would remain at their posts at such a crucial moment of the campaign. Brigade Leader E.A. Sorvanov made a serious mistake in this regard. He himself went to the village at the beginning of June, leaving only a couple of herders with the herd. (Sorvanov 1958)

Such reports would not be rare in the press of those days, presented to the public with the reservation that ‘alongside indisputable successes in kolkhoz/sovkhoz reindeer husbandry there are still some difficulties to overcome’. They tend to dislodge the imagined picture of close care for herds that the local community tends now to present: that ‘the herd was in our hands then’ (the ‘herd-in-hand’ refrain). Notwithstanding the nostalgic poetisations of the past that are common in the countries of the former ‘socialist bloc’ from one end to the other, there is some truth in them, at least relative to the present. Thus, in Sorvanov’s report cited above, he talks about three herders attending to the herd at calving time, while today the practice is that, most likely, there would be none. Despite such evidence from the past, the majority of herders and non-herders alike tend to connect the relaxation of control over the herds during the latter half of the mature sovkhoist period with the town-tundra split, resulting from leaving only one or two paid chumrabotnitsa positions per brigade. Those of the herders’ wives, who found themselves suddenly unemployed, refused to stay on in the brigades and sought employment in town. The gender policy of the relevant local authorities thus contributed to an erosion of brigades, despite constant complaints of these same authorities about difficulties with herder recruitment. Instead of finding ways and means to keep whole families in the tundra, available funding was channelled to auxiliary sovkhoz departments and workshops in the town of Lovozero, and to a lesser extent, to the central tundra village of Krasnoshchel’e. A larger, but less readily acknowledge part was going towards expanding ‘women’s jobs’ in local ‘budget sphere’ departments.
5. Extensive herding, ‘hyper-extensivity’, and ‘whole-eared’ deer

According to the herders who worked in the brigades before perestroika, by the late 1970s – early 80s herding had been firmly set upon the road to an extensive form. This meant that brigade herds were increasingly allowed to move along the migratory circuit without close supervision, to graze freely and compose herds according to their preferences. The abandonment of close calving care as part of this process meant, in its turn, that ear-marking became more arbitrary, replacing the ‘traditional’ biological ear-marking at birth which was ‘according to the mother’.126

Gradually, more and more unmarked, or ‘whole-eared’ reindeer (tseloushnye oleni) would turn up at corralling sessions. In addition, these corralling sessions would become rarer and what is more – the harvesting season itself would show a tendency to be postponed. While previously – at the time of traditional ‘kolkhoz harvesting’ – it would be over by New Year’s Eve, towards the end of the mature sovkhoist period harvesting began to be pushed forward till the second half of January and even later. In the postsoviet period the tendency increased until harvest corralling sessions would drag on till the very end of stable ice surface, which is to say, mid-April.

It would be thus the case that due to abandoning calving control, as well as overall herd control, save for a limited period during the winter and prior to harvesting, whole-eared deer of a year and more would increasingly turn up in the corral enclosure. Given the existing heavy mixing of brigade herds from all over the herding territory of the two sovkhozy, as well as that of MOOS, an insiders’ arrangement gradually evolved for distributing whole-eared deer. An insiders’ code of behaviour thus came to govern a highly complex state of affairs. It followed rules of hierarchical order, as well as of shared ethical norms.

This is how the herders explained it to a rare journalist from Murmansk, who was present at a corralling session in February 2004. In its basic outlines, the picture given by the herders is true to high sovkhoist traditions:

People say that before [in Soviet times] calves used to be ear-marked when they were very little. But then the herders used to stay by the herd throughout the year. Nowadays the reindeer are let to graze freely [uncontrolled] during the summer. When the time for a corralling counting session comes, the herders simply count who the mothers (razhenki) that turn

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126 Vladimirova (2009); Konstantinov (2007); for Sweden: Beach (2007).
up belong to, as also how many yearlings have turned up. On that basis the marking is being done. (Grechina 2004: 3)

Whether the journalist sandpapered the more embarrassing edges off this explanation, or the herders did so themselves, it is impossible to tell: it is likely to be the latter, rather than the former, in my experience. Nevertheless, the smoothed-out edges contain valuable information that need an ‘archaeological’ reconstruction.

To begin with, during mature sovkhoism (the quoted term is the usual ‘before’), uncontrolled grazing progressively stretched beyond the summer to take up ever more of the year, as was explained above. The process continued until at present there is hardly any herding at all during the year. In the words of a former brigade-leader: ‘We are now herd-drivers (pogonstchiki), not herders.’ (Konstantinov 2005b). What was meant was that from the latter years of mature sovkhoism on brigade members had come to be principally engaged in locating the herd prior to corralling, driving it into the corral enclosure, processing it through the churn, and then driving the part to be slaughtered (zabojniy kusok) to the slaughter facility in Lovozero. All the numerous operations and ‘campaigns’ that used to feature so prominently in reports of socialist competition were gradually reduced to these critical operations, in order that some sort of a meat-production plan (myasoplan) could be fulfilled, despite the constraints of hyper-extensive husbandry.

In consequence, unmarked animals that turned up in the churn were not only yearlings but even older reindeer as well. The very logic of increasing private-in-the-collective herds requires, thus, relaxation of control, correspondingly rising hyper-extensivity, growing ferality (odichanie, ‘wildening’) of the herd, and a resulting inability to round it up and process it in its entirety. This inevitably leads to an increase of whole-eared deer as fewer of them are processed, which in turn, allows for arbitrary marking, hinted at in the journalist’s ‘pruned’ version of the process, as described in the excerpt from Grechina (2004), above. More arbitrary marking means it is easier to replace or even supplement stocks of private deer.

This pruning has removed from the gaze of the reading public the fact of the heavy mixing of brigade and sovkhoz herds. Mixing compelled representatives of every brigade on the Peninsula to be present at each and every corralling session wherever it happens, save, possibly, for those in far-flung Kanevka and Sosnovka. The four active corral enclosures during
mature sovkhoism were the northernmost ‘Km 69’\textsuperscript{127}, the left-side of Tundra called ‘Polmos Corral’, the right-side of Tundra called ‘Porosozero Corral’, and the left-side of Olenevod known as ‘Sem’ostrov’ie Corral’ (Grechina wrote about the last site). These corrals would have been attended by representatives of all brigades. Besides them there would have been pensioned-off herders who expected that their private deer, or the deer of siblings, relatives, or other people who had put their deer in their care, would turn up at this or that corral. Brigade leaders and other interested people would want to register which deer were included by reading their ear-marks – both those with brigade and those with private marks.

Even more critically, apart from registering this ‘marked’ part of the herd, the question arises of how to process the unmarked contingent fairly. The procedure that established itself as the ‘traditional’ one during the mature sovkhoist period, and has seamlessly continued into the post-Soviet one, evolved on a principle, which can be called ‘relative proportionality’.

This principle takes into account the state of brigade ownership as regards the main body of reindeer, which brigade members have managed to round up for processing. Thus, if it is the case that most reindeer belong to two neighbouring brigades X and Y, then during two successive days of processing, the brigade leaders, under the supervision of the head of the reindeer herding ‘side’, would mark half of the whole-eared deer for Brigade X and the other half for Brigade Y.

This oversimplified description aims at giving a rough outline of the much more complicated – and complex – affair that a corralling session is in reality. What complicates matters is that, as a result of heavy mixing, Brigade X may have many animals in the rounded up contingent, but there would also be some belonging to brigades adjacent to it. The same would also apply to Brigade Y. Furthermore, there would be private deer, belonging to a great many owners from both sovkhozy. These would be owners whose private deer should nominally be attached to a given brigade, but insofar as the brigades themselves are heavily mixed, such attachment gradually shifted to a more nominal identification.

Inherited from Soviet times, and continually sophisticated, the procedure for resolving the situation is typically the following at present. The presiding head of session, in tacit agreement with all the present brigade-leaders and senior herders, has to register and distribute fairly the marked deer of the session, according to brigade and private mark, and simulta-

\textsuperscript{127} This was closed, due to the liquidation of Brigade 5 of Tundra in the mid-2000s, followed by the disbanding of Brigade 3 in 2011. For the last years of active operation of all those units of Tundra, see Konstantinov (2005a).
neously mark the whole-eared contingent with brigade and private marks. For unmarked, whole-eared animals, brigade marks would be given by generally following the outlines given above: priority is given to those brigades in whose nominal territory the herd has been rounded up and who are likely to have the greater part of the deer marked with their brigade mark. Such brigades would also be, in the first place, those who have located the herd, rounded it up, and driven it into the corral. Representatives of brigades from other parts of the herding territory, and all other people present – pensioners with strong tundra presence, relatives who may be in other walks of life, but are owners of private deer, traders, etc. – are expected to help in the corralling work once the herd has been safely enclosed in the corral. Here are also members of obshchiny who own private deer – animals they may decide to harvest, or take to the obshchina camp and use for principally ethnotourist activities. To the outside public – and home or foreign grant givers, who are typically unaware of the differences between ‘personal-private’ and strictly ‘private’ deer status, animals belonging to the former category are often paraded as belonging to the latter by obshchiny leaders (Berdnikov 2010).

As regards the critical category of personal-private deer, the interests of those present are satisfied according to their rank in the herding hierarchy, as described below. Next come the pensioned-off herders. Also eligible are other owners who are present, who have inherited reindeer from herding fathers or grandfathers, but have never herded themselves. Then come owners who are not present, but have someone from the mentioned categories interceding for them – in the ideal case, acting brigade-leaders, or the ‘wing’ boss himself. Thus, an old woman from the village who has a nephew or other relative in the previous categories may have a ‘say’ at the session. When, for instance, a female deer (vazhenka) with her ear-mark fails to turn up at a session, and the owner thus risks remaining without a calf for the year, the interceding relative may plead for a whole-eared calf to be marked for the old woman and thus protect her interests. Last come those owners, who are neither present at the tundra session, nor have anyone to intercede for them. Such people usually decide to forget about their deer entirely, since the latter would most likely be declared not to have turned up at corralling sessions anyway128. The system thus works for the protection of interests according to ‘tundra merit’ – that is, according to how close one stands to actual work in the tundra and is present at key herding events.

Who is present is very much a question of transport and access to information. Old-age pensioners, and especially elderly women could be barred from the start from participation because they commonly cannot afford to maintain snowmobiles, nor keep a reindeer draft team for health or other reasons. Autonomous transport is thus out of reach for them, while the masculine orientation of the whole process – both the vezdekhod journey and the alcohol-saturated corralling session – also tend to deter women’s participation. In the common case, that an elderly woman would go to such a place would not even be contemplated.

For outsiders access is difficult because of lack of information. No one knows exactly when a corralling session shall take place due to the great number of variables. There are the vagaries of the weather, whether a herd can be located and contacted or not, the state of the ATVs and other vehicles, the state of the herders themselves. The decision is circulated among the insiders by cell-phone, radio-phone, or by hanging around the Mekht-sekh and relevant garages. In my experience, no one has been turned back from a corral base at the time of a session, but, on the other hand, if you do not get reliable information – best from the brigade leaders themselves – you may endure an arduous journey only to find the place empty.

Thus to own personal-private deer in a real sense means that one should be male, tundra-mobile, fit for tundra work, and close to the brigade or ‘wing’ leadership. This last can come from former membership in the brigade, assisting in its present work, and critically, from having family or kin in it. In the end, who may get what from the compensating pool of whole eared deer is very much in the hands of the herding leaders. This point is discussed below.

6. Hierarchical arbitration

It is clear from the brief account, presented above, that the combined factors of erosion of the autonomy of herds and range (permanent ‘mixing’), growing extensivity of ‘herding’, a consequent growing of the contingent of whole-eared deer of all ages – all of this has contributed to placing considerable power in the hands of the arbiters of marking. Attention should be turned therefore to the matter of the arbitrating hierarchies who emerged during the decades of mature sovkhoism.

129 Women are occasionally present at corralling sessions only in an official capacity – as messengers of the Cooperative or District administrations. In the first case this happens in the capacity of Controller (schetchik) of personal-private deer (Akt 2012; Vladimirova 2009; 2006: 296); in the second – of the Reindeer Husbandry Committee (Akt 2013; 2012).
The tundra part of the sovkhoz workforce developed a rather complex organisational structure, both horizontally and vertically. The hierarchical ordering of this structure, it must be said from the start, makes the claims of visiting researchers who say they have spoken with ‘the herders’ and heard ‘their voice’ be taken with serious reservations. The opinion of a herder with no reindeer, and at the bottom of the herding hierarchy, can be very different from that of his brigade leader, or another ‘boss’ (nachal’nik) from the tundra herding elite. The ‘boss’ may have been, during mature sovkhoism, an owner of fifty, or more deer, while at present his personal-private herd may well include hundreds of head. It is therefore important to look more closely at the structure of the brigade, since in a town context, and on the strength of a brief visit, hierarchical differentiation may remain totally unobserved, while its relevance as regards especially the all-important issue of personal-private deer is very great indeed.

At the top of the herding hierarchy, and with greatest power in the whole-eared distribution, is the head of the Reindeer Husbandry Department – nachal’nik tsekha olenevodstva. In descending order from him are the veterinary doctor (vetvrach), veterinary technicians (zootekhniki), brigade leaders (brigadiri), senior herders, herders, junior herders, camp-cooks/caretakers (storozhi), and trainees (ucheniki). Horizontally, at the level of herders, there are the vezdekhod drivers and their co-drivers (naparniki). There are also ‘workers in reindeer husbandry’ (rabochie olenevodstva) – carpenters, electricians, and generally masters of all hands, who do a variety of repair jobs at permanent base camps and corral enclosures, and also work in fence-building and maintenance. With the exception of the position of camp cook (chumrabotnitsa), all other positions are filled by men.

In addition to this contingent of employees there also exists the ‘insiders’ periphery’ of pensioned off herders, mentioned above. Moving about the tundra on battered Soviet-time Buran snowmobiles, or by well-trained draft-buck teams, they manage to hang on to the brigades where they had spent their entire working lives, and remain as accepted presence at corral and reindeer herding camps. Here we should note the fact that retirement age for herders is fifty years (previously fifty-five). These veterans usually own a dozen or so personal-private deer in the brigade’s herd. They enjoy the privilege of travelling to the camps and back by the brigade vezdekhods, and, critically, be able to carry on them back to town fish caught and salted in the tundra, reindeer meat after corralling sessions, berries for sale, etc. They have the use of the base to live in and store belongings, have unlimited access to the communal pot on a par with herd-
ers, and occasionally may be hired by the administration to keep watch over the camps, for minimal pay.

When travelling around the tundra and stopping by a camp in the hope of a cup of tea and a chat, I would often find such veterans living there by themselves and taking care of the camp. I once found a former brigade-leader, called by everyone by his patronymic Ivanich, keeping watch over the castrated bucks of the wing-boss along with his own. In his spare time he was fishing, both for himself and the boss. Such services kept him on the inside of tundra affairs. Another close friend, Sergey, would keep order at one of the bases and also occasionally act as Controller of personal-private deer.

At the very bottom of the hierarchy one may find down and outs from the village, who may or may not have been in herding before. In exchange for helping in various domestic chores, at corral sessions, or in fishing for the communal pot, such people, referred to jokingly as ‘serfs’ (raby), enjoy all the privileges of pensioners. The difference between the ‘serfs’ and that latter category is that ‘serfs’ do not get the minimal salary given occasionally to some of the pensioners and typically do not own personal-private deer.

During the decades of mature sovkhozism the brigade leader’s position came to be invested with considerable authority, resembling that of a captain of a ship. He, just as his superiors from the herding elite, has the power to fire or appoint brigade members, to bar people from or allow the use of town-to-tundra transport, to allow people to stay and access the common pot at a base: generally speaking, they can admit people to the tundra and its camps or chase them away. In this sense, brigade leaders and those above them, might still feel like ‘masters of the tundra’ (khozyayeva-tundry), although the position has been significantly undermined in postsoviet times.

During mature sovkhozism a firm understanding was established between the administrative part of the enterprise (kontora) and its tundra-based productive units (brigada). According to it kontora would not meddle in brigada affairs, save for a single, but critical matter: the fulfilment of the meat-production plan (myasoplan). Aside from this the herding elite was given full license to manage reindeer husbandry affairs as they saw fit, including the crucial matter of whole-eared deer arbitration. In this way, as will be shown in the next chapter, the postsoviet liberalizing of tendencies that were established during the ‘mature sovkhoist’ 1970s and ‘80s,

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130 In 2011 pensioners, or other people, working temporarily as camp cooks/caretakers, got a gross salary of some 3,000 roubles, roughly equivalent to USD 100/month. That they would get in addition to their pension, on the average of about 7,000 roubles/month.
gave power to herding elites to expand the private-in-the-collective system. This development, accepted by the herding community as a whole, positioned the members of the herding elite as the likely large private owners of the future. Here may emerge a ‘de-democratizing’ force in postsoviet society, leading to increasing class differences to levels unthink-able in Soviet times. As I showed above, reindeer husbandry reflected this trend. How this process unfolded when the sovkhozy were reorganized and the Soviet Union disbanded is discussed in the following chapter.
Chapter 5
Radical Reforms
and the ‘Barents Euphoria’

In this chapter I describe the impact of the radical pro-market reforms that were implemented in Russia at the beginning of the 1990s. That decade, and especially the fateful year of 1992, deserves special attention in the light of the main argument I put forward in this book. The normally opaque grassroots-to-power dialogue can be seen more clearly when it surfaces in the more transparent texts and related practices that emerge at times of radical change.

Modern Russian and Soviet history have seen a whole succession of such highly eventful periods. From the point of view of the general concern of this book with ‘rural’ matters, one could mention the redistribution of land immediately after the October Revolution (1917); the temporary shift to the state governed capitalism of the NEP after the official closure of military communism in 1921; the beginnings of mass collectivisation in the late 1920s; and the beginning of radical reforms in the 1990s, to name the most prominent. I have chosen to focus on the last two only, both for reasons of space and of specificity of purpose.

This latter is connected with the reindeer husbandry profile of my concerns, where conversations with power revolve mostly around the topic of personal-private reindeer, as explained in the preceding chapters. Such was the case at the moment of the creation of the first kolkhozy in the late 1920s, and, again, during the advent of the ambiguous ‘decollectivisation’ of 1992. In both cases, marking a full circle from the liquidation of state-controlled ‘capitalism’ in 1929, to its reinstitution in 1992, the critical concern of reindeer herders had been the state of the relationship between their personal-private deer and the collective herd. Would the desirable features of the private-in-the-collective mix be sustained? The critical importance of this concern derives from the great and lasting attractiveness of the hybrid private-in-the-collective arrangement in which the ‘personal-private’ is safeguarded from risk and enhanced in size, by existing within the ‘collective’.
With the advent of radical economic reforms in 1991-‘92, the ‘town-formative enterprises’ of the region, gradoobrazuyushchie predpriyatiya: the Revda MPCs, the two district sovkhozy – Tundra and Olenevod (formerly Pamyati Lenina) – and the poetically low-profiled, but very extensive ‘budget sphere’ sector of the local economy, saw very different fates. While the Revda MPCs were next to fully destroyed as foundational enterprises, the sovkhozy managed to weather the radical reform storm with greater resilience. The budget sphere sector, however, emerged from the reforms in an enhanced shape, managing to become the primary, and practically the only effective ‘town-formative enterprise’ of the district. With nearly ninety percent of the district budget coming from regional, and ultimately, federal subsidies (dotatsii), supporting the functioning of the budget sphere, this became the primary provider of the district, while the economic input from the reindeer herding sector, together with some residual income from the Revda MPCs, are of only symbolic significance.

Against the background of such dramatic changes, sovkhoism, based on the private-in-the-collective formula, has persisted as the dominant grassroots actors’ view of the world ‘as it should be’. This has sustained continuities of structure and function in the sectors of the local socio-economy mentioned above: the principal one of the ‘budget sphere’ (administrations, educational, health, and cultural institutions, as well as various urban infrastructural services); the agricultural sector (comprising reindeer husbandry, dairy farming, raising of crops, private fresh-water fishing, and wild-fruit gathering); and the decimated mining-processing in Revda. In all these spheres of local life a private-in-the-collective socio-economy – exemplified most clearly by reindeer-husbandry – has been sustained.

The private-in-the-collective, or sovkhoist worldview, has also shaped developments in a new subsidiary sector that appeared in the late 1980s and early ‘90s: ethnopolitics with its applied branch in the creation of obshchina micro-businesses. A brief introductory sketch of these new postsoviet developments is given below.

Ethnopolitics and obshchinyism

These have tended to reveal features, albeit in a modest way, of functioning as newly emerging town-formative enterprises for the district. From the very beginning of radical reforms tendencies became apparent that concerned supportive institutions – both foreign and home ones – have been perceived as a collective multifaceted sovkhoz with the capability to
sustain a liberal private-collective mix of personal stakes in collective projects. In an extension of the sovkhoz metaphor, an ethnopolitical project may be metaphorically likened to a collective herd, from which one felt entitled to carve out or ‘saw off’\(^{131}\) a personal-private stake. That the metaphor has explanatory power has been most convincingly demonstrated by the applied component of the overall ethnopolitical project: the support it gave to the creation of private indigenous businesses, known as clan communities (*obshchiny*). In contrast to other parts of the Russian Far North, Siberia, and Far East, obshchiny appeared relatively late on the Kola scene. It was only in the late 1990s and early 2000s that the first such businesses began to be registered, with ‘Piras’ and ‘Kil’din’ of Lovozero, being among the pioneers (Kalstad 2009; Oreskov 21.05.2012 [2006]). In the course of the following decade some of the early birds wound down activities – like ‘Piras’ and ‘Kil’din’ themselves, while a growing number of new ones were being registered. By 2006 as many as fourteen ‘clan’ (*rodovye*) and ‘territorial-neighbourhood’ (*territorial’no-sosedskie*) obshchiny had been registered (Bogdanov 2007:10), with their number steadily growing in the following years. According to local opinion they should number over twenty by now, that is – by 2014, but getting a reliable picture of the situation has proved far from easy. Many obshchiny are known to exist only ‘on paper’, while relevant regional authorities have not managed, so far at least, to come out with a comprehensive report of the situation (*Clan community monitoring*; Kuchinskiy 2012; *Obshchiny* 2012).

Whatever the number of ghost as against actually working obshchiny, it has become clear by now that many in the second category have turned to tourism as their primary activity. Another – and in some cases even more important activity – has proved to be the management of fishing quotas. More about that shall be said further below. When it comes to tourism, the best example is provided by the ‘Sam’ siyyt’ obshchina mentioned earlier, which has successfully developed a ‘Sami Village’ (*Laplandskaya derevnya*) tourist complex, close to the main road leading from Lovozero/Revda to Olenegorsk. Like other such small-scale tourist ventures, belonging to local or non-local entrepreneurs, ‘Sam siyyt’ has specialized in catering for urban visitors, out for a few days of holiday-making.

\(^{131}\) ‘Sawing off’ or *raspil* is a popular way of describing taking from state - usually sums from ‘target programme’ funding. Together with another popular word – *otkat* (return of part of this funding to the state official, responsible for granting it), and a third – *zanos* (giving bribes to people responsible for a project during all phases of its execution), an abbreviation has been coined –ROZ (standing for Raspil-Otkat-Zanos) – used by critics to characterize current Russian economy as a ‘ROZ economy’ (Belkovskiy 2012).
The week-end holiday-making of urban dwellers, which has come to be locally called *etnoturizm*, is a far cry from the poetics of the early obshchina, in which reindeer herding was a prominent goal of obshchina formation. The aspirations of the initial enthusiasts and financial sponsors from the West had been to assist in making Kola reindeer husbandry private. An implied tenet of that missionary ideology was that setting up private reindeer herding farms was what everybody wanted, the Sami people most of all, now that the shackles of Soviet collectivised herding were broken.

It is not difficult to see that the bipolar perception of local dispositions, which incoming Western enthusiasts had formed, followed popular Western perceptions of ‘the East’, harking back to the not so distant Cold War. In this bipolar, black-and-white picture, ‘collectivised’ stood for bad, and ‘private’ for good, so there was no doubt about which of the two people would choose. The mission was seen, therefore, as finding and providing financial support for the setting up of obshchiny, the latter seen principally as budding private reindeer husbandry ventures, led by liberated herd- ers. In the vision of one such foreign supporter – a Danish NGO in the specific case – theirs was a project ‘for raising the necessary funds for the continuation of the privatisation of reindeer-breeding’ (Oreskov 21.05.2012).

Locally the message was generally accepted as another agitprop line in response to which a compromise private-in-the-collective strategy quickly evolved. In essence, it was a version of the old sovkhoist compromise, but this time involving two ‘collective’ parts – not just Soviet state assets, as it used to be before. The new postsoviet conditions provided a second prop to the compromise – this time in the form of foreign state support. Thus, while still leaning heavily on the sovkhoz in its postsoviet cooperative (SKhPK) version, the strategy incorporated the western ‘sovkhoz’ that arrived in the form of various support projects, financed by Western (mostly Nordic) public funds.

In this case – as in all others – the reindeer husbandry situation demonstrated its capacity to represent large and complex issues in simple, physically observable forms. In response to what was judged to be the new agitprop line – namely that to be private, traditional, reindeer herding, etc. was ‘good’ – poetic texts were created in accordance with the new canons. The concrete action consisted in taking a few personal-private reindeer to the ethno-tourist camp sites of the obshchiny and parading them there as the beginning of building up private herds. It is important to notice here that the personal-private reindeer of the old Soviet days were symbolically reconstructed as ‘private’ in the Western sense of the
term, receiving thus a two-faced, Janus-like symbolic form. To western ethnopolitical missionaries it symbolized the end of collectivised tyranny and the beginning of private, market-based entrepreneurship, democracy, and, above all, Sami cultural and economic revival. When the same animal returned to the common herd, it would be seen and treated in the ‘traditional’ hybrid (‘personal/private-in-the-collective’) sovkhoist manner.

The inherent ambiguity, characterizing so much of post-Soviet reality, would tend not to be registered by the outside observer due to, first and foremost, a complete innocence about the very existence of the personal-private category of reindeer ownership – as different from ‘truly’ private – and what that implied in terms of the local socio-economy. Beyond this, not a little of this innocence about local arrangements resulted from taking local poetic texts as substantive, that is, by not recognizing the different genres of local discourse. That talk of going ‘traditional’, private, and tundra-living, should be treated as poetic and not substantive, would not be registered by outsiders on brief visits. Statements like the following, made by an obshchina leader, would be accepted without any reservations whatsoever:

‘Now we want to be engaged in what our souls desire. Namely, to engage in reindeer breeding, hunting, fresh water fishing, wild berry and mushroom gathering, and the production of objects of decorative and applied art. We want to be in unity with nature’. (From Kalstad 2009: 64)

This ‘return to nature’ line, equated with a return to backwardness in Soviet-era texts, is presented as the raison d’être for obshchiny, rather than the actual (substantive) turning to ‘ethnotourism’ or fishing-quota businesses. The fact that one and the same personal-private reindeer, used as a draft-buck in week-end ‘ethnic’ shows for urban holiday-makers, was only poetically ‘private’, failed to undermine the belief in a romantic, ‘return to nature’ scenario that was staged for outside consumption. At the same time, the endowment of reindeer with a poetic identity bears witness to its capacity for carrying multiple symbolic meanings from many conceptual universes. This capacity points to the broader mystique of the North in which the animal has become enrobed over the centuries.

Ethnic tourism, alongside other new tourisms in the reindeer herding part of the Peninsula, has thus come to be a new element in the local socio-economy – via obshchinism and Sami cultural revival. This development has received official recognition, promoting it to the desired status of ‘economic component’ (ekonomicheskaya sostavlyayushchaya) for the district. Thus, in the latest strategy of the regional government, Lovozero District’s economic future is seen to depend on two principal components:
‘agriculture’, principally meaning reindeer husbandry in the local case, and, secondly, tourism. It is highly unlikely, however, that reindeer husbandry can become anything different from what it is now: a subsidized activity whose economic significance is negligible. This leaves the district with tourism, specifically ethnic tourism, as its greatest hope for the future.

This scenario for the future does not inspire great expectations locally, at least without bringing its implications to the surface. Firstly, mining-processing has practically dropped out of local plans and Revda’s economy has been increasingly referred to as ‘ugasyayushchaya’, i.e. ‘dying out’ (Cf. Minregion 26.02.2013). At the same time the government budget sector funds that currently sustain Lovozero/Revda in the absence of the former industrial power are being put under constant pressure to reduce the inflated number of its employees, a process known as ‘optimizatsiya’ [optimisation].

Against this background, the agricultural/tourist scenario seems to be invested with a degree of hope on the part of regional authorities. The hope is to reduce the dependence on subsidies for the district and thereby gain some room for autonomous movement, diminish tensions caused by ‘optimisation’ and, in general, increase a sense of local power for decisions in matters of local concern. Not least among these is the exclusive safari-tourism of which more shall be said further on. So far, decisions about this lucrative business, exploiting the best salmon rivers of the district, are taken above the heads of local administrators, with proceeds and taxes from it also going to higher power tiers.

That the ailing reindeer husbandry and week-end ethnic shows for visiting urbanites can provide adequate incomes is in doubt. A resulting yearning for good news leads some to believe – mostly those among present or laid-off employees of the Revda MPC – that the mining-processing complex will be revived somehow, and thus improve the whole district economy. The fact that the people of Revda are still hesitant to abandon the town, although everyone’s suitcases have long been packed, reflects such a hope. Recently, signs that motivate such hopeful attitudes have indeed appeared. Against a smallish regional industrial growth of 0.6% for 2013, compared to the previous year, production of Loparite concentrate at the Karnasurt Complex increased by as much as 12%. 

At the same time, other voices can be heard, expressing rather pessimistic views. Importantly, these tend to come from the ranks of the old-

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132 For descriptions of the pressure to reduce budget sphere personnel see esp. Zhirtskaya (18.11.2013).
age pensioners, grouped around the **Council of Veterans**, and the Council of Deputies (**Lovozero District Council**). These are bastions of local critical opinion, often stated in uncompromising terms. Usually the speakers are administrative or Party leaders of the previous nomenklatura list. Their views are shared, nevertheless, by the majority of the population, investing the councils with considerable local authority. Returning to the issue of the mining-processing complex and its fate, the Head of the Council of Deputies and former director of the enterprise recently stated without mincing words: ‘The [Revda] Complex is slowly but surely going to the bottom’ (Kuznetsova 2014b:2).

On a more optimistic note, another hope has nonetheless appeared. It is based on some rumours that at a **Military Unit** site near Revda, one known as ‘Km. 54’, a vast space centre shall be built, providing as many as one thousand jobs. In this way Revda shall flourish yet again. (ibid.)

Those who appraise the situation less optimistically, however, place their hopes in the sustainability of a sovkhoist tapping of tundra resources – with reindeer herding becoming the central platform for a variety of parasitically attached informal activities. The attitude is reflected by growing real estate prices, particularly in Lovozero, where apartments cost as much as three hundred Euros per square meter. Even more telling, the price of a square metre of garage space is currently (end of 2013) 3,500 roubles (approx. 87.5 Euros). Such prices underscore the critical importance of tundra access for enhancing domestic economies.

How does sovkhoism inspire such developments? **Obshchinist** ethnotouristic activities illustrate the case. The crucial point here is that obshchina and other tourisms operate as informal linkages between the postsoviet reincarnations of the former sovkhozy, on the one hand, and foreign and home programmes, premised on the notion of revival of ‘private reindeer herding’, on the other. With weakening foreign support for private ventures characterizing the end of the second postsoviet decade, the importance of home programmes, ‘poetically’ premised on the same principles as the fading foreign ones, has been steadily growing. Obshchiny are now principally dependent on home rather than foreign economic support. The ideology of home support has followed in the steps of the foreign one, as the latter came in with great enthusiasm in the heady nineties. Its main tenets have thus consistently been giving support for sustaining ‘traditional land use’. What this means has never been clearly explained or juridically specified and yet carries legal obligations. If subsidies are given to obshchiny to be ‘traditional’, then they have to be such. So far a vaguely implied meaning of ‘being traditional’ is to engage in reindeer husbandry, fresh- and/or sea-fishing, wild-berry and mush-
room gathering (sbor dikorosov), and souvenir production. It remains unclarified to what extent these activities should provide for subsistence needs or can be directed towards market sales.

So far obshchiny look vulnerable on all counts. Those of them that practice reindeer husbandry in real terms must be, by general opinion, very few indeed. No one really knows. With a degree of confidence I can say that I know of only one (cf. Clan community monitoring). At the same time, the fact that ‘etnobiznes’ and getting and subsequently selling to outsiders liberal fresh- and sea-water fishing quotas is what most of the obshchiny seem to subsist upon, is not considered to be ideologically and even juridically problematic by the obshchiny themselves or the wider community.

This last statement should be qualified by adding that there seems to be an unspoken agreement between givers and receivers of support by which the latter are accepted as ‘traditional’. The agreement suggests that as long as the vague idea of the ‘traditional’ is only stretched to a certain limit, negative sanctions shall not follow.

This aspect of the current state of affairs is reminiscent of the ‘traditional’ sovkhoz acceptance of only moderately exceeding personal-private deer quotas, as long as they were not exceeded drastically. In the ethnotourist case, home programmes of support tolerate the use of personal-private deer of obshchina members, to be paraded as ‘private’. This seems to rest on an unspoken understanding with the regional administration that funding is not drawn for completely imaginary, or ghost private herds, claimed to be of hundreds of head. (Cf. Scheller et al. 2013; Berdnikov 2010) Russian project authorities have thus proved to be stricter in monitoring ‘reindeer herding poetics’ than their foreign counterparts. The case of Obshchina ‘Chígar’, discussed further down, was a strong signal from the regional authorities that excesses of sovkhoism would not be tolerated. The case involved a lawsuit against the leader in which she was sentenced to return a considerable sum of subsidized help for what proved to be an imaginary private herd.

It can be claimed, despite such extreme cases, that the newly emerged sector of ethnic and tundra-oriented entrepreneurship, principally in the sphere of tourism and fishing-quota businesses, managed to sustain and enhance the former Soviet version of a private-in-the-collective socioeconomic arrangement. This is what I see as pushing up real estate prices in Lovozero. The new possibilities of applying sovkhoism (within limits) as a complex, interdependent linkage between the budget sphere, the postsoviet sovkhozy, and the new opportunities for indigenous ethnic entrepreneurship, together with the added attraction of living next-door
to the tundra and its renewable resources, are seen by local people as a better security scheme than the uncertain future resulting from moving elsewhere in the region or beyond.

The reinterpretation of sovkhoism as first and foremost a grassroots survival strategy helped local people withstand the dramas of the 1990s. This is to be credited to the tenacity of dominant grassroots views and dispositions. In a way, it is double credit. Not only did people manage to weather a turbulent period in economic terms, but they also withstood the impact of a sharply changed ideological line, managing to adapt flexibly to the new conditions, and, in the longer term, to contribute to the country’s reassertion of sovkhoism as a leading socio-political and economic agenda. To appraise this dynamic it is necessary to recall that at the beginning of postsoviet reforms such lapsing back into sovkhoism was vehemently resisted by the country’s leaders and proclaimed as a detrimental legacy of the Soviet era. But sovkhoism now rules the day at all levels of life, which eloquently points to the sustained role of grassroots agency over the course of the two post-Soviet decades.

Sovkhoist grassroots dispositions have critically informed the home side of ‘Russia’s new pragmatism’ (Tsygankov 2010: 129f) and its underlying ROZ economy as expressed by its critics, noted above (Belkovskiy 2012). This fact – of a ‘public-private’ substantive compromise, reinterpreted in accordance with new surface realities – cannot be fully assessed unless one considers it against the background of the ideological climate of the first reform years. To this I turn below.

The beginning of radical reforms – ‘Gaydar’s Year’ (1992)

Radical pro-market reforms in Russia had been much debated in 1990 (Chernyaev 1997), but flourished only in 1992–93. The political will that set them in motion came from acting President Boris Yel’tsin, and was put into action by a group of young neo-liberally minded economists among his immediate entourage. The spirit of the day – at the top of the ‘power hierarchy’ (vertikal’ vlasti) – was one of conviction in the virtues of neo-liberal economy. Liberalization of prices from state control (‘deregulation’), as well as large-scale privatisation of state assets were among the top priorities of Yel’tsin’s team of reformers headed by Egor’ Gaydar. (Gaydar and Chubays 2011) Gennadiy Burbulis, one of the leading reformers and Yel’tsin’s deputy, had summarized those goals in the following way:
The social and economic aim of the reforms, from my point of view, [is to] create the institution of private ownership. People should live in a society where they can acquire freely any kind of private property, and own it without fear. (After Sogrin 2001: 111)

Larissa Piyasheva, a prominent economist and fervent advocate of absolute economic freedom, praised thus its virtues: ‘I am staking my hopes on the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ let loose, which shall resurrect in the country the will to live, as well as the ‘Protestant ethic’.’ (Ibid.:104)

Following such convictions, the reformers began the year of 1992 (now popularly remembered with a shudder as ‘Gaydar’s Year’) with ‘de-regulation of prices’. What ensued amounted to the dismantling of the known world for some three generations of people. Coming from the pinnacle of political power, much like Stalin’s ‘revolution from above’, the decrees announced the end of socialism in Russia, internalized firmly as the antithesis of capitalism by the majority of the population.

The true beginning of ‘socialism’, heralded as the complete liquidation of ‘capitalism’ in the Soviet Union, was, as is well known, announced by Stalin in the autumn of 1929. In his long programmatic article ‘Year of the great breakthrough’, which set forth the campaigns of accelerated industrialisation and collectivisation, Stalin wrote: “The principle of sacredness of private property”, this last hope of the capitalists from all countries, dreaming about the reviving of capitalism in the USSR, is crumbling and turning into dust."

Between Stalin’s article of November 1929, and the reintroduction of ‘capitalism’ in the momentous year of 1992, there is a period of sixty-three years of what I call in this book ‘sovkhoism’ (with its corresponding varieties in all spheres of socioeconomic life). I find justification for doing so in the general agreement that the term ‘socialism’ is a misnomer for Soviet reality, unless it is qualified as ‘command socialism’, or ‘state socialism’. Moreover: Stalin’s ‘revolution from above’, or as Trotsky called it at the time: ‘The Soviet Thermidor’ (1936: 55), makes a relevant division between two rather different periods in Soviet history. The first revolutionary years, the military communism of the Civil War and the New Economic Policy (NEP) period up to 1928-29, stand in rather sharp contrast to the following period, ushered in by the simultaneous campaigns of accelerated industrialisation and mass collectivisation.

My own fieldwork in Lovozero District has abundantly indicated that the relevant period against which current developments are being compared by the local people is the well-remembered period of the 1960s till the changes of 1991–92, not some all-encompassing period since the
October Revolution. (Cf. Dubin 2011: 50) This clearly has much to do with the age of those remembering, but much more with the fact that the ‘mature sovkhoism’ of the Brezhnev decades provided the best ground for the flourishing of the loosely controlled private-collective mix. It thus stands as the strongest referential point in community memory, a referential point or rather period, not designated as ‘socialism’ in everyday speech, but actually having no name at all. Denotation is fragmented into various pieces of text, revolving around the general theme of how things were ‘before’ (the changes), with that ‘before’ going not much further back than the 1960s.

For the period since 1992 I have chosen, for the same reasons, the term ‘neo-sovkhoism’ as preferable to ‘postsocialism’. The inadequacy of the latter can be ascribed to the fact that it names a generalized period, whose anchoring is in an undifferentiated and therefore emically meaningless past. (Cf. Humphrey 2002:13) In using terms like ‘sovkhoism’ and ‘neo-sovkhoism’ I also draw inspiration from the persistence of ‘sovkhoz’ in the everyday talk of the community with whom I work. The truth is that the two reindeer herding enterprises in Lovozero District continue to be called sovkhozy by local people to this day. The usage has been registered in a great variety of other places, to mention only two as the nearest: the Nenets Autonomous Okrug (Tuisku 2001:42), and the NE of the Komi Republic (Habeck 2005:47). This is twenty years after the enterprises ‘re-registered’ themselves from sovkhozy to supposed ‘cooperatives’.

The spirit of the reforms was, however, completely contrary to such popular sovkhoist leanings. As stated above, the reforms were implemented in the conviction that Russia would be resurrected from the ruins of the Soviet experiment by establishing a fully liberalized entrepreneurial regime, aiming at reducing the role of the state to a minimum. ‘Gaydar’s Year’ set, in this way, a dividing line between the period of perestroyka (1985–1991), and what followed, by totally abandoning Gorbachev’s attempts to sustain ‘the socialist choice’ in an untenable compromise with the changes he initiated.

