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Juslin, Peter
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Publications (10 of 124) Show all publications
Andersson, L., Eriksson, J., Stillesjö, S., Juslin, P., Nyberg, L. & Wirebring, L. K. (2020). Neurocognitive processes underlying heuristic and normative probability judgments. Cognition, 196, Article ID 104153.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Neurocognitive processes underlying heuristic and normative probability judgments
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2020 (English)In: Cognition, ISSN 0010-0277, E-ISSN 1873-7838, Vol. 196, article id 104153Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Judging two events in combination (A&B) as more probable than one of the events (A) is known as a conjunction fallacy. According to dual-process explanations of human judgment and decision making, the fallacy is due to the application of a heuristic, associative cognitive process. Avoiding the fallacy has been suggested to require the recruitment of a separate process that can apply normative rules. We investigated these assumptions using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during conjunction tasks. Judgments, whether correct or not, engaged a network of brain regions identical to that engaged during similarity judgments. Avoidance of the conjunction fallacy additionally, and uniquely, involved a fronto-parietal network previously linked to supervisory, analytic control processes. The results lend credibility to the idea that incorrect probability judgments are the result of a representativeness heuristic that requires additional neurocognitive resources to avoid.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
ELSEVIER, 2020
Keywords
Decision making, Dual-system, Dual-process, fMRI, Representativeness
National Category
Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-408111 (URN)10.1016/j.cognition.2019.104153 (DOI)000518704700021 ()31838247 (PubMedID)
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 421-2009-2348Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, M14-0375:1
Available from: 2020-04-04 Created: 2020-04-04 Last updated: 2020-04-04Bibliographically approved
Millroth, P., Juslin, P., Winman, A., Nilsson, H. & Lindskog, M. (2020). Preference or Ability: Exploring the Relations between Risk Preference, Personality, and Cognitive Abilities.. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 33(1), 1-15
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Preference or Ability: Exploring the Relations between Risk Preference, Personality, and Cognitive Abilities.
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2020 (English)In: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, ISSN 0894-3257|, Vol. 33, no 1, p. 1-15Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Keywords
risk preferences, personality, cognitive abilities
National Category
Social Sciences
Research subject
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-402715 (URN)10.1002/bdm.2171 (DOI)
Funder
Swedish Research Council
Available from: 2020-01-18 Created: 2020-01-18 Last updated: 2020-02-04Bibliographically approved
Lidén, M., Gräns, M. & Juslin, P. (2019). From devil's advocate to crime fighter: confirmation bias and debiasing techniques in prosecutorial decision-making. Psychology, Crime and Law, 25(5), 494-526
Open this publication in new window or tab >>From devil's advocate to crime fighter: confirmation bias and debiasing techniques in prosecutorial decision-making
2019 (English)In: Psychology, Crime and Law, ISSN 1068-316X, E-ISSN 1477-2744, Vol. 25, no 5, p. 494-526Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This research examines the role of confirmation bias in prosecutorial decisions before, during and after the prosecution. It also evaluates whether confirmation bias is reduced by changing the decision maker between arrest and prosecution. In Experiment 1, Swedish prosecutors (N = 40) assessed 8 scenarios where they either decided themselves or were informed about a colleague's decision to arrest or not arrest a suspect. Participants then rated how trustworthy the suspect's statement was as well as the strength of new ambiguous evidence and the total evidence. They also decided whether to prosecute and what additional investigative measures to undertake. In Experiment 2 the same method was used with Law and Psychology students (N = 60). Overall, prosecutors' assessments before the prosecution indicated that they were able to act as their own devil's advocate. Also, their assessments while deciding about whether to prosecute were reasonably balanced. However, after pressing charges, they displayed a more guilt-confirming mindset, suggesting they then took on the role as crime fighters. This differed from the student sample in which higher levels of guilt confirmation was displayed in relation to arrested suspects consistently before, during and after a prosecution decision. The role of prosecutors' working experience is discussed.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Taylor & Francis Group, 2019
Keywords
confirmation bias, cognitive bias, criminal procedure, arrest, prosecute, debiasing
National Category
Law and Society
Research subject
Jurisprudence
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-351673 (URN)10.1080/1068316X.2018.1538417 (DOI)000466385700005 ()
Available from: 2018-08-09 Created: 2018-08-09 Last updated: 2019-05-22Bibliographically approved
Millroth, P., Guath, M. & Juslin, P. (2019). Memory and decision making: Effects of sequential presentation of probabilities and outcomes in risky prospects. Journal of experimental psychology. General, 148(2), 304-324
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Memory and decision making: Effects of sequential presentation of probabilities and outcomes in risky prospects
