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A Single-Adversary-Single-Detector Zero-Sum Game in Networked Control Systems
Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Matematisk-datavetenskapliga sektionen, Institutionen för informationsteknologi, Avdelningen för systemteknik.
Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Matematisk-datavetenskapliga sektionen, Institutionen för informationsteknologi, Avdelningen för systemteknik.ORCID-id: 0000-0001-5491-4068
Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Matematisk-datavetenskapliga sektionen, Institutionen för informationsteknologi, Avdelningen för systemteknik.ORCID-id: 0000-0002-6608-250x
2022 (engelsk)Inngår i: IFAC-PapersOnLine, E-ISSN 2405-8963, Vol. 55, nr 13, s. 49-54Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to address the problem of optimal sensor placement for detecting cyber-attacks in networked control systems. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game with two players, namely a malicious adversary and a detector. Given a protected target vertex, the detector places a sensor at a single vertex to monitor the system and detect the presence of the adversary. On the other hand, the adversary selects a single vertex through which to conduct a cyber-attack that maximally disrupts the target vertex while remaining undetected by the detector. As our first contribution, for a given pair of attack and monitor vertices and a known target vertex, the game payoff function is defined as the output-to-output gain of the respective system. Then, the paper characterizes the set of feasible actions by the detector that ensures bounded values of the game payoff. Finally, an algebraic sufficient condition is proposed to examine whether a given vertex belongs to the set of feasible monitor vertices. The optimal sensor placement is then determined by computing the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game through linear programming. The approach is illustrated via a numerical example of a 10-vertex networked control system with a given target vertex.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
Elsevier, 2022. Vol. 55, nr 13, s. 49-54
Emneord [en]
Cyber-physical security, networked control systems, game theory
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-485955DOI: 10.1016/j.ifacol.2022.07.234ISI: 000852734000009OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-485955DiVA, id: diva2:1700407
Konferanse
9th IFAC Conference on Networked Systems (NECSYS), JUL 05-07, 2022, Zurich, Switzerland
Forskningsfinansiär
Swedish Research Council, 2018-04396Swedish Research Council, 2021-06316Swedish Foundation for Strategic ResearchTilgjengelig fra: 2022-09-30 Laget: 2022-09-30 Sist oppdatert: 2023-12-28bibliografisk kontrollert
Inngår i avhandling
1. Security Allocation in Networked Control Systems
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Security Allocation in Networked Control Systems
2023 (engelsk)Licentiatavhandling, med artikler (Annet vitenskapelig)
Abstract [en]

Sustained use of critical infrastructure, such as electrical power and water distribution networks, requires efficient management and control. Facilitated by the advancements in computational devices and non-proprietary communication technology, such as the Internet, the efficient operation of critical infrastructure relies on network decomposition into interconnected subsystems, thus forming networked control systems. However, the use of public and pervasive communication channels leaves these systems vulnerable to cyber attacks. Consequently, the critical infrastructure is put at risk of suffering operation disruption and even physical damage that would inflict financial costs as well as pose a hazard to human health. Therefore, security is crucial to the sustained efficient operation of critical infrastructure. This thesis develops a framework for evaluating and improving the security of networked control systems in the face of cyberattacks. The considered security problem involves two strategic agents, namely a malicious adversary and a defender, pursuing their specific and conflicting goals. The defender aims to efficiently allocate defense resources with the purpose of detecting malicious activities. Meanwhile, the malicious adversary simultaneously conducts cyber attacks and remains stealthy to the defender. We tackle the security problem by proposing a game-theoretic framework and characterizing its main components: the payoff function, the action space, and the available information for each agent. Especially, the payoff function is characterized based on the output-to-output gain security metric that fully explores the worst-case attack impact. Then, we investigate the properties of the game and how to efficiently compute its equilibrium. Given the combinatorial nature of the defender’s actions, one important challenge is to alleviate the computational burden. To overcome this challenge, the thesis contributes several system- and graph-theoretic conditions that enable the defender to shrink the action space, efficiently allocating the defense resources. The effectiveness of the proposed framework is validated through numerical examples. 

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2023. s. 79
Serie
IT licentiate theses / Uppsala University, Department of Information Technology, ISSN 1404-5117 ; 2023-003
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
Elektroteknik med inriktning mot reglerteknik
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-518890 (URN)
Presentation
2023-10-13, Uppsala, 10:15 (engelsk)
Opponent
Veileder
Tilgjengelig fra: 2024-01-31 Laget: 2023-12-28 Sist oppdatert: 2024-01-31bibliografisk kontrollert

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Nguyen, Anh TungTeixeira, AndréMedvedev, Alexander

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