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Since mid-December 2013, thousands of people have been killed in armed conflict in South Sudan. The fighting is entrenched in a power struggle between the main political contenders ahead of elections which were scheduled for 2015. This article examines the violence in South Sudan since the North-South war ended with a focus on the consequences of the introduction of electoral politics. Our research contributes to the literature on state-building and peace-building in war-torn societies, by exploring how the extreme levels of violence are linked to three groups of factors. First, the stakes involved in being part of the government are extremely high, since it is the only way to secure political and economic influence. Second, the actors involved in political life are dominated by individuals who held positions within the rebel groups, which increase the risk of political differences turning violent. Third, the institutions important for a legitimate electoral process, and which work to prevent violence, are weak or non-existent.

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INTRODUCTION

On 15 December 2013, fighting between different factions of the presidential guard broke out in Juba, the capital of the world’s newest nation, South Sudan. The conflict spread rapidly and killed more than 10,000 people (ICG 2014). Within only a few months, over 1 million had been displaced, with approximately 950,000 people internally displaced in South Sudan and close to 300,000 having fled to neighbouring countries (Amnesty International 2014). The fighting included massacres where people were targeted because of their ethnicity, with the main dividing line being between the Dinka and Nuer. The Dinka constitutes South Sudan’s largest ethnic group, to which President Salva Kiir belongs, while the Nuer are the second largest group and also the ethnic affiliation of the rebel leader Riek Machar (UNMISS 2014). Fears about a ‘next Rwanda’ were raised (Sudan Tribune 30.4.2014).

This article seeks to contribute to research on post-war governance and conflict in South Sudan by advancing our understanding of links between violence and electoral politics. These aspects remain largely unexplored and previous analyses of violence in South Sudan focus instead the dynamics of the war and road to independence, predation and kleptocracy (de Waal 2014; Johnson 2012; LeRiche & Arnold 2012; Pinaud 2014). This is surprising given that the 2010 election in South Sudan had clear connections to several violent conflicts, both insurgent challenges against the central regime in Juba and more localised communal conflicts. In the article, we build on previous research on South Sudan to trace the legacies of the North-South war on electoral politics and how the introduction of electoral competition has influenced patterns of violence in South Sudan. The analysis is also informed by more than five months of field research carried out in Sudan and South Sudan between 2007 and 2013 during which 97 interviews were carried out with politicians, rebels, religious leaders, academics, traditional leaders, UN personnel, and youths in Juba, Bor, Malakal and Khartoum. Despite the ethnic component of the fighting, the prime cause of the deplorable situation concerns power struggles
between political leaders. In fact, the December 2013 incidents constitute an escalation of a crisis of governance that has been ongoing since South Sudan gained its autonomy in 2005. The situation deteriorated during 2013 as competition for influential positions within the ruling party SPLM (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement) ahead of the 2015 elections intensified; elections which currently have been postponed.¹

Theoretically, this article contributes to the expanding research agenda on elections and violence in post-war societies (Bekoe 2012; Brancanti & Snyder 2013; Jarstad & Sisk 2006; Lyons 2005). By studying South Sudan, we develop the theoretical understanding of electoral politics in societies transitioning from war. Given its recently gained status as an independent state, South Sudan faces a dual predicament. South Sudan has not only been struggling to achieve peace, but also to build a viable state. The parallel processes of state-building and peace-building require a framework that considers key factors from both these perspectives. However, much of the literature on electoral processes in Africa’s transitioning societies analyses democratisation, state-building and peace-building processes as separate phenomena (e.g. Boone 2003; Bratton & de Valle; 1997; Lindberg 2006; Lyons 2005; Mamdani 1996). We therefore make use of a conceptual framework which is structured around three key components: stakes, actors and institutions. The framework was developed to identify the conflict-inducing aspects of elections in countries which have introduced multiparty-democracy in a post-war period (Höglund et al. 2009). Our analysis of South Sudan represents a first empirical application of the theoretical framework.

The analysis yields several important insights. First, the stakes in the elections in South Sudan are extraordinarily high, since a position within the government is principally the only way to safeguard political and economic influence. Second, a majority of the actors involved in the elections were associated with the rebel movements during the previous civil war, which increases the risk that they will choose a violent path over non-violent politics. Third, key
institutions – including election management bodies and political parties – are very weak and in some cases non-existent. This encourages manipulation of institutions to further partisan interests, and the ability of institutions to prevent or mitigate the risk of violence is extremely low.

The analysis also sheds light on the continuities and discontinuities from the North-South war. We argue that the end of the longstanding war of independence and the formation of a new state have created (or reintroduced) new dividing lines which have reignited power struggles at the elite level. At the same time, the legacies of violent conflict linger: parties and institutions are weak, weapons abound, and there is a violent political culture nurtured by the war. Moreover, prevailing hostile relations between Sudan and South Sudan mean that challengers of the regime in Juba have an accessible source of support, including weapons. In this context, the introduction of electoral politics has spawned new conflicts, with a major propensity for violence.

