The political economy of strategic default: Sweden and the international capital markets, 1810-1830
2016 (English)In: European Review of Economic History, ISSN 1361-4916, E-ISSN 1474-0044, Vol. 20, no 4, 410-428 p., Article in journal (Refereed) Published
This article examines the commitment mechanisms which guided sovereign borrowing
during the Napoleonic Wars by analyzing Sweden’s default on its external debt in 1812.
The default was driven by internal political bargaining concerning the division of
resources, and the availability of subsidies provided by the major European powers.
Thus, the Swedish government and the Diet made strategic choices when deciding which
debts to pay. The reputational mechanisms and the creditors’ attempts to force the
Swedish state to honor its commitments did not work when the government had access
to foreign subsidies.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. Vol. 20, no 4, 410-428 p.,
Research subject History
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-307471DOI: 10.1093/ereh/hew009OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-307471DiVA: diva2:1047040
FunderRiksbankens Jubileumsfond, P2010:60:1