uu.seUppsala University Publications
Change search
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Where's the disagreement?: The significance of the ordinary in Austin and Ayer
Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics.
2016 (English)In: Language & Communication, ISSN 0271-5309, E-ISSN 1873-3395, Vol. 49, 45-55 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

J. L Austin is commonly known as an 'ordinary language philosopher'. Ordinary language philosophy, in turn, is generally known as a philosophy of language which employs everyday language as a standard of correctness - an arbiter between meaningful speech and nonsense. By means of a return to the somewhat heated debate between Austin and A. J. Ayer, this paper challenges this picture. I argue that if there is one philosophical tradition that encourages us to turn 'ordinary language' into a problem for philosophy, it is ordinary language philosophy. There is no simple instruction of the form 'If you are philosophically troubled, then turn to ordinary language and you will see the true sense' coming out of Austin's work (rightly construed).

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. Vol. 49, 45-55 p.
Keyword [en]
J. L Austin, A. J. Ayer, Ordinary language philosophy, Meaning, Ordinary language, Philosophical language
National Category
Philosophy General Language Studies and Linguistics
URN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-304529DOI: 10.1016/j.langcom.2016.06.003ISI: 000381532500004OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-304529DiVA: diva2:1034525
Available from: 2016-10-12 Created: 2016-10-06 Last updated: 2016-10-12Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text

Other links

Publisher's full text

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Forsberg, Niklas
By organisation
Logic and Metaphysics
In the same journal
Language & Communication
PhilosophyGeneral Language Studies and Linguistics

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

Altmetric score

ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link