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Juslin, Peter
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Publications (10 of 120) Show all publications
Wirebring, L. K., Stillesjö, S., Eriksson, J., Juslin, P. & Nyberg, L. (2018). A Similarity-Based Process for Human Judgment in the Parietal Cortex. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 12, Article ID 481.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>A Similarity-Based Process for Human Judgment in the Parietal Cortex
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2018 (English)In: Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, ISSN 1662-5161, E-ISSN 1662-5161, Vol. 12, article id 481Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

One important distinction in psychology is between inferences based on associative memory and inferences based on analysis and rules. Much previous empirical work conceive of associative and analytical processes as two exclusive ways of addressing a judgment task, where only one process is selected and engaged at a time, in an either-or fashion. However, related work indicate that the processes are better understood as being in interplay and simultaneously engaged. Based on computational modeling and brain imaging of spontaneously adopted judgment strategies together with analyses of brain activity elicited in tasks where participants were explicitly instructed to perform similarity-based associative judgments or rule-based judgments (n = 74), we identified brain regions related to the two types of processes. We observed considerable overlap in activity patterns. The precuneus was activated for both types of judgments, and its activity predicted how well a similarity-based model fit the judgments. Activity in the superior frontal gyrus predicted the fit of a rule-based judgment model. The results suggest the precuneus as a key node for similarity-based judgments, engaged both when overt responses are guided by similarity-based and rule-based processes. These results are interpreted such that similarity-based processes are engaged in parallel to rule-based-processes, a finding with direct implications for cognitive theories of judgment.

National Category
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-372510 (URN)10.3389/fnhum.2018.00481 (DOI)000453235900001 ()
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 421-2009-2348
Available from: 2019-01-07 Created: 2019-01-07 Last updated: 2019-01-15Bibliographically approved
Sundh, J. & Juslin, P. (2018). Compound risk judgment in tasks with both idiosyncratic and systematic risk: The “Robust Beauty” of additive probability integration. Cognition, 171, 25-41
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Compound risk judgment in tasks with both idiosyncratic and systematic risk: The “Robust Beauty” of additive probability integration
2018 (English)In: Cognition, ISSN 0010-0277, E-ISSN 1873-7838, Vol. 171, p. 25-41Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In this study, we explore how people integrate risks of assets in a simulated financial market into a judgment of the conjunctive risk that all assets decrease in value, both when assets are independent and when there is a systematic risk present affecting all assets. Simulations indicate that while mental calculation according to naïve application of probability theory is best when the assets are independent, additive or exemplar-based algorithms perform better when systematic risk is high. Considering that people tend to intuitively approach compound probability tasks using additive heuristics, we expected the participants to find it easiest to master tasks with high systematic risk – the most complex tasks from the standpoint of probability theory – while they should shift to probability theory or exemplar memory with independence between the assets. The results from 3 experiments confirm that participants shift between strategies depending on the task, starting off with the default of additive integration. In contrast to results in similar multiple cue judgment tasks, there is little evidence for use of exemplar memory. The additive heuristics also appear to be surprisingly context-sensitive, with limited generalization across formally very similar tasks.

Keywords
Multiple risk integration, Linear additive integration, Probability, Risk
National Category
Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
Research subject
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-337841 (URN)10.1016/j.cognition.2017.10.023 (DOI)000427208300004 ()
Funder
Swedish Research Council
Available from: 2018-01-05 Created: 2018-01-05 Last updated: 2018-05-18Bibliographically approved
Millroth, P., Guath, M. & Juslin, P. (2018). Memory and decision making: Effects of sequential presentation of probabilities and outcomes in risky prospects.. Journal of experimental psychology. General
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Memory and decision making: Effects of sequential presentation of probabilities and outcomes in risky prospects.
2018 (English)In: Journal of experimental psychology. General, ISSN 0096-3445, E-ISSN 1939-2222Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

The rationality of decision making under risk is of central concern in psychology and other behavioral sciences. In real-life, the information relevant to a decision often arrives sequentially or changes over time, implying nontrivial demands on memory. Yet, little is known about how this affects the ability to make rational decisions and a default assumption is rather that information about outcomes and probabilities are simultaneously available at the time of the decision. In 4 experiments, we show that participants receiving probability- and outcome information sequentially report substantially (29 to 83%) higher certainty equivalents than participants with simultaneous presentation. This holds also for monetary-incentivized participants with perfect recall of the information. Participants in the sequential conditions often violate stochastic dominance in the sense that they pay more for a lottery with low probability of an outcome than participants in the simultaneous condition pay for a high probability of the same outcome. Computational modeling demonstrates that Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) fails to account for the effects of sequential presentation, but a model assuming anchoring-and adjustment constrained by memory can account for the data. By implication, established assumptions of rationality may need to be reconsidered to account for the effects of memory in many real-life tasks. (PsycINFO Database Record

