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Mitigating global warming requires a rapid reduction in the use of fossil fuels which form the foundation of modern economies. Fossil fuel reduction is crucial for minimizing future loss and damage associated with a changing climate, but a challenging task. In diverse contexts, climate-friendly policies that increased fuel prices have sparked massive, at times violent, protests, ultimately leading to a reversal of those policies. However, to what extent and under what conditions fuel prices and policies affect protest more generally is poorly understood. Addressing this gap, we study how fuel prices affect the likelihood of protest onset. We theorize that increases in fuel prices may create economic grievances through their impacts on the cost of living and income. We also suggest that the likelihood of protest following such price increases would be particularly high where attribution of blame to government policies is feasible, such as in fuel subsidizing states, as well as when governments are seen as being able to provide a remedy such as in petroleum producing states. We evaluate our theoretical framework using global country-level monthly statistics 2003–2015, combining protest data with data on the price of gasoline, fuel policies, and country characteristics, and subject our results to placebo and sensitivity tests. Our study finds that gasoline price hikes increase the likelihood of protest onset across the global sample. In line with our theoretical framework, we also find evidence for a clustering of such relationships in the presence of subsidies and oil production, where the attribution of fuel prices to government (in)action tends to be higher. These results highlight the need for policymakers to anticipate public responses to price increases. This study lays the groundwork for more detailed investigations into climate-friendly subsidy and tax reforms.

What are the drivers of inclusion in peace negotiations? How can meaningful participation in peace processes be ensured? This research brief shows that civil society engagement, in the form of non-violent protests, demonstrations, or other forms of street action can help shape the conditions for inclusive peace talks in civil wars. We also present trends and patterns based on data on civil society engagement across civil wars in Africa, the Americas, and the Middle East. We propose three recommendations directed at international peacebuilding actors who strive to promote inclusive peace processes.

This brief is part of a research brief series generated by a joint initiative by the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). The aim of the series is to contribute to policy development by bringing cutting-edge research on key issues within mediation to the attention of policy makers and practitioners. The topics to be explored in the series were selected during joint discussions within the FBA initiative “Improving Mediation Effectiveness” throughout 2021-2023. The Initiative brought together policymakers, practitioners, and researchers within the mediation field to discuss challenges and opportunities for greater effectiveness in mediation. The editorial committee has consisted of Dr. Niklas Hultin, Agnes Cronholm, Dr. Johanna Malm and Maja Jakobsson from FBA, and Andrea Prah from ACCORD. We would like to thank the members of the Mediation Support Network for comments. The views and opinions expressed in the brief series are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the collaborating partners.

Why do some non-violent uprisings escalate into armed violence while others do not? We suggest that horizontal polarisation contributes to the escalation of non-violent campaigns. We examine the effect of ethnic cleavages between the campaign and its opponent and movement cohesion as explanatory factors for escalation into civil war and non-state violence. Statistical analysis of all major non-violent campaigns (1970-2014) shows that non-violent conflicts with ethnic cleavages have a higher risk of escalating into armed violence in particular, when the conflict takes place over governmental aims. The results also indicate that movement cohesion alleviates the risk of armed escalation.

Local ceasefire agreements are prevalent in modern civil wars, but we know little about their impact. This study analyzes geo-referenced data on 145 local ceasefire agreements declared during the Syrian Civil War, 2011-2019, exploring their short- and long-term effects on the intensity of armed violence. Drawing on scholarship on gradual confidence-building processes, we theorize the conditions under which local ceasefire agreements may generate trust and reduce conflict intensity. Using interrupted time-series analysis and spatial panel regression, we examine factors relating to the design and strategic context of ceasefire agreements. We find that local ceasefire agreements can trigger both escalation and de-escalation in the short term. De-escalatory outcomes are more likely in the long-term, when ceasefire signatories share a history of previous interaction, and when ceasefires are implemented in a stepwise fashion. We also find evidence of spatial diffusion: local ceasefire agreements in one area reduce conflict intensity in neighboring areas.

Whereas previous research shows that peace agreements which include a broad segment of society are more likely to lead to sustainable peace, little effort has gone into explaining inclusion itself. We address this gap in the literature by providing the first large-N study to examine the causes of inclusive peace negotiations across civil wars. We argue that civil society actors can gain leverage through mobilization of civilian protest, or build trust through dialogue efforts, thereby enhancing the chances of inclusion of non-warring actors at the negotiation table. The argument is examined by analysing unique and new monthly data on peacemaking efforts in all intrastate armed conflicts in Africa and the Americas, 1989–2018, including measures beyond mere nominal participation, such as whether civil society actors or political parties had substantive roles as either mediators or full participants at the peace talks. Our findings show that protests by civil society actors increase the likelihood that non-warring actors will have a seat at the negotiation table, whereas we find no such effect concerning dialogue efforts. The article contributes by providing new insights into how nonviolent action can shape peace processes by opening the doors to negotiations and is thus part of an emerging research agenda that seeks to bring together the fields of civil resistance and inclusive peace processes.

