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Moberger, Victor
Publications (10 of 12) Show all publications
Moberger, V. (2018). Non-naturalism och superveniens. Filosofisk Tidskrift, 39(2), 27-42
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Non-naturalism och superveniens
2018 (Swedish)In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 39, no 2, p. 27-42Article in journal (Other academic) Published
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Thales, 2018
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-350004 (URN)
Available from: 2018-05-02 Created: 2018-05-02 Last updated: 2018-05-02
Moberger, V. (2018). Recension av Åsa Wikforss, Alternativa fakta: Om kunskapen och dess fiender [Review]. Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, 22(1), 38-45
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Recension av Åsa Wikforss, Alternativa fakta: Om kunskapen och dess fiender
2018 (Swedish)In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 22, no 1, p. 38-45Article, book review (Other academic) Published
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Thales, 2018
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-347575 (URN)
Available from: 2018-04-04 Created: 2018-04-04 Last updated: 2018-04-04Bibliographically approved
Moberger, V. (2018). The Queerness of Objective Values: An Essay on Mackiean Metaethics and the Arguments from Queerness. (Doctoral dissertation). Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The Queerness of Objective Values: An Essay on Mackiean Metaethics and the Arguments from Queerness
2018 (English)Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This book investigates the argument from queerness against moral realism, famously put forward by J. L. Mackie in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977). The book can be divided into two parts. The first part, roughly comprising chapters 1 and 2, gives a critical overview of Mackie’s metaethics. In chapter 1 it is suggested that the argument from queerness is the only argument that poses a serious threat to moral realism. A partial defense of this idea is offered in chapter 2 via a discussion of Mackie’s argument from relativity, which is concluded to fail for reasons that generalize to other influential arguments against moral realism. Chapter 2 also explores Mackie’s moral semantics at length. The key notion of authoritative prescriptivity is analyzed, and a new interpretation of Mackie’s error theory is defended. In the second part, consisting roughly of chapters 3 and 4, the argument from queerness is taken apart and put back together, resulting in several different versions. Chapter 3 discusses three different supervenience-related arguments, all of which are found to be unpersuasive. Chapter 4 develops two different versions of the core argument from queerness, focusing on authoritative prescriptivity. A total of thirteen objections are discussed and rejected. It is concluded that the two arguments do indeed refute the targeted versions of moral realism. Finally, in chapter 5 the entire discussion is briefly summarized.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, 2018. p. 141
Keywords
J. L. Mackie, argument from queerness, objective values, moral realism, claim to objectivity, argument from relativity, non-naturalism, supervenience, normative explanation, authoritative prescriptivity, objectivity, categoricity, minimal realism, ardent realism
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-363084 (URN)978-91-506-2724-4 (ISBN)
Public defence
2018-11-30, Auditorium Minus, Gustavianum, Uppsala, 13:00 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2018-11-07 Created: 2018-10-11 Last updated: 2018-11-07
Moberger, V. (2017). Not Just Errors: A New Interpretation of Mackie's Error Theory. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 5(3), 1-12
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Not Just Errors: A New Interpretation of Mackie's Error Theory
2017 (English)In: Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, E-ISSN 2159-0303, Vol. 5, no 3, p. 1-12Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

J. L. Mackie famously argued that a commitment to non-existent objective values permeates ordinary moral thought and discourse. According to a standard interpretation, Mackie construed this commitment as a universal and indeed essential feature of moral judgments. In this paper I argue that we should rather ascribe to Mackie a form of semantic pluralism, according to which not all moral judgments involve the commitment to objective values. This interpretation not only makes better sense of what Mackie actually says, but also renders his error theory immune to a powerful objection.

National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-312841 (URN)10.15173/jhap.v5i3.2953 (DOI)
Available from: 2017-01-13 Created: 2017-01-13 Last updated: 2018-04-05Bibliographically approved
Moberger, V. (2016). Mackie och misstagsteorin. Filosofisk Tidskrift, 37(1), 21-33
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Mackie och misstagsteorin
2016 (Swedish)In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 37, no 1, p. 21-33Article in journal (Other academic) Published
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-279248 (URN)
Available from: 2016-02-29 Created: 2016-02-29 Last updated: 2017-11-30
Moberger, V. (2015). Tio vanliga argumentationsmisstag. Folkvett (4), 33-51
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Tio vanliga argumentationsmisstag
2015 (Swedish)In: Folkvett, ISSN 0283-0795, no 4, p. 33-51Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.)) Published
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-312888 (URN)
Available from: 2017-01-14 Created: 2017-01-14 Last updated: 2017-03-13Bibliographically approved
Moberger, V. (2013). Recension av Sam Harris, Moralens landskap [Review]. Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, 17(2), 38-40
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Recension av Sam Harris, Moralens landskap
2013 (Swedish)In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 17, no 2, p. 38-40Article, book review (Other academic) Published
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-217395 (URN)
Available from: 2014-02-03 Created: 2014-02-03 Last updated: 2017-12-06Bibliographically approved
Moberger, V. (2013). Svar till Ylva Bexell. Folkvett (1), 60-63
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Svar till Ylva Bexell
2013 (Swedish)In: Folkvett, ISSN 0283-0795, no 1, p. 60-63Article in journal, Editorial material (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.)) Published
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-198364 (URN)
Available from: 2013-04-14 Created: 2013-04-14 Last updated: 2013-10-08Bibliographically approved
Moberger, V. (2012). Don Loeb om gastronomisk realism. Filosofisk tidskrift, 33(1), 31-37
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Don Loeb om gastronomisk realism
2012 (Swedish)In: Filosofisk tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 33, no 1, p. 31-37Article in journal, Editorial material (Other academic) Published
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-178128 (URN)
Available from: 2012-07-29 Created: 2012-07-29 Last updated: 2013-10-08Bibliographically approved
Moberger, V. (2012). From Reasons to Norms: On the Basic Question in Ethics – By Torbjörn Tännsjö [Review]. Theoria, 78, 84-88
Open this publication in new window or tab >>From Reasons to Norms: On the Basic Question in Ethics – By Torbjörn Tännsjö
2012 (English)In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 78, p. 84-88Article, book review (Other academic) Published
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-178124 (URN)10.1111/j.1755-2567.2011.01124.x (DOI)
Available from: 2012-07-29 Created: 2012-07-29 Last updated: 2017-12-07
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