National Category
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-361937 (URN)10.1037/xge0000438 (DOI)29878808 (PubMedID)
Available from: 2018-09-28 Created: 2018-09-28 Last updated: 2018-11-28Bibliographically approved
Lidén, M., Gräns, M. & Juslin, P. (2018). Self-Correction of Wrongful Convictions: Is there a "System-level" Confirmation Bias in the Swedish Legal System's Appeal Procedure for Criminal Cases? -: Part I. Law, Probability and Risk
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Self-Correction of Wrongful Convictions: Is there a "System-level" Confirmation Bias in the Swedish Legal System's Appeal Procedure for Criminal Cases? -: Part I
2018 (English)In: Law, Probability and Risk, ISSN 1470-8396, E-ISSN 1470-840XArticle in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

In this study, we propose that confirmation bias may not only be present in the behaviors of individual agents in the judicial system but can also be recognized at a system-level as an inability to self-correct, that is, an inability to acquit wrongfully convicted who appeal or petition for a new trial. To assess the self-correctional ability a very low error rate of wrongful convictions in the District Courts in 2010-2014 was tentatively assumed. An empirical review of appeals (Part I) and petitions for new trials (Part II) in the Courts of Appeal and Supreme Court between 2010 and 2014 was carried out to evaluate to what extent these legal remedies can be expected to change wrongful convictions into acquittals. Realistic assumptions and empirical estimates of real-world statistics suggest that at least 34.67 % of the wrongfully convicted remained convicted despite the possibility both to appeal and petition for a new trial. A robustness analysis was performed to ascertain that the conclusions hold under a wide variety of assumptions about the unknown statistics. According to additional analyses the odds of an acquittal were low even for appeals referring to new innocence supportive evidence and for private individuals claiming to be innocent of e.g. assault or murder the odds of being granted new criminal trials were particularly low.

Keywords
confirmation bias, wrongful conviction, appeal, new trial, legal system, organization
National Category
Law and Society Psychology
Research subject
Jurisprudence
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-351677 (URN)10.1093/lpr/mgy018 (DOI)
Available from: 2018-08-09 Created: 2018-08-09 Last updated: 2019-01-07Bibliographically approved
Lidén, M., Gräns, M. & Juslin, P. (2018). Self-Correction of Wrongful Convictions: Is there a "System-level" Confirmation Bias in the Swedish Legal System's Appeal Procedure for Criminal Cases?: Part II. Law, Probability and Risk
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Self-Correction of Wrongful Convictions: Is there a "System-level" Confirmation Bias in the Swedish Legal System's Appeal Procedure for Criminal Cases?: Part II
2018 (English)In: Law, Probability and Risk, ISSN 1470-8396, E-ISSN 1470-840XArticle in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

In this study, we propose that confirmation bias may not only be present in the behaviors of individual agents in the judicial system but can also be recognized at a “system-level” as an inability to self-correct, that is, an inability to acquit wrongfully convicted who appeal or petition for a new trial. To assess the self-correctional ability a very low error rate of wrongful convictions in the District Courts in 2010-2014 was tentatively assumed. An empirical review of appeals (Part I) and petitions for new trials (Part II) in the Courts of Appeal and Supreme Court between 2010 and 2014 was carried out to evaluate to what extent these legal remedies can be expected to change wrongful convictions into acquittals. Realistic assumptions and empirical estimates of real-world statistics suggest that at least 34.67 % of the wrongfully convicted remained convicted despite the possibility both to appeal and petition for a new trial. A robustness analysis was performed to ascertain that the conclusions hold under a wide variety of assumptions about the unknown statistics. According to additional analyses the odds of an acquittal were low even for appeals referring to new innocence supportive evidence and for private individuals claiming to be innocent of e.g. assault or murder the odds of being granted new criminal trials were particularly low.

