Legal Positivism, Law's Normativity, and the Normative Force of Legal Justification
2003 (English)In: Ratio Juris, ISSN 1794-6638, Vol. 16, no 4, 469-485 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law’s normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law’s normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow view-point of the study of law’s normativity, it is less attractive than the latter from the broader view-point of the study of the nature of law. I then distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of the normative force of legal justification, and argue that legal positivists may without contradiction embrace the moral conception, and that therefore the analysis of the normative force of legal justification need not be a problem for legal positivists. I conclude that, on the whole, we have reason to prefer legal positivism to natural law theory.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003. Vol. 16, no 4, 469-485 p.
Legal Positivism, normativity of law, legal justification
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-81427DOI: 10.1046/j.0952-1917.2003.00246.xOAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-81427DiVA: diva2:109342