Has the Gatekeeper State Persevered?

A case study of Tanzania

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Abstract

Despite success stories democracy and development has been struggling in Africa, and colonialism is a contributing factor to that. The aim of this thesis is to examine if this colonial legacy is still intact, which has been done by applying the gatekeeper theory by Frederick Cooper to Tanzania, resulting in the question: *Is Tanzania still a gatekeeper state?* The gatekeeper state theory concerns how the colonial legacy shaped the countries of Africa and explains the gatekeeper state as being centred on the gate, the intersection between external and internal, where the power is generally centralized and struggle over it is extensive. To conduct the analysis I have extracted three central aspects of this theory, the centralization of power, the centralization on the gate and the struggle over the gate and applied them to Tanzania through a text-analysis, using reports on the economy and governance of the country. The results gathered determine that Tanzania lives up to two of the three criteria, however due to the high degree of centralization of power on the gate, and the other possible factors that contributed to the lack of struggle, I still determine Tanzania to occupy by the structures of a gatekeeper state.
Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................. 2

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 4
THESIS QUESTION ....................................................................................................................... 5

1.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .......................................................................................... 5
1.1 STATE FORMATION ............................................................................................................. 5
1.2 THEORIES ON POLITICAL COLONIAL LEGACY ............................................................... 5
1.3 THE GATEKEEPER STATE ................................................................................................ 7
    Changing the gatekeeper state ................................................................................................ 8
A BRIEF SUMMARY .................................................................................................................... 9

2.0 METHOD ............................................................................................................................ 10
2.1 CHOICE OF METHOD ........................................................................................................ 10
2.2 CHOICE OF CASE ............................................................................................................. 10
2.3 MATERIAL .......................................................................................................................... 11
2.4 LIMITATIONS ..................................................................................................................... 12
2.5 OPERATIONALIZATION ..................................................................................................... 12

3.0 BACKGROUND INFORMATION ....................................................................................... 14
3.1 THE COLONIAL LEGACY ................................................................................................ 14
3.2 TANZANIA – A BRIEF BACKGROUND ............................................................................. 15

4.0 ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................................... 16
4.1 CENTRALIZATION OF POWER ......................................................................................... 16
    4.1.1 The Ruling coalition .................................................................................................................. 16
    4.1.2 Geographically centralized ........................................................................................................ 18
    4.1.3 Judiciary, executive, legislative ................................................................................................. 18
    4.1.4 Access to power ........................................................................................................................ 19
    A brief summary .......................................................................................................................... 21
4.2 CENTRALIZATION ON THE GATE ................................................................................... 21
    4.2.1 Economic plurality and domestic entrepreneurs ......................................................................... 21
    4.2.2 Capabilities of the state .......................................................................................................... 23
    A brief summary .......................................................................................................................... 23
4.3 STRUGGLE OVER THE GATE ....................................................................................... 24
    4.3.1 Political struggle ...................................................................................................................... 24
    4.3.2 Internal struggle ...................................................................................................................... 25
    4.3.3 The case of Zanzibar .............................................................................................................. 26
    A brief summary .......................................................................................................................... 27

5.0 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 27
5.1 RESULTS ............................................................................................................................ 27
5.2 DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE GATEKEEPER STATE .................................. 29

LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 30
Introduction

The question of democratization and development in Africa is a wildly debated topic, both in politics and academia. Since the years of independence between 1960-1980, African regimes have gone through brutal civil wars, cruel dictatorship and shaky democracies. As of this year, still only eight African countries out of 42 reach the level of “Free” on the Freedom House democracy index, fifteen are considered “Partly free”, and nineteen are considered “Not free” (Freedom House, 2015). Concerning development, only two African countries are listed as having high human development in the UNDP Human Development Index, eight are listed as having medium and the remaining 32 are listed as having low (UNDP, 2015). The question remains, why is this the case?

According to a study of Bernhard, Reenock and Nordstrom (2004, 240-241) on development in former colonies, colonialism, defined as the European colonization of non-European countries, is proven to have a negative effect on democratization and economic development. Compared to non-colonized countries and regions, the colonial legacy rendered former colonies with a lesser degree of economic development, a greater degree of social fragmentation and a poorer relationship between state and civil society. Lack of democracy and development can be attributed to many factors, but given this study, a history of colonialism is not a factor that can be ignored.

Something that separates the former colonies of Africa from the rest of the colonized world is that the formation of colonial states in Africa did not have any pre-colonial states to relate to. Lines were drawn on a map in Europe and states were constructed (Rosenberg 2014). Despite lasting for just a brief period in history, the colonization of Africa completely reordered the continent (Young 1994, 9-10). The majority of the African states were completely constructed through and shaped within colonialism (Rosenberg 2014). It is not only social fragmentation and civil society that colonization affected, but also the very formation of states. The effect that this period in time had on the institutional formation of Africa is therefore difficult to disregard when studying the continent.

However, 45 years has passed since the golden decade of African independence (Cooper 2002, 82). Since then governments and regimes have come and gone, peace has been reached and broken again and economies have crashed and flourished. It may be safe to say that the
colonial legacy had an effect on the structure of African states in the period just following independence, but nearly half a century later, is this legacy really still intact, and what does it look like today?

**Thesis Question**
The question in focus in this thesis is the one presented above; does the political legacy of the colonial period still have an affect on the structure and therefore also the function of the postcolonial state in Africa. I will attempt answering this question through a case study on Tanzania, applying on it the theory of the gatekeeper state developed by Frederick Cooper. The question that I aim to answer is “Can Tanzania still be considered to be a gatekeeper state?” How exactly this will be done and the reason for the choice of case will be explained in the method section further down in the text.

**1.0 Theoretical framework**

**1.1 State formation**
What constitutes the theoretical and practical base of the formation of the state is a topic that has been extensively examined in political science and sociology. The concept of the state can in itself be understood and interpreted in different ways, and whilst that is a fascinating discussion in itself, I will in the following section focus on theories concerning the formation of states, mainly to make the point of how the formation of the colonial states differs from that (Boix 2010). According to a convincing amount of the literature, elaborated on by the political scientist Christopher Clapham (2001b), the act of warfare is a central aspect to the creation of states. Faced with the threat of destruction the European societies were forced to develop effective states as a protection against possible aggressors. In the process, the threat of destruction consolidated the central governments’ control over the territory and the need for extraction of resources in order to maintain protection. It also formed the idea of the community that constituted the moral base for the legitimation of the state, ensuring the willing participation and self-sacrifice of the citizens. In short, it enabled nation building.

