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Neurocognitive processes underlying heuristic and normative probability judgments
Umea Univ, Dept Psychol, SE-90187 Umea, Sweden.
Umea Univ, Dept Integrat Med Biol, Umea, Sweden;Umea Univ, Umea Ctr Funct Brain Imaging, Umea, Sweden.
Umea Univ, Dept Psychol, SE-90187 Umea, Sweden;Umea Univ, Dept Integrat Med Biol, Umea, Sweden;Umea Univ, Umea Ctr Funct Brain Imaging, Umea, Sweden.
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
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2020 (English)In: Cognition, ISSN 0010-0277, E-ISSN 1873-7838, Vol. 196, article id 104153Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Judging two events in combination (A&B) as more probable than one of the events (A) is known as a conjunction fallacy. According to dual-process explanations of human judgment and decision making, the fallacy is due to the application of a heuristic, associative cognitive process. Avoiding the fallacy has been suggested to require the recruitment of a separate process that can apply normative rules. We investigated these assumptions using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during conjunction tasks. Judgments, whether correct or not, engaged a network of brain regions identical to that engaged during similarity judgments. Avoidance of the conjunction fallacy additionally, and uniquely, involved a fronto-parietal network previously linked to supervisory, analytic control processes. The results lend credibility to the idea that incorrect probability judgments are the result of a representativeness heuristic that requires additional neurocognitive resources to avoid.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
ELSEVIER , 2020. Vol. 196, article id 104153
Keywords [en]
Decision making, Dual-system, Dual-process, fMRI, Representativeness
National Category
Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-408111DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2019.104153ISI: 000518704700021PubMedID: 31838247OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-408111DiVA, id: diva2:1421682
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 421-2009-2348Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, M14-0375:1Available from: 2020-04-04 Created: 2020-04-04 Last updated: 2020-04-04Bibliographically approved

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