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Processteism har haft en viktig roll i den religionsfilosofiska debatten. Processteism vill vara ett alternativ till "traditionell" teism. Hur skiljer den sig från den traditionella? Vilka fördelar eller nackdelar medför den? Med utgångspunkt i Alfred North Whiteheads processfilosofi ges i denna bok en introduktion till processteismen. Viktiga särdrag i den processteistiska gudsbilden beskrivs i detalj, däribland Guds föränderlighet och det faktum att processteism är en form av panpsykistisk panenteism. Dessutom behandlas processteismens närhet till naturvetenskapligt tänkande, hur den möjliggör en fruktbar dialog med personer med andra livsåskådningar, dess relation till forskning om mänskligt medvetande, hur den tar sig an lidandets problem och eskatologiska frågor, samt hur skapelseakten förstås inom en processteistisk gudsbild. Författarens förhoppning är att denna bok kommer att utgöra ett värdefullt bidrag till den svenska livsåskådningsfilosofiska debatten. 

Recent research papers and tests in real life point in the direction that machines in the future may develop some form of possibly rudimentary inner life. Philosophers have warned and emphasized that the possibility of artificial suffering or the possibility of machines as moral patients should not be ruled out. In this paper, I reflect on the consequences for moral development of striving for AGI. In the introduction, I present examples which point into the direction of the future possibility of artificial suffering and highlight the increasing similarity between, for example, machine–human and human–human interaction. Next, I present and discuss responses to the possibility of artificial suffering supporting a cautious attitude for the sake of the machines. From a virtue ethical perspective and the development of human virtues, I subsequently argue that humans should not pursue the path of developing and creating AGI, not merely for the sake of possible suffering in machines, but also due to machine–human interaction becoming more alike to human–human interaction and for the sake of the human’s own moral development. Thus, for several reasons, humanity, as a whole, should be extremely cautious about pursuing the path of developing AGI—Artificial General Intelligence.

In this article, I argue that given the possibility and prospect of ArtificialGeneral Intelligence (AGI), panentheism, as a form of theism with astronger emphasis on the immanence of God, parallels the anti-anthropocentrism implied by AGI. I discuss some general issues relatedto the categorization of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Next, bothanthropomorphism and anthropocentrism will be discussed as conceptsfor how humans may relate to AI. Subsequently, I argue and concludethat there is an analogy between the anti-anthropocentric implications ofAGI and the anti-anthropocentric element of panentheism, but thatpanentheism points to a stronger form of anti-anthropocentrism.

Panenteism som en speciell form av teism -- en allt i Gud-teism -- har diskuterats bland teologer i många år. Här görs en religionsfilosofisk undersökning av denna gudsbild. Författaren definierar panenteism och tar upp några betydelsefulla exempel på hur panenteistiska tankar kan spåras i den västerländska tanketraditionen. Panenteismens konsekvenser undersöks i relation till ett urval teman: förhållandet mellan naturvetenskap och religion, frågan om religiös mångfald, ett antal traditionella teologiska frågor, samt människans förhållande till världen i sin helhet. Guds starka immanens och ömsesidiga relation till världen inom panenteismen betonas och lyfts fram. Boken utmynnar i slutsatsen att panenteism kan erbjuda ett sätt att känna och uppleva ödmjukhet och vördnad inför naturen, medmänniskorna och skapelsen -- en gudsbild för vår tid.  

In this paper I identify and discuss a number of features that I argue are necessary for the realization of AGI. As a preliminary step, common definitions of AGI are presented in respect to their understanding of mind, intelligence, and consciousness. I show that, despite the amazing performance of artificial systems, at present they are still far from exhibiting AGI, and I identify some of their central short-comings. Secondly, inspired by research within the philosophy of mind, embodiment and situatedness, I suggest a number of features that I deem necessary for a mind. I then investigate the possible objection against the relevance of these features namely that they are overly anthropocentric or biocentric. I further discuss aspects of these features in relation to their transfer to artificial systems with the goal of creating an artificial mind. I finally conclude that self-reflexivity and the re-creation of the world as an inner world should be strongly focused upon if one wishes to create an artificial mind or artificial consciousness. However, I also issue a warning about some well-known risks when creating AGI.

In this article we discuss themes of artificial subjectivity in Ishiguro's novel Klara and the Sun. We first present a thematic overview, and some reflections upon subjectivity. The analysis proceeds in four steps pertaining to perspectives on artificial subjectivity and the narrative construction of human dignity: (1) who is human, (2) where does the heart lie, (3) the dialectical creation of the heart, and (4) reflections on subjectivity and personhood. Finally, we summarize the views suggested and emphasize their relevance to society's understanding of humanity and the non-human. We also conclude that relational ontologies are more suitable to understand subjectivity and personhood, in particular in cases of interaction between the human and non-human.