**1.2 Theories on political colonial legacy**
The state formation in colonial Africa did not follow the patterns described above. Rather they were formed by external conquest. The state was imported and implemented from the outside, and as such lacked the nation building mechanisms that were central to the formation
of European states (Clapham 2001b). The states of Africa, and other colonies, were created in a different fashion than those of Europe and therefore tend to present different characteristics. However the theories and research specifically concerning what the colonial legacy meant for state formation goes beyond just attributing the differences to lack of warfare.

Christopher Clapham understands the third world state as being characterized by its combination of fragility and power, the more decisive one being power. The main interest of the state is to maintain order, an inheritance that can stem from monarchical historical setting, or from colonial rule. The third world state gains power and wealth from extracting from the domestic economy, especially from trade revenues. The services the state provides are generally inadequate, but the means of extraction are developed. The state is the most successful way of attaining power, and is therefore subject to extensive struggle. The fragility of the third world state is the lack of unity behind a set of shared values. (Clapham 2002a, 40-43) This in contrast to the nation building unity that the threat of war developed in Europe (Boix 2010). The colonial legacy is likely to have contributed to this; with the state implemented from the outside the distinction between the external political structure and internal, indigenous society remained after decolonization. Rather than a state built on a national identity, where political structure is constructed in connection with the indigenous society, the externally implemented state creates a divide, making loyalty to the state harder to attain, and thus constituting a source of fragility. (Clapham 2002a, 40-43)

An alternative understanding of the third world state, and specifically that of Africa, is the Bonapartist theory. In the writings of B.C. Smith (2009, 91-97) the postcolonial state is explained as “… being a factor of cohesion, managing and manipulation class struggles without fundamentally damaging the economic system that preserves the dominance of a particular economic class” (B.C Smith 2009, 95). It does not neutrally manage the needs of the various classes in society, but rather works for the interests of the bourgeoisie, against the interests of the other classes. However the postcolonial state is more than just an instrument for the bourgeoisie class, in itself it has a certain degree of autonomy. Nevertheless it still works in favour of the dominant class. B.C Smith (2009, 91-97) explains the state as, rather than being a means of controlling wealth for this petty bourgeoisie class, it is a road to wealth. This results in an extensive focus on the state and the state apparatus, contributing to an “overdeveloped bureaucratic state”. In the colonial times the bureaucratic system held, together with police and military, a central role in the colonial powers’ governing. The
bureaucratization also meant a far-reaching involvement from the state in the national economy, generating an overall overdevelopment of the state in relation to civil society and autonomous economy.

As Randall and Theobald (1998, 176-177) account for in their book on third world politics, Issa Shivji, a Tanzanian author and academic in the field of law and development, examines Tanzania from a similar perspective. Recently decolonized Tanzania had a small African petty bourgeoisie as well as a business centred Asian bourgeoisie. Unlike bourgeoisie in non-colonized countries the bourgeoisie in Tanzania was economically weak and therefore had to use the state to a greater extent to ensure power and wealth. Shivji claims that this was the objective of the Tanzanian government when it chose to nationalize businesses, removing the Asian bourgeoisie. An overdeveloped state and bureaucracy helped create a base for the formation of bureaucratic bourgeoisie, using the state to attain lucrative positions in society.

None of the descriptions of the third world state explained above contain the unifying nation building that Charles Boix and Christopher Clapham describe in the construction of the European state. As the historical course of events differs, so does the function and capability of the state.

### 1.3 The gatekeeper state

One extensive theory concerning how the colonial states were structured and what that meant for the postcolonial states is the Gatekeeper state theory by Frederick Cooper (2002, 5-6). Elements of the theories presented above occur in this one as well, and it seems evident that they have all been constructed with the same societies in mind. However Frederick Cooper is, unlike the other theorist presented here, a history professor and as the political theorist Richard Joseph (2004, 4-5) points out Cooper’s theory provides an understanding of the postcolonial state that avoids ideological dispute. His theory centres on explaining the dynamics that have shaped the African states’ weak formal institution and analyses them in the specific historical and geographical context in which they were formed. As such it has the possibility of not only explaining how the postcolonial African states got to where they are today, but also of improving our understanding of the developmental challenges the continent faces in the context of this colonial formation.

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1 Currently working at Yale University
The gatekeeper state is, as the name implies, centred on the gate, around the “intersection of internal and external economies” (Cooper 2002, 96-97). The power of the state is concentrated there, and the state struggles with extending power beyond that. This renders the state dependent on outside recognition. According to Cooper (2002, 155-157) the states of Africa are not deemed to be states based on their ability to provide the services that a state should provide, nor based on their capacity to extract power within their territory, but rather based on international recognition.

In the economic sector the gatekeeper state is centralized. The main revenues come from tariffs on export and import, rather from taxes within the country. The states also suffer issues going through with economic policies. (Cooper 2002, 156-157) The focus on raw material, remaining from the colonial times has left the gatekeeper states with an economy lacking plurality, and the structure of the state tempts leaders to strengthen their control over the narrow channels of inflow and outflow, rather than broadening connections and creating plurality (Joseph 2004, 4-5). This is also tightly connected to corruption and crony capitalism. Rather than an open and dynamic capitalism, many leaders encourage a market imbedded with authoritarian relations and patron-client politics (Cooper 2002, 194-195).

This tendency of the ruling elites to prioritize patron-client relationships and rely on the gate, rather than creating a sustainable national capitalism leaves the gatekeeper states especially vulnerable (Joseph 2004, 4-5). Governmental power is centralized and the economy does not grant many alternative ways to wealth and power, rendering the control of the gate, more or less, the only access to power. In a system like this neither of the groups fighting for control over the gate, fighting for governmental power, can afford to lose. With so much at stake, once that control has been seized the winner will use various non-democratic measures to maintain its positions. (Cooper 2002, 180-182) To quote Frederick Cooper on the matter “As I have argued, gatekeeper states are distinguished not by effective control of the gate, but by the intensity of struggle over it” (2002, 180).

**Changing the gatekeeper state**

The gatekeeper state is not however, immune to change. Cooper (2002, 180-183) describes how during the 1990s many of the African states went through changes that weakened the

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2 “A description of capitalist society as being based on the close relationships between businessmen and the state. Instead of success being determined by a free market and the rule of law, the success of a business is dependent on the favouritism that is shown by the ruling government…” (Investopedia)
gatekeeper state. (1) A decade of economic hardships weakened the ruling elites’ patronage capabilities. (2) Desperate workers who saw their attempts at using personal informal connections fail were available for mobilization against rulers. (3) The continuous corruption irritated donor agencies and generated demands for “good governance”. (4) International NGOs were becoming more involved in Africa, and worked more closely with the African natives. (5) Professionals and students saw little chance of future success in African societies. This rendered the gatekeeper state vulnerable to structural change, and up to 16 African countries took steps toward democratization between 1990 and 1994. Despite voting old leaders out of office and introducing multi-party systems however both ruling elites and oppositional parties continued to work in a “winner take all” fashion and still conducting politics through patron-client relationships. The old regimes were not replaced with governments capable of amending the vital challenges at hand. With political liberalization came economic liberalization, too. The power of governments was reduced and public facilities put in private ownership. These attempts at change were, too, accompanied by the survival of patronage, and rather than promoting a effective free market institutions once again end up in the hands of public servants, continuing the very thing the liberalization was supposed to counteract. Furthermore reducing the capabilities of the state in the name of liberalization risks, more than counteracting patronage, only weakening the state. In the worst-case scenario this renders a complete system collapse where the state is not able to provide any services to the people, as seen in Somalia for example.