This article is divided into four parts. First, we briefly discuss previous research on violence, elections, peace-building and state-building and outline our theoretical approach. Second, we describe electoral politics and patterns of violence in South Sudan. Third, we apply the conceptual framework and analyse the influence of actors, stakes and institutions on the connection between elections and the violence in South Sudan. Fourth, in our concluding remarks we discuss the interlinkages between the three factors, identify key conflict-generating aspects and some insights for further research.
Two research trends have served to further our understanding of the challenges that peaceful politics face in war-torn countries. A first strand highlights the dilemmas encountered in war-to-peace transitions and focuses on the structural features of societies shattered by armed conflict. For instance, institutions and party structures are weak, civil society is generally politicised or has minimal influence, spoilers set on ruining the peace process are present, infrastructure is poor and there is dependence on large-scale international involvement (Brancanti & Snyder 2013; Jarstad & Sisk 2006; Paris 2004; Lyons 2005). These conditions make the advent of multi-party politics and the institutions sustaining democracy precarious. Moreover, war-to-peace transitions are often accompanied by state-building processes, emphasising the necessity to develop capable and legitimate state institutions to underpin the conduct of democratic politics. While a necessary step, this introduces further difficult conditions since institution-building in essence requires not only fundamental reform, but also time (Paris & Sisk 2009). Taken together, this research has pointed to the conflict-inducing aspects of elections, especially in times of transition.

A second strand focuses more directly on violent electoral competition and views violence as a strategy parallel to other constitutional or non-constitutional strategies, which governments and opposition parties use to further their influence during electoral periods. Election-related violence has been studied both as a strategic form of political violence used by elites and as more grass-root driven processes, including ethnic rioting and violent protest.

Part of this research stresses the features of the electoral process, in particular the incentive structures shaped by institutional weakness and constitutional constraints, the electoral system, electoral management bodies and the nature of international involvement (Hafner-Burton et al. 2010; Daxecker 2012; Arriola & Johnson, unpublished paper; Fjelde & Höglund 2014). For instance, Wilkinson’s (2004) study on ethnic riots in India suggests that
electoral incentives at the town level explain where Muslim–Hindu riots break out, whereas state-level electoral motivations decide if the police will be called in to prevent riots.

Other studies emphasise more general features of society, such as the combination of social cleavages and patrimonialism. Patrimonialism is a feature of societies which increases the stakes of elections, especially when intertwined with societal features which price ethnicity as the most important political asset (Arriola 2009). The importance of patrimonial politics for electoral conflicts can be witnessed, for example, in Kenya, Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire, where local land grievances are used by opportunistic politicians for their own political purposes (Boone 2012; Boone & Krieger 2012). Conflicts between Christians and Muslims in Indonesia have been based on patronage networks and clientelism, where the triggering factor was the upcoming election (Van Klinken 2001). These studies point to the interlinkages between the formal political arena and the informal structures which are used by political elites to gain and maintain power.

This article adopts a novel approach to studying the violence-election nexus in South Sudan. Our conceptual framework builds on insights from previous research and suggests three sets of factors which have been emphasised as important features in explaining the conflict-generating dynamics of elections: stakes, actors, and institutions (Höglund et al. 2009). While other factors also come into play, such as ethnic and socioeconomic configurations in the country, resource scarcity or path dependency, the theoretical framework is useful to capture the dynamics in South Sudan, since its constituent components include factors of relevance both from a peace-building and state-building perspective.

*Stakes* highlight the price attached to winning elections. The likelihood of elections becoming violent is premised on the importance of the elections. In transitioning countries, the stakes of elections are generally higher than in consolidated democracies. Access to state power becomes a means to secure personal wealth and provide significant benefits for one’s own
constituency (Bratton & van de Walle 1997; Posner 2005). Presidential and governmental power is of particular importance, especially in highly centralised states, since control of the state’s economic resources is exercised at the centre. In non-democratic countries, state assets can also be used to oppress political opponents to gain an advantage during times of election. For instance, the police and military may be manipulated to make extra-legal arrests of regime critics, break up political meetings of opposition parties, or intimidate opposition voters and candidates.

*Actors* point to a component that deals with the political players involved in the electoral process. Political parties are considered the key agents in electoral processes, because they establish the link between the voter and the institutions of democracy. In countries emerging from violent conflict, the main political actors are generally strongly militarised. While non-militant political parties may exist, many of the electoral competitors may be formerly armed actors who only recently became formal political parties. In addition, in many developing countries the political parties are fairly weakly institutionalised and have insufficient resources (Diamond 1999; Panebianco 1988; Randall & Svåsand 2002). This holds true in many war-torn societies as well. The main challenge from the perspective of violence, is the involvement of militants in politics. Democratic, non-violent behaviour and norms take time to develop. The risk is considerable that violence will be used as a means to repress opponents, or, if faced with electoral loss or political marginalisation, take up arms (Lyons 2005; Manning 2007; Söderberg Kovacs 2008).

*Institutions* emphasise the structures of the state in which elections take place. The institutional framework – including the electoral system, the electoral law, electoral management bodies (EMBs), police and judiciary – determines the rules of the game in electoral politics. A key issue to consider with regard to institutions and conflict management in a post-war context is the extent to which the institutions increase polarisation by excluding important
actors with the capacity to foment violence. The representativeness of institutions such as the executive, parliament and local government is, for instance, influenced by the type of electoral system. Majoritarian systems may to a larger extent than proportional ones encourage winner-takes-all dynamics and create permanent minorities, which may have a violence-inducing influence on electoral politics (e.g. Lindberg 2005; Reynolds 1999; Sisk 1996). The representativeness of key institutions, such as EMBs, the police and judiciary, is also fundamentally determined by appointment and recruitment processes, which may be based on political considerations and partisan interest, rather than merit. A second aspect of importance relates to the capability and independence of institutions to fulfil the roles they are meant to perform. For instance, electoral laws may be designed to prevent militant actors from standing in elections and may prohibit ‘hate speech’ that might encourage violent mobilisation. However, if the police and judiciary are weak or politicised and thereby unable to enforce the laws, these laws will have little influence on behaviour around elections.