As is well known, the implementation of the laissez-faire ways of ‘Gaydar’s Team’ (komanda Gaydara) brought disastrous social results already in the first months of the memorable 1992. Consequently, the reformers became instantly the butt of popular anger and have stayed so to this day. Without going into details, suffice it to say that in the space of a very short period of time millions of people lost their jobs and savings and found themselves impoverished by rampant hyperinflation. The social price of economic liberalism proved enormous.
During subsequent months prices jumped up at the rate of 30–40% per month and by mid-1992 they had shot to a level ten times that of the previous year. With salaries lagging far behind this stampede, the impoverishment of the population rapidly became evident.

Against this grim background, the expectation of the government was that the population would withdraw their savings in a struggle for sheer survival. That did not happen, however, much to the surprise of top-echelon economists. Despite skyrocketing hyperinflation, the population in their majority not only did not withdraw their savings in panic, but in fact went on putting their money in the banks. In this way, by the end of the year, with the joint action of the government and the governed, practically all savings of the population, as well as those of enterprises, had disappeared. That was as good as a confiscation of all savings. Even Stalin’s economists during the currency exchange reform of 1947 had not performed such a feat. As noted in contemporary literature, that reform principally aimed at confiscating the savings of personal-private plot producers, who had been given free rein during the war. (Khronos 17.08.2014; Alexandrov 1949) While reducing such savings considerably, the 1947 currency reform did not annihilate them. The 1992 reforms managed to do so.

The episode of saving in the face of hyperinflation, which occurred in the fateful year of 1992, reveals with clarity the firm belief not only of the average citizen, but of the directors of public enterprises as well, that they could rely on benevolent state institutions as the ultimate safeguard in times of adversity. It took some time for this firmly internalized belief to be shaken in the later phase of privatisation, and is to be connected with the conspicuous consumption behaviour of overnight billionaires (oligarkhi), the rampant corruption of state officials, law-enforcing organs, and the military, as well as a corresponding unprecedented rise of crime.

The ‘voluntary forfeiture of savings’ episode clearly illustrated a case of blocked grassroots-to-power communication. Its results were that, contrary to the popular notion of a state acting as deus ex machina in such situations, the money never came back. Those in power only registered that the entrepreneurial consciousness of the masses had not reached the necessary level of development. Apart from proclaiming their faith in liberal capitalism in messages alien and largely incomprehensible for the greater part of the people, the elites had seemingly found it superfluous to connect in any meaningful way with the ‘masses’ and modify accordingly, if needs be, their decisions. In other words, they ignored the establishing of any form of dialogue with the populace at large in the belief that economic interest spoke loudly enough. (Appel 2000)
Under the impact of what was unleashed, the reformers’ majority in the Supreme Council and at the Sixth Congress of the People’s Deputies of Russia (April 1992), began to crumble. Radicalism was seriously opposed and the Congress adopted a resolution declaring the course of the reforms unsatisfactory. By mid-summer of 1992 the government of the radical reformers had, in practice, ceased to exist (Sogrin 2001: 121).

Despite the shocking results of the radical reforms, belief in the state as the ultimate provider of security was not fully destroyed. Taking bank savings as an indicator again, the government default on its debts in August 1998 caused another wave of losses of savings.

The agrarian reform in Lovozero District

Against such a background of hyperinflation and loss of savings, reforms aiming at ‘de-collectivisation’ of the agricultural sector had been implemented. In the autumn of 1992 Sovkhoz Tundra of Lovozero, as well as Pamyati Lenina of Krasnoshchel’e, were registered anew as joint stock limited companies – TOO-s. (Konstantinov and Vladimirova 2006a; Rybkin 1999; Konstantinov 1997; Rantala 1995:60). In this way they fulfilled the directives of the radical reformers, known as ‘Land and agrarian reform’ (zemel’no-agrarnaya reforma). (Bogolyubov and Minina 2000: 12f; Krassov 2000: 62f)

A great number of documents are connected with the reform and its implementation. What is of importance, from the point of view of the state of communication between power and grassroots actors at this time, is the free rein for compromise and ambiguousness that was signalled by the radical reformers. The telling document in this respect was the presidential decree ‘On urgent measures for the realization of land reform in RSFSR’ (1992). Following the principal tenets of the Land Reform programme, it contained ‘prescriptions’ (predpisaniya) about how the existing kolkhozy and sovkhozy were to change their status in accordance with the Law of the RSFSR ‘On businesses and business activities’. On the naming side of it, the enterprises were instructed to register themselves anew – as Tundra and Pamyati Lenina promptly did, replacing the word ‘sovkhoz’ with ‘cooperatives’ (TOO, later SKhPK).133 The whole process of reorganisation and renaming was called ‘pereregristratsiya’ (re-registering). (Bogolyubov and Minina 2000:12; Popov and Shmelev 1992:14)

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133 On the manner in which Tundra had been re-registered see detailed reporting in several consecutive issues of Lovozerskaya pravda of January-March 1993.
The directives for re-registering were followed by a Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 4 September 1992 No 708 ‘On the procedure of privatisation and reorganisation of enterprises and organisations of the agro-industrial complex’. The decree endorsed ‘Regulations (polozheniya) for reorganisation of kolkhozy, sovkhozy and the privatisation of state agricultural enterprises’ (Krassov 2000: 62; 278), elaborating on the directives, prescribed by the previous documents.

It is important to emphasize the point that in accordance with the new democratic atmosphere in which the leadership spoke with subjects down the vertical axis of power, the decrees and other documents, cited above, were issued as ‘prescriptions’, rather than orders. I turn attention to the noun used which is *predpisanie*, with the corresponding verb *predpisyvat’*, that is, ‘prescribe’ in the manner of writing out medical recipes to patients. The patients may then follow the prescriptions, but, again, they may not.

In actual fact that was exactly what happened. By 1993 roughly half of the kolkhozy and sovkhozy in the Russian Federation had re-registered as joint stock limited companies (TOOs), or as some other transitional forms (agricultural cooperatives, shareholding companies, municipal unitary enterprises, etc.). Another forty-five per cent had chosen not to follow the prescriptions and thus retain their previous status, and only about five per cent had re-registered as associations of private farmers.¹³⁴ Those who monitored the process noted that the particular change from kolkhoz/sovkhoz to TOO may be considered as one of only formal renaming. (Denisova 1996; Rantala 1995)

Special attention should be paid to the difference between responding to the ‘prescriptions’ by formally renaming a sovkhoz into a TOO – as it happened in Lovozero District – and creating a cooperative of private farmers (*assotsiatsiya fermerskih khozyaystv*). It is significant that this new – and truly ‘private’ – form was not chosen in Lovozero District, and it eventually was established only slowly in the region in strictly agricultural (non-reindeer husbandry) sectors.¹³⁵

The difference between a cooperative in the form of a TOO or SKhPK, on the one hand, and an association of private farmers, on the

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¹³⁵ The only private reindeer husbandry farm that I know to have been registered was M.E. Mkrtchyan’s on Rybachiy Peninsula (Gorter-Grovik (1995); personal conversation with M.E. Mkrtchyan 25.09.2010). By the end of 2012 official statistics list the presence of some 100 private farms in Murmansk Region, but reindeer husbandry farms are not mentioned among them (*Na razvitie* 06.11.2012).
other, is crucial for the understanding of the local situation. The TOOs, SKhPKs, and other similar organisational forms, can be considered as reinterpretations of the previous sovkhoz/kolkhoz enterprises, with only superficial changes as regards the manner of administration and, critically, of subsidizing by the state. While called ‘cooperatives’ in both the home and foreign literature, their essentially ‘private-in-the-collective’ nature is, as a rule, not being recognized. In other words, hybrid Soviet/post-Soviet forms like these TOOs and SKhPKs are not being differentiated from associations of private farmers. Consequently, the difference between ‘private-in-the-collective’ vs. ‘truly private’ is not being made. Although many recognized from the very start that ‘re-registering’ was primarily a cosmetic operation of making the old sovkhozy look like new cooperatives (i.e. Rantala 1995, quoted earlier), the fact that local people continued to call the new hybrids by their old sovkhoz names attracted little attention.

It is in this way, that somewhat paradoxically, radical reformism in agriculture allowed the continuation of the collectivisation compromise. That grassroots actors clung hard to sovkhoist worldviews, which they aimed to veil over by a creative use of labelling – that is, poetically – was a fact condoned, but only patronizingly rebuked by the governing team of liberal economists. The elites tended to see such grassroots actors’ behaviour as resembling that of mental patients, deranged by decades of Soviet rule, and in need of liberal economic cure.

A similar ‘mental deficiency’ of the populace, reminiscent of the recurrent Soviet leadership’s conclusion that people’s ‘consciousness’ was still not at the desired level, was made in connection with the ease with which people were fooled by the financial pyramids that were widespread at the time. The large-scale fraud of Sergey Mavrodi and his financial pyramid ‘MMM’ is one example.\(^{136}\) The dominant opinion in the West, as among the contemporary Russian leadership, was that after so many decades of command socialism the people were inevitably gullible, thinking that the state would always shield them from robbery, punish evil doers, and give hard-earned money back to the people. Large-scale social disasters, like the two losses of savings, mentioned earlier, could not but sustain such an opinion.

Still, condescending attitudes to grassroots actors, on which Gaydar’s Team and Western opinion generally converged, blocked from view any reservations that grassroots actors held in their dialogue with power. The case was particularly obvious as regarded the rural sector, and reflects misconceptions concerning, among myriad such, just a microscopic part

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\(^{136}\) About similar phenomena in Romania Verdery (1995a,b).
of the vast Russian rural scene – that of Kola reindeer husbandry. Since this type of misunderstanding became a structural part of cross-border ‘dialogue’ and has stayed as such over the last two decades, a brief look at the emergence and dynamics of that dialogue becomes necessary at this point.

Communication problems in the context of the ‘Barents Euphoria’: ‘poetic’ textual production

A highlight in recent North European history was that a very strong signal for entering into a new phase of cross-border communication came with Gorbachev’s visit to Murmansk on 30 Sept.-2 Oct. 1987. The formal reason for that state visit was to award the City of Murmansk with the prestigious Order of Lenin, and with the Medal ‘Gold Star’ (Zolotaya Zvezda). (Ceremonial presentation of medals to cities is a good illustration of poetic usage in power-to-grassroots talk. In its less visible substantive part it helped ensure a better supply of food stuffs and deficit consumer goods to the awarded city. In the same way, cities would be granted better food and consumer goods supplies when they were proclaimed ‘Hero Cities’ (goroda geroi), on account of collective heroic behaviour of their citizens during the Patriotic War. Murmansk was honoured in this way in 1985).

In the course of these ceremonial proceedings the General Secretary launched the so-called ‘Murmansk Initiative’. It envisaged the creation of a nuclear free zone in Northern Europe and opened the road for pan-Arctic cooperation. (KE (Gorbachev); Hønneland 2010: 40; Sillanpää 2008: 47–9)

The initiative was interpreted as signalling the coming of a new era of cross-border relations and consequent political and economic initiatives. Attracted by such enticing vistas, and with cooperative efforts by Fennoscandic countries, the Russian Federation, and the European Union, the creation of a Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) was announced in Kirkenes on 11 Jan. 1993. Those and similar developments created a new cross border climate of greatly improved relations between Russia and the ‘west’. It created also great hopes, especially on the western side of the border, for dissolving political, economic, and cultural differences in the north-west of Europe, and thus transforming the area from a zone of confrontation during the Cold War to one of smooth and unproblematic dialogue, with a gradual relaxation of border regimes and a promise of an economic boom (Seppänen 1995). Twenty years hence such enthusiasms
have undergone some serious dampening, leading a prominent analyst of political developments in the Region to dub the nineties as the time of ‘Barents Euro-Arctic Region euphoria’ in the Fennoscandic countries (Hønneland 2003:63).

The quip reflects the growing need for a critical reassessment of all aspects of the thaw in cross-border relations, initiated by Gorbachev’s ‘Murmansk Speech’ of Oct. 1987. Such a reassessment was not possible before the late 1990s, as the same author notes, when ‘it was simply politically incorrect in Norway to question these assumptions’, i.e. ‘that all European northerners are “basically alike”, or that new infrastructure will make “cultural differences” disappear.’ (Hønneland 2003:63) It is to be added here that there is an aspect of the thaw of those heady times, which still seems to be politically incorrect to question. This is the state of the cross-border ethnopolitical dialogue, particularly as it concerns the Sami indigenous people on both sides of the border. Despite this, and as already mentioned in Chapter 1, a number of scholars, whose research has been focused on Lovozero District, have indicated that the current state of affairs of Kola Sami ethnopolitics needs critical reassessment (Scheller 2013; Scheller et al. 2013; Øverland and Berg-Nordlie 2012; Berg-Nordlie 2011; Vladimirova 2011; Øverland 1999).

‘Becoming visible’

The first years of enhanced cross-border relations – ‘euphoric’ in Hønneland’s phrasing – marked the Kola Sami people’s emergence from previously imposed obscurity and their ‘becoming visible’. (Mustonen and Mustonen 2011; Sillanpää 2008: 47f; Vatonena 1997; Rantala 1995). The coming of what amounted to a cultural, linguistic, and political liberation for the Sami people, was welcomed enthusiastically by regional scholars and activists. It was set in a sharp contrast to the previous state of affairs, glamorized at the time by agitprop classics like ‘Lovozero’ and ‘The Soviet Sami’, discussed in the previous chapter. In marked contrast, new revelations of the grim facts of recent history foregrounded the Sami as a people oppressed by Soviet rule. In the words of regional social scientists, concerned with Kola Sami issues: ‘for decades the Kola Sami of the Murmansk Region were playing the role of colonial natives whose interests were subordinated to those of the Soviet State’ (Gutsol and Ryabova 2002: 314).

Among the enthusiasms accompanying such liberatory moods, there were ideas even of the Kola Peninsula becoming part of Sápmi, the latter
imagined as a new transnational polity of the Nordic and Russian Sami people. I still remember, as I noted in earlier writing (2005a: 40), that during my first visit to Lovozero on occasion of the local ‘Festival of the North’, the Sami flag stood above the Russian on the pole in the centre of the festive square. That was in March 1994. By the 2000s the Sami flag had gone down beneath the Russian on that same pole, and when I was at the Festival last, in March 2010 and again in 2013, it had entirely disappeared.

By 2012 Sami flag-raising had been moved towards the back of the symbolic stage. Sami Day – 6 February – which used to be marked by flag-raising in the centre of Murmansk, on a special stage set up in the Pyat’ Uglov (Five Corners) central square, had been this time moved to the suburban village of Molochnoe. In an effort to make the flag visible again, a Kola Sami Parliament delegation raised it ‘unofficially’ in front of the Regional Government buildings, some way from the central square.137 The fortunes of the flag are a symbolic expression of the changes since the period of Barents Euphoria of which, to paraphrase Hønneland, a ‘Sápmi Euphoria’ had been a significant part.138

By early 2014, however, what could be called ‘the Sami flag issue’ seemed to find a solution pointing to an ‘etatisation’ of indigenous issues. International Sami Day was celebrated all over the Region with considerably publicity given to the event in the regional, as well as federal mass media. The sensitive issue of where to raise the Sami flag in Murmansk – in the Pyat’ Uglov central square or in front of the Regional Government building – found a solution which appeared to be permanent. The flag was raised in front of the Centre of the Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the North (1 Podstanitskogo Street) (6 fevralya 04.02.2014). Thus, by making the flag symbolically relevant only to the ethnopolitical group itself, an official stamp was put, as I see it, on a return of indigenous peoples to the governmental fold, after a period of some two decades of unchaperoned activism.

137 Trofimov describes the ‘flag situation’ as following established Nordic practices, namely that ‘the (Sami) flag can be raised at unofficial celebrations, like other national flags’ (30.03.2012:6).
138 It may be added here that the point has been very firmly driven home recently (November 2012) as regards a neighbouring region’s attempt for an indigenous revival – that of the Russian Pomors and the ensuing Pomor controversy.
Ideological premises

A special note is in order here about the premises which a liberated Kola Sami ethnopolitical discourse adopted from the start, and which became integrated in the conceptual structure of all that followed. From the point of view of the present discussion, the following propositions were of special significance:

(i) the Kola Sami people’s cultural revival was critically related to reindeer husbandry;

(ii) Sami reindeer husbandry was ‘revivable’ as private family reindeer husbandry businesses, now that the Sami people were liberated from the bonds of imposed collectivisation and Soviet state oppression;

(iii) revival was contingent on resurrection of a traditional life style and land use practices, a socio-economic complex that had been forcibly dismantled by the collectivisation of the late 1920s–30s, industrialisation, the militarisation of the Peninsula, and the administrative liquidation of Sami villages at the turn of the 1970s.

The propositions listed above contain an essentially romantic motif implying the possibility of regression in the sense of resuming a process that had been interrupted. They thus ignore the possibility that the ‘Soviet decades’ may have not been an ‘interruption’, but a continuation of a process, already unfolding, which, in the space of time between 1929 and 1992, developed its inner perception of traditionality. I maintain that in substantive terms this ‘sovkhoist traditionality’ is the one that is critically relevant at present. Following the main tenets of the Kola Sami ethnopolitical discourse – especially point (iii) above – poetic discourse would stress a pre-Soviet (pre-kolkhoz/sovkhoz traditionality), anchored in some vague past, implicitly positioned in the latter half of the 19th through the beginning of the 20th centuries. In this, it might be noted, they have been following the principal tenets of Soviet folkloristic historiography.

The representations of Sami history after collectivisation, vocalized in urban culture halls and conference rooms, would therefore tend to be of a tragic experiment that had failed, that its effects were removable, and that now people could sigh with relief and go back to their traditional business as usual. In the Kola case such revivalist romanticism expressed itself in the texts of a quickly mounting proliferation of cross-border seminars and conferences. However, the texts – principally following the postulates listed above and with the ‘traditionalist’ theme as a key element in them - displayed some communicational incongruities that eventually made the dialogue vacuous. What emptied it of meaning was that on the western
side of the border the idea of returning to an imagined pre-collectivisation traditionality would be generally taken as self-evident. On the eastern side, however, such an idea could flourish only on the symbolic stage. What happened in fact was supported by postsovkhoist reinterpretations of the previous Soviet order, assisted by national or diminishing international support. How and why such a vacuity of the ethnopolitical cross-border dialogue appeared?

**Dialogic incongruities**  The main reasons for the emerging gap is found in the fact that texts which expressed the perceptions and expectations of a generalized Western interlocutor about Kola Sami people, principally reflected a *substantive* use of language, as described in Chapter 1. In other words, such a generalized interlocutor generally abided by Grice’s *Cooperative Principle* 139 in proposing that the Kola Sami people were a unified community with a single voice that spoke, equally sincerely, of reviving traditional lifestyle and land use as an utmost priority. The obstacles to conducting a successful dialogue were due to the facts that (a) the deep and radical divisions within the Kola Sami community were either not noticed or ignored; (b) that those who had positioned themselves as spokespeople for the community were radically ‘non-traditional’ in both the pre-Soviet and sovkhoist sense of the term; (c) that the motive in taking prominent – and lasting – part in ‘Kola Sami urban talk’ in not a few cases came from reinterpreted Soviet agitprop and ‘social work’ competences, and the desire to be a ‘socially active person’ (Yurchak 2005:102f), and finally (d) that the substantive parts in the discourse of the ethnically mixed and much divided urban/tundra local community remained muted, unheard, or simply ignored.

Thus the mega-speech event was compromised. The two sides ‘communicated’ by following mutually incompatible language uses. Most schematically put, one was substantive usage, the other poetic. The nearest to visualizing the incongruity of such a make-believe dialogue would be to imagine one of two interlocutors discussing a topic, while constantly winking at an imaginary audience. Non-substantive production of texts in such a ‘dialogue’ may be said to be marked, para-linguistically, by a ‘winking mood’. 140

Texts, stressing the critical importance of reviving traditions, so characteristic of what I call here ‘Kola Sami urban talk’, could be easily rendered

139 Grice 1975:45–46; Davies 2000:2, see also Austin on ‘sincerity of speech act requirements’ (1962).

140 Mood I use here in the sense of a grammatical category, like imperative (mood), subjunctive, etc.
in a ‘winking mood’. Such a ‘grammaticalization’ captures the essence of a substantive-poetic gap, implying the recurrent character of its presence, and competent awareness of that. A consequence of this state of dialogic affairs has been that the omnisciently present substantive-poetic gap left little room for reflecting on the fact that the emphasis on traditionalism had been a key theme in Soviet ‘minority encapsulation’ discourse. The latter’s thrust of encasing Sami culture within boundaries of particularity\textsuperscript{141} has thus been largely ignored.

One should note here the existence of a long Soviet ethnopolitical practice of performing and sophisticating the genre of romantic traditionalism in various other domains of public performance. A central place among them was held by amateur and professional shows of the ubiquitous House of Culture (\textit{Dom kul’tury}). Beside a venue, which used to be and still is the place for community gatherings even in the smallest and remotest of villages, these fully institutionalized community centres organized a great variety of stage and applied-art activities. In the sense of a ‘community life’, events at the House of Culture and the National Cultural Centres, come nearest. These are the places where disco-nights for the young are arranged, as well as festive dinners with dancing for the older. One takes along food and drink to them, following practices of community gathering of southern Russian and Ukrainian regions.\textsuperscript{142}

In connection with the tundra part of the life of reindeer herders, of high prominence were the activities of \textit{kul’tbrigady} (cultural brigades), and \textit{agitbrigady} (propaganda brigades) who went round the tundra herding camps and, alongside reading the latest ideologically poetic (‘cloudspeak’) texts published as \textit{Pravda} editorials, presented ‘ideologically correct’ folkloristic shows. Recently, a revival of these culture-and-propaganda events has been noticed\textsuperscript{143}.

As regards Lovozero District, save for the \textit{kul’tbrigady}, all else is still firmly in place. The activities of cultural and educational institutions are impressive. Here are the Houses of Culture of both towns, the National Cultural Centre in Lovozero, the Municipal Libraries, the Lovozero and Revda Regional Lore Museums, the several Sami and Komi folk choirs and dance troupes, the Children’s Art Schools of both towns (\textit{Detskie shkoly isskustv}), the Houses of Artistic Creativity (\textit{Doma tvorchestva}), the

\textsuperscript{141} Cf. Trond Thuen’s analysis of a similar situation, concerning the Saami people in Norway (Thuen 1995: 92).

\textsuperscript{142} An artistic representation of such a gathering made a central moment in ‘Shadows of forgotten ancestors’ (\textit{Teni zabytykh predkov}, 1964), by Armenian film director Sergey Paradzhanov.

\textsuperscript{143} Fo’llklornyy (24.12.2014); Kul’tbrigady (14.12.2013); cf. campaigning team.
Sunday School of the Parish Orthodox Church – these are representative examples from a list of cultural institutions that support a busy schedule of events. In the rich panoply of cultural festivals, warranting a Committee for Culture, Youth Affairs and Public Relations at the District Administration in the capacity of an overseeing institution, most are ‘all-Russian’ ones – such as All-Russian Library Day (Vserossiyskiy Den’ Bibliotek, 27 May). Some are international – such as International Museum Day (Mehzdunarodnyy Den’ Muzeva, 18 May). Since the month of May is particularly rich in festive occasions, a syncretic festival has also been created: the Day of Slavonic Writing and Culture, the Sami Word, and the Komi Language (Den’ slavyanskoy pis’mennosti i kul’tury, saamskogo slova i komi yazyka, 24 May), which thus manages to gather distinct language families under one banner.

The cultural occasions roll one after the other, intermixed with strictly indigenous ones – like the winter and summer Sami festivals, a host of other celebratory and anniversary events, book presentations, and choir and dance performances. The choir and dance troupes, in the syncretic manner exemplified by the Day of Slavonic Writing, appear at all festive occasions throughout the year, with performances given on local stages or further afield. Texts and choreography mainly rely on the body of literature on amateur art (khudozhestvennaya samodeyatelnost) accumulated during the decades of Soviet ideological production and only slightly readjusted thereafter. Ideas about what Sami (or Komi) ‘traditional culture’ is supposed to have looked like are inevitably informed by such texts and the codified amateur art practices of Soviet house-of-culture lore. Connections with an Imperial Russian past protrude at times through them. Such is for instance the so-called ‘saamskiy kadriil’ (Sami cadrille), usually performed by pairs of young Sami girls in national costume, evoking strange associations with the aristocratic parquet-room ball culture of pre-revolutionary days.

**Culture and the camps**

This bustling urban life is thus permeated with Soviet and pre-Soviet amateur art images of indigenous traditionalism, interwoven into the dominant All-Russian cultural life. The eclectic combination stands in sharp, if not tragic, contrast with the state of affairs at a presumed critical

144 ‘Vserossiyskie’, in the sense of encompassing all citizens of the country, as different from ‘russkie’, an adjective and noun referring only to ethnic Russians.
locus of indigenous traditions – the tundra and the reindeer herding camps. To the outside public, both at home and abroad, that would be the natural space for living and celebrating traditional culture.

The contrast between such a vision and everyday life at tundra camps is striking. In the first place, the infrequent observer who gets there for a sufficiently long spell of time, is forcefully hit by the gender split. While urban institutions and performances are marked by the overwhelming presence of women – from a very young age at that, the tundra is markedly an all-men’s place with women being present there, with rare live exceptions, only as pin-ups. When it comes to observable ‘traditions’, the principal one seems to be in the area of alcoholic and nicotine dependencies, with devastating health consequences. Several statistical indices are especially telling in this respect: (i) the average life-expectancy for reindeer herders is still in the region of 45 years of age (Bogoyavlenskiy 2008; Vatonena 1989), (ii) enforced bachelorship hits 70%, (ibid.); (iii) 50% of death cases are the result of ‘unnatural causes’, suicides being common (ibid.; also Kozlov and Bogoyavlenskiy 2008).

This grim picture is in full agreement with my own experience of living at or close to herding camps over many years. The Sami brigade No 3 with whom I began work in 1994, lost, in the space of ten years five of its members of an original complement of eight. The situation in all other brigades with whom I have worked for greater or lesser periods of time, if not so tragic, has been, at the same time, not much different.

The marked contrast between indigenous traditionalism as the urban artistic or symbolic performance mostly of women, and the tundra all-male reality, is isomorphic with numerous other layers of oppositions. My principal interest here is in the area of public communication, including cross-border dialogue. On this discursive level the generalizing opposition would be one of non-substantive vs. substantive uses, in linguistic, or para-linguistic ways. My claim is that traditionalism – as public performance in an urban setting, i.e., onstage at an event like the Festival of the North in Lovozero, Krasnoshchel’e, or amid apartment blocks in Murmansk, is a highly efficient and economical way of claiming traditional belonging by artistic expression, and yet remaining, at the same time, part of mainstream culture. With its back firmly turned to the tundra, staged folkloric traditionalism exists in a state of suspended disbelief. The parallel with ethnic tourism is more obvious. The visitors and the ‘ethnic staff’ may share views on the artifice in the staging of traditionalism, but nonetheless they enjoy it for its poetic qualities. Displayed in ethnic shows, souvenir production, ethnic reconstruction of Sami festivals and villages, etc., they stabilize the convention that fictional poetic renderings save
traditions from disappearance. In the setting of a cultural ethnic event the preservationist sentiment is shared by locals and visitors alike. Once the boundary to the tundra is crossed, the retrospective gaze to traditions as a bounded and fragile existence of the past, seems to instantly lose relevance. The boundary is thus crossed upon leaving the culture hall. From there on traditions and customs string one after the other to become obligatory part of current actuality. The fragility of tundra existence is accentuated by a long list of minute ritualistic acts, aiming to deflect ‘plokhaya primeta’ (bad omen). One does not go back to fetch an item left behind, as that would bring bad luck on a trip, swans are not shot at in view of the same, one does not shake hands or even say good-bye upon departing, not to invite the prospect of that being one’s last trip to that camp, planning about the future is generally averted: ‘v budushchee ne budem zaglyadivat’ (we shall not try to look into the future), etc.

The ‘traditional land use’ discourse

The need to claim traditional belonging became especially prominent with the advent of obshchina building, discussed earlier in this chapter. I leave aside the question as to why exactly the theme of traditionalism came to anchor this domain so strongly to itself, given the fact that in the reindeer husbandry world of Nordic states, for instance, the profession has come to be a highly technological one and unproblematically recognized as such (i.e. Forbes et al. 2006). In the Kola Peninsula, as in all the rest of the Russian northern regions, obshchiny, as private business entities, have been practically assigned to the practice of ‘tradition’, with various interpretations of the term. In the Kola case the generally accepted meaning has stabilized under the broad banner of ‘traditional land use’, understood, principally, as pre-collectivisation reindeer husbandry.

The logic of this semiotic and legal operation (since subsidies are premised on maintaining ‘tradition’ in the ‘culture hall’ sense explained above) has been uncritically accepted by grassroots actors and superimposed state administrations alike. The result has been that obshchina leaders, while wishing to engage primarily in the otherwise legitimate business of ‘ethnic’ tourism, or the less-legitimate of fishing-quota subcontracting, have put themselves in the position of pretending to be reindeer herders. As explained earlier, they have to resort to a number of ‘code-switches’ (Gumperz 1982:59–100) to accomplish this feat: passing off personal/private deer as private, ethnic tourism as reindeer herding, exclusive access to tundra range as a need for reindeer pastures, and modern urbani-
ty for tundra traditionality. The Obshchina ‘Chigar’ court-case, discussed below, illustrates well the precariousness of the situation. In short, the tight ethno-ideological link with traditionalism, imagined in vague pre-collectivisation terms, forces principally urban dwellers to veil over substantive reality at every step of the political and even juridical process by poetic texts of the type quoted previously, along the lines of ‘reindeer breeding is what our souls desire’ (Kalstad 2009:64). While the quoted text may have reflected quite genuine feelings and aspirations at an initial stage, sovkhoism has prevailed. Urban dwellers, save for sporadic and generally short-lived tundra outings, have remained bound to their flats and jobs. At the same time, other, ‘sovkhoism-independent’ options – meaning ones that have nothing to do with the tundra and its ways – are often sought. These, in the general case, are such that can be performed in town: like, most commonly, by participation in amateur and applied art activities.

The Obshchina Chigar case  Statements about aspirations for engaging in tundra land use activities may thus express quite genuine feelings, but it is to be strongly emphasized again that when it comes to reindeer husbandry they render the speakers highly vulnerable. In the two decades after the onset of reforms and the parallel intensification of ethnopolitical cross-border ‘dialogue’, the number of people – Sami or non-Sami – who have engaged in anything different from private-in-the-collective, or sovkhoist reindeer husbandry, is practically nil. The vulnerability that such a position invites is illustrated by a recent court case in which the leader of an obshchina stood as defendant.

This is the case of ‘Chigar’, whose leader was sentenced, after court proceedings dragging on for a couple of years, to return over a million rubles, i.e. some 25,000 euro at the current rate, ‘received unlawfully by the defendant as subsidies from the budget of Murmansk Region’ (Scheller et al. 2013; Chigar 14.05.2012). According to reports in the regional press, the obshchina leader claimed possession of a fairly large private herd, while the few animals that the obshchina was actually using from time to time, were personal/private deer of the members. When not taken to the obshchina camp to give it a ‘traditional’ reindeer husbandry look they would be let graze together with the cooperative herd of the Tundra ex-sovkhoz. (Cf. Berdnikov 2010; Alekseeva 2009)145

145 See also Vladimirova (2011) for a discussion of the topic, in connection with a similar case in a Lovozero District obshchina, to whom she gives the fictional name ‘Kedd’k’ (‘Rock’).
The story of ‘Chigar’ reveals very clearly the dangers of uncritically following the new ideological lines of the early 1990s, according to which financial support was to be firmly bound with a reversal to some imagined pre-collectivisation way of life and husbandry practices. The concept of ‘subsidies for pre-collectivisation traditionality’ was conveyed through calls for Sami liberation and revival that came both from home administrative and ethnopolitical elites and from foreign ethno-activists and supporters.

An important aspect of the development is that when the period of rule of the ‘westernisers’ in Russian leadership ended by the late 1990s, and a strongly statist doctrine superseded it with Putin’s first term of office (Tsygankov 2010), the formula ‘subsidies for pre-collectivisation traditionality’ remained intact. In other words, practitioners of ethnotourism or other tundra-connected businesses were supposed to be engaged in reality with private (not private-in-the-collective) reindeer herds of their own. With the progressive diminishing of western support for the obshchiny, and a compensatory increase of home funding for them, the degree of vulnerability correspondingly increased. Why the obshchiny let themselves become hostages to an imagined traditionality is an interesting question. It seems to be connected with the fact that the tundra’s main ‘land use’ attractions like reindeer husbandry in the first place, had come to belong, over time, to the poetic, rather than substantive realm for urban dwellers. Hence, actually engaging with them in a permanent tundra-anchored way had become a non-option. Consequently, remote connectedness with tundra affairs established itself as a substitute, relegating to outsiders the management of various tundra tourisms or fishing-quota businesses.

The ‘traditionality discourse’ – further developments The interconnectedness between conceptualisations of traditionality, underpinning western-inspired Kola Sami urban talk, on the one hand, and the liberal economic ideology of the radical reformers of the 1990s decade, on the other, changed greatly with the onset of the next decade. Until then interconnectedness was evident in the sense that pre-collectivisation regression was not only seen as a possibility in both of them, but also as desired by grassroots actors. Differences emerged in the separation of substantive vs. poetic discursive tracks, emerging from different readings of historical dynamics.

In the liberal economic reformist view, the opportunities from proclaimed removal of constraints on private ownership should be taken up in forming private farms, while a more ‘collectivist’, but still market-
oriented version was to become a member of a cooperative of private farmers. Sticking to sovkhoism was seen as a lack of entrepreneurial mentality and resulting from Soviet indoctrination—a point at which both discourses met. However, radical reformist ideology flourished for just a short period and, moreover, was never popular among grassroots actors, to put it mildly (it was regarded by the majority of them with downright aversion).

The following incident has stuck in my mind from those early days. It must have been in 1996 or ’97 when, preparing to leave for Sofia after yet another field-season, I asked a friend if he could help me buy some souvenirs. Perhaps things carved from birch-gall (kap) which I particularly liked for its smooth texture and softness to the touch. My friend Aleksey worked at a local museum at the time and I knew that people offered him a variety of souvenirs to put on a table by the entrance in the hope they would attract the attention of visitors. ‘I do not engage in commerce’ (Ya kommertsiey ne zanimayus’), Aleksey retorted proudly on that occasion and there was something in the tone of his voice suggesting that I had asked as if for an indecent service. During the following years the museum set up a souvenir-stand by the entrance, with price-tags and all, but in the nineties ‘commerce’ (kommertiya) was still a bad word. Some of that negative connotation has been preserved to this day in the derivative agentive noun kommersant (trader). Locally, the word brings associations with shady deals.

On the stage of top-power policies, the time of the liberal reformers had expired. A reassertion of the sovkhoist mode ‘from above’ soon followed and thus, once again, grassroots preferences for a private-in-the-collective compromise came to rule the day, historically preceding top-down initiatives with the same end in view. At the same time, Western ‘Russian Sami talk’, ‘domesticated’ (Creed 1998) on the other side of the border for home poetic and instrumental purposes, remained frozen in its initial stage, as if the downfall of the westernizing reformers in Russia had never taken place. Developed as a ‘discourse of need’ (Berg-Nordlie 2011) and premised on an imagined desire for community return to the tundra and pre-collectivisation private reindeer husbandry, Western ‘Russian Sami talk’ increasingly exhibited strong signs of substantive inadequacy and anachronism. Such signs were evident already by the end of the 1990s, but are still with us a decade after. Meanwhile, on the level of nation-wide politics, Russian substantive dynamics has been producing new realities and idioms, having little or nothing to do with the return to imagined pre-collectivisation traditionalist cosmologies. Petrodollar fuelled ‘national programs’ (natsprogrannya) and the immense opportunities for
reinterpreting a private-in-the-collective order through them, became the order of the day. Barents euphoria talk was increasingly vacuous and situated in a parallel world to that of a new Russian ‘Fight for the Arctic’ discourse (see following chapter). It is important to note here, however, that the ethnopolitical stance of the regional government remained residually anchored to vague ideas of regressive, pre-collectivisation traditionalism.

On the Sami ethnopolitical stage, these parallel tracks, characteristic especially of the 2010s, managed to carve an inner rift between one part of the ethnopolitical elite, oriented towards the painfully emerging Kola Sami Parliament on the one hand, and parallel ethnopolitical structures under the tutelage of the regional government on the other. Tourism and fishing-quota trading – as increasingly important economic practices – and the way they came to live in local discourse, provide important optics for the examination of these new tensions.
Chapter 6
New ideological and substantive directions

A twenty year cycle: 1992–2012

In the previous chapter the two decades of post-Soviet changes, counted since the introduction of radical reforms in 1991-‘92, have been viewed in parallel with the birth and flowering of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) vision. The development, ushered in by Gorbachev’s ‘Murmansk Speech’ of 1987, and boosted by the Kirkenes Declaration of 1993, was actively promoted on the home side by the dominance of ‘westernisers’ in the leadership of the country (Tsygankov 2010). With the rise of the political star of Vladimir Putin since the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the re-establishment of a doctrine of strongly centralized statist governance, the euphoric spirit of the 1990s gradually subsided. By 2013 – on the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Kirkenes Declaration, the BEAR idea was felt to be fading away. The mood on the Nordic side of the ailing process ranged from extreme pessimism (Hønneland 2003), to a moderate position with lingering hopes for revitalization (Staalesen 11.01.2012).

Looked at from the Russian side, the rhetoric surrounding the BEAR project showed a shift of key accents from a BEAR-premised discourse, to one shaped by a new Russian Arctic Strategy. The latter was being disseminated for public consumption in terms of ‘Fight for the Arctic’ concerns. The BEAR-inspired, integrative ‘Barents Region unity’ rhetoric of the 1990s had thus given way, on the Russian side, to a divisive ‘Fight for the Arctic’.

\[146\] See for instance the recent statement of current Governor of Murmansk Region Marina Kovtun to the effect that ‘the basis for international cooperation in Murmansk Region is provided by national priorities, as defined by the Arctic Strategy of the Russian Federation’ (M. Kovtun 01.06.2012).
Worrying consequences of such an abrupt ideological shift have been heavy-handed attacks against proponents of the ‘Pomor regional identity’ idea, culminating in the Moseev case, in addition to the suspension of RAIPON’s activities, as has been noted earlier. Other indigenous and para-indigenous movements may be expected to be affected – like that of the Izhma Komi with their attempts to gain indigenous people’s status, and perhaps also the Kola Sami themselves.

At the same time, and in contrast with the Cold War tone of such rhetorical exercises pragmatic relations with the Nordic neighbours have been enhanced in many ways, and, in such matters as cross-border passage within the 30 km border zone, significantly improved.

**BEAR and Lovozero District**

In the previous chapter it was pointed out that during the heyday of the BEAR project its impact on Lovozero District was perceived most palpably as support for Sami political and cultural revival. Hand in hand with the attainment of such ethnopolitical and cultural goals, the project also provided much needed economic support, especially during the hardest times of the first reform years.

At the same time, it needs to be emphasized that the recipients of such support in all its aspects have been principally and consistently the urban part of the local community. The inherent ‘urbanisation’, and a parallel ‘feminisation’ of indigenous revivalism (Overland and Berg-Nordlie 2012; Burykin 1999), has been recently ironically captured by a regional journalist, in an article, describing the activities of the Kola Sami Association. Its heading read ‘I’ll take you to the city to show you my (tundra) camp’ (Dvoretskaya 2012). It is to the credit of concerned journalism that such a key accent like ‘urbanisation’ of indigenous revivalism is properly understood, which is consonant with much that has appeared in academic writing (Novikova 2012: 96; Overland and Berg-Nordlie 2012; Vladimirova 2012; Burykin 1999).

In this way, the Sami revivalist movement, generously supported in moral and financial terms by the Nordic neighbours, invigorated urban life in Lovozero/Revda, engaging the existing cultural and educational institutions and creating some new ones. Two Sami NGOs were founded: at first the Kola Sami Association (AKS) and later the Public Organisation of the Sami of Murmansk Region (OOSMO). The Barents Secretariat, based at Kirkenes, opened a branch, the Barents Indigenous People’s Office (BIPO) in Lovozero. A joint Nordic support effort produced a new spectacular feature on the Lovozero skyline – a radio mast for the newly opened Sami Radio. The renovation of an architectural symbol in
Lovozero was undertaken, also with Nordic support. The building, in the form of a conical Sami tent, in Soviet times housed a small restaurant (‘Kafé Chum’), and in early post-Soviet years, a bank. The newly repaired tent-shaped building became now a National Cultural Centre, with part of it housing the offices of the Sami Radio.

