I massmedia har målet om avverkningarna i urskogen Białowieża beskrivits med ord som ”seger i EU-domstolen för naturvården” eller ”skalbaggar stoppar avverkningarna av Europas sista urskog”. Det är riktigt att EU-domstolen (EUD) slagit ned på Polens omfattande avverkningar i området till förmån för alla sällsynta kryp, fåglar och andra skyddsvärda arter men det är inte därför som målet är intressant för en vidare krets av ERTs läsare. Sakligt sett är det ett ganska ordinärt fall där en medlemsstat först har pekat ut ett område som Natura 2000, men sedan efter några år vidtagit en rad åtgärder som kan skada de skyddsvärda intressena där utan att göra den konsekvensbedömning som krävs enligt EUs art- och habitatdirektiv (92/43/EEG, AHD). Det uppmärksammades av EU-kommissionen som inledde ett överträdelseärende som sedermera resulterade i att domstolen i Luxemburg ansåg att Polen bryter mot EU-rätten. Sådana mål finns det många av och just det här sticker inte ut i något särskilt avseende, förutom då kanske att domen är så förtvivlat lång (269 punkter, alltså betydligt längre än ”klassikerna” på området[1]). Det som gör domen intressant ur ett allmänt EU-rättsligt perspektiv är att här använder sig EUD för första gången av de interna domstolsreglerna för att slå ned på något som man uppfattar som domstolstrots. Även domstolens hänvisning till försiktighetsprincipen i ett beslut om interimistiska ingripanden är nydanande, liksom fördelningen av bevisbördan mellan kommissionen och den berörda medlemsstaten

Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration provides for the three ‘pillars’ of environmental democracy, that is, the right of the public to obtain environmental information, to participate in environmental decision-making procedures, and to have access to justice in environmental matters. This chapter deals with some key issues concerning the third pillar’s rights on access to justice. First, it covers the relevant historical background and outlines developments in international law in this area. Following on from setting the context, access to justice in different regional human rights conventions is discussed in respect of their strengths and shortcomings. Although there has been a significant ‘greening’ of the provisions therein relating to the protection of family and home, as well as the requirement for a fair trial, most of these conventions are confined to ‘individual’s rights’ in a more traditional sense. As for the protection of general environmental interests, the international human rights instruments remain far less effective. Instead, the most advanced instrument on environmental democracy currently is the regional 1998 Aarhus Convention from UNECE with 47 signatory Parties. Under Article 9 of this Convention, the public is entitled to have access to justice to challenge refusals to make environmental information accessible, decisions and omissions about permits for large installations and operations which may have a significant impact on the environment, as well as other kinds of activities which may breach environmental legislation. These provisions and their implementation in EU law are analysed, using recommendations from the Aarhus Compliance Committee and case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as sources of interpretation. The main focus is on standing for individuals and environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs), the requirement for a review on both substantive and procedural legality, the effectiveness of the review procedure and costs. The chapter concludes with a short note on future prospects for access to justice for the public concerned in order to protect a healthy environment, on a more regional and global level.

This chapter discusses the relationship between the Aarhus Convention and EU law concerning access to justice in environmental decision-making. Focus lies on environmental rights from a procedural perspective and more precisely on the legal requirements for the public concerned to have access to justice in environmental decision-making. I will use standing for environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) in cases concerning nature conservation and species protection as an illustrative example. This area of law is particularly interesting, as it contains clear obligations according to international law and EU law, while at the same time, the responsibility to implement those obligations in many Member States lies exclusively on the competent authorities and the public cannot challenge the administrative decision-making in court. In my analysis, I will discuss the relationship between the Aarhus Convention and the principle of judicial protection enshrined in EU law. My conclusions suggest that the principle of judicial protection goes beyond the Convention in requiring that members of the public – often represented by the ENGOs – shall be able to challenge administrative decisions and omissions made in this area of law by having the possibility to take legal action in court.

n April 2017, the EU Commission published a “Notice on Access to Justice in Environmental Matters”, laying down the views of Brussels on this hot topic. The Notice takes stock of the dynamic development of the CJEU’s case law on the matter and draws cautious conclusions from this jurisprudence. This article is both an introductory and a short comment on the Notice. The main reasoning and conclusions drawn in the document are described, and then a couple of key issues are highlighted and discussed. All in all, evaluation of the Notice is positive, as it represents a rather big step forward compared with previous standpoints from Brussels. In this way, the Notice consolidates the impression that the EU is furnished with a Janus face concerning access to justice in environmental matters. It is very positive and affirming concerning legal challenges to administrative decision-making in national courts on the one hand, but very strict and of a rejecting nature when dealing with direct action to the CJEU on the other.

This report is from a study on permits for hydro power in Norway, narrated from the perspective of a Swedish legal scholar. The main focus is on the possibilities to update and amend granted permits, in order to adapt them to new and developing conditions in the environment and changes in the values of society. The author concludes that even though the applicable regulation is quite similar to the Swedish Environmental Code, differences between the two legal systems have a major impact. One such difference is that the Norwegian system for decision-making and appeal lies, in its entirety, within the administration – at least in practical terms – whereas the Swedish system is court-based. Another is that whereas provisions on compensation play a decisive role in determining the possibilities to update permits according to the Swedish Environmental

Code, no such rights exist in Norway despite similarities in circumstances. The report concludes with some recommendations on how to construe environmental law so as to allow for permits to be adaptable to changes in the environment and social values, while still respecting the permit holder’s legitimate expectations to legal certainty.