Money for nothing?: Motivation crowding and economic rationality in the vaccination decision.
(English)Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
Vaccines famously possess public goods characteristics that make them vulnerable to the collective action dilemma. Economists have posited a simple way of solving the problem -- economic incentives. However, results from studies on motivation crowding suggest that extrinsic incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivation and therefore backfire. This study investigates if vaccines are subject to motivation crowding using two sets of survey experiments. It is found that in the aggregate, introducing economic incentives has positive effects on vaccination propensity. However, for a subset of highly intrinsically motivated individuals, the effect of introducing economic incentives could be negative. Further, the distinction between pure and impure public goods seems to be driving this dynamic.
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-311019OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-311019DiVA: diva2:1058393