A brief summary

In conclusion the formation of postcolonial states differ from the formation of for instance the states of Europe. The difference in the process of formation has also led to inherent differences within the state. In the prior research on the third world by Clapham, B.C Smith, Shivji and Cooper terms like weak, vulnerable and overly bureaucratic are reoccurring. There may be differences in how theorists explain the mechanisms that have lead to this, but the red thread is that postcolonial states are fragile, centralized states arranged around an over-developed bureaucracy that obstructs societal development. Cooper’s theory on the gatekeeper state concretizes the structure of the postcolonial state as a state with centralized power focused on the intersection between the internal and external. The majority of power in society in concentrated to this narrow gate, and as such the state is characterized by an

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3 Good Governance: Used here in the way it is understood by Gray and Khan (2010, 1). A reform programme based on neoclassical economic theory, where it is promoted that African regimes generate growth by making markets more efficient.
extensive struggle, often through non-democratic means, and is generally a vulnerable one. Furthermore this is a structure that has not only survived democratization and liberalization policies, but also constituted an obstacle for the success of these policies of change.

2.0 Method

2.1 Choice of method

This thesis consists of a single case study of Tanzania, with the aim of answering the question of whether Tanzania still presents a structure correlating to that of the gatekeeper state theory developed by Frederick Cooper. The choice of conducting a study focusing on a single country is an adaptation to the time frame at hand. Focusing on one specific country gives me the possibility to dig deeper into the areas brought up by Cooper in his theory and conduct a more thorough analysis within the frame of a bachelor thesis.

Choosing the method of a single case study also provides a fitting possibility of making this a qualitative study. It grants me the prospect of closely examining more aspects of that single case, thus making it a qualitative study, rather than being forced to maintain a broader quantitative outlook, which would be the case if I were looking at more cases (Teorell & Svensson 2007, 266-267). This study has been done through a text analysis, where I have taken the material that I have chosen and applied to it the operationalization of the gatekeeper theory, searching for indicators of Tanzania still being a gatekeeper state. I have focused on the areas I deemed central in the section on the gatekeeper state above, and then based on criteria from the operationalization, I have categorized aspects of Tanzania into either being a character of the gatekeeper state, or not. The sum of this categorization will be presented in the following analysis section.

2.2 Choice of case

Choosing the case of Tanzania has a number of reasons. Primarily it is one of the countries Cooper brings up as an example of a gatekeeper state at its formation. Seeing as the aim of this paper is to examine whether the colonial legacy in the shape of the gatekeeper state is still intact, it is a prerequisite that the case chosen was, at the very least, once considered a gatekeeper state. Secondly Tanzania receives a lot of aid from donor countries and has had on-going development cooperation with Sweden since 1963 (SIDA 2015a). Sweden has democratization as one of its main goals in the foreign aid program (SIDA 2015b), and with
the obstacle to democracy that the gatekeeper state structure is, the result of this analysis could be of interest in Sweden, hence providing an interesting connection between the country from which I write this thesis, and the case I choose to focus on. Finally Tanzania is in a lot of ways a relatively average country considering development, history and governance in Africa. The decolonization process was not particularly late, nor particularly bloody (Cooper 2002, 177-180). Additionally Tanzania has not broken down completely, as Somalia, for example, nor is it as much of a success story as Botswana (Cooper 2002, 180-183). However, as we will see, the degree of democratization and liberalization that the country has seen renders it with the possibility of having developed past the formation of the gatekeeper state, making it an interesting case to study. Based on the characteristics presented here, explaining Tanzania as relatively average, it has the possibility of being a representative case where the results can, to some extent, be applied to the rest of the sample population of former colonies of Africa (Teorell & Svensson 2007, 152-153). It should be pointed out though that the possibility to generalize the result from this study has challenges. Undoubtedly there are similarities between the colonial experiences in different colonized countries, African or otherwise, especially between those countries that were colonized by the same European colonizing power (Bernhard, Reenock & Nordstrom 2004, 241-243). Despite that each of these countries have specific histories, specific prerequisites considering natural resources, ethnic and religious fragmentation, economic development etc. and thus it is difficult to surely claim that the results can be directly applied to the rest of the former colonies in Africa.

2.3 Material
The material that has been used is various studies and reports on governance, economy and development in Tanzania. The majority of the analysis takes information from three different articles. The first is an assessment of democracy and governance in Tanzania produced through collaboration between USAID/Tanzania, and the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance’s Office of Democracy and Governance (DCHA/DG), subsequently it will be referenced to as “Tucker et al.”. It specifically concerns the transition from the single-party state and examines questions of governance, corruption, institutions etc., thus it provides thorough examination of the Tanzanian state fitting to my method of analysis. The second is an article concerning the governance of Tanzania, focused on the ruling coalition, the governance legacy and the weak productive capacity of the government. It is written by Ole Therkildsen, a researcher emeritus in development and natural resources, specialized on sub-Saharan Africa, together with France Bourgouin, a PhD in sociology and philosophy. It
too constitutes a thorough examination of the governance in Tanzania, and being a scientific article it provides a study of the mechanisms behind for instance the weak productive capacity of the Tanzanian state. The third is an article on Good Governance in Tanzania by Hazel Gray, doctor in developmental studies at London School of economics and political science, and Mushtaq Khan, economics professor at Lahore University. It concerns Tanzanian economy and has thus constituted a useful source for analysing the Tanzanian state’s economic centralization on the gate. Both of these latter papers are also also written several years later than the article by Tucker et al., combining the three provide an information base of the entire period of interest for this analysis.

2.4 Limitations
The limitations in this study are mainly pertaining to a certain time frame and certain aspects of the gatekeeper theory. The period of interest is foremost the period after the introduction of the multi-party system. This change to the political scene has the potential of being very extensive, leading me to the decision that looking at facts from before the transition from a single-party state risks being misguiding. Within that frame of interest this thesis will focus on the period from the late nineties until today. This is partly due to lack of space to include a longer time frame, but also because with the question of the thesis concerns the situation today, making it illogical to include facts from too far into the past.

