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This thesis examines how we should understand the concept of harm, and its moral and prudential importance. It discusses various analyses of harm and normative principles that appeal to harm. In broad terms, it offers a defense of the view that harm is normatively important and useful for philosophical theorizing. Further it proposes a novel analysis of harm, which aligns with that view.

The first paper, "The Harm Principle and the Nature of Harm", defends John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle against the criticism that the principle has unacceptable implications regardless of which analysis of harm we plug into it. I argue that the criticism is built on mistaken assumptions – most importantly, the assumption that the Harm Principle is plausible only if there exists an unproblematic analysis of harm.

The second paper, "Feit on the Normative Importance of Harm", criticizes Neil Feit’s suggested solution to the so-called Failing to Benefit Problem for the Counterfactual Comparative Account (CCA). Feit argues that CCA’s inability to align with some commonsense views about harm’s moral importance is no flaw since those views are false. I object to that argument, in part by showing that the cases that Feit appeals to are not genuine counterexamples.

The third paper, "Doing Away with Skepticism about Harm", scrutinizes the elimination thesis, which states that we should do away with the concept of harm in philosophical theorizing. I examine various claims in support of that thesis – for instance that the concept is defective – but conclude that we lack good reasons to accept it.  

The fourth paper, "Misfortune and Missing Out", focuses on Kaila Draper’s famous challenge for deprivationism – the view that death harms a subject in so far as it deprives her of life’s goods. Since not winning the lottery is also a deprivation, the challenge is to explain why only death is a misfortune in the sense that it merits negative emotional responses. I argue that the challenge is serious, in part by criticizing some prominent suggested solutions, and identify a parallel challenge for CCA.

The fifth paper, "A Fitting Attitudes Analysis of Harm", puts forward a novel analysis of harm. Roughly, this analysis says that an event harms me if, and only if, it is fitting for me to disfavor the event for my own sake.

An important objection to the Counterfactual Comparative Account (CCA) of harm is that the account fails to cohere with standard views about the normative significance of harm. In response, some proponents of CCA suggest that the concept of harm should play a more limited role in normative theorising than philosophers might usually think. This paper addresses the most elaborate defence of CCA of this sort, namely that by Neil Feit (2019) Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 22, 809-823, and argues that it is unsuccessful.

This article defends the Harm Principle, commonly attributed to John Stuart Mill, against recent criticism. Some philosophers think that this principle should be rejected, because of severe difficulties with finding an account of harm to plug into it. I examine the criticism and find it unforceful. Finally, I identify a faulty assumption behind this type of criticism, namely that the Harm Principle is plausible only if there is a full-blown, and problem-free, account of harm, which proponents of the principle can refer to.

The interest in "social sustainability" has recently increased in the field of urban development. We want societies, cities, and neighborhoods to be economically and environmentally sustainable, but we also want urban areas that are safe, diverse, walkable, and relaxing, just to mention a few examples. Strikingly, however, there is no consensus regarding what definition of "social sustainability" should be employed. Additionally, some people are skeptical about the prospect of finding a useful definition at all and claim it is impossible to satisfactorily define the concept for various reasons, such as its complexity. A potential first step towards navigating this conceptual maze is to provide desiderata for a definition of social sustainability. We defend a list of nine desiderata and thereby create a theoretical framework for analyzing and constructing a definition of "social sustainability". We also examine the skeptical arguments and find that it is premature to conclude that the goal of finding a useful definition is hopeless. With the criteria in place, the future debate can proceed by assessing definitions of "social sustainability" in a more structured and transparent manner. This activity is of upmost importance if we want to create just cities.