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A Zero-Sum Game Framework for Optimal Sensor Placement in Uncertain Networked Control Systems under Cyber-Attacks
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Science and Technology, Mathematics and Computer Science, Department of Information Technology, Division of Systems and Control.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-9316-233X
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Science and Technology, Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering, Signals and Systems.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-9948-4118
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Science and Technology, Mathematics and Computer Science, Department of Information Technology, Division of Systems and Control. Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Science and Technology, Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering, Signals and Systems. Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Science and Technology, Mathematics and Computer Science, Department of Information Technology, Automatic control.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-5491-4068
2022 (English)In: 2022 IEEE 61st Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2022, , p. 8p. 6126-6133Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to address the problem of optimal sensor placement against an adversary in uncertain networked control systems. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game with two players, namely a malicious adversary and a detector. Given a protected performance vertex, we consider a detector, with uncertain system knowledge, that selects another vertex on which to place a sensor and monitors its output with the aim of detecting the presence of the adversary. On the other hand, the adversary, also with uncertain system knowledge, chooses a single vertex and conducts a cyber-attack on its input. The purpose of the adversary is to drive the attack vertex as to maximally disrupt the protected performance vertex while remaining undetected by the detector. As our first contribution, the game payoff of the above-defined zero-sum game is formulated in terms of the Value-at-Risk of the adversary’s impact. However, this game payoff corresponds to an intractable optimization problem. To tackle the problem, we adopt the scenario approach to approximately compute the game payoff. Then, the optimal monitor selection is determined by analyzing the equilibrium of the zero-sum game. The proposed approach is illustrated via a numerical example of a 10-vertex networked control system.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2022. , p. 8p. 6126-6133
Series
Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision & Control, ISSN 0743-1546, E-ISSN 2576-2370
Keywords [en]
Systems and Control (eess.SY), FOS: Electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering
National Category
Control Engineering
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-489467DOI: 10.1109/CDC51059.2022.9992468ISI: 000948128105028ISBN: 978-1-6654-6762-9 (print)ISBN: 978-1-6654-6761-2 (electronic)ISBN: 978-1-6654-6760-5 (electronic)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-489467DiVA, id: diva2:1714862
Conference
2022 IEEE 61st Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 6-9 December 2022, Cancun, Mexico
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2018-04396Swedish Research Council, 2021-06316Swedish Foundation for Strategic ResearchAvailable from: 2022-11-30 Created: 2022-11-30 Last updated: 2023-12-28Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Security Allocation in Networked Control Systems
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Security Allocation in Networked Control Systems
2023 (English)Licentiate thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Sustained use of critical infrastructure, such as electrical power and water distribution networks, requires efficient management and control. Facilitated by the advancements in computational devices and non-proprietary communication technology, such as the Internet, the efficient operation of critical infrastructure relies on network decomposition into interconnected subsystems, thus forming networked control systems. However, the use of public and pervasive communication channels leaves these systems vulnerable to cyber attacks. Consequently, the critical infrastructure is put at risk of suffering operation disruption and even physical damage that would inflict financial costs as well as pose a hazard to human health. Therefore, security is crucial to the sustained efficient operation of critical infrastructure. This thesis develops a framework for evaluating and improving the security of networked control systems in the face of cyberattacks. The considered security problem involves two strategic agents, namely a malicious adversary and a defender, pursuing their specific and conflicting goals. The defender aims to efficiently allocate defense resources with the purpose of detecting malicious activities. Meanwhile, the malicious adversary simultaneously conducts cyber attacks and remains stealthy to the defender. We tackle the security problem by proposing a game-theoretic framework and characterizing its main components: the payoff function, the action space, and the available information for each agent. Especially, the payoff function is characterized based on the output-to-output gain security metric that fully explores the worst-case attack impact. Then, we investigate the properties of the game and how to efficiently compute its equilibrium. Given the combinatorial nature of the defender’s actions, one important challenge is to alleviate the computational burden. To overcome this challenge, the thesis contributes several system- and graph-theoretic conditions that enable the defender to shrink the action space, efficiently allocating the defense resources. The effectiveness of the proposed framework is validated through numerical examples. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2023. p. 79
Series
Information technology licentiate theses: Licentiate theses from the Department of Information Technology, ISSN 1404-5117 ; 2023-003
National Category
Control Engineering
Research subject
Electrical Engineering with specialization in Automatic Control
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-518890 (URN)
Presentation
2023-10-13, Uppsala, 10:15 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2024-01-31 Created: 2023-12-28 Last updated: 2024-01-31Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

The full text will be freely available from 2025-01-10 11:31
Available from 2025-01-10 11:31

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Authority records

Nguyen, Anh TungAnand, Sribalaji C.Teixeira, André M. H.

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