Legal Positivism, Anti-Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes
2003 (English)In: Logic, Law, Morality: Thirteeen Essays in Practical Philosophy in Honour of Lennart Åqvist / [ed] Krister Segerberg and Rysiek Sliwinski, Uppsala: Uppsala University, Department of Philosophy , 2003, 127-145 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
The so-called realist/anti-realist debate cuts through a number of philosophical disciplines, such as the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mathematics, and meta-ethics. In this article, I argue that this debate pertains to jurisprudential matters as well. More specifically, I argue (i) that our position in the semantic realism/anti-realism debate will influence our understanding of the inter-pretive arguments – especially the textual argument – and (what I shall refer to as) the modalities of decision, such as analogy and argumentum e contrario. I also argue (ii) that our current under-standing of these concepts is premised on semantic anti-realism, and that therefore adoption of some sort of semantic realism would entail radical changes in our understanding of these concepts. Finally, I argue (iii) that legal positivists who are also empiricists have reason to accept such anti-realism.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Uppsala University, Department of Philosophy , 2003. 127-145 p.
Uppsala Philosophical Studies / Uppsala University, Department of Philosophy, ISSN 1402-1110 ; 51
Legal Positivism, statutory interpretation, anti-realism, empiricism
Law and Society
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-81431ISBN: 91-506-1672-2OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-81431DiVA: diva2:109346