The aspects of the gatekeeper theory that will be addressed are the centralization of power, centralization on the gate, and struggle over the gate. Choosing not to look at the vulnerability of the state comes mainly from lack of space to do so, but I have also made the assessment that it is not the most central aspect to Cooper’s theory. It may in fact be considered to be a result of the gatekeeper state, rather than a creator of it, and thus deemed less relevant than the other three. With the choice of these three key aspects the analysis will be able to provide an answer to thesis question.

2.5 Operationalization
As is mentioned above, in order to apply the gatekeeper theory to the case of Tanzania I will operationalize the central aspects of the Cooper theory brought up in the end of the theoretical section above. To determine the centralization of the Tanzanian state I aim to assess the distribution of power between various groups and political branches in society. The indicators I will use consist of looking at:
(a) Which groups in society have political power and influence, and more importantly is the power spread out or held by a few actors.
(b) The balance of power between the executive, the judiciary and the legislative.
(c) Who has the access to power in society and whether there are several alternate ways of doing so.

The intent is that these aspects will provide an indication of the degree of centralization of power in Tanzania to a few actors, as well as these actors affiliation to the entity of the state.

Cooper describes the power in a gatekeeper state being not only centred, but centred on the gate. Assessing the degree of centralization of power is one part of this.

Determining whether this centralization of power can constitute centralization on the gate, the intersection between the internal and external, is the second part of this aspect of the gatekeeper theory. In order to do that I will look at:

(a) The revenues of the state and whether they mainly come from tariffs from export, aid etc.
(b) The degree of plurality in the internal economy as well as the state’s relation to a potential domestic business and industrial class.
(c) The state’s ambition and capability of extending its power beyond the central government.

The last aspect of the gatekeeper theory that will be addressed in this paper is the degree of struggle over the gate. In order to assess that I will look at:

(a) Whether there exists any violent struggle over power.
(b) The shape of the struggle between various political actors, with focus being on struggle that concerns primarily the mere control over the state, rather than ideological disputes (Cooper 2002, 182-183).
(c) The methods used by the elite to remain in power.

Assessing the existence of violent struggle is based on Cooper’s criteria of the gatekeeper state being characterized by struggle, if it is a country plagued by extensive violence that would be an indication of characteristic struggle. Apart from that the struggle of interest in this analysis is the struggle pertaining specifically to control over the gate. All countries experience various sources of political struggle and debate, what characterizes the gatekeeper state is the specific struggle over control over the state, and through that the gate. This what I will aim at determining when looking at the various struggles explained above.
3.0 Background information

3.1 The colonial legacy

“The colonial state in Africa lasted in most instances less than a century – a mere moment in historical time. Yet it totally reordered political space, societal hierarchies and cleavages, and modes of economic production” (Young 1994, 9)

As explained by Crawford Young (1994, 72-76), the colonization launched on Africa by the European powers was different from the imperialist expansions that preceded it; it was far more extensive. The colonial powers of the late 1800s had more capacity and control than before, and their colonization was imbedded with legal-rational ideas of how the state was to be run. This new imperialism contained expanded capabilities of control that went further than just military domination and the state extended further into the civil society. Africa met a colonial power equipped with not only improved capabilities to control, but also a legitimation of this control. Ideas of European superiority combined with theories of social Darwinism changed the idea of Africa in the European mind. From being a subordinate continent from which the Europeans could buy slaves as was formerly done, it became a blank canvas for the Europeans to mould, change and develop. The new industrialized technology of the 19th century provided the Europeans with a way into Africa and a way to conquer regions that had formally been hard to for the Europeans to master.

The economic ambitions of the colonial powers foremost concerned the export of the goods needed for the domestic markets and industries, as well as the expansion of markets on which their own manufactured goods could be sold. There was little focus on industrialization and the system of infrastructure and industries built up in the colonies was not sufficient to build a state-economy on once independence was achieved. (Ankomah 1970, 130-132) The newly formed nation-states of the late 20th century in Africa inherited virtually all other governmental institutions as well, including the issues that came with them. As has been mentioned by the political scientists presented in the theoretical section, the colonial administration of the colonies was not primarily created by and for the natives, but rather constituted a government imposed from above. Unlike in independent nation-states there were no national politicians to answer to and the government employee held the highest rank.
Working for the state became the foremost route to wealth and power (Muiu 2010, 1317-1318).

3.2 Tanzania – A brief background

Tanzania was first colonized in 1886 and achieved its independence from Britain in 1961, and is by Cooper considered to be a gatekeeper state at its formation. In 1964, three years after independence, what is now mainland Tanzania, Tanganyika, joined with Zanzibar, an island just off the coast, to form Tanzania. (Gascoigne) After a small, educated elite led by Julius Neyrere led the country to independence Tanzania chose the course of the continent-specific “African Socialism”, led by the party TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) and Julius Neyrere in a single-party system. The centre of Neyrere’s plan for Tanzania was village-communities: Ujamaa. They would be the foundation of both the Tanzanian economy and societal structure. The objective was to turn the African values of communal sharing and cooperation into productive plans to create development, while simultaneously giving villagers a say in the national party. In the same era Neyrere also nationalized large parts of the commercial sector, with the intention of creating a truly national economy. It was meant to be a socialist society with its foundation on the communal values of African life. Neyrere’s plans did not pan out as intended but rather resulted in a negative cycle, culminating in an economic crisis in the 1980s. Instead of Neyrere’s so highly valued independence Tanzania was caught in a heavy dependency on foreign aid (Cooper 2002, 178-180).

Neyrere was forced to abandon the ideas of socialism and the Ujamaa system, and in 1990, five years after his resignation, he admitted that his single-party rule was not as opportune as he originally claimed (Cooper 2002, 178-180). Following the economic difficulties of the 1980s, donor threats of economic crisis resulted in liberalization and privatization of the Tanzanian economy (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 32-33). Donors also made demands on democratization, threatening to withdraw aid, in 1992 Tanzania changed to a multi-party system and in 1995 the first elections were held (Ibid, 23-24). However the support for a multi-party system was low among Tanzanians and it was a democratization implemented from above, rather than demanded from below (Tucker et al. 2003, 3-4). Despite this Tanzania has since then had five presidential elections and is enjoying a relatively stable democratic development, although it is still not considered to be a complete democracy (Freedom House 2015, The World Bank). The revolutionary party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi, was created through a merging of TANU, the political party on the mainland, and ASP on
Zanzibar in 1977 (Gascoigne). The party has been in power since then (Therkildsen, Bourgouin 2012, 9-10). There are reoccurring discussions concerning the union between Zanzibar and Tanganyika and how the distribution of power between them should be shaped (Tucker et al. 2003, 11-12).