Keywords
legal system, confirmation bias, wrongful conviction, appeal, new trial, organization
National Category
Law and Society Psychology
Research subject
Jurisprudence
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-356848 (URN)10.1093/lpr/mgy019 (DOI)
Available from: 2018-08-09 Created: 2018-08-09 Last updated: 2019-01-07Bibliographically approved
Lidén, M., Gräns, M. & Juslin, P. (2018). The Presumption of Guilt in Suspect Interrogations: Apprehension as a Trigger of Confirmation Bias and Debiasing Techniques. Law and human behavior, 42(4), 336-354
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The Presumption of Guilt in Suspect Interrogations: Apprehension as a Trigger of Confirmation Bias and Debiasing Techniques
2018 (English)In: Law and human behavior, ISSN 0147-7307, E-ISSN 1573-661X, Vol. 42, no 4, p. 336-354Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This research tests whether a police officer’s decision to apprehend a suspect triggers confirmation bias during an interrogation. The study also tests two strategies to reduce confirmation bias: (1) decoupling decision to apprehend from interrogation and (2) reducing cognitive load for the interrogating police officer. In Experiment 1, Swedish police officers (N = 60) were faced with 12 scenarios in which they either had to decide for themselves whether to apprehend a suspect or were informed about the corresponding decision by another police officer or a prosecutor. Participants then prepared questions for a suspect interrogation and evaluated the trustworthiness of the suspect’s denial or confession. The same method was used in Experiment 2 but with law and psychology students (N = 60) as participants. In Experiment 3, psychology students (N = 60) prepared interrogation questions either by freely producing their own or by choosing questions from a preset list. Overall, apprehended suspects were interrogated in a more guilt presumptive way and rated as less trustworthy than non apprehended suspects. However, the tested debiasing techniques, primarily reducing cognitive load for the interrogating police officer, hold some potential in mitigating this bias.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
American Psychological Association (APA), 2018
Keywords
confirmation bias, cognitive bias, debias, police, interrogation, apprehension, investigation
National Category
Law and Society Psychology
Research subject
Jurisprudence
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-351671 (URN)10.1037/lhb0000287 (DOI)000439922500004 ()29963877 (PubMedID)
Available from: 2018-08-09 Created: 2018-08-09 Last updated: 2018-10-18Bibliographically approved
Millroth, P., Juslin, P., Eriksson, E. & Ågren, T. (2017). Disentangling the effects of serotonin on risk perception: S-carriers of 5-HTTLPR are primarily concerned with the magnitude of the outcomes, not the uncertainty.. Paper presented at US. Behavioral Neuroscience, 131(5), 421-427
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Disentangling the effects of serotonin on risk perception: S-carriers of 5-HTTLPR are primarily concerned with the magnitude of the outcomes, not the uncertainty.
2017 (English)In: Behavioral Neuroscience, ISSN 0735-7044, E-ISSN 1939-0084, Vol. 131, no 5, p. 421-427Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Serotonin signaling is vital for reward processing, and hence, also for decision-making. The serotonin transporter gene linked polymorphic region (5-HTTLPR) has been connected to decision making, suggesting that short-allele carriers (s) are more risk averse than long-allele homozygotes (ll). However, previous research has not identified if this occurs because s-carriers (i) are more sensitive to the uncertainty of the outcomes or (ii) are more sensitive to the magnitude of the outcomes. This issue was disentangled using a willingness-to-pay task, where the participants evaluated prospects involving certain gains, uncertain gains, and ambiguous gains. The results clearly favored the hypothesis that s-carriers react more to the magnitude of the outcomes. Self-reported measures of everyday risk-taking behavior also favored this hypothesis. We discuss how these results are in line with recent research on the serotonergic impact on reward processing.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
American Psychological Association, 2017
Keywords
Cognitive Processes, Decision Making, Judgment, Risk Perception, Risk Taking, Rewards, Serotonin, Alleles, Neurotransmitter Transporters
National Category
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-333475 (URN)10.1037/bne0000209 (DOI)000416437800006 ()
Conference
US
Available from: 2017-11-14 Created: 2017-11-14 Last updated: 2018-03-07Bibliographically approved
Stikvoort, B., Juslin, P. & Bartusch, C. (2017). Good things come in small packages: is there a common set of motivators for energy behaviour?. Energy Efficiency
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Good things come in small packages: is there a common set of motivators for energy behaviour?
2017 (English)In: Energy Efficiency, ISSN 1570-646X, E-ISSN 1570-6478Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Household energy consumption can be curbed by individuals’ energy saving, yet despite many efforts, our energy consumption is not lowering. This study investigated the role of a common set of behavioural determinants for households’ intention to perform four energy-related behaviours: investing in PV cells, turning off apparatus on standby mode, showering less, and replacing old home appliances with new energy-efficient ones. Behavioural determinants—energy awareness, general energy knowledge, attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control, and moral norms—were assessed in a survey (N = 83) among Swedish residents. Energy awareness was moderately correlated with energy knowledge, but not with respondents’ intentions to perform the behaviours, except for replacing home appliances. Moral norms were judged by respondents as important motivators and were a strong predictor to behavioural intentions to perform all four behaviours. Attitudes likewise were assessed as important motivators and were important predictors to all behavioural intentions except investing in PV cells, which was instead predicted by perceived behavioural control. Respondents’ assessment of beliefs underlying attitudes also differed for investing in PV cells; namely, beliefs about economic benefits were lower. Moreover, respondents felt less morally responsible for investing in PV cells. Concluding, we found no evidence that intentions to engage in four energy-saving behaviours are mediated by general energy knowledge or energy awareness. Determinants to each behaviour differed, where—surprisingly—investment in PV cells stood out as less motivated both by economic incentives and moral concerns, although moral norms were shared motivators across all four behaviours. We discuss different possible interpretations of these findings.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Netherlands: Springer, 2017
Keywords
Social psychology, Energy saving, Energy awareness, Behavioural determinants, Survey
National Category
Social Psychology Engineering and Technology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-330236 (URN)10.1007/s12053-017-9537-0 (DOI)
Funder
Swedish Energy Agency
Available from: 2017-09-28 Created: 2017-09-28 Last updated: 2017-10-18Bibliographically approved
Nilsson, H., Juslin, P. & Winman, A. (2016). Heuristics Can Produce Surprisingly Rational Probability Estimates: Comment on Costello and Watts (2014). Psychological review, 123(1), 103-111
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Heuristics Can Produce Surprisingly Rational Probability Estimates: Comment on Costello and Watts (2014)
2016 (English)In: Psychological review, ISSN 0033-295X, E-ISSN 1939-1471, Vol. 123, no 1, p. 103-111Article in journal, Editorial material (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Costello and Watts (2014) present a model assuming that people’s knowledge of probabilities adheres toprobability theory, but that their probability judgments are perturbed by a random noise in the retrievalfrom memory. Predictions for the relationships between probability judgments for constituent events andtheir disjunctions and conjunctions, as well as for sums of such judgments were derived from probabilitytheory. Costello and Watts (2014) report behavioral data showing that subjective probability judgmentsaccord with these predictions. Based on the finding that subjective probability judgments followprobability theory, Costello and Watts (2014) conclude that the results imply that people’s probabilityjudgments embody the rules of probability theory and thereby refute theories of heuristic processing.Here, we demonstrate the invalidity of this conclusion by showing that all of the tested predictions followstraightforwardly from an account assuming heuristic probability integration (Nilsson, Winman, Juslin,& Hansson, 2009). We end with a discussion of a number of previous findings that harmonize very poorlywith the predictions by the model suggested by Costello and Watts (2014).

