uu.seUppsala University Publications
Change search
Link to record
Permanent link

Direct link
BETA
Publications (10 of 34) Show all publications
Tersman, F. (2018). Review of Derek Parfit’s On What Matters, volume 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, ISBN: 9780198778608). [Review]. European Journal of Philosophy
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Review of Derek Parfit’s On What Matters, volume 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, ISBN: 9780198778608).
2018 (English)In: European Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0966-8373, E-ISSN 1468-0378Article, book review (Refereed) Accepted
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Wiley-Blackwell, 2018
National Category
Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-341521 (URN)10.1111/ejop.12338 (DOI)
Available from: 2018-02-09 Created: 2018-02-09 Last updated: 2018-02-14Bibliographically approved
Tersman, F. (2017). Debunking and Disagreement. Noûs, 51(4), 754-774
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Debunking and Disagreement
2017 (English)In: Noûs, ISSN 0029-4624, E-ISSN 1468-0068, Vol. 51, no 4, p. 754-774Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

A familiar way of supporting skeptical doubts about the beliefs in some area, such as ethics or religion, is to provide a “debunking” argument against them. Another, even more familiar, way is to appeal to the disagreement that occurs in the area. These types of challenge are often treated separately and there is not much overlap in the literature they have given rise to. Yet, as they pursue similar conclusions one might well wonder how they are related. Are they entirely independent or do they interact in non-trivial and interesting ways? The purpose of this paper is to argue that the latter is indeed the case and that appeals to disagreement have a crucial role to play in the debunking strategy.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Wiley-Blackwell, 2017
Keywords
Moral disagreement, moral realism, evolutionary debunking arguments
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Ethics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-269714 (URN)10.1111/nous.12135 (DOI)000414712900005 ()
Projects
Expressivism Generalized
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2012-988
Available from: 2015-12-17 Created: 2015-12-17 Last updated: 2018-02-19Bibliographically approved
Tersman, F. (2017). Moral Skepticism and the Benacerraf Challenge. In: Diego Machuca (Ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Moral Skepticism and the Benacerraf Challenge
2017 (English)In: Moral Skepticism: New Essays / [ed] Diego Machuca, New York: Routledge, 2017Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

The Benacerraf challenge is a well-known objection to Platonism in mathematics. Its proponent argues that, if mathematical entities are, as Platonists claim, mind-independent, causally inert, and existent beyond space and time, then we are led to a skeptical stance according to which it is not possible to explain how it is that we have cognitive access to the mathematical realm or how it is that our mathematical beliefs are reliable. It has been argued that a similar objection could be leveled against those forms of moral realism that fall under what in Section 2 was called “robust moral realism.” In “Moral Skepticism and the Benacerraf Challenge,” Folke Tersman considers whether, unlike the argument from the best explanation, the argument from disagreement, and the argument from evolution, the moral version of the Benacerraf challenge can undermine moral knowledge without appealing to empirical claims that moral realists deem controversial. His verdict is negative: to successfully counter certain responses to the moral version of the challenge, its proponent needs to have recourse to empirical considerations taken from some of the above arguments

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
New York: Routledge, 2017
Series
Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Ethics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-325227 (URN)9781138645868 (ISBN)
Note

Forthcoming (8 Nov. 2017)

Available from: 2017-06-21 Created: 2017-06-21 Last updated: 2017-06-29Bibliographically approved
Tersman, F. (2016). Explaining the Reliability of Moral Beliefs. In: Neil Sinclair and Uri Leibowitz (Ed.), Ethics and Explanation: (pp. 37-57). Oxford University Press
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Explaining the Reliability of Moral Beliefs
2016 (English)In: Ethics and Explanation / [ed] Neil Sinclair and Uri Leibowitz, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 37-57Chapter in book (Refereed)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford University Press, 2016
Keywords
Benacerraf, moral realism, moral knowledge, evolutionary debunking arguments, non-naturalism
National Category
Ethics Philosophy
Research subject
Ethics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-283616 (URN)9780198778592 (ISBN)
Projects
Expressivism Generalised
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2012-988
Note

This is a draft of a chapter that has been accepted for publication by Oxford University Press in the forthcoming book "Ethics and Explanation", edited by Neil Sinclair and Uri Leibowitz due for publication in 2016.

Available from: 2016-04-13 Created: 2016-04-13 Last updated: 2016-07-22Bibliographically approved
Tersman, F. (2015). Review of Joyce, R., and Kirchin, S., (eds.), A World Without Values. Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory (Springer, 2010) [Review]. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 5(4), 333-337
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Review of Joyce, R., and Kirchin, S., (eds.), A World Without Values. Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory (Springer, 2010)
2015 (English)In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, ISSN 2210-5697, Vol. 5, no 4, p. 333-337Article, book review (Refereed) Published
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Brill Academic Publishers, 2015
Keywords
John Mackie, Moral Skepticism, The Argument from Relativity
National Category
Ethics
Research subject
Ethics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-265535 (URN)10.1163/22105700-05031197 (DOI)000369171100005 ()
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2012–988
Available from: 2015-10-31 Created: 2015-10-31 Last updated: 2016-04-06Bibliographically approved
Tersman, F. (2014). Disagreement: Ethics and Elsewhere. Erkenntnis, 79(S1), 55-72
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Disagreement: Ethics and Elsewhere
2014 (English)In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 79, no S1, p. 55-72Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

