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Olsson, Henrik
Publications (10 of 15) Show all publications
Olsson, A.-C., Juslin, P. & Olsson, H. (2006). Individuals and dyads in a multiple-cue judgment task: Cognitive processes and performance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42(1), 40-56
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Individuals and dyads in a multiple-cue judgment task: Cognitive processes and performance
2006 (English)In: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, ISSN 0022-1031, Vol. 42, no 1, p. 40-56Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Virtually all studies of multiple-cue judgment focus on the learning by individuals. In a multiple-cue judgment task the authors examined if people acquire rule or exemplar knowledge as a function of learning the task alone or in dyads. Learning in dyads was expected to promote explicit rule-based thinking as a consequence of verbalization (social abstraction effect) and to improve performance due to the larger joint exemplar knowledge base (exemplar pooling effect). In two experiments the results suggest more accurate judgment by dyads, evidence for an exemplar pooling effect, but no evidence for the social abstraction effect. In contrast to most previous research, social interaction proved beneficial and allowed the dyads to surpass their combined individual performance.

Keywords
socialpsykologi, beslutsfattande
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-75583 (URN)
Available from: 2006-02-13 Created: 2006-02-13 Last updated: 2011-01-11
Enkvist, T., Newell, B., Juslin, P. & Olsson, H. (2006). On the role of causal intervention in multiple-cue judgment: positive and negative effects on learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 32(1), 163-79
Open this publication in new window or tab >>On the role of causal intervention in multiple-cue judgment: positive and negative effects on learning
2006 (English)In: Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, Vol. 32, no 1, p. 163-79Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Previous studies have suggested better learning when people actively intervene rather than when they passively observe the stimuli in a judgment task. In 4 experiments, the authors investigated the hypothesis that this improvement is associated with a shift from exemplar memory to cue abstraction. In a multiple-cue judgment task with continuous cues, the data replicated the improvement with intervention and participants who experimented more actively produced more accurate judgments. In a multiple-cue judgment task with binary cues, intervention produced poorer accuracy and participants who experimented more actively produced poorer judgments. These results provide no support for a representational shift but suggest that the improvement with active intervention may be limited to certain tasks and environments.

Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-76097 (URN)16478348 (PubMedID)
Available from: 2006-02-24 Created: 2006-02-24 Last updated: 2011-01-11
Juslin, P. & Olsson, H. (2005). Capacity limitations and the detection of correlations: Comment on Kareev (2000). Psychol Rev, 112(1), 256-67; discussion 280
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Capacity limitations and the detection of correlations: Comment on Kareev (2000)
2005 (English)In: Psychol Rev, ISSN 0033-295X, Vol. 112, no 1, p. 256-67; discussion 280Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-68238 (URN)15631597 (PubMedID)
Available from: 2005-02-21 Created: 2005-02-21 Last updated: 2011-01-12
Nilsson, H. & Olsson, H. (2005). Categorization vs. inference: Shift in attention or representation?. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Categorization vs. inference: Shift in attention or representation?
2005 (English)In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2005Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Recently it has been found that people that learn through in-ference create qualitatively different cognitive representations than those who learn through categorization. The present study addresses the question of whether the findings support-ing this claim generalize to a design where both learning tasks have a probabilistic relation between each stimulus cue and the category label. It was shown that participants in the cate-gorization condition learned faster than participants in the in-ference condition. Further, participants in the inference condi-tion did not rely on prototypical values when making one-cue categorizations. The results suggest that shifts in attention must be considered as a viable explanation of some of the re-sults in studies that investigate differences between inference and categorization.

Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-73982 (URN)
Available from: 2005-08-17 Created: 2005-08-17
Enkvist, T., Juslin, P., Olsson, H. & Newell, B. R. (2005). Intervention in multiple-cue judgment: Not always for the better. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Intervention in multiple-cue judgment: Not always for the better
2005 (English)In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2005Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Previous studies suggest improved learning when participants actively intervene rather than passively observe the stimuli in a judgment task. In two experiments the authors investigate if this improvement generalizes to multiple cue judgment tasks where judgments may be formed from abstract knowledge of cue-criterion relations or exemplar memory. More specific hypotheses were that intervention in learning should improve performance over observation, and that improvement should be associated with a relative shift from exemplar memory to cue abstraction. In contrast to previous studies, in a multiple-cue judgment task with binary cues and continuous criterion, there was poorer learning with intervention than observation, and participants actively experimenting more produced poorer judgments. The results suggest that intervention may distract from efficient exemplar encoding and improvement may be limited to tasks efficiently addressed by cue-abstraction.

Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-73984 (URN)
Available from: 2005-08-17 Created: 2005-08-17
Jönsson, F. U., Olsson, H. & Olsson, M. J. (2005). Odor emotionality affects the confidence in odor naming.. Chemical Senses, 30(1), 29-35
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Odor emotionality affects the confidence in odor naming.
2005 (English)In: Chemical Senses, ISSN 0379-864X, Vol. 30, no 1, p. 29-35Article in journal (Other scientific) Published
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-68542 (URN)15647462 (PubMedID)
Available from: 2005-03-02 Created: 2005-03-02 Last updated: 2011-01-12
Juslin, P. & Olsson, H. (2005). Postscript. Psychol Rev, 112(1), 267
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Postscript
2005 (English)In: Psychol Rev, ISSN 0033-295X, Vol. 112, no 1, p. 267-Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-68240 (URN)15631598 (PubMedID)
Available from: 2005-02-21 Created: 2005-02-21 Last updated: 2011-01-12
Nilsson, H., Olsson, H. & Juslin, P. (2005). The cognitive substrate of subjective probability.. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 31(4), 600-20
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The cognitive substrate of subjective probability.
2005 (English)In: Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, ISSN 0278-7393, Vol. 31, no 4, p. 600-20Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The prominent cognitive theories of probability judgment were primarily developed to explain cognitive biases rather than to account for the cognitive processes in probability judgment. In this article the authors compare 3 major theories of the processes and representations in probability judgment: the representativeness heuristic, implemented as prototype similarity, relative likelihood, or evidential support accumulation (ESAM; D. J. Koehler, C. M. White, & R. Grondin, 2003); cue-based relative frequency; and exemplar memory, implemented by probabilities from exemplars (PROBEX; P. Juslin & M. Persson, 2002). Three experiments with different task structures consistently demonstrate that exemplar memory is the best account of the data whereas the results are inconsistent with extant formulations of the representativeness heuristic and cue-based relative frequency.

Keywords
subjective probability judgment, multiple-cue learning, exemplar memory, representativeness heuristic, cue-based relative frequency
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-73985 (URN)16060768 (PubMedID)
Available from: 2005-08-17 Created: 2005-08-17 Last updated: 2011-01-11
Olsson, H. & Poom, L. (2005). The noisy cue abstraction model is equivalent to the multiplicative prototype model.. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 100(3 Pt 1), 819-20
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The noisy cue abstraction model is equivalent to the multiplicative prototype model.
2005 (English)In: Perceptual and Motor Skills, ISSN 0031-5125, Vol. 100, no 3 Pt 1, p. 819-20Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

We prove that the noisy cue abstraction model for binary choice and the multiplicative prototype model of categorization are formally identical.

Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-73987 (URN)16060449 (PubMedID)
Available from: 2005-08-17 Created: 2005-08-17 Last updated: 2011-01-11
Olsson, H. & Poom, L. (2005). Visual memory needs categories. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 102(24), 8776-80
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Visual memory needs categories
2005 (English)In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, ISSN 0027-8424, Vol. 102, no 24, p. 8776-80Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Capacity limitations in the way humans store and process information in working memory have been extensively studied, and several memory systems have been distinguished. In line with previous capacity estimates for verbal memory and memory for spatial information, recent studies suggest that it is possible to retain up to four objects in visual working memory. The objects used have typically been categorically different colors and shapes. Because knowledge about categories is stored in long-term memory, these estimations of working memory capacity have been contaminated by long-term memory support. We show that when using clearly distinguishable intracategorical items, visual working memory has a maximum capacity of only one object. Because attention is closely involved in the working memory process, our results add to other studies demonstrating capacity limitations of human attention such as inattentional blindness and change blindness.

Keywords
Adult, Attention/*physiology, Comparative Study, Discrimination (Psychology)/physiology, Humans, Memory/*physiology, Models; Psychological, Photic Stimulation, Psychophysics, Research Support; Non-U.S. Gov't, Visual Perception/*physiology
National Category
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-74220 (URN)doi:www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0500810102 (DOI)15937119 (PubMedID)
Available from: 2005-09-11 Created: 2005-09-11 Last updated: 2011-01-11
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