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Publications (10 of 54) Show all publications
Johansson, J. & Risberg, O. (2019). Harming and Failing to Benefit: A Reply to Purves. Philosophical Studies
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Harming and Failing to Benefit: A Reply to Purves
2019 (English)In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883Article in journal (Refereed) In press
National Category
Ethics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-378227 (URN)10.1007/s11098-019-01273-5 (DOI)
Available from: 2019-03-04 Created: 2019-03-04 Last updated: 2019-04-04Bibliographically approved
Johansson, J. & Risberg, O. (2019). The Preemption Problem. Philosophical Studies, 176(2), 351-365
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The Preemption Problem
2019 (English)In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 176, no 2, p. 351-365Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

According to the standard version of the counterfactual comparative account of harm, an event is overall harmful for an individual if and only if she would have been on balance better off if it had not occurred. This view faces the “preemption problem.” In the recent literature, there are various ingenious attempts to deal with this problem, some of which involve slight additions to, or modifications of, the counterfactual comparative account. We argue, however, that none of these attempts work, and that the preemption problem continues to haunt the counterfactual comparative account.

Keywords
Harm, Preemption, Well-being
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-334580 (URN)10.1007/s11098-017-1019-x (DOI)000454895300004 ()
Projects
Harm: The Concept and Its Relevance
Funder
Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, P14-0212:1
Available from: 2017-11-24 Created: 2017-11-24 Last updated: 2019-01-29Bibliographically approved
Johansson, J. (2018). Review of Anders Jeffner, I vetandets gränsmarker: Nio essäer om religion och verklighetstolkning [Review]. Filosofisk Tidskrift (4), 52-56
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Review of Anders Jeffner, I vetandets gränsmarker: Nio essäer om religion och verklighetstolkning
2018 (Swedish)In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 4, p. 52-56Article, book review (Other academic) Published
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-352096 (URN)
Available from: 2018-06-01 Created: 2018-06-01 Last updated: 2019-04-04Bibliographically approved
Risberg, O. & Johansson, J. (2018). The Problem of Justified Harm: A Reply to Gardner. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21(3), 735-742
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The Problem of Justified Harm: A Reply to Gardner
2018 (English)In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 21, no 3, p. 735-742Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In this paper, we critically examine Molly Gardner’s favored solution to what she calls “the problem of justified harm.” We argue that Gardner’s view is false and that her arguments in support of it are unconvincing. Finally, we briefly suggest an alternative solution to the problem which avoids the difficulties that beset Gardner’s proposal.

National Category
Ethics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-356990 (URN)10.1007/s10677-018-9912-8 (DOI)000449326400020 ()
Funder
Riksbankens Jubileumsfond
Available from: 2018-08-09 Created: 2018-08-09 Last updated: 2018-12-14Bibliographically approved
Johansson, J. & Risberg, O. (2018). The Problem of Justified Harm: A Reply to Gardner. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21, 735-742
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The Problem of Justified Harm: A Reply to Gardner
2018 (English)In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 21, p. 735-742Article in journal (Refereed) Published
National Category
Ethics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-356037 (URN)10.1007/s10677-018-9912-8 (DOI)
Available from: 2018-07-11 Created: 2018-07-11 Last updated: 2019-04-04Bibliographically approved
Johansson, J. (2018). The Subject of Harm in Non-Identity Cases. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The Subject of Harm in Non-Identity Cases
2018 (English)In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447Article in journal (Refereed) Published
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-361702 (URN)10.1007/s10677-018-9933-3 (DOI)
Available from: 2018-09-26 Created: 2018-09-26 Last updated: 2019-04-04Bibliographically approved
Carlson, E. & Johansson, J. (2018). Well-Being without Being? A Reply to Feit. Utilitas, 30(2), 198-208
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Well-Being without Being? A Reply to Feit
2018 (English)In: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 30, no 2, p. 198-208Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In a recent Utilitas article, Neil Feit argues that every person occupies a well-being level of zero at all times and possible worlds at which she fails to exist. Views like his face the problem of the subject': how can someone have a well-being level in a scenario where she lacks intrinsic properties? Feit argues that this problem can be solved by noting, among other things, that a proposition about a person can be true at a possible world in which neither she nor the proposition exists. In this response, we argue that Feit has not solved the problem of the subject, and also raise various related problems for his approach.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Cambridge University Press, 2018
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-317493 (URN)10.1017/S0953820817000103 (DOI)000434295800004 ()
Funder
Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, P14-0212:1
Available from: 2017-03-15 Created: 2017-03-15 Last updated: 2018-09-26Bibliographically approved
Johansson, J. (2017). Asymmetry and Incoherence: A Reply to Cyr. Journal of Ethics, 21(2), 215-221
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Asymmetry and Incoherence: A Reply to Cyr
2017 (English)In: Journal of Ethics, ISSN 1382-4554, E-ISSN 1572-8609, Vol. 21, no 2, p. 215-221Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In defense of the Deprivation Approach to the badness of death against the Lucretian objection that death is relevantly similar to prenatal nonexistence, John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have suggested that whereas death deprives us of things that it is rational for us to care about, prenatal nonexistence does not. I have argued that this suggestion, even if correct, does not make for a successful defense of the Deprivation Approach against the Lucretian objection. My criticism involved a thought experiment in which a person avoids being tortured. Recently, Taylor Cyr has defended Fischer and Brueckner's approach, arguing that my thought experiment is incoherent. In this response, I question both the truth and relevance of Cyr's incoherence claim.

National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-299452 (URN)10.1007/s10892-016-9238-5 (DOI)
Available from: 2016-07-19 Created: 2016-07-19 Last updated: 2019-04-04Bibliographically approved
Johansson, J. (2017). Review of Mikael Stenmark, Tankar om Gud, kristen tro och livets mening [Review]. Filosofisk Tidskrift (2), 59-62
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Review of Mikael Stenmark, Tankar om Gud, kristen tro och livets mening
2017 (Swedish)In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 2, p. 59-62Article, book review (Other academic) Published
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-312605 (URN)
Available from: 2017-01-12 Created: 2017-01-12 Last updated: 2019-04-04Bibliographically approved
Johansson, J. (2017). The Lucretian Puzzle and the Nature of Time. Journal of Ethics, 21, 239-250
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The Lucretian Puzzle and the Nature of Time
2017 (English)In: Journal of Ethics, ISSN 1382-4554, E-ISSN 1572-8609, Vol. 21, p. 239-250Article in journal (Refereed) Published
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-314181 (URN)10.1007/s10892-017-9248-y (DOI)
Available from: 2017-01-30 Created: 2017-01-30 Last updated: 2019-04-04Bibliographically approved
Organisations
Identifiers
ORCID iD: ORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0002-2484-4502

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