We seek to trace the connection between election and violence in a broad sense. We do not confine our study to violence in the immediate proximity to elections, but include violence prior to and after the elections. We also analyse both communal and state-based armed conflicts, and the extent to which they are interwoven with electoral dynamics. For this reason, we do not use the term electoral violence, which is considered a specific form of political violence in much of the academic literature (Höglund 2009; Daxecker 2012). Communal conflicts constitute ‘conflicts between non-state groups that are organised along a shared communal identity’, while state-based conflict is a ‘conflict with a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory … between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state’ (UCDP 2014). In our study we focus primarily on the conflicts which originate in relationships between the elites, but throughout the analysis we highlight the interlinkages to local conflict dynamics (Kalyvas 2006). Moreover, the South Sudan case points
to an additional factor with regard to institutions which is important to consider. In states completely dominated by one political party, the real political competition takes place within the party, rather than at the actual elections.

ELECTORAL POLITICS AND PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE IN SOUTH SUDAN

On 9 January 2005, Sudan’s longstanding North-South war ended through the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by the Government of Sudan and the rebel movement SPLM/A. The agreement ended Africa’s longest conflict that killed more than 2 million people. The war had its origin in the centralisation of economic and political power in Khartoum, in the north of Sudan, whereas the peripheries – the south of Sudan in particular – remained severely marginalised. The North-South divide was further entrenched by the north being predominately Muslim and Arabic, whereas the south is predominantly Christian and African. The CPA fundamentally changed South Sudan as a political entity by granting the region extensive autonomy and by establishing the Government of South Sudan as the prime ruling authority of the area. The agreement also resulted in power-sharing institutions, such as the Government of National Unity with representation from the north and south, wealth-sharing arrangements for the oil, and the formation of new armed forces. On 9 January 2011, a referendum was held in which 99% of the electorate voted in favour of independence and South Sudan was born on 9 July 2011 (LeRiche & Arnold 2012).

The 2010 elections

The interim period opened up for electoral competition within South Sudan as a political unit. The April 2010 elections were stipulated in the CPA and the international community believed that the elections would foster a democratic culture in Sudan (Thomas 2009; Willis et al. 2009).
However, many analysts were hesitant about the advisability of elections because they were seen as potentially destabilising. Given the low levels of trust between the signatories of the agreement, and deep divisions within Sudan and South Sudan, it was suggested that elections would foster new conflict. For South Sudan, the CPA was primarily a means to pave the way to independence, not a means to promote democracy. In addition, the electoral process faced numerous structural difficulties relating to, for example, the demarcation of the north-south border, population census, voter registration, and the ongoing conflict in Darfur (Willis et al. 2009).

The elections were held for three levels of executive positions – President of Sudan, President of South Sudan and State Governors – as well as three levels of legislative elections – the National Assembly, the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, and state legislative assemblies. In addition to several structural problems, many opposition candidates were harassed and arrested before the elections. In South Sudan, the April 2010 elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for the SPLM. Salva Kiir won the presidential election with 93% of the vote, leaving 7% to his sole rival, Lam Akol of the SPLM-DC (SPLM-Democratic Change). Akol was from the Shilluk community and had previously been an influential commander during the SPLM rebellion (Carter Center 2010). In addition, all governorships except one went to the SPLM. The exception was Western Equatoria, where Colonel Joseph Bakosoro ran as an independent and won. Bakosoro was a former commander of the SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army, the armed wing of the SPLM). In the assembly, only three seats were filled by non-SPLM candidates (Curless 2010).

Violence in the 2010 elections

In spite of some harassment and intimidation ahead of the 2010 elections, they were generally peaceful (Carter Center 2010). However, in their aftermath several violent conflicts were
initiated with clear links to electoral politics. Two rebellions were launched soon after the elections by candidates who lost the elections (UCDP 2014). A first insurgency was initiated by George Athor, a former commander in the SPLA from the Padeng Dinka community, who ran as an independent candidate for governor of Jonglei state. Following defeat at the polls, Athor accused the SPLM of manipulating the voting, declared the results invalid, and called on the government of South Sudan to dissolve. Athor founded a rebel group called the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A) and initiated fighting against the regime in Juba. In late 2011, George Athor was killed in battle but other elements of the SSDM/A continued the rebellion. Another rebellion in Jonglei was launched by David Yauyau in May 2010, which started after he lost the election for a parliamentary seat. In contrast to most other rebel leaders, Yauyau, from the Murle community, was not an ex-combatant, but a civil servant in Pibor county (Small Arms Survey 2013b). In 2011, Yauyau joined the government, but defected again in April 2012. An important reason for Yauyau’s defection was the severe abuses against Murle civilians in Pibor county by SPLA during a disarmament operation earlier in 2012. Elements within SPLA used this campaign to take revenge on communities perceived as enemies (Small Arms Survey 2013a). A ceasefire agreement was signed with the government in late January 2014 (Sudan Tribune 30.1.2014).

