Self-screening Effects of Monitoring: Evidence from a Quasi Experiment in the Swedish Temporary Parental Benefit Program
2018 (English)In: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, ISSN 0305-9049, E-ISSN 1468-0084, Vol. 80, no 5, p. 893-904Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]
Monitoring and screening have been shown to be important to reduce moral hazard in social insurances. This paper empirically investigates whether monitoring in the Swedish temporary parental benefit program affects future benefit take-up. Identification is based on the fact that parents' benefit applications are monitored randomly by the insurer. The estimation results show that parents who are monitored are less likely to apply again in the near future.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2018. Vol. 80, no 5, p. 893-904
National Category
Probability Theory and Statistics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-364169DOI: 10.1111/obes.12230ISI: 000443403200002OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-364169DiVA, id: diva2:1259487
2018-10-302018-10-302018-11-16Bibliographically approved