Norms that Confer Competence
2003 (Swedish)In: Ratio Juris, ISSN 0952-1917, Vol. 16, no 1, 89-104 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
In most, perhaps all, cases a person has a duty or a competence because a norm imposed that duty, or conferred that competence on him. Although competence and duty, on the one hand, and norms that confer competence and impose duties, on the other hand, are closely connected, one can study the concept of competence or duty without studying the norms that confer competence or impose duties. So in what follows, I am going to focus on those norms that confer competence, offering only a brief explanation of the concept of competence itself. The question I am going to consider is whether norms that confer competence should be understood as duty-imposing norms addressed to legal officials, or as special competence norms whose sole function is to confer competence, and which are addressed directly to the competence-holders. I am going to suggest that norms conferring competence are best understood as duty-imposing norms addressed to legal officials, and that so-called competence norms are best understood as fragments of such duty-imposing norms. My argument is that duty-imposing norms but not competence norms are (complete) norms in the sense that they give (complete) reasons for action.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003. Vol. 16, no 1, 89-104 p.
competence, norms, norm-individuation, action-guiding capcity
Law and Society
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-81437DOI: 10.1111/1467-9337.00225OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-81437DiVA: diva2:109352