During the Syrian civil war, different types of Salafi-Jihadi rebel groups controlled territory and established governance over civilians. Their governing strategies have been markedly diverse. In this study, we explore how this governance variation can help to explain the occurrence of civil resistance. We suggest that different types of rebel governance structures provide political opportunities for civilians to mobilize against those rebel groups through public demonstrations. In particular, we argue that it is middle-ranged opportunity structures of rebel governance that strongest incentivizes civil resistance, by giving enough space for civilian mobilization but fewer alternative channels of expressing discontent. This argument is explored through an analysis of the variation between the three main Salafi-Jihadi rebel groups in Syria – IS, HTS and Ahrar al-Sham. We show how differences in the groups’ four rebel governance dimensions – rebel collaboration, civilian inclusion, alliance structure, and repression – impact the political opportunities for civilians to mobilize against these groups. We find that HTS, the group that is in the middle range across these four governance dimensions, provided greater opportunity for civilian protests. This study uses a new dataset of civilian resistance events in Syria as well as interviews with civilians governed by these groups.

Trans-national jihadist groups have established themselves across many contexts. However, we have limited knowledge about the larger picture of how such groups tap into various inter-religious, sectarian, or ethnic divisions. To address this research gap, we explore: How do trans-national jihadist groups mobilize on the basis of different forms of identity cleavages? Our empirical analysis focuses on all trans-national jihadist groups who have challenged governments in civil wars. We find that mobilization along ethnic divisions is the most common cleavage, and is increasing most over time. We also find that sectarian mobilization is rare, but associated with significant escalation of violence.

This article presents the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) "Violent Political Protest"€ (VPP) data set: a new -standalone- category of organized violence, which complements, and is compatible with, UCDP's three categories of organized violence: one-sided violence, non-state, and state-based conflict. It consists of violent political protests, with at least 25 casualties during a year, in which informally organized civilians challenge states over governmental or territorial issues. We describe the data collection process, and demonstrate the data's use with empirical analyses. Violent political protest is present globally, but most prevalent in the Middle East and Africa, and increasingly common over time. Violent political protest frequently co-occurs with state-based conflicts, but rarely due to conflict escalation. We explore if this is due to shared contexts, and find that gender inequality increases the likelihood of VPP onset, similar to state-based conflicts. Finally, we identify avenues for future research, including using VPP to assist in a more precise and complete analysis of organized violence.

Research has shown the potential of nonviolent civil resistance in challenging autocratic state regimes (e.g. Sharp, 1973; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Yet, little is known about its applicability in jihadist proto-states, that is, territories governed by militant jihadist groups. We argue that civil resistance is more likely to occur when jihadists impose a rule that local populations perceive as alien and when organizational structures capable of collective nonviolent mobilization are activated. We develop this argument through a comparative analysis of three jihadist proto-states: one in which manifest and organized civil resistance occurred (Islamic Emirate of Azawad in Mali in 2012), and two in which it did not: the Islamic State of Iraq (2006-2008) and the Islamic Principality of al-Mukalla in Yemen (2015-2016). Whereas the former was met with mainly armed resistance (the Sunni Awakening campaign), the latter saw neither armed nor unarmed organized and collective resistance by locals under its rule. We demonstrate how variation in the jihadists' governing strategies (especially the degree of adaptation to local conditions) as well as in the social structures for mobilization (i.e. whether opposition was channeled through civil society networks or tribal networks) created different conditions for civil resistance. This study adds to a growing research discussion on civil resistance against rebel governance (e.g. Arjona, 2015; Kaplan, 2017). More broadly, our study is an innovative first attempt to bridge research on terrorism, rebel governance, and civil resistance, three fields that have been siloed in previous research.

Mark Juergensmeyer is a world-renowned scholar, who has been a pioneer within the fields of global studies, conflict research and religious studies, and whose methods have inspired integrated and multidisciplinary approaches to understanding globalization, peace and conflict as well as religious violence.

On the occasion of Mark Juergensmeyer’s retirement Mona Kanwal Sheikh (DIIS) and Isak Svensson (Uppsala University) have compiled an edited volume highlighting central debates and concepts within the fields of religious violence, conflict studies and global studies.

Twenty-two leading scholars from around the world, and with a range of different diciplinary backgrounds, provide broadly accesible overviews of scholarly debates and institutional processes where Juergensmeyer has contributed major insights and made an important impact.

The book is not only a celebration of Mark Juergensmeyer’s lifetime achievements, but also a warranted tool for students and scholars, who want an insight into major conceptual debates on topics such as secularism, cosmic warfare, worldviews, and the globalization of global studies.