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In this paper we will argue: (1) that scholars, regardless of their normative stand against or for genetic enhancement indeed have a moral/professional obligation to hold on to a realistic and up-to-date conception of genetic enhancement; (2) that there is an unwarranted hype surrounding the issue of genetic enhancement in general, and gene doping in particular; and (3) that this hype is, at least partly, created due to a simplistic and reductionist conception of genetics often adopted by bioethicists.

Today, certain rule-violating behaviours, such as doping, are considered to be an issue of concern for the sport community. This paper underlines and examines the affective dimensions involved in moral responses to, and attitudes towards, rule-violating behaviours in sport. The key role played by affective processes underlying individual-level moral judgement has already been implicated by recent developments in moral psychological theories, and by neurophysiological studies. However, we propose and discuss the possibility of affective processes operating on a social level which may influence athletes’ individual-level attitudes. We conclude that one-sided focus on individual rule- violating behaviour and individual sanctions may prove to be ineffective in coming to terms with the issue. In this regard we recommend a twofold approach by addressing underlying social dimensions, along with preventive measures through affect-oriented education.

One of the most common arguments in the discussion on doping is that it represents a form of cheating. In this paper, it is argued that common doping-is-cheating arguments based on notions of rule-violation and unfair advantage are inadequate, since they treat cheating as distinct from the structure and the logic of competitive sport. An alternative approach to cheating in sport as regards performance enhancement will be offered based on the ethics of participation in interpersonal relationships. This participatory perspective points towards the need to broaden our conception of agency and moral responsibility in relation to doping, beyond the notion of the individual “drug-cheat” who acts in a vacuum.

In this paper it will be argued that notwithstanding the need for more clear regulative measures in relation to sports physicians’ doping behaviour, the predominant medical/legalistic approach in/by itself is not sufficient, and fails in doing what sports anti-doping authorities whish it to do, i.e., to define and to assign sports physicians’ responsibility in an adequate way. High-performance sport is a form of social practice and sports physicians are an integrated part of the practice. In dealing with such a large-scale social process as high-performance sport, the above approach is lacking since it (a) proceeds from a conception of responsibility which limits the scope of responsibility in athletic settings, and (b) overlooks social aspects of responsibility and responsibility-attributing processes. Furthermore, it will be maintained that responsibility is relational, and as such, it is chiefly created and assigned within the social practice, rather than imposed from authoritative sources that are external to the practice itself. It will be concluded that sports physicians, given their position in relation to athletes and sports management, should actively assume prospective responsibilities beyond those pre- defined responsibilities that are expressed in rules, regulations and policies issued by sports’ governing bodies.