uu.seUppsala University Publications
Change search
Link to record
Permanent link

Direct link
BETA
Publications (10 of 13) Show all publications
Stokke, A. (2019). Lies, Harm, and Practical Interests. Philosophy and phenomenological research, 98(2), 329-345
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Lies, Harm, and Practical Interests
2019 (English)In: Philosophy and phenomenological research, ISSN 0031-8205, E-ISSN 1933-1592, Vol. 98, no 2, p. 329-345Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper outlines an account of the ethics of lying, which accommodates two main ideas about lying. The first of these, Anti‐Deceptionalism, is the view that lying does not necessarily involve intentions to deceive. The second, Anti‐Absolutism, is the view that lying is not always morally wrong. It is argued that lying is not wrong in itself, but rather the wrong in lying is explained by different factors in different cases. In some cases such factors may include deceptive intentions on the part of the liar. In other cases, where such intentions are not found, the wrong in lying may be explained by other factors. Moreover, it is argued that the interaction between considerations against lying and considerations against telling the truth are sensitive to the practical interests of those lied to. When the topic of the lie in question matters little to the victim's rational decision making, the threshold for when considerations against telling the truth can outweigh considerations against lying are lowered. This account is seen to explain why lying to avoid little harm is sometimes permissible, and sometimes not.

National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-379057 (URN)10.1111/phpr.12439 (DOI)000462056000004 ()
Available from: 2019-03-11 Created: 2019-03-11 Last updated: 2019-04-15Bibliographically approved
Stokke, A. (2018). Bullshitting. In: Meibauer, Jörg (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying: . Oxford University Press
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Bullshitting
2018 (English)In: The Oxford Handbook of Lying / [ed] Meibauer, Jörg, Oxford University Press , 2018Chapter in book (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This chapter provides an overview of reactions to Harry Frankfurt’s influential theory of bullshitting, addressing the four main features he ascribes to it, and considers some alternatives to Frankfurt’s account. Among others, issues raised by Thomas Carson and G. A. Cohen are examined in the discussion. A proposal to characterize bullshitting in terms of Gricean maxims is discussed, and it is argued that these views fail to capture the full range of cases. Here, works by Stokke and Don Fallis are cited. An alternative view that analyzes bullshitting in terms of the speaker’s attitudes toward the communal project of inquiry is canvassed, and the chapter ends by discussing the relation between bullshitting and lying.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford University Press, 2018
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-379064 (URN)10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.20 (DOI)9780198736578 (ISBN)
Available from: 2019-03-11 Created: 2019-03-11 Last updated: 2019-09-11Bibliographically approved
Stokke, A. (2018). Fabrication and Testimony. In: Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, Politics. Oxford University Press
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Fabrication and Testimony
2018 (English)In: Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

This chapter is concerned with the question, what are the conditions under which insincerity blocks testimonial knowledge and what are the conditions under which testimonial knowledge may be acquired in the face of insincere testimony? The chapter argues that when insincerity blocks testimonial knowledge, the insincerity involved is a kind of unreliability. In particular, insincere testimony—in particular, lying—is seen to involve fabrication, that is, making something up. It is argued that acquiring testimonial knowledge requires that the testimony be given on a reliable basis. Yet fabrication is not a reliable basis for testimony, and hence this explains why lying testimony typically does not yield testimonial knowledge. By contrast, the chapter shows that, in cases where listeners acquire testimonial knowledge from insincere testifiers, the testimony is given on a reliable basis.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford University Press, 2018
Keywords
testimony, knowledge, reliability, fabrication, lying, insincerity
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-379058 (URN)10.1093/oso/9780198743965.003.0006 (DOI)9780198743965 (ISBN)
Available from: 2019-03-11 Created: 2019-03-11 Last updated: 2019-08-21Bibliographically approved
Stokke, A. (2018). Lying and Insincerity (1ed.). Oxford University Press
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Lying and Insincerity
2018 (English)Book (Refereed)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford University Press, 2018 Edition: 1
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-378971 (URN)9780198825968 (ISBN)9780191865022 (ISBN)
Available from: 2019-03-11 Created: 2019-03-11 Last updated: 2019-05-08Bibliographically approved
Stokke, A. (Ed.). (2018). Lying:: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics. Oxford University Press
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Lying:: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics
2018 (English)Collection (editor) (Refereed)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford University Press, 2018
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-378969 (URN)9780198743965 (ISBN)
Available from: 2019-03-11 Created: 2019-03-11 Last updated: 2019-08-21Bibliographically approved
Stokke, A. (2018). Lying, Sincerity, and Quality. In: Meibauer, Jörg (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying: . Oxford University Press
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Lying, Sincerity, and Quality
2018 (English)In: The Oxford Handbook of Lying / [ed] Meibauer, Jörg, Oxford University Press, 2018Chapter in book (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This chapter considers various ways of theorizing about lying from the point of view of Gricean Quality maxims. It first discusses attempts to characterize lying as a violation of the First Maxim of Quality and then turns to views of lying in terms of the supermaxim of Quality. The chapter suggests that both these types of view on lying give the wrong results on non-deceptive lies, the difference between lies and ironic statements, and the difference between lying and misleading. The chapter finishes by considering the view that lies are insincere assertion in relation to the Gricean view that Quality maxims have a special status in relation to the other maxims and the Cooperative Principle.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford University Press, 2018
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-379063 (URN)10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.10 (DOI)9780198736578 (ISBN)
Available from: 2019-03-11 Created: 2019-03-11 Last updated: 2019-09-11Bibliographically approved
Stokke, A. & Fallis, D. (2017). Bullshitting, Lying, and Indifference Toward Truth. Ergo - An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 4, 277-309
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Bullshitting, Lying, and Indifference Toward Truth
2017 (English)In: Ergo - An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0014-0171, E-ISSN 2330-4014, Vol. 4, p. 277-309Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper is about some of the ways in which people sometimes speak while being indifferent toward what they say. We argue that what Harry Frankfurt called 'bullshitting' is a mode of speech marked by indifference toward inquiry, the cooperative project of reaching truth in discourse. On this view bullshitting is characterized by indifference toward the project of advancing inquiry by making progress on specific subinquiries, represented by so-called questions under discussion. This account preserves the central insight of Frankfurt's influential analysis of bullshitting in seeing the characteristic of bullshitting as indifference toward truth and falsity. Yet we show that speaking with indifference toward truth is a wider phenomenon than the one Frankfurt identified. The account offered in this paper thereby agrees with various critics of Frankfurt who argue that bullshitting is compatible with not being indifferent toward the truth-value of one's assertions. Further, we argue that, while bullshitting and lying are not mutually exclusive, most lies are not instances of bullshitting. The account thereby avoids the problem that Frankfurt's view ultimately is insufficient to adequately distinguish bullshitting and lying.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
MICHIGAN PUBLISHING, 2017
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-372916 (URN)10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.010 (DOI)000453528500010 ()
Available from: 2019-01-10 Created: 2019-01-10 Last updated: 2019-01-10Bibliographically approved
Stokke, A. (2017). Conventional Implicature, Presupposition, and Lying. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 91, 127-147
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Conventional Implicature, Presupposition, and Lying
2017 (English)In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Vol. 91, p. 127-147Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Introduction. Most philosophers agree that lies are assertions.1 In particular, most agree that you lie only if you assert something you believe to be false.2 You can avoid lying if you can avoid asserting disbelieved information. A well-known strategy of cunning disingenuousness is to mislead by asserting something one believes to be true and thereby convey something one believes to be false.