2019 (English)In: Journal of experimental psychology. General, ISSN 0096-3445, E-ISSN 1939-2222, Vol. 148, no 2, p. 304-324Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The rationality of decision making under risk is of central concern in psychology and other behavioral sciences. In real-life, the information relevant to a decision often arrives sequentially or changes over time, implying nontrivial demands on memory. Yet, little is known about how this affects the ability to make rational decisions and a default assumption is rather that information about outcomes and probabilities are simultaneously available at the time of the decision. In 4 experiments, we show that participants receiving probability- and outcome information sequentially report substantially (29 to 83%) higher certainty equivalents than participants with simultaneous presentation. This holds also for monetary-incentivized participants with perfect recall of the information. Participants in the sequential conditions often violate stochastic dominance in the sense that they pay more for a lottery with low probability of an outcome than participants in the simultaneous condition pay for a high probability of the same outcome. Computational modeling demonstrates that Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) fails to account for the effects of sequential presentation, but a model assuming anchoring-and adjustment constrained by memory can account for the data. By implication, established assumptions of rationality may need to be reconsidered to account for the effects of memory in many real-life tasks.

Keywords
judgment and decision making under risk, memory, sequential presentation, anchoring and adjustment
National Category
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-361937 (URN)10.1037/xge0000438 (DOI)000456244600007 ()29878808 (PubMedID)
Funder
Swedish Research CouncilMarcus and Amalia Wallenberg Foundation
Available from: 2018-09-28 Created: 2018-09-28 Last updated: 2020-03-30Bibliographically approved
Millroth, P., Nilsson, H. & Juslin, P. (2019). The decision paradoxes motivating Prospect Theory: The prevalence of the paradoxes increases with numerical ability. Judgment and decision making, 14(4), 513-533
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The decision paradoxes motivating Prospect Theory: The prevalence of the paradoxes increases with numerical ability
2019 (English)In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 14, no 4, p. 513-533Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Prospect Theory (PT: Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) of risky decision making is based on psychological phenomena (paradoxes) that motivate assumptions about how people react to gains and losses, and how they weight outcomes with probabilities. Recent studies suggest that people's numeracy affect their decision making. We therefore conducted a large-scale conceptual replication of the seminal study by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), where we targeted participants with larger variability in numeracy. Because people low in numeracy may be more dependent on anchors in the form of other judgments we also manipulated design type (within-subject design, vs. single-stimuli design, where participants assess only one problem). The results from about 1,800 participants showed that design type had no effect on the modal choices. The rate of replication of the paradoxes in Kahneman and Tversky was poor and positively related to the participants' numeracy. The Probabilistic Insurance Effect was observed at all levels of numeracy. The Reflection Effects were not fully replicated at any numeracy level. The Certainty and Isolation Effects explained by nonlinear probability weighting were replicated only at high numeracy. No participant exhibited all 9 paradoxes and more than 50% of the participants exhibited at most three of the 9 paradoxes. The choices by the participants with low numeracy were consistent with a shift towards a cautionary non-compensatory strategy of minimizing the risk of receiving the worst possible outcome. We discuss the implications for the psychological assumptions of PT.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
SOC JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING, 2019
Keywords
prospect theory, replication, numeracy, experimental design
National Category
Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-392873 (URN)000477796000009 ()
Available from: 2019-09-26 Created: 2019-09-26 Last updated: 2019-09-26Bibliographically approved
Wirebring, L. K., Stillesjö, S., Eriksson, J., Juslin, P. & Nyberg, L. (2018). A Similarity-Based Process for Human Judgment in the Parietal Cortex. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 12, Article ID 481.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>A Similarity-Based Process for Human Judgment in the Parietal Cortex
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2018 (English)In: Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, ISSN 1662-5161, E-ISSN 1662-5161, Vol. 12, article id 481Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

One important distinction in psychology is between inferences based on associative memory and inferences based on analysis and rules. Much previous empirical work conceive of associative and analytical processes as two exclusive ways of addressing a judgment task, where only one process is selected and engaged at a time, in an either-or fashion. However, related work indicate that the processes are better understood as being in interplay and simultaneously engaged. Based on computational modeling and brain imaging of spontaneously adopted judgment strategies together with analyses of brain activity elicited in tasks where participants were explicitly instructed to perform similarity-based associative judgments or rule-based judgments (n = 74), we identified brain regions related to the two types of processes. We observed considerable overlap in activity patterns. The precuneus was activated for both types of judgments, and its activity predicted how well a similarity-based model fit the judgments. Activity in the superior frontal gyrus predicted the fit of a rule-based judgment model. The results suggest the precuneus as a key node for similarity-based judgments, engaged both when overt responses are guided by similarity-based and rule-based processes. These results are interpreted such that similarity-based processes are engaged in parallel to rule-based-processes, a finding with direct implications for cognitive theories of judgment.