In 2011, a new rebellion was launched in South Sudan when the South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A) took up weapons against the regime in Juba. The group was led by Peter Gadet, a commander from the Bul Nuer community (Small Arms Survey 2013a). Compared to the two rebellions described above, this rebellion was less linked to electoral dynamics and was initiated several months after the elections. Nevertheless, when launching the rebellion, the SSLM/A stated that ‘[t]he noises of victory by the SPLM in the last elections in the South are preposterous and ludicrous’ (Sudan Tribune 11.4.2011) and called for a caretaker government to rule South Sudan until new elections were held. However, the real
motivation for the rebellion can be found in a search for economic and political advantages, and divisions created during the North-South war. Gadet changed sides several times during the war: at times he fought for the SPLM and at other times for the Sudanese government (De Waal 2014). Gadet signed a peace agreement with the regime in Juba in August 2011, but other sections of the SSLM/A have continued to fight against the South Sudanese government (Small Arms Survey 2013a).

In addition to these rebellions, electoral politics have also added fuel to violent communal conflicts that have killed thousands in South Sudan since the signing of the CPA. These conflicts are very intricate and have multiple causes such as land-grievances, animosities created during the North-South war, cattle-raiding, proliferation of small arms, uneven disarmament, lack of development, and the absence of justice institutions (ICG 2009). Elites have also fanned violent conflicts between communities in South Sudan in order to increase their political influence locally, as well as centrally (Brosché 2014). While the rebellions were directed against the governing regime in Juba, the communal conflicts play out between non-state actors. But these two types of collective violence are connected. For instance, the Athor and Yauyau rebellions (which were launched due to lost elections) have influenced the Murle-Lou Nuer communal conflict, which at the time was the most violent communal conflict in the world. The conflict has escalated in recent years, and peaked in year 2011 when more than 1,400 people were killed (UCDP 2014). The communities have historically-rooted grievances, primarily related to competition over land and cattle, and the animosity between the groups increased during the civil war when different commanders armed the communities to strengthen their position vis-a-vis their rivals. However, Athor recruited from the Lou Nuer community and provided them with weapons, while Yauyau had a similar strategy within the Murle community. Typically, young men from the respective communities joined the rebellion to arm against rival
communities. Thus, dynamics related to rebellion and electoral competition is a factor that intensifies fighting between the communities.

The 2013 crisis

The most severe challenge to South Sudan since the signing of the 2005 peace accord is a result of the crisis which erupted in mid-December 2013, when fighting between different factions of the presidential guard broke out in Juba. Within only a few months, more than 10,000 people were killed.

The conflict originates in the struggle for power within the SPLM, which in turn has implications for the elections that were planned for 2015. In mid-March 2013, the then Vice-President Riek Machar declared his intention to challenge President Salva Kiir over the leadership of the SPLM at the SPLM’s third extraordinary national convention scheduled for May 2013. However, the convention was repeatedly delayed, as were other important meetings in, for instance, the National Liberation Council (NLC) and the SPLM Political Bureau. One reason was that Machar appeared to have stronger support than Kiir at such meetings (ICG 2014). To safeguard his power, Salva Kiir sacked the entire government, including Riek Machar, in July 2013. When the government was reinstalled, politicians perceived as threats to Kiir were replaced with people assumed to be more loyal to the president. On 6 December 2013, several of those previously fired from the government held a press conference outlining a political platform that challenged Kiir and accused him of ‘dictatorial tendencies’ (Sudan Tribune 6.12.2013). The group took the name SPLM-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) and was led by Riek Machar but also included several other influential politicians from various communities, including Dinka. This broad coalition constituted a severe threat to Salva Kiir (Small Arms Survey 2014). In an attempt to curtail the crisis, a meeting in the NLC was held on 14 December. During the tense meeting Kiir succeeded in removing some of his critics and, as a result,
discharged officials boycotted the next day’s session. On the evening of 15 December, fighting erupted after the President decided to disarm presidential guards from the Nuer community, and to arrest leaders of the SPLM-IO who were accused of an attempted coup (ICG 2014). While disputed, independent analysts consider the alleged coup as unlikely (Reuters 20.12.2013). Intense fighting broke out and within a few days most of the leading critics were arrested, but Riek Machar succeeded in escaping (ICG 2014).

The fighting has been intense and control over strategic towns like Bentiu, Bor and Malakal has changed several times. An integral part of the fighting has been repeated massacres, where people have been targeted because of their ethnicity (the incumbent President Salva Kiir is Dinka and the rebel leader Riek Machar is Nuer). In an early phase of the fighting, the SPLM-IO advanced towards Juba, and it is widely believed that without support from Uganda, the South Sudanese government would not have been able to keep control of the capital. The regime has also been supported by Sudanese rebel groups – notably the JEM (Justice and Equality Movement), an opposition movement based in Darfur. Moreover, there are allegations that Machar is supported by Eritrea, but no proof has been presented. The role played by Sudan is particularly intricate. Officially it has supported the regime in Juba, and Khartoum is active as a mediator in the IGAD-led negotiations. At the same time, it allows SPLM/A-IO to use rear bases in Sudan and has given weapons and training to Machar’s forces. Sudan balances between several crucial interests. Economically it is important for Khartoum to uphold a working relationship with Juba (ICG 2014; ICG 2015). Currently, all oil produced in South Sudan is transferred through a pipeline in Sudan and the fee Juba pays for usage is economically important for Khartoum. In 2013, Sudan and South Sudan agreed that the latter should pay about 10US$ for every barrel transported through Sudan in addition to about 3 billion US$ over a three year period in ‘transitional financial arrangements’ (Radio Tamazuj 2013). Thus, if the rebels succeed in taking control of the oil-fields, it is likely that Khartoum will provide even
more support. In addition, since the Sudanese rebels – and Sudan’s arch enemy Uganda – are fighting alongside the South Sudanese government, there is a risk of Sudan-South Sudan relations deteriorating (ICG 2015).

