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Intergovernmental Grants and Bureaucratic Power
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
Uppsala University, Units outside the University, Office of Labour Market Policy Evaluation. IFAU.
2008 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

In their role as agenda setters and implementers of political decisions, bureaucrats potentially have the power to influence decisions in their own favor. It is however difficult to empirically test whether bureaucrats actually are involved in such actions. In this paper we suggest and apply a new way of testing the hypothesis that bureaucrats can and do in fact affect policy to their own benefit. Making use of a discontinuity in the Swedish grant system, we estimate causal effects of intergovernmental grants on different types of personnel employed by the local governments. On the margin, we find a large, positive effect of grants on the number of bureaucrats in the central administration, but no effects on the number of personnel in other important sectors run

by the local government (child care, schools and elderly care). These results support the

view that bureaucrats are able to, and do indeed, affect the allocation of grants within

municipalities to support own goals.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Department of Economics, Uppsala University , 2008. , p. 34
Series
Working paper / Department of Economics, Uppsala University (Online), ISSN 1653-6975 ; 2008:12
Keywords [en]
Fiscal federalism, grants, bureaucrats, rent seeking, discontinuity analysis
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-86712OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-86712DiVA, id: diva2:127031
Available from: 2008-12-09 Created: 2008-11-28 Last updated: 2013-06-26Bibliographically approved

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Dahlberg, MatzMörk, Eva

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CiteExportLink to record
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Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
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Output format
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