Thinking about the nature of lying, and in particular the important relation between lying and other ways of deceiving with language, therefore involves thinking about what can be asserted by particular utterances.3 In ‘Lucifer’s Logic Lesson: How to Lie with Arguments’, Roy Sorensen tries to expand the canvas by drawing attention to a species of information that is conveyed by a variety of utterances, but which has received relatively little attention in the philosophy of language. This is the category of conventional implicature. Sorensen notes that conventional implicatures are typically thought to be assertions, as opposed to conversational implicatures, one of the chief characteristics of which is that they are not asserted. While conversational implicatures provide the default strategy for misleading while avoiding lying, Sorensen suggests that conventional implicatures will be lies in the right circumstances.

Sorensen is interested in a particular type of construction, namely, the construction P therefore Q. He argues that therefore contributes a conventional implicature to such utterances, and that if what is conventionally implicated is believed to be false by the speaker, she is lying.

Five interrelated claims can be distilled from Sorensen’s (2017) discussion:

(s1) You lie only if you make an assertion (p. 106).

(s2) Conventional implicatures are assertions (p. 110).

(s3) You can lie with conventional implicatures (p. 107).

(s4) P therefore Q conventionally implicates that P implies Q (p. 106).4

(s5) You can lie with P therefore Q (even if you believe P and believe Q) (p. 105).

My plan is as follows. In §ii, I will comment on (s1) and (s2). §§iii–v will be concerned with (s4) and (s5). Finally, §vi will turn to (s3). We will see that there is reason to agree with (s1)–(s3) while disagreeing with (s4)–(s5). In other words, there is reason to agree that conventional implicatures are asserted, and therefore you can lie with conventional implicatures. But I think the case Sorensen focuses on, that of therefore, is ill-chosen. We will see that the evidence suggests that therefore is a presupposition trigger, rather than a conventional implicature trigger. This means that the implication relation conveyed by P therefore Q is presupposed, and not asserted, by utterances of such constructions. Hence, since I agree with (s1), I will reject (s5). I think the relevant examples are not outright lies, although they may be misleading.

National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-379056 (URN)10.1093/arisup/akx004 (DOI)
Available from: 2019-03-11 Created: 2019-03-11 Last updated: 2019-07-17Bibliographically approved
Stokke, A. (2017). Proposing, Pretending, and Propriety: A Response to Don Fallis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95(1)
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Proposing, Pretending, and Propriety: A Response to Don Fallis
2017 (English)In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 95, no 1Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This note responds to criticism put forth by Don Fallis of an account of lying in terms of the Stalnakerian view of assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Fallis objects by presenting an example to show that one can lie even though one does not propose to make what one says common ground. It is argued here that this objection does not present a problem for the view of lying as Stalnakerian assertion. Responding to the objection brings out important features of this view of discourse and of assertion.

National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-379060 (URN)10.1080/00048402.2016.1185739 (DOI)
Available from: 2019-03-11 Created: 2019-03-11 Last updated: 2019-08-07Bibliographically approved
Stokke, A. & Huvenes, T. (2016). Information Centrism and the Nature of Contexts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 94(2), 301-314
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Information Centrism and the Nature of Contexts
2016 (English)In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 94, no 2, p. 301-314Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Information Centrism is the view that contexts consist of information that can be characterized in terms of the propositional attitudes of the conversational participants. Furthermore, it claims that this notion of context is the only one needed for linguistic theorizing about context-sensitive languages. We argue that Information Centrism is false, since it cannot account correctly for facts about truth and reference in certain cases involving indexicals and demonstratives. Consequently, contexts cannot be construed simply as collections of shared information.

National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-379062 (URN)10.1080/00048402.2015.1066833 (DOI)
Available from: 2019-03-11 Created: 2019-03-11 Last updated: 2019-08-07Bibliographically approved
Projects
Representation and Perspective in Language [2014-00737_VR]; Umeå University
Organisations
Identifiers
ORCID iD: ORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0002-7467-7263

Search in DiVA

Show all publications