Tanzania has been doing rather well economically in recent years. GDP has grown with around 7% both 2013 and 2014. (The World Bank) Corruption is still a problem however despite efforts to fight it and the country struggles with tax collection (The World Bank, Tucker et al. 2003, 20-21). There is still a considerable number of Tanzanians (28.2% in 2012) that live below the poverty line and inequality is increasing between the rural and urban areas (The World Bank).

4.0 Analysis

4.1 Centralization of power

The centralization of power is one of the aspects of the gatekeeper theory that is examined in this thesis. As is clarified in the method section this analysis will look at various ways that power can be centralized to determine the general state of centralization of power in the Tanzanian state.

4.1.1 The Ruling coalition

The first aspect of power centralization to be assessed is the ruling elite. In Tanzania it consists of a coalition of the ruling party, Chi Chamanda Munduzi (CCM) and fractions of the public administration and the military (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 9-10). A considerable amount of power is centralized to this group and the following paragraphs are an account of this coalition.

The CCM is the dominating power on the political scene in Tanzania, claiming to have 3.5 million members and having won the last election in 2015 with a little over 58% (Therkildsen, Bourgouin 2012, 13-14. BBC 2015). Its dominance is especially apparent on the grassroots level, where opposition parties are virtually non-existent (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 24). The situation on Zanzibar is an exception to this, but I will elaborate on that further down in the text. Enjoying this amount of popularity and geographical spread allows the CCM to cut across ethic and religious lines and extend its power beyond the usual fragmentations of
society (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 13-14). Tucker et al. (2003, 2-4) point out that the CCM dominance needs to be understood in the context of the top-to-bottom democratization process in Tanzania explained in the background section above. The multi-party system was implemented from above, and done in a context of weak opposition parties and a weak civil society. Bickering within the opposition after the first election led to further strengthening of the CCM’s legitimacy, and opposition parties declined even more after the election. The political liberalization and the introduction of the multi-party system did open up broader political and civic space, but rather than challenging the CCM dominance, it strengthened it. The CCM dominance is more or less institutionalized and the state is intertwined with the party (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 12-13). In the end, the democratization has not had the much of an affect on the actual political play and culture within the political competition, despite an attempt at changing the rules, and power is still securely tied to the CCM (Tucker et al. 2003, 2-4).

The second part of the coalition is the public administration. CCM holds a considerable degree of control over public administration, and the president himself holds the option of assigning leading administrators. This contributes to the interconnectedness between the entity of the state and the ruling party. The CCM also utilizes the public administration, especially on a local level, to secure support prior to elections. The final third of the power elite is the military. A considerable part of senior positions within the CCM and public administration are granted to people with their background in the military. The connections between the CCM and the military and public administration grants the CCM a position of advantage compared to opposition parties (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 13-17). More importantly for this analysis, actors that could possibly have become alternative and oppositional powers are now fully integrated in the ruling coalition (Gray, Khan 2010, 10-11). It supports the notion that the power in Tanzania is centralized to a few actors who are tightly connected to, and dependent of, one another.

Apart from the strictly political dominance, the power of the ruling coalition forces other actors in society to maintain a certain degree of connections with the party, as Therkildsen and Bourgouin (2012, 17) illustrate with the quote from a former premier minister, “If you want to do well in business you should join the CCM”. Generally patron-client relationships between politicians of the ruling coalition and businessmen are common in Tanzania. Therkildsen and Bourgouin (2012, 40-41) further explain how the CCM for years has traded
tax-reductions, licenses and rights to land in exchange for funding to the party, pushing businessmen and investors to operate through informal, paternalistic relations with the ruling coalition, rather than through formal relations with the entity of the state. This could further centralize the power around the party and the ruling coalition. Tanzania has however seen success in the area of good governance, especially pertaining to public finances, so this could be a subsiding issue (Gray & Khan 2010, 7-8).

4.1.2 Geographically centralized
Apart from being centralized to a limited amount of actors, connected to each other, the power in Tanzania is also geographically centralized. Despite the CCM having strong support on the local level, the local government is weak. The capacity is generally low and there is a lack of qualified personnel, resulting in a lack of will to grant the local offices of government with more power and autonomy (Tucker et al. 2003, 38-39). The power that the CCM holds on the grassroots level is mainly attributed to a strong central organization that has managed to extend its influence into the local political and bureaucratic sphere (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 13-14). Tucker et al. (2003, 38-39) portray the manner in which the local government is perceived by looking at how the local elected councils have been handled. Although reinstated now after being dismantled during a period of former president Neyrere’s rule, they are often still seen as incompetent power brokers. A contradiction arises when this informal distrust towards local government meet formal policies of decentralization, and it risks making these programs less successful, which in turn leads to continuum of the geographical centralization of power.

4.1.3 Judiciary, executive, legislative
One method of encouraging the sharing of power, and thus counteracting a too extensive centralization, is the system of checks and balances, where power is balanced between independent executive, legislative and judiciary branches (Britannica Academic). In Tanzania this institutional separation is not quite adequate (Tucker et al. 2003, 18-19).

The legislature in Tanzania is weak, and not completely separate from the executive branch. With the CCM being the dominant party in the legislative, and maintaining a high degree of control over its party members and MPs it effectively controls the parliament (Tucker et al. 2003, 24-25). In addition the legislature in Tanzania lacks the resources to be able to have a proper impact on budget and law making, and do not manage an effective check on the activities of the executive government. The balance between the executive and the judiciary is
also skewed. The lower levels of the court system have extensive problems with corruption and are publicly not considered trustworthy. The higher courts enjoy an extensive degree of public support and have in several cases attempted to rule against the executive branch. Cases however that mostly have been overturned by the executive and the legislature, indicating that despite public support these courts struggle with actually posing any serious threat to the discretionary power of the executive (Tucker et al. 2003, 33-34). Despite being formally equal, in reality the judiciary and legislative are subordinate to the executive. Additionally, with the ambition of reducing the power of the executive being something supplied, rather than something demanded and backed by significant social pressure, changing this imbalance is proving difficult (Tucker et al. 2003, 19-22).

The system of checks and balances is not one used in all functioning democracies in the world, and it is no prerequisite for a democratic system. However in a country like Tanzania where the ruling party is so closely connected to the public administration and military, and more or less an institutionalized part of the state, the system of checks and balances could be a method of counteracting this centralization of political power. The failure of that system in Tanzania renders the executive branch with extensive power and an executive dominance that is embedded into Tanzanian political culture and constitution (Tucker et al. 2003, 24-25). When putting this in relation to the theory of the gatekeeper state it serves as another sign of the centralization of power in Tanzania. The constitution is however being changed, which could be a sign of a change in this centralization of power to the executive (Central Intelligence Agency).