Another international dimension of the crisis is the presence of about 9,000 UN peacekeepers as part of the UNMISS (United Nations Mission in South Sudan) operation that has a chapter seven mandate from the UN Security Council. Severely outnumbered by the fighting forces, UNMISS has been unable to halt the fighting although the mission has protected around 70,000 civilians who have fled to UN camps (ICG 2014; UNMISS 2014). The international community has pushed for a negotiated solution to the crisis and IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) has led negotiations in Addis Ababa. In May 2014, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar signed an agreement to cease hostilities, and in June 2014 the two leaders signed another agreement that stipulated that a government of national unity should be formed within 60 days (Sudan Tribune 11.6.2014). However, fighting has continued in South Sudan. One important reason for the difficulty in addressing the conflict is that the two sides are not stable units: the rebels are internally split and Machar is not in control over all of them, and several influential government officials have changed sides (AFP 31.5.2014). In March 2015, the year-long negotiations in Addis Ababa broke down as the parties did not meet a deadline set up by IGAD and fighting between the government and SPLM/A-IO intensified immediately (Small Arms Survey 2015). In June 2015, negotiations restarted and in late August the government and SPLM/A-IO signed a peace agreement. This agreement has lowered fighting, but the situation remains unstable (Sudan Tribune 29.9.2015).

Hence, instead of nurturing a democratic culture, the introduction of elections in South Sudan has helped foster several destructive conflicts. Our analysis of why this is the case will build on theoretical work on the predicaments of elections in war-torn societies and highlights
three clusters of factors that influence the outbreak of violent conflict: stakes, actors, and institutions.

THE STAKES: THE PRICE OF STATE POWER

The stakes involved in the political struggle in South Sudan are immense. The structure of the South Sudanese state – and the party governing it – is very hierarchical and puts the winner in this contest in a powerful position. South Sudan has a very strong presidential system in which the parliament only has limited power to counteract decisions by the president (Radon & Logan 2014: 157). Power is also concentrated at the top level at the expense of more local governance structures.

The Government of South Sudan was established by the CPA and the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan. However, state institutions are entirely dominated by the SPLM, in essence making it a one-party state (ICG 2014). The history of the SPLM is closely linked to John Garang, who led the organisation from its formation in 1983 until his death in 2005. Garang ruled the SPLM in a highly authoritarian manner, and during the war his leadership was frequently challenged. For instance, the SPLM split in 1991 after Riek Machar and Lam Akol accused Garang of dictatorial behaviour and formed a separate group. This led to fighting between the two factions, with widespread atrocities committed by both sides (Jok 2007). To answer to the demand for reform, and to consolidate power, Garang used a strategy of co-optation. While this policy caused interludes in the fighting, it did not result in any real changes in the organisation (Mamdani 2014). The authoritarian manner in which the SPLM has traditionally been ruled has continued after Garang’s death. While Garang’s successor, Salva Kiir, used a ‘big-tent’ policy, which – at least on paper – incorporated various factions within the armed forces, it did not constitute any real institutional changes (ICG 2014).
The leader of the SPLM/A is set to preside over a sovereign government, and the territory it controls has significant oil resources and other important economic assets, including land. In rural South Sudan, control over land is economically vital for agriculturalists and pastoralists alike, and politicians in power have extensive power to determine landownership. The stakes are augmented, as all subterranean natural resources belong to the central government (Mertenskoetter & Luak 2012). Furthermore, corruption is widespread and the governance system has taken the form of a kleptocracy. Thus, political elites have extensive opportunities to enrich themselves (de Waal 2014). This dynamic is largely a continuation of the predation that took place during the North-South war when commanders in the South carried out extensive predation on the areas they controlled (Pinaud 2014). The incentive to capture influential positions is further amplified, as the prospects of getting rich outside the government structures are very limited. Government appointments are highly priced in South Sudan because they represent one of the few opportunities to safeguard income and influence (ICG 2009). The institutionalised corruption creates further problems for those outside the government. Without connections within the government structures, individuals can face significant problems with administrative practicalities such as obtaining permits (UNMIS representative 2009 int.).

Obtaining an influential position is also a way for elites to secure resources for their constituencies, which in the South Sudanese context generally means community, ethnic group or family. The peace dividends resulting from the 2005 peace agreement are limited and unevenly distributed. For many residents in South Sudan, living conditions have not improved. In fact, the agreement resulted in renewed suffering for some residents since several relief organisations reduced their contributions after the CPA. Some economic and infrastructure development has taken place in Juba, but other areas have seen no progress. The political and economic centrality of Juba means that decisions in the capital determine where development
projects are located (Ibrahim Adam Mudawi 2009 int.). Thus, the stakes at play in the political game in South Sudan are very high, which increases the risk for violence around elections.

