Legal Theory (Scandinavian Studies in Law, Volume 40, 2000; PeterWahlgren, ed.)
2002 (English)In: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Vol. 88, no 2, 298-304 p.Article, book review (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.)) Published
LEGAL THEORY aims to ”provide interesting material for further discussions concerning legal theory also outside the Scandinavian countries.” The essays are divided into five categories: (1) On the Nature of Law; (2) On Legal Concepts and Legal Principles; (3) On Legal Reasoning; (4) Legal Rules and the Development of the Legal System; and (5) Perspectives on Legal Science. In this review, I consider Jes Bjarup's analysis of Axel Hägerström’s meta-ethical non-cognitivism. In his essay, Bjarup makes several claims. First, he claims that the received view, according to which Hägerström was concerned in his inaugural lecture with meta-ethics and nothing else, is mistaken. According to Bjarup, Hägerström also advanced a thesis in the field of normative ethics, which Bjarup dubs the ideal of self-realization, according to which ”an actual autonomous morality is within us, determined only by direct regard for what we esteem most of all.” ng of its citizens.” Second, he maintains that there is a place for law under Hägerström’s theory. For to pursue the ideal of self-realization, the individual needs a stable social framework, which positive morality cannot provide. Third, he claims that Hägerström’s theory leaves no room for ”substantial normative or ethical inquiries into the law and its application,” nor for legal reasoning conceived as practical reasoning. However, I question all of Bjarup's main claims.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2002. Vol. 88, no 2, 298-304 p.
Jurisprudence, legal theory, Jes Bjarup, Axel Hägerström, non-cognitivism
Law and Society
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-81438OAI: oai:DiVA.org:uu-81438DiVA: diva2:109353