4.1.3 Access to power

The question of the access to power concerns the gatekeeper state criteria of narrow channels of access. In the gatekeeper state there are few and narrow channels of access to power and wealth. The following paragraph will be an assessment of the channels of access to power in Tanzania and whether they centralize the struggles for power and wealth around the state and the gate.

The access to higher positions in Tanzanian society today begins with education; a higher level of education is a prerequisite. The access to higher education in Tanzania is low, even compared to other countries of comparable economical and developmental capabilities. Generally only those with sufficient economic means can attend higher education, and thus
their economic advantage is the transformed with an educational advantage opening even more doors to power. However having education is not necessarily enough. Most of those that occupy elite positions within the CCM were people that were brought into it through the party or it’s affiliated organisations. The education scene in Tanzania is improving though, which combined with alternate arenas for power seeking could render the centralization of the struggle for power slightly weaker. However, as explained above, a mere education is not equal to an access to power, and in order to gain more influence many are still forced into the few narrow channels mainly connected to the CCM and the ruling elite in order to get it. (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 21-23)

The arenas that could constitute alternative channels of access in Tanzania, mainly business and civil society, are not very prominent. The civil society in Tanzania is weak and the government has a complicated relation to the NGOs. On the one hand they are encouraged, and the need for inclusiveness of the civil society is stressed. (Tucker et al. 2003, 25-28). On the other hand the government merely accepts the existence of NGOs as long as they do not risk posing a threat to the rule of the government in questions concerning environment, human rights etc. (Tucker et al. 2003, 6-7) Therkildsen and Bourgouin (2012, 22-23) explain how this can partly be attributed to the time under single-party rule. Incorporating possibly powerful actors into the party was a deliberate strategy, aimed at strengthening the party, and subsequently weakening other actors in society in relation to the party. This still has an affect on NGOs and civil society. The fact that the multi-party system is a product of a top-to-bottom democratization process, lacking a thorough democratization of mind-set, has sustained the reluctance to NGOs, and still, partly due to government policies, NGOs lack the capacity to properly organize amongst themselves and thus become a durable political force (Tucker et al. 2003, 19-20). In 2002 an act was passed that vastly restricted possibilities of NGOs, giving the government the power to investigate and assign fines and penalties to NGOs they do consider go against national laws. This risks keeping NGOs and through them the civil society weak in relation to the government. (Ibid, 28-29) This in turn lessens the chances of a channel of access to power and wealth through civil society.

Tanzania also suffers from a weak domestic entrepreneurial class, where few Tanzanians manage to compete with foreign investors. As such it is also a group with limited influence over the government and a group with limited power. (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 13-17) As explained above it is also a group forced to interact with the government through informal
patron-client relationships. However structural changes in economy lately have provided new possibilities for wealth accumulation and could alter power structures. The domestic entrepreneurial class is a group with growing influence that may in the future consist a possible route to power. (Ibid, 30-31)

A brief summary
Political power in Tanzania is centralized. The ruling party is closely integrated with the military and the bureaucracy. Additionally the state is tightly tied to the ruling party, to the degree where it is difficult to separate what is state apparatus and what is CCM. This is strengthened by the fact that much of the political power falls on the executive branch of government, with the judiciary and legislative being far from as powerful and having the same influence. With a new constitution however this could be on its way to be amended. For individuals seeking power or wealth the way to do so is still mainly through the ruling coalition and state, indicating a very centralized power struggle. This too could however be changing as the domestic entrepreneurial class’ influence grows. With reference to the theory of the gatekeeper state, all of this indicates Tanzania being a centralized state, with power focused in more or less a single, albeit a big, group and the rest of society offering little in terms of channels of access.

4.2 Centralization on the gate
Thus far it is determined that the power in the state of Tanzania is centralized, the second step is assessing what this power is centred on: the gate. As explained above the gate is the intersection between internal and external markets, a state that is mainly concerned with this intersection, rather than the internal affairs, shows signs of being a gatekeeper state.

4.2.1 Economic plurality and domestic entrepreneurs
The economy of Tanzania has gone through substantial changes since independence. During the socialist ambitions of the Neyrere regime the government suppressed private accumulation in the name of social equality and nationalized the remains of the gold mining industry. (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 33-37) Since then the neoliberal reorganization of public finances has introduced cuts in public spending, privatization and a rationalisation of taxes. Through the past 20 years of reforms and liberalizations the fiscal structure has been made more generous to foreign investors. It has triggered a vast increase of foreign direct investment into the natural resource extraction sector. Additionally these reform strategies have weakened the state’s capacity of supporting domestic industry and diversification in the
For the past 15 years large-scale, capital-intensive gold mining has been given priority over labour-intensive artisanal activities. The majority are both foreign-owned and foreign-operated, and possibilities to support local accumulation has been overlooked. Additionally few efforts have been made to connect the foreign-operated mining business to local economic development. Largely there is a lack of visible socio-economic benefits of the mining privatization. In a commission launched 2007 to amend this however the suggestions brought forward were only centred on avoiding tax exceptions and increasing revenues from major foreign mineral companies. The commission did not even have the objective of examining the possibilities for artisanal miners. (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 33-37)

The primitive accumulation of the state of Tanzania is mainly concerned with land and mining rights (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 33-34). Funding to improve industries and manufacturing is low (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 44-45). At independence the industrial class of Tanzania was virtually non-existent, and still the industrial sector in Tanzania is not extensive. Most Tanzanians make their living off small scale farming, and 60% of those that are employed in manufacturing industry are employed by foreign owned business. (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 33-37) As I have already touched upon, the domestic entrepreneurial class is also weak. The colonial rulers as well as the single-party state suppressed the group, from which they have not yet recovered. Although the non-black, mainly Asian, fragment of the entrepreneurs are doing slightly better they are still politically weak and suffer suspicion based on the prior economic nationalism of the country. (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 11-17)

Gray and Khan (2010, 11-13) describe how historical evidence points to the market’s incapability of amending the lack of a successful national capitalism without the involvement of the state. Such an involvement in Tanzania is unlikely to be received well by donors, who have favoured extensive liberalization reforms rather than state involvement. Additionally the ruling coalition is more prone to invest the money they preside over in their own continued rule (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 9-11). The extensive growth of a domestic, but more specifically black domestic entrepreneurial class risks having more legitimacy as threat to the CCM, which could explain the ruling coalition’s continuous discouragement of them
4.2.2 Capabilities of the state

