uu.seUppsala universitets publikationer
RefereraExporteraLänk till posten
Permanent länk

Direktlänk
Referera
Referensformat
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Annat format
Fler format
Språk
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Annat språk
Fler språk
Utmatningsformat
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Legal Interpretation and Standards of Proof: Essays in Philosophy of Law and Evidence Law Theory
Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
2020 (Engelska)Doktorsavhandling, sammanläggning (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
Abstract [en]

This dissertation addresses the issues of the indeterminacy of law and judicial discretion in the decision of the quaestio facti. It is composed of four papers:

In the first paper, I develop an account of legal indeterminacy called the ‘systemic indeterminacy’ thesis. This thesis claims that legal indeterminacy and judicial discretion are the results of features of the structure of typical rational legal systems such as interpretative codes with a plurality of interpretative directives, the non-redundancy clause, and the non-liquet rule. 

In the second paper, I criticise two approaches that support the thesis that law ought to ascertain the truth of the quaestio facti: the motivation approach and the legal approach. First, I advance two objections to a version of the motivation approach that I call the ‘behaviour-guidance’ theory. The first objection claims that the appearance of ascertaining the truth is enough to produce the psychological state of compliance. The second objection claims that the indeterminacy of law brings about the impossibility of an ex ante knowledge of the content of the law, thus, the governed cannot gain knowledge of the law’s efforts to ascertain the truth. Second, I explore if the legal approach is plausible. I provide five different legal reasons to support the claim that the law ought to ascertain the truth of the quaestio facti. However, I show that none of these reasons are particularly convincing.

In the third paper, I advance three objections to the idea of reducing the indeterminacy of the standard of proof rules by adding new legal rules for their interpretation. The first objection claims that these interpretative rules, do not provide any guidance to the trier of fact to set the quantum of evidence. The second objection claims that insofar as these interpretative rules are posited in a natural language they are also indeterminate. The third objection claims that these interpretative rules are redundant legal rules.

In the fourth paper, I develop the thesis that standards of proof are competence norms that grant competence to triers of fact to set the quantum of evidence in a case-by-case manner. 

Ort, förlag, år, upplaga, sidor
Uppsala: Department of Philosophy , 2020. , s. 21
Nyckelord [en]
law, legal interpretation, evidence, legal evidence, proof, philosophy of law, legal theory, general jurisprudence, standards of proof, philosophy, legal reasoning, evidential reasoning
Nationell ämneskategori
Juridik Filosofi
Forskningsämne
Filosofi
Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-402713ISBN: 978-91-506-2804-3 (tryckt)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-402713DiVA, id: diva2:1387224
Disputation
2020-03-13, sal IV, Universitetshuset, Akademigatan 3, Uppsala, 02:15 (Engelska)
Opponent
Handledare
Projekt
civis sum
Forskningsfinansiär
Knut och Alice Wallenbergs Stiftelse, Dnr KAW 2014.0133Tillgänglig från: 2020-02-20 Skapad: 2020-01-21 Senast uppdaterad: 2020-05-15
Delarbeten
1. Systemic Indeterminacy and Judicial Discretion
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Systemic Indeterminacy and Judicial Discretion
(Engelska)Manuskript (preprint) (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
Abstract [en]

The main claim of this paper is the following: In a typical rational legal system, legal adjudication is necessarily discretional. Discretion is the result of what I call ‘systemic indeterminacy’. Systemic indeterminacy is the thesis that claims that typical rational legal systems that have an interpretative code with more than one interpretative directive and the non-redundancy clause are necessarily indeterminate. Since typical rational legal systems do not have redundant rules a plurality of interpretative directives will necessarily yield a plurality of interpretative results. Due to the non-liquet rule judges are obligated to choose among the different interpretative results provided by the interpretative code. In other words, by building a thesis on legal indeterminacy as the consequence of having a plurality of interpretative directives that necessarily yield different results, I proceed to provide an account of discretion as a necessary feature of legal adjudication.

