Naturalism, Induction and Laws
2006 (English)In: Science-A Challenge to Philosophy, Peter Lang Pub Inc , 2006, 339- p.Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
It is argued that from a naturalistic viewpoint the problem of justifying induction is no problem because induction is no inference principle but is best understood as a causal process for forming general concepts suitable for stating scientific and other generalisations.The naturalism referred to can be traced back to Aristotle who in Posterior Analytics clearly describes induction not as an inference principle but as concept formation.oc
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Peter Lang Pub Inc , 2006. 339- p.
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-76027ISBN: 3631-54260-7OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-76027DiVA: diva2:103938