uu.seUppsala universitets publikasjoner
Endre søk
RefereraExporteraLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Referera
Referensformat
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Annet format
Fler format
Språk
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Annet språk
Fler språk
Utmatningsformat
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Voluntary Action and Rational Sin in Anselm of Canterbury
Uppsala universitet, Humanistisk-samhällsvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Historisk-filosofiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen, Avdelningen för teoretisk filosofi.ORCID-id: 0000-0002-1194-4141
2016 (engelsk)Inngår i: British Journal for the History of Philosophy, ISSN 0960-8788, E-ISSN 1469-3526, Vol. 24, nr 2, s. 215-230Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert) Published
Abstract [en]

Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) holds that freedom of the will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. This condition, however, turns out to be trivially fulfilled by all rational creatures at all times. In order to clarify the necessary conditions for moral responsibility, we must look more widely at his discussion of the nature of the will and of willed action. In this paper, I examine his theory of voluntariness by clarifying his account of the sin of Satan in De casu diaboli. Anselm agrees with Augustine that the sinful act cannot be given a causal explanation in terms of a distinct preceding act of will or desire or choice. He thus rejects volitionalist accounts of Satan's sin and thus of voluntary action in general. He moves beyond his predecessor, however, in insisting on the necessity of an explanation in terms of reasons, and his theory of the dual nature of the rational will is designed to meet this demand. A comparison of Satan's case with the case of the miser of De casu diaboli 3, finally, shows that Anselm's account requires that acts of the will or ‘willings’ qualify as voluntary, a suggestion as interesting as problematic.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
2016. Vol. 24, nr 2, s. 215-230
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-287366DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2015.1057687ISI: 000372840300003OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-287366DiVA, id: diva2:922645
Tilgjengelig fra: 2016-04-24 Laget: 2016-04-24 Sist oppdatert: 2017-11-30bibliografisk kontrollert

Open Access i DiVA

Fulltekst mangler i DiVA

Andre lenker

Forlagets fulltekst

Personposter BETA

Ekenberg, Tomas

Søk i DiVA

Av forfatter/redaktør
Ekenberg, Tomas
Av organisasjonen
I samme tidsskrift
British Journal for the History of Philosophy

Søk utenfor DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

doi
urn-nbn

Altmetric

doi
urn-nbn
Totalt: 279 treff
RefereraExporteraLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Referera
Referensformat
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association
  • vancouver
  • Annet format
Fler format
Språk
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Annet språk
Fler språk
Utmatningsformat
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf