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Juslin, Peter
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Publications (10 of 116) Show all publications
Sundh, J. & Juslin, P. (2018). Compound risk judgment in tasks with both idiosyncratic and systematic risk: The “Robust Beauty” of additive probability integration. Cognition, 171, 25-41
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Compound risk judgment in tasks with both idiosyncratic and systematic risk: The “Robust Beauty” of additive probability integration
2018 (English)In: Cognition, ISSN 0010-0277, E-ISSN 1873-7838, Vol. 171, p. 25-41Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In this study, we explore how people integrate risks of assets in a simulated financial market into a judgment of the conjunctive risk that all assets decrease in value, both when assets are independent and when there is a systematic risk present affecting all assets. Simulations indicate that while mental calculation according to naïve application of probability theory is best when the assets are independent, additive or exemplar-based algorithms perform better when systematic risk is high. Considering that people tend to intuitively approach compound probability tasks using additive heuristics, we expected the participants to find it easiest to master tasks with high systematic risk – the most complex tasks from the standpoint of probability theory – while they should shift to probability theory or exemplar memory with independence between the assets. The results from 3 experiments confirm that participants shift between strategies depending on the task, starting off with the default of additive integration. In contrast to results in similar multiple cue judgment tasks, there is little evidence for use of exemplar memory. The additive heuristics also appear to be surprisingly context-sensitive, with limited generalization across formally very similar tasks.

Keywords
Multiple risk integration, Linear additive integration, Probability, Risk
National Category
Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
Research subject
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-337841 (URN)10.1016/j.cognition.2017.10.023 (DOI)000427208300004 ()
Funder
Swedish Research Council
Available from: 2018-01-05 Created: 2018-01-05 Last updated: 2018-05-18Bibliographically approved
Lidén, M., Gräns, M. & Juslin, P. (2018). The Presumption of Guilt in Suspect Interrogations: Apprehension as a Trigger of Confirmation Bias and Debiasing Techniques. Law and human behavior, 42(4), 336-354
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The Presumption of Guilt in Suspect Interrogations: Apprehension as a Trigger of Confirmation Bias and Debiasing Techniques
2018 (English)In: Law and human behavior, ISSN 0147-7307, E-ISSN 1573-661X, Vol. 42, no 4, p. 336-354Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This research tests whether a police officer’s decision to apprehend a suspect triggers confirmation bias during an interrogation. The study also tests two strategies to reduce confirmation bias: (1) decoupling decision to apprehend from interrogation and (2) reducing cognitive load for the interrogating police officer. In Experiment 1, Swedish police officers (N = 60) were faced with 12 scenarios in which they either had to decide for themselves whether to apprehend a suspect or were informed about the corresponding decision by another police officer or a prosecutor. Participants then prepared questions for a suspect interrogation and evaluated the trustworthiness of the suspect’s denial or confession. The same method was used in Experiment 2 but with law and psychology students (N = 60) as participants. In Experiment 3, psychology students (N = 60) prepared interrogation questions either by freely producing their own or by choosing questions from a preset list. Overall, apprehended suspects were interrogated in a more guilt presumptive way and rated as less trustworthy than non apprehended suspects. However, the tested debiasing techniques, primarily reducing cognitive load for the interrogating police officer, hold some potential in mitigating this bias.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
American Psychological Association (APA), 2018
Keywords
confirmation bias, cognitive bias, debias, police, interrogation, apprehension, investigation
National Category
Law and Society Psychology
Research subject
Jurisprudence
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-351671 (URN)10.1037/lhb0000287 (DOI)000439922500004 ()29963877 (PubMedID)
Available from: 2018-08-09 Created: 2018-08-09 Last updated: 2018-10-18Bibliographically approved
Millroth, P., Juslin, P., Eriksson, E. & Ågren, T. (2017). Disentangling the effects of serotonin on risk perception: S-carriers of 5-HTTLPR are primarily concerned with the magnitude of the outcomes, not the uncertainty.. Paper presented at US. Behavioral Neuroscience, 131(5), 421-427
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Disentangling the effects of serotonin on risk perception: S-carriers of 5-HTTLPR are primarily concerned with the magnitude of the outcomes, not the uncertainty.
2017 (English)In: Behavioral Neuroscience, ISSN 0735-7044, E-ISSN 1939-0084, Vol. 131, no 5, p. 421-427Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Serotonin signaling is vital for reward processing, and hence, also for decision-making. The serotonin transporter gene linked polymorphic region (5-HTTLPR) has been connected to decision making, suggesting that short-allele carriers (s) are more risk averse than long-allele homozygotes (ll). However, previous research has not identified if this occurs because s-carriers (i) are more sensitive to the uncertainty of the outcomes or (ii) are more sensitive to the magnitude of the outcomes. This issue was disentangled using a willingness-to-pay task, where the participants evaluated prospects involving certain gains, uncertain gains, and ambiguous gains. The results clearly favored the hypothesis that s-carriers react more to the magnitude of the outcomes. Self-reported measures of everyday risk-taking behavior also favored this hypothesis. We discuss how these results are in line with recent research on the serotonergic impact on reward processing.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
American Psychological Association, 2017
Keywords
Cognitive Processes, Decision Making, Judgment, Risk Perception, Risk Taking, Rewards, Serotonin, Alleles, Neurotransmitter Transporters
National Category
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-333475 (URN)10.1037/bne0000209 (DOI)000416437800006 ()
Conference
US
Available from: 2017-11-14 Created: 2017-11-14 Last updated: 2018-03-07Bibliographically approved
Stikvoort, B., Juslin, P. & Bartusch, C. (2017). Good things come in small packages: is there a common set of motivators for energy behaviour?. Energy Efficiency
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Good things come in small packages: is there a common set of motivators for energy behaviour?
2017 (English)In: Energy Efficiency, ISSN 1570-646X, E-ISSN 1570-6478Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Household energy consumption can be curbed by individuals’ energy saving, yet despite many efforts, our energy consumption is not lowering. This study investigated the role of a common set of behavioural determinants for households’ intention to perform four energy-related behaviours: investing in PV cells, turning off apparatus on standby mode, showering less, and replacing old home appliances with new energy-efficient ones. Behavioural determinants—energy awareness, general energy knowledge, attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control, and moral norms—were assessed in a survey (N = 83) among Swedish residents. Energy awareness was moderately correlated with energy knowledge, but not with respondents’ intentions to perform the behaviours, except for replacing home appliances. Moral norms were judged by respondents as important motivators and were a strong predictor to behavioural intentions to perform all four behaviours. Attitudes likewise were assessed as important motivators and were important predictors to all behavioural intentions except investing in PV cells, which was instead predicted by perceived behavioural control. Respondents’ assessment of beliefs underlying attitudes also differed for investing in PV cells; namely, beliefs about economic benefits were lower. Moreover, respondents felt less morally responsible for investing in PV cells. Concluding, we found no evidence that intentions to engage in four energy-saving behaviours are mediated by general energy knowledge or energy awareness. Determinants to each behaviour differed, where—surprisingly—investment in PV cells stood out as less motivated both by economic incentives and moral concerns, although moral norms were shared motivators across all four behaviours. We discuss different possible interpretations of these findings.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Netherlands: Springer, 2017
Keywords
Social psychology, Energy saving, Energy awareness, Behavioural determinants, Survey
National Category
Social Psychology Engineering and Technology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-330236 (URN)10.1007/s12053-017-9537-0 (DOI)
Funder
Swedish Energy Agency
Available from: 2017-09-28 Created: 2017-09-28 Last updated: 2017-10-18Bibliographically approved
Nilsson, H., Juslin, P. & Winman, A. (2016). Heuristics Can Produce Surprisingly Rational Probability Estimates: Comment on Costello and Watts (2014). Psychological review, 123(1), 103-111
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Heuristics Can Produce Surprisingly Rational Probability Estimates: Comment on Costello and Watts (2014)
