Rationality and the moral significance of emotions
2015 (English)In: Inherent and Instrumental Values: Excursions in Value Inquiry, University Press of America, 2015, 89-99 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
A conventional assumption of traditional moral philosophy is that emotions are irrational forces likely to make us act other than on moral principles. One aspect of this tradition that its followers emphasize is the notion that a moral life is a matter of rational self-sufficiency. Because rationality grounds morality, and emotions are allegedly merely irrational phenomena, they have no positive moral significance. Since the recent renewal of interest in the emotions, however, some philosophers have concerned themselves with morally vindicating the emotions by arguing that under some conditions they can be assessed as rational. This chapter addresses the connection usually made between the moral significance of the emotions and their rational status.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
University Press of America, 2015. 89-99 p.
emotions, rationality, moral status
Research subject Ethics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-317211ISBN: 978-0-7618-6494-3 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-317211DiVA: diva2:1080823