National Category
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-372510 (URN)10.3389/fnhum.2018.00481 (DOI)000453235900001 ()
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 421-2009-2348
Available from: 2019-01-07 Created: 2019-01-07 Last updated: 2019-01-15Bibliographically approved
Sundh, J. & Juslin, P. (2018). Compound risk judgment in tasks with both idiosyncratic and systematic risk: The “Robust Beauty” of additive probability integration. Cognition, 171, 25-41
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Compound risk judgment in tasks with both idiosyncratic and systematic risk: The “Robust Beauty” of additive probability integration
2018 (English)In: Cognition, ISSN 0010-0277, E-ISSN 1873-7838, Vol. 171, p. 25-41Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In this study, we explore how people integrate risks of assets in a simulated financial market into a judgment of the conjunctive risk that all assets decrease in value, both when assets are independent and when there is a systematic risk present affecting all assets. Simulations indicate that while mental calculation according to naïve application of probability theory is best when the assets are independent, additive or exemplar-based algorithms perform better when systematic risk is high. Considering that people tend to intuitively approach compound probability tasks using additive heuristics, we expected the participants to find it easiest to master tasks with high systematic risk – the most complex tasks from the standpoint of probability theory – while they should shift to probability theory or exemplar memory with independence between the assets. The results from 3 experiments confirm that participants shift between strategies depending on the task, starting off with the default of additive integration. In contrast to results in similar multiple cue judgment tasks, there is little evidence for use of exemplar memory. The additive heuristics also appear to be surprisingly context-sensitive, with limited generalization across formally very similar tasks.

Keywords
Multiple risk integration, Linear additive integration, Probability, Risk
National Category
Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
Research subject
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-337841 (URN)10.1016/j.cognition.2017.10.023 (DOI)000427208300004 ()
Funder
Swedish Research Council
Available from: 2018-01-05 Created: 2018-01-05 Last updated: 2019-03-24Bibliographically approved
Stikvoort, B., Juslin, P. & Bartusch, C. (2018). Good things come in small packages: is there a common set of motivators for energy behaviour?. Energy Efficiency, 11(7), 1599-1615
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Good things come in small packages: is there a common set of motivators for energy behaviour?
2018 (English)In: Energy Efficiency, ISSN 1570-646X, E-ISSN 1570-6478, Vol. 11, no 7, p. 1599-1615Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Household energy consumption can be curbed by individuals’ energy saving, yet despite many efforts, our energy consumption is not lowering. This study investigated the role of a common set of behavioural determinants for households’ intention to perform four energy-related behaviours: investing in PV cells, turning off apparatus on standby mode, showering less, and replacing old home appliances with new energy-efficient ones. Behavioural determinants—energy awareness, general energy knowledge, attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control, and moral norms—were assessed in a survey (N = 83) among Swedish residents. Energy awareness was moderately correlated with energy knowledge, but not with respondents’ intentions to perform the behaviours, except for replacing home appliances. Moral norms were judged by respondents as important motivators and were a strong predictor to behavioural intentions to perform all four behaviours. Attitudes likewise were assessed as important motivators and were important predictors to all behavioural intentions except investing in PV cells, which was instead predicted by perceived behavioural control. Respondents’ assessment of beliefs underlying attitudes also differed for investing in PV cells; namely, beliefs about economic benefits were lower. Moreover, respondents felt less morally responsible for investing in PV cells. Concluding, we found no evidence that intentions to engage in four energy-saving behaviours are mediated by general energy knowledge or energy awareness. Determinants to each behaviour differed, where—surprisingly—investment in PV cells stood out as less motivated both by economic incentives and moral concerns, although moral norms were shared motivators across all four behaviours. We discuss different possible interpretations of these findings.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Netherlands: Springer, 2018
Keywords
Social psychology, Energy saving, Energy awareness, Behavioural determinants, Survey
National Category