**ACTORS: THE IMPORTANCE OF WAR-LORD POLITICS**

South Sudan gained its autonomy, followed by independence, from the 2005 peace agreement. The accord gave almost all power to the two main belligerent in the civil war, the SPLM and the Sudanese government, whereas other political movements were excluded (Mamdani 2014). In post-agreement South Sudan, this situation endures and the political life is dominated by individuals who held positions within the rebel groups. Government positions are predominantly occupied by militaries. Moreover, influential generals are sometimes more powerful than ministers, dictating how ministers allocate the resources they have at their disposal (de Waal 2014). However, there are some prominent exceptions. For instance, the well-known politician Francis Deng, who in 2012 was appointed South Sudan’s ambassador to the United Nations, has a civilian background (Miamingi 2012). There are two dimensions related to the North-South war which have caused political discord. First, there are tensions between those who fought for independence and those who sided with the Sudanese government during periods of the North-South war. These conflicts originate in splits in the rebel movement during the war, which caused fighting between South Sudanese rebel groups. Second, tensions exist between those who remained in the country and fought in the war and those who fled and have returned after it ended. In general, returnees are more educated and believe they should take a leading role in politics. However, those who fought the war, also feel entitled to influential positions (e-mail conversation Tubiana 2015).

From the perspective of violence, the post-agreement political structures of South Sudan have made the threat of violence a powerful tool for gaining concessions and influence (LeRiche 2014). In particular, elites are given prominent positions depending on how large a
threat they constitute (SPLA veteran 2011 int.). When the government of South Sudan was installed it was challenged by several armed groups. Many of these groups had fought against the SPLM during the North-South war, as Khartoum persistently used a divide-and-conquer tactic that resulted in extensive fighting between Southern factions (Johnson 2012). To deter the threat of these groups, the regime incorporated them in the governmental structure through a ‘big-tent’ policy, which meant that instead of fighting off rivals they were included in the state structures. The rank-and-file of these groups were included in the armed forces, while the leaders gained positions in the army and were sometimes included in the government. The most powerful of these groups was the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), which were incorporated through the Juba Declaration signed in January 2006 (Young 2006). In the following years, co-optation continued through a widely used policy of granting amnesties to different factions that fought against the regime (ICG 2014). Although this policy ended several insurgencies, it also created several problems.

First, it encouraged armed rebellions, since it meant that military leaders could defect, fight for a while, be granted amnesty and then be reintegrated into the governmental structures, often with a higher grade and salary. Many of the leaders were given high positions within the army, creating strong incentives for military commanders to launch rebellions. Such dynamics are illustrated in the case of Peter Gadet, who has defected twice (in 2011 and 2013) since the signing of the 2005 peace agreement (BBC 11.07.2014). Moreover, individuals have strong incentives to join rebellions, since it is beneficial to be part of the army. The lowest-ranking soldiers in the army are paid about 140 USD a month, which is a high salary considering that most of the population lives on less than 1 USD a day (Mamdani 2014). Thus, the opportunity costs of joining a rebellion are low.

Second, the policy of co-optation is very expensive for the government to maintain. Prior to the rebellion in mid-December 2013, it was estimated that 50% of the government
budget was used to pay the armed forces (Mamdani 2014). When the peace agreement was signed, about 200,000 Southerners were part of the Sudanese army and ‘other armed groups’, primarily militias that had fought on Khartoum’s side during the war. Five years later this number was reduced by almost 90%, while at the same time the army numbers increased from about 50,000 to more than 300,000 (de Waal 2014). As most fighters in these militias were Nuer, it also created an army where a majority came from this community (ICG 2014).

Third, this policy has created a deeply divided army (ICG 2014). Reconciliation between different factions has been hampered, and to a large extent the SPLA has become a coalition of ethnic militias rather than a national army (Mamdani 2014). The deep division within the SPLA was a key factor in explaining the rapidity with which events unfolded in late 2013.

Fourth, local grievances and ethnic identities have been manipulated by local and central elites in their struggle for political power, thereby linking tribal politics to politics at the national level (de Costa 2012). Typically, political players in Juba instigate communal conflicts between communities to sustain their own significance. For instance, high-ranking officers within the army, as well as important politicians, often provide weapons to their own community to ensure political support. This practice has become a prevalent feature of politically tense periods, such as elections (James Ninrew 2011 int.). In addition, local politicians use similar tactics in order to empower themselves (International academic 2011 int.; Sørbø 2010). This type of political positioning has been particularly fierce in Jonglei, which has also been the state most struck by violent conflicts (Young 2010).

Finally, the long history of war in the region has made retaliatory dynamics crucial, and many conflicts are retributions for earlier conflicts (Harragin 2011). These dynamics make it easier for military ‘strong men’ to gain prestige. High-ranking officers within the army, as well
as important politicians, often provide weapons to their community, which ensures that they remain in a powerful position (James Ninrew 2011 int.).

To conclude, the political landscape in South Sudan is dominated by actors associated with the previous civil war. In this milieu, political power struggles often become armed, and political entrepreneurs frequently use weapons in order to empower themselves. In the following, we will turn to examining the institutions in which these actors operate.