According to a traditional argument against moral realism, the existence of objective moral facts is hard to reconcile with the existence of radical disagreement over moral issues. An increasingly popular response to this argument is to insist that it generalizes too easily. Thus, it has been argued that if one rejects moral realism on the basis of disagreement then one is committed to similar views about epistemology and meta-ethics itself, since the disagreements that arise in those areas are just as deep as the moral ones. This in turn is taken to show that a moral anti-realist should seek another basis for her position. For, if she extends her anti-realism also to epistemology and meta-ethics, then she is no longer in a position to say that her meta-ethical position is true or that it is a fact that we have reason to accept it. She therefore seems left with a position that hardly even seems to be a position. The purpose of the paper is to challenge this response and in particular the claim that the argument from disagreement applies equally well to epistemology and meta-ethics as it does to ethics. It is argued that, despite contrary appearances, there are crucial differences between the disagreements that occur in ethics compared to those that arise in the other areas. Moreover, even granted that the disagreements are just as deep, there are other differences between the areas that nevertheless justify drawing different conclusions about their status from the existence of those disagreements.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2014
Keywords
Disagreement, realism, moral realism, epistemology, meta-ethics, anti-realism
National Category
Ethics Philosophy
Research subject
Ethics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-195314 (URN)10.1007/s10670-013-9445-4 (DOI)000331970000004 ()
Projects
Expressivism Generalised
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2012-988
Available from: 2013-02-24 Created: 2013-02-24 Last updated: 2017-12-06Bibliographically approved
Tersman, F. (2013). Disagreement, Moral. In: Hugh LaFolette (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics: . Wiley-Blackwell
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Disagreement, Moral
2013 (English)In: International Encyclopedia of Ethics / [ed] Hugh LaFolette, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

In the philosophical literature one often meets the locution “the argument from moral disagreement”, as if there is only one such argument. But there are in fact several arguments that appeal to moral disagreement, arguments that take quite different routes to their anti-realist conclusions. In what follows, some of these arguments are reconstructed and discussed.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Wiley-Blackwell, 2013
Keywords
ethics, metaethics
National Category
Ethics
Research subject
Ethics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-193567 (URN)10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee131 (DOI)9781444367072 (ISBN)
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 421-2012-988
Available from: 2013-02-05 Created: 2013-02-05 Last updated: 2013-07-14
Tersman, F. (2012). Detaljernas paradox. 10tal (8/9), 91-93
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Detaljernas paradox
2012 (Swedish)In: 10tal, ISSN 2000-5350, no 8/9, p. 91-93Article in journal, Editorial material (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.)) Published
Keywords
Fångarnas dilemma, allmänningens tragedi
National Category
Humanities Ethics
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-181502 (URN)
Available from: 2013-01-08 Created: 2012-09-24 Last updated: 2013-01-08Bibliographically approved
Tersman, F. (2012). Intuitional Disagreement. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 50(4), 639-659
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Intuitional Disagreement
2012 (English)In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0038-4283, E-ISSN 2041-6962, Vol. 50, no 4, p. 639-659Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The aim of the paper is to reconstruct the best version of the ‘experimentalist’ challenge to the use of intuitions in philosophy and in particular in ethics and to discuss possible responses to the challenge. I focus especially on responses that invoke substantive assumptions of the very type intuitions are supposed to support. It is argued that even if this apparently circular strategy is thought legitimate, the prospects of providing a compelling response to the challenge are still bleak.

Abstract: Some think that recent empirical research has shown that peoples' moral intuitions vary in a way that is hard to reconcile with the supposition that they are even modestly reliable. This is in turn supposed to generate skeptical conclusions regarding the claims and theories advanced by ethicists because of the crucial role intuitions have in the arguments offered in support of those claims. I begin by trying to articulate the most compelling version of this challenge. On that version, the main problem is the absence of a believable positive account of the reliability of the intuitions (rather than the bits of negative evidence that have so far been gathered). I then consider the response to this challenge that, in my view, holds most promise. It differs from others by invoking substantive moral assumptions. Such a strategy may appear problematically circular, in that the justification of those assumptions seems to presuppose the very thesis that is challenged (the thesis that our intuitions deserve being treated as evidence). However, although I think that objection can be met, I argue that there are other problems with the strategy. On the basis of a set of conditions that a successful defense of the pertinent kind plausibly must satisfy, I argue that the prospects of developing such an account are bleak.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Wiley-Blackwell, 2012
Keywords
Intuition, experimental philosophy, skepticism, theory-dependent justification
National Category
Humanities Philosophy Ethics
Research subject
Ethics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-188351 (URN)10.1111/j.2041-6962.2012.00139.x (DOI)000312537700008 ()
Available from: 2012-12-16 Created: 2012-12-16 Last updated: 2017-12-06Bibliographically approved
Tersman, F. (2011). Meaning, Morals, and Mistakes. In: Rysiek Sliwinski and Frans Svensson (Ed.), Neither/Nor: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlsson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday (pp. 345-350). Uppsala: Uppsala universitet
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Meaning, Morals, and Mistakes
2011 (English)In: Neither/Nor: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlsson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday / [ed] Rysiek Sliwinski and Frans Svensson, Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2011, p. 345-350Chapter in book (Other academic)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2011
Series
Uppsala Philosophical Studies / Uppsala University, Department of Philosophy, ISSN 1402-1110 ; 58
National Category
Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-169170 (URN)978-91-506-2224-9 (ISBN)
Available from: 2012-02-23 Created: 2012-02-23 Last updated: 2014-01-07
Organisations
Identifiers
ORCID iD: ORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0003-4002-3007

Search in DiVA

Show all publications