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Security Allocation in Networked Control Systems under Stealthy Attacks
Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Matematisk-datavetenskapliga sektionen, Institutionen för informationsteknologi, Avdelningen för systemteknik. Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Matematisk-datavetenskapliga sektionen, Institutionen för informationsteknologi, Reglerteknik.ORCID-id: 0000-0001-9316-233X
Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Tekniska sektionen, Institutionen för elektroteknik, Signaler och system. Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Matematisk-datavetenskapliga sektionen, Institutionen för informationsteknologi, Reglerteknik. Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Matematisk-datavetenskapliga sektionen, Institutionen för informationsteknologi, Avdelningen för systemteknik.ORCID-id: 0000-0001-5491-4068
Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Matematisk-datavetenskapliga sektionen, Institutionen för informationsteknologi, Reglerteknik. Uppsala universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga vetenskapsområdet, Matematisk-datavetenskapliga sektionen, Institutionen för informationsteknologi, Avdelningen för systemteknik.ORCID-id: 0000-0002-6608-250x
(engelsk)Manuskript (preprint) (Annet vitenskapelig)
Abstract [en]

This paper considers the problem of security allocation in a networked control system under stealthy attacks in which the system is comprised of interconnected subsystems represented by vertices. A malicious adversary selects a single vertex on which to conduct a stealthy data injection attack to maximally disrupt the local performance while remaining undetected. On the other hand, a defender selects several vertices on which to allocate defense resources against the adversary. First, the objectives of the adversary and the defender with uncertain targets are formulated in probabilistic ways, resulting in an expected worst-case impact of stealthy attacks. Next, we provide a graph-theoretic necessary and sufficient condition under which the cost for the defender and the expected worst-case impact of stealthy attacks are bounded. This condition enables the defender to restrict the admissible actions to a subset of available vertex sets. Then, we cast the problem of security allocation in a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework. Finally, the contribution of this paper is highlighted by utilizing the proposed admissible actions of the defender in the context of large-scale networks. A numerical example of a 50-vertex networked control system is presented to validate the obtained results.

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Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-522013OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-522013DiVA, id: diva2:1833040
Tilgjengelig fra: 2024-01-31 Laget: 2024-01-31 Sist oppdatert: 2024-04-15bibliografisk kontrollert
Inngår i avhandling
1. Security Allocation in Networked Control Systems
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Security Allocation in Networked Control Systems
2023 (engelsk)Licentiatavhandling, med artikler (Annet vitenskapelig)
Abstract [en]

Sustained use of critical infrastructure, such as electrical power and water distribution networks, requires efficient management and control. Facilitated by the advancements in computational devices and non-proprietary communication technology, such as the Internet, the efficient operation of critical infrastructure relies on network decomposition into interconnected subsystems, thus forming networked control systems. However, the use of public and pervasive communication channels leaves these systems vulnerable to cyber attacks. Consequently, the critical infrastructure is put at risk of suffering operation disruption and even physical damage that would inflict financial costs as well as pose a hazard to human health. Therefore, security is crucial to the sustained efficient operation of critical infrastructure. This thesis develops a framework for evaluating and improving the security of networked control systems in the face of cyberattacks. The considered security problem involves two strategic agents, namely a malicious adversary and a defender, pursuing their specific and conflicting goals. The defender aims to efficiently allocate defense resources with the purpose of detecting malicious activities. Meanwhile, the malicious adversary simultaneously conducts cyber attacks and remains stealthy to the defender. We tackle the security problem by proposing a game-theoretic framework and characterizing its main components: the payoff function, the action space, and the available information for each agent. Especially, the payoff function is characterized based on the output-to-output gain security metric that fully explores the worst-case attack impact. Then, we investigate the properties of the game and how to efficiently compute its equilibrium. Given the combinatorial nature of the defender’s actions, one important challenge is to alleviate the computational burden. To overcome this challenge, the thesis contributes several system- and graph-theoretic conditions that enable the defender to shrink the action space, efficiently allocating the defense resources. The effectiveness of the proposed framework is validated through numerical examples. 

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2023. s. 79
Serie
IT licentiate theses / Uppsala University, Department of Information Technology, ISSN 1404-5117 ; 2023-003
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
Elektroteknik med inriktning mot reglerteknik
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-518890 (URN)
Presentation
2023-10-13, Uppsala, 10:15 (engelsk)
Opponent
Veileder
Tilgjengelig fra: 2024-01-31 Laget: 2023-12-28 Sist oppdatert: 2024-01-31bibliografisk kontrollert

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Nguyen, Anh TungTeixeira, André M. H.Medvedev, Alexander

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