In this article, I maintain that legal positivism leaves some room for the idea of objectivity in the determination of the law, though not as much as one might think. More specifically, I maintain that on a legal positivist analysis we can attain legal objectivity at the level of the sources of law, though not at the level of interpretation and application of the law. The reason, I argue, is (i) that the identification of the legal raw material at the level of the sources of law is a purely factual matter, whereas the interpretation and application of this raw material often involves moral reasoning; and (ii) that reasoning about factual matters can be, and usually is, objective, whereas it seems that moral reasoning cannot be. This means, inter alia, that I reject the notion – entertained by Joseph Raz, among others – that the so-called strong social thesis applies to the level of interpretation and application of the law as well as to the level of the sources of law.