Despite the ruling coalition’s rather effective control over the state, it seems to be struggling with creating socio-economic development. Tanzania has in past years seen a strong rise in GDP and an overall successful economic development, much thanks to foreign investment and aid. However the living standards experienced by the average Tanzanian has not significantly improved, and general productive capacity is not enjoying the same degree of positive development as the GDP. The revenues to the state have increased since the 1990’s, partly due to an increased inlet of taxes. But despite this improved capacity of making changes, an increasing amount of the money that the government controls is being invested into the ruling coalition itself, with the objective of contributing to winning elections and staying in power. There is little support for the notion that the money at the hands of the government is being systematically used for capacity building activities.\(^5\)

When discussing the Tanzanian economy the factor of foreign aid cannot be easily disregarded. As has been mentioned Tanzania has a history of aid dependency and since the turn of the century the levels of aid have been at around 10-12% of GDP. The first five years of the new century even saw a vast increase in received aid compared to other developing countries. What is more remarkable however in the case of Tanzania is that the aid received makes up 40% of the governmental budget. Like other state revenues a significant share of this money is used by the ruling coalition to maintain its position. There is a lot more that can be said about the pros and cons of aid and the potential of aid being fruitful, for which there is not sufficient room in this thesis. However the amount of aid going directly to the government, and in turn being used to tighten the ruling elite’s hold on power strengthens the image of the Tanzanian state foremost being a gate. The continuous control over which is the utter priority of the CCM and ruling coalition. (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 38-41)

A brief summary

At large the Tanzanian economy shows several signs of being centred on the gate. Foreign-operated natural resource extraction is given priority over local labour-intensive artisanal

\(^4\) Due to the general suspicion towards the non-black entrepreneurial group based on the former attempts at nationalizing the economy, a black entrepreneurial class risks gaining more legitimacy and therefore being a bigger threat to the CCM (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 17)

\(^5\) Entire paragraph is based on Therkildsen & Bourgouin (2012)
activities and industry. Past attempts at improving the economy has concerned tariffs and reducing tax exception for these foreign mining companies. The domestic entrepreneurial class is being undermined rather than supported. Capacity developing activates are at a minimum, and despite impressive growth in GDP, the productive sector is stagnant. The state monitors the intersection between the internal and external, collecting tariffs, encouraging foreign direct investment and fails to create plurality in the economy. As Cooper explains in his theory, leaders in Tanzania still seem more tempted to use the revenues to the state to strengthen their own hold on power than to create economic plurality and growth. Additionally the liberalization policies introduced by donors seem to have had the effect of strengthening the gatekeeper state. Reducing state involvement and putting the energy in attracting foreign direct investment in the natural resource section seems to be making the gate an even more prominent aspect of the Tanzanian state.

4.3 Struggle over the gate

So far it has been determined that Tanzania is both characterized by centralization of power, and a state constructed on the characteristics of the gate. The next aspect to examine is struggle. As Cooper describes, what characterizes the gatekeeper state is not the effective control over the gate, but rather the struggle over it. The following text will concern the nature of the political struggles discernible in Tanzania, with the aim of determining whether they constitute a struggle over the gate. Political struggle is undoubtedly present in fully functioning democracies as well. Hence, as is mentioned in the section on operationalization, what is of interest here is political struggle that above all concerns the mere control over the state rather than ideological debate. As Cooper (2002, 182-183) explains, addressed in the theoretical section, the political struggle in gatekeeper states is imbedded with a winner-take-all mode of competition, affecting the shape of the struggle.

4.3.1 Political struggle

The following section concerns the political struggle between parties. However with the opposition being so weak the struggle between them and the CCM is not a too extensive one.

During the time of single-party rule, creating unity was a deliberate strategy. The emphasis was put on the similarities and the loyalty to the state and party was stressed. Further more, the popular mobilization behind the socialist, single-party state created an inclusive society
that toned down differences (Tucker et al. 2003, 14-16). Since then, Tanzanians are used to the single-party formation and the struggle being within that one party, rather than between several different parties (Ibid, 3-4). A ruling party enjoying that amount of political hegemony, in a context of a state with such a strong executive power, has diminished both will and capacity to fight for change among oppositional forces. Nevertheless the legalization of opposition parties in 1992 naturally resulted in a rise in political struggle in between parties, but the opposition in Tanzania remains weak. One of the areas that are widely debated is that of the constitution and structure of the government. With the rule of the CCM being more or less institutionalized, and the prerequisites for political competition therefore being poor, there is significant struggle concerning the structures of this political competition. And not without reason, with a democracy implemented from above the political culture has not followed the process of democratization. To conclude the matter, Tanzania may have formal instruments of multi-party democracy in place, but the infrastructure of the single-party state is still intact to such a degree that the actual competition between parties is suffering, haltering the struggle over the control of the gate on the inter-party level. (Tucker et al. 2003, 17-19)

Despite the advantage of the CCM when it comes to winning elections and maintaining control, the party still uses unfair tactics. This includes buying votes and corruption, but also exploiting the local level connections with bureaucracy to assure support (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 26-27). This follows the development Cooper describes when gatekeeper states go through a certain degree of democratization; despite a multi-party system politics is still conducted through patron-client relationships (Cooper 2002, 180-183).

4.3.2 Internal struggle
The weakness of the opposition does not, however, result in a complete lack of political struggle (Therkildsen & Bourgouin 2012, 22-24). With the CCM being so dominant on the political scene and in such a position of power in Tanzania, control over the party can be largely synonymous with control over the state. Thus rendering the potential struggle over control over the party a struggle over control over the gate. This power struggle is undoubtedly evident in the CCM. During the almost 20 years of single-party rule, the CCM was the only political organisation in which people could get involved. Hence the party incorporates politicians of very varying opinions. After the introduction of multi-party system most of the talented and experienced politicians decided to stay in the party and as such the
party still cuts across ethnic, religious and social divides, which constitute a source of conflict. There are mainly four different areas over which the fractions of the CCM struggle. The first is foremost ideological, between the market-supporting reformist and those who prefer the Ujama idea. The second one concerns the questions of Zanzibar vs. the mainland. The third is between different generations, concerning positions of power and the forth is between the party bureaucratic elite, the party political elite and the state elite over the control of the party. It is foremost the latter two that constitute a struggle over control over the party, and thus a struggle over control over the gate. (Ibid, 22-24)

4.3.3 The case of Zanzibar

One of the issues causing tension in Tanzanian politics is the formation of the union with Zanzibar (Tucker et al. 2003, 11-13). There is a quite solid support for the existence of a union, but it is still embedded with discussions of how. There are those on the mainland saying that Zanzibar has too much autonomous power, and those on Zanzibar saying that the islands do not have enough. This discussion was suppressed by the single-party state, and is now resurfacing with the introduction of the multi-party system. Within this multi-party system it is also on Zanzibar that the CCM meet their largest threat. The CCM on the mainland is foremost concerned with whether further liberalization will create outcomes that may threaten the party’s control over the territory. There is worry that further liberalization may spark increased demands for economic and political autonomy. The election of 2000 once again saw this question spark violence, so bad that it for the first time sent Tanzanians fleeing to Kenya to avoid it. Being the one arena where its dominance is actually really threatened, the question of Zanzibar constitutes the biggest test for CCM’s commitment to democracy.

