False reforms?: The debate on the IMF’s 2009 reforms of structural lending conditionality and handling of the Greek Crisis
Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
This thesis explores how the International Monetary Fund (IMF) discussed and presented the reforms in its structural conditionality lending framework after the global financial crisis in the spring of 2009. Then briefly, this work presents a short overview of critiques with regard to the contradiction between the IMF structural conditionality reforms in 2009 and the actual IMF’s lending conditions to Greece since the spring of 2010. Thirdly and more extensively, this thesis examines how the IMF responded to the critiques.
In the spring of 2009 the IMF presented the comprehensively reformed structural conditionality lending framework. It included a new stance towards the conditional lending and also concrete reforms such as the elimination of performance criteria and introduction of a new instrument, the FCL. The IMF has, despite the criticism, defended the chosen Greek structural conditionality policy track after the reforms. The IMF’s responses have been coherently defensive.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
The IMF, Structural conditionality, Greece, The IMF criticism
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-317408OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-317408DiVA: diva2:1081470
Guvå, Tomas, Universitetslektor