Social Psychology Engineering and Technology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-330236 (URN)10.1007/s12053-017-9537-0 (DOI)000448039600004 ()
Funder
Swedish Energy Agency
Available from: 2017-09-28 Created: 2017-09-28 Last updated: 2020-01-23Bibliographically approved
Lidén, M., Gräns, M. & Juslin, P. (2018). Self-correction of wrongful convictions: is there a ‘System-level’ confirmation bias in the Swedish legal system’s appeal procedure for criminal cases?—Part I. Law, Probability and Risk, 17(4), 311-336
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Self-correction of wrongful convictions: is there a ‘System-level’ confirmation bias in the Swedish legal system’s appeal procedure for criminal cases?—Part I
2018 (English)In: Law, Probability and Risk, ISSN 1470-8396, E-ISSN 1470-840X, Vol. 17, no 4, p. 311-336Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In this study, we propose that confirmation bias may not only be present in the behaviors of individual agents in the judicial system but can also be recognized at a system-level as an inability to self-correct, that is, an inability to acquit wrongfully convicted who appeal or petition for a new trial. To assess the self-correctional ability a very low error rate of wrongful convictions in the District Courts in 2010-2014 was tentatively assumed. An empirical review of appeals (Part I) and petitions for new trials (Part II) in the Courts of Appeal and Supreme Court between 2010 and 2014 was carried out to evaluate to what extent these legal remedies can be expected to change wrongful convictions into acquittals. Realistic assumptions and empirical estimates of real-world statistics suggest that at least 34.67 % of the wrongfully convicted remained convicted despite the possibility both to appeal and petition for a new trial. A robustness analysis was performed to ascertain that the conclusions hold under a wide variety of assumptions about the unknown statistics. According to additional analyses the odds of an acquittal were low even for appeals referring to new innocence supportive evidence and for private individuals claiming to be innocent of e.g. assault or murder the odds of being granted new criminal trials were particularly low.

Keywords
confirmation bias, wrongful conviction, appeal, new trial, legal system, organization
National Category
Law and Society Psychology
Research subject
Jurisprudence
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-351677 (URN)10.1093/lpr/mgy018 (DOI)000456537600003 ()
Available from: 2018-08-09 Created: 2018-08-09 Last updated: 2019-02-18Bibliographically approved
Lidén, M., Gräns, M. & Juslin, P. (2018). Self-correction of wrongful convictions: is there a “System-level” confirmation bias in the Swedish legal system’s appeal procedure for criminal cases?—Part II. Law, Probability and Risk, 17(4), 337-356
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Self-correction of wrongful convictions: is there a “System-level” confirmation bias in the Swedish legal system’s appeal procedure for criminal cases?—Part II
2018 (English)In: Law, Probability and Risk, ISSN 1470-8396, E-ISSN 1470-840X, Vol. 17, no 4, p. 337-356Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In this study, we propose that confirmation bias may not only be present in the behaviors of individual agents in the judicial system but can also be recognized at a “system-level” as an inability to self-correct, that is, an inability to acquit wrongfully convicted who appeal or petition for a new trial. To assess the self-correctional ability a very low error rate of wrongful convictions in the District Courts in 2010-2014 was tentatively assumed. An empirical review of appeals (Part I) and petitions for new trials (Part II) in the Courts of Appeal and Supreme Court between 2010 and 2014 was carried out to evaluate to what extent these legal remedies can be expected to change wrongful convictions into acquittals. Realistic assumptions and empirical estimates of real-world statistics suggest that at least 34.67 % of the wrongfully convicted remained convicted despite the possibility both to appeal and petition for a new trial. A robustness analysis was performed to ascertain that the conclusions hold under a wide variety of assumptions about the unknown statistics. According to additional analyses the odds of an acquittal were low even for appeals referring to new innocence supportive evidence and for private individuals claiming to be innocent of e.g. assault or murder the odds of being granted new criminal trials were particularly low.

Keywords
legal system, confirmation bias, wrongful conviction, appeal, new trial, organization
National Category
Law and Society Psychology
Research subject
Jurisprudence
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-356848 (URN)10.1093/lpr/mgy019 (DOI)000456537600004 ()
Available from: 2018-08-09 Created: 2018-08-09 Last updated: 2019-02-18Bibliographically approved
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