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Optimal Detector Placement in Networked Control Systems under Cyber-attacks with Applications to Power Networks
Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Matematisk-datavetenskapliga sektionen, Institutionen för informationsteknologi, Avdelningen för systemteknik. Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Matematisk-datavetenskapliga sektionen, Institutionen för informationsteknologi, Reglerteknik.ORCID-id: 0000-0001-9316-233X
Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Tekniska sektionen, Institutionen för elektroteknik, Signaler och system.ORCID-id: 0000-0002-9948-4118
Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Matematisk-datavetenskapliga sektionen, Institutionen för informationsteknologi, Avdelningen för systemteknik. Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Tekniska sektionen, Institutionen för elektroteknik, Signaler och system. Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Matematisk-datavetenskapliga sektionen, Institutionen för informationsteknologi, Reglerteknik.ORCID-id: 0000-0001-5491-4068
Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Matematisk-datavetenskapliga sektionen, Institutionen för informationsteknologi, Reglerteknik. Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Matematisk-datavetenskapliga sektionen, Institutionen för informationsteknologi, Avdelningen för systemteknik.ORCID-id: 0000-0002-6608-250x
2023 (engelsk)Konferansepaper, Publicerat paper (Fagfellevurdert)
Abstract [en]

This paper proposes a game-theoretic method to address the problem of optimal detector placement in a networked control system under cyber-attacks. The networked control system is composed of interconnected agents where each agent is regulated by its local controller over unprotected communication, which leaves the system vulnerable to malicious cyber-attacks. To guarantee a given local performance, the defender optimally selects a single agent on which to place a detector at its local controller with the purpose of detecting cyber-attacks. On the other hand, an adversary optimally chooses a single agent on which to conduct a cyber-attack on its input with the aim of maximally worsening the local performance while remaining stealthy to the defender. First, we present a necessary and sufficient condition to ensure that the maximal attack impact on the local performance is bounded, which restricts the possible actions of the defender to a subset of available agents. Then, by considering the maximal attack impact on the local performance as a game payoff, we cast the problem of finding optimal actions of the defender and the adversary as a zero-sum game. Finally, with the possible action sets of the defender and the adversary, an algorithm is devoted to determining the Nash equilibria of the zero-sum game that yield the optimal detector placement. The proposed method is illustrated on an IEEE benchmark for power systems.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
Elsevier, 2023. s. 1820-1826
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-518875DOI: 10.1016/j.ifacol.2023.10.1896OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-518875DiVA, id: diva2:1822769
Konferanse
22nd IFAC World Congress: Yokohama, Japan, July 9-14, 2023
Tilgjengelig fra: 2023-12-27 Laget: 2023-12-27 Sist oppdatert: 2024-01-10bibliografisk kontrollert
Inngår i avhandling
1. Security Allocation in Networked Control Systems
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Security Allocation in Networked Control Systems
2023 (engelsk)Licentiatavhandling, med artikler (Annet vitenskapelig)
Abstract [en]

Sustained use of critical infrastructure, such as electrical power and water distribution networks, requires efficient management and control. Facilitated by the advancements in computational devices and non-proprietary communication technology, such as the Internet, the efficient operation of critical infrastructure relies on network decomposition into interconnected subsystems, thus forming networked control systems. However, the use of public and pervasive communication channels leaves these systems vulnerable to cyber attacks. Consequently, the critical infrastructure is put at risk of suffering operation disruption and even physical damage that would inflict financial costs as well as pose a hazard to human health. Therefore, security is crucial to the sustained efficient operation of critical infrastructure. This thesis develops a framework for evaluating and improving the security of networked control systems in the face of cyberattacks. The considered security problem involves two strategic agents, namely a malicious adversary and a defender, pursuing their specific and conflicting goals. The defender aims to efficiently allocate defense resources with the purpose of detecting malicious activities. Meanwhile, the malicious adversary simultaneously conducts cyber attacks and remains stealthy to the defender. We tackle the security problem by proposing a game-theoretic framework and characterizing its main components: the payoff function, the action space, and the available information for each agent. Especially, the payoff function is characterized based on the output-to-output gain security metric that fully explores the worst-case attack impact. Then, we investigate the properties of the game and how to efficiently compute its equilibrium. Given the combinatorial nature of the defender’s actions, one important challenge is to alleviate the computational burden. To overcome this challenge, the thesis contributes several system- and graph-theoretic conditions that enable the defender to shrink the action space, efficiently allocating the defense resources. The effectiveness of the proposed framework is validated through numerical examples. 

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2023. s. 79
Serie
IT licentiate theses / Uppsala University, Department of Information Technology, ISSN 1404-5117 ; 2023-003
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
Elektroteknik med inriktning mot reglerteknik
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-518890 (URN)
Presentation
2023-10-13, Uppsala, 10:15 (engelsk)
Opponent
Veileder
Tilgjengelig fra: 2024-01-31 Laget: 2023-12-28 Sist oppdatert: 2024-01-31bibliografisk kontrollert

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Nguyen, Anh TungCoimbatore Anand, SribalajiTeixeira, AndréMedvedev, Alexander

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