All of these new appearances on the local scene ushered in a busy schedule of seminars, conferences, festive occasions, visits, and all sorts of public gatherings, devoted principally to the Sami cultural and political revival. Active cross-border cooperation translated also into opportunities for Sami children and youth to study at Nordic Sami educational establishments, principally in Northern Norway.

A lesser part of such events and activities looked in the Izhma Komi direction, while the Nentsi and the Pomors – two of the other para-indigenous minorities with presence in the district – hardly increased in visibility at all. The Nentsi, in any case, had firmly come to identify as Komi and did not aspire to gain visibility as Nentsi. The following story illustrates this point.

It was told to me by a friend who had worked as a teacher at one of the tundra villages during the nineties. One of his students, a very good grader with ambitions for applying to the prestigious State University at St. Petersburg, came to Sergey (fictitious name) to ask for advice. Sergey told her that since she came from an established Nentsi reindeer herding family, she could claim indigenous numerically-small people’s status, and thus be privileged in the application process. The girl strongly rejected the suggestion, saying that ‘she felt herself to be Komi’ (ya chuvstvuju sebya Komi). The Komi people are not listed among the indigenous, numerically small peoples of the North, because their large number is far over the limit of 50,000 in population, needed for numerically small status. Sergey’s comment was that she wished to dissociate herself from the locally low-prestige image of Nentsi and was thus prepared to sacrifice privileges to do so.

Another story is connected with an old friend from a reindeer herding brigade near my camp who would often come to my tent for a cup of tea and a chat. He was Nenets from an old Nentsi family of the first settlers. Once he began a conversation about a Swiss student who had spent a month at my camp. Who was he, where did he come from? His words were: ‘Well, you are Bulgarian, I am Komi, but who is he?’

Yet a third story I remember was with a Nenets hunter from ‘the other coast’, as it is said locally, meaning the Archangelsk side coast of the White Sea. At some point in the early 1980s, Kola reindeer husbandry authorities decided to ‘import’ some ‘real Nentsi’ from the Nenets Auton-
omous Okrug (NAO). The idea was to reintroduce, with their help, intensive nomadic methods in Kola reindeer-husbandry as the dangers from it going the hyper-extensive way were becoming all too obvious. It so happened that during one of my stays with a brigade from Sosnovka I met such a ‘real Nenets’ person. I asked him what had happened with the whole idea. ‘Nothing happened’, he said, ‘there are no Nentsi here, they are all Komi and have no idea of proper herding. So I gave up herding (with them), now I only hunt and fish.’

The cultural revival of the 1990s was first and foremost focused on the local Sami people, and the Nentsi case was thus ignored. And yet it shows many similarities with that of the Sami people in Soviet times, when ascription to the more prestigious Russian majority identity was the choice of many. There are differences also: the ‘submerging’ of Nentsi identity has not been part, to my knowledge, of any policy on the part of the state as had been the case with the Sami. In the final account, and against the background of restricted access to BEAR-inspired support measures, the Komi part of the tundra-connected community felt morally justified to maintain and enhance their leading role in reindeer husbandry, and subsequently, in micro-safari tourist businesses developing symbiotically with it.

**BEAR and the tundra**

Following from what has been said above, it can be claimed with conviction that the very active cross-border cooperation of the past twenty years has been sustained by a variety of western projects – mainly Nordic-funded – amounting to a never publicly announced, but certainly very substantial number. I personally doubt that a statistical count was ever made.

From the perspective of the tundra part of the local landscape however, and the reindeer herders working there, all of this bustling activity remained remote and invested with rather controversial meanings. From jeering comments around the tables of herding camps it could be surmised that the herders saw the developments as financially well-padded cultural activities on the part of ‘tricky’ (shustrye) city women, with a sharp eye for new opportunities for gain. As for themselves, the herders did not see any chance of jumping on that new bandwagon, nor did they care much. The situation, in its gender aspects, was reminiscent of the way boys and girls differed when it came to taking part in various agitprop activities, like joining ‘The Red Trackers’ circle at school, or, alternatively ‘Young Reindeer Herders’ (Chapter 2). From the herders’ perspective what was happening on the indigenous front in town, was ‘women’s business’ (bab’e delo), having to do with skills like ‘having a well-hung
tongue’ (chtoby yazyk byl khorosho podveshannym). That was decidedly not something rank-and-file herders excelled in, according to their own critical self-assessments. The role of educated city women was seen as firmly within the cultural and educational life of the district. That was a role which could be summarized in a label like ‘custodians of culture and education’. From the perspective of the herding camps, for city women this was a role as natural and ‘traditional’ as that of the herders who were described in local elevated discourse as ‘custodians of the tundra’ (khozyaeva tundry).

Another gender-related aspect of the situation has been that such ‘received’ attitudes underwent serious change with the coming of the obshchina idea at the beginning of the 2000s. While seminar room activities never gained popularity among herders, many left herding to join various forms of tundra-related tourism and fishing-quota use or trading, which were the main business activities adopted by the obshchiny (fishing quotas for indigenous people). The generously provided financial support for tundra-based activities – at first foreign, later increasingly from home – with which obshchiny were associated from the start (cf. Kalstad 2009; Oreskov 2006), motivated many herders to leave (post)sovkhoz work and try their hand at tapping this newly-emerged resource.

In retrospect, the turn to such new and promising opportunities, straddling the tundra/town divide, are reminiscent of the Sami provision of auxiliary services for Pomor sea-fishing along the Murman Coast, especially prominent during the latter half of the 19th century (Took 2004: 159ff; Kharuzin 1890: 132–4; Nemirovich-Danchenko 1875). One should also mention their role as service personnel in late 19th century tourism – noted by Ostrovskiy in his popular guide book for tourists (1899). In more recent times, the construction and maintenance of the Petrozavodsk-Kola railway line in the early 20th century (October Railway), and, the later Soviet industrialisation drive of the late 1920s, with their demands for reindeer draft power, especially in connection with timber-felling, created opportunities for comparatively better income than reindeer husbandry and inland fishing could provide147. It was thus that a Kola version of the central and southern regions’ rural economic strategy of otkhodnichestvo, that is leaving the village for seasonal jobs in town, was well developed on the Peninsula also, at least since the latter half of the

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147 See Bunakov (1934: 136f). A special note needs to be made of the figures he gives about the share of reindeer husbandry in relation to other economic activities. Estimates for 1933 indicate average income from reindeer husbandry for Kola kolkhozi to be 23.4%, the rest being from freshwater fishing -23.9%, transport services -12.3%, timber-felling – 4.2%, dairy farming – 4.7%, and hunting – 2% (ibid. 136–7).
19th century. Among the local versions of *otkhodnichestvo* we thus see principally the provision of draft and carrier power. The provision of hosting services for tourists and travellers was interrupted by WW1 and the Bolshevik Revolution, to be resumed only since the early nineties. Thus if one seeks the early birds of ethnic tourism on the Kola Peninsula and the neighbouring parts of Fennoscandia, the literature of the latter half of the 19th century up until the beginning of WWI provide very intriguing reading.¹⁴⁸

Looked at from the town side of the gendered town/tundra divide, it should be reiterated that the busy ethnic revivalist activities in town never reached out to the tundra camps. Only very recently some attempt has been made to take ‘revivalism’ to the brigades (*campaigning team; Red Tent*). Otherwise, the bustling activities have been taking place mainly within the walls of city conference halls and seminar rooms. In this way, Sami ‘conference-hall revivalism’, can be seen as a post-Soviet version of former ‘mass culture work’ (*kul’turno-massovaya rabota*), but has made a step backwards in comparison to its Soviet predecessor’s closer relations to reindeer herders.

It was mentioned in the previous chapter that insistence on constant ideological conversations with the ‘masses’, even when they might be taken by their duties to the remotest corners of the tundra, had born in Soviet times the institution of cultural and propaganda brigades – the ‘Red Tent’. In the course of time this travelling agitprop show had established itself as a familiar feature on the tundra scene. *Kul’brigady*, loaded with ‘materials’ provided by the Agitprop Department of the District Party Committee (*raykom*), had a busy annual schedule of visits to tundra camps and remote villages, presenting cultural programmes, reading newspapers (*chitki*), giving newsreel and film shows, and handing out newspapers, journals, and books.

In the pantry of the Hydro-Meteorological Station (*GMS*) ‘Kolm’yavr’, close to Base 8 of Tundra, there were stacks of 16 mm films in circular tin boxes – maybe a hundred altogether. As Vladimir Golovin, the director of the GMS explained to me once, the herders would come to the meteorological station to watch films and read books and magazines. ‘The station used to be the Red Tent in Soviet times’, he used to say, ‘now they (the herders) have a video-machine and watch only action and porno-films (*boeviki i pornushki*).’ The station was closed down in the spring of 2009, after 50 years of service – it had become too expensive to maintain it. The building

¹⁴⁸ Stone (2004); Took (2004); Engelhardt (1899); Gulevich (1891), (1883); Bukharov (1885); Rae (1881).
was then rented by a businessman from Monchegorsk and the Soviet films and newsreels disappeared during subsequent renovation work.

While one may be dismissive of the Soviet propaganda content of Red Tent activities – as the new owner of former GMS ‘Kolm’yavr’ certainly was (the reels of film were burnt together with the rest of the ‘rubbish’, left by the former inhabitants), one needs to recognize, at the same time, that a visit by a kul’tbrigada used to be a welcome and exciting event for herders, an occasion to break the monotony of tundra life, and provide a spell of enjoyment and relaxation. Not least, it provided reassurance that people in town cared for the herders, and were not being dismissive of them as social inferiors.

The bitterness of herders in the new post-Soviet days can be well understood against the background of such memories. ‘They (the city ethno-activists) are prepared to go to America for the Sami cause, but coming here to the Base (the reindeer herding camp) they find difficult.’ This is my rendition of a scathing comment by a herder, which, in the original, was liberally peppered with unprintable words.

Tundra-related developments

And yet, the reindeer herders also felt the winds of change and the general enthusiasm for active cross-border cooperation. (Cooperation meant principally that Nordic and other western countries provided support, while the still essentially Soviet regional and district administrative machinery helped channel it to local recipients, or, at least, would not obstruct the process. By all appearances, such an arrangement seemed to suit both sides.) ‘Cooperation’ thus materialized as direct help in the difficult years immediately following ‘Gaydar’s Year’, when salaries were delayed for months, prices skyrocketed, and all savings were practically lost. Those lucky enough to have wives or mothers who were part of the revivalist process and enjoyed its collateral benefits, felt the winds of change in more ample terms. Distanced – in a spatial and conceptual sense – reindeer herders, on the other hand, hardly registered the coming of regional cooperation and indigenous revival.

In Brigade 3, who hosted me in 1994–96, there was only one person, connected with the new tides – a young herder, whose mother was a prominent local ethnoactivist. The boy had been to Kautokeino and Karasjok in Norwegian Finmark, Norwegian Sami villages with strong ties with Lovozero to this day. Kautokeino, especially, as a centre of Norwegian Sami academic and educational life, has been giving opportunities to a great number of Kola Sami young people to study North Sami at the
various courses given there, as well as follow further educational programmes. In the brigade, however, the boy was the butt of general resentment on account of his mother’s ‘pampering’. By this it was meant that she was using her clout in the newly-sprung ethnoactivist establishment and its never-ending internal strife, to remove competition and ensure ‘trips abroad’ for her son. Ethnoactivism, and the opportunities it gave, was seen essentially as a zero-sum game from the herders’ perspective, in which those without connections with key players were to be losers by definition. The practical consequences of such views and sentiments were that no chance was lost to assign disagreeable tasks to this young herder, until in the end he left the brigade and dropped out of reindeer herding altogether.

NorrFrys ‘Polarica’ and the Mission

The arrival of a Swedish commercial venture to the district, a far-flung branch of the mighty NorrFrys of Haparanda, and the building of a sparkling new, technologically up-to-date slaughterhouse and meat-packing plant, brought, in contrast to conference-hall revivalism, definite changes for the herders. The involvement of NorrFrys was a direct consequence of the new regional developments, and thus can be considered a BEAR vision come true. The herders – who generally meet life changes with misgivings – this time abandoned at least a fraction of their pessimism. There were good grounds to do so since to begin with salaries were paid out more regularly. The meat plant quickly turned to be the principal and, at times, the only buyer of the produce of the two cooperatives/sovkhozy which allowed normalized payment of salaries, and these salaries also gradually increased. In time, NorrFrys also became the biggest buyer of wild berries gathered during the summer.

Due to such developments, many local people, in one way or another related to reindeer husbandry, were able to weather the storms of radical reforms better than their urban and even military neighbours. NorrFrys began to pay for personal/private meat through the local bank directly to the herders. This was another welcome improvement, not only stabilizing domestic budgets, but also enhancing herders’ self-esteem and social position.

A less decisive and conspicuous change, not exclusively connected with seminar room and culture hall activities and nonetheless important, was the coming of the Norwegian Sami Mission to Lovozero. It initiated a soup-kitchen and arranged courses for combating alcoholism among many other activities. Although the Mission never reached out to the
tundra, it was of real help to retired herders and drop-outs from reindeer herding, many of whom led down-and-out lives in the village, often resulting in early death (Konstantinov and Vladimirova 2008a). However, the Mission’s activities were suspended in 2012 after accusations against allegedly fraudulent business activities of its leader (see Giskegerde).

Closures

The new appearances on the local urban scene, briefly sketched out above, would thus tend to follow the basic tundra/town divisions. The greater part of them, to be generally subsumed under a blanket title of ‘mass culture work’ (kul’turno-massovaya rabota), or ‘cultural and educational activities’ (kul’turno-prosvetnye meropriiatya), followed the well-beaten agitprop track of former Soviet times, reinterpreted now as conference-hall indigenous revivalism. By the end of the 2010s, conference room revivalism was significantly expanded by internet and virtual ‘social network’ channels of communication.

The practitioners of conference hall and internet ethnoactivism revealed gender and career characteristics of a traditional Soviet order. In it the thesis familiar since the 1970s of ‘female is to male as nature is to culture’ (Ortner 1974) is turned upside down, as mentioned earlier (p.25). According to such a reversal, women’s ‘natural place’ would be in nurture, culture, and education, and men’s in the local heavily mechanized version of ‘traditional land use’.149 Or, in other words, here female to male seems to be like culture is to nature.

Insofar as Sami and other men in reindeer husbandry were concerned, the line cut deeply through marriage preferences, as has been noted before, leaving ‘nature’ – i.e., sovkhoz reindeer husbandry engagement with the tundra – as a progressively all-men’s domain, with many men remaining bachelors against their will. The ‘culture/nature’ dichotomy would thus be isomorphic to the ‘town/tundra’ one.

In terms of marriage preferences, a marked feature would be Sami as well as non-Sami people’s preferences for marriage partners not involved in herding. This led to a common pattern particularly among the generation born in the 1960s and ‘70s. It consists of Sami people (more women than men) tending to choose marriage partners from among people of the

149 Note in this respect the official designation of ‘reindeer herder’ as it appears as a specialty in the list of professional tutoring that the National Northern Lyceum in Lovozero offers (formerly Professional School, PU 26). ‘Reindeer herder’ figures in it as ‘olenevod-mekhanizator’ (reindeer herder and mechanic). The former ‘chumrabotnitsa’ is entered as ‘khozyayka usadby’, i.e. ‘camp hostess’.
district, but born to labour migrant families, or from among other local people with more longstanding roots in the district (Komi, Komified Nentsi, Pomors, Karelians). The pattern, reproducing itself consistently to this day, was not shaken by ‘Sami conference hall/internet revivalism’ in any significant sense. Concerning the family, its influence has been felt in the much increased preference of parents in mixed families, to attribute Sami ethnic status to their children in marked contrast to the pre-revivalist period, when the Russian one would be preferred. As noted by other authors also, this led to a statistical increase of the Sami population in the 1990s (Bogoyavlenskiy 2008; 1985). This has led not to a few paradoxes, a principal one among them being that a Sami person would prefer to marry a non-Sami, while children from such a marriage would be declared Sami. In other cases of mixed Sami/non-Sami marriages, non-Sami husbands may even take the recognizably Sami Russian family name of the wife.

Such naming and identity variants, reflect the inner contradictions and tensions within the community. Urban residents would prefer to be part of the revivalist process while still keeping a safe distance from the tundra-bound part of their people because of the latter’s association with alcoholism and social degradation. This explains something that is evident after even shallow acquaintance with local life: the marked incidence of Sami women with traditionally Russian personal names, coupled with Ukrainian, non-Sami Russian, or Byelorussian family names, acquired after marriage. The other side of this coin, namely the high levels of enforced bachelorship among Sami reindeer herding men, is not so readily apparent. It exists, as it were, as the dark side of the local social moon, noted only in chilling reports of alcoholic and nicotine dependencies and early mortality. As regards reindeer herding, and local women’s general disinclination to marry into it, not only Sami men tend to be affected, but not infrequently Komi, as well as people of ethnically mixed origin.

In this way, the greater part of newly emerged ethnopolitical institutions would tend to be represented by the ‘urban’ part of the principal ‘town/tundra’ pair of divides – that is, by educated people with markedly

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150 A common way to make such distinctions in local usage is to self-define as coming ‘from Russia’ if one came as a labour migrant, mostly in the period 1950s-'60s. The children of such people, born on district soil would self-refer and be referred to by others as ‘of Lovozero’ (lovozerskie), or ‘of Revda’ (revdenskie), and the same is the case for the remote villages. See also: *Northerner, Little Birthland*.

151 Sami family names have been following Russian etymological and morphological patterns since conversion to Christianity in the 16th century. Over time a set of names in frequent usage (Matrekhini, Danilovi, Yur’evi, Lukini, Yakovlevi, etc.) have come to mark Sami origin (Kuchinskiy 2008; Kiselev and Kiseleva 1987:34–35).
urban and, in substantive terms – outgroup life-style preferences. Ethno-political institutions, engaging with the tundra part of the divide have not emerged, at least so far. Before the establishment of obshchiny, one could list only NorrFrys-Polarica and the Mission as having beneficial impacts in this direction, in direct or indirect ways.

The twenty-year cycle, outlined above may be said to have ended with the closing down of both NorrFrys-Polarica and the Mission, both closures taking place almost simultaneously. In 2010 ‘Our window to Europe’, as regional journalists had dubbed the Swedish enterprise or ‘our magic wand’ (nasha palka-vyruchalka) – a phrase often heard in kontora discussions – lost a prolonged court-case with a powerful regional businessman. I shall be calling him by the fictional name ‘Smelykh’. It is interesting to note that neither the particulars of the court case, nor the very end of NorrFrys in local life gained publicity, or merited any local public discussion. As we shall see in the further development of this story, the public indifference with which the event was met – that is, of the facility passing into the hands of a well-known former local Komsomol leader, now turned prominent regional komersant – may be seen as an acceptance of the return to the former status quo. I mean this in the sense that public discussion was deemed useless – conversation with local power was to take other, more usual forms.

The lack of reaction confirmed, in a parallel manner, the existence of deeply felt distrust in the BEAR enthusiasms, and an undercurrent of resentment of ‘westerners’ (disparagingly called burzhui, ‘bourgeois’), who had established themselves locally. Even the ‘oligarchic’ takeover of the former sovkhoz had thus the feel of things getting back to normal. Viewing events from this angle suggests that the end of the infatuation with BEAR visions had come long before the closing down of NorrFrys itself, or, indeed, that such visions never took more than shallow root in the place.

At the same time, the fall of NorrFrys found a place among a new category of veiled presences in local life. The need to suspend images and events seemed to be prompted, in a world traditionally beset by crushing substantive vs. poetic tensions152, by a new surface motif. It consisted in removing from public gaze the effects of the synergy between big business, on the one hand, and ruling state power, on the other, leading up to

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152 In contemporary Russian journalism the ‘substantive/poetic tension’, as I call it here, comes out in formulations like ‘divorce with reality’, or ‘smoothing out contradictions with reality’. Various social phenomena are seen as produced by such rifts, such as outward mobility, escapism into virtual reality provided by ‘social networks’, and into dependent behaviour such as alcoholism (i.e. Bovt 25.05.2012).
a classic case of ‘crony capitalism’ (Gel’man 2010). Whenever this substantive and hence highly sensitive part of local life would approach public exposure, the well-conditioned reflexes of the regional and district media would divert people’s attention in the direction of festive day ceremonies, celebrations of culture, education, sports, Patriotic War heroism, current military valour, patriotism, in short, what would be ironically referred to by practitioners of the art, as ‘correct topics’ (pravil’nye temy).

Cases in which local affairs were of different nature and there was no danger for high level regional private/public deals to get uncomfortable publicity, or trigger off an eventual backlash, do not have the propensity to activate such self-censoring reflexes. Thus, in contrast to the silent departure of NorrFrys, the virtual closing down of the Norwegian Sami Mission did receive media exposure. The Head of the Mission was accused of engaging in business activities which were incompatible with his office and thus the permit for the Mission to operate in Lovozero was withdrawn. The hotel ‘Vyma’ which the Mission had acquired for tourist purposes – the accused business activities – has remained in state of disrepair and gradual decay ever since then.\(^{153}\) To top it all, the Head of the Mission in Lovozero was wanted by the Norwegian authorities for having allegedly embezzled nearly 6 million Norwegian crowns, and was allegedly hiding somewhere in the Region (Larsen and Balto 28.04. 2011; Larsen 30.04.2011).

Another case of misuse of BEAR-related initiatives came into the open with the scandal around the Head of the regional veterinary inspection, Pavel Dolzhanov. Accused of bribe extortion in respect of the NorrFrys venture, Dolzhanov was sentenced to a long term of imprisonment in 2005. (Mikhaylova 2006; Zaderzhan 2005).

Other disappearances marking the end of a cycle, which had passed under the combined influences of radical reformism and BEAR visions, may be connected with the closing down of the Lovozero Barents Indigenous Peoples’ Office (BIPO), mentioned above. A gradual decrease in foreign-funded project initiatives has also begun to be noticed. Funding for obshchiny, for instance, became primarily the concern of regional state institutions, marking a shift away from the former reliance on western support. The tendency was further propelled by a tightening in 2012 of the regime for NGO existence. New federal legislation required that NGOs receiving foreign support had to register as ‘foreign agents’. A broader definition of what constituted treason in Russian law also served this end (Nilsen 26.09.2012).

\(^{153}\) In September 2013 the premises were put up for sale by the Mission.
In parallel to such events, a reassertion of the military significance of the Peninsula could not but be noticed on the bigger regional stage. News of the expansion of the Northern Fleet and its nuclear-powered submarines kept coming in (Nilsen 10.01.2013), of reestablishment of military towns (V Zapolyar’e 21.02.2014), and, in general, of a strengthening of conservative tendencies, reminiscent of Brezhnev’s era (Dubin 2011:50–51f). All of this could not but strongly suggest that the re-launching of the BEAR initiative (BEAR 2) in June 2013, had been rhetorically set in a ‘poetic’ key (if not in a ‘winking mood’) by all concerned, in the spirit of the formulations, made earlier in this study. At the same time, there is strong evidence that such tendencies match a significant part of grassroots dispositions, explaining the stability of President Putin’s popularity and significant grassroots yearning for the comeback of strongly centralized statism (ibid., pp.233–316). In the local context the tendency has been most evident in the ‘etatisation’ of the obshchiny.

‘Etatisation’ of indigenous affairs

As a consequence, provision of home funding paved the way to a reassertion of state tutelage over local indigenous affairs. A full circle was thus made, arriving back to the point from which indigenous revivalism had begun twenty years before. At that time local indigenous affairs were supervised by the Committee for Indigenous Numerically-small Peoples of the North as an advisory organ at the Regional Party Committee. By 2012 a reinterpretation of the arrangement, fitting the new post-Soviet conditions, could be seen in the establishing of a new overseeing governmental institution in 2004 – the State Regional Budget Agency ‘Murmansk Regional Centre of the Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the North’. The mission of the new/old institution was stated as follows:

The main task of the agency is to implement authorized measures concerning the coordination of the activities of executive organs of state power as regards people-specific (samobytnye) matters of historical-cultural, social-economic, and linguistic development of the numerically small peoples of the North, the protection of their original places of habitation, and of their traditional life-styles and forms of land use. (GOBU 22.10.2013; cf. Yakovleva 21.02.2014; Kuchinskiy 2012; Vinogradova 2012)

It is to be noted that the term ‘indigenous’ is absent from the mission statement, which refers broadly to ‘numerically small peoples of the North’. This can be interpreted as extending administrative tutelage not only in terms of the Sami indigenous people, but also of the minorities
that I have been referring to previously as ‘para-indigenous’ ones, namely, the Komi people, the ‘Komified’ Nentsi, as well as the Russian Pomors of the Ter’ Coast.

In addition to this move of the regional administrative authorities, in the direction of reasserting their governance over local indigenous and para-indigenous affairs, a hold temporarily released during the hey-day of Sami ethnopolitical and cultural revival of the 1990s, an advisory body to the Regional Government was created in 2010. This was called ‘Council of representatives’ of the indigenous numerically small peoples of the North at the Government of Murmansk Region’. This time, it might be noted in parenthesis, ‘indigenous’ did figure in the name of the new council, but as referring to ‘peoples’, rather than the only indigenous people in the region – the Sami people. The formulation can be again seen in the light of a standing wish, on the part of regional authorities, to make room for the para-indigenous peoples of the Kola.

The same can be noted as regards other official documents of the post-euphoria period such as, for instance, the 2003 Law of Reindeer Husbandry of Murmansk Region. In it, the formulation ‘ethnic communities’ (etnicheskie obshchnosti) was used to include in the provisions of the law not only the Sami indigenous people, but also the other para-indigenous minorities – i.e. the Komi, the ‘Komified’ Nentsi, and the ‘ethnographic group’ of the Russian Pomors along the Ter’ Coast (Zakon 2003: Article 2). It can be said on the whole, that variations on this denotative theme may be seen as a reflection of a certain hesitation and uncertainty on the part of authorities. The problem seems to be about how not to privilege the Sami over other peoples with whom they have been sharing life-style and place of habitation for sufficiently long historical periods, without, at the same time, overtly upgrading such para-indigenous minorities to an indigenous status. The motivation for such an evasive tactic in its last part may be seen as being prompted by continuous attempts of the Izhma Komi of the northeastern part of the Komi Republic to gain indigenous status. As mentioned earlier, recent claims on the part of Arkhangelsk academic and intellectual circles for an indigenous status of the Pomors, as a people different from Russians (Schwenke Fors 22.11.2012), would have, most certainly, stiffened a course of action aimed at discouraging ‘proliferation’ of indigenous status by candidates of currently only ‘ethnic’, or ‘ethnographic group’ standing.

Returning to the Council of representatives, it has to be noted that its creation followed almost immediately that of the Provisional Kola Sami Parliament in December 2010. The fact provided reason to local commentators to see the Council as a regional government-backed rival body,
established with the purpose, among its other tasks, to decrease the chances of the Sami Parliament to acquire a legitimate and authoritative standing in regional and international indigenous affairs. Inner rifts and conflicts within the Sami ethnopolitical elite, having established in former days divisions between the principal NGOs and their leaders, thus re-grouped in the late 2000s into those oriented towards the ‘state budgeted’ GOs, on the one hand, and the problematically emerging Sami Parliament, on the other.  

The ‘rural’ side of the district moon

On the ‘rural’ side of this dynamic, the end of the BEAR period – or at least of BEAR in its initial, emphatically enthusiastic (‘euphoric’) edition – was signalled again by the regional businessman Smelykh. As mentioned above, his court victory against NorrFrys-Polarica allowed him to gain ownership of the key slaughtering facility for the entire reindeer herding territory of Lovozero District, the Lovozero slaughterhouse.

A second strong signal of Smelykh’s determination to expand his regional business empire in the reindeer husbandry direction came with his sudden and rather unexpected election as the new manager of SKhPK Olenevod of Krasnoshchel’e. This is to be considered a significant juncture in the local narrative, which suggests desire for a radical rearrangement of the private-in-the-collective formula. This turn in district reindeer husbandry affairs requires, therefore, a closer look.

Olenevod The ex-sovkhoz/cooperative, with its head office in Krasnoshchel’e since the early 1970s, had managed to weather the storms of radical reforms somewhat better that the central farm in Lovozero. By the end of the second post-Soviet decade, Krasnoshchel’e’s herd was quoted to number some 25,000 head, while that of the once bigger Tundra had fallen to 23,000. Reports by Regional agricultural authorities often cited an even higher figure of the total herd of both former sovkhozy – in the region of some 60,000 head. Insiders’ opinions lower considerably such ‘poetic’ counts but still place Olenevod in the lead, with some 15,000 head, as against 11,000 in Tundra.  

154 For detailed discussions of various Sami organisations Vinogradova (2012); Øverland and Berg-Nordlie (2012); Berg-Nordlie (2012, 2011b).  
155 According to the latest figures available to me (as of 16 Apr. 2013, Tundra has officially declared a herd-size of 24,087; Olenevod – 24,200, i.e. a total main Kola herd of semi-
Herd numbers, it may be noted at this point, apart from the wide disparity between official presentations and insiders’ assessments, have always been rather poor indicators of what goes on inside the collectives. The reason for this, as noted also in other parts of the Russian reindeer husbandry universe (Anderson 2006), has been the ever more pronounced diversification of land use forms – especially during the last twenty years. Translated into local specifics this means that up to a certain limit, the overall size of the herd is less important than control over redistribution of collective into private-in-the-collective deer. As we see further down, it is also less important than having access to the collective herd for sustaining micro-safari businesses. Judging by the relative stability of the current ratio between collective and private-in-the-collective deer of roughly 1:1 over the last ten years, it may be surmised that this represents the accepted limit of ‘hyper-extensivity’. In other words, the collective herd should be approximately the same size as that of the private-in-the-collective one, so that there is enough sovkhoz deer to take from for a variety of private purposes. Below such a ‘sanitary’ level, interest in caring for herding may disappear, as returns from hunting (or rather: poaching in the legal sense) may be considered easier to come by. It can be suggested therefore, that when sovkhoz deer fall down to less than half the whole herd, hyper-extensive herding may give way to hunting. As this is felt as a threat to personal/private deer and the entire sovkhoist (private-in-the-collective) system, inner pragmatic as well as ethical negotiations keep the system at a state of relative stability. Said in other words, a relative parity between collective and private contingents has to exist, for the private-in-the-collective system to work.

Far from telling the inside story as presented above, herd size in the Kola case has still remained as some indication of the health of the existing post-Soviet system. In terms of more specific operations sustaining the system, a sufficiently large collective herd, managed hyper-extensively, is capable of providing a correspondingly large pool of ‘whole-eared’ deer, tseloushnye oleni, with which to increase personal/private herds and diminish all herding risks. Command of collective-to-personal/private redistribution has remained, in this way, as the all-important means whereby grassroots participants continue sovkhoism.

Big herd numbers have been also important for sustaining sovkhoism, as traditionally realized by the kontora part of the sovkhoz structure. The critical factor here has been the annual state subsidy given per head of domesticated reindeer of 48,287 pre-harvest head (Data of the Reindeer Committee (Olen-naya komisiya) – Lovozero; cf. Bogdanov 2008 a, b).
deer. By the end of the first twenty-year period of allegedly pro-market reforms, it had reached 420 roubles (EUR 10.5). This sum may look small, but when it is multiplied by big numbers – by the 24,000 or so head count, claimed by the Tundra Cooperative for instance – the sum gets close to 10 million roubles. According to insiders’ opinions, how the sum is used, as well as the profit from meat-sales, is under the control of a small and exclusive circle of kontora people.

The relative insignificance of reindeer meat production in the overall agricultural production of the Region, may perhaps explain why the regional administrative eye does not blink when blatantly exaggerated figures of herd numbers are provided by sovkhoz managers and subsequently published in statistical bulletins and the regional press. This also suggests why superior administrative tiers – at both district and regional level – would choose not to carry out any systematic herd monitoring. Overseeing administrative bodies in Murmansk, that is the Agricultural Committee, prefer to rely on figures provided by subsidy-seeking directors of the two reindeer husbandry farms. According to sovkhoz traditions, the directors, in their turn, would be given the figures by the ‘tundra herding bosses’ – those that preside over corralling counting sessions, conducted at the major corral enclosures of the district. Eventually, the figures supplied to the regional authorities in Murmansk are at the discretion of the tundra reindeer herding elite, or, in other words, at the discretion of those people who have managed to increase their personal/private herds to the greatest size and, consequently, have the greatest interest in sustaining the subsidy-dependent status quo.

With control over herd figures and, crucially, over redistribution of the unmarked (‘whole-eared’) deer firmly in the hands of the tundra-based herding management, and restrictions on numbers owned – lifted, the basic structural features of the private-in-the-collective system reached new heights in the post-Soviet decades. These heights have become evident most spectacularly in the personal/private herd size of the ‘counting bosses’ themselves: as mentioned above the figures there have been creeping towards the thousand head mark for each one of the three top positions – that of the head of the reindeer herding shop (nachal’nik tsekha

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156 Per head subsidies have been constantly rising. Thus for 2009 the overall subsidy was 6,7 million roubles (approximately EUR 170,000) given for a supposed total herd of 66,000 head, or about 100 roubles per head (Karelin 2009).

157 For 2013 the total production of meat in Murmansk Region is quoted to have been 11,000 tons (V 2013 godu 31.01.2014). With approximately 200 tons of reindeer meat produced by both cooperatives of Lovozero District, the percentage of reindeer meat in the overall meat production of the district has been 1,8%.

158 For a ‘poetic’ rendering of the procedure Fedoseev (2013).
olenevodstva), the **vet-doctor** (vetvrach), and the **head veterinary technician** (glavnyy zootekhnik). Close behind them come brigade leaders and senior herders. This goes down in a diminishing progression to the lesser ranks of reindeer herders, until one reaches the level of those reindeer herders who own no personal/private deer at all. There are many herders, at the lowest level of the hierarchy, especially among the Sami, who have by now reached such a ‘reindeer-less’ (bezolennyy) status, or are close to it.

It is to be strongly emphasized that single Sami men, with strongly pronounced alcohol dependent behaviour, tend to occupy the greater part of this lowermost niche. They are, correspondingly, the most invisible part of what may be called the local Sami ‘community’. When in town, their frail, emaciated figures, and more often than not conspicuous intoxication, make urban dwellers recoil and shun contact with them. In many cases, the entrances in apartment blocks where such people were resettled after the liquidation of the tundra villages in the late 1960s–70s, are regarded as ‘bad entrances’ by neighbours. These prejudices are so strong that they tend to lower the price of adjacent flats, or even entire entrances or blocks (Cf. Øverland and Berg-Nordlie 2012: 125).

In marked contrast to this pariah social stratum in reindeer husbandry, the herding bosses tend to belong to the top crust of the local establishment. Komi people usually predominate here. (Cf. Fedoseev 2013) Such a strong social position of the herding elite may explain the fact that while the ‘unnatural’ growth of the personal/private herds of the top herding bosses evoked public protest, as mentioned above, by all appearances it has been to no avail: a stable trend of increasing disparity between rich and poor in personal/private reindeer ownership has come to stay. What veterans of sovkhoz administrative and former Communist Party posts saw as ‘unnatural’ (p. 178) seems to have been accepted now as a natural course of events on the part of the overall community. In private conversations with Sami people they often shared that ‘the Komi have always been the well-off ones’ and that ‘it has always been like this – from the very start’. Such feelings tend to keep a muted Sami-Komi tension smouldering under open proclamations to the contrary. The much stronger position of the Sami people’s urban elites in relation to national and international support tends to be counterbalanced by the stronger standing of non-Sami people in the local key sectors of the budget-sphere and private-in-the-collective reindeer husbandry. In this way, on the town side of the general town-tundra divide, further muted rifts and rivalries can be observed, fissuring the community. This is a reason for using the very term ‘community’ with reservation.
Returning to the issue of redistributive tactics, it can be said that the *brigada* tundra workers use of the collective sovkhoz herd, is being mirrored closely by the *kontora* management use of subsidies and other income. At the end of the day, the combined income would keep the sovkhoz running, sustain the collective herd, produce a whole-eared contingent of deer, and thus propel the postsovkhoinist process a step further. All blame for the steadily diminishing collective herd would be put on poachers and predators. Thus, through the rhetorical device of ‘poacher/predator bashing’, both kontora and brigada redistributive operations, involving income and herd numbers, would be poetically deflected from close scrutiny.

Smelykh’s appearance on this scene, and the very radical reforms he introduced in the management of the *Olenevod* Cooperative, brings automatic associations with the beginning of reforms in the early nineties and, specifically, of the onset of liberal economism during ‘Gaydar’s Year’ (see previous chapter). Along this train of thoughts, *Olenevod*’s version of liberal economic reformism shall be discussed in some detail below.

**From ‘private-in-the-collective’ to ‘truly private’?**

is the question one may ask in view of this development. The ‘decree’ announcing the bid for such a radical departure from sovkhoist practices, appeared as an ‘Order’ of the new director of *Olenevod* on 26 December 2011. (*Prikaz* 2011) The meat-harvesting campaign (*zaboynaya kampaniya*) had, by that time, already begun. Members of the new cooperative leadership chose to be present at corralling activities, exercising close control over corralling sessions in a way not done, most probably, at least since the 1970s.

What the new leaders witnessed during the first corralling events of that fateful year was in the best sovkhoist traditions – ones, I might add, that did not match conceptualisations of ‘traditionalism’ on which poetic ethnopolitical discourse was so strongly premised (but see Prakhova further below). This was sovkhoism pure and simple. One of the controlling officials shared his views with me about what he saw at the corrals:

What I saw there was scandalous – all around the corral fence there were people slaughtering and dressing reindeer – maybe twenty people, mostly not familiar to me. “What are you doing?”, I asked them. “Well, these are our private deer – what’s wrong with that?” “Why are they marked with fresh marks? And why are these not marked at all?” “Because they were not marked last June”, and so on – complete chaos (*polnyy bardak*). (22 Nov.2011, Krasnoshchel’e)
The Order, which was announced a month after this conversation took place, was an attempt to change such practices in a very radical way. The main thrust of the move was to diminish the number of private-in-the-collective owners to a minimum and thus radically reduce the size of the private-in-the-collective part in the overall herd.

To this end it was stipulated that an active herder was allowed to own only up to twelve deer gratis – that is, without having to pay a monthly fee for their grazing together with the cooperative herd. For deer above that figure herders would have to pay a monthly fee of 1,000 roubles per head. The same conditions applied to pensioners from reindeer husbandry except that they were allowed only six head gratis. For all other people, owning personal/private deer, no animals were allowed to be grazed free of charge and the monthly fee was doubled – they would have to pay 2,000 roubles a month per head for any deer they owned. In a further effort to reduce personal/private herds to a minimum, the order decreed that members of the cooperative administration and ‘specialists’ – i.e. members of what I have been describing as the ‘herding elite’ above – did not have the right to own deer. If they already did, the conditions listed above would also apply to them (ibid.).

The average price of reindeer meat used to be in the region of 150–200 roubles per kilogram at the time the order was issued, which meant that an average carcass of forty-five kilos or so would cost around 7,000 to 9,000 roubles. Paying the fee for one year only would thus considerably exceed the value of an animal, which meant, in its turn, that the order aimed if not to eradicate the private-in-the-collective system entirely, at least to take it down to strict limits – by still allowing a small contingent of private deer to active and retired herders. Twelve for herders and six for pensioners, it may be added, was considerably less than the established quota of 30 to 50 head even during the harshest years of control – or, indeed, terror – of the late 1930s. Moreover, as noted in Volkov’s field data, mentioned earlier on, this allowed number was often exceeded and thus personal/private herds of kolkhoz members in some cases reached 150 head or even more (p.107).

**Sovkhoizm as ‘tradition’**

It is instructive to look at the reaction the order evoked. The move was so radical that it placed it on a par with nation-wide revolutionary events such as collectivisation or the liberal reformism of Gaydar’s Year. The microscopic size of application in Olenerod’s particular case does not change the fact that it was an extreme jolt reflecting conflicting interests. As suggested above, it is at such times that grassroots actors’ voices, in their conversations with power, can be
heard with the greatest clarity – by those who have ears to hear it, one might add. What did these voices say in this particular case?

Predictably, at first there were strong cries of indignation, which received some local publicity. By this time – at the beginning of the 2010s – publicity channels had greatly expanded to include numerous electronic fora and blogs. In the space of about ten years electronic communication became part of daily life in the towns of Lovozo District – first in Revda and then in Lovozero. By the end of the decade, Krasnoschechel’e had also joined the internet community, albeit in a still rather limited way.

The most eloquent texts of the conversation that followed the Order of 26 December became accessible in the net – i.e. Otkrytoe pis’mo (2012); Prakhova (14.02.2012); chats on the electronic Sami Forum – thus expanding much beyond the usual heavily chaperoned newspaper channels like Lovozerskaya pravda, or the regional press. The second document cited here (Prakhova 14.02.2012), when seen in this context of enhanced communicative possibilities, deserves attention for at least two reasons.

