uu.seUppsala universitets publikationer
Ändra sökning
Länk till posten
Permanent länk

Direktlänk
BETA
Reisner, Andrew
Publikationer (8 of 8) Visa alla publikationer
Reisner, A. & Michaelson, E. (2018). Ethics for Fish (1ed.). In: Anne Barnhill; Mark Budolfson; Tyler Doggett (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics: (pp. 189-208). Oxford: Oxford University Press
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Ethics for Fish
2018 (Engelska)Ingår i: The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics / [ed] Anne Barnhill; Mark Budolfson; Tyler Doggett, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 1, s. 189-208Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
Abstract [en]

In this chapter we discuss some of the central ethical issues specific to eating and harvesting fish. We survey recent research on fish intelligence and cognition and discuss possible considerations that are distinctive to questions about the ethics of eating fish as opposed to terrestrial and avian mammals. We conclude that those features that are distinctive to the harvesting and consumption of fish, including means of capture and the central role that fishing plays in many communities, do not suggest that eating fish is less morally problematic than eating terrestrial of avian animals.

Ort, förlag, år, upplaga, sidor
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018 Upplaga: 1
Nyckelord
Animal Ethics, Fish, Food Ethics, Fish Ethics
Nationell ämneskategori
Filosofi
Forskningsämne
Filosofi
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-372107 (URN)9780199372263 (ISBN)9780199372287 (ISBN)
Tillgänglig från: 2019-01-05 Skapad: 2019-01-05 Senast uppdaterad: 2019-09-12Bibliografiskt granskad
Reisner, A. (2018). Pragmatic Reasons for Belief (1ed.). In: Daniel Star (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity: (pp. 705-728). Oxford: Oxford University Press
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Pragmatic Reasons for Belief
2018 (Engelska)Ingår i: The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity / [ed] Daniel Star, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 1, s. 705-728Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
Abstract [en]

This is a chapter describing of the state of the philosophical debate on pragmatic reasons for belief. 

Ort, förlag, år, upplaga, sidor
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018 Upplaga: 1
Nyckelord
Reasons, reasons for belief, pragmatic reasons for belief, normativity
Nationell ämneskategori
Filosofi
Forskningsämne
Filosofi
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-372105 (URN)978-0-19-965788-9 (ISBN)9780191756764 (ISBN)
Tillgänglig från: 2019-01-05 Skapad: 2019-01-05 Senast uppdaterad: 2019-09-12Bibliografiskt granskad
Reisner, A. (2018). Two Theses about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity (1ed.). In: C. McHugh, J. Way, and D. Whiting (Ed.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical (pp. 221-240). Oxford: Oxford University Press
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Two Theses about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity
2018 (Engelska)Ingår i: Normativity: Epistemic and Practical / [ed] C. McHugh, J. Way, and D. Whiting, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 1, s. 221-240Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
Abstract [en]

In tradition linked to Aristotle and Kant, many contemporary philosophers treat practical and theoretical normativity as two genuinely distinct domains of normativity. In this paper I consider the question of what it is for normative domains to be distinct. I suggest that there are two different ways that the distinctness thesis might be understood and consider the different implications of the two different distinctness theses.

Ort, förlag, år, upplaga, sidor
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018 Upplaga: 1
Nyckelord
Normativity, reasons, domains of normativity
Nationell ämneskategori
Filosofi
Forskningsämne
Filosofi
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-291297 (URN)9780198758709 (ISBN)
Tillgänglig från: 2019-01-05 Skapad: 2019-01-05 Senast uppdaterad: 2019-01-17Bibliografiskt granskad
Reisner, A. (2016). Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against. In: Martin Grajner and Pedro Schmechtig (Ed.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals: (pp. 95-114). Germany: Walter de Gruyter
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against
2016 (Engelska)Ingår i: Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals / [ed] Martin Grajner and Pedro Schmechtig, Germany: Walter de Gruyter, 2016, s. 95-114Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
Abstract [en]

This chapter addresses an ambiguity in some of the literature on rational peer disagreement about the use of the term 'rational'. In the literature 'rational' is used to describe a variety of normative statuses related to reasons, justification, and reasoning. This chapter focuses most closely on the upshot of peer disagreement for what is rationally required of parties to a peer disagreement. This follows recent work in theoretical reason which treats rationality as a system of requirements among an agent's mental states. It is argued that peer disagreement has either no, or a very limited, affect on what rationality requires of an agent in a given circumstance. This is in part because of difficulties generated by a novel example of evidence of evidence of p being evidence against p. This example calls into question the mechanisms whereby peer disagreement might affect what is rationally required of an agent. The chapter also reevaluates the importance of actual peer disagreement against the backdrop of prior expectations about whether disagreement is believed to be likely, arguing that peer disagreement is most likely to change what is rationally required of an agent when it is believed to be unlikely.

