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A Zero-Sum Game Framework for Optimal Sensor Placement in Uncertain Networked Control Systems under Cyber-Attacks
Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Matematisk-datavetenskapliga sektionen, Institutionen för informationsteknologi, Avdelningen för systemteknik.ORCID-id: 0000-0001-9316-233X
Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Tekniska sektionen, Institutionen för elektroteknik, Signaler och system.ORCID-id: 0000-0002-9948-4118
Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Matematisk-datavetenskapliga sektionen, Institutionen för informationsteknologi, Avdelningen för systemteknik. Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Tekniska sektionen, Institutionen för elektroteknik, Signaler och system. Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Matematisk-datavetenskapliga sektionen, Institutionen för informationsteknologi, Reglerteknik.ORCID-id: 0000-0001-5491-4068
2022 (engelsk)Inngår i: 2022 IEEE 61st Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2022, , s. 8s. 6126-6133Konferansepaper, Publicerat paper (Fagfellevurdert)
Abstract [en]

This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to address the problem of optimal sensor placement against an adversary in uncertain networked control systems. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game with two players, namely a malicious adversary and a detector. Given a protected performance vertex, we consider a detector, with uncertain system knowledge, that selects another vertex on which to place a sensor and monitors its output with the aim of detecting the presence of the adversary. On the other hand, the adversary, also with uncertain system knowledge, chooses a single vertex and conducts a cyber-attack on its input. The purpose of the adversary is to drive the attack vertex as to maximally disrupt the protected performance vertex while remaining undetected by the detector. As our first contribution, the game payoff of the above-defined zero-sum game is formulated in terms of the Value-at-Risk of the adversary’s impact. However, this game payoff corresponds to an intractable optimization problem. To tackle the problem, we adopt the scenario approach to approximately compute the game payoff. Then, the optimal monitor selection is determined by analyzing the equilibrium of the zero-sum game. The proposed approach is illustrated via a numerical example of a 10-vertex networked control system.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2022. , s. 8s. 6126-6133
Serie
Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision & Control, ISSN 0743-1546, E-ISSN 2576-2370
Emneord [en]
Systems and Control (eess.SY), FOS: Electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-489467DOI: 10.1109/CDC51059.2022.9992468ISI: 000948128105028ISBN: 978-1-6654-6762-9 (tryckt)ISBN: 978-1-6654-6761-2 (digital)ISBN: 978-1-6654-6760-5 (digital)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-489467DiVA, id: diva2:1714862
Konferanse
2022 IEEE 61st Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 6-9 December 2022, Cancun, Mexico
Forskningsfinansiär
Swedish Research Council, 2018-04396Swedish Research Council, 2021-06316Swedish Foundation for Strategic ResearchTilgjengelig fra: 2022-11-30 Laget: 2022-11-30 Sist oppdatert: 2023-12-28bibliografisk kontrollert
Inngår i avhandling
1. Security Allocation in Networked Control Systems
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Security Allocation in Networked Control Systems
2023 (engelsk)Licentiatavhandling, med artikler (Annet vitenskapelig)
Abstract [en]

Sustained use of critical infrastructure, such as electrical power and water distribution networks, requires efficient management and control. Facilitated by the advancements in computational devices and non-proprietary communication technology, such as the Internet, the efficient operation of critical infrastructure relies on network decomposition into interconnected subsystems, thus forming networked control systems. However, the use of public and pervasive communication channels leaves these systems vulnerable to cyber attacks. Consequently, the critical infrastructure is put at risk of suffering operation disruption and even physical damage that would inflict financial costs as well as pose a hazard to human health. Therefore, security is crucial to the sustained efficient operation of critical infrastructure. This thesis develops a framework for evaluating and improving the security of networked control systems in the face of cyberattacks. The considered security problem involves two strategic agents, namely a malicious adversary and a defender, pursuing their specific and conflicting goals. The defender aims to efficiently allocate defense resources with the purpose of detecting malicious activities. Meanwhile, the malicious adversary simultaneously conducts cyber attacks and remains stealthy to the defender. We tackle the security problem by proposing a game-theoretic framework and characterizing its main components: the payoff function, the action space, and the available information for each agent. Especially, the payoff function is characterized based on the output-to-output gain security metric that fully explores the worst-case attack impact. Then, we investigate the properties of the game and how to efficiently compute its equilibrium. Given the combinatorial nature of the defender’s actions, one important challenge is to alleviate the computational burden. To overcome this challenge, the thesis contributes several system- and graph-theoretic conditions that enable the defender to shrink the action space, efficiently allocating the defense resources. The effectiveness of the proposed framework is validated through numerical examples. 

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2023. s. 79
Serie
IT licentiate theses / Uppsala University, Department of Information Technology, ISSN 1404-5117 ; 2023-003
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
Elektroteknik med inriktning mot reglerteknik
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-518890 (URN)
Presentation
2023-10-13, Uppsala, 10:15 (engelsk)
Opponent
Veileder
Tilgjengelig fra: 2024-01-31 Laget: 2023-12-28 Sist oppdatert: 2024-01-31bibliografisk kontrollert

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Nguyen, Anh TungAnand, Sribalaji C.Teixeira, André M. H.

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