The first is that it reiterated a position which had been voiced whenever the issue of charging a fee for grazing private deer in the ‘private-in-the-collective way’ was raised. This position typically discussed attempts to restrain the private-in-the-collective system as a way of forcing herders to destroy their private deer. To heighten the dramatic tension of such rhetoric, texts would highlight old-age pensioners as the principal targets of such measures.

The issue was first publicly raised almost exactly twenty years before the events discussed here. As in Prakhova’s letter of February 2012, a newspaper article of 1992, written by a veteran local journalist and published in Lovozerskaya pravda, equated the introduction of grazing fee to liquidating personal/private animals. The plight of old age pensioners who were owners of such deer was heavily stressed and appeared as the heading of the article itself. ‘I do not want to kill my reindeer…’ the article was called, reiterating the words of anguish of an old-age pensioner. (Kuznetsova 1992)

According to the logic of such texts, the only option when sovkhoizm is threatened is to slaughter one’s private-in-the-collective reindeer. The implied tenet here is that going ‘truly private’ cannot be even contemplated as an alternative: it is either sovkhoizm or nothing. This proved to be more than empty rhetoric. Private-in-the-collective owners in Olenevod did slaughter a lot of their deer after the Order of December 2011. In one

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159 According to my notes from the 1990s, the first internet user in Revda – and probably in the District as well – was registered in 1995.
case an owner was reported to have slaughtered his entire private herd of
four hundred head. The act contains a very clear statement of protest
against any attempt to liquidate the established private-in-the-collective –
or sovkhoist – arrangement. Likewise, it contains an equally strong rejec-
tion of truly private reindeer husbandry as an alternative to a private-in-
the-collective one.

The second highly interesting moment in Prakhova’s letter is the defin-
ing of ‘private-in-the-collective’ practices as ‘traditional’. Consequently,
those attempting to destroy the private-in-the-collective system – such as
the new leadership of Olenevod – can be accused of acting in a cavalier and
disrespectful way towards traditions. To quote:

Traditions of grazing one’s own deer together with those of the kol-
khoz/sovkhoz herd appeared already at the time of collectivisation in the
Soviet Union. Let’s recall that until then every Sami and Komi family used
to have herds of 500 head or more.\footnote{160} With collectivisation Sami and Ko-
mi people were forced to give their deer to the kolkhozy which were being
created. Soviet authorities (sovetskaya vlast’) allowed each family to own a
small number of deer – about 30 head, permitting these to be grazed to-
gether with the state herd. (…) This tradition (emphasis mine) continued
for many years (…). Luckily, the leadership of Tundra remembers tradi-
tions and have never thought of introducing a fee for private deer.\footnote{161} Con-
trary to that, SKhPK Olenevod’s chairperson evidently does not care about
preserving national traditions (my emphasis), and (…) has introduced new
regulations. (…) As a result of the new Order some members of the coop-
erative have already found themselves forced to destroy their reindeer.’
(Prakhova 14.02.2012)

Written by a prominent Sami ethnopolitician, this letter of protest cap-
tures a most critical point as regards the issue of ‘traditionality’ – a point I
have been drawing attention to throughout this book. Namely, it chal-
 lenges the idea that after the reforms of 1991/92 ‘liberated-from-
collectivisation’ reindeer herders would enthusiastically go back to pre-
collectivisation practices. The possibility that they may prefer to preserve
the socio-economy that evolved during the kolkhoz/sovkhoz era (late
1920s to early 1990s), or indeed, that such a socio-economy would be

\footnote{160} This may have been true of Komi families. As for the Sami, most sources suggest that the
majority had small herds of 10–20 head each. Sami owners of scale were rare.

\footnote{161} This is historically inaccurate. Tundra’s leadership had often thought of introducing a fee.
One of the more determined, but eventually unsuccessful, attempts, was during the last days
of the sovkhoz, as already noted (p.238). Another was during the time of Vl. F. Syrota’s
mandate as Tundra’s chairperson (1996–2000). It is Syrota, in fact, who is at present hold-
ing the position of second-in-command in Olenevod’s leadership, and who was the principal
organizer of the anti-sovkhozist campaign, signalled by the Order of Dec. 2011.
part of an accepted life-style and world-view (i.e. ‘traditions’), had been implicitly ruled out by most ethnopoliticians. As we know, all manner of political and applied support that has come since 1991/92 – both from the ‘west’, and increasingly from home – was founded on a belief that going back to pre-collectivisation ‘traditional’ private herding was self-evidently the grassroots actors’ preference. ‘Traditions’, in such a well-entrenched view, were thought to be anchored in some indefinite period in the past, but certainly before collectivisation. The most likely candidate was the imagined golden ‘historic present’ generally assigned to the late 19th and beginning of the 20th century, much beloved for its vague definitions and unproblematic handling in both the imperial Russian and the Soviet ethnographic literature.

The formula ‘removal of private-in-the-collective deer equals destruction of (sovkhoist) traditions’, adopted with such clarity in Prakhova’s open letter cited above, is the nearest we can get to hearing clearly the grassroots’ voice in its conversation with power. By the same token, this position implies also that obshchinism may not be about reindeer husbandry at all, or at least not about private husbandry. This follows from an insistence, evident in the text quoted above, that beyond the private-in-the-collective form of ownership, which presupposes having one’s deer as part of a state-subsidized collective herd, there is no alternative such as private husbandry.

Such a position is ironic, indeed, when we remember the efforts of people like Klaus Oreskov (2006), or the late Johan Albert Kalstad (2009), to help Sami people create obshchiny in the name of resuming traditionally private land use, seen as tragically destroyed by Stalinist collectivisation. The position is evident in most of the texts published during the last two decades – from the first fact-finding reports of the early 1990s (i.e. Fenge and Reimer 1992; Bjørklund et al. 1995), to Robinson and Kassam’s ‘Sami potatoes’ (2000), or similar visions of obshchiny exemplifying new strategies for reviving reindeer husbandry and other traditional forms of land use (i.e. Fryer 2007). Prakhova’s statement stands in strong contrast to these and similar texts. Its implied logic – that attempts to destroy sovkhoism equal forcing people to destroy their deer – acknowledges the glaring fact that ‘truly private’ reindeer husbandry is something the majority of people do not want to engage in, and therefore the motivation for setting up obshchiny is to be sought in other directions. Before I turn to the issue of what that might mean in substantive terms, I want to present more details about the aftermath of the fateful Order promulgated by the new leadership of Olenevod.
Second generation postsovkhoism  There are reasons to suggest that the Order of Dec. 2011 may have ushered in a second generation of postsovkhoist changes in Kola reindeer husbandry. This second round of changes is marked by the increasing role various forms of tundra tourism and other business activities came to play on the range. New tundra-centred entrepreneurship has made reindeer husbandry into a subordinate appendage rather than relating to it in the peripheral and even clandestine way characteristic of former times. In other words, the new forms of land use – tourism and fishing quota-based businesses – begin to feel like the new masters of the tundra, asserting themselves and pushing reindeer husbandry to the side.

The first round of changes – characterizing the period 1991–2011 – had as its beginning the re-registering of the former sovkhozy, that is, their reorganisation into something like cooperatives (Chapter 5). In more substantive terms, however, the real beginning of the first generation of postsovkhoism is to be connected with the removal of the upper limit to the number of personal/private deer one could own (p.178).

As shown in the previous chapter, only a handful of owners of personal/private deer were actually able to benefit significantly from the changes of 1992. These were the few that belonged to the herding elite (p.190f). The problems of recruitment and retention of the lower ranks were thus not solved, but instead the ever greater widening gap between a few big owners, on the one hand, and the mass of small owners, on the other, was decisively opened.

Local insiders’ opinion, as well as that of some analysts of the situation such as the late Nikolay Bogdanov in particular – saw in this development a return to pre-collectivisation days in a way rather different than that seen in obshchina-poetic representations. In contrast to conference room and related literature narratives of Sami (and other) herders becoming small-scale private and ‘traditional’ land users, the liberation of personal/private quotas was seen to pave the way for the emergence of a future generation of reindeer husbandry businesses of scale, and the reemployment into them of the present herders as hired hands. Or, in other words, a scenario was envisaged, and considered not without a degree of revulsion, not to say horror, according to which a liberated postsovkhoism paved the way for capitalist reindeer husbandry of the worst sort. In it the majority of herders were to become hired hands (batraki), or, in more extreme opinion – ‘serfs’ (raby) of the ‘herding bosses’ who were now re Framed as new ‘kulaks’ or ‘feudal lords’ (boyare; knyazi). The majority of the tundra-connected community of middle and lower rank considered it
the likeliest scenario, drawing analogies with what was often referred to as ‘the rule of the oligarchs’ (*pravlenie oligarkhov*) in the country as a whole.

The events in Krasnoshchel’e, culminating in the Order of Dec. 2011, reinforced such fears. Reactions shared both privately and publicly pointed strongly to the herders’ fear of becoming downtrodden labourers at the beck and call of rapacious capitalists. Voices like the following ones could be heard:

Outrageous!!! (in reference to the Order of 2011- here and below my gloss) Hadn’t we been telling everyone – from the very start – that he (i.e. the new director of *Olenevod*) would be their future prince (*knyaz*) and feudal lord (*boyarin*)? They didn’t believe us! (personal communication 20.02.2012)

or:

Here he is (the new director) in all his glory! I shall do away with your private deer and you will be working for me as serfs (*raby*). So now the range and the reindeer can be used for tourism… (ibid.)

Such heated comments, exchanged on the net, suggested the unfolding of a sinister plot whose aim was to appropriate people, reindeer, and territory in a new private estate, and thus throw the community back into the dark ages of serfdom. ‘Out with sovkhoism’, in other words, ‘in with serfdom’.

It is to be noticed, in the light of such reactions, that the interpretive formula given above, stands in direct opposition to the principal ideological tenets of *obshchinism*: namely, that separation from the post-Soviet versions of the former sovkhozy would liberate former state employees from the bonds of collectivised husbandry and place them on the road of private ownership and traditionalist revival. Clearly, these two ideological machineries stood in opposition to each other, each with its own ideas about the ‘traditional’, its temporality, and virtues.

‘Poeticising reaction’ When the heat of the initial reaction subsided and the community managed to recover somewhat from the shock, practical solutions began to be sought. The tactical solutions found, as well as the strategic directions they embodied, are highly informative about relations with power. Their principal characteristic feature can be summed up as tacit persistence. In the particular case the policy – above everything else – ruled out overt clash.
Such a ‘response of the weak’, to paraphrase James Scott’s famous formulation, made itself felt while the initial state of shell-shock had not yet passed. Strong words like ‘bondage’, ‘serfdom’, ‘appropriation’, etc. were still bandied about in private ‘kitchen’ and ‘garage’ talk and blogs, when more sober voices began to be heard. These exemplified the rhetorical strategy of ‘double talk’, or ‘double think’ (p.19), the skills for which had been honed in the course of an age-long history of conversing with power.

Throughout this book I have been using the Jakobsonian distinction between ‘poetic’ and ‘substantive’ use of language to describe the parallel tracks in ‘double talk’. Another point I have been making has been that during highly charged historical moments, direct reference to making this distinction tends to emerge in emic text. The following excerpt from the general debate, shared by an informant, is illuminating in this respect.

Commenting on a suggestion that the issue of the fees should seek arbitration by state administrative organs and possibly be invalidated by them, he argued:

> But who will make the agenda for such a discussion? As I understand – the GOU? Nevertheless, it may make sense to try and suggest something? Perhaps through the obshchiny, not directly? Perhaps something entirely neutral – something about culture and such things?

(personal communication, Feb. 2012)

Events of April 2012, that followed the initial debate and protest of February that year, indicated very clearly that the ‘neutral’ method, one that prefers to talk about ‘culture and such things’, was to prevail in public discourse, while forms of substantive reaction would be characteristically effective, preferring to remain rhetorically muted.

**Olenevod’s general meeting** of 21 April 2012 illustrates the tactic well. Contrary to what might have been expected, the issue of fees for personal/private deer was not even mentioned. As part of a long speech about how to make the former sovkhoz a winning concern, the new director announced a serious reduction of salaries until cooperative fortunes improved. After initially raising herders’ monthly salaries to the attractive level of 17,000 roubles (approx. EUR 425), they were now reduced to

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162 The Centre of the Numerically Small Peoples of the North.
163 My description of the meeting relies on the account shared with me by Petya Mankova. Doing fieldwork in the Village of Krasnoshchel’e at the time, she was present at the event. I thank her for the chance she gave me to get close to a firsthand feel of the proceedings. Their analysis remains, of course, my own responsibility.
the 6–7,000 rouble level, which was in fact lower than the official living wage for Lovozero District.\textsuperscript{164} This drastic measure was justified as a response to the very small meat production plan of only thirty-six tons of carcass meat, realized in the harvest campaign of 2011–12. The plan was reduced by the management to ensure future growth of the much depleted cooperative herd over the past two decades. The animals that were slaughtered were said to have been principally personal/private reindeer. As mentioned above, owners decided to slaughter their deer, rather than pay the stipulated prohibitive fees, or, alternatively, to collect their personal/private animals and go ‘truly private’ (that last being the ‘non-option’).

An additional reason for the unprecedentedly low yield was pointed out to be the failure to contact and round up brigade herds in their entirety – a chronic problem of hyper-extensive husbandry. What was rather surprising, however, concerning this very point, was that the harvesting campaign conducted in the neighbouring \textit{Tundra} Cooperative proved to be nearly 90 tons for 2011, or almost three times bigger than in \textit{Olenevod}. In chats with herders at tundra bases and at the \textit{Ked’kyavr} (Ketkozero) Camp (p.12f) the fact was often mentioned, but no clear explanation was given. This was hardly surprising, taking into account that vague, or even contradictory answers to questions concerning husbandry tactics is a feature very characteristic of husbandry discourse. (Cf. Heikkilä 2006) Through the maze of various comments, jokes, and innuendoes, I was finally led to the conclusion that hyper-extensivity of husbandry may not at all be such an obstacle to contacting and rounding up the herd as I had been previously led to believe. Two facts lead to such a conclusion.

The first is the above mentioned difference that appears in realized meat production plans for 2011 and following years. With approximately equal official herd sizes of some 24,000 head each (\textit{Rasporyazhenie} 2013), \textit{Olenevod} reports a meat production plan one-third the size of \textit{Tundra} for 2011. (\textit{Dinamika} 2014) Then it reports one-quarter that of the latter but with some improvement in the following two years. Secondly, losses that both cooperatives are reporting are colossal, according to the same source. These run at the rate of 6,600 head per year for \textit{Tundra}, and 7,100 head for \textit{Olenevod} for the five years between 2009 and 2013. If such figures are to be believed, one should conclude that Lovozoero District loses a number equalling its entire officially announced herd every five years. As for \textit{Olenevod}, it is reported to have lost for 2012 alone a total of 9,227 head.

\textsuperscript{164} At the time that was just under 10,000 roubles/month for each family member (\textit{Lovozerskaya pravda} 17.06.2011, p. 4).
These losses include those from poacher and predator attacks as well as disease.

The figures quoted above need further verification, but one thing can be said with some degree of certainty: officially quoted figures of herd size, realized meat production plans, and losses, can be considered only as poetic descriptors of what is going on in Kola reindeer husbandry at the moment. The substantive process involves collective deer being redistributed into personal/private herds. One looks in vain for evidence of this in official statistics. For the question of how the herds of the two cooperatives are connected one may possibly judge by the phenomenal losses reported by Olenevod in 2012. With a corresponding increase of Tundra’s meat production plan by over a thousand head (from reported 3,078 for 2011 to 4,244 for 2012) one may well ask oneself whether the increase might not register deer saved from new regulations of the ‘feudal lord’ in Krasnoshchel’e. This particular point, which may throw light on the exact nature of hyper-extensive husbandry, requires, however, a determined field-based study in its own right – a task which has to be left for the future.

Going back to the general meeting of Olenevod one cannot be but surprised by the generally peaceful manner in which it was conducted, with, seemingly, full acceptance of the new and alarming decisions. According to them, on top of the already running personal/private herd decimation, there was also the salary cut to be digested.

Despite the harshness of the blows the community had sustained, the following months exhibited the same feature of passive acquiescence that had become apparent during the general meeting. Thus, for instance, a sociological investigation, conducted by a researcher from Murmansk during the summer of 2012, registered neither the fee issue, nor that of the slashed salaries. The general picture was summed up in the following way:

Two contrasting tendencies have been revealed in the life of the village (of Krasnoshchel’e). One of them suggests a down trend in its socio-economic potential (diminishing population, productive capacities, ageing of residential infrastructure, etc.). The other indicates the presence of development processes and improvements: a new church is under construction, new, well-stocked shops are appearing, villagers are increasing their use of household appliances, etc. (Tsylev 2012).

**Manners of observation** At least one reason for such opaqueness for the visiting sociological eye may be attributed to the constraints in the manner of observation. ‘Semi-structured’ interviews with actors, well-
versed in a sophisticated tradition of doublespeak, tend to uncover the poetic track only, and, at best, provide muted hints about what may be going on behind the representational screens. In the local version of poetic discourse, ‘litanies and laments’ (Ries 1997) on the theme of dilapidation and entropy, predicting an apocalyptic future for the village, tend to abound in conversations with urban visitors and sympathetic foreigners. While much of these texts of despair and gloom may be prompted by real concerns – the pervasive fear of administrative liquidation of the remote villages being the strongest of them – ‘trends of development and improvements’, as Tsylev notes in the excerpt above, are hard to miss. Tundra-related transport equipment in particular, has been steadily upgraded over the past ten years with ever more expensive and sophisticated Western models. The old Soviet snowmobiles and outboard engines are being replaced with Western makes, inomarki, as well as all manner of items of tundra equipment, previously unheard of – such as hooded aluminium sleds, GPS, and occasionally – satellite phones. The cell-phone operator ‘Megafon’ extended its coverage to Krasnoshchel’e, which meant provision of not only telephone connections, but of internet as well. And thus the cell-phone and various pieces of electronic equipment found their way to the log-cabins of the remote, roadless villages. The trend was the same as the one that replaced the majority of Soviet cars with western makes on the urban landscape.

To this account of expanding consumerism, which was apparently not affected overmuch by either the liquidation of personal/private herds, or by slashed salaries, one should add the very active role people from the remote villages came to play on the Lovozero real estate market. On this scene, in contrast to representations of the ‘litany and lament’ kind, the ‘remote villagers’ have asserted themselves as affluent buyers of flats and garages, contributing, in effect, to the steady increase of real estate prices in the urban part of Lovozero District. (Konstantinov 2010a)

One may be led, thus, to the general conclusion that the contrasting developments that are observed require more research before an explanation is found, and that such an explanation may reside at some deeper, so far inaccessible level of local reality. The general meeting of Olenevod, discussed above, may leave the observer with the same impression. It is a puzzle that the community would accept so stoically the dismantling of postsovkhooit arrangements that had helped them to weather the storms of the liberal economic reforms of the early 1990s. A possible answer to this riddle could be sought only in the direction of hidden resources of resilience.
With such thoughts in mind it would be unrealistic to expect that the answer to the resilience riddle may be elicited by various forms of interviewing, and even less through administering questionnaires. Participation in meetings – such as the general meeting discussed above or similar public events – may also increase puzzlement rather than make things clearer. While one could learn a lot about the state of local discourse by participating in such public events, when it comes to getting to the heart of the matter, other discursive situations should be sought as primary sites, rather than merely complementary. On the public stage and with outsiders, actors prefer to remain ‘neutral’, as one of the participants in the discussion about grazing fees was quoted above to have said. Staying ‘neutral’ is to be understood as a hedging, protective tactic, in which tropes of ‘culture’ and ‘traditions’ play the role of defensive screens (as well as ‘litanies and laments’ of which Ries writes). Preservation of traditions and culture are thus better fitted to the purpose of conversing with power. The legally vulnerable, and consequently unmentionable tactics of lived sovkhozism – or rather, postsovkhoism – should thus stay muted in all but the most intimate discursive domains. Among the venues of ‘non-neutral talk’ that I know of, the most promising have been those of the tundra camps, the kitchen table, or the garage. Below I focus on the last of these venues of the substantive.

‘Garage talk’ mostly takes place in connection with some activity – such as repairing a snowmobile or some other piece of machinery (Cf. Orr 1996; Certeau 2013\textsuperscript{165}). Such repairs may last hours, or even days. They would usually turn into get-togethers exclusively of men, who have arranged to meet for the purpose, but may have also happened just to be passing by. In the course of the work, pieces of advice would constantly be addressed to those actually working – only one or two of the little group, while the rest are commenting in the manner of people watching others playing a card game.

Advice would be, naturally, about how to solve the particular technical problem at hand and accounts of the speaker’s past experiences with similar problems. A strong emphasis would be put on past achievements: how

\textsuperscript{165} De Certeau develops the thesis of the methodological importance of studying in context throughout his work. Most eloquent is perhaps his reference to Durkheim. In ‘Arts de faire’ he quotes him in relation to acquiring sociological knowledge (comparing it to acquiring education and art): ‘We can acquire it only by getting in contact with those objects with which the activity can be performed, and only by performing it ourselves.’ (Durkheim 1922:87ff, from de Certeau 2013:154, Note 12)
one had been able to find an ingenuous solution to a very similar problem, with minimal available means and in difficult circumstances.

Consider the following excerpt from a garage talk over the repair of my Buran snowmobile. While the garage owner Mikhail and I at his side were elbow-deep into the engine, neighbour Kolya, who is Mikhail’s first cousin, was keeping a running commentary. Kolya was saying:

and there we used to have in the [reindeer herding] brigade a machine just like this one. And what was wrong? There was no pull to it (не тянет). We thought it was the carburettor – the needle [regulating the fuel intake] was letting in too much [fuel]. OK, I fixed that somehow and we were on our way back to the village with some meat, and then, when we got to Efimka [Lake] – hrr – hrr – wouldn’t pull at all. A snowstorm (пурга) was picking up, you couldn’t see anything. I felt with my finger that the needle had sprung up somehow, maybe from the jolts. How I fixed it I don’t know – just by feel. The main thing is that we managed to get to the village in the end (Lovozero, Oct. 2011).

Garage talk is usually historical – it tends to be mostly about what mishap had happened, where and when. Accidents happen all the time – from crashing through ice and drowning a machine, to a never ending list of mechanical failures. A great deal of emphasis is thus placed on the unpredictability that goes with machines. At some point, the general conclusion is reached that the machines are after all only ‘bits of iron’ (железяк) and thus not to be trusted whatever the make. Such being the state of the art, one has to be tough, resourceful and skilful or one wouldn’t last long in the tundra. The message is repeated over and over again in myriad variations.

Such genre specifics and ideological postulates tend to rule out orderly and comprehensive descriptions of survival tactics and strategies. Pointers to what these might be come through the kind of descriptions of specific historical events as illustrated above. They seem to stand by themselves, and are brought to life haphazardly by repair events. The general theme of frequent machine break-downs and what a great mechanic one has to be to put them back is the underlying message of such events. Apart from suggestions about specific failures that may occur and what to do if that happens, there is the unspoken, but pervasive ‘gender-ideological’ line that – as a man – one should be capable of proving one’s masculinity (cf. Bourdieu 1998: 75). This requires being well-versed in tundra mechanical lore – particularly in its on-the-spot repairs, mainly of snowmobiles, but also of vezdekhodi.
The tundra being the supreme arbiter of such matters – that is, whether one is performing effectively in it and in the final account surviving – orients local masculinities, and, in a more general way, defines what makes a ‘Northerner’. Machines and one’s tundra skills with them also draw indigenous boundaries. Kuchinskiy (2013) quotes a Sami man of Lovozero saying that ‘only the Sami know how to drive a Buran snowmobile’. This statement closely echoes the above-quoted point from Eikjok (2007:111) about the significance of the snowmobile for Norwegian Sami boys.

The garage is certainly an urban shrine of such emphatically gendered relationships with the tundra. On a more pragmatic level it is also the place where much of the ‘what to do community strategy’ evolves and is put into practice. If a researcher’s interests focus in this direction, immersion in garage activities can well help one to see through the fragmentariness and messiness of everyday life. Striving for symmetrical participation in these – or other – activities can help bring to the fore local voices and narratives in a clearer and more candid manner than classical interviewing that follows a researcher’s own topical agenda. Voices that arise while a task is performed in its time and place reflect the speakers’ own interests and hierarchies of significance.

Garage or ‘camp-fire’ talks (Myerhoff 1986) are almost exclusively organised around the historicity of experience, as illustrated above, and their bottom lines are conveyed by descriptions of separate events, that serve as parables. A common theme, for instance, is composure in adversity. In November 2013 a young tractor-driver perished when his tractor broke through the new ice on Lovozero Lake and sunk. Naturally, the incident was much discussed in garage-talk. An experienced vezdekhod driver stated:

He panicked – that was it. If such a thing happens to you, you should not try to get out – wait till the water gets above your head, till the machine is entirely full. It is then you can open the hatch and swim to the surface. He panicked and was caught between the hatch and the body of the machine. He may have not known, or didn’t have the nerve to wait.

Experience, presence of mind, inventiveness, tundra skills – these and similar virtues are emphasized as valuable when discussing tundra-extractive entrepreneurship. They come out in specific histories, elicited by occasions of joint activity. Outsiders’ attempts to elicit responses about generalized instances – such as attitudes to this or that current event – tend to be seen as meaningless and responses would most likely be random. The issue of personal/private deer, for instance, would rarely surface
in conversation and if it does, it would be related to some incident, telling a tundra-skill story, rather than presenting an opinion about the nature and generalized features of the phenomenon.

The principally action-oriented mission of the garage is to be seen in conjunction with the social functions it performs in an environment entirely devoid of such public institutions like the coffee-place or the pub. This is a setting in which seemingly disjointed narratives obliquely provide clues to changes in adaptive strategies. In what follows I illustrate this point by drawing from various ‘garage conversations’ with two Komi friends from a remote village, with whom I shared a garage.

Micro-safari tourism – a close up

This garage which Pavel (Pasha, 49), and Nikolay (Kolya, 47) shared with me belonged to Sergey (65) who was Pasha’s half-brother. Sergey was born in the same village, but he had moved to Lovozero long ago, had married there, and had spent his working years as a fireman in the local Fire Brigade. All three were Komi, with parents who had spent their lives in reindeer herding.

A great advantage of that garage was its location next door to where Sergey lived – he was in fact able to watch over it from his glass-panelled balcony. The garage was thus considered fairly burglar-proof. When garages or boat houses would be broken into and cleared of possessions, it would usually happen in the more distant and dark corners of the sprawling village of garages, encircling the blocks-of-flats of the small town on all sides.

The attractiveness of safety that Sergey’s garage offered was partly countered by its lack of heating. That caused a great deal of discomfort when one returned from a winter tundra trip and both machine and sleds would be covered in ice and snow. In unheated garages they could stay like that till spring. As it came to be, however, this deficiency proved to be an asset for Pasha and Kolya: meat and fish they were regularly bringing in from the tundra in great quantities could safely stay frozen until gradually dispatched to the remotest ends of their mysterious network of customers. Sergey’s garage was thus a convenient place to have available – on the strength of good kinship relations – but nevertheless both Pavel and Kolya kept talking about the need to get real estate of their own in Lovozero.

\footnote{A previous version of this text was published as Konstantinov 2010a.}
Pasha was actively looking around for a flat, while Kolya had already bought one. It was a two-room flat in the same building as Sergey’s, but in addition to it Kolya was about to buy a garage from a family who were leaving for the south. It was a matter of arranging the final formalities, so Kolya had already put his brand-new four-by-four car in the garage. Apart from this impressive acquisition, he also had an all-purpose track vehicle – a GTT – which was parked not far from the garage.

Kolya had a job as a stoker at the primary school of his village, but that was ‘for a few cents only’, as he would say, kopeyechnoe delo. The part of his activities which brought in serious income and could support also a rented room in Murmansk, where his daughter was a university student, was connected with tundra transport services for well-off urban hunters and anglers. He was running what one may call a self-employed micro-safari business. Kolya began his working life as a herder in one of the reindeer herding brigades, where his brother Slava is working to this day. The two brothers are very close and manage to combine their various formal and informal engagements in a mutually beneficial way. The synergistic effects produced in this way explain the striking discrepancy between meagre official salaries, on the one hand, and the booming state of the two brothers’ domestic economies – on the other. To this riddle I return in more detail below.

Pasha’s story was nearly identical. He also used to be a reindeer herder in one of the brigades, but like many herders from the remote villages subsequently left the profession to become a free-lance hunting/fishing guide. In essence that meant that he would accompany relatively well-off people – mostly businessmen – from Murmansk, St. Petersburg, or Moscow – on much-coveted bear, moose, or deer hunts, as well as on salmon fishing outings.

Apart from this informal tourist business, the main part of returns for both Pasha and Kolya came from selling tundra-produce on the town market. This consisted mostly of selling reindeer meat and fish through urban networks of kin and friends. Here Sergey’s garage came in very handy, since for most of the year it was practically a refrigerator. It was also very convenient for foodstuffs and other goods which the two partners bought in town and subsequently sold in the remote villages. In this way a constant two-way stream of goods made a temporary stop at Sergey’s garage: meat and fish from the tundra on their way to town, and, in the opposite direction, food products and, crucially, vodka and cigarettes, fuel, lubricants, spare parts for various engines, household appliances, pieces of furniture, etc. A significant part of this busy two-way traffic consisted of items that had to be taken to town for repairs – from washing
machines and TV sets to cell phones and hearing aids. Parcels (posiłki) would be sent from the villages to the towns with return gifts going the other way. Roadlessness meant that the two-way traffic between the remote villages and Murmansk, or with other nearby towns such as Olengorsk and Monchegorsk, never stopped. Those who could perform carrier service – like Pasha and Kolya – stood to gain from this busy traffic.

Unless one had the chance to observe it from such a vantage point as the midway garage, one could never form an adequate idea of the size of the lively economic exchange between tundra and town. No statistics exist for this overwhelmingly ‘grey’ economic zone, nor would a participant in it be inclined to share its secrets. The matter thus calls for participant observation as close to a symmetrical distribution of roles as possible. In other words, if the researcher did not become a tourist guide/trader him- or herself, it would help a lot at least to have the use of a snowmobile and be able to travel to the tundra and back on one’s own. Contact with safari-guides and traders becomes thus a large part of fieldwork life, as is also participation in the action-focused garage talk.

As for the goods themselves, those that go to the home village are partly used for one’s own needs, while the much larger part is sold straight from a room in Pasha’s house. The room functions as a shop but on an informal basis. Both village and district administrations turn a blind eye to the ‘grey’ nature of such shops. As an official from the district administration explained to me, illegal operators help diminish the difficulties of food and consumer goods supply to the remote villages. District authorities have therefore decided not to bother them about taxes, hygienic norms and other such ‘formalities’. The result is that there are quite a number of ‘grey stores’ in rooms of village log-cabins. Prices, of course, are considerably higher than those in the big cities and even in Lovozero, but the trade is booming nonetheless.

It is clear from this brief account that for the various commercial activities Pasha and Kolya engage in – and many other local operators like them – a base in Lovozero was very necessary. Ideally, it should include a garage, a flat, and also a number of vehicles – snowmobiles and ATVs for the tundra, cars or vans for town. Apart from sustaining commercial operations, a Lovozero base is also very helpful when children are studying at the high school there. In many cases, once a flat is secured, the younger generation of remote villagers are inclined to find a job in town, get married, and settle there. Strong links with the home village are nevertheless sustained and the two-way traffic never stops.
Reindeer husbandry: a new formula

Combining tundra tourism with commercial activities has proved to be a winning combination in Pasha and Kolya’s case. I had almost daily occasion to observe this from the vantage point of the garage we all shared. This position also allowed access to most of the neighbouring garages and I witnessed the busy traffic between tundra and town, involving at times whole caravans of snowmobile-drawn sleds, and on rarer occasions, even reindeer drawn ones. In many ways the garage part of town – a suburban growth encircling it on all sides – was like a small port, from which ‘boats’ were going out at the tundra ‘sea’ and returning, in a principally male preoccupation of turning a boundary between elements into an important resource.

The town based part of the kinship/friendship network, stretching between the remote villages and the district centre, made its contributions in various ways. Sergey, for instance, besides providing the garage as the crucial link in the chain, would also man it while the traders-cum-safari guides were absent. While Pasha and Kolya were back at their village, or were in the tundra ‘with clients’, there was meat and fish to sell – a task performed by Sergey. For these purposes there was a wooden block with a hefty hatchet stuck into it, as well as an old lever-balance hanging from a beam. Both the hatchet and the balance had the look of items brought to the Kola from the distant Izhma and Pechora homelands perhaps a hundred years ago.

The ‘clients’ would also appear at the garage. They would arrive in shiny off-roaders, with trailers behind, carrying the latest in snowmobile fashion – Arctic Cats, SkiDos, Polaris, Bombardiers – tucked like dolls under fancy hoods. These were people from banks in Murmansk, various commercial companies, big industrial concerns like Norilsknnikel, oil and gas related ventures, politicians from the regional establishment, police and army officers. On most occasions they would have brought along friends from Moscow or St. Petersburg to show them ‘their region’ – the Kola Arctic (Kol’skoe Zapolyar’e). The visitors from far-away centres of power would come in expectation of wondrous adventures in the ‘Russian Province of the North’ (Engelhardt 1899), in places teeming with fish and game and generally ‘not of this world’ (ne ot mira sego). That was the picture painted along the lines of the slogan ‘Kola – the last European wilderness’, which was used in selling the exclusive salmon-fishing camps for rich foreigners. These were the ‘camps’, lagerya, which, by the time of writing had established themselves as an exclusive archipelago, superim-
posed on the tundra territory of the Peninsula: what I am tempted to call, paraphrasing Solzhenitsyn, the safari archipelago.

Micro-safari businesses of the type run by Pasha and Kolya offered a less costly tourist product, but presented very similar hunting and fishing opportunities. Unlike the high price safari camps, micro-safari businesses would cater mainly for a domestic clientele. For relatively moderate fees, they offered to this public an intensely personalized service, inhabiting the indeterminate space between business and friendship. This arrangement ruled out any negotiation of prices, or commenting on the quality of the service. The intimacy of the relationship ruled out any formalization, making it ‘substantive’ in Polanyian terms (Polanyi 1957).

There would normally be a welcoming feast at Sergey’s flat, to which clients would contribute all manner of expensive snacks (zakuski) and drinks. At one occasion there even appeared a bottle of vodka with tiny gold flakes inside – a mark of the heights sybaritic tastes had reached in the central places. When it came to more ordinary fare – like sausages, cheese, chocolates and such – so much would be left over after the feast that Sergey and his wife Anya could live on the remains for many days.

At these ‘afore we go’ get-togethers with clients, the line about going to hunt (or fish) in places where the state of nature was ‘as in the Stone Age’ would be very prominent. Wonders of the Terra Borealis would be much talked about, including ‘eye-witness accounts’ of encounters with the elusive Abominable Snowman (snezhniy chelovek), or the remains of the Hyperborean Civilization, and other themes of a locally flourishing esoteric tourism. There are many stories of unexplainable disappearances of whole expeditions, supposed to have been wiped off by mysterious subterranean beings or sinister KGB conspiracies. Drinking and storytelling continue until the early hours of the morning.

Pasha and Kolya’s tundra-based economy depends greatly on answering the desire of clients to connect with a dream world. For this reason they need access to rarely visited parts of the Peninsula, and also, critically, they need contact with abundant game. For both of these essential tasks experience and connections with the reindeer herding brigades are of high importance. Herders could direct the parties to likely spots for moose migration, show where bears might be sleeping or are likely to come out in April, and to good salmon runs. However, should hunting luck fail – as, alas, it often does – some poaching on the brigade herds can be done instead and the clients would thus not return empty-handed to their metropolises. On return trips a sobering up process takes place and the more exotic ambitions are temporarily forgotten. A sovkhoz buck with good antlers can easily serve as a glorious trophy from lands strange and myste-
rious. The clients go back to their glittering offices with sufficient photo and video-recorded material to show around, and the wish to return for more adventures. The demand appears to be great, persistent, and growing.

It may thus become gradually apparent why neither the issue of the newly introduced outrageous fees for personal/private deer, nor that of the reduced salaries, managed to bring lasting despair to the remote villages. By the end of the second decade of post-Soviet changes, reindeer husbandry, as well as other employment opportunities that the remote villages offered, were progressively assuming an auxiliary role to that of various forms of tundra tourism and trading.

Concerning the main official employment – reindeer-husbandry – it should be stressed that its role as a carrying platform for micro-safari tourism has been hardly noted. At its most basic, the collective herd provides opportunities for micro-safari operators to sustain the image on which their business depends. A big herd of deer on the snowy tundra is a sight to record and remember. For people who have never seen a reindeer in their lives, even a reindeer team hitched to a sled will do, together with the opportunity to be photographed or video-recorded riding on it.

Collective reindeer husbandry, in its present form, produces a large contingent of unmarked deer, as has been explained before. These animals can easily pass for wild reindeer and thus be fair game for hunting. This issue pitted the Regional Hunting Inspectorate against the reindeer herding cooperatives in a legal battle that has stretched for nearly a decade by now. At the very least, the ex-sovkhoz herd, and poaching from it, provide meat for outings with clients as well as being the main item in tundra-town trading. For all these reasons it is necessary for the collective herd to exist and to support the growth of private concerns parasitically attached to it. In this way, the previous relationship between collective and private-in-collective deer – the bone of contention in the Olenevod personal/private deer affair of the winter of 2011/12 – can be said to have been gradually and invisibly shifted to a relationship between collective deer and private safari and trading businesses. It can be claimed, therefore, that the second stage of post-Soviet changes in reindeer husbandry has been to shift priorities from possession and enlarging of personal/private herds in a parasitic relationship to a state-subsidized and hyper-extensively managed collective herd, to the possession of tundra territories through long-term renting, or through privileged access. Preserving one’s parasitic relationship to a collective herd – mainly through poaching or through informal reindeer meat trading – remains, at the same time, an essential part in the overall equation.
As far as exclusive safari camps are concerned the collective herd issue is not relevant. Here the focus is on salmon fishing. Exclusivity of access is ensured on unseen planes of negotiation above the regional level of connections, let alone that of the district. The regional and district administrations can be said, by and large, to be only servicing arrangements made high above them.

For the obshchiny and the variety of small-scale tourist firms and micro-safari businesses that many of them have become, the collective herds are important. For the obshchiny and their ‘ethnocultural tourism’ enterprises personal/private deer are taken from the cooperative herd for both consumption and for reindeer-drawn sled rides for the tourists – one of the main attractions offered. For the tourist firms doing hunting on the side, and especially for the micro-safari businesses in remote villages – like that of Pasha and Kolya – the collective herd provides important resources, as illustrated above. Being sellers of the exotic, they – like all other tourist concerns of various calibres and specialization – stand to gain from the roadlessness of Lovozero District, the ‘traditional land use’ such as herding, and the ‘Sami brand’ (brend) of the place. Over and above this complex stands the unspoiled natural beauty of large parts of the reindeer herding territory of the district, its richness of renewable resources, as well as the continuing existence of a big reindeer herd of some 30,000 head.

It is against the background of all this that the events in Olenevod may become clearer. It is early days as yet to predict the final outcome, but one thing can be said with a degree of certainty: liberal economism is likely to be sabotaged. While the battle for personal/private herds seems to be lost for the moment, these mixed grazing arrangements are not the only way, as suggested above, to tap the collective herd – or the whole cooperative, for that matter – as public resources that support private ventures. These are clearly the grassroots actors’ dominant desires, suggesting that the private-in-the collective arrangement is the most preferred.
In this book I have been discussing two interrelated problems, the solution to which may throw light on the current state of the Kola Sami people. In essence, both problems are concerned with the nature and dynamic of a dialogue which is conducted between generalized speakers. In one of the cases I have discussed the Kola Sami people, as a generalized subject in a mega-speech event, or ‘conversation’, with interested sympathizers and supporters, mainly from abroad, but also increasingly from home. On the other hand, I have been interested in their dialogue with Russian state power and the dynamic of that ‘conversation’ in the recent historical perspective. In both cases, as can be seen, my approach has involved studying mega-communicative acts.

The ‘Quest for Security’

Both mega-speech events have been analysed from the point of view of how their subjects have been using the communicative means at their disposal. In other words, the approach relies upon an extended version of discourse pragmatics that could be called ‘mega-speech act pragmatics’. The communicative means in such speech acts can be, as we have seen, linguistic or para-linguistic. I expand the latter category to include within it, crucially, the activities of participants. Here, of special importance are political statements made through action: like, for instance, the distribution of reindeer into ‘own’ and ‘belonging to the state’, made at the onset of collectivisation (p.105). The political statement of this act reflects grassroots actors’ will to make a compromise between public and private interests, with the implicit, but critical caveat that the arrangement is to be at the expense of the public, not the private. As I have tried to show, this form of compromise – in which the costs of giving up private herds are recompensed by public contributions – described by some as ‘domesti-
cating revolution’ (Creed 1998), has proved to be a lasting one, leading to long term reproduction. An important conclusion to be made, at this point, is that the motivational drive, propelling the search for a private-in-the-collective compromise on the part of grassroots actors, is the attainment of security. We may conclude, therefore, that attainment of security reflects the political will of ‘the weak’, and furthermore, that grassroots actors are capable of communicating this will in mega-speech events with power.

This ‘Quest for Security’ comes out in various statements of grassroots actors. One uttered in myriads of variations from every corner of the post-Soviet/postsocialist space has been quoted earlier to run like this: ‘Nowadays we do not have to worry (emphasis mine) about what might happen tomorrow’. Spoken by a Sami woman in 1958, in a stereotypical praise of Soviet power (p.72) the statement, for all its agitprop quality, is valuable for the emphasis it lays and the categorical opposition it stresses: ‘security vs. insecurity’. It is worth repeating, from this point of view, what Hugh Beach noted in his report of the early 1990s: ‘The sovkhoz organisational structure provides herders with a basic income security independent of their personal “reindeer luck”’ (p.20).

The fact that existential security stands as a primary concern for grassroots actors makes an ironic comment on the context that Soviet power had set the conversion in. The ‘high table’ participants assume the stance of not even registering the implied message: that a celebration of security is the figure against a vast ground of insecurity.

Regressive conservatism

Celebration of security as the ultimate value had come to construct, in this way, the very channel of communication between grassroots and power – the only channel, in fact, that ensures an operatively stable communication flow between the two interlocutors. This can explain, in its turn, the ‘nostalgia for Soviet times’ motive on the part of grassroots actors that has been noted in practically all studies of post-Soviet/postsocialist societies. In the study I have made here it explains ‘time-space’ (chronotope) divergences that exist between grassroots perceptions of recent history, on the one hand, and, particularly, ‘equity-premised’ principles (Thuen 1995). As discussed above in the Kola situation, the latter principles tend to refer to a ‘big tradition’ chronotope, stretching from ‘times immemorial’ to the Stalin-led ‘revolution from above’ of the late 1920s and 1930s, while grassroots actors’ period of reference tends to be fixed on the ‘little tradi-
tion’ of post-Stalinist ‘Soviet times’. The latter, within the Kola and particularly the world of reindeer husbandry among Sami and other local communities, points very firmly to the ‘mature sovkhozism’ of the 1960s through 1980s as their main referential period. In turn, the present ideological message promoting a return to stability as the contribution of the current regime, has all the indications of being premised on a similar chronotope. ‘Security’ and ‘stability’ are thus to be read as synonyms. We can draw the conclusion from this that other ideological ‘buzzwords’ of recent coinage – namely ‘modernisation’ and ‘innovation’ – are inherently unpersuasive in communication with grassroots actors, and have become extraneous and artificial. Tendencies for regressive conservatism seem likely to be prevalent for a long time to come.

Informal social contracting

An important methodological conclusion is that attention should focus on the social contracts being made through ‘conversations with power’. The theme of social contracting is of particular interest in relation to the birth and the dynamics of grassroots-to-power compromises. In recent history such compromises have been achieved by implementing and developing the institution of the private-in-the-collective as the foundation of what I metonymically term ‘sovkhoozism’. Its security and stability generating mechanisms that sustain the private at the expense of the collective can be said to have led to the decline of the Soviet/socialist system. It remains an open question for me as to why power chose to legitimise itself at such a great cost? The nearest to an answer I can offer here is that it was the only language understood by both sides in a stable and long-term manner. Power, in other words, was thinking, talking, and even ruthlessly enfor
ing basic security as an ultimate value. In this way, a ‘mega-speech act’ felicity condition has been met – that of a shared code (cf. Austin 1962; Jameson 1981).

In the dynamic of the very recent period the shared code appears to be financially supported with money from non-renewable resource extraction. The latter entails the risk of laying the economy open to the consequences of the ‘oil/gas-curse’, as it has been repeatedly argued (e.g. Gel’man and Marganiya 2010). So far at least, the view of security/stability as a primary goal, to be practically attained through surface expressions of a private-in-the-collective (‘sovkhooz’) principle, seems central. I have shown in the preceding text how, on a micro-level this has been operating in reindeer husbandry on a long-term basis. Equally in-
structive is the way in which ‘twilight’ social contracts between grassroots actors’ and state power, are being realized as semi-institutionalised economic informalities (p.251). At higher levels of realization such informalities can be said to be flourishing against the background of the institution of ‘state-private partnership’ (*gosudarstvenno-chastnoe partnerstvo*).

The sustainable life of actually achieved or imagined security, as well as the dynamic of zigzagging between these two poles, currently informs activities of grassroots actors in the same way that it motivates decision-making and application on the level of state power. As regards those of grassroots actors in Murmansk Region – and of the Kola Sami community in particular, a number of important conclusions follow from the position taken above.

In the first place, a divergence of paradigmatic ideological priorities has to be recognized, as concerns the interlocutors of mega-speech events, which I have defined to be taking place between the Sami community, on the one hand, and western sympathizers and agencies, or home state institutions – on the other. As I have tried to show, the crisis of a cross-border dialogue between the Kola Sami community (with reservations about the term community) with a ‘concerned West’, stems from the fact that a the Western paradigm of a ‘quest for equity’ is shared locally in ways that only connect to poetic communication. As has been shown, this quality has rendered it operationally accessible first and foremost to a cohort of ‘practitioners of the poetic’, or, in other words, by the carriers of the agitprop torch from Soviet times to ours. In this sense, the new indigeneity-minded talk, despite all its post-modern importations, has been borrowing abundantly from the rich store of Soviet ideological poetics. In terms of sophistication the art far surpasses the substantive idiom of current western ‘indigeneity talk’.

The divergence between the ‘quest for equity’ and ‘quest for security’ paradigms in terms of relative prioritization (but not exclusion) of the one or the other, I have shown to underpin a number of surface consequences, generally overarched by the ‘town-tundra’ rift. Intersecting (Valentine 2007) differences in terms of gender, professional, residential, life-style-, and marriage-preferences characterize grassroots actors on both sides of the divide. Of critical importance is the fact that this sort of situation has placed reindeer herders – especially those at the bottom of the tundra reindeer herding hierarchy – in an existentially unstable position. They are thus similar to the urban indigenous and para-indigenous ‘silent majorities’ who share their social ills: low life expectancy, high levels of dependencies (including recently and increasingly among the young: on narcotics), and deterioration of family life. An important conclusion to draw
from this is that initiatives to support local communities have to be prioritized.

Vulnerabilities

Ideological formulas like the ‘Quest for Equity’, as well as its close corollary of the ‘Quest for the Traditional’, are currently informing a largely false dialogue between local indigenous communities on the one hand, and regional state authorities on the other. This dialogue accompanies otherwise concrete and responsible activities of giving and receiving subsidies to clan communities or obshchiny. While both sides, steeped in a common tradition of ‘ideological talk’, recognize the conventional nature of the principal slogans, the receiving side are placed, nevertheless, in the context of what has been called ‘the trap of the traditional’ (Fondahl 2012). In most concrete terms this has concerned vulnerabilities that result from attempts to pass the ‘private-in-the-collective’ off as the ‘truly private’. The most notable instance of falling into this trap has been that of Obshchina ‘Chigar’ and the court proceedings against its leader.

This and similar cases, especially concerning the increasingly significant fishing quotas, compel the conclusion that the ‘Quest for the Traditional’ ideology should be critically revisited. There is no reason to expect that such forms of land use as reindeer husbandry and fresh-water fishing, so typical of the Kola Peninsula, would not follow the same highly technologized and state-subsidized path found in Western Sami communities. Or, in the words of the Deputy Governor of Murmansk Region quoted above, the authorities give subsidies to obshchiny to buy technology for carrying out their ‘traditional way of life’ (p.42).

‘Technology’ here means, in the first instance, snowmobiles and, increasingly, four-wheel ATVs (kvadrotsikli). These principally foreign-made vehicles hardly fit popular ideas about historical ‘tradition’, but the Deputy Governor may have been conveying an instructive message: the ‘traditional’ is now a postsovkhooist version of a recent technologically-obsessed past. If this is so, then there is recognition at high administrative tiers that the ‘Quest for the Traditional’ ideology is in need of adjusting to grassroots tundra-focused aspirations and demands.

One useful applied conclusion would be to support bringing into the open actual (‘substantive’) concerns of indigenous entities that use the tundra – such as obshchiny – even when they are less concerned with poetically promoted ‘traditional’ land use values. This is primarily a matter of juridical support, since subsidy receivers become vulnerable when they
feel they have to pretend to be ‘traditional’ while actually wanting only to develop as – for instance – fishing-quota based, micro-safari, or ethnotourist firms. The degree of vulnerability seriously rises also in what has come to be an alarmingly widespread case: that of acting as ‘straw people’, on the strength of having indigenous status, for non-indigenous and often non-local entrepreneurs.

To this list of vulnerabilities, which supporting initiatives need to consider, we have to add the ones which relate to current ethnopolitical leadership. The double effect of standing on the ‘poetic side’ of ethnopolitical talk, on the one hand, and on the urban side of the ‘town-tundra divide’ on the other, has propelled a dynamic of divisiveness and fragmentation. In this respect current ethnopolitical leadership has inherited tendencies well established already during the Soviet period. A prominent local example comes from the side of the Sami language debate and concerns what could be called the ‘Sami alphabet feud’. As Øverland and Berg-Nordlie note, the feud pitted prominent local Sami specialists against each other through their lives (2012:64).

The tendencies toward fragmentation, cliquishness, and divisiveness, sapping the strength of efforts of the Kola Sami ethnopolitical leadership, can be seen as related in many instances to the availability of generous support from abroad, especially during the initial years of the process. In a security-oriented environment, and one in which ideological ‘social work’ activities claimed political attention, but received only nominal material support, the new situation brought previously undreamt of possibilities. The resulting scramble and infighting for the new ‘dream resource’ followed the divisive lines of the previous period, but carried it to much higher levels. Several lines of fission quickly developed in result.

In the first place, the line of fission separated even more decisively the community on both sides of the already existing town-tundra rift. As I have tried to show throughout, inclusion in ethnopolitical life had given a natural advantage to professional or semi-professional practitioners of poetic ideological talk. Conversely, reindeer herders and other members of the highly varied tundra-connected community, all of them traditionally positioned on the ‘wrong’ side of such skills, had to, or consciously chose to, isolate themselves from the ethnopolitical process. In this way, while the ethnopoliticians of the first wave have become entrenched firmly and on a long-term basis into leadership positions, the herders have remained extraneous to it. This is despite the fact that reindeer herding and the tundra stand out in all ethnopolitical talk. The town/tundra rift remains pronounced with practitioners of ethnopolitics on the one side and active herders on the other.
Against this background, the vulnerability of actors amongst the ethnopolitical leadership cannot but be fed by such a state of relative separation from the tundra-connected part of the community. Recall that the gap was partially bridged in Soviet times by the agitprop work of cultural brigades, kul’tbrigady, in herding camps in the tundra. These poetic performances and travelling ideological shows which transferred social work from town to tundra herding camps and remote villages has not received focussed attention among researchers. There is much to learn, however, from a study devoted to the cultural brigades, both from the point of view of the historical facts it will unearth and, even more importantly in relation to the present situation. The present process of Sami cultural revival has occurred on an exclusively urban stage, with no presence at the herding camps for the entire period. Giving some balance to this extreme asymmetry is thus an important task. Among other consequences, a beneficial effect of such balancing will be to diminish the discrepancy between word and deed which, at present, makes the leadership highly susceptible to accusations of hypocrisy on the part of the herding community. The long-felt need for ethnopolitical life to extend its activities in the tundra direction should be addressed.167

In the second place, the increasingly noticeable division between ‘state’ and ‘independent’ ethnopolitical organisations should be noted, particularly in regard to the sensitive issue of subsidies and fishing quotas for obshchiny. Fractures in the urban ethnopolitical arena involve division and enmities between those gravitating around regional government committees, particularly the Centre of the Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the North and the Council of representatives, on the one hand, and those ethnopolitical bodies that have chosen more independent paths, often relying on foreign funding, on the other. Since obshchiny are primarily supported by state subsidies, and foreign support is becoming worryingly suspect, obshchiny leaders are understandably tending to join the ranks of those who act within the framework of state-supported indigenous-centred programmes. A tension has thus been created between ‘state’ vs. ‘independent’ indigenous ethnopolitical bodies, a situation widely noted in recent literature (Scheller et al. 2013; Berg-Nordlie 2011b). With the coming into force of the decree that foreign supported NGOs should declare themselves as ‘foreign agents’, the vulnerability of ‘independent’ indigenous bodies has seriously increased. An overall result has been the continued fracturing amongst Sami ethnopoliticians.

167 Signs of movement in this direction have recently appeared. Members of the Kola Sami Parliament take part in the work of the Reindeer Husbandry Committee at Lovozero District Administration and occasionally participate in coralling sessions at key tundra corrals.
A principal conclusion that I draw from the fissures and cleavages that have become so characteristic of the urban ethnopolitical scene is the need of reducing gaps and tensions between substantive and poetic ethnopolitical talk. This amounts to saying that the private-in-the collective institutions – or sovkhozism – should reduce its presence in the ethnopolitical domain and, ideally, leave it entirely. So far the substantive/poetic division has expressed itself by the prominent profiling of the traditional in ethnopolitical speech. The actual absence of ethnopolitical life in the tundra has made such pronouncements and missionary stances vacuous. This has placed urban ethnopolitical actors in a position of vulnerability as explained above. This vulnerability extends to ‘state’ and ‘independent’ leaders and entities in equal measure. There are grounds to say, even, that state-gravitating actors bear the greater responsibilities and risks from engaging in poetically-premised action. In reality this happens, in the most banal of cases, when ethnotourism is passed for ‘truly private’ reindeer husbandry, or when fishing quotas are effectively sold to non-indigenous operators. As home state institutions are much closer to such scenes, and actors are financially answerable to them, control tends to be stricter. The terrain on which independent actors play is, by comparison, much ‘softer’ in the sense of Kornai’s felicitious phrase ‘soft budget control’ (Kornai 1992).

It is thus the case that for the sake of reducing such vulnerabilities and diminishing thereby lines of fission within the highly fragmented urban ethnopolitical body, every effort should be made to legitimise substantive perspectives and motivations insofar as this is possible within the existing juridical and ethically prevalent frameworks. What I mean by this is, in the first place, that existing differences between ideological paradigms on both sides of the ‘west-east’ border need to be recognized. These differences I have tried to capture in a very sketchy manner by the phrases ‘quest for equity’ vs. ‘quest for security’. For many historical and contemporary reasons the latter is informing discursive behaviour and action on the eastern side of the border, resulting in veiling over substantive content by what I have been calling ‘poetic’ expression. Or, as prominent Finnish journalist and writer Anna-Lena Lauren said recently: ‘The main thing in Russia is the implied text’ (Glavnoe v Rossii – podtekst). (Lauren 2013)

These are words of great perceptiveness. They have been warmly reported by regional media, suggesting that Lauren named in a beautifully succinct way a central issue that is instantly comprehensible on the home terrain.

It is the veiling of a substantive text – turning it into an implied text (‘subtext’) – that constitutes the dialogic problem which has been a prima-
ry concern of this book. In the micro-context of my research it motivates a compulsion for veiling over by ‘traditional’ or recently borrowed slogans, premised on laudable moral concerns. While such aspirations are certainly shared by local actors, a historically set environment motivates everyday action to be premised on an underlying concern for attaining personal security first and foremost.

When one looks at the urban scene, to which not only ethnopolitical action, but obshchinism also belongs, the rendering of the ‘Quest for equity’, and ‘for cultural and ethnic revival’ into poetic usage, follows many of the mechanisms of Soviet dealing with the nationality issue. The famous formulation ‘national in form, socialist in content’ might be recalled in this connection. Nationality was thus reduced to folklorism and vestiges of this state of affairs we can see till this day. One, in other words, can be ‘folkloristic’ in some limited and transient context and then go back to an everyday life which has a completely mainstream character and outer appearance. To bring it to a visual image: one can carry about a cellphone on one’s belt, stuck in the sheath of a Sami knife. But if one has received subsidies for ‘being traditional’, or, more precisely – in order to engage in traditional forms of land use – this entails a sense of responsibility for maintaining consistency. The conclusion to be made, therefore, is to recognize the fact that in a given historically determined context ‘being traditional’ in a pre-sovkhoist form is for the majority of actors a non-option. As regards reindeer husbandry – the ostensibly principal domain of the ‘quest for the traditional’ – the more relevant paradigm is outlined by a sovkhoist quest for security. The latter is premised on a private/public compromise, and it is embodied in the private-in-the-collective reindeer. From here it follows that the substantive will of actors to relate to recently opened entrepreneurial opportunities – as, for instance, ethnotourism – by sovkhoist means (through use of private-in-the-collective reindeer) – should be brought into the open and legitimised. It should not be something to hide, veil over, and ultimately position an actor on the wrong side of the law. This could be extended to a great variety of other local situations.

Reaching out to the tundra

The reduction of the distance between the substantive and the poetic cannot, however, solve problems when we get to the tundra side of the town/tundra rift. Here problems attain a starkly existential character. I have shown what this means: medieval life expectancy figures, high mor-
tality, high alcohol and nicotine dependency, and a high degree of enforced celibacy. Urban based participants in ethnopolitical and/or obshchinskyst-entrepreneurial activities certainly face vulnerabilities and risks, but, at the same time, they have a much greater access to skills and networks, to help them navigate the turbulent waters of ‘indigeneity in the city’ (Vladimirova 2012). Actors in reindeer-herding, particularly Sami people of low husbandry hierarchical standing, can be said to be those who are vulnerable in stark existential terms. Aware of such a situation, the main recourse for this part of the community is deepening alcohol dependency, and the circle closes.

The fact that urban-based activism and obshchinskyism have not chosen to address this problem beyond conference room mention can be said to be the greatest deficiency of the revivalist process of the last twenty years, thus emptying it of much of its proclaimed content. This situation is in need, therefore, of the most serious attention. While no ready-made recipes can be given, some general paths of approach can still be outlined. Below I single out some points that I consider of primary importance.

**Tundra family life**

Gradual disappearance of family life from tundra camps (bazi) has proved to be a lasting legacy of Soviet times. Sovkhoz managements were preoccupied first and foremost with calculable results in terms of socialist competition indexes. Creation of conditions for a normal family life close to the herds was never a priority. In the context of roadlessness, prevalent to this day, the best that was done was in the way of sustaining regular mechanized transportation – primarily by ATVs (vezdekhodi) and helicopters – so that families could unite in the tundra for the summer or parts of it. During the rest of the time children would be studying at the boarding school (shkola-internat), while wives would be employed in urban-based jobs. With the reduction of paid jobs for women at tundra camps in the mid-seventies, the institution of the female camp worker (chumrabotnitsa) was progressively eroded. Today there are only a handful of women who accompany husbands or partners while they are engaged in this or that reindeer husbandry operation. The logistical pattern which has stabilized since mature sovkhoist days is one of commuting to tundra camps in connection, principally, with attempts to contact the herds and round them up in corrals. These are the principal operations performed, alongside fence-building and repairs. Reduction of husbandry to these and a few other operations – most of all: the reduction of herding as such – are part
and parcel of the currently prevalent hyper-extensivity as the principal mode of Kola reindeer husbandry.

Hyper-extensivity of husbandry should be seen in parallel to a reduction of extractable products to the single one of reindeer meat. There is still some extraction of mature ('wooden') antlers, and leg-hide strips (koyby), going for local making of leather boots (toburki and burki), but very little else. In this way, husbandry has come to mean contacting freely roaming fragments of the overall herd and rounding them up for corral-processing. These activities, performed on ever more sophisticated and fast snowmobiles, call for considerable technical and driving skills, as well as a GPS-aided ability to locate herd fragments over the vast expanse of the tundra and across the often treacherous snow-ice surface. Former activities, connected with a much wider portfolio of reindeer-husbandry proceeds – from milk to pelts and leather for tundra clothes – have gradually been abandoned. Thus, the erosion of female tundra positions, hyper-extensivity and meat-focused production have significantly widened the occupational gender rift.168

Tundra reindeer husbandry camps have thus turned into male spaces, where alcohol dependent behaviour is a painful presence for most of the time. This state of affairs has much to do with another alarming figure – that of enforced celibacy. At the beginning of the revivalist process, Lyubov Vatonena cited the figure of 70% of Sami people engaged in reindeer husbandry to have belonged to this category. Today the figure can be considered to have stayed the same, together with the alarming figures concerning life-expectancy and causes of early mortality. All of this unreservedly means that the process of Sami ethnic and cultural revival, for all its splendid results on the urban scene of events, has had practically no effect on the state of affairs as regards life and work at the tundra camps.

On the rare occasions when the theme of absence of family life in the tundra is broached, the blame is laid at the door of the traumatic liquidation of tundra villages and the concentration of their population in the apartment blocks in Lovozero, or, for a small number, in the log-cabins of Krasnoshchel’e. The detrimental effects of the liquidation/resettlement campaigns cannot be overemphasized. At the same time, however, it is to be recognized that it will be soon half a century since those events occurred. With the general liberation of the tundra-movement regime since the early 1990s, alongside supportive state measures for obshchina development, there are no overt prohibitions that obstruct tundra-village reviv-

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al. The absence of such, however, is currently particularly advantageous to the micro-safari ‘grey’ operators, and to the notorious but elusive category of poachers. Great parts of the tundra have been cordoned off by tundra tourist companies for their safari-camps, or allotted to the private estates of wealthy people, not infrequently belonging to the power elite. The gradual liberation of previously off-limits parts of the coast by the military has also gone overwhelmingly, so far at least, to the exclusive benefit of tourist businesses or exclusive private estates.

Reaching out to the tundra

Addressing this state of affairs, in all its multifacetedness and complexity, is to be promoted, therefore, at every level of research or applied activities. This, in its turn, means that opportunities should be sought for indigeneity-oriented events to take place at and go on tour to camps, rather than be limited exclusively to urban stages.

Improving the balance between town vs. tundra life of indigeneity events – these latter currently existing practically only in town – should be based in the energy and imagination of local activists and groups. Extending activities out into the tundra as I see it is to take them to the tundra camps, as well as the two ‘remoter’ villages of Kanevka and Sosnovka, which exist seemingly beyond the pale of cultural and revivalist attention.

Crossing that boundary is a matter of wilful determination and not a little money. To do anything beyond a kilometre or two from the last blocks-of-flats of Lovozero, or the log-cabins of Krasnoshchel’e, depends upon either possessing one’s own transport infrastructure – complete with snowmobiles, ATVs and garages – or buying transport and accommodation from ‘white’ or ‘grey’ operators. In both cases prices soar to levels higher than travelling from Lovozero to Cyprus, or even in some cases, to Tokyo. Additionally, the unpredictability of departure and return dates requires that one have generous amounts of time: something that even those who go to Lovozero to do fieldwork cannot afford beyond the space of a few days. When we talk about the tundra we had better think of weeks, if not months – and best forget about fixed travel times.

The daunting problems of travelling and living in tundra locations draw a firm boundary between town and tundra. These are hard givens, but their validity has to be faced and accepted. I conclude with the comment that more shall be done by supporting the return to the tundra of at least a single Sami family, than by conducting years of seminars in Lovozero, Tromsø, or elsewhere. Such a goal is worth working for.
Glossary

The glossary is prepared in view of assisting especially newcomers to the field to orient themselves to basic terms, literature, people, and events related to the Kola Sami people, the reindeer herding community of Lovozero District, reindeer husbandry and other topics, discussed in the main text. When appropriate, preference has been given to rare and less well known sources that readers may find useful. The entries contain a basic explanation and related literature. Neither the explanations, nor the literature cited aim at completeness: their purpose is rather to introduce readers to a topic, from which point on they would begin to create a bibliography of their own and find their way in the field. All documents marked ‘Personal archive’ in References can be sent upon request by writing to the author at yulian.konstantinov@uit.no

Abbreviations:
abbr. – abbreviation
adj. - adjective
adm.l. – administratively liquidated, administrative liquidation
at – author’s term
b. - born
comp. - compare
em – emic term
Eng. – English
esp. - especially
et – etic term
fd - full designation
FN – Far North
g – generally for Soviet Union/Russia
joc. – jocularly, jocular
l – locally, i.e. in the context of Lovozero District/Murmansk Region
LD – Lovozero District
Lit. – literature
MR – Murmansk Region
ot – official term

Administrative designations of present-day MR. In 1921 the former Kola uyezd of Arkhangel’sk Province (guberniya) was administratively changed to Murmansk Province (Murmanskaya guberniya), in 1927 – to Murmansk Okrug (Murmanskiy okrug), and in 1938 – to MR (Murmanskaya oblast’). Lit.: KE 2008:206, Administrativno-territorial’noe ustroystvo Kol’skogo kraya; Arkhivnyy otdel 1995: 15–59f.


Agglomeration, consolidation (ot) Agglomeratsiya, okrupnenie. A process of unting smaller farms (collective farms, kolkhozi) into bigger ones (soviet
farms, sovkhozi). In LD the process took place in the 1950–60s, when collective farms in its northern part went into Soviet farm Tundra of Lovozero, of the southern – into Pamyati Lenina /In Memory of Lenin/ of Krasnoshchel’č’e. The term occurs variously in the literature. In official Soviet/Russian usage it appears as ‘gorodskaya aglomeratsiya’ /urban agglomerations/ (SES 1987: 327), and also as ‘okrupnenie’. In agitprop usage the term appears as ‘prisoedinenie’ /appending/ /of a village to a bigger settlement, of a kolkhoz to a sovkhoz/, or ‘ob’edinienie’ /uniting/. In western usage it can be met as ‘consolidation’ (i.e. Fondhal 1998:68f). See also: Administrative liquidation; Resettlement.

AKS see: Kola Sami Association.


Antonova, Lidiya Dmitrievna (née Torovina) (1927–2011) was a supervisor with the younger pupils at the Nationalities Boarding School (shkola-internat) in Lovozero between the 1950s and the late 1980s. She was known regionally and beyond for her successful extra-class social work with her students, particularly for organising the Circle ‘Red Trackers’, leading it for many years. Those in her care, mostly Sami children, whose parents had been relocated from tundra villages to Lovozero, remember her nowadays as a stern and exacting supervisor (vospitatel’nitsa). Lit.: Antonova’s Archive 1971-2005; Antonova 1990; Kachanova 1985.

Arbitrary ear-marking (at) Marking of newborn or older unmarked (‘whole-eared’) reindeer according to instructions by corral-presiding authorities. This may differ from biological ear-marking, which follows the mark of the mother and is cut shortly after birth. Lit.: Konstantinov 2010b, 2007, 2005a: 93–103f; Vladimirova 2009; Beach 2007; Grechina 2004.


ATV (abbr) all-purpose track vehicle, vezdekhod. Main vehicle for transporting people and cargo from town/ village to tundra brigade bases. In the common case to each reindeer husbandry brigade is allotted a heavy version of the vehicle (GTT), driven by an ATV driver (vezdekhodchik), and a co-driver (naparnik). The vehicles are maintained by the cooperatives, but
increasingly private ATVs are being hired for performing transport operations. The vehicles are of unchanging models since the 1970s and many of them date back to those days. For finding spare-parts, diesel-fuel, or buying second-hand vehicles, the usual solution is through connections with the military units around the District and Region.

**Barents Euro Arctic Region (BEAR)** (*Barentsev Evro-Arkticheskiy region, BEAR*). Organisation of the countries of the Barents Region (Norway, Finland, Sweden, Russia, Denmark, Iceland). Declaration for creating BEAR Council signed in Kirkenes 11 Jan., 1993. Renewed Declaration for continuing the initiative as BEAR 2.0 signed in Kirkenes on 4.06.2013. Concerning the renewal of the Declaration (‘Kirkenes 2.0’) it is to be noted that – from the Russian side - the main thrust for such an action is coming from Archangelsk Region, with MR keeping, so far at least, a more reserved stance (*Barentsevo sotrudnichestvo 28.05.2012*). Border passage within the 30 km. border zone with Norway has been facilitated for people living there, with plans for establishing a visa-free regime in the near future (*Uproshchenyy 31.05.2012*). Lit.: *Sovet 30.10.2013; Budushchee 5.06.2013; Novoyu 28.05.2012; Staalesen 11.01.2012; Honneland 2010, 2003; KE, Murmanskaya oblast’ i Barentsevo sotrudnichestvo; Barentsev Evro-Arkticheski region, BEAR; Bjorklund et al. 1995; Seppänen 1995.


**Beach, Hugh** (b.1948). Cultural anthropologist, Professor of Uppsala University, prominent authority on reindeer husbandry and reindeer herding peoples in Fennoscandia (part. Sweden), and the Russian North. His fieldwork experience in LD produced a valuable source of information about regional reindeer husbandry at the very beginning of post-Soviet reforms (1992). Lit. (selected): Beach 2007; 1998; 1992; 1981.

**Belaya Golovka** (Sami: *Lyangetporr*). Peak on the Keivi Ridge, some 60 km to the SE of Lovozero. A Corral Base, situated in its vicinity is locally known by the same name. The Base – locally abbreviated to *Belaya* - is used by brigades No 1,2,8, and 9, being situated in the winter grazing range of the first three brigades. The Base also serves as a stop-over sta-
tion (pereval baza) on the snowmobile and tractor/ATV winter road from Lovozero to Krasnoshchel'e. Lit.: Muzhikov 1996:86, Lyangetporr.

**Berezhkov affair** Dmitriy Berezhkov, former Deputy Head of RAIPON, was arrested in Tromsø on 14.06.2013 by Norwegian Police on Russian demands to be handed over to Russian Police authorities. Later released. The case has been connected by commentators with previous measures against RAIPON, especially its temporary closing in February 2013. The case has also been connected with action against the Pomor Brotherhood. Lit.: Emberland and Pedersen 14.06.2013; Larsson 14.06.2013; Berezhkov 2012.

**Berry gathering and trading** Tundra berries, particularly moroshka /cloudberry, Rubus chamaemorus/ and chernika /bilberry, Vaccinium myrtillus/ are object of active gathering in the tundra with subsequent sale in town or village at wholesalers’ buying points marked by signs ‘Priem yagod’ /Berries bought/. The trade carries over to further buyers in regional towns, and often across the border. It is one of the officially informal local economies, as it is an open practice of many years, in which cash is paid on the spot without any receipt and absence of taxation of any sort. Those with tundra access are at an advantage, as in the case of meat and fish trading, particularly the top crust of the tundra hierarchy. In the latter case, buying berries from gatherers constitutes an important element of the local private-in-the-collective economy, i.e. of sovkhoism. For the small gatherers berry gathering and subsequent selling constitutes an important addition to income. This is one of the few cases, principally in the month of August, in which there is a marked presence of women and children in the tundra.

’Best times’ Luchshee vremya. A popular phrase when talking about what was ‘before’ (the changes of 1991/2), i.e. during ‘Soviet times’ (sovetskoe vremya). The two expressions are used thus synonymously, but are mostly restricted to the 1970s and ’80s, i.e. what in elitist urban rhetoric has been dubbed the time of stagnation. Historically, the ’best times/stagnation’ tensed opposition is equated with Brezhnev’s stay in power and of his successors till the advent of Gorbachev. Grassroots perception as regards the period tend to be overwhelmingly positive. They reveal a marked nostalgia for ‘the gilded epoch’ of Brezhnev’s fifteen years as a new Utopia’ (Dubin 2011:50, 51-Table 4).

**Bibliographies** of literature on or related to the Sami people and regional affairs. Kol’skiy kray 1988; Makov 1930; Rantala (undated a, Finnish scientific fieldwork on the Kola Peninsula), (undated b, Russian Sami); Rozonov 1903; Ostrovskiy 1899:86. See also the site of Murmanskaya oblastnaya nauchnaya biblioteka: www.mgounb.ru

‘Big truth’ An ideological expression of the Brezhnev era dividing truth between ‘big truth’ (bol’shaya pravda) and ‘little truth’ (malenkaya pravda). The formula gave great possibilities for repressing dissent thought, by accusing dissenters of seeing only the ‘little truth’ of ‘some temporary shortcomings’, while deliberately ignoring the ‘big truth’ of ‘great socialist transformations and success’, ‘ever-increasing prosperity of the working people’, etc.
Biological ear-marking (et) Marking esp. of newborn calves after the ear-mark of the mother at or shortly after birth. (em) Kleymenie vozle materi /marking by the mother/. Lit.: Beach 2007; Konstantinov 2010b, 2007.


Brigade in reindeer husbandry (Rus. sg. brigada, pl. brigadi). (fd) Olenovodcheskaya brigada /reindeer husbandry team/. In Kola reindeer husbandry: a team of reindeer herders, consisting of 6–8 people: brigade leader (brigadir); herders; apprentices. In their care is a brigade herd, usually consisting of 1,500 to 4,500 head of reindeer, grazed over a brigade territory, with a reindeer migration trek route of approx. 50 to 150 km. This stretches, in the main, from the forest-tundra of the Keivi Ridge in the western part of LD to the Barents Sea coast. Lit.: Zakon 2003; Digurov 1987; Semyashkin 1962; Fedotov 1956; Goldstein and Kambulin 1956; Druri 1955; Ostrovityanov et al. 1954: 488–9; Mayorov 1931. Rel: BSE III, Brigada proizvodstvennaya; BSE II 1957, Vol. 46: 262–3, Khozraschetnaya brigada.

Brigade 3 of ‘Tundra’. Tret’ya brigada; tretostadniki. A reindeer herding team of collective/Soviet/cooperative farm ‘Tundra’ (Lovozero) with a brigade territory in the NW part of Lovozero District grazing range, and a brigade base at Polkas Lumpol Lake. For many years led by Ivan Lukin, assisted by his brother Nikolay Lukin, during its last years – by Denis Yulin. Created in 1962 on the basis of disbanded Kolkhoz ‘Odd siyyt’ (New

Brigade 8 of ‘Tundra’. Vos’maya brigada; vos’nistadniki. A reindeer herding team of collective/Soviet/cooperative farm ‘Tundra’ (Lovozero) with a brigade territory in the NE part of Lovozero District grazing range, brigade base at Lake Kol’myavr (Kolmozero). For many years led by Afanasiy Semyashkin, subsequently by Arkadiy Khodzinskiy, since 2002 – by Vladimir Khatanzey. The core part oft he brigade has historically consisted of family/kin members of the Komified Nentsi Khatanzey family. Lit.: KK, Krasnoshchel’e; Konstantinov 2007; Vladimirova 2006; Semyashkin 1962.

Brigade ear-mark Brigadnoe kleymo. Ear-mark registering ownership of reindeer of a given brigade of the reindeer husbandry farm and thus belonging to its stock of collective deer. To be distinguished from personal (‘private’) ear-mark.

Brigade herd Brigadnoe stado. That part of the herd of a reindeer husbandry farm (collective/-Soviet/post-Soviet cooperative) for which a brigade is responsible. Average size of 1,500–4,500 head, comprising collective as well as personal (‘private’) reindeer.

Brigade leader Brigadir. Leader of reindeer herding team (brigade). Usually the most experienced and respected herder in a reindeer husbandry team, officially appointed to the position by the farm director (the latter in post-Soviet times: chair of the managing board of the cooperative). Lit.: Semyashkin 1962; V lovozerskoy 1962; Fedotov 1956; Goldstein and Kambulin 1956.

Brigade member Pastukh; -stadniki. Member of a reindeer husbandry brigade, herder. Of various rank according to competence and work history: senior herder, herder, junior herder, apprentice (uchenik). The synonym -stadniki is mostly used in the plural and qualified by the number of a particular brigade, for instance members of Brigade 1, would be referred to as pervostadniki, of Brigade 3 – tret’estadniki, etc.

Brigade territory Brigadnaya territoriya. That part of the overall reindeer husbandry farm territory over which a brigade used to graze its brigade herd. With progressive abandonment of intensive herding since the late 1950s, brigade herds began to mix and the term has been gradually emptied of meaning. A more relevant descriptor has become side, denoting either of the two parts (‘left side’/‘right side’) into which the whole territory is divided (for ‘Tundra’). Lit.: KK, Lovozero, Krasnoshchel’e; Robinson and Kassam 2000, Lovozero map; Rasmussen 1995; Atlas 1971; Oleni pasbishcha 1962 [map].
Budget sphere  Byudzhetnaya sfera. (pt) Blanket term for institutions financed by federal, respectively regional or district local budgets: i.e. educational, health, and administrative establishments and offices. A subdivision of this may be considered to be the ‘social sphere’ (sotsiatsfera), which includes separately employees in education and health. Lit.: Na 9% 9.09.2013; Mnennie 17.03.2011.


‘Buran’ lit.: ‘Storm’. A Soviet make of snowmobile, developed in the 1970s and serving to this day. By extension, the word buran is used to refer to any kind of snowmobile.

Bych abbr. of Byvshiy chelovek /former person/, (sl.) Pejoratively used when referring to unemployed people living from hand to mouth. In LD often about drop-outs from reindeer herding brigades, down-and-outs.

C
Calf-pelt harvesting Malichnyy zaboy /pelt slaughter/. From malitza: Komi/Nenets knee-length parka, made of 4 to 5 calf hides. The prime material for this all-important tundra piece of clothing, used to this day, is considered to be the pelt of a three-month old calf, i.e. one slaughtered in late August-early September. When rubbing the pelt with an open palm from the tail towards the head, the hairs should not rise above one’s fingers. For protection an outer garment of cotton material is worn over it: malichnaya rubashka /malitsa shirt/.

Campaigning team Agitatsionnaya brigada, abbr. Agitbrigada, also ‘campaigning and cultural team’ (agitatsionno-kul’turnaya brigada, abbr. agitkul’tbrigada). In the 1950s-'60s that was a mobile team, usually consisting of a lecturer and a film-projecting operator, arranging lectures, film shows, distribution of newspapers, journals, and books at reindeer herding bases, as part of ‘cultural and educational work’ (kul’turno-vospitatel’naya rabota) among reindeer herders. In the 70sand 80s fresh fruit and vegetables also used to be supplied to herders during such visits. Discontinued after the changes of 1990-'92, but showing signs of revival as of December 2013. See also: ‘Red Tent’, Social work. Lit.: Fol’klorny 24.12.2014; Kul’tbrigady 14.12.2013; EP, Biblioteka-Agitbrigada; SE, Krasnyy chum; Vosrozhdenie 2002; Zemtsov 2001:12–13, Agitation; Kiselev and Kiseleva 1987:165–6; BSE III, Agitbrigada; Sokolov 1958.

‘Catch up (with) and overtake the West’ ‘Dognat’ i peregnat (Zapada)’. One of the principal slogans of Stalinist modernisation of the 1930s, taken up later by Khrushchev in 1957. Lit.: Heveshi 2002: 38–9.

Centre of the Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the North (fd)

Centre of Sami Knowledge-Lovozero (fd) Avtonomnaya nekomercheskaya organizatsiya ‘Tsentr saamskikh znaniy’ /Autonomous non-commercial organisation ‘Centre of Sami Knowledge’/. Created in 2010 as part of a network of similar NGOs in the Barents Region, it was based in Lovozero with Russian researcher M. Kuchinskiy as its leader. Its initial activities, oriented to organising existing knowledge about the Sami people and making it available to them and the academic community, have considerably slowed down after 2011. Lit.: Dvoretskaya 2012; Obshchiny 2012; Kuchinskiy 2010; http://saami-tied.ru


‘Charr’ (Kil’din Sami: tundra). (fd) Nekommercheskaya organisatsiya Rodovaya obschchina korenogo malochislennogo naroda saami – “Charr” /Non-profit organisation ‘Clan community of the indigenous, numerically small people Sami – “Charr”’/. Founded in 2005 by Boris Yulin and his family. It may be one of the very few Sami obschchiny who have developed private reindeer husbandry, as different from etnoturizm based on private-in-the-collective one. Situated some 40 km to the N of Lovozero, it has about twenty head of deer at present. Lit.: Obshchiny 2012.

Chigar affair Leader of Sami clan community (obschchina) ‘Chigar’ /’Herd’/ Svetlana Matrekhina was sentenced in 2012 to return to the state a large subsidy, allegedly used unlawfully. The main charge was that the obschchina had received the subsidy for developing reindeer husbandry activities, but had allegedly been using it only for etnoturist ones. The obschchina leadership was accused of not using any private deer, but only a limited number of private-in-the-collective (personal) ‘private’ reindeer, owned by its members and grazed mixed with the collective herd of SKhPK ‘Tundra’. Lit.: Scheller et al. 2013; Chigar 14.05.2012; Ob-
Chronotope: lit. ‘time-space’. One of the key concepts in Bakhtin’s studies of the poetics of the novel. As explained by Dentith (1995), it is ‘a mobile term which alludes to the way time and space are together conceived and represented. This has been done in distinct and characteristic ways in different kinds of writing, permitting different characteristic narratives and relying upon some characteristic motifs. Bakhtin provides a series of accounts of different novels and related forms, starting with the Greek romances, seeking to show how they are organised around particular inter-related conceptions of time and space.’ Lit.: Dentith 1995: 50; Bakhtin 1990, 1981, 1979, 1975a, b.

Chudz’yavr’ (Sami name of original settlement: Kild syt; Rus.: Kildinskiy pogost). Sami village, used to be located at 50 km. to the NW of Lovozero, close to the banks of eponymous lake. It had changed place many times, in 1934 receiving its last name and setting up a kolkhoz – ‘Odd-syyt’ (New Village). The latter was incorporated by consolidated sovkhoz ‘Tundra’ in 1962. At that time the village was administratively liquidated and its population moved to Lovozero. The herders of the liquidated kolkhoz were organised as Brigade 3 of ‘Tundra’. Lit.: Muzhikov 1996: 162; Arkhivnyy otdel 1995: 262; Kiselev and Kiseleva 1987: 32, 37; see esp. the article in Voshchanyin 1939: 102. Rel.: Konstantinov 2005a; Beach 1992; Paustovskiy 1985: 353.

Chum (Nenets: tent). Siberian nomadic conical tent. Borrowed by Komi herd- ers from the Nentsi of Bolshezemel’skaya tundra, the use of such a portable structure was imported to the Kola by the Komi and ‘Komified’ Nentsi in-migrants during the 1880s. Gradually displaced the smaller Sami tent (kuvaks, koavas). Lit.: Luk’yanchenko 1971: 84–120; Charnoluskiy 1930a: 100–108; Kharuzin 1890: 98–103. For use of chum by present day Komi herdres Habeck 2005: 11–39.

Chumrabotnitsa see: female camp worker

Circle Kruzhok /’little circle’, club, society/. Study group, led by paid or vol- untary supervisors, for extra-class or after work activities of students or employees, helping to advance communist upbringing and education in the fields of fatherland history, military patriotism/para-military training, amateur arts, sports, social work, etc. Essential component of communist upbringing, social work, and organisation of leisure. Lit.: Heveshi 2002: 66, Kruzhok politgramoty, politprosveshcheniya; BSE II 1953, Vol.23: 510– 11, Kruzhki; kruzhki v seti partynogo prosvesheniya; kruzhki uchenicheskie; For ’Red Trackers’ Circle at Lovozero Boarding School see Antonova’s Archive 1971- 2005; Kachanova 1985; For the Circle ‘Young Reindeer Herder’ see National Northern Lyceum; For satirical reflection in contemporary fiction see esp. Bulgakov 2007: 181–89, Bespokoiniy den’; 1988: 209–23, A Day of Anxiety.

Civil War (Grazhdanskaya voyna) War between supporters of Bolshevik take-over of power in 1917 and pro-monarchist and other oppositional forces (1918–1920, in some regions till 1923). A prelude to the armed conflict served to be an agreement for a joint defence of MR (at the time: Mur-
mansk Uezd) by allied British, French and Russian troops against advancing German and Finnish forces. The agreement was reached between an Allied Mission and the Murmansk Council of Deputies (sovdep), endorsed by the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) in Moscow (2 March 1918). The agreement soon gave way to armed conflict and a full-blown civil war. Lit.: SE, Grazhdanskaya voyna; Took 2004: 192–208, Civil War and ‘Allied Intervention’.

Clan community Obschina, pl. obschchiny. (fd) Rodovaya obschina korennoogo malochislennogo naroda saami, abbr. ROKMNS /Clan community of the indigenous numerically small Sami people /; Territorial’nossedskaya obschina korennoogo malochislennogo naroda saami, abbr. TSKMNS /Territorial-neighbourhood community of the indigenous numerically small Sami people /. Variants: Territorial’no obschestvennoe samoupravlenie ROKMNS /Territorial social autonomy /; Nekommercheskaya organizatsiya ROKMNS / Non-commercial organisation /; Nekommercheskaya organizatsiya saamskaya obschina /Non-profit organisation Sami community /. Organisation of indigenous, numerically small peoples of MR (principally Sami) and other people (70% indigenous, the rest may be non-indigenous) for conducting activities of preservation and development of traditional (for the Kola Sami) land use forms. Existing regulations stress support by regional grants (see: Committee for relations) of such activities with a principally non-commercial character. The issue is unclear, particularly as it regards inland fishing and ethnotourist activities. In many cases indigenous presence is nominal, while actual management of commercial nature may be in the hands of non-indigenous urban entrepreneurs. Lit.: KE, Obschchiny korennykh malochislenennoh narodov Severa; Subsidii 18.06.2013; Dedyukh 03.09.2012; Normal’noy zhizni 17.05.2012; Obschchiny 2012; Odinadsat’ 24.04.2012; Overland and Berg-Nordlie 2012, Obschchinas; Vinogradova 2012: 46–52; Vladimirova 2011, 2006: 359–389; Kalstad 2009: 68–9; Bogdanov 2007: 10; Oreskov 21.05.2012[2006]; Kryazhkov 2005; Ustav 2005.

Clan community monitoring Monitoring obschchin. (fd) Monitoring po izucheniyu sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo polozheniya obschchiny korennykh malochislennykh narodov Severa 2010 god /Monitoring for the study of socio-economic state of clan communities of the indigenous numerically small peoples of the North 2010/. A survey conducted in 2010 by the Centre for Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the North. As stated by the Kola Sami Parliament, its results have not been made public. Separately, RAIPON published a Resolution of 3.02.2012 ‘On creating a unified data base of the obschchiny and national enterprises of the numerically small indigenous peoples of Russia’ (raipon@raipon.info; limanzo@raipon.info). Recently, the Council of representatives of numerically small indigenous peoples at the Government of MR have informed the regional press that by 15 May 2012 ‘some twenty obschchiny had been registered, but only five of them were operating in real terms, the rest being ‘in a state of establishing themselves’ (Normal’noy zhizni 17.05.2012)


Collective reindeer (em, l) *sovkhovnie oleni* /sovkhov deer/. That part of the herd of the reindeer husbandry farm which was considered collective farm property in *kolkhoz* times (1929–1970), that of the state in *Soviet farm* (sovkhoz) times (1970–1992), and belonging to the indivisible property (nedelimiy fond) of the *post-Soviet cooperative farm* (since 1992).

Collectivisation *Kollektivizatsiya*. In LD: A process of enforced property transformation in the course of which private reindeer and other related property became property of collective farms (kolkhozi), or Soviet farms (sovkhoz), undergoing a process known as ‘social appropriation’ (obobshchestvenenie). Initiated in 1917 countrywide it reached the Kola only when Stalinist agrarian reforms were introduced in the late 1920s–30s as ‘mass collectivisation’ (sploshnaya kollektivizatsya). Until this time the principal collective form of agricultural property, trading and crediting of reindeer herders had been the co-op (kooperatsiya). The co-op is to be distinguished both from collective/ *Soviet farm* and *post-Soviet cooperative*. 
Colonisation of the Murman Coast Kolonizatsiya Murmanskogo berega. An attempt by the Russian state to attract settlers from other parts of Russia, as well as from neighbouring Fennoscandia in the latter half of the 19 c. Privileges and financial assistance was offered to colonists, but the results were far below initial expectations. With the advent of Soviet power further attempts were made, particularly in connection with the emergence of the *October Railway* as an economic complex of great significance for the region (*Kanadizatsiya*). In the late thirties Soviet policy towards colonists, particularly from North Norway and Finland sharply changed and a great majority of them became subject to deportations and repression. Lit.: KE, *Kolonizatsiya Murmanskogo berega*; Fedorov 2009; Orekhova 2008, 2007; Belyaev 2007; Jentoft 2002. Rel.: KE, *Kanadizatsiya; Kolonizatsiya Karelo-Murmanskogo kraya; Kolonizatsiya Kol'skogo kraya*.

Committee for relations (fd) *Komitet po vzaimodeystviyu s obshchestvennymi organizatsiyami i delam molodezhi Murmanskoy oblasti* /Committee for relations with NGOs and MR youth affairs/. Successor of administrative structures with which regional power had managed Sami and *para-indigenous regional peoples*’ affairs in early post-Soviet times. Created in 1992, this was the Committee for affairs of the indigenous, numerically small peoples of the North (*Komitet po delami korennykh malochislennykh narodov Severa*) whose first Chairperson was Sergey Semyashkin, later Anna Prakhova. Subsequently renamed to Committee for affairs of local self-governing, problems of military settlements, and affairs of the indigenous, numerically small peoples of the North at MR Administration (*Komitet po voprosam mestnogo samoupravleniya, problemam voennykh garnizonov i delam korennykh malochyslennykh narodov Severa Murmanskoy oblastnoy administratsii*). After 2004 indigenous affairs were removed from its competence and relegated to *Tsentr korennykh malochislennykh narodov Severa* (*Centre of the Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the North*). At present the Centre functions in relation to the Committee insofar as the latter administers regional funds for which the Centre, along with other GOs/NGOs, applies, allegedly on a competitive basis. The whole process since 2010 is to be seen in relation to the founding of the *Kola Sami Parliament*, and as an overall attempt on the part of regional government for etatisation of management of indigenous affairs through financial (grants and subsidies) influence on *clan communities*. Lit.: Dvoretskaya 2012; Vinogradova 2012: 38–39; Bogdanov 2007: 10; Bol'shakova 2005: 219. For Centre - Committee relations see: *Utverzhden 20.05.2013*. See also: *Council of representatives*.

Communal pot (pt) *Obshchepyt*. In reindeer herding camps (*bases*): cooked food for all present at a base (herders and visitors) at any time, usually soup of boiled reindeer meat. The meat comes from *collective reindeer*,...
which *brigade leaders* report to the *cooperative farm* administration (*kontora*).

**Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)** (фи) Kommunisticheskaya partiya Sovetskovo Soyuza, abbr. KPSS. Under this name since 1952, formerly Vsesoyuznaya Kommunisticheskaya Prtiya (bol’shevikov), VKP(b)/ All-Union Communist Party (of the Bolsheviks)/, and other previous names. Disbanded in 1991, its members joining in their great part the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiy-skoy Federatsii, KPRF). KPRF has significant influence in MR and LD. Locally, former CPSU members and leading figures are also grouped around the *Council of veterans* of Lovozero District, and hold leading positions in the *District Council of Deputies*. Lit.: BSE III, Kommunisticheskaya partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza; Sogrin 2001: 91; Zemtsov 2001: 217–19, Party; Schlesinger 1977; Fedenko 1960; Kratkii kurs 1997[1938].

**Company for joint reindeer herding** Tovarishchestvo po sovmestnomu vypasu oleney. A pre-kolkhoz form of collective herding, similar to that of a cooperative, in which private property had not been collectivised. The form is thus analogous to Tovarishchestvo po sovmestnoy obrabotke zemli (TOZ/Company for collective cultivation of land/), characteristic of central and southern belt regions. TOZ were wide-spread in USSR till the onset of mass *collectivisation* in the second half of 1929. Lit.: BSE III, Tovarishchestvo po sovmestnoy obrabotke zemli; BSE II 1956, Vol.42: 535.

‘Comrades’ court’ Tovarishcheskiy sud. An extra-juridical Soviet social institution, created at places of work or residence by allegedly free elections on the part of employees or residents, and having the power of imposing limited corrective sentences in the name of ‘actively contributing for educating citizens in the spirit of communist attitude to labour’ (BSE III, Tovarishcheskiy sud). As a rule this amounted to public rebuke of employees, accused of lack of discipline, absence from work, hooliganism, pilfering, etc., but could also escalate to accusations of *social parasitism*, leading to various terms at corrective insitutions, particularly *medical labour preventive clinics* (LTP), or turning the accused over to the law-enforcing authorities. Lit.: Kralina 1960.

**Controller** Schetchik. (рт) A person who is officially appointed to be present at corralling sessions for registering *personal* (*private*) *deer*. Animals are entered under names of owners on a plywood board (*pentium*) as they are processed in the *working chamber* of the *corral* enclosure. *Collective reindeer* are similarly registered against names of brigades. Registering of collective deer is usually done by the *Head of the Reindeer Husbandry Department* of the sovkhoz/ *cooperative*, sometimes accompanied by the *Veterinary Doctor* or a representative of the sovkhoz/cooperative administration (*kontora*). During the last years counting is supervised also by a member of the *Reindeer Committee* at the Administration of Lovozero District. Lit.: Vladimirova 2009, 2006; Konstantinov and Vladimirova 2006b; Konstantinov 2005b, 2002; Grechina 2004.

**Co-op** Kooperatsiya, -koop. The term is usually qualified by an attribute denoting specialization: potrebitel’skaya K./for consumer goods/; kreditnaya K./for financial crediting/, integral’naya K. (*integral’ka*) /mixed/, etc. Dur-
ing the period 1917–1928 K. was the main form of collective organisation in Kola reindeer husbandry villages. Private owners were co-op members and benefitted from the offered range of services. With the onset of mass collectivisation (1928–1929), K. was dismantled in many of its forms and what remained was put in the hands of the state. Locally this happened in the case of Rybkoop /Fishing Co-op/ which became a diversified state-run enterprise. It had a place second in importance to that of the collective/Soviet farms in Lovozero and Krasnoshchel’e, taking care of trading and transportation activities, construction and infrastructural services, etc. K. is to be distinguished from collective farm (kolkhoz); Soviet farm (sovkhoz), and post-Soviet cooperative farm (TOO, SKhPK). Lit.: KE, kooperatsiya; SE, Kooperatsiya; Integral’nya kooperatsiya; Zemtsov 2001: 69–71, Cooperative/co-op; Voronin 1997; Danilov 1990, 1991; BSE III, Kooperatsiya kreditnaya; Kiselev 1972; Il’yin 1932; Osinovskiy 1927; Evdokimov 1922.

Cooperative farm, cooperative (fd) Kooperativ proizvodstvennyi v sel’skom khozyaystve /Production cooperative in agriculture/. A generalized term for a wide range of cooperative organisational forms in Soviet agriculture, ranged according to the degree of ‘socialisation’/obobshchestvenie/ of members’ property, i.e from that of agricultural cooperation for land-cultivation (Tovarishchestvo po sovmestnoy obrabotki zemli, TOZ) to completely socialized property as in communes (komuni). Collective farms (kolkhozi) became the dominant form of agricultural production cooperatives after the late 1920s; during the 1960s-’70s a significant part had been grouped together in agglomerated (consolidated) Soviet farms. In post-Soviet agricultural production C. succeeded former collective and Soviet farms, re-registered after 1991 as limited companies (TOOs), production Cs (SKhPKs), and a host of other new names. In many essential ways these were ‘recycled’ forms of the Soviet state farm, thus perpetuating the private-in-the-collective compromise of sovkhois. The post-Soviet cooperative has to be technically distinguished, thus, from its immediate predecessor (collective-/Soviet farm), and in substance: from the pre-collectivisation co-op. Lit.: BSE III, Kooperativ proizvodstvennyi.

Corral Koral’. (rt) Enclosure with complex system of partitions (pens) into which a reindeer herd is driven, and subsequently ‘processed’. The latter operation usually includes: separation of a contingent for harvesting (zagonyi kusok), counting separately collective from private reindeer, ear-marking hitherto unmarked ‘whole eared’ deer (tseloushnye oleni), cutting off antlers for subsequent sale, castrating male deer, etc. Lit.: Konstantinov and Vladimirova 2006b, 2006b; Vladimirova 2006; Druri 1955: 185, Raskoly.

Corral camp Collection of log cabins close to a corral, capable of housing several herding brigades at a time. Corral camps are usually called by the name of a nearby lake or other land feature, i.e. Porosozero (Lake) Corral; Belaya Golovka (Peak) Corral, Polmos Corral, Sem’ostrov’ye Corral, etc.

Corrective labour camp No 509. Ispravitel’no-trudovoy lager’ 509. Forced labour camp of the GULAG system in MR (GULAG na Murmane) cre-
ated in 1951 for building a transpeninsular railway line from the town of Apatiti to the village of Ponoy on the Barents Sea Coast, with a planned branch line to Yokanga Bay. Abandoned in 1953. Lit.: KE 2008: 191, Ugolovno-ispolnitel’naya sistema Murmanskoy oblasti; Took 2004: 238.


**Council of representatives** (fd) Sovet predstaviteley korennykh malochislennykh narodov Severa pri Pravitel’stve Murmanskoy oblasti /Council of representatives of the numerically small indigenous peoples of the North at the Government of MR/. Created in 2006 as Coordinating Council (Koordinationnyy sovet) in an advisory function to MR Government and structurally related to the Centre of the Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the North. It is mainly oriented to the interests of Sami obshchiny, in many cases C. members being themselves obshchiny leaders, as also holding other regional administrative positions. The Council can be seen, in this way to bolster etatisation of indigenous affairs in the spirit of implementing private-in-the-collective (sovkhoist) patterns of socio-economic organisation. Lit.: Dedyukh 03.09.2012; Overland and Berg-Nordlie 2012: 3; Sovet predstaviteley 17.12.2012; Vinogradova 2012: 103; Berg-Nordlie 2011b: 62–71; Bogdanov 2007: 7. On new team elected on 17 May 2013 see: Utverzhden 20.05.2013.

**Council of veterans** (pt) Sovet veteranov; (fd) Lovozerskiy raionnyy sovet veteranov /Council of Veterans of Lovozero District /. A local branch of the NGO Vserosiyskaya obshchestvennaya organisatsiya veteranov (pensionerov) voiny, truda, vooruzhonykh sil i pravoohranitel’nykh organov / All-Russian Public Organisation of the Veterans (Pensioners) of War, Labour, Armed Forces, and Law-enforcing Organs/. Lit.: Brylev 2010; Kuznetsova 2010; Yarovaya 2008; Otkrytoe pis’mo 2003.

CPSU see: Communist Party of the Soviet Union

**D**

‘Developing the North’ *Osvoenie Severa*. Major trope of Soviet and post-Soviet ideological discourse about extractive activities and industrialisation of subarctic regions; currently of oil/gas extractive activities in coastal waters. *Osvoenie* is the principal term on which Russian northern policy has been formulated, as it emerged more clearly in the 18th, but especially in the 19th century, and was later adopted in Soviet Union/Russia. Etymologically the word derives from ‘*svoy*’ (own); the verb ‘*osvoit/osvaivat*’ literally meaning ‘to make one’s own’, hence ‘to master’, ‘utilize’. The noun is variously translated as ‘mastering’, ‘developing’, or ‘utilizing’. Lit.: KE, Osvoenie nedr Kol’skogo poluostrova; SE, Muzyk-arkhiv istorii i osvoeniya Severa; Promyshlennoe razvitie Evropeyskogo Severa Rossii; “Okno v istoriyu” 19.03.2013; Konstantinov et al. 2011; Dmitriy Dmitrienko 05.03.2010; Strategiya 2010; Fedorov 2009; Krizis 2009; Belyaev 2007; Tsirkunov 2007; Honneland and Blakkisrud 2001; Widdis 2000: 404; Kiselev and Shevchenko 1996; Kotkin 1995; Milanov 1985; Sukharev 1979; Pyatovskiy 1974; Dmitriev 1959; Dvinin 1959; Proizvodatel’nye sily 1923; Engelhardt 1899; Rippas 1895; Gulevich 1891, 1883; Sluchevskiy 2009[1886]; Konstantinov 1885; Terentiev 2008b[1873]; Sidorov 1870; Zhuravskiy 1870; Maksimov 1984[1864]. Related topics: ‘Fight for the Arctic’; Murmansk Economic Forum; October Railway; GULAG na Murmane.

‘Dialogic incongruity’ (at) (also: ‘dialogic discrepancy’). A state of discursive affairs in which dialogue between interlocutors is compromised due to their employing language in divergent or even conflicting ways. Related: *language functions*.

**District CPSU Committee** Rayonnii komitet partii, abbr. *raykom*. District level Communist Party (*CPSU*) structure and actual holder of Soviet power on this level, subordinate to the Regional CPSU Committee (*Oblastnoy komitet partii, obkom*). Nominally, the supreme holder of power on this level was supposed to be the District Committee of Deputies (*Raysoviet*). Lit.: Heveshi 2002: 112, *Raykom*; Yasin 2002: 29, Fig.2.1, *Yevarkhisheskaya struktura upravleniya sovetskoy ekonomiki*. See also: *Lovozero District Committee*.

‘Dizzy with Success’ (fd) Golovokruzhenie ot uspekhov. K voprosam kolkhoznogo dvizheniya / Dizzy with success. On problems of kolkhoz development/. Programmatic article by Stalin, published in ‘Pravda’ of 2 Mar., 1930. In it he castigates over-eager collectivisers, accusing them of the sin of practising ‘overflexing (of the stick)’ (peregybi), i.e. conducting the collectivising drive by excessively violent means and by applying total confiscation of private agricultural property in the name of setting up a kolkhoz. Analysts see in this attack against excesses and terror in collectivisation a political ploy on the part of Stalin aiming to remove from the political scene adherents of exiled Trotsky, i.e. an attack against so-called ‘left opposition’, ‘left opportunists’, ‘trotskytes’. The article can be also taken as signalling the end of the First Wave of mass collectivisation, setting its limits to 1928/9–1932/4, relative to region. Lit.: BS II 1952, Vol.11:619–21; Stalin 1930. For reflection in contemporary fiction see esp. Platonov 2004, 1987.
E

Ear-mark Sami: tibht; Rus.: ushcupyatno, kleymo. (rt) Mark cut by knife on both ears of reindeer, denoting ownership. The mark is cut in the form of simple geometrical figures (triangles, half-moons, wedges, etc.). Since collectivisation, two sets of marks exist: brigade and personal (‘private’) ear-marks. Lit.: KE, Saamskie kleyma; Polozhenie 2007; Opis’ 1987; Spisok No 1 1987; Spisok No 2 1987; Volkov 1935; Komshilov 1926.

Ear-marking Kleymenie. (rt) A seasonal activity in reindeer husbandry, during which ear-marks are cut on the ears of reindeer. The cutting is done by knife, usually as animals are passed through the working chamber of a corral enclosure. In the literature a difference is made between ‘biological’ and ‘arbitrary’ ear-marking. Lit.: Konstantinov 2010b, 2007; Vladimirova 2009; Beach 2007; Grechina 2004; Borozdin et al. 1977: 210, Mechenie oleney; Druri 1955:78, Zootekhnicheskiy uchet.


Esoteric tourism (at) A currently popular form of tourism in the reindeer husbandry part of LD and adjacent areas. Clients are mainly in search of connecting with magical powers of ancient Sami sites, particularly Lake Seydozero (Seyd’yavr) in the Lovozero Ridge (Lovozerskie tundry) in the vicinity of Revda. A parallel interest is connected with the search of an ancient Hyperborean Civilization, allegedly flourishing on the Kola Peninsula at an unspecified prehistoric period. A third line still is connected with the search of the Abominable Snowman (snezhniy chelovek) allegedly living in the tundra and ridges to this day. On the practical side of it, ET belongs to the list of officially informal local economies. Lit.: Likhachev 2013b; V Hiperboreyu 18.10.2013; Berkuta 2010; Demin 2002, 1998a,b. For an early genre text: Gumilevskiy 1927.

Ethnographic expeditions in Kola Peninsula Reindeer Husbandry Territories: Arvid Genetz – 1870s (Likhachev 2013a: 4; Tret’yakova 2007: 201; Genetz 1891); D.N. Bukharov (Western parts and Finnish Lapland) – 1883 (Bukharov 1885); W. Ramsay, A.O. Kihlman, J.A. Palmen et al. - late 1880s (Likhachev 2013a:5–6; Pekov 2013; Kihlman und Paldmen 1891; Kihlman 1889); G.Hallström – 1908 (Hallström 2013/1922/); V.Yu. Vize - 1910-11 (Vize 1912a, b) V. K. Alymov – 1920s (Alymov 2004/1930/, 1928a, 1928b, 1927); VI. VI. Charnoluskiy– late 1920s-30s; Samorukova 2007; Charnoluskiy 2002; 1972; 1931; 1930a,b); F.G. Ivanov-Dyatlov – late 1920s-30s (Ivanov-Dyatlov 1928); D.A. Zolotarev – late 1920s, (Zolotarev 1930; 1928);
Nikolai N. Volkov – 1930s (Volkov 1996/1946, 1940, 1935); Tat’ana V. Luk’yanchenko - 1960s–90s (Luk’yanchenko 1983; 1979; 1971; 1966); Hugh Beach – early 1990s (Beach 1992); Yulian Konstantinov – 1990s–2000s (Konstantinov and Vladimirova 2008a, b; Konstantinov 2005a); Petya Mankova – 1990s (Mankova 2004); Vladislava K. Vladimirova – 2000s (Vladimirova 2006).

Etnoturizm – abbr. of Etnokul’turnyi turizm narodov Severa /Ethnic and cultural tourism of the peoples of the North/. A form of tourism, in most cases offering to clients participation in stereotypical, often invented and eclectic versions of indigenous traditions and forms of land use; staged shows of such. In LD etnoturizm has been growing since the appearance of clan communities (obshchiny), for many of which it is the main – often only – activity. Lit.: Predsedatel’ obshchiny 12.09.2013.

Extensive reindeer husbandry (et) A form of reindeer husbandry characterized by minimal control of the movements and life-cycle of semi-domesticated reindeer. In practical terms this means that herders let the herds migrate mostly on their own. To be contrasted with intensive reindeer husbandry in which herders migrate with the herds, direct their movements, protect them from predators, and control closely their life-cycle. When extensivity of reindeer husbandry attains maximum values, we talk of over- or hyper-extensivity. Lit.: V lovozerskoy 1962; Kolkhoz “Krasnoschel’e” 1960; Sorvanov 1958.


Extreme tourism (pt) Ekstremniy turizm. A form of tourism, offering to ‘extreme’ clients (‘ekstremaly’) participation in outdoor activities containing elements of adventure and daring. In LD ‘extreme tourists’ engage mainly in snowmobile trekking across reindeer herding territories, white-water canoeing and rafting, off road bike, car and ATV races, etc.

F

Female camp worker (pt) (rt) Chumrabotnitsa, pl. chumrabotnitsi; (ot) Rabochaya chuma; Khozyayka usadby /Camp hostess/. From Nenets chum: Siberian nomadic conical tent; lit. ‘a woman taking care of a tent, tent hostess’. Female cook at intermediary herding camps (bases), also responsible for keeping living quarters clean and mending herders’ clothing. Till the 1960s wives of herders would accompany their husbands as chumrabotnitsi, subsequently only one or two women would be left as salaried employees in a brigade. The measure is considered by the community as having been detrimental to preserving family life in the tundra and responsible for the ensuing very marked gender asymmetries and family splitting between town and tundra, bringing about pronounced male bachelorship and alcoholism among reindeer herders. By and by men have stepped into this previously exclusively female role in many brigades. Such people are usually pensioned off herders, combining duties with those of wardens.

‘Fight for the Arctic’ Bor’ba za Arktiku. Ideological slogan promoted since 2007, capturing an alleged necessity of defending Russian interests in the Arctic against western ambitions to appropriate newly opened access to resources. As a signal of the campaign, also marking the beginning of a gradual peripheralization of the Norwegian-launched Barents Euro Arctic Region (BEAR) initiative, the raising of the Russian flag under the North Pole (August 2007) may be taken. Lit.: Medvedev 2013; Alexeev 18.06.13; Semushin 11.06.2013; M.Kolerov 17.10.2010; Flag 03.08.2007; All news items on the topic ‘Fight for the Arctic’ (1093 items): http://www.regnum.ru/dossier/ 1283.html. Rel.: Barents Euro Arctic Region.

‘First Wave’ of collectivisation in the Kola Peninsula. (et) A process of ‘mass collectivisation’ (sploshanaya kollektivizatsiya), began in Autumn 1929 with the aim of total collectivisation of agriculture in the country. In the Kola collectivisation affected reindeer husbandry and fishing. By the summer of 1932 the way collectivisation was done was proclaimed to have been in many cases ‘incorrect’, and characterized by ‘deviations from the Party line’ (peregilby), so many of the newly created collective farms were disbanded. The First Wave in the Kola can thus be said to have lasted from the Autumn of 1929 (in some cases of 1928) till 1932-34. Already in 1932, however, the process was rigourously started anew, with a decisive ‘victory’ of complete collectivisation by 1937-39, relative to region and access. Lit.: General: Zemtsov 2001: 53–6, Collective farm; BSE III, Kollektivizatsiya sel’skogo khozyaystva; BSE II 1953, Vol.21:612f, Kollektivizatsiya sel’skogo khozyaystva; Russian North: Kuoljok 1985; Skachko 1934; Mayorov 1931; Kola: KE Kollektivizatsiya na Murmane; Kiselev and Kiseleva 1987: 68; Kiselev 1972; Pyatovskiy 1974: 150–56, 1965; Gudzenko 1954; Bunakov 1934; Budovnits 1931.


Fishing brigade in Lovozero district. Rybolovetskaya brigada. Kolkhoz ‘Tundra’ of Lovozero used to have five fresh-water fishing brigades, reduced to two in the sovkhoz period, ultimately disbanded. Both sea- and freshwater fishing brigades had been preserved as part of the Sosnovka Branch of ‘Pamyati Lenina’/’Olenevod’, operating with four weirs along the White Sea coast. Lit.: Bogdanov 2007: 9; Likvidirovat’ 1960; Morozov 1958; Sokolov 1958.

Fishing quotas in Lovozero District (pt) Rybnye kvoty; (fd) Kvoty na rylov vodnykh biologicheskikh ob”ektov /Quotas for catching water biological objects/. Annually allowed quantities of catches of sea- and freshwater fish ‘for sustaining the traditional way of life and realizing traditional forms of land use of the indigenous, numerically small peoples of MR.’ Side by side with etnoturizm, the main activity of many obshchiny is connected with catching anadromous fish in inland basins. Consequently regionally
determined annual fishing quotas are a main local concern, often pitting the local population against safari tourist firms. Fishing quotas obtained by obshchiny are often sublet (‘sold’) to third parties. In this way selling quotas may turn as a principal economic activity of an obshchina, such obshchini being called in a critical manner ‘rant’ye obshchiny’ /rentier clan communities/. Lit.: Popov 29.11.2012; Danilov 30.05.2012; Normal’noy zhizni 17.05.2012; Mikhaylov 2011; Zaytseva 2009; Bogdanov 2007: 9; Pravila 1984. Rel.: Pyatovskiy 1965; Alymov 1928b; Krogius 1928.

Fish trading, informal in Lovozero District. There are principally two forms. One is when fish caught in lakes and rivers is sold locally in the district in salted or frozen form, depending on the season. This is the principal way in which herders and other tundra-connected people earn additional income, while the fish gets transported from the tundra to town or village by cooperative farm transport for free. In this way informal fish trading constitutes an important local feature of the local private-in-the-collective socioeconomic arrangement (sovkoism). The second form concerns obshchiny and their rights to fishing quotas. Another informal market is born by this arrangement through subletting fishing quotas to non-indigenous outsiders. Rel.: fishing quotas.

‘Foreign agents’ Inostrannye agenty. Official label of NGOs, carrying out political activities in the Russian Federation with the financial support of foreign states, decreed in 2012. Lit.: Prokuratura 7.06.2013; Sotsiologicheskiy 2.06.2013; Staalesen 23.05.2013.

G

Garage Garazh. The garage is an essential infrastructural part for the local tundra-connected culture in its current state. The better garages are built in brick, the less so are made of wooden planking, for better quality reinforced with tin sheets. These would be called somewhat disparagingly sarai, i.e. ‘barns’. Garages and barns constitute, together with boathouses along both banks of river Vyrma, a horizontal village of several rows (ryadi), encircling the town from all sides. The same would be true about other towns, including Murmansk. For the significane of auxiliary buildings: Konstantinov 2009; about garages in Murmansk see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/pop_ups/06/business_murmansk0s_gorgeous_garages/html/10.stm. See also: garage theft.

Garage theft Breaking into garages and stealing snowmobiles or outboard engines is a recurrent theme locally. It inevitably leads to comparisons with what used to be in ‘Soviet times’ when ‘such things did not happen’. Such thefts will be talked about for months and even years afterwards, and constitute items of news in the local and regional press, i.e.: Za ugon 03.05.2012.


Glasnost’ see: Publicity

Great Patriotic War Velikaya otechestvennaya royna, abbr. VOV. War of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany (1941–45) as a decisive part of WW2 (1939–1945). Related topics: Cult of veterans (Dubin 2011: 61f); Reindeer army; ‘Red Trackers’.

Gremikha (since 1981 Ostrovnoy, also formerly Murmansk-140). Naval base and closed town (ZATO) on the Barents Sea Coast. The population of the town had reached 20,000 in Soviet times (1985), but has been rapidly dwindling in post-Soviet years. A program of resettling citizens has been beset by recent financial scandals. Parallelwise, safari tourism has been growing in the vicinity. A small number of Sami people live in the town. In relation to LD reindeer husbandry: for many decades military personnel and other citizens from the settlement have allegedly been poaching on Lovozoero and Krasnoshchel’e herds with impunity, particularly as regards the herd of ‘Tundra’s Brigade No 9. Lit.: Na Pskovshchine 14.10.2013; Uchastilis’ 21.11.2012; KE, Gremikha; Mer Ostrovnogo 28.09.12; Took 2004: 172ff, Yokanga, Holy Cape; Honneland and Jorgensen 1999: 120ff, Gremikha; Muzhikov 1996: 104, Ostrovnoy; Arkhinmy otdel 1995: 170, Gremikha; Babich 1991; Skorve 1991; Voshchinin 1939: 29, Gremikha.


H

Head of Reindeer Husbandry Department Nachal’nik tsekha olenevodstva. (rt) The highest position in the tundra part of collective/state/cooperative farm, ultimate authority in matters of reindeer husbandry management, particularly distribution of whole-eared reindeer. In consequence, the biggest owner of personal (‘private’) reindeer in post-Soviet times, as also of private-in-the-collective (sovkhoist) tundra businesses (ethnic and safari tourism, berry gathering, meat trading).

Herd size Pogolov’e. (rt) Total number of reindeer of collective/state/cooperative farms. Used also to describe the total number of semi-domesticated reindeer in the district or region. Comprises both collective and personal (‘private’) deer. Insiders differentiate between ‘paper deer’ (bhumazhnye oleni) and ‘real deer’ (real’nie oleni). Official statistics
usually reflect ‘paper herd size’ and have to be approached with great caution (as in Vinogradova 2012: 54–56; Khorolya 2012: 98; Karelin 2009; Vserossiyskaya 2006; Jernsletten and Klokov 2002: 34–36; Rybkin 1999). Figures presented in annual reports of the Reindeer Committee (Olenaya komisya), as a controlling organ of Lovozero District Administration, have also to be approached carefully, as the Committee have limited access to the real state of numbers. For critical opinion in respect of the well-established practice of inflating herd counts see especially Bogdanov 2008a. For the practice in respect of obschhiny herd counts i.e. Berdnikov 2010. Rel.: Anderson 2006.

Hotel ‘Vyrma’ The only hotel building in the centre of Lovozero, not in use since the late 1990s. Object of recent controversy between local tourist interests and its current owner - the Norwegian Sami Mission. Lit.: Larsen 30.04.2011; Larsen and Balto 28.04.2011.

Hunting in reindeer herding territories. Hunting activities in such territories follow the general rules for sport (not subsistence) hunting in the Russian Federation. Hunting is mainly of big game: bear and moose, but also of wild reindeer. These last, being morphologically very similar to the semi-domesticated form of the species Rangifer tarandus, have periodically triggered conflicts between hunting authorities, on the one hand, and co-operative farms, on the other. Instances of poaching on either the wild or the semi-domesticated form of the species have been the bone of contention. Related topic: micro-safari tourism. Lit.: For general hunting rules: V Murmanskoj oblasti 29.03.13, 01.03.2011; Uporyadochit’ 1960; For hunting as a local form of land use: Bogdanov 2007: 8–9; Luk’yanchenko 1971: 44–63; Charnoluskiy 1930a: 77–80; Kharuzin 1890: 108–13.

Hyper-extensive reindeer husbandry. (et) Term introduced by Whitaker (1955: 27), comp. Beach (1981: 503, over-extensivity). In Kola reindeer husbandry the method implies all-year round free grazing of herds, reducing or abandoning key operations, particularly much reduced spring calf-marking, and contacting the herd exclusively by occasional round ups, followed by corralling in complex corral enclosures (korali), or simple ones (tandri, tandari). Current Kola hyper-extensivity of reindeer husbandry can be considered an exaggerated return to Sami (pre-Komi) summer free grazing, characterizing so-called ‘traditional’ Sami husbandry. Signs of shifting from intensive Komi/Nentsi methods to hyper-extensivity have been registered as early as the late 1950s, dislodging current popular belief that the practice came with post-Soviet reforms. Lit.: Konstantinov 2010a,b, 2009, Super-extensivity; Kolkhoz “Krasnoshchel’e” 1960; Sorvanov 1958; Extensive reindeer husbandry.

I

‘Il’ich’s lamp’ ‘Lampochka Il’icha. An allegedly popular way of recognition for an electricity-minded state plan. Created in the first years of Soviet power, and proposed by GOELRO ( Gosudarstvennaya komissiya elektrifikacii Rossii, State Committee for the Electrification of Russia) in 1920, it became subsequently known by the acronym. GOELRO was strongly backed by Lenin, whose patronymic Il’ich, as an allegedly ‘fond way’ of peasants
calling him, was often cited in public texts as denoting recognition and love for the leader. The electric bulb, symbolizing electrification of the country, was thus allegedly called ‘Ilich’s lamp’.

“Inomarka” abbr. Inostrannaya marka /foreign brand/. In the local context usually used to differentiate between home and foreign motorized vehicles and engines, like with esp. the Soviet time snowmobile ‘Buran’. Lit.: Konstantinov 2009.

Intensive reindeer husbandry (et) A form of reindeer husbandry practiced by exercising close control over the life-cycle of semi-domesticated reindeer, keeping watch over the herd at all times, migrating with it throughout the year, or keeping them in an advanced domesticated state in a reindeer farm enclosure. To be contrasted with extensive/hyper-extensive forms of husbandry.

Internal poaching (at) Poaching on herds of semi-domesticated reindeer by reindeer herders or other local people by selective hunting (shooting) of animals for subsistence or trade. To this form of appropriation, marking whole-eared deer with own or brigade car-marks can also be attributed, and its role as a crucial component of the private-in-the-collective (sov khoist) socio-economy – strongly emphasized. Poaching in this sense also includes organised or sporadic appropriation of wild reindeer. To be contrasted with external poaching. Cases of internal poaching are, as a rule, not publicly discussed, but have been noted by researchers, including this author, as also by the hunting authorities as part of the wild reindeer controversy. Cases of internal poaching are also noted in the reindeer husbandry part of Northern Norway. Lit.: Norvegiya 29.10.13; Vladimirova 2014; Konstantinov 2010a, b; Bogdanov 2008a; Paine 1999.

Internat see: Boarding School
Ispravitel’no-trudovoy lager’ (ITL) see: Corrective labour camp.
Izvestiya Arkhangelskogo Obshchestva izucheniya Russkogo Severa see: Newsletter of Archangels’k Society for the Study of the Russian North

K

Kandalaksha-Kola Trakt (Kandalakshskiy trakt) A land and water route stretching from Kandalaksha to the town of Kola. The only connection between the White Sea Coast and the Murman Coast, it was used for administrative and trading purposes at least since 16 c. Its use much expanded in 18–19 cc. in connection with Pomor fishing and sea-mammal hunting along the Murman Coast. Sami people from the pogosts along the Trakt provided much needed reindeer-draft power as well as hosting services. The Petrozavodsk-Kola railway (October Railway) was later built along the Trakt. Lit.: Took 2004:159–160; Engelhardt 1899; Ostrovskiy 1899; Rippas 1895; Rae 1881; Nemirovich-Danchenko 1875.
Kanevka, village. One of the three extant tundra villages of LD, surviving administrative liquidation and resettlement. Founded in 1923 by immigrant Komi reindeer herders at the place of a Sami winter settlement (Acheryok). Today of approx. 95 permanent inhabitants, the village belongs to the category of remote villages, being, in fact, the one most difficult to reach (Krasnoschel’e is much closer to Lovozero, Sosnovka is reachable by sea). Traditionally occupied in reindeer husbandry and inland fishing, today a main source of local income comes from micro-safari businesses and seasonal work at exclusive safari-camps. Most inhabitants have residential and storage property in Lovozero. Lit.: KE, Kanevka; Mal’tsev 2011; Konstantinov 2010a; Took 2004: 39ff.


Karnasurt The first of the two mines near the town of Revda. Opened up in 1940 with the labour of repatriated by Finland Russian prisoners-of-war from the Soviet-Finnish War (1939–40). The project was interrupted by the ensuing Great Patriotic War, after its end resumed in 1947. Together with a processing factory it comprised Lovozero Mining-Processing Complex, town-formative enterprise for the town of Revda. Named after Karnasurta (Kil’din Sami: Crow Ridge), an elevation in the northern part of Lovozero Ridge (Lovozerskie tundry). Lit.: KE, Alluyavstroy; Karnasurt; Sevredmet; Nikolaev 2008; Took 2004: 257; Ushakov and Dashchinskiy 1988: 171–2; Voshchinin 1939.


Khozraschet see: Economic self-accounting

‘Kil’din’ The first Sami clan community in MR, founded in March 2002. Led by Elena Yakovleva, the community attempted to revive traditional forms of land use, particularly private reindeer husbandry, but without success. Its activities were suspended in 2011. Lit.: Kalstad 2009: 63–68. Related topics: agglomeration, administrative liquidation, resettlement, Brigade 3.

Kiselev, Aleksey Alekseevich (b.1926) Leading figure of Regional Lore Studies of MR, in a life-long collaboration with I.F. Ushakov. Both are known to have benefitted from privileged access to regional wealth of archives in the climate of the poststalinist, Khrushchev-led ‘thaw’ (ottepel’) in the late 1950s-’60s. His work bears the indelible stamp of Soviet ideological poetics. For all that, it is highly useful for its albeit selective, but meticulously archival-based work. K. is perhaps best known for ‘Soviet Sami’ (co-author T. Kiseleva): a heavily ideologized version of Sami recent history till the first years of restructuring. This thin brochure (first edition 1979; second 1987), contains, nonetheless, a very rich store of

About him: KE, Kiselev.

**Kleino** see: Ear-mark


**Kola Sami Parliament** Kil’din Sami: Kuellnegk nyoark Sam’ Sobbrar; Rus.: Saamskiy parlament Kol’skogo poluostrova. An NGO of the Kola Sami people founded in 2010. Lit.: Yakovleva 11.03.2013; Berg-Nordlie 2012, 2011b; Øverland and Berg-Nordlie 2012:32; Semushin 15.08.2012; Vinogradova 2012:103, Fig.4.1; Henriksen and Rafaelsen 2011; http://saami.forum24.ru

**Kolkhoz** see: Collective farm

‘*Kol’skaya Entsiklopediya’/*Kola Encyclopedia/. A rich source of information on regionally prominent people, events, history (part. on the Great Patriotic War), regional military life, local geography, etc. Published since 2008 (Vol.1 A-Д), in 2009 (Vol.2 E-К). Vol. 3 came out in 2013, but has been available only in electronic form, with a final fourth volume following. Lit.: Segodnya 7.04.2013; http://ke.culture51.ru/

**Koloniya** see: Corrective colony No 23

**Komi** In LD: Descendants of Komi people of the Izhma and Pechora regions of today’s Komi Republic, who had migrated in the mid-1880s to present day LD and had settled there. Own ethnonym Iz’vatus. Referred to also as Izhma Komi (komi izhentsy, izhentsy), older appellations Zyrians, Izhma Zyrians (zyryane, izhenskie zyryane). The main part of the Kola community live in Lovozero, Krasnoshchel’e and Kanevka. Currently around 2,200 people. Traditionally engaged in reindeer husbandry, where they have a leading role, the Komi people are also represented in other tundra-connected occupations (micro-safari tourism) as well as in all urban professions. Since 1992 all Kola Komi have been represented by ‘Iz’vatus’ – a branch organisation (Lovozerskoe otdelenie) of the Association of Izhma Komi, uniting the Izhma Komi diaspora throughout the Russian Federation (created in 1990). Lit.: Pidgaetskaya 2013; KE, Komi-izhentsy, Filipchenko 2011; Konstantinov 2010a, 1997; Fryer 2007; Mankova 2004; Konakov 1993; Kotov 1985; Konakov et al. 1984; Khomich 1977; Fedotov 1956, 1955c; Engelhardt 1899: 91f; Perepiska 1889. Rel.: Vityazeva 1989; Olenevodstvo 1911, 1909; Kertselli 1911, 1910; Belditskiy 1910a, b; Meat harvest 1910.

‘Komified’ Nentsi (et) Descendants of the Nentsi people who had migrated to the Kola Peninsula together with Komi reindeer herding families in the mid-1880s. As in other regions, they are characterized by strong links with the Komi, with well-established integration into the Komi massif. The process is accompanied by virtual loss of native language, and a well-
spread preference to identify as Komi, as is certainly the case in the Kola. According to local statistical bulletins there are about 150 Nentsi today in LD; a considerable number over this may be expected to have been statistically entered as Komi. These longtime Kola settlers are to be distinguished from Nentsi of Archangel'sk Region, referred to locally as 'Nentsi from the other coast' (nentsi s drugogo berega), i.e. from the southern White Sea coast, the 'Arkhangel'sk side'. Traditionally engaged in reindeer husbandry. Lit.: KE, nentsy.

Komitet po vzaimodeystviyu see: Committee for relations

Komsomol (fd) Всесоюзный Ленинский Kommunisticheskii soyuz molodezhi, VLKSM /All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League/. Mass youth organisation of Soviet times, created in 1918 (in what is today MR – in 1920). The League worked under direct supervision by CPSU and was considered to be the 'fighting reserve of the Party' (boevoj rezerv Partii). Members were admitted from the age of 16 with the prospect of entering the Party at a later age. In 1977 Komsomol members were 36 m. citizens of the USSR in the age bracket 16–28 yrs. Lit.: Potemkina 2013; Gubernator 29.10. 2013; Segodnya 29.10.2013; KE, Konferentsi Murmanskoy oblastnoy komsomol'skoy organisatsii; Heveshi 2002: 62, Komsoomolets; Zemtsov 2001: 176–7, Komsomol; BSE III, Vsesoyuzny Leninskiy Kommunisticheskii soyuz molodezhi; BSE II 1951,Vol.9: 330–47. For critical reflection in contemporary fiction see esp.: Polyakov 2004[1985].

Kontora (em, rt) /office/. (ot, fd) Administrativno-upravlencheskiy personal, AUP/Administrative management personnel/. The administrative staff of a collective/Soviet /cooperative farm. Metonymically: the administrative building. In etic use: to distinguish administrative staff of a reindeer husbandry farm, on the one hand, from the actual herders, working in the tundra - the 'brigada' (brigade) part of the collective. The 'kontora-brigada' opposition intersects with the town/tundra divide as realized in personnel distribution of reindeer husbandry farms. For the term and distinctive opposition Habeck (2005).

Kooperatsiya see: Co-op

Kraevedenie see: Murmansk Regional Lore Studies

'Krasniy chum' see: 'Red Tent'.

Krasnoshchel'e The biggest of LD remote villages, centre of the eastern part of LD reindeer husbandry territory (the boundary between these two running along river Rova-Lake Kalmzero-Barents Sea Coast). Current population approx. 500, mostly Komi and 'Komified' Nentsi. Central office (kontora) of cooperative farm 'Olenevod', with branch offices in Kannevkа and Sosnovka. Main traditional occupations are reindeer husbandry and inland fishing. In post-Soviet times employment has been found in consumer goods and tundra produce trading (meat/fish/berries), in parallel with micro-safari tourism; also in seasonal jobs at safari camps. Most inhabitants have residential and storage property in Lovozero, where, as well as to other regional towns the younger part of the population are steadily outmigrating. Related topic: 'Olenevod'. Lit: KE, Krasnoshchel'ë; Tsylev 2013; Artieva 2013, 2011; Filipchenko 2011; Popovich 2011; Konstantinov 2010a, 1997; Fryer 2007; Dushenkovskaya 2005; Manko-

‘Krasnye sledopyty’ see: ‘Red Trackers’


Kruzhok see: Circle

Kuoljok, Kerstin Eidlitz (b.1935). Swedish ethnographer, for many years Associate Professor at Uppsala University’s (Department of Cultural Anthropology). She is known for her work on indigenous numerically-small peoples of the Russian Far North, and of the circumpolar area in general. In ‘The Revolution in the North’ (1985) she describes the Marxist foundation of Soviet policy towards indigenous peoples of the Russian North.

L

Lager’ see: Safari camp

Language functions The uses to which language is put in speech, i.e. to inform, make the Listener/s do something, perform an activity, signal that communication exists, experiment with communicational or artistic qualities of language, etc. Lit.: Östman and Verschueren 2009; Sbisà 2006; Wierzbicka 1991; Lyons 1977: 50f; Scarle 1969; Austin 1962; Jakobson 1960; Bühler 1965[1934]; Malinowski 1930.

‘Lechebno-trudovoy profilaktoriy (LTP) see: Therapeutic-labour preventive clinic


‘Little birthland’ Malaya rodina. In local and regional use: The place from which a person had originally come to MR, where he/she was born and
had spent one’s significant childhood. The second feature is of greater relevance, as one may have been born in one place, but his/her parents may have then moved to another and there one’s significant childhood years would have been spent. These last would stay firmly in memory and thus this second (third, etc.) place would be ‘malaya rodina’ for that person. In a big city the term may thus be connected with the area or neighbourhood of one’s significant childhood. An original migrant’s identity would thus be stretched between the pole of their ‘malaya rodina’ (somewhere ‘in Russia’, Ukraine, Byelorussia, etc.), and the local point, where the person resides and can be identified as a ‘Northerner’. Another term used is ‘historical birthland’ (istoricheskaya rodina).

Lovozero, Luyav’r, Luyav’r syyt (Kil’din Sami: ‘village by the strong lake’, after eponymous lake). Village (by administrative designation) in MR, centre of Lovozero District. Population approx. 2,600, very mixed between Sami, Komi, ‘Komified’ Nentsi and descendants of labour-migrants from all over the former USSR, with a marked presence of Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians. At the same time the greatest number of Kola Sami people (approx. 900) live together in this small town, which gives reason for its promoting a self-image of a ‘Sami capital’. A small part of the population are occupied in reindeer husbandry, the majority – in administrative, social service, urban maintenance, as well as self-employing entrepreneurial jobs, distributed between the two parts of the Lovozero/Revda twin urban complex. Lit.: Likhachev 2013c; KE, Lovozero; KK, Lovozero; Ustav 2006; Muzhikov 1996: 82; Ushakov and Dashchinskiy 1988; Kiselev and Kiseleva 1987; Voshchinin 1939: 58; Khalapsin 1927; www.lovozeroadm.ru

Lovozero District Lovozeriskiy rayon. Territorially the biggest administrative district of MR (53,000 sq.km., 37% of the regional territory). Population 11,800 (2010). Consists of Village Settlement Lovozero (Sel’skoe poselenie Lovozero) and Urban Settlement Revda (Gorodskoe poselenie Revda). Village Settlement Lovozero includes four villages (sela): Lovozero, Krasnoshchel’e, Kanevka, and Sosnovka. Urban Settlement Revda consists of itself: Settlement of Urban Type Revda (poselok gorodskogo type, p.g.t. Revda). The District also includes a number of Military Units (voinskie chasti), which are not part of official statistics, but are administratively included for electoral and other purposes. LD is administratively run by Lovozero District Administration (Administratsiya Lovozereskogo rayona), before 2013: Municipal Formation Lovozero District (Munitsipal’noe obrashchaniye Lovozeriskiy Rayon). The District has an organ of public representation: Lovozero District Council. Financially one of the poorest districts of MR, depending for over 90% of its budget on regional, resp. federal subsidies. Lit.: Likhachev 2013c; KE, Lovozeriskiy rayon; KE, 2008, Vol.1: 17–18, Vvodnyy ocherk: Mestnoe samoupravlenie); Filippov 2000; Ushakov and Dashchinskiy 1988; Kiselev and Kiseleva 1987; www.lovozeroadm.ru

Lovozero District Council Lovozeriskiy rayonnyy sovet. Variants: Lovozeriskiy raysovet; Sovet deputatov Lovozereskogo rayona; Rayonniy sovet deputatov. Organ of public representation of Lovozero District, performing like a dis-


Lovozerskiy GOK see: Lovozero Mining-Processing Complex


M
Malaya rodina see: ‘Little birthland’

Meat traders (pt, l, often pej.): kommersanty /’dealers’/. Local petty entrepreneurs who buy reindeer meat in carcasses (tushi) during tundra corralling sessions for subsequent informal sale in Lovozero, Revda, or to other towns in the region. In many cases meat traders are also owners of personal (’private’) reindeer and are closely connected by family, kin, or friendship links with herdsmen. The practice of informal meat trading is often involving taking alcohol to tundra camps for ’lubricating’ advantageous deals (’spirit-sleds’), and slaughtering on the spot without veterinary control. For all these reasons the practice of meat trading from corrals has been banned for a long time, but is seemingly ineradicable, being an essential part of the local private-in-the-collective (sovkhoist) socio-economic system. Rel.: Officially informal local economies.

Micro-safari tourism (at) Informal tourist operations, usually over an extended weekend, organised by local tundra-connected people for urban clients from the regional towns, often from St.Petersburg or Moscow, in some cases from nearby Fennoscandic countries. These are either hunting or inland fishing forrays, typically for bear, moose, and wild reindeer, or salmon or trout (kumzhva) in the non-snow months. Semi-domesticated
reindeer herds would at times be poached on, mostly by the safari operators themselves, fuelling thus the *wild deer* conflict between cooperative farms and hunting authorities. Recent bans (since 2009) on big-game hunting in LD have moved a part of micro-safari operations to the Ter’ District in the south, where operators from the *remote villages* have a natural advantage. Lit.: Vladimirova 2014; Konstantinov 2010a. Rel.: *Officially informal local economies*.

**Military Communism** *Voenniy komunizm*. A period of violent rule and excesses of terror by Bolsheviks, having come to power by the coup of October 1917 (later termed Great October Socialist Revolution by Soviet propaganda). An economic policy stressing expropriation from the wealthier part of the population and enforced requisition of food stuffs from the villagers brought the economy of the country to ruins. The period coincided with the Civil War (1918–1922), and was terminated by a sharp turn to a new economic course in 1922 – the *New Economic Policy* (NEP) period, lasting till 1928. Lit.: Demidova 2013; Heveshi 2002:26, *Voenniy komunizm*; SES 1987: 236; BSE II 1951, Vol.8: 484–86.

**Military-Industrial Complex** *Voennno-promishlenny kompleks*, VPK. All industrial facilities and research institutes who work for sustaining and increasing the military capacity of the country. In MR these are mainly industrial facilities servicing the Northern Fleet, Strategic Aviation, Border Troops and other military formations and units. Lit.: Jørgensen 2001: 187–210; Hønneland and Jørgensen 1999: 77–91; Nilsen and Bøhmer 1994; Skorve 1991.

**Militia Detachment for Special Purposes** (fd) *Otriad militsii osobogo naznacheniya*, abbr. OMON. Created in 1993, the MR detachment has been used in operations in the Caucasus, in containing public demonstrations in big cities (Moscow, St.Petersburg), as well as in local activities, designated as anti-terrorist ones. Soldiers from this force have been occasionally hired by administrations of reindeer husbandry cooperatives for containing *poaching* on their reindeer herds, but with inconclusive results. More effectively used for patrolling territories of *safari camps*. Lit.: Byshego 11.06.2013; KE 2008: 190, *Organy vnutrennykh del*.

**Military units** (pt, l) *Voinskie chasti*. A number of military units, situated in LD. They are partly integrated into the district supply and maintenance structure, also in electoral and census activities. Military units offer some employment opportunities to the district civilian population, social contacts, forming part of the local marriage pool. For reindeer husbandry are esp. important cash or barter deals for obtaining *ATVs*, spare parts for such, cheap diesel fuel and various tundra related equipment. Informal deals with the military constitute an important part of the local tundra-connected economy. Lit.: Shirmer 2006; Konstantinov 2005a: 393f; Honneland and Jorgensen 1999. Rel.: *Officially informal local economies*.

**Murmansk Economic Forum** *Murmanskiy Ekonomicheskiy Forum*. Two events (Oct. 2009, Oct. 2010), organised during the Governorship of Dmitriy Dmitrienko (March 2009–April 2012), inviting big Russian and international companies with interests of investing in the region (often imagined). A hopeful background to the events was an expected begin-

**Murmansk Experimental Reindeer Husbandry Station** Murmanskaya Opytnaya Olenevodcheskaya Stantsiya, MOOS; (fd) Murmanskaya gossudarstvennaya sel'skokhozyastvennaya opytnaya stantsiya Rossiyskoy akademii sel'skokhozyastvennykh nauk /Murmansk State Agricultural Experimental Station of the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences/. An applied research station, created in 1929s to assist regional reindeer husbandry. At first at the village of Oksino near Krasnoshchel’e (Oksino was later administratively liquidated in 1962). After numerous changes of names and sites, finally established in the settlement of Molochnoe near Murmansk. In 1970 an autonomous experimental and production unit was created as a branch enterprise, registered as OPKh ‘Voskhod’/Experimental and productive farm ‘Advance’/. The latter declared bankruptcy in 2000, leaving after itself a new station – OPKh ‘Ras-svet’ /‘Sunrise’/, which was, however, unrelated to reindeer husbandry. With a part of the former MOOS herd (once up to 7,000 head) private reindeer husbandry was begun on Rybachiy Peninsula. Lit.: KE, Murmanskaya gossudarstvennaya sel'skokhozyastvennaya opytnaya stantsiya; Rybkin 1999: 19; Gorter-Grønvik 1995; Golovin and Drury 1928; Kertselli 1923: 100; 1921.

*MOOS* see: Murmansk Experimental Reindeer Husbandry Station

*Murmanskaya Oblast*’ see: Murmansk Region/Kola Peninsula

*Murmanskoe obshchestvo kraevedeniya* see: Murmansk Regional Lore Society

**Murmansk Region/ Kola Peninsula. Reference books and other sources:**


**Murmansk Regional Lore Society** Otschestvo izucheniya Murmanskogo kraya/Murmanskoe otschestvo kraevedeniya. The idea of creating a regional lore society was promoted as early as 1923, by V.K. Alymov. It was realized in 1926, when a learned society was created for carrying out regional lore studies of MR (at the time: Murmansk Okrug, see Administrative designations). First leaders were regional lore scholars G.A.Klyuge and V.K. Alymov. Suspended activities in 1931, when many members left the region. Lit.: KE, Otschestvo izucheniya Murmanskogo kraya, Razvitiyu kraevedeniya 17.10.2013; Murmanskoe otschestvo kraevedeniya 1928, 1927.


N

**National** (adj.) Natsional’nyy. The word is generally synonymous with indigenous, as in *Natsional’nyy Kul’turnyy Tsentr /National Cultural Centre/, Natsional’nyy Severnyy Litsiy /National Northern Lyceum/, Natsional’naya shkola-internat /National Boarding School/, natsional’nyy rayon, etc. At the same time the term is inclusive not only of the local indigenous Sami people, but also of all other para-indigenous regional communities (Komi, ‘Komified’ Nentsi, Nentsi), defined by law as ‘etnicheskie obshchnosti’ /ethnic communities/, as in Zakon 2003, Article 2.

**National Cultural Centre**, fd: Municipal Budget Cultural Agency ‘Lovozero District Cultural Centre’ (*Munitsipal’noe byudezhetnoe uchrezhdenie kul’tury “Lovozerskiy rayonnyy natsionalnyy kul’turnyy tsentr”), abbr. MBUK “LRNKTs”, or just NKTs. The principal cultural institution in LD, situated in the village of Lovozero. Its main mission is stated as aiming to support the national and cultural development of the peoples of the Russian Federation, carrying out activities in the sphere of international relations, creating conditions for the development of local traditional folk art, creating conditions for developing tourism, etc.’

http://lovozerocentre.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=60&Itemid=57

‘National in form, socialist in content’ Identity formula, describing Soviet people as ‘national in form’ while ‘socialist in content’. ‘National’, in this particular case, includes all nationalities of the former USSR, including that of the titular nationality: the Russians. ‘Form’ alludes to folkloric features, often perceived as exotic expressions of peoplehood (‘national’ costumes, dances, traditions). In northern subarctic contexts ‘national’ would approximate in meaning that of the Imperial Russian now archaic designation ‘other tribes’ (inorodtsy), i.e. the indigenous peoples of the North, as well as the larger northern peoples. The application to the Sami case would thus be one in which people were ‘Sami in form’ while their ‘socialist content’ would be shaped along Soviet ideological, ultimately
Russian lines. Currently a version of this formula has reappeared in public talk in the following way: ‘We Sami are all rossiyane’, which may be seen as a paraphrase of the Soviet identity formula: i.e. ‘Sami in form, rossiyane in content’). The terms russkie and rossiyane continue to be variously treated in the relevant Russian literature. While they are supposed to differ as belonging to a specific ethnicity (russkie) vs. citizenship of the Russian Federation (rossiyane) (Yazykova 2011: 631), there are authors who treat them as interchangeable synonyms (Batalov 2011: 479, Note 2). Rel.: Ssorin-Chaikov 2003; Slezkine 1994a, b.


**Newsletter of Archangelsk’k Society for the Study of the Russian North** *Izvestiya Arkhangelskogo Obshchestva izucheniya Ruskogo Severa*. Ethnographic journal published twice a month from 1909 till 1919, containing academic reports, as well as stories and notes by traders, amateur ethnographers, priests, etc. Lit. (selected publications, related to topics discussed in the main text): Vize 1912a, b; *Olenevodstvo* 1911; Belditskiy 1910a, b; Fedorov 1910, *Arteli*; Kertselli 1910; Meat harvest 1910; *K voprosu* 1909; Meletiev 1910a, b; *Olenevodstvo* 1909; *Iz oblasti* 1909. See also: http://www.emaproxect.com/north_article.html?id=2363; http://www.snor.ru/?an=sc_12
NorrFrys ‘Polarica’ (pronounced: nur-fryus). Major Swedish slaughtering and reindeer meat-processing business, based at Haparanda. In 1992 established a daughter slaughtering/processing point in Lovozero, under the leadership of Birger Wallström. The facility soon became the major wholesale buyer of Kola reindeer-meat, later also of wild tundra berries. In 2010 the facility was bought by Murmansk businessman Andrey Reizvikh, who, together with former SKhPK ‘Tundra’ chairperson V.F. Syrota, subsequently assumed leadership of SKhPK ‘Olenevod’ (Krasnoshebele). Lit.: Konstantinov 2005a:405f; Beach 1998. Rel.: Mi-khaylova 2006.

Northern bonuses (ot, fd): L’goty dlya rabotnikov Kraynego Severa /Bonuses for those working in the Far North/; also: polyarnye nadbavki /polar bonuses/; (pt): polyarki. Bonuses increasing salaries of people employed in regions legally recognised as the Far North of the Russian Federation (Krayny Sever). A basic one is the regional coefficient (rayonnyy koefitsient), together with other bonuses increasing monthly salaries to about twice the size of what would be received in other regions. In reindeer husbandry there used to be also a tundra bonus (tundrovye nadbavki), swelling salaries in reindeer husbandry to levels among the highest in Soviet times. Since the early 1990s northern bonuses have greatly lost their economic significance, especially in non-state enterprises, due to the fact that their size was placed in the hands of employers according to their views on what they could afford to give. Discussions of the issue are closely connected with the problem of outmigration from the region and its steadily diminishing population. The issues has been again raised since 2011 in connection with the planned inclusion of MR in the newly created structure Arctic Zone (Arkticheskaya zona). Lit.: V Murmanskoy oblasti 18.02.2014; KE, L’goty dlya rabotnikov Kraynego Severa; V Arkticheskuyu zonn 04.09.2013; Konstantinov 2005a: 139–43; Ivanov 2002, 1999: 281–321; BSE III, Rayonnyy koefitsient.

Northerner Severyanin. lit: one living or born in the North. The term, as used in regional lore and related literature, associates principally with newcomers to the North, i.e. labour migrants of various generations, as well as their descendents born in the North, who have settled in the Region. The term, which has the status of a sub-ethnonym, thus separates newcomers from the local indigenous or para-indigenous population. Northerners are city dwellers with two ‘birthlands’ (rodini): the North and the town where they live and may have built themselves as active participants in the programme of Developing the North, on the one hand, and their original birthplace in the South, from which they have originally arrived – on the other. The latter would be referred to as ‘malaya rodina’ (‘little birthland’), or ‘istoricheskaya rodina’ (‘historical birthland’). Lit.: Razumova 2008; Petrov and Razumova 2006; Kiselev 2002; Evdokimov 1928, 1925.

Norwegian Sami Mission in Lovozero (Norges samemisjon). A Norwegian religious charity for the Sami people. Establishing a branch in Lovozero in the 1990s, with Sigfried Giskegerde as its leader, it used to have a strong presence in the village, conducting educational and anti-alcoholic
work, as also providing a soup-kitchen for the needy. Local representative was Lidiya Maleeva. Acquired the only local hotel ‘Vyrma’. By 2012, however, the Mission had virtually terminated its activities in LD. Lit.: Larsen 30.04.2011, Larsen and Balto 28.04.201; Konstantinov and Vladimirova 2008a. See also: http://www.samemisjonen.no

O

*Obschestvo izucheniya Murmanskogo kraya* see: Murmansk Regional Lore Society

*Obshchina* see: Clan community


**Officially informal local economies** (at) There is a large part of LD small-to-middle range businesses which are officially known to be performing informally, i.e. without paying any taxes or formalizing deals. They are, nonetheless condoned by the authorities, in some cases administrative officials themselves run informal businesses on the side. To officially informal local economies belong the traditional ones of selling reindeer meat, fish, and related products; as well as micro-safari, and other tourist businesses (*etnoturism, esoteric turism, extreme turism*), running shops and trading in the remote villages, bartering deals with military units, arranging helicopter transport services, etc. It is not clear whether businesses run by obshchiny do not belong here, as obshchiny are supposed to be organised for sustaining and developing traditional forms of land use for subsistence and family maintenance purposes – not for strictly business ends as is the practice by and large, particularly in the lines of *etnoturism* and utilization of fishing quotas.

‘*Ogonek’* Popular Soviet journal for the general reading public. Published since 1899, later as a Soviet propaganda journal – since 1923. *BS II* defined the latter mission in the following way: ‘O. writes about life in the Soviet Union, acquaints the reader with the achivements of Soviet culture, art; devotes its attention to sport and humour’. (1954, Vol. 30:505) During Gorbachevian restructuring the journal became one of the most critical media sources in respect of Brezhnev’s ‘stagnation time’ and a revelatory tribune, exposing various Soviet abuses to person and nature, following the spirit of publicity. The journal had a wide circulation beyond the Soviet Union, particularly in its East/Central European allies and may be said to have bolstered dissident movements in such countries. The
journal is still published, albeit with much reduced circulation and as an edition of the press group ‘Kommersant’. Lit.: Ries 1997; Boym 1994: 91ff; ogoniok.com; kommersant.ru

**Oktyabryata** ‘Children of the October Revolution (1917)’, sg. Oktyabrenok. Primary school children of 7–9 yrs., members of a children’s organisation for communist upbringing O. First step of such education, leading later to pionery /Pioneers/ (10–16 yrs.), komsomol’tsi /Komsomol members/, from 16 on, ultimately: kommunisty /members of CPSU/. Their motto used to be: Tol’ko tekh, kto lyubit trud, oktyabryatami zovut /Only those who love work, are called Children of October/. Lit.: Heveshi 2002, Oktyabrenok; BSE III, Oktyabryata.

Oktyabrowskaya doroga see: October Railway


Olenevodstvo see: Reindeer Husbandry

OMON see: Militia Detachment for Special Purposes

OOSMO see: Public organisation of the Sami of MR.

‘Osvoenie Severa’ see: ‘Developing the North’

Otechestvennaya voyna see: Great Patriotic War

P

‘Paper deer’ (et, l, joc.): Bumazhnye oleni. Number of collective reindeer, presented in brigade and cooperative head count lists, but not corresponding to really existing animals. Lit.: Bogdanov 2008a. Rel. topics: Ear-mark; Ear-marking. In relation to reindeer in obshchiny: Berdnikov 2010; Chigar affair.

Para-indigenous regional communities. (at) People living in MR, specifically in Lovozero and Ter’ Districts, who share place of habitation and lifestyle with the regional indigenous people – the Sami. (ot): Etnicheskie obshchnosti /ethnic communities/; Etnicheskie gruppy /ethnic groups/; Etnograficheskie gruppy /ethnographic groups/; Istoriko-ethnograficheskie gruppy /historical-ethnographic groups/; Sub-etsnosy /sub-ethnoses/. These are, in the main, the Komi people, Komified ‘Nentsi, and Pomory of the Ter’ Coast. Lit.: Zakon 2003, Article 2.
Peasant emancipation (1860-'70s) *Otmena krestostnogo prava*. On 19 Feb, 1861 Alexander II signed a ‘Manifest for abolition of serfdom’ and ‘Regulations for peasants, liberated from serfdom’. The essence of the ensuing reforms was that henceforth peasants could buy the land they had been working on as serfs of landlords (*pomeshchiki*). By the beginning of the 1880s the overwhelming part of former serfs had become landowners. The reforms did not directly affect the situation on the Kola Peninsula as serfdom had not existed there, ‘peasants’, i.e. the *Sami* people, as well as the *Pomor* Russians, and other local tundra or sea users, having the status of ‘state peasants’ not in bondage to landlords as in the central and southern regions. The reforms had indirect effects, as many of the emancipated peasants from the rest of the country took part in the government-encouraged *Colonisation of the Murman Coast*. Lit.: KE 2008:85; Ushakov 1998: 273–281. Rel.: Prikolsonskiy 1884; Zhuravskiy 1870:73f.

Pedestitut see: Murmansk State Humanities University

‘Pentium’ (joc. among reindeer-herders) Plywood board on which reindeer counted during processing of herds in *corral* enclosures are entered against the names of owners, as well as their sex/age characteristics. In the case of *collective* deer they would be entered against the names of *brigades* (i.e. *vazhenka* /female deer of reproductive age/ - Brigade 1, etc); *personal* (*‘private’*) deer are entered against the names of their owners. Lit.: Vladimirova 2009, 2006: 296. Rel. topics: Controller; Arbitrary ear-marking.

Perestrojka see: Restructuring

Pereval-baza; (pt, rt): Stop-over station in reindeer husbandry. Usually a log cabin with basic facilities for sleeping and cooking, used by herders when travelling from town/village to *brigade base*. Among more prominent ones in LD’s grazing range are *Yashka Domik* /Yashka’s Hut/ on the trek from Lovozero to Brigades 2, 1, 8. 9 (*Right side* ‘Tundra’), *Sotiy* /The Hundredth* (kilometer)/ on the trek from Lovozero to Krasnoschel’e, etc.

Personal auxiliary farm (ot): *Lichnoe podsobnoe khozyaystvo*. Personal farm situated on *priusadbenyy uchastok* /farm-house adjoining plot/; *kolkhozniy dvor* /kolkhoz member’s farm/ and worked by the personal labour of the use-holder and his/her family (i.e. without hiring paid labour). The personal farm entailed use of individual land-holding in the USSR, given by the state for free and eternal use to kolkhoz/sovkhoz members or urban dwellers, of up to 0.5 hectares in size. Users had the right to sell surplus produce at ‘free’ or ‘kolkhoz’ markets, where prices were not regulated by the state. Lit.: BSE III, *Lichnoe podsobnoe khozyaystvo*; *priusadbennyy uchastok*; BSE II 1950, Vol. 3: 124–28, *Artel’ sel’skogo khoziaistvennyaya*.

Personal (*‘private’*) ear-mark (rt): *Lichnoe (chastnoe) kleymo/ushepyatno*. Mark cut on the ears of a reindeer, denoting personal (*‘private’*) ownership. See: *Ear-mark; Ear-marking; Personal (*‘private’*) reindeer.

Personal (*‘private’*) reindeer (rt): *Lichnie (chastnuye) oleni*. In Kiselev and Kiseleva *‘individual’nie oleni’/individual reindeer/(1987:134). That part of the herd of the reindeer husbandry farm which is allotted for personal use of employees (herders, as well as other farm employees). The right of personal use can be inherited; such deer can be bought, sold, or given away
as presents. The category thus functions as private ownership, a fact reflected in local speech: personal reindeer (lichnie oleni) are called ‘private’ (chastnye). In Soviet times the upper limit for use-rights to personal deer had gradually increased from 30 head to 50 head. Since 1992 the upper limit has been abandoned. State **reindeer subsidies** are given for deer, officially registered at corral sessions. Such counts establish the overall herd size (collective + personal deer), with subsidies being dispensed to cooperative farm managements and placed within their competence. Lit.: Akt 2013; Rasporyazhenie 2013; Akt 2012; Prakhova 14.02.2012; Grechina 2004; Volkov 1996: 127; Kuznetsova 1992; Smalyarchuk 1989; Kiselev and Kiseleva 1987: 134, individual'nye oleni; Bunakov 1934: 126. Rel.: Ostrovityanov et al. 1954: 360.

**Peteushnik** (pt, rt) From PTU, abbr. of Professional'no-tekhnicheskoe uchilishte /Vocational Secondary School/, a student from such a school. In Lovozero this is currently the National Northern Lyceum. Students of the school who have been trained for working in reindeer husbandry get appointed to reindeer husbandry **brigades** after graduation. They begin work as apprentices (ucheniki), usually called peteushniki. Lit.: Heveshi 2002: 108, Peteushnik; Konstantinov 2005a: 139–43.

**Phatic function** of language. When language is used in this way, its function is to signal the existence of a channel of communication and the sharing of the same code, rather than to ask for information. Lit.: Jakobson 1960; Malinowski 1930. Rel.: Bühler 1965[1934].

**Pioneers** Pionery. Members of the children’s All-Union Communist Leninist Organisation (Vsesoyuznaya pionerskaya organizatsiya imeni V.I.Lenina). Created in 1922 the organisation’s mission was to educate children in the values of communism. Children were recruited between ages 10 and 16, i.e. after passing through the stage of Oktyabr'yata and before becoming Komsomol members. Pioneers wore red kerchiefs (krasnye galstuki) around their necks, and peaked caps. Their motto, reflecting a fighting spirit for the defence of communism and country was ‘Always ready!’ (Vsegda gотоv!). Lit.: Heveshi 2002: 101, Pioner; BSE III, Vsesoyuznaya pionerskaya organizatsiya.

‘**Piras**’ (Kil’din Sami: family) (fd): Nekommercheskaya organizatsiya Rodovaya obshchina korennoy malochislennogo naroda saami “Rodovaya obshchina – Piras” /Non-commercial organisation ‘Clan community of the indigenous, numerically small people Sami “Clan community - Piras”’. One of the earliest Sami clan communities in MR, founded in 2002 with the decisive support of Danish NGO Infonor (www.infonor.dk). Its projected attempts to develop **private reindeer husbandry** (as different from private-in-the-collective one) are locally considered to have been inconclusive (data by 2013). Lit.: Gerasimova 04.09.2013; Obshchiny 2012; Oreskov 21.05.2012[2006]; Kalstad 2009: 68; Vladimirova 2006:359–389, ‘Kedd’k’.

**Poaching** Brakonyerstvo. In local usage mainly in reference to poaching on semi-domesticated reindeer herds, i.e. those of ’Tundra’ and ’Olenevod’, less often in reference to inland fishing. Poachers (brakonieri, breki) are accused by administrations of reindeer husbandry farms of being the single
cause for the steady diminishing of herd numbers in post-Soviet times. The blame is thus put exclusively on poachers from the urban part of the region, as well as from closed towns and military bases, particularly those of Gremikha and 'Tsar' Gorodok'. This type of poaching by civilian or military outsiders may be called external poaching as different from internal poaching, i.e. one practiced by herders and related local people, micro-safari operators, meat traders, etc. In official and western discourse LD poaching is discussed mainly as external poaching. Lit.: Staalesen 27.03.2013; Uchastilis' 21.11.2012; Popovich 1999; Okhranyat' 1960; Kertselli 1923: 90. Related topics: OMON; Reindeer Police; Wild reindeer.

Poetic function of language. That use of language when the speaker is employing imaginatively or experimentally its qualities of a medium of communication. Lit.: Jakobson 1960; Language functions.

Pogolov'e see: Herd size
Polyarki see: Northern bonuses


‘Pravda’ /Truth/. Daily newspaper, organ of the Central Committee of CPSU, published since pre-Soviet times (1912). The most influential and authoritative newspaper of the Soviet period in which pronouncements from the top of political power would be related to all subsequent levels of society. Lit.: BSE III, ‘Pravda’-gazeta; BSE II 1955, Vol. 34: 339–45.

Priests among the Sami Priests of the Russian Orthodox Church, ministering in Sami parishes during the latter half of 19th c./beginning of 20th, known for their dedicated work among the Kola Sami. Of special prominence are Fathers Terentiev, Meletiev, Shchekoldin. Lit.: KE; Bodrova 2013:276f; Luchshiy uchenyy 15.03.2013; Tret’yakova 2008a; Terentiev 2008a, b; Bol’shakov 2005: 39–43; Meletiev 1910a,b.

‘Private-in-the-collective’ reindeer. (at) Semi-domesticated reindeer known as personal reindeer (lichnye oleni) of employees in reindeer husbandry co-
operatives, pensioned off employees, or their heirs. In popular local usage: ‘private’ reindeer (‘chastnye’ oleni). PR migrate mixed with collective reindeer, and get contacted principally at corralling sessions among the mass of the rest. A limited number of draft-reindeer used by obshchiny in ethnotourism are of this type. The term distinguishes this sovkhoist category of ownership from ‘truly’ private reindeer, i.e. reindeer that are not kept mixed with the cooperative ones, and are grazed and controlled by their owners. Lit.: Konstantinov 2010b, 2007, 2005b, 2004, 2002, 2000; Konstantinov and Vladimirova 2006a, b. Related topic: Personal auxiliary farm.

‘Puaz’ (Kildin Sami: reindeer) (fd) Rodovaya obshchina korennoy malochislen- 
nogo naroda saami ‘Rodovaya obshchina-Puaz’ /Clan community of the indigenous, numerically small people Sami ‘Clan community-Puaz’/. Founded in 2008 for developing private reindeer husbandry and related tundra-based activities. Well-represented in governmental obshchiny structures, part. the Council of representatives, whose leader is a family and obshchina member. Lit.: Utverzhden 20.05.2013; Dedyukh 03.09.2012.


R

RAIPON affair. Activities of the Association of indigenous, numerically small peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation, abbr. RAIPON (Assotsiatsiya korennykh malochislennykh narodov Severa, Sibiri i Dal’nego Vostoka Rossiskoy Federatsii), were suspended by the Russian Ministry of Justice in November 2012 for a period of six months for alleged legal breaches. Activities have been allowed to be resumed as of April 2013. Commentators saw in the act an overall attack against indigenous organisations and related it to the Pomor controversy and the Berezhkov affair. The generally nationalistic and imperially conservative tone of some publications gave abundant grounds for such an opinion, see esp. the extensive body of texts by Dmitriy Semushin, regularly appearing in Regnum.ru. A good illustration of their tone, reminiscent of the anti-western satirical pamphlets and cartoons of Soviet times on the pages of the ‘Krokodil’ journal, is a recent invective, ridiculing Norwegian views of the Pomor controversy (Semushin 09.12.2012; 06.10.2011). A comparison between the balanced and well-meaning tone of Schwenke Fors’s article on Moseev’s case (22.11.2012), and Semushin’s aggressive satire, is illustrative of the dialogic incongruity, increasingly characterising attitudes to R., as well as it regards the general cross-border discursive scene. Lit.: Novym prezidentom 01.04.2013; Staalesen 15.03.2013; Berezhkov 2012; IWGIA 27.11.12; Ministry of Justice 09.11.2012; Minyust 19.11.2012. Rel. topic: Foreign agents.
'Real deer' (em, l, rt) Real'nie oleni. Referring to actual size of brigade or cooperative reindeer herds, as different from one based on 'paper deer' (bumazhnye oleni). The figure of 'real deer' may often be as much as half that of 'paper deer'.

'Red Tent' Rus./Nenets: 'Krasniy chum'. Tent (Nenets: chum) in which campaigning, propaganda and cultural work used to be conducted in the 1930s–60s. In the '70-'80s such activities would habitually take place in the common room of a reindeer herding base. Metonymically: members of mobile campaigning teams (agitbrigady). Lit.: Vozrozhdenie 2002; Kelyevaeva 1979; Zhivoe slovo 1962; Rabotnikov 1961; Sokolov 1958.

'Red Trackers' 'Krasnye sledopyty'. A circle of primary school students at Lovozero Boarding School organised and led by L.D. Antonova. The 'Red Trackers' traced veterans of the 1917 October Revolution, the Civil War (1918–1921), and the Great Patriotic War, or their relatives. The children corresponded with such people, sending greeting cards and letters on national holidays. Lit.: Antonova’s Archive 1971-2005; Kachanova 1985.


Reindeer Committee (rt) Olennaya komissiya; (fd) Komissiya po uchetu domashnikh severnykh oleney, vypasaemykh na territorii, podvodomstvennoy munitsipal’nomu obrazovaniyu sel’skoe poselenie Lovozero, Lovozerskogo rayona /Committee for registering the number of domesticated reindeer, grazed on the territory managed by Municipal Formation Village Settlement Lovozero of Lovozero District/. The Committee includes representatives of Lovozero Village Administration, managers of the reindeer-husbandry cooperatives, representatives of Sami NGOs, veteran specialists in reindeer-husbandry, deputies of the Council of Deputies of Village Settlement Lovozero, altogether 5 members. Some of them would be present at (some) corralling sessions, endorsing figures given to them by collective and private-in-the collective reindeer controllers, who, in their turn, get these figures from leaders of the tundra part of cooperatives. Those last conduct the corralling sessions and are the only ones in actual control of figures. Lit.: Akt 2013; Rasporyazhenie 2013; Akt 2012; Grechina 2004. Rel. topic: Arbitrary ear-marking.

1923, 1919; *Olenevodstvo* 1911, 1909; Meat harvest 1910; Mukhin 1910; *K voprosu* 1909; *Iz oblasti* 1909.

**Reindeer husbandry on Rybachiy Peninsula** In Soviet times *Murmansk Experimental Reindeer Husbandry Station* (MOOS) used grazing land on Rybachiy as summer pastures. In the early 1990s former Vice-Director of MOOS, M.E. Mkrtchyan set up a Reindeer Husbandry Farm (*olenevodcheskeo fermerskoe khozyaystvo*) on the Peninsula, but later outside interests, allegedly of Moscow-based business people, have been reported by insiders (as well as by Mkrtchyan himself) to have taken over the farm. Reindeer herders from Lovozero are hired to take care of it, but report a very poor state of management. The herd is reported to graze approx. 300 (according to some 500) head of reindeer. Lit.: KE, Rybachiy; Rybkin 1999: 19, *OPH “Voshad”*; Gorter-Grønvik 1995. Rel.: Took 2004, *Rybachy Peninsula*; Rybachiy 1876.

**Reindeer-husbandry part** of the Kola Peninsula. At present this is identical with the territory of Lovozero District. The grazing range stretches east of the *October Railway* and the motorway running parallel to it, ending at the coast of the Barents Sea and the easternmost part of the White Sea. The range is divided between grazing territories belonging to Lovozero’s ‘*Tundra*’ to the north, and Krasnoshchel’e’s ‘*Olenevod*’ to the south. From there on each *cooperative* has subdivided its range into *brigade territories*, with parts of the range subletted to *clan communities* (*obshchiny*). At present a total herd of *collective* plus *personal/private reindeer* of officially 50,000 head (in reality – approx. half that) is taken care of by 15 herding teams of both cooperatives. Lit.: KK; Robinson and Kassam 2000, *Lovozero map*; Rybkin 1999; Rasmussen 1995; *Atlas 1971, Map: Oleni pasbishcha [map] 1962*.

**Reindeer Police** *Olennaya politsiya*. At present this is hardly more than periodically announced wishes for creating a special police force to contain *poaching* on semi-domesticated reindeer in the *reindeer-husbandry part* of the Kola Peninsula, similar to units in neighbouring Fennoscandic countries, particularly in Norway. Hitherto there is occasional hiring of soldiers from the *Militia Detachment for Special Purposes* (OMON) for guarding the herds. Lit.: *V Murmanske* 29.03.13; Staalesen 27.03.2013; Artieva 2011.

**Reindeer subsidies** (pt, rt) *subsidii*. Support by the state for developing regional reindeer husbandry. Subsidies are annually given per head of reindeer that have been registered at corralling sessions and the number endorsed by the *Reindeer Committee*. For 2013 the sum has been around 400 roubles (EUR 10) per head/year. Lit.: Murmanskoy oblasti 7.04.2009.

**Remote villages** in L.D. *Otdalennye poselki*; (pt) *Otdalenka*. The three tundra villages which have survived *administrative liquidation* of the 1950s–‘70s: Krasnoshchel’e, Kanevka, and Sosnovka. Administratively they are managed by Village of Lovozero Administration. The villages are situated at 150, 250, and 300 km. respectively, to the south-east of the district centre Lovozero (where all hard surface roads end). Transport to the villages is by helicopter from Lovozero, relative to weather conditions,
flights being subsidized by the municipal budget. During snow-surface months transport is mainly by snowmobile, with major supplies being transported on freight-sleds pulled by tractors. The villages are not connected to the regional electric power grid, so substantial quantities of diesel fuel have to be transported for running electric generators (done by heavy \textit{ATVs} along the shorter track to the \textit{October Railway}). Telephone communications since 2009 are by cell-phone, there is also some degree of internet provision. Sosnovka is connected to Murmansk and the Archangelsk Coast by sea, which diminishes its problems of isolation somewhat. In this respect Kanevka is the most isolated, being almost equally remote from Lovozero, the sea, and the railway. The three villages experience serious social service problems, particularly as regards medical help. There are constant rumours that the villages shall be eventually administratively liquidated, so most people have flats in Lovozero or other places.

\textbf{Reports and announcements of the Murmansk Society for Regional Studies} \textit{Doklady i soobshcheniya Murmanskogo obschestva kraevedeniya}. Two volumes of reports, published in 1926 and 1927, on various topics concerning social and economic life of MR (at the time: \textit{Murmanskaya Guberniya}). Prominent among them are reports by V.K. Alymov on Sami life and Sami traditional forms of land use.

\textbf{Representativeness of Sami ethnopolitical organisations.} A topic in the specialized literature, reflecting wide-spread local views that representation of community interests by existing Sami ethnopolitical organisations is problematic. The issue was first raised by Indra Øverland in his dissertation of 1999, later also discussed by a number of scholars with long field-based experience in LD, as well as local Sami authors. Lit.: Scheller 2013, 2010; Scheller et al. 2013; Berg-Nordlie 2012, 2011a, b; Øverland and Berg-Nordlie 2012; Vladimirova 2012, 2011, 2009, 2006; Bol’shakova 2005: 218–19; Konstantinov 2005a; Øverland 1999.

\textbf{Re-registration} Pereregistratsiya. A process of administrative change of status of Soviet-time agricultural farms (collective and Soviet). Initiated in 1992 by Presidential decree, the process presupposed restructuring from state enterprises to private cooperatives. In terms of local administrative management the change was little more than an act of renaming: from collective farms (kolkhozi) and Soviet farms (sovkhzozi) to cooperatives (TOO, SKhPK, etc.). A more substantial change was that the state withdrew from planning and realization of agricultural produce (including that of reindeer husbandry), reducing its role to one of subsidizing and exercising a degree of control (reindeer subsidies; Reindeer Committee). Lit.: Nikulin 2005; Mankova 2004; \textit{Otkrytoe pis’mo} 2003; Bogolyubov and Minina 2000:12; Konstantinov 1997; Kuznetsova 1992; Popov and Shmelev 1992: 14.

\textbf{Resettlement} Pereselenie. In the local context: resettling the population of Sami villages to new locations in the 1930s and in 1950–60s, in the latter period concentrating former tundra village inhabitants in the district centre Lovozero and the biggest of the remote villages – Krasnoshchel’e. Resettling was a consequence of the sedentarisation policy of the Soviet
state, the strategic militarisation of the region in after WW2 years, and industrialisation. The process was closely connected with that of agglomeration and administrative liquidation of tundra villages.

Restructuring, also reconstruction (perestroika). Principal ideological trope of reforms introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev, together with publicity (glaonsost*). It gave name to the whole period of Gorbachevian reforms (1985–1989), leading up to the disbanding of the Union. Lit.: Dubin 2011: 70f; Yasin 2002; Sogrin 2001; Zemtsov 2001: 137–40, Glasnost; 232–40, Perestroika; Chernyav 1997; Gorbachev 1992. Rel.: Gorbachev.

Revda Mining town in Lovozero District, in twin-city relationship with the District Centre Lovozero. Current population approx.8,000. The town is economically dependant on its foundational town-formative enterprise Lovozero Mining-Processing Complex (Lovozerskiy gorno-obogatitel’nyy kombinat, LGOK) which has been in a chronically ailing state since the onset of post-Soviet reforms. This has caused a very high rate of out-migration, with little prospect to be checked. Lit.: 5,5 mln rub. 31.05.2013; Dubrovskaya 2009; KE Revda; Nikolaeva 2008; Zabastovshchiki 01.09.2006; Barkov 2004; Took 2004: 238, 257; Filippov 2000; Kiselev and Shevchenko 1996: 165f; Nilsen and Bøhmer 1994: 134, Servredmet; Ushakov and Dashchinskiy 1988: 150–56;170–75; Dvinin 1959: 243.


‘Russia, forward!’ (Rossiya, vpered!) Programmatic article of the third President of the Russian Federation Dmitriy Medvedev, published in the Internet edition Gazeta.ru of 10 Sept. 2009. In it the President sharply criticized various ills of current Russian development, particularly widespread corruption and an economy based on gas/oil exports, and presented his vision of a remedial course of action. (Medvedev 10.09.2009). The article can be seen as initiating the programme of ‘modernisation and innovation’ with which Medvedev’s name came to be linked. A subsequent programmatic text along similar lines was his speech at the opening of St.Petersburg Economic Forum on 18 June, 2010. (Medvedev 18.06.2010)

Rybkoop (pt, abbr.). (fd) Rybolovetskaya kooperatsiya /Fishing Co-op/. Fishing co-ops in MR experienced considerable rise from the 1920s on, particularly during the years of economic liberalization (New Economic Policy, NEP, 1921–28). With the beginning of mass collectivisation they were gradually turned into state-commanded structures. It is possible that Lovozero’s Rybkoop dates back to those times. During the Soviet farm (sovkhoz) period (1971–92), the co-op performed a very wide range of local functions, working like a state enterprise, second to Sovkhoz ‘Tundra’. It took care of reindeer slaughter at a slaughter point (zaboyniy punkt), and the subsequently selling of meat to regional meat-processing factories. R. was responsible for storing and transporting essential goods
to the remote villages, was engaged in construction and repair activities, running of consumer goods shops, supplying reindeer herders with food and work materials, etc. It changed its name many times, but the local population remember and still use the original name Rybkoop. Today, under yet another name – PO ‘Payshchik’ /Shareholder/ - the enterprise runs a few shops, a sewing/shoe-repair workshop, hairdresser’s, etc. Lit.: EP, Rybolovetskaya kooperatsiya; KE, Kooperatsiya; Voronin 1997; Gorbunov 1980; Kiselev 1972; Il’yin 1932; Osinovskiy 1927; Evdokimov 1922; murmanarchiv.ru/index8.php?p=31

S

Safari camps (at). (pt, l) sg. lager’, pl. lagerya /camp, camps/; in media and official usage: turistcheskiy lager’/tourist camp/; turistkaya rybolovnaya baza /tourist fishing camp/. Luxury camps of permanent or portable buildings, usually situated at advantageous spots on salmon rivers, catering for high price range clients interested in fly fishing for trout or salmon, or in hunting. Clients are taken out to fishing spots by helicopter or motor boat. The camps have rented from regional authorities (with the acquiescence of district ones) the best locations for salmon fishing, thus pushing the local population out of its traditional fishing places and ancestral Sami resource territories since times immemorial. Lit.: Kozlov, D. 21.07.2013; Byvshego omonovtsa 11.06.2013; Prokuratura 23.05.2012; Mal’tsev 2011; Perechen’ 2010; Ogarkova 2007; Currie 2000; Hunter 2000; Osherenko 1998. See also: http://www.ponoiriver.com; Frontiers International Travel http://www.frontierstravel.com; info@frontierstravel.com

‘Sami alphabet feud’ A long-lasting controversy between Murmansk based Sami activists, on the one hand, and a Lovozero group of present and former teachers. The bone of contention is whether to use an extended version of the Cyrillic alphabet as more ‘objectively’ reflecting the phonemic system of the Kil’din Sami language (the Murmansk group), or a simpler version, easier to teach and acquire by Sami pupils. Lit.: Scheller 2013, 2010; Overland and Berg-Nordlie 2012: 65–69; Chernyakov 1998: 65f; Kert 1986.


‘Sam’ Syyt’ (Kil’din Sami: Sami village). (fd): Nekommercheskaya organisatsiya territorial’no-sosedskaya obshchina korenного malochislennogo naroda saami “Sam’ Syye” /Non-commercial organisation territorial-neighbourhood community of the indigenous, numerically small people Sami ‘Sam’ Syyt’/. Created in 2010 by Ivan Golovin and Vitaliy Krut’ the obshchina
has turned into possibly the most successful and expansive etnoturizm project in LD. Catering principally for weekend tourists from regional cities and beyond, it operates a camp on the road leading from Lovozero to Olenegorsk/Murmansk, also renting tundra land near the big Chud'yar' Lake. The leaders of the obshchina are members of the Council of representatives. Lit.: Goryacheva 16.05.2012; Obshchiny 2012; http://lovozero1.ru/

Schetchik see: Controller


‘Serf’ (rt, joc.) ‘Rab’. A guest-like position in tundra herding hierarchy granting board and lodging at reindeer herding bases in exchange for helping with domestic chores. ‘Ss.’ are usually people whose alcoholic and personal problems make life in district towns or villages dangerous or impossible for them, and reindeer herding bases serve as places of refuge and charity. In town/village contexts referred to as ‘bychi’ /‘former people’, down-and-outs/. Often drop outs from reindeer herding, living on odd jobs (shabashki). The ‘S.’ institution at reindeer herding bases can also be seen, on the more practical side, as a way to overcome the general dearth of female camp workers. Lit.: Vladimirova 2006: 295–304; Konstantinov 2005a, Hierarchy. Rel.: Bych.

Severyanin see: Northerner

Shabashka (sl.) Odd informal jobs, paid informally in cash upon completion of work.


Shock-labour construction sites Udarnye strojki. Construction sites of scale considered to be of special importance for industrialising the country. Recruiting work force for them during the First Five Year Plan (1928–32)
became a major driver of labour migration working synergetically with the serf-like status of peasants, imposed by mass collectivisation. As late as the mid-1960s villagers could not travel freely within the country, and thus one of the escape routes from villages was by volunteering to work at such sites (the other one being by joining the army). MR with its construction sites was a major point of attraction in this respect. Lit.: Gaydar and Chubays 2011: 20; Razumova 2008; Lewin 2005: 340–342; 1968; Kotkin 1995; Fitzpatrick 1994; Mitrany 1951.


SKhPK abbr. for Sel’skokhozyaystvennyy proizvodstvennyy kooperativ /Cooperative for agricultural production /. A post-Soviet form of a collective agricultural enterprise retaining basically Soviet farm (sovkhoz) features of management, employment regime, and a sovkhoist manner of operation. By comparison with their sovkhoz predecessors, however, the post-Soviet cooperatives lost much of former state support, particularly in the marketing of produce. In the case of Kola reindeer husbandry, the cooperatives also lost their previous status of virtual monopoly over tundra land and its resources, cheap ATV and air-borne transportation, high salaries for reindeer herders, as well as the formerly numerous fringe benefits for them.

Social parasitism (ot) Tuneyadstvo. In official use also occurring as Vedeniya paraziticheskogo obraza zhizni /Carrying out a parasitic way of life/. Established as a criminal offence in 1960–80s the formulation allowed extra-judicial sentencing for a range of offences, generally describable as ‘non-participation in socially useful work’, as also for alcoholism, breaking work discipline, pilfering of materials from places of work, neglect of parental duties, petty speculation, petty hooliganism, illegal production of alcohol (samogon), vandalizing residential premises, etc. It allowed enterprise administrations, particularly through the system of comrades’ courts to send Sami and other herders, as well as other local people, for corrective terms of forced labour to therapeutic-labour preventive clinics (LTPs). Local informants also report the posting of portraits of such people in public places as a measure of inciting public opprobrium (obshchestvennoe poritsanie). Lit.: Heveshi 2002: 130, Tuneyadstvo; Zemtsov 2001: 212–14, Parasite; 299–300, Socially Useful Labour; Pikhoya 2000: 214; BSE III, Obshchestvenno neobkhodimyy/poleznyy trud; Obshchestvennoe poritsanie; Kraitina 1960; Ostrovityanov et al. 1954: 427–39, Obshchestvennyi trud pri sotsializme.
ior (in particular: social parasitism), and organise free time in a ‘cultural manner’. Social work at the lower and middle levels of management was voluntary and unpaid, but was expected of CPSU and Komsomol members, its performance giving them credit in addition to that expected from their professional duties. Lit.: Heveshi 2002: 92, Oobschestvennaya rabota; Zemtsov 2001: 12f, Agitation; 225f, Patriotism; 251, Propaganda; Antonova’s Archive 1971-2005; Kachanova 1985; BSE III, Kul'turno-prosvetitel’naya rabota.


Sosnovka The smallest of LD remote villages of approx. 70 inhabitants. A reindeer husbandry and fishing kolkhoz ‘Put olen’ya’ /Reindeer’s Road/ was created here in 1930. During the agglomeration campaign of the 1960-early ‘70s, S. became part of the newly created sovkhoz in Krasnoshchel’e (‘Pamyati Lenina’/ ‘Olenevod’), as its Department 4 (4-oe otdele-nie). The latter currently consists of one reindeer herding and two sea-fishing brigades. Lit.: Akt 2013; Rasporyazhenie 2013; Akt 2012; O likvidatsii 2011; Muzhikov 1996; Arkhivnyy otdel 1995:247, Sosnovka; Voshchinin 1939.

Sovet predstaviteley see: Council of representatives

‘Soviet being’ (pej.) sg. sovok, pl. sovki. Used in reference to people with die-hard Soviet mentality, unable to imagine life in other than Soviet terms. Comp. also Sovdepiya (from Sovet deputatov /Council of deputees/, metonymically: the Soviet Union), a derogatory name for Soviet power and the country, inhabited by sovki. Lit.: Heveshi 2002:118, Sovdepiya.

Soviet farm Sovetskoe khozyaystvo, abbr. sovkhoz. A form of agricultural organisation in Soviet times in which an agricultural (incl. reindeer husbandry) enterprise was run in the manner of a state factory. Employees received salaries, enjoyed paid holidays, etc. while production planning as well as realization of produce was part of the Central State Plan of the Soviet Union and its regional branches (Gosplan). Smaller Kola collective farms (kolkhozi) were consolidated into two big Soviet farms with centres in Lovozero and Krasnoshchel’e, respectively, in the late 1960s-early ‘70s, setting off the period of mature sovkhoism lasting till the onset of post-Soviet reforms (1991–92).

Sovkhoism (at) A view of the world according to which the best order of things is one exemplified by the Soviet state farm (sovkhoz). The latter is
characterized by possession of private property in a private-in-the-collective manner, i.e. when private ownership is parasitic in respect of the collective (state) one. Such a relationship creates a stable, economically risk-free social environment, characterised by a degree of social and economic well-being, in which democratic values are of low priority. The arrangement may be seen as one constituting a compromise between the individual and the state in which security is exchanged for lack of political freedom. Lit.: Konstantinov 2011, 2000: 61, 1997:15–17; Vladimirova 2006: 28f; Nikulin 2005; Gregory 2004; Gregory and Markevich 2002; Anderson 1996:110; Humphrey 1998, 1983; Millar 1988; Fitzpatrick 1988; Dunham 1990[1976]; Mitrany 1951; Schlesinger 1950; Maslov 1937; Trotsky 1936. Rel.: Lampland 2002; Creed 1998.

Sovkhoz see: Soviet farm
Sovok see: Soviet being
‘Spirit-sleds’ (rt, joc) ‘Spirtovozy’. Sleds, carrying substantial quantities of alcohol among other luggage. Meat traders (kommersanty) transport by snowmobile such loads to corrals at times of corralling sessions to directly barter for reindeer carcasses (tushi), or use to facilitate advantageous deals with herders. The name associates with illegal slaughter of personal (private) reindeer during corralling sessions, as well as with appropriating collective deer by the herders for subsequent selling to meat traders (internal poaching). The practice critically attributes to wide-spread alcoholism among the tundra-related part of the local community.

‘Stability’ Stabil’nost’, Stabilizatsiya /stabilisation/ can be seen as the hall-mark of the after-'90s period. Associated principally with the name of current President Vladimir Putin, and his rule of power since 2000, stabil’nost’, as an ideological catch-word, aimed at dissociation from Boris Yeltsin-led reforms of the ‘90s, dubbed, in the popular ideological slang of post-Yeltsin years likhie devyanostie /the nineties of abandon/. Stabil’nost’, in this way, is ideologically counterpoised to the ‘chaos’, and ‘destruction’ (razval), allegedly characterising the early post-pere-stroyka years.

-Stadnik see: Brigade member
Stado see: Brigade herd
‘Stagnation’ Zastoy. Name of the period of rule of Leonid Brezhnev and his successors, which was publicly promoted in the rhetoric of Gorbachev’s restructuring (perestroika). The term forefronted the overall downhill of Soviet economy in the 1970s-'80s, bent on extensive and outmoded industrial production. Contrastively, grassroots actors generally remember the period as their ‘best times’, particularly so in labour-migrant regions like MR. Lit.: Dubin 2011: 264f; Heveshi 2002: 49.

Substantive function of language. That use of language by which the speaker is informing the addressee of something and, in this sense, the statement can be judged to be true or false (susceptible to truth evaluation). Lit.: Östman and Verschueren 2009; Sbisà 2006; Wierzbicka 1991; Lyons 1977: 50f; Searle 1969; Austin 1962; Jakobson 1960; Bühler 1965[1934]. Rel.: Language functions.


**Therapeutic-labour preventive clinic** *Lechebno-trudovoy profilaktoriy*, abbr. *LTP*. Corrective establishment of Soviet times where people accused of *social parasitism*, alcoholism, breaking work discipline, pilfering of materials from places of work, neglect of parental duties, petty speculation, petty hooliganism, illegal production of alcohol (*samogon*), vandalizing residential premises, etc., used to be interned for various terms of forced labour (the latter, however, was paid). Sentencing to terms at *LTP* had extra-judicial character, but was in the competence of law-enforcing organs (*pravookhranitel’nye organy*) in cooperation with local *CPSU* and enterprise administrations. Verdicts were often pronounced by extra-judicial *Comrades’ Courts* (*tovarishcheskie suda*) at places of work. Reindeer herd-ers accused of chronic alcoholism, breaking work discipline, etc. would be usually sent to an *LTP* in Appatiti. Other such establishments existed in Olengorsk and Koashva. The total number of MR *LTP* inmates had reached 3,878 people by 1.01.1987. On a national scale, the most notorious case has been that of poet Yosif Brodsky, sentenced to five years of hard labour for ‘social parasitism’(1964), subsequently Nobel prize winner for Literature. At present a return of LTP may be seen in the form of Settlement Colonies (*kolonii-poseleniya*). *KP*-24 near Olengorsk, for instance, seems to function very much like the former *LTP* there. Lit.: *Poselen’ye* 14.02.2014; Allemann 09.12.2013; *KE* 2008: 192, *Ugolovno-ispolnitel’naya sistema Murmanskoy oblasti*; Konstantinov 2005a: 120. Rel.: *Comrades’ Courts*: Krailina 1960; Heveshi 2002: 130, *Tuneyadstvo*; Zemtsov 2001: 212–14, *Parasite*.

‘Truly’ private reindeer (at) Semi-domesticated reindeer, which are taken care of by their owners independently of *collective reindeer*, particularly not grazed mixed with collective reindeer in cooperative herds. To be distinguished from *‘private-in-the-collective’ reindeer*, the latter popularly called ‘private’ (*chastnye*), officially ‘personal’ (*lichnye*).

**TOO** abbr. of *Tovarishchestvo ogranichennoy otvetstvenosti* /Limited liability company/. A form of post-Soviet collectives to which the majority of *Soviet farms* re-registered themselves in 1991-92. Subsequently many preferred re-registering again to agricultural cooperatives (*SKhPK*), this form deemed to offer greater advantages, particularly as regarded support by the state. In the case of Krasnoschel’e’s *‘Olenevod’* such advantages had been sought also in the direction of support for indigenous peoples.
and their traditional forms of land use (in the case of the remote villages: *para-indigenous*). The search for the ultimately advantageous combination produced, in the case of ‘*Olenevod*’ an opaque and laborious official designation: *SKhPK OPKh MNS* /Agricultural production cooperative - reindeer-husbandry farm of the numerically small peoples of the North/.

**Town-formative enterprise** *Gradoobrazuyushchee predpriyatie*. An industrial enterprise which necessitated the building of a ‘workers’ settlement’ (*rabochiy poselok*) close or around it, housing the workers and other inhabitants and gradually turning into a town dependent for its existence on that single foundational enterprise (*monogorod*, abbr. from *monoprofil’nyy naselennyy punkt* /single-profile settlement/). Officially, for an enterprise to have such a status not less than 30% of the working population of the town should be employed by it. The phrase answers to the English ‘one-mine town’. In post-Soviet years, the ailing state of such enterprises raised the topic of the critically problematic state of such ‘one-mine towns’ (*monogoroda*). A typical example of a town-formative enterprise is *Lovozero Mining-Processing Complex* (*Lovozerski GOK*) in respect of *Revda*. The problem of ailing *monogoroda* is a recurrent theme in much of recent mass-media and specialized discussions. Lit.: *Vlasti* 31.01.2014; *Problemy monogorodov* 21.03.2013; KE, *Gradoobrazuyushchie predpriyatiya Murmanskoj oblasti*.

**Town part** of *collective/Soviet /cooperative reindeer husbandry farms*. (at). Comp. ‘*kontora*’ (Habeck 2005). That part of a reindeer husbandry farm which includes its administration and town-based (in the case of the remote villages: village-based) departments (tsekhi/otdeleniya). In the case of ‘*Tundra*’, and in a smaller way of ‘*Olenevod*’, these latter also include a mechanical shop, a sewing factory, dairy farm, etc.

**Town/tundra divide** (at) Division between people, values, interests, professional skills and practices, territorially focussed on the central town/village part, as different from the tundra one, of reindeer husbandry regions or districts. Important expressions of such a divide are professional and esp. gender asymmetries.

*TOZ* see: Company for joint reindeer herding

**Tsar’ Gorodok** (pt, l) among herders /lit.: King Townlet/. Former designation: Olen’ya–2, currently Bol’shoe Ramozero. A small military settlement and base, some thirty kilometres to the northeast of Olenegorsk. Its nickname TsG is reported to come from the very good conditions and higher pay that inhabitants enjoyed in Soviet times. For many decades associated with poaching on ‘*Tundra*’ Brigade No 3. Lit.: Konstantinov 2005a: 162–5.

‘*Tundra*’ Since *agglomeration* in 1950s–70s, the biggest reindeer husbandry *Soviet farm* (*sovkhоз*) in the Kola Peninsula. Head office (*kontora*) in the District Centre of *Lovozero*. After *re-registering* in 1992 it became a *TOO*, later *SKhPK*. Beginning as Kolkhoz ‘*Tundra*’ in 1930, the farm gradually expanded in the 1960s by including a number of adjacent kolkhozi as part of agglomeration and *administrative liquidation of tundra villages*. At present the *cooperative farm* consists of 7 brigades (1,2,4,6,7,8,9), distributed into two ‘*sides*’/‘wings’/ to the NW and NE of
Lake Lovozero respectively. Officially having a herd size of 24,087 head (by 01.01.2013) its real reindeer according to insiders’ (herders’) opinion may be approx. twice less (collective plus personal). Lit.: Rasporyazhenie 2013; Vladimirova 2006; Konstantinov 2005a; Mikhnyak 1990; Ushakov and Dashchinskiy 1988; Digurov 1987; Kiselev and Kiseleva 1987; Fedotov 1961, 1955a, b; Goldstein and Kambulin 1956; Gudzenko 1954; Bunakov 1934; Budovnits 1931.

**Tundra part** of reindeer husbandry farms (at). Comp. ‘brigada’ (Habeck 2005). Employees who are responsible for carrying out husbandry activities at tundra locations, principally in rounding up, corralling, marking of reindeer (newborn and older), building of fences, etc. Side by side with these activities, these tundra-connected personnel, consisting of herders, **ATV** (vezdekhod) drivers, vets (veterinary doctor and veterinary technicians), repair workers, brigade base wardens/cooks, are actively engaged in lake fishing and seasonally – at tundra berry picking. To be distinguished from the town or ‘kontora’ part.

**Tundra-connected part** of the local community (at). In addition to the tundra part of the cooperative farm here belong all people who conduct hunting, fishing, gathering, trading, **ATV** (vezdekhod) driving, or **microsafari tourist** activities, in various combinations of these. In the common case such people own autonomous tundra transport: snowmobiles, sleds, in some cases: **ATVs** (vezdekhodi), boats, etc., related storage and repair infrastructure (garages, boat houses), and command extensive tundra skills and experience. Lit.: Konstantinov 2009.

*Tuneiadstvo* see: Social parasitism
*Tsentrs korennykh malochislennykh narodov Severa* see: Centre of the Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the North

**U**

**Umba** Umba – a small town on the White Sea Coast to the east of Kandalaksha, centre of Ter’ District, MR. Sea port where River Umba flows into Kandalaksha Bay. Lit.: Muzhikov 1996: 151; Arkhivnyy otdel 1995: 256; BSE III, Umba; Voshchinin 1939: 102.

**Umbozero** The second of the two mines near the town of *Revda*, the first being *Karnasourt*. Opened in 1983 together with a processing factory thus forming Umbozero Mining-Processing Complex (*Umbozerskiy gorno-obogatitel’nyy kombinat*) as part of *Lovozero Mining-Processing Complex*. Named after Lake Umbozero, close to which it is situated. In 2006 Umbozero Complex was declared bankrupt, whereupon it went through a wave of pillaging, until finally the mines had been flooded. Lit.: Rabochikh 05.09.2006; Ushakov and Dashchinskiy 1988: 170–75.

**Ushakov, Ivan Fedorovich** (1921–2002) Historian and regional lore scholar, the most prominent figure of the 2nd post WW2 period of *Murmansk Regional Lore Studies*. In some division of labour with the other prominent scholar of that generation – A.A. *Kiselev*, he specialized in the study of history till the early Soviet period, although in various texts the work of the two regional historians runs parallel to each other. This is particularly so in ‘Lovozero’ – a text published with S.N. *Dashchinskiy*, closely

Ushepiatno see: Ear-mark

V

**Veterinary doctor** in reindeer husbandry, abbr. *Vetvrach*. The second leading figure in the *tundra part* of reindeer husbandry farms, and belonging to the topmost tier of the tundra hierarchy (*Head of Reindeer Herding Department, Veterinary Doctor, Brigade Leaders, Veterinary Technicians*). Responsible for the health of the herd, the Vet is also one of the biggest owners of personal/private reindeer (close after the Head). Lit.: Konstantinov 2005a: 46f; Makhnev 1988.

**Veterinary technician** in reindeer husbandry, abbr. *Zootekhnik*. Member of the *tundra part* of the reindeer husbandry farm. He would answer to medical attendant in human medicine. A zootekhnik is usually responsible for a number of *brigade herds*, but is stationed, when in the tundra, at the base camp of a *brigade* of his choice. The position is higher than that of a *brigade leader*, and lower than that of the *Veterinary Doctor* (*vetvrach*), and the *Head of the Reindeer herding Department* (*nachal’nik tsekh olenevodstva*). Lit.: Borozdin et al. 1977: 199–215; Perevozchikov 1966. Rel.: Dietrich 1998; Druri 1955: 78, *Zootekhnicheskiy uchet*; Golovin and Druri 1928.

Vezdekhod see: ATV

**Volkov, Nikolay Nikolaeевич** (1907–1953). Russian ethnographer, one of the few whose writing derived from tundra-based work in the *reindeer husbandry part* of the Kola Peninsula. His doctoral dissertation (not published in the USSR), contains particularly valuable data of the state of reindeer husbandry in the late 1930s, including the issue of personal/private reindeer. Victim of stalinist repressions (in 1947 he was sentenced to 10 years of exile, where he died). His work has been made available by the efforts of the Nordic Sami Institute in Kautokeino, Norway in cooperation with the Russian Academy of Sciences (Kunstkamera, St. Petersburg). Lit.: KE, Volkov; Lasko and Taksami 1996; Volkov 1996[1946], 1940, 1935. Rel.: Luk’yanchenko 2003; Tumarkin 2003, 2002.

**Voron’e Kil’din Sami**: *Kordeg-syyt*; Rus.: *Voron’inskiy pogost*. Used to be situated on the right bank of eponymous river, some 60 km. to the north of *Lovozero*. One of the oldest Sami villages. Reindeer husbandry kolkhoz ‘Dobrovolets’ /Volunteer/ set up in 1930, earlier attempts being made in 1928–29. Until administratively liquidated in 1963 of about 200 people. Liquidation and subsequent resettlement to Lovozero was brought about by flooding of the surrounding territory in 1963 in connection with the construction of a series of power stations and reservoirs known as *Serebryanskoe GES /Serebryanskoje* Hydro-Electric Station/. Lit.: Afanas’yeva 2013: 41f; KE, Voron’inskiy pogost; Took 2004: 42, 46; Muzhikov 1996: 30, Voron’e; Arkhivnyy otdel 1995: 262; Ushakov and Dash-
Warden in reindeer husbandry. (pt) Storozh; (ot) Rabochiy olenevodstva /Worker in reindeer husbandry/. An employee of the reindeer husbandry farm, usually a pensioned-off herder. For a small pay in addition to their pension such people take care of a brigade base, often as a temporary employment, and particularly when the brigade members are in town/village, which, as part of hyper-extensive husbandry, is during a substantial part of the year. In the absence of female camp workers (chunrabortnitsi) at the base (which is the common case), wardens cook for the communal pot (obshchepyt), clean, chop wood, bake bread, etc. In some cases, wardens also keep draft deer at the base all through the summer to facilitate rounding up activities in early autumn. The warden may be assisted in these functions by other pensioned-off herdmen, who would live most of the year at brigade bases, in some cases also by so-called (in joke) ‘raby’ (‘serfs’).

Whole-eared reindeer Tseloushnye oleni. Reindeer which have not been marked with ear-marks shortly after birth and appear in corralling session later in the year, or even in following years. See: Arbitrary ear-marking.

Wild reindeer controversy Conflict between regional hunting authorities (Gosokhotinspektsiya/ State Hunting Inspectorate/) and reindeer husbandry farms’ management around the issue of what animals are to be classified as ‘wild reindeer’. Hunting authorities claim that the two forms of the species Rangifer tarandus (‘wild’ and ‘domestic’) are indistinguishable from each other and if unmarked and unattended by herdmen they can be considered ‘wild’ and thus be fair game for hunting. The Hunting Inspectorate has also accused the management of SKHP ‘Tundra’ of culling the wild deer herd of the Peninsula during corralling sessions. ‘Tundra’, in its turn, has denied such allegations, and considers the two forms of the species clearly distinguishable at sight. It has accused the Hunting Inspectorate of tolerating poaching on its herds. The conflict brought about banning of moose and wild deer hunting for a period of three years, beginning in 2009. The measures have had inconclusive results. Lit.: Vladimirova 2014; Karelin 2009; Otstrel 2009; Ryazanova 2009a, b. Rel.: KE, Olenevodstvo; Syroechkovskiy 1986: 12–16; Semenov-Tian-Shanskiy 1985, 1977.

‘Wild tourism’ (pt) Dikyy turizm. A form of tourism in USSR/Russia not organised by state organisations or – in post-Soviet times - private firms. In reference to the reindeer husbandry part of Lovozero District this is in the main canoeing down the bigger rivers of the Peninsula (Yokanga, Umba, etc). Canoeists publish reports of their journeys and other relevant information in a number of websites and other fora. Lit.: Mankova 2013; Kogda i kak 28.05.2012; Mikhaylov 24.04.2012; Tsirkunov 2007; Dubovskiy 1999; Evdokimov 1925; Basmanov (unknown year).
‘Winking mood’ (at) A para-linguistic marker (winking) signaling that the speaker is giving lip-service to an established view (i.e. dominant ideological doctrine) while holding an opposite, often ironic opinion of it. Besides winking, such an attitude can be signaled para-linguistically to the addressee by facial or hand gestures, or by other expressive devices. The term relates to the grammatical category of mood, like conditional mood, imperative mood, etc. Rel.: Language functions.

‘Woman-faced’ indigenous elites (fd) ‘Zhenskoe lito’ intelligentsya sovremen-nykh malochislennykh narodov Severa /The ‘woman’s face’ of the intelligentsia of contemporary numerically small peoples of the North/. Phrasing introduced by linguist Aleksey Burykin (1999), reflecting preponderance of urban professional women in indigenous ethnopolitical activism. In the local (LD) context tundra connectedness/disconnectedness has clear and consistent gender asymmetry features. There are very few women continuing to work in reindeer herding brigades, and thus the latter can be called ‘man-faced’ if we expand on Burykin’s pointing to the ‘women-facedness’ of indigenous elites. Lit.: Konstantinov 2013; Øverland and Berg-Nordlie 2012; Lyarskaya 2010; Anderson 2006; Burykin 2002, 1999.

Work-day Trudoden’, pl. trudodni. A unit of labour for work done as a member of a collective farm (kolkhoz). A day’s work could be assessed as equaling from 0.5 to 4 work-days. At the end of the year it would be estimated how many work-days a kolkhoz member had put in for the farm and work would be remunerated in its greater part in kind. The system was introduced in 1930–31 and lasted till 1966. With the advent of agglomeration and the consolidation of collective farms into big Soviet farms (sovkhzozi), payment by work-day was substituted by a monthly salary. Lit.: Heveshi 2002: 129–30, Trudoden”; BSE III, Trudoden”; Kolkhoz “Krasnosobets’e” 1960; BSE II 1956, Vol.43: 332–3, Trudoden”; Ostrovitanov et al. 1954: 487–8.

Working chamber (churn) Rabochaya kamera. Part of a reindeer corral enclosure in which 15–20 animals would be driven at a time and various operations performed on them. These include most importantly counting and registering; cutting ear-marks on whole-eared reindeer, vaccinating, separation into further pens for subsequent operations: sawing off antlers, castration, forming a slaughter-fragment (zaboyini kusok) to be driven to a slaughter point, distribution of the rest to the various brigades and personal/private owners. Usually slaughter and trading of personal (‘private’) animals is carried out right outside the corral-fence. Lit.: Vladimirova 2006: 244–256; Konstantinov and Vladimirova 2006b; Grechina 2004.

Y

‘Year of the great breakthrough’ (fd): God velikogo pereloma. K XII godovshchine Oktyabrya /The year of the great breakthrough. In commemoration of the 12th anniversary of the October Revolution/. A programmatic article of Stalin, celebrating the first year of launching mass collectivisation of agricultural holdings (1929). Published in Pravda”(7 Nov., 1929). Excesses perpetrated during this time were attacked the next year by Stalin

Z
ZATO see: Closed town


Zona see: Corrective colony No 23.

Zootekhnik see: Veterinary technician
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All authors’ names are given as they have been originally transcribed. Authors’ personal names are given in initials whenever their full versions have not been indicated in the respective publications.

Abbreviations:

AKMNS - Assotsiatsiya Korennyh Malochislennykh Narodov Severa (RAIPON)
BSE - Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya
EP – Elektronnaya Pamyat Arktiki
IAOIRS - Izvestiya Arkhangelskogo Obschestva Izucheniiya Ruskogo Severa
KE – Kol’skaya Entsiklopediya
KK - Kol’skie karty
L - Leningrad
LP – Lovozerskaya pravda
M – Moscow
MGPU – Murmanskiy gossudarstvenniy pedagogicheskiy universitet
MGTU – Murmanskiy gossudarstvenniy tekhnicheskiy universitet
MKI - Murmanskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo
MV – Murmanskiy vestnik
OD – Odd document
PA – Personal archive
PE - Pedagogicheskaya entsiklopediya
PP - Polyanaya pravda
RAN – Rossiyskaya Akademiya Nauk
SE - Severnaya entsiklopediya
SES - Sovetskiy entsiklopedicheskii slovar’
StP – Saint Petersburg


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