In this chapter, the author highlights some efforts to approach the issue of functional neuro-imaging and its possible threat to privacy in the neuroethics literature. Two main approaches or strategies are usually used in the discussion: the first strategy consists in a description and discussion of what neuro-imaging can and cannot do with a focus on the technical and methodological problems that bedevil the technology. The second strategy focuses on the metaphysical assumptions about the mind underlying concerns on the subject of neuro-imaging and mental privacy. Sometimes these two strategies are used jointly. There is a third strategy, less common in the neuroethics literature, that brackets technical, methodological, and metaphysical issues to put the focus on the discussion of normative questions. The questions raised are: why would neuroimaging’s impinging on privacy be problematic? What is valuable about mental privacy? Would it be morally undesirable to have less of it? My main aim is to outline the first two strategies clarifying their implications for the privacy debate, and then focus more on the third. I end by proposing to expand the normative discussion to incorporate some of the issues raised by a recent account of privacy as contextual integrity.