The relationship between Tanganyika and Zanzibar constitutes one of the more troublesome political discussions in Tanzania. It is definitely a political struggle, but the question of interest in this analysis is whether it can really constitute a struggle over the gate. It is the Tanzanian state that constitutes the gate, and seeing as the discussions here mainly concern the degree of autonomy of Zanzibar and the details of how the union between Zanzibar and Tanganyika should be shaped, it is not a fight over control of the Tanzanian state, and thus not a fight over control over the gate.
A brief summary

Struggle over the gate is not as prominent in Tanzania as Cooper’s gatekeeper theory would suggest. The opposition is weak and the CCM experience little confrontation powerful enough to really risk the party’s hold on power. Despite this however they still do use unfair methods, using informal connections and corruption to cling to the power they have. The struggle for power within the CCM is more prominent, and various fractions fight for the control over the party. Despite this the party still seems to maintain an effective control of the state. The biggest challenge to the CCM is the question of Zanzibar. Despite being the main source for violent struggle in Tanzania, and the place where CCM is most successfully challenged, it does not necessarily constitute a struggle over the gate. With the CCM having maintained an effective degree of control over the state, and still maintaining a high degree of support from Tanzanians, it is difficult to say that the Tanzanian state is characterized by struggle. Rather the opposite seems true, what characterizes the Tanzanian state is the ruling coalition’s continuous ability to remain the unquestionable political authority.

5.0 Conclusion

5.1 Results

A vast majority of those that are now independent states in Africa were created through colonialism. During colonialism they were structured in a way fitting to what the colonial powers’ objective with them was. The centralization of power and an economy solely centred on exports and import created gatekeeper states, a legacy that remained when these states became independent. The “winner-takes-all” system of a state with so much power centralized to the intersection between the inside and outside has inspired patronage and crony capitalism rather than development and plurality. In order to asses whether Tanzania still suffers from the obstacle to development that is the gatekeeper state I have throughout this paper focused on three different aspects of the gatekeeper theory: The centralization of power, the centralization on the gate, and the struggle over the gate. After applying these three categories to Tanzania, my conclusion is that the country meets two of these three criteria. Tanzania is mostly still characterized by this centralization of power. The power is not only centralized to the state through the extensive powers of the executive branch and the lack of alternative channels of access to wealth and power, but it is also centralized to the ruling coalition. With the strong connections between public administration, military, and the ruling
party powers that could have been oppositional now constitute a further centralization. Additionally this centralization of power still appears to concern mainly the gate. The national industry and domestic entrepreneurial class is weak, and foreign operated mining companies are given priority, whilst at the same time the ruling coalition struggles with improving productive capacity and living standards, despite its political dominance. As in the gatekeeper state Cooper describes, the Tanzanian ruling elite is more tempted to use their economic power to strengthen their own hold on power, rather than creating economic plurality. The one criteria of the three utilized in this analysis that Tanzania does not quite live up to is the one concerning struggle over the gate. Rather than being characterized by political struggle, Tanzania is characterized by political stability. This is the case despite that the high degree of centralization of power to the gate should be enough incentive to fight over the power of the state to far larger degree. Despite the lack of extensive struggle I still make the assessment that Tanzania remains a gatekeeper state. Based on the high degree of centralization of power and centralization on the gate Tanzania carries the fundamental structure of a gatekeeper state. I will shortly discuss the fact that this is not accompanied by a high degree of struggle in the following paragraph.

Apart from answering the thesis question this analysis has also contributed with two more results: the relation between the effects of the single-party state and liberalization policies, and the perseverance of the gatekeeper state. The years of single party rule are likely to have had some supplementary effects on some of these three criteria of the gatekeeper state focused on in the analysis. First is the centralization of power. Undermining or incorporating oppositional power centres, such as the military (incorporated) or civil society (undermined) centralized power to the state, and thus, given the single-party system, also to the ruling coalition. The ruling coalition has therefore had every incentive of strengthening this aspect of the gatekeeper state. Secondly we have the power struggle. Through the ruling coalition’s 20-year long hold on power people were allowed, even encouraged, to get involved into the party. Combining this with the undermining or incorporation of possible oppositional power centres left the party and ruling coalition being the scene of the main power struggle, undermining other arenas for struggle over the gate. The liberalization policies implemented in Tanzania have also had some supplementary effects. Cooper brings up how liberalization and privatization does not necessarily lead to a weakened degree of centralization of power to the ruling elite in gatekeeper states. This is evident in Tanzania too. As this analysis has not included the time period before the liberalization processes, it is difficult to say what the
effects of the economic policies of the Neyrere regime was on the gatekeeper state. It is still however possible to say that the liberalization processes strengthened rather than weakened the centralization of power around the gate. This was done through prioritizing foreign direct investment in the natural resources extraction sector rather than strengthening a labour-intensive production sector. It may have improved the Tanzanian GDP growth, but has nevertheless failed in shifting the focus away from the intersection between the internal and external markets and economies, rendering the ruling coalition’s dependency on the gate intact.

5.2 Democracy, development, and the gatekeeper state

This thesis began with an account of the degree of democratization and human development in Africa, and through that the argument was made that there is reason to study the gatekeeper state. In this final paragraph I would like to return to the topic of democracy and development. Tanzania has, like many other African gatekeeper states did during the 1990s, gone through a certain degree of democratization. Unfortunately Tanzania has also seen the development following this degree of democratization that Cooper describes, where the same patron-client ridden politics is merely given a new form. The multi-party system in Tanzania was introduced from above after demands from donor agencies and even though it was a step forward it might have been less of a success than one would have wished. It failed to create a more democratic culture, and whilst this can be attributed to lack of will from the public and the residual experience of the years of single-party rule, the still intact gatekeeper state of Tanzania is also a relevant factor. The amount of power centralized to the gate renders the potential losses when loosing control over this gate too high, counteracting democratization. These high stakes also leave the ruling elite focusing their funds and capabilities on staying in power, rather than improving chances for development. As is accounted for in the section above, and as Cooper addresses too, this can render liberalization processes with the best intentions not only fruitless, but also counteractive. The final point I wish to make is therefore that the study of the Tanzanian state does not only determine the colonial legacy and the structure of the gatekeeper state to still be intact, it also supports what Cooper establishes; the gatekeeper state can constitute a challenge for the chances of development and democracy. Thus it is of importance to keep in mind that this structure is still intact to avoid the risk that these policies meant to create democratization and development, instead strengthen the gatekeeper state.
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