Keywords
probability judgment, rationality, conjunction error, configural weighted average, random variation
National Category
Social Sciences Psychology
Research subject
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-270761 (URN)10.1037/a0039249 (DOI)000367327000008 ()26709414 (PubMedID)
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2012–1212
Available from: 2016-01-04 Created: 2016-01-04 Last updated: 2017-12-01Bibliographically approved
Juslin, P., Elwin, E., Guath, M., Millroth, P. & Nilsson, H. (2016). Sequential and myopic: On the use of feedback to balance cost and utility in a simulated electricity efficiency task. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 28(1), 106-128
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Sequential and myopic: On the use of feedback to balance cost and utility in a simulated electricity efficiency task
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2016 (English)In: Journal of Cognitive Psychology, ISSN 2044-5911, E-ISSN 2044-592X, Vol. 28, no 1, p. 106-128Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

While there is extensive research on feedback, little research is aimed at the use of feedback to optimise conflicting goals. A task modelled after In Home Displays for providing feedback about electricity cost was designed to investigate the effects of feedback frequency, detail, and stability, when participants try to balance cost and utility. Frequent feedback proved to be advantageous in a deterministic system, but feedback aggregated over time was advantageous in a system with noisy feedback. Surprisingly, performance was better with noisy feedback, where the probabilism, in effect, acted as a filter, highlighting the applications that are most important for the cost and the utility. Computational modelling suggested that the best-fitting model assumes that the participants are sequential, considering one goal at a time, first satisfying the cost budget, only thereafter trying to maximise the utility, and reflexive, myopically responding primarily to the feedback explicitly available on a given trial.

Keywords
Feedback, optimisation, goal conflict, cognitive myopia, energy efficiency
National Category
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-274420 (URN)10.1080/20445911.2015.1095192 (DOI)000367337800008 ()
Funder
StandUp
Available from: 2016-01-21 Created: 2016-01-21 Last updated: 2018-04-18Bibliographically approved
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