INSTITUTIONS: FEEBLE STATE AND PARTY INSTITUTIONS

When South Sudan gained autonomy it started off from a deplorable situation. Not only was the area shattered by decades of war – and animosities among actors and communities were high – but state structures and infrastructure were also extremely weak, or non-existent. In fact, practical matters such as offices for the ministers were key problems that occupied the regime and international donors during the first years after the signing of the CPA (Senior international observer 2009 int.). A main issue with regard to the institutions is that the regime in Juba has completely failed to form independent institutions with broad representation (ICG 2014). While co-option has been used as a way to circumvent threats from the opposition, inclusion in state institutions has been dependent on the actors’ military capability, rather than its representativeness. Moreover, the institutions are dependent on the SPLA, which has dominated most important aspects of life in South Sudan, including the government (de Waal 2014). After SPLA, the churches are the institution which reaches most people in South Sudan and they often play an important role in attempts to solve inter-communal conflicts (ICG 2014, Archbishop Deng 2011 int.). In addition, the church has occasionally challenged the government. For example, the archbishop of Juba, Paulino Lukudu Loro, has criticised the widespread corruption and Dinka dominance in the government (NCR 22.10.2012).
Institutional progress since independence has been piecemeal, and the dysfunction of political institutions continues to be a fundamental problem. It shapes conflicts in the country in several ways (de Waal 2014). First, a crucial institutional problem in South Sudan is the lack of established, strong democratic political parties. This is particularly troublesome, given the strong standing of president, ‘where the powers concentrated in the presidency under the 2011 Transitional Constitution are even greater than those normally vested under presidential systems’ (Radon & Logan 2014: 156). An important factor for the 2013 crisis to unfold was that President Kiir cancelled several important SPLM meetings – a move that he was able to make because of weakly institutional structures of the SPLM. In particular, the party lacks a democratic process for leadership change. The opportunities to challenge incumbent leaders are restricted because open voting, rather than secret ballot, is the standard voting procedure. There has been opposition to open voting, which may discourage votes against the top leaders – President Kiir in particular. In fact, this issue was critical in the political contestation resulting in the violence that erupted in December 2013 (ICG 2014). Nevertheless, the power of the President is not completely uncircumscribed and presidential decisions are sometimes blocked. One well-known example is how the general assembly of South Sudan in August 2013 stopped the President’s nomination of Telar Deng to become the next minister of justice (Sudan Tribune 13.08.2013). South Sudan also lacks established opposition parties. In the 2010 elections, most opposition politicians ran as independent candidates. This meant that elections stood between influential individuals rather than political parties, which increased conflict-generating factors such as patrimonialism and ethnic favouritism, especially since the politicians involved were military men.

A second problem related to institutions and elections concerns the electoral management bodies. The National Election Commission (NEC) was assigned to administer the 2010 elections. This institution attempted to increase the credibility of the elections, but the
absence of voter training and widespread irregularities related to the polling, counting, and tabulation, undermined the legitimacy of the elections (Carter Center 2010). The NEC is also tasked with administering the next elections, but the delay of the elections, repeated flaws in the electoral preparations, such as rescheduling of important meetings within the SPLM, and the chaos that has prevailed since late 2013, has severely circumvented the ability of this institution to fulfil its task.

Third, there is no functional criminal justice system in place, and there are several parallel judicial systems operating – customary as well as statutory – and they are not sufficiently coordinated. In addition, the lack of trained civil servants causes problems for the police. In this context, arbitrary detentions and other human rights violations are common (HRW 2011). A further problem for the citizens of South Sudan is that the regime in Juba tends to act in a biased manner – often favouring Dinka over non-Dinka – and the risk of facing sanctions from the state varies depending on the communal affiliation of the perpetrator (Brosché 2014). This has seriously diluted state institutions and undermined the rule of law, which increases the risk of political competition turning violent (UNMISS 2014).

Fourth, local government institutions are also very weak. This raises the risk for violence – communal conflicts in particular – as it undercuts local conflict resolution mechanisms that can solve such conflicts before they become violent (Brosché 2014). The Government of South Sudan was established by the CPA and the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, which both emphasise decentralisation of power and local democracy. The SPLM also employs a rhetoric that focuses on local governance (Rolandsen 2005). However, such structures hardly exist in reality and the opportunities for local establishments to influence rules, or to control their execution, have been severely restricted (Rolandsen 2007). In fact, in many areas of South Sudan no functional, legitimate, local governing institutions exist (Young 2010). The move away from decentralisation was further established in the 2011 Transitional
Constitution, which strengthened the national government at the expense of local structures (Radon & Logan 2014). How the centre influences local policies in South Sudan can be illustrated by the way in which a governor is chosen. In the first years after the signing of the CPA, governors were not elected but directly appointed by the president (Rolandsen 2007). It was not until 2010 that the first election of a governor took place, and this process is still primarily part of Juba politics rather than part of the local political processes in the state. Important decisions (like nominations of candidates) are, for example, made at the national level. The preferences of the government are thus more important than considerations of local contexts. Similar dynamics exist at the state level where the power of the governor is extensive (Ferrie 2011). Hence, despite support in the constitution, decentralisation is generally absent and rules regularly do not take local conditions into account. Furthermore, within the SPLM the prospects for ordinary members to influence decisions are strictly limited, as party structures at grassroots level are lacking and decision making follows a clear top-down approach (Rolandsen 2007).