Ort, förlag, år, upplaga, sidor
Germany: Walter de Gruyter, 2016
Nyckelord
Peer disagreement, rational requirements, evidence, evidence of evidence, reasons for belief, theoretical rationality, rationality, theoretical reaosn
Nationell ämneskategori
Filosofi
Forskningsämne
Filosofi
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-379105 (URN)978-3-11-049676-5 (ISBN)
Tillgänglig från: 2019-03-11 Skapad: 2019-03-11 Senast uppdaterad: 2019-03-13Bibliografiskt granskad
Reisner, A. (2015). Fittingness, Value, and Trans-World Attitudes. Philosophical quarterly (Print), 260, 1-22
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Fittingness, Value, and Trans-World Attitudes
2015 (Engelska)Ingår i: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 260, s. 1-22Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat) Published
Abstract [en]

Philosophers interested in the fitting attitude analysis of final value have devoted a great deal of attention to the wrong kind of reasons problem. This paper offers an example of the reverse difficulty, the wrong kind of value problem. This problem creates deeper challenges for the fitting attitude analysis and provides independent grounds for rejecting it, or at least for doubting seriously its correctness.

Ort, förlag, år, upplaga, sidor
Oxford: , 2015
Nyckelord
buck passing; fitting attitude analysis; reasons; value; value theory
Nationell ämneskategori
Filosofi
Forskningsämne
Etik; Filosofi
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-291301 (URN)
Tillgänglig från: 2016-04-30 Skapad: 2016-04-30 Senast uppdaterad: 2017-11-30
Reisner, A. & van Weelden, J. (2015). Moral Reasons for Moral Beliefs: A Puzzle for Moral Testimony Pessimism. Logos & Episteme: an International Journal of Epistemology, 4, 429-448
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Moral Reasons for Moral Beliefs: A Puzzle for Moral Testimony Pessimism
2015 (Engelska)Ingår i: Logos & Episteme: an International Journal of Epistemology, ISSN 2069-0533, E-ISSN 2069-3052, Vol. 4, s. 429-448Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat) Published
Abstract [en]

According to moral testimony pessimists, the testimony of moral experts does not provide non-experts with normative reasons for belief. Moral testimony optimists hold that it does. We first aim to show that moral testimony optimism is, to the extent such things may be shown, the more natural view about moral testimony. Speaking roughly, the supposed discontinuity between the norms of moral beliefs and the norms of non-moral beliefs, on careful reflection, lacks the intuitive advantage that it is sometimes supposed to have. Our second aim is to highlight the difference in the nature of the pragmatic reasons for belief that support moral testimony optimism and moral testimony pessimism, setting out more clearly the nature and magnitude of the challenge for the pessimist.

Nyckelord
Moral Testimony; Reasons for Belief: Reasons; Moral Epistemology.
Nationell ämneskategori
Filosofi Filosofi, etik och religion
Forskningsämne
Etik; Filosofi
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-291296 (URN)
Tillgänglig från: 2016-04-30 Skapad: 2016-04-30 Senast uppdaterad: 2017-11-30Bibliografiskt granskad
Reisner, A. (2015). Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity (1ed.). In: I. Hirose and A Reisner (Ed.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome (pp. 189-206). Oxford: Oxford University Press
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity
2015 (Engelska)Ingår i: Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome / [ed] I. Hirose and A Reisner, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 1, s. 189-206Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
Abstract [en]

This paper considers the relation between the sources of normativity, reasons, and normative conflicts. It argues that common views about how normative reasons relate to their sources have important consequences for how we can understand putative normative conflicts.

Ort, förlag, år, upplaga, sidor
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015 Upplaga: 1
Nyckelord
normativity; reasons
Nationell ämneskategori
Filosofi
Forskningsämne
Filosofi
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-291300 (URN)DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684908.003.0014 (DOI)
Tillgänglig från: 2016-04-30 Skapad: 2016-04-30 Senast uppdaterad: 2016-04-30
Reisner, A. & Hirose, I. (Eds.). (2015). Weiging and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome (1ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Weiging and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome
2015 (Engelska)Samlingsverk (redaktörskap) (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
Abstract [en]

John Broome has made major contributions to, and radical innovations in, contemporary moral philosophy. His research combines the formal method of economics with the philosophical analysis. Broome's works stretch over formal axiology, decision theory, philosophy of economics, population axiology, the value of life, the ethics of climate change, the nature of rationality, and practical and theoretical reasoning. Weighing and Reasoning brings together fifteen original essays from leading philosophers who have been influenced by the work and thought of John Broome.They explore Broome's works on the theory of value, and his works on practical and theoretical reasoning. This volume also includes Broome's note on his intellectual history to date.

Ort, förlag, år, upplaga, sidor
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. s. 272 Upplaga: 1
Nyckelord
John Broome; rationality: normativity; aggregations; ethics; value theory: consequentialism
Nationell ämneskategori
Filosofi
Forskningsämne
Filosofi
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-291299 (URN)John Broome has made major contributions to, and radical innovations in, contemporary moral philosophy. His research combines the formal method of economics with the philosophical analysis. Broome's works stretch over formal axiology, decision theory, philosophy of economics, population axiology, the value of life, the ethics of climate change, the nature of rationality, and practical and theoretical reasoning. Weighing and Reasoning brings together fifteen original essays from leading philosophers who have been influenced by the work and thought of John Broome.They explore Broome's works on the theory of value, and his works on practical and theoretical reasoning. This volume also includes Broome's note on his intellectual history to date. (ISBN)
Tillgänglig från: 2016-04-30 Skapad: 2016-04-30 Senast uppdaterad: 2016-04-30
Organisationer

Sök vidare i DiVA

Visa alla publikationer