Nyckelord
legal interpretation - law - indeterminacy - discretion
Nationell ämneskategori
Juridik
Forskningsämne
Filosofi
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-402323 (URN)
Tillgänglig från: 2020-01-14 Skapad: 2020-01-14 Senast uppdaterad: 2020-01-21
2. On Behaviour-guidance, Legal Reasons, and The Ascertainment of the Truth of the Quaestio Facti
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>On Behaviour-guidance, Legal Reasons, and The Ascertainment of the Truth of the Quaestio Facti
(Engelska)Manuskript (preprint) (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
Abstract [en]

In this essay, I advance two objections to the ‘behaviour-guidance’ theory that claims that for the law to motivate the behaviour of the governed, legal systems ought to ascertain the truth of the quaestio facti.  The first objection is based on what can cause the psychological state of being motivated to comply with the content of the law. The core claim is that the appearance of ascertaining the truth is enough to produce the psychological state of compliance. The second objection is based on the indeterminacy of law. It claims that if indeterminacy of law brings about the impossibility of an ex ante knowledge of the content of the law, then the governed cannot gain knowledge of the law’s efforts to ascertain the truth. Thus, the psychological state of compliance cannot be produced. I then provide five different legal reasons to support the claim that the law ought to ascertain the truth of the quaestio facti

Nyckelord
law - truth - interpretation - legal interpretation - indeterminacy - normativity
Nationell ämneskategori
Juridik
Forskningsämne
Filosofi
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-402330 (URN)
Tillgänglig från: 2020-01-14 Skapad: 2020-01-14 Senast uppdaterad: 2020-01-21
3. On Legal Interpretation and Second Order Proof Rules
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>On Legal Interpretation and Second Order Proof Rules
2017 (Engelska)Ingår i: Analisi E Diritto, ISSN 1126-5779, s. 165-184Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper puts forward three critiques of pardo’s second-order proof rules thesis. The rst criticism states that these rules are not suitable to guide the in- terpretation of standards of proof rules because they confuse matters of legal interpretation with matters of epistemology. The second criticism states that sec- ond-order proof rules are affected by the same indeterminacy problems they are designed to resolve, thereby rendering them unsuitable for the task they are purposely designed for. The third criticism renders pardo’s proposal redundant. a reconceptualization of second-order proof rules is offered. 

Ort, förlag, år, upplaga, sidor
Italy: Marcial Pons, 2017
Nationell ämneskategori
Juridik
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-346246 (URN)
Tillgänglig från: 2018-03-15 Skapad: 2018-03-15 Senast uppdaterad: 2020-05-15Bibliografiskt granskad
4. Standards of Proof as Competence Norms
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Standards of Proof as Competence Norms
(Engelska)Manuskript (preprint) (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
Abstract [en]

In this essay, I develop the thesis that standards of proof are competence norms that grant competence to triers of fact to set the quantum of evidence in a case-by-case manner. One of the distinctive features of competence norms is that they provide a procedure for the competence-holder to follow for exercising her competence. However, since standards of proof are legal rules they are necessarily indeterminate -- that is, multiple norms can be ascribed to a standard of proof rule. From a practical perspective, an indeterminate standard of proof suggests that courts choose the quantum of evidence in a case-by-case manner. In other words, the trier of fact exercises discretion when setting the quantum of evidence. That triers of fact exercise discretion when setting the quantum of evidence brings about the following consequence: similar cases can have a different quantum of evidence. 

Nyckelord
law - standards of proof - evidential reasoning - competence norms - legal power - trier of fact - adjudication
Nationell ämneskategori
Juridik
Forskningsämne
Filosofi
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-402331 (URN)
Tillgänglig från: 2020-01-14 Skapad: 2020-01-14 Senast uppdaterad: 2020-01-21

Open Access i DiVA

fulltext(360 kB)377 nedladdningar
Filinformation
Filnamn FULLTEXT01.pdfFilstorlek 360 kBChecksumma SHA-512
7ac1fb208498185a0348a60d615fd532544b73e007cc9a51550978ed624071a0ac6961b5bc7ed81046be181967b35f971c4ea2fdc0acd81af1d42d1283d87426
Typ fulltextMimetyp application/pdf

Personposter BETA

Reyes Molina, Sebastián

Sök vidare i DiVA

Av författaren/redaktören
Reyes Molina, Sebastián
Av organisationen
Filosofiska institutionen
JuridikFilosofi

Sök vidare utanför DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
Totalt: 377 nedladdningar
Antalet nedladdningar är summan av nedladdningar för alla fulltexter. Det kan inkludera t.ex tidigare versioner som nu inte längre är tillgängliga.

isbn
urn-nbn

Altmetricpoäng

isbn
urn-nbn
Totalt: 314 träffar
RefereraExporteraLänk till posten
Permanent länk

Direktlänk
Referera
Referensformat
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Annat format
Fler format
Språk
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Annat språk
Fler språk
Utmatningsformat
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf