Logotyp: till Uppsala universitets webbplats

The article discusses if China will be inspired by its strategic partner Russia to use force as an instrument of its foreign policy. After a pro et con discussion the authors find that the disincentives created by the Russian example are likely to convince China that it should continue to show restraint under the 'peaceful development' formula, and avoid military adventures. The East Asian Peace is thus not seriously threatened, at least not by China-for now.

With the annexation of the Crimea and the engagement in confrontation with the West, Russia has embarked on a course of making the military force into a useful instrument of policy. Moscow has effectively sacrificed the goals of modernization and development for the sake of geopolitical ambitions. The question about the price of Russia's revisionist enterprise is relevant for many states that are not satisfied with the unfair and often discriminating rules of the world order, first of all China. Russia hopes to inspire other states dissatisfied with the "unipolar'' world order to challenge the West more boldly, but the result of its assault on the principles of nonintervention and territorial integrity might work in the opposite way. The states of East Asia could take a good measure of the risk inherent to embarking on the course of projecting power at the expense of modernization and become even more committed than before to upholding their unique prosperity-producing peace. China has a vested interest in Russian internal stability and must be worried by the prospect of a post-Putin crisis.

The article is part of a discussion of  why nationalism is surging in the world today, instead of  having run its course. It discusses this question in an Asian context with main focus on state nationalism in China, Japan and Taiwan, and on sub-state nationalism in Myanmar.  The article argues that the new nationalism is dangerous and could, in conjunction with other factors, lead to open conflict in a region that has long enjoyed relative peace.

While entering into a deep confrontation with the West in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, Russia has sought to uphold its international profile by upgrading its strategic partnership with China and adding new economic content to it, first of all in energy deals. At the same time, Moscow is aware of the risks related to becoming a minor partner to powerful China and to diminishing its ability to make its own contributions to forming the global agenda. One way of avoiding too much dependence on Chinese patronage would be to retain and cultivate the traditional ties with Vietnam and perhaps even play a pacifying role in the oscillating Chinese-Vietnamese tensions. Russian energy companies are exploring opportunities for further advancing offshore oil and gas projects in the South China Sea, although the profitability of these projects remains rather low. Russia has delivered two out of six contracted Kilo class submarines to Vietnam, but its role as the main provider of weapons may now be challenged by the USA and Japan. The prospects for maintaining or expanding Russia’s security and energy connections with Vietnam is thus a demanding topic for analysis, which may throw light also on the all-important trilateral relationship between China, the USA and Japan.

Peace between China and the USA is likely to continue as long as the relationship is underpinned by mutual nuclear deterrence as well as economic interdependence

One article among eight contributions from members of the East Asian Peace program's core group to present basic findings

The article looks at three ways in which international law has affected government behavior in the South China Sea. It has exacerbated disputes. It has probably curtailed the use of force. And it has made it difficult to imagine solutions that violate the law of the sea.

Thailand has since 2004 formed an exception to the general peace trend in East Asia. An insurgency in its deep south has cost several thousand lives. Thailand has also engaged in a deadly border conflict with Cambodia and there have been violent incidents in Bangkok, as part of a polarized struggle for power between bitterly opposed political factions. Why does Thailand go against the regional grain? We seek an explanation to the Thai exception by investigating to what extent the southern conflict, the border dispute and the struggle over government are causally interlinked. The latter, we suggest, has been the determining factor, and the main explanation for the upsurge of conflict in Thailand is the lack of civilian control with the military, which has weakened state capacity and made it possible to topple elected governments in coups, court decisions and street-based campaigns.