uu.seUppsala University Publications
Change search
Link to record
Permanent link

Direct link
BETA
Repetto, Luca
Publications (4 of 4) Show all publications
Repetto, L. & Solis, A. (2017). The Price of Inattention: Evidence from the Swedish Housing Market. Uppsala
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The Price of Inattention: Evidence from the Swedish Housing Market
2017 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Do behavioral biases affect prices in a high-stake market? We study the role of left-digitbias in the purchase of an apartment, one of the most important assets in a household’sportfolio. Left-digit bias is the inability to fully process digits after the first, perceivingprices just below a round number (such as $3.99) as cheaper than their roundcounterpart ($4). We start by documenting that apartments listed at just-below asking prices are sold at a 3-5% higher final price after an auction. This effect appears not to bedriven by i) differences in observable characteristics; ii) differences in real estate agents’behavior; or iii) institutional characteristics of the market. We show that apartments using just-below prices attract more bidders and bids, leading to higher competition and to a higher final price. Our results suggest that inattentive buyers might be losing roughlyhalf a year of disposable income.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: , 2017. p. 48
Series
Working paper / Department of Economics, Uppsala University (Online), ISSN 1653-6975 ; 2017:10
Keywords
Housing market, auctions, inattention, first-digit bias
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-331189 (URN)
Available from: 2017-10-11 Created: 2017-10-11 Last updated: 2017-10-12Bibliographically approved
Carozzi, F. & Repetto, L. (2016). Distributive Politics inside the City?: The Political Economy of Spain’s Plan E. Uppsala: Uppsala universitet
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Distributive Politics inside the City?: The Political Economy of Spain’s Plan E
2016 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

We study the allocation of investment projects by municipal governments across groups of voters using data from a fiscal stimulus program carried out in Spain between 2009 and 2011. This program provided municipalities with a large endowment to spend in public investments and required the geocoding of each individual project. Combining these data with disaggregated election information at the census area level, we study whether politicians use expenditures to target their supporters or to raise turnout. Estimates from regression, matching and RDD methods show no evidence of local governments targeting areas of core support. Instead, investment goes disproportionately to low turnout areas, suggesting that politiciansuse funds to increase participation. We confirm this hypothesis by showing that, in the following elections, turnout is increased in areas that received more investment. Our results suggest that mobilization can be a strong force in shaping the allocation of resources acrossvoter groups within cities.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2016. p. 48
Series
Working paper / Department of Economics, Uppsala University (Online), ISSN 1653-6975 ; 2016:15
Keywords
Political economy, Distributive Politics, Core voters, Turnout, Partisan alignment
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-310886 (URN)
Available from: 2016-12-20 Created: 2016-12-20 Last updated: 2016-12-21Bibliographically approved
Repetto, L. (2016). Political budget cycles with informed voters:evidence from Italy. Uppsala
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Political budget cycles with informed voters:evidence from Italy
2016 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

I exploit a reform that required Italian municipalities to disclose their balance sheetsbefore elections to study whether having more informed voters aects the political budgetcycle. To start, investment spending in the year before elections is 28.5% higher thanin the election year and this increase is mainly nanced with new debt and sales of publicassets. Taking advantage of the staggered timing of municipal elections, I estimate thatthe reform reduced this pre-electoral spending increase by around one-third. I also studythe role of local newspapers in disseminating municipal nancial information to votersand I nd that the reduction in spending after the reform is twice as strong in provinceswith above-median local newspapers sales per capita. I interpret these results as evidencethat mayors react to more informed voters by reducing spending manipulation.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: , 2016. p. 50
Series
Working paper / Department of Economics, Uppsala University (Online), ISSN 1653-6975 ; 2016:6
Keywords
Information, Political budget cycles, accountability, Italian municipalities
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-294526 (URN)
Available from: 2016-05-23 Created: 2016-05-23 Last updated: 2016-05-25Bibliographically approved
Carozzi, F. & Repetto, L. (2016). Sending the pork home: Birth town bias in transfers to Italian municipalities. Journal of Public Economics, 134, 42-52
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Sending the pork home: Birth town bias in transfers to Italian municipalities
2016 (English)In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 134, p. 42-52Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

We ask whether the birthplaces of Italian members of Parliament are favoured in the allocation of central government transfers. Using a panel of municipalities for the years between 1994 and 2006, we find that municipal governments of legislators' birth towns receive larger transfers per capita. Exploiting variation in birthplaces induced by parliamentary turnover for estimation, we find that this effect is driven by legislators who were born in a town outside their district of election. As a result, we argue that our findings cannot be a consequence of re-election incentives, the usual motivation for pork-barrel policies in the literature. Rather, politicians may be pursuing other personal motives. In line with this hypothesis, we find that the birth town bias essentially disappears when legislative elections are near. We explore several possible mechanisms behind our results by matching parliamentarians to a detailed dataset on local level administrators.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2016
Keywords
Pork-barrel politics; Distributive policies; Careers in politics; Political economy
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-288412 (URN)10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.12.009 (DOI)000373541100005 ()
Funder
EU, European Research Council, 269868
Available from: 2016-04-27 Created: 2016-04-27 Last updated: 2017-11-30Bibliographically approved
Organisations

Search in DiVA

Show all publications