2016 (English)In: Psychological review, ISSN 0033-295X, E-ISSN 1939-1471, Vol. 123, no 1, p. 103-111Article in journal, Editorial material (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Costello and Watts (2014) present a model assuming that people’s knowledge of probabilities adheres toprobability theory, but that their probability judgments are perturbed by a random noise in the retrievalfrom memory. Predictions for the relationships between probability judgments for constituent events andtheir disjunctions and conjunctions, as well as for sums of such judgments were derived from probabilitytheory. Costello and Watts (2014) report behavioral data showing that subjective probability judgmentsaccord with these predictions. Based on the finding that subjective probability judgments followprobability theory, Costello and Watts (2014) conclude that the results imply that people’s probabilityjudgments embody the rules of probability theory and thereby refute theories of heuristic processing.Here, we demonstrate the invalidity of this conclusion by showing that all of the tested predictions followstraightforwardly from an account assuming heuristic probability integration (Nilsson, Winman, Juslin,& Hansson, 2009). We end with a discussion of a number of previous findings that harmonize very poorlywith the predictions by the model suggested by Costello and Watts (2014).

Keywords
probability judgment, rationality, conjunction error, configural weighted average, random variation
National Category
Social Sciences Psychology
Research subject
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-270761 (URN)10.1037/a0039249 (DOI)000367327000008 ()26709414 (PubMedID)
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2012–1212
Available from: 2016-01-04 Created: 2016-01-04 Last updated: 2017-12-01Bibliographically approved
Juslin, P., Elwin, E., Guath, M., Millroth, P. & Nilsson, H. (2016). Sequential and myopic: On the use of feedback to balance cost and utility in a simulated electricity efficiency task. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 28(1), 106-128
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Sequential and myopic: On the use of feedback to balance cost and utility in a simulated electricity efficiency task
Show others...
2016 (English)In: Journal of Cognitive Psychology, ISSN 2044-5911, E-ISSN 2044-592X, Vol. 28, no 1, p. 106-128Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

While there is extensive research on feedback, little research is aimed at the use of feedback to optimise conflicting goals. A task modelled after In Home Displays for providing feedback about electricity cost was designed to investigate the effects of feedback frequency, detail, and stability, when participants try to balance cost and utility. Frequent feedback proved to be advantageous in a deterministic system, but feedback aggregated over time was advantageous in a system with noisy feedback. Surprisingly, performance was better with noisy feedback, where the probabilism, in effect, acted as a filter, highlighting the applications that are most important for the cost and the utility. Computational modelling suggested that the best-fitting model assumes that the participants are sequential, considering one goal at a time, first satisfying the cost budget, only thereafter trying to maximise the utility, and reflexive, myopically responding primarily to the feedback explicitly available on a given trial.

Keywords
Feedback, optimisation, goal conflict, cognitive myopia, energy efficiency
National Category
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-274420 (URN)10.1080/20445911.2015.1095192 (DOI)000367337800008 ()
Funder
StandUp
Available from: 2016-01-21 Created: 2016-01-21 Last updated: 2018-04-18Bibliographically approved
Lindskog, M., Kerimi, N., Winman, A. & Juslin, P. (2015). A Swedish validation of the Berlin Numeracy test. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 56(2), 132-139
Open this publication in new window or tab >>A Swedish validation of the Berlin Numeracy test
2015 (English)In: Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, ISSN 0036-5564, E-ISSN 1467-9450, Vol. 56, no 2, p. 132-139Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Recent research has highlighted the importance of considering an individual’s level of numeracy, that is their numerical abilities, in a vast variety of judgment and decision making tasks. To accurately evaluate the influence of numeracy requires good and valid measures of the construct. In the present study we validate a Swedish version of the Berlin Numeracy Test (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal & Garcia-Retamero, 2012). The validation was car- ried out on both a student sample and a sample representative of the Swedish population. The Swedish BNT showed sound psychometrical properties in both samples. Further, in both samples the BNT had satisfactory convergent and discriminant validity when correlating with other measures of numeracy, while not being significantly related to measures of personality. With respect to predictive validity the results indicated divergent patterns in the two samples. In the student sample, participants scoring highest on the BNT outperformed those in the other three levels, which did not differ in performance. In contrast, in the population sample participants scoring lowest on the BNT performed worse than those in the other three levels, which did not differ in performance. Taken together, however, the results suggest that the Swedish version of the BNT should be considered a valid measure of numeracy in both Swedish student and population representative samples.