A final institutional problem is that boundaries of electoral entities are unclear and the introduction of elections in South Sudan has contributed to disarray over boundaries. South Sudan’s Local Government Act stipulates that 70,000 inhabitants are needed for an area in order to constitute a county. If a region is smaller it is merged with a neighbouring county. A county entails a seat in the South Sudan Legislative Assembly, whereas a constituency size of 146,000 is needed for a seat in the National Assembly. This is stipulated in the Local Government Act from 2009, which is authorised by the SPLM (ICG 2009). This means that a redrawing of boundaries can be disastrous for a politician jockeying for power, because it can jeopardise his chances to safeguard a political position. Importantly, administrative changes can put a community that was previously in the majority in a constituency into a position of being a minority. With voting strongly following tribal lines in South Sudan, such changes are also
likely to alter who will win an election in the area. Accordingly, administrative alterations are a useful tool in the fierce competition of the political sphere (UNMIS representative 2011 int.). The communal conflict between Balanda and Dinka in 2012 illustrates these dynamics, as it was triggered by a decision by the regime in Juba to relocate the administrative headquarters of Wau County in Western Bahr el-Ghazal from Wau to Bagari. This verdict empowered the Dinka at the expense of the Balanda and 28 people were killed in the fighting (Sudan Tribune. 27.12.2012).

To sum up, the institutional structures of South Sudan are too weak to handle political power struggles in a peaceful manner. Without formal institutions to manage conflicts through constitutional means – in particular in relation to the transfer of power – electoral politics continue to be waged with unconstitutional tactics, including violence.

CONCLUSIONS

This study addresses how the violence South Sudan has experienced since the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement in 2005 relates to electoral politics. Future elections in the country are very likely to experience violence, for several reasons. First, the actors involved in coming elections will probably be the same, since the opportunities to carve out political space for actors without experience from the rebellion is limited. Second, institutional structures are likely to remain weak, as South Sudan will continue to suffer from underdevelopment, at least in the immediate future. Third, there are no indications that the stakes involved in elections will decrease, since state power will probably remain the only way in which individuals can secure economic and political influence. Several important conclusions emerge from the analysis.

First, the three components of the theoretical framework – stakes, actors and institutions – have several interlinkages that are important for the violence-election nexus. One connection
is that influential actors benefit from weak institutions, as they provide them with uncircumscribed power. This authority can be used for personal enrichment, either through corruption or salaries. Such rent-seeking behaviour among state actors may have negative consequences for public spending on social services, education and health, while payrolls to the public and security sector are over-spent (de Waal 2014). Such patterns of distribution of state resources create grievances which may contribute to conflict and points to the challenges for both peace-building and state-building processes to take root.

Second, although we have primarily focused on violence arising from elite animosity, the analysis of actors, stakes and institutions reveals several links to local conflict dynamics (Kalyvas 2006). Local grievances and ethnic identities have been used by both local and central elites, as a way of gaining political influence. The consequence has been raised competition over scarce resources and further militarisation in the communities. These dynamics have resulted in several armed insurgencies and violent communal conflicts, especially in Jonglei.

Third, the analysis provides insights into the debate on the timing of elections and the conditions for elections in the future. Previous research on peacebuilding has highlighted the pros and cons of early versus late elections in the aftermath of war (Brancanti & Snyder 2013; Paris 2004). The stipulation of elections in the CPA was a way for the international community to legitimise the peace accord. However, such legitimisation did not take place, since the opposition boycotted the elections in the North and in the South the focus was on the referendum for independence. Thus, the 2010 elections illustrate the predicament that arises from elections being held before sufficient political structures are in place. In such contexts, electoral politics can be counterproductive and induce repression of the opposition, communal violence and armed rebellion.

A final insight relates to peace-building and state-building in a *de facto* one-party state. In this context, concerned international and local actors need the monitor closely the intra-party
politics of the dominant party. Since the SPLM dominates the political life in South Sudan and its presidential candidate is certain to become the head of state, the legitimacy of the electoral process depends on the internal processes of this party. However, the international community, including the US and many other western countries, has been reluctant to criticise the SPLM for shortcomings in the democratic process. This is because the international community appears to be stuck in a mind-set of supporting Juba and the SPLM after siding with them for decades in the North-South war. However, under circumstances where a state is completely dominated by one party the real competition will take place well in advance of the election.

NOTES

1. In May 2014, Kiir announced that the elections would be postponed until 2017 or 2018 because of the crisis (BBC 12.5.2014).

2. For arguments about the conflict-mitigating and conflict-generating influence of electoral systems, see, for instance, Horowitz (2003) and Reilly & Reynolds (2000).

3. For an analysis of the interlinkages between these types of conflict, see Brosché & Elfversson (2012).

4. Sudan held multiparty elections in 1953, 1958, 1965, 1967, 1968, and 1986, but South Sudan did not constitute an autonomous political entity during any of these elections (Carter Center 2010). South Sudan was granted some autonomy between 1972 and 1983, but no multiparty elections took place during this time (Willis et al. 2009).

5. The CPA stipulated that elections were to be held in July 2009, but they were delayed. A prime reason was problems with the census. In addition, John Garang, the SPLM/A leader, died in a helicopter crash six months after the signing of the CPA, which impeded the implementation of the accord (LeRiche & Arnold 2012).
6. Elections for presidency require a simple majority, whereas first-past-the-post elections are used for governors. In the legislative elections for the assembly, a combination of first-past-the-post votes and proportional representation was used. Of the seats, 60% were designated for single-member constituencies, and 40% were elected from closed party lists, of which 25% were reserved for women and 15% for political parties (Carter Center 2010).

7. The supply of weapons also had an international dimension, as Sudan was the prime arms supplier to both Yauyau and Athor (Small Arms Survey 2013a).
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