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Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Ethics and Social Philosophy.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-9566-8374
2016 (English)In: Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals / [ed] Martin Grajner and Pedro Schmechtig, Germany: Walter de Gruyter, 2016, p. 95-114Chapter in book (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This chapter addresses an ambiguity in some of the literature on rational peer disagreement about the use of the term 'rational'. In the literature 'rational' is used to describe a variety of normative statuses related to reasons, justification, and reasoning. This chapter focuses most closely on the upshot of peer disagreement for what is rationally required of parties to a peer disagreement. This follows recent work in theoretical reason which treats rationality as a system of requirements among an agent's mental states. It is argued that peer disagreement has either no, or a very limited, affect on what rationality requires of an agent in a given circumstance. This is in part because of difficulties generated by a novel example of evidence of evidence of p being evidence against p. This example calls into question the mechanisms whereby peer disagreement might affect what is rationally required of an agent. The chapter also reevaluates the importance of actual peer disagreement against the backdrop of prior expectations about whether disagreement is believed to be likely, arguing that peer disagreement is most likely to change what is rationally required of an agent when it is believed to be unlikely.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Germany: Walter de Gruyter, 2016. p. 95-114
Keywords [en]
Peer disagreement, rational requirements, evidence, evidence of evidence, reasons for belief, theoretical rationality, rationality, theoretical reaosn
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-379105ISBN: 978-3-11-049676-5 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-379105DiVA, id: diva2:1295495
Available from: 2019-03-11 Created: 2019-03-11 Last updated: 2019-03-13Bibliographically approved

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Reisner, Andrew

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CiteExportLink to record
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  • apa
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