Keywords
Berlin Numeracy Test, statistical numeracy, individual differences, decision making, student sample, population sample, Swedish validation.
National Category
Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
Research subject
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-247922 (URN)10.1111/sjop.12189 (DOI)000351217500003 ()25581209 (PubMedID)
Funder
Swedish Research Council
Available from: 2015-03-25 Created: 2015-03-25 Last updated: 2017-12-04Bibliographically approved
Juslin, P. (2015). Controlled information integration and bayesian inference. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, Article ID 70.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Controlled information integration and bayesian inference
2015 (English)In: Frontiers in Psychology, ISSN 1664-1078, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 6, article id 70Article in journal, Editorial material (Other academic) Published
Keywords
linear additive integration, probability reasoning, base-rate neglect, working memory capacity, Bayesian inference
National Category
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-247069 (URN)10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00070 (DOI)000348848800001 ()25698998 (PubMedID)
Available from: 2015-03-13 Created: 2015-03-12 Last updated: 2017-12-04Bibliographically approved
Guath, M., Millroth, P. & Juslin, P. (2015). Does Sequential or Simultaneous Presentation of Value and Probability Affect the Information Integration in Risky Prospects?. In: : . Paper presented at SPUDM 25th Biannual Conference, Budapest, Hungary. August 2015..
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Does Sequential or Simultaneous Presentation of Value and Probability Affect the Information Integration in Risky Prospects?
2015 (English)Conference paper, Poster (with or without abstract) (Other academic)
National Category
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-284525 (URN)
Conference
SPUDM 25th Biannual Conference, Budapest, Hungary. August 2015.
Available from: 2016-04-18 Created: 2016-04-18 Last updated: 2016-04-18
Juslin, P., Lindskog, M. & Mayerhofer, B. (2015). Is there something special with probabilities?: - Insight vs. computational ability in multiple risk combination. Cognition, 136, 282-303
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Is there something special with probabilities?: - Insight vs. computational ability in multiple risk combination
2015 (English)In: Cognition, ISSN 0010-0277, E-ISSN 1873-7838, Vol. 136, p. 282-303Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

While a wealth of evidence suggests that humans tend to rely on additive cue combination to make controlled judgments, many of the normative rules for probability combination require multiplicative combination. In this article, the authors combine the experimental paradigms on probability reasoning and multiple-cue judgment to allow a comparison between formally identical tasks that involve probability vs. other task contents. The purpose was to investigate if people have cognitive algorithms for the combination, specifically, of probability, affording multiplicative combination in the context of probability. Three experiments suggest that, although people show some signs of a qualitative understanding of the combination rules that are specific to probability, in all but the simplest cases they lack the cognitive algorithms needed for multiplication, but instead use a variety of additive heuristics to approximate the normative combination. Although these heuristics are surprisingly accurate, normative combination is not consistently achieved until the problems are framed in an additive way. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords
Risk integration, Probability reasoning, Multiple-cue judgment
National Category
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-248439 (URN)10.1016/j.cognition.2014.11.041 (DOI)000349882600026 ()25514208 (PubMedID)
Available from: 2015-04-02 Created: 2015-03-30 Last